Access Type

Open Access Dissertation

Date of Award

January 2023

Degree Type

Dissertation

Degree Name

Ph.D.

Department

Philosophy

First Advisor

Jada Strabbing

Abstract

In this dissertation, I offer a novel solution to a contemporary skeptical argument about moral responsibility stemming from actions from ignorance. The skeptics argue that actions are only blameworthy when they are akratic or result from an akratic act. This condition, the skeptics argue, leads to skepticism about moral responsibility. This is because people rarely conceptualize their action as wrong; they are ignorant of some decisive reason not to do that act. Thus, in order to be blameworthy for the wrong act, the person must be blameworthy for the ignorance. But in order to be blameworthy for the ignorance, the skeptics argue, the person must have performed an akratic action which either directly led to the ignorance or foreseeably resulted in the ignorance. Since it seems such actions are rare, it follows that people are rarely blameworthy. I first look at the current responses to the skeptical argument and argue that they all fail. I then propose my own solution to the skeptical argument by identifying an akratic act in desire-motivated belief mismanagement, which generates blameworthiness for the ignorance and the wrong acts that result from it. I then apply my theory to responsibility for implicit biases. It is often said that people are not blameworthy for their implicit biases because we are ignorant of them due to their unconscious nature. I examine empirical literature to challenge the assumption that they are unconscious in a way that is relevant to moral responsibility and argue that the experienced ignorance of them is actually due to desire-motivated belief mismanagement. This means that the ignorance one has of their implicit biases does not exculpate one for their possession or the actions which result from them.

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