Access Type
Open Access Thesis
Date of Award
January 2014
Degree Type
Thesis
Degree Name
M.S.
Department
Computer Science
First Advisor
Daniel Grosu
Abstract
A major challenging problem for cloud providers is designing efficient mechanisms for
Virtual Machine (VM) provisioning and allocation. Such mechanisms enable the cloud
providers to effectively utilize their available resources and obtain higher profits. Recently,
cloud providers have introduced auction-based models for VM provisioning and allocation
which allow users to submit bids for their requested VMs. We formulate the dynamic
VM provisioning and allocation problem for the auction-based model as an integer program
considering multiple types of resources. We then design truthful greedy and optimal
mechanisms for the problem such that the cloud provider provisions VMs based on the
requests of the winning users and determines their payments. We show that the proposed
mechanisms are truthful, that is, the users do not have incentives to manipulate the system
by lying about their requested bundles of VM instances and their valuations. We perform
extensive experiments using real workload traces in order to investigate the performance
of the proposed mechanisms. Our proposed mechanisms achieve promising results in terms
of revenue for the cloud provider.
Recommended Citation
Movahednejad, Mahyar, "Truthful Mechanisms For Resource Allocation And Pricing In Clouds" (2014). Wayne State University Theses. 308.
https://digitalcommons.wayne.edu/oa_theses/308