Access Type

Open Access Dissertation

Date of Award

January 2022

Degree Type

Dissertation

Degree Name

Ph.D.

Department

Philosophy

First Advisor

John Corvino

Abstract

In this essay, I offer a new defense of abortion. I argue that even if we assume that the fetus is a person with full moral rights abortion is still generally morally permissible. For this argument, I rely on the concept of self-defense, arguing that abortion is morally permissible as a self-defensive action.

In Chapter II, I motivate the personhood assumption by finding and defending the strongest version of Don Marquis’s Future-Like-Ours Argument.

In Chapter III, I argue for the rejection of responsibility arguments in favor of the moral permissibility of abortion – the sort of arguments offered by Judith Jarvis Thomson. I argue that she fails to establish that the two partners who create the fetus lack morally responsibility for its creation.

In Chapter IV, I offer my new defense of abortion, arguing that the burdens of pregnancy and childbirth are significant enough to justify a self-defensive action from the pregnant woman. However, in responding in self-defense, there are no proportional options for the pregnant woman. Instead, there is only one option for self-defense against the risks/burdens imposed upon the pregnant woman by the continued existence of the fetus – abortion. So, if self-defense is warranted, then abortion is the minimally aggressive response that a pregnant woman can choose. This analysis relies on an intuitive understanding of self-defense, proportionality, and other related concepts. But in support of my defense of abortion, I legislate between six prominent theories of self-defense. While I do not commit myself to any particular theory as clearly correct above all others, I argue that all of the reasonable understandings cohere well with my argument.

In Chapter V, I consider three more moderate arguments in defense of abortion on the basis of self-defense. The first concludes that the procurement of an abortion in a standard pregnancy is excused, if not justified. The second concludes that if the fetus is not a person, then abortion is demonstrably morally permissible on the basis of self-defense. And the third concludes that abortion is morally permissible in a certain class of non-standard pregnancies – specifically pregnancies resulting from nonconsensual sexual intercourse.

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