Access Type

Open Access Thesis

Date of Award

January 2014

Degree Type


Degree Name



Computer Science

First Advisor

Daniel Grosu


A major challenging problem for cloud providers is designing efficient mechanisms for

Virtual Machine (VM) provisioning and allocation. Such mechanisms enable the cloud

providers to effectively utilize their available resources and obtain higher profits. Recently,

cloud providers have introduced auction-based models for VM provisioning and allocation

which allow users to submit bids for their requested VMs. We formulate the dynamic

VM provisioning and allocation problem for the auction-based model as an integer program

considering multiple types of resources. We then design truthful greedy and optimal

mechanisms for the problem such that the cloud provider provisions VMs based on the

requests of the winning users and determines their payments. We show that the proposed

mechanisms are truthful, that is, the users do not have incentives to manipulate the system

by lying about their requested bundles of VM instances and their valuations. We perform

extensive experiments using real workload traces in order to investigate the performance

of the proposed mechanisms. Our proposed mechanisms achieve promising results in terms

of revenue for the cloud provider.