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Shadows of Ethics: Criticism and the Just Society by Geoffrey Harpham. Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1999. Pp. xiv + 263. \$54.95 cloth; \$19.95 paper.

If you are of the party that believes that most writing on ethics is plagued by a self-congratulatory earnestness, then this is the book for you. *Shadows of Ethics* is a rich, elegant work with a skeptical sensibility and a wonderful sense of proportion. Defining ethics as “the site of a desire for a clean conscience” (xiii), Geoffrey Harpham argues for the unsurpassability of the Kantian imperative (even in many who claim to disdain it), the impossibility of fulfilling that imperative, and the undesirability of taking it too literally.

This argument is not made in a direct or repetitive way throughout the book, which is a series of thirteen discrete essays, nine of which have been previously published. The connections between chapters are often oblique, and many of the individual chapters stand alone quite well, particularly the critiques of individual writers and the essay on Enlightenment and modernity. The book’s second chapter, “Ethics in Literary Study,” will be the most familiar to many readers, having appeared as the entry on “Ethics” in the Lentricchia/McLaughlin collection *Critical Terms for Literary Study*. The essay makes two well-known claims. The first is that “On or about December 1, 1987, the nature of literary theory changed” (20). However witty or ironic this is meant to sound, it presents an unfortunately trivializing history of literary theory, suggesting that somehow it was only with the revelation of de Man’s wartime writings that theorists realized that the world was a serious place. Harpham’s other succinct and familiar claim in this chapter, that narrative “negotiates the relation . . . of the is and the ought” (36) is a far more productive insight. Harpham nicely shows how this formula subsumes the question in narrative theory of which comes first, the reader or the text, and makes this an ethical, rather than a strictly formal problem. It is entirely plausible that this model could be applied to other modes of formalist reading in order to show the centrality of ethical concerns even when they seem to be invisible.

In Chapter Three, Harpham takes the fact/value dilemma from Hume (beginning with a brief reading of Hume’s text that shows that Hume himself is more ambivalent, and unsuccessful, in making this distinction than a unified critical heritage that makes him into the guarantor of the difference thinks he is) into an observation about a governing structural paradigm of criticism: that critics inevitably construct the truth of their own analyses by presenting their own work as fact, the “is” (a site of “necessity, obligation facticity”) observing value, an “ought” (a site of “freedom, choice and desire” [48]). Harpham’s examples in this essay are Terry Eagleton’s critique of Lyotard and Susan Stewart’s reading of the Meese Report on pornography, but he obviously realizes

that the same charge can be leveled against his own meta-analysis: that by uncovering the evaluative choices made by Eagleton and Stewart, he positions himself as the “is” to their “oughts.” His conclusion to the essay neatly frames the issue: “not only is this the way it is,” Harpham allows, but “the way it ought to be” (49). If Hume could not separate fact and value, neither will Harpham.

Harpham plays this distinction to much higher stakes in what is perhaps the most substantive essay in the volume, “So . . . What Is Enlightenment? An Inquisition into Modernity.” This essay takes Foucault’s late essay “What Is Enlightenment?” as its springboard and challenges the confident “voice of modernity” that makes a clear distinction between Enlightenment and the darkest technology of premodern truth, the Inquisition. Layering Foucault’s close readings of Kant with a survey of the practices and apologists for the Inquisition, Harpham comes to a Foucauldian comparison of the coherence of the “political rationale for the Inquisition” against the “fatuous Enlightenment assertion of a free private realm secured by submission in a public realm by which it is magically untouched” to come to the conclusion that “The Inquisition is, perhaps, Enlightenment without denial” (90–91). And if that observation seems too comfortably set in an Adornian distance, Harpham brings it to bear on the protocols of the enlightened scholarly profession. What would the result be, he wonders, of a “psychopathology of scholarship” that would show how “findings,” “conclusions,” and “results” are inevitably presented as the result of “a suffering that is both genuinely painful and eagerly desired” (97); in other words, where is the line between inquiry and inquisition? When Harpham asks if we are the heirs of Enlightenment or its Other, he makes it impossible to maintain a comfortable distinction between those alternatives.

Five of the later chapters in the book are focused on individual writers: Robert Nozick, Martha Nussbaum, Geoffrey Hartman, Fredric Jameson, and Noam Chomsky. The variety of disciplines on display here—two philosophers, two literary critics, and a linguist—gives some inclination of the range of Harpham’s reference, which is one of the greatest strengths of the book. When Harpham surveys Chomsky’s life and writings and wonders why Chomsky has been so little read by literary theorists, or produces an essay on the legacy of Enlightenment that moves gracefully from Kant to Lyotard, Foucault, Norris, Eagleton, Benjamin and de Man in order to construct a lurid history of the entanglement of Enlightenment and counter-Enlightenment, or reviews the careers of Homi Bhabha and Judith Butler in two pages as examples of the postmodern, oppositional intellectual, he displays an erudition that is both vast and lightly worn. The rhetoric of his assessments of individual writers is, to borrow his own description of Derrida, a rhetoric of “attention and nonassertion”; nevertheless, the chapters on Hartman, Jameson, and Chomsky

turn out to be deeply respectful, even poignant analyses that assess these writers in terms that connect the personal and the professional. Taking the ethical and political concerns expressed by these writers as their central desires, Harpham looks for the connections between those desires and the impact these critics have had on contemporary thought.

The philosophers—Nozick and Nussbaum—do not fare so well under Harpham's scrutiny. The chapters on Nozick and Nussbaum are not facile, polemical dismissals, but careful, clinical, devastating analyses that offer a great deal of irrefutable "is"—in the form of extensive quotation—from the subjects under demolition. Harpham begins his chapter on Nozick with an account of Nozick's complaint of a "slandorous distortion" of his work by Ian Hacking. Nozick protests that he does not, as Hacking charges, describe rationality as a "hypostasised entity" but rather that by "rationality" he means the "continuing rational actions of individuals" (101). In response, Harpham presents a painstaking reading of what he calls Nozick's "confusions," highlighted by Nozickisms like "Rationality has brought many benefits and thus enabled rationality to extend its domain further" and "Rationality . . . is not the whole of our rationality" (106, 103). Harpham offers the neologism "*rat*" as a means of bracketing the distinction between a hypostasised "rationalism" and rational people, and then uses the term to effectively characterize Nozick's "rationality" as a "self-glorifying, morally indifferent aggressivity" (110); that is, as something ratlike.

While Nozick seems to be able to make the word "rationality" mean whatever he likes, so long as it signifies the seriousness of his own work, Martha Nussbaum, as Harpham shows in one of the most dazzling performances in *Shadows*, abuses the words "life" and "love" to similar effect in distinguishing her own work from the supposed aridness of both analytic philosophy and contemporary, materialist and poststructuralist, literary theory. The turns of this essay are too complex to do justice to here, but Harpham's carefully constructed but still stunning conclusion is that the hidden desire in Nussbaum's texts, which is to have a proximate but "pre-renounced" identification with the love that undoes philosophy proper, can be found in Nussbaum's ecstatic identification with David Copperfield's love for James Steerforth and in her reading of the *Phaedrus* that sees only a "winged ascent 'toward truth and knowledge'" (236), with a seeming obliviousness to the fact that what she calls love is in each text both homoerotic and pederastic. In Harpham's reading, Nussbaum's ambivalence towards erotic love manifests itself in a repressed fascination, on the part of the "feminine but not feminist" philosopher who presents perception as a good in itself, with a scene in which she could not participate. Nussbaum is thus able to occupy "a morally optimal position [that] is slightly, but not wholly removed from the tumultuous scene of action" (229).

Harpham's treatments of Jameson, Chomsky and Hartman are more sympathetic. In Jameson's case, Harpham finds a curious imbalance between Jameson's stature and his influence. As Harpham states, everyone recognizes Jameson as America's most important Marxist intellectual, but, he points out, the major themes of Jameson's hard Marxism—the necessity to destroy the culture of individualism for the sake of a future collectivist utopia—have not been the central concerns of the academic left during the period of Jameson's ascendancy. In Jameson's later work, such as *States of Theory*, Harpham finds a stylistic softening that accommodates the soft totality of global capitalism, and makes Jameson now "our preeminent postmodern theorist" (179), writing brilliantly about a world that is as far as one could get from the one he tried to bring about. The essays on Chomsky and Hartman are equally thorough and even more personal. In each case, Harpham connects boyhood experiences—Chomsky's first published article, a high school newspaper editorial on the fall of the Spanish anarchist uprising in Barcelona in 1937, and Hartman's escape from Germany to England at the age of nine—to their later political commitments. In Chomsky's case, his insistence that any institutional circumscription of human creativity is an assault on the genetic code, which is programmed to produce sentences we have never heard, is traced back to his childhood in an antifascist household. For Hartman, his focus on Wordsworth's sympathy for outsiders becomes symptomatic of his belief that "culture must hold a place open for those who are not altogether 'inside' it" (216).

In one of the curious elements of the book's structure, Harpham's own argument for something beyond the "culture" that Hartman clings to despite the inherent "danger of purity" of cultural formations is placed in the book's first chapter, which was written specifically for this volume. In this essay, Harpham argues for a distinction between "culture," a mode of identification based in place and the past, and "society," a voluntaristic association formed on the basis of shared values. There is a tenuous link between this distinction and the argument of the book's last chapter, in which Harpham criticizes the stance of the perpetually oppositional intellectual and urges academics to be willing to take on the responsibilities of power. While the culture vs. society opposition is provocative, I found the book's final chapter disappointing. There is some amusement value in Harpham's needling of the "narcissistic oppositionality" of bourgeois professionals who imagine themselves standing in solidarity with the wretched of the earth and being "a royal pain" to those in power, but Harpham's example of the case in which it becomes necessary to do more than stand on the sidelines gives me pause. Responding to Christopher Norris's *Uncritical Theory: Postmodernism, Intellectuals, and the Gulf War*, Harpham remarks on Norris's silence "on the question of what—Kuwait having been invaded—one ought to do" (256). The rhetorical gesture of starting the clock at the moment that They did X to Us in order to confer ethical value

on Our Side is common to every tit-for-tat conflict; Israel/Palestine, Northern Ireland, and the former Yugoslavia are some of the most recent examples. In this case, the use of the term “Kuwait” as though it signified a naturally integral political entity is the sort of rhetorical abuse that Harpham is usually very deft at exploding.

The final chapter aside, the most serious criticism of the book as a whole may lie in what is not there. In his two books on ethics in contemporary theory, *Shadows of Ethics* and *Getting It Right* (Chicago, 1992), Harpham has not, for some reason, offered a sustained critique of either Levinas or Foucault, the two thinkers who have had the greatest influence in bringing ethics into the field of literary and cultural theory. There are scattered comments on Levinas, including the observation in *Getting It Right* that Levinas’s repression of history has produced “a sense of sterility, abstraction, reduction, and even self-absorption,” but nothing like the sort of analysis that Harpham offers of Nozick or Nussbaum. While I have a good deal of sympathy with Harpham’s comments on Levinas, Levinas’s stature, and particularly his importance to Derrida, a figure Harpham holds in the highest regard, would call for a more thorough critique. Foucault would seem to offer himself to Harpham as a Nussbaum-like target, with his texts fissured between scholarly findings and powerful desires, but Harpham’s critical view of “culture” as opposed to “society” would demand a sustained engagement with the influence of Foucault in cultural studies, a mode of study that Harpham’s view of “culture” would seem to suggest is flawed from its origins. Perhaps it is the measure of this long and stimulating book that my only serious criticism is that I would like to see more.

On the whole, *Shadows of Ethics* is a book whose value goes beyond the particulars of its separate, often brilliant, analyses. For my money, Harpham is our best contemporary theorist of ethics. His skeptical temper consistently conveys the necessity of never overestimating the depth of one’s own knowledge. The overly confident are his natural prey. This epistemological asceticism gives a sense of the moral weight of words; Harpham’s wit appears in flashes, but the underlying power of his work depends upon putting his formidable intellect in the service of discerning the connections between the most sophisticated rhetorical practices and their most direct moral consequences.

I would also like to say a word about the production of this book by the Duke University Press. This is a long book—I estimate over 120,000 words—and it is crammed into 263 pages by the device of using very tiny print. Everyone understands the present economic difficulties of academic publishing, but reducing costs in this way will make this book physically difficult to read for many people.

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The Romantic Performative: Language and Action in British and German Romanticism by Angela Esterhammer. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000. Pp. xv + 357. \$55.00 cloth.

Over the past few years, Romanticists have had to confront (or, perhaps, accept as a fact) the apparent decline of their field, particularly its waning potential for opening new and compelling perspectives on literary and cultural studies overall. No doubt, some of the reasons for this widely deplored trend are institutional and economic—mere epiphenomena of the pervasive trend of “downsizing” the humanities in favor of grant-getting and revenue-generating work in the sciences and, on a smaller scale, the social sciences. The embattled condition of Romanticists thus ought to be understood as but one symptom of the pervasive transformation of the university over the past twenty years or so, away from the intellectual and (admittedly Western-Europe dominated) *universitas* envisioned by Humboldt, Hegel, Coleridge and their late-Romantic contemporaries and toward a (still Anglo-European–dominated) model of the university as one more corporate subject within a transnational and for-profit-only global business culture. On that count, it would seem that things, notwithstanding the standard line of university administrators about a rapidly changing world, do indeed stay the same. For just as the liberal-secular institutions of higher learning delivered the cultural justifications and technological means required for the twin projects of nineteenth-century Nationalism and Imperialism, so the early twenty-first century worship of “interdisciplinarity,” new media, and “excellence” (the “Test Act” for any successful career in university administration today) essentially replicates the globalist credo in perpetual technological innovation and the tearing down of obstacles to free trade whereby transnational corporations and their umbrella organizations evangelize capital as intrinsically benevolent and profit-motives as the very fuel for social progress.

In his new book, *The Law of Cool*, Alan Liu offers a poignant commentary on the uncertain “future of literature and literary study when all culture is increasingly the culture of information and when even literary scholars subordinate literature to an apparent clone of information: cultural context?” Liu’s view of literature’s vaunted autonomy as but a short-lived epoch within the far more enduring and inventive quest of “the literary” to find new idioms and roles in changing times is, if only implicitly, seconded by the architecture of Angela Esterhammer’s study of the Romantic performative. Arguably the most remarkable feature in a book of many strengths, it is the insistence of *The Romantic Performative* on taking us beyond Romanticism as endlessly ruminating and eulogizing the death of Literature or, inversely, writing yet another critical

and righteous exposé of its figural contradictions or ideological complicity. Instead, Esterhammer reads Romanticism as a watershed moment in the understanding of language *tout court*, with Literature advancing this broader project in important, though certainly no longer exclusive ways. By approaching Romanticism's "linguistic and poetic texts . . . [as] both analyses of language as action and instances of language as action" (3), she credits the period with a kind of reflexivity and fluidity that so often seems missing in eagerly political or materialistic accounts of Romantic writing. Indeed, Esterhammer goes further by contending that Romanticism's "speaking subject tends to be a much more fluid entity . . . than it is in twentieth-century speech-act theory—neither a function of the power that linguistic rules and societal conventions assign to certain utterances, nor an independent agent exerting control over the external world, but a mind negotiating its position with respect to language, nature, and society" (13).

The book's seven main chapters take us from the debate over promises, contracts and constitutions in Britain (Burke, Paine, Bentham) through a discussion of German Idealism (Kant and Fichte), German philosophy of language (Bernhardi, Humboldt) to readings of individual authors (Coleridge, Holderlin, Kleist, and Godwin). Throughout the book, Esterhammer's command of her primary materials, as well as the range of her scholarship (both philological and theoretical) proves truly remarkable and ensures that her study, however wide-ranging and ambitious, remains at all times on firm ground. In its scholarly and critical demeanor, *The Romantic Performative* makes an eloquent plea not only for reintegrating the study of literature with the larger theoretical and political effects of writing at a time when "literature" had barely begun to claim formal-aesthetic autonomy for itself, but also for the seemingly defunct field of comparative literature and its lately ignored capacity for productively integrating literature with theory.

Esterhammer's first chapter focuses on the French Revolution and its stunning impact on public print-culture in Britain. If time then seemed ripe to acknowledge the instability and consequent malleability of political realities as *de facto* linguistic fictions, Esterhammer shows how premonitions of this shift can be found in Hume's and Thomas Reid's particularly intriguing exploration of promises and other, non-propositional types of linguistic expression. The *differentia specifica* in most discussions of the performative—the question of intentionality—already emerges with great clarity in Reid's distinction between "the will to engage" and the "will to perform what we have engaged" (39). Here "a revealing contrast between the British and German traditions emerges. For the Germans (including Herder, Humboldt, and Bernhardi), language is essentially dialogic because cognition is essentially dialogic. For Reid, language is essentially dialogic—but precisely this distinguishes it from cognition and renders it essential to the existence of human beings as social creatures." It is here that Esterhammer locates the emergent distinction between

performativity as “a phenomenological” or “sociopolitical” act (40), a distinction that was to ignite such heated debate between Searle and Derrida about whether performative utterances are by their very nature undecidable and (as a further consequence of Derrida’s argument, and one particularly unsettling to Searle) impossible to distinguish from any other forms of utterance. Ever vigilant of human beings’ proclivity to confuse linguistic and material realities, Bentham here appears as a direct precursor to Derrida (and also Paul de Man) when he asserts that “the various declarations issued by the French National Assembly . . . [inasmuch as] they bring into being exactly the reality they describe” produce “absurdity or self-contradiction” (51). What Derrida was to label the “fabulous retroactivity” of constitutionalist practice is here already subjected to a critique that, interestingly, confounds the usual dichotomy between a politically conservative but rhetorically adventurous Burkean model and the politically principled and hence conservative linguistic theories of the Painites. This is outstanding, superbly informed expository writing on intricate and often ignored theoretical questions, and Esterhammer pushes her analyses to the point that “metaphysical questions about the power of language” (66) also begin to open up. Among these figures centrally the tension between Paine’s idea of an “original, transcendent contract” and his generation’s desire to define that contract anew, in spite of the apparent and seemingly overwhelming power of historical time.

The next chapter explores a significant “structural parallel” (75) between the Kantian transcendental apperception (the “I think” that must accompany all representation) and Fichte’s foundational act (*Tathandlung*) of the self positing itself on the one hand, and the basic structure of performative utterances on the other. Where Kant’s prose often proves reticent when it comes to acknowledging its linguistic underpinnings, Esterhammer sensibly averts to Herder’s largely unread *Metakritik* of Kant’s *Critique of Pure Reason* (78–83) as arguably the first attempt to “link Kant’s First Critique with universal grammar—the study of parts of speech in terms of universal logical categories, rather than in relation to specific natural languages, that formed the prevailing mode of linguistic scholarship during the eighteenth century” (81). Quite possibly, no theorist would seem more pertinent to a study of Romantic performativity than Fichte. In her reading of his *Wissenschaftslehre* (Science of Knowledge), Esterhammer persuasively traces the degree to which Fichte’s epigenetic account of the self (as *Setzen*) relates to the positional power of language (*Satz*), and how Fichte ultimately “fails [“avoids” might not have been too strong a word] to work out the larger linguistic implications of his own idealist philosophy” (88). In yet another of her numerous valuable recoveries of overlooked and theoretically pioneering texts from the Romantic era, Esterhammer juxtaposes Fichte’s hesitant, even defensive relationship to the linguistic foundations of his formalist logic with August Ferdinand Bernhardt

(1769–1820). Bernhardt's *Sprachlehre* (1801–1803), and even more so, Humboldt's numerous and more widely known writings on universal grammar and its relationship to cognition, lead Esterhammer to these momentous conclusions:

It is illustrative . . . that speech-act philosophers tend to *observe* the asymmetry of first-person forms and modify their analysis accordingly, without investigating the role of the I itself. The Romantic performative, on the other hand, grows out of a theorization of the I in its relation to being, objective reality, and other human subjects. It therefore focuses on utterances that not only (like the modern performative) alter the circumstances in which they are spoken, but also react back on the speaker, altering the I itself and its relation to the hearer and context.

(99–100)

Humboldt, above all, appears to have understood the extraordinary autonomy of the linguistic medium vis-à-vis the intentions that the speaking subject appears to project onto it. For Humboldt, the study of language essentially places the enigmatic nature of Kant's "synthesis" (nowhere more apparent than in the chapter on the "Schematism" from the First Critique) on firm empirical footing.

It is beyond the scope of this review to detail the wealth and acuity of Esterhammer's subsequent readings of Coleridge, Hölderin, Kleist, and Godwin. Of these, Kleist may well prove the one most congenial and supportive of Esterhammer's overall reading of Romanticism as a variously explicit or implicit meditation on the performative and world-constituting power of linguistic fictions. Esterhammer's wholly lucid account of Kleist's most ambitious novella, *Michael Koohlhaas*, ends with what Coleridge would surely have called "genial coincidence." A quote from Jeremy Bentham's 1791 critique of the French National Assembly's Declaration of Rights exemplifies his skepticism with the very image of horses left to a stranger's care and received back in nearly worthless condition that was to become the thematic premise for Kleist's story. To exist in the world is, for Bentham and Kleist, no less than for us, to take things on faith (or on promise) with no collateral to back us up: "[Bentham's] evocative image suggests that not only Kohlhaas's declarations, but the fate of the horses that represent the catalyst for his whole adventure, may be read as an illustration of how the meaning and effect of words shift beyond the control of those who use them and those whose lives they alter" (279). Koohlhaas's fantasy, which in the end may also be that of more "conservative" twentieth-century theoreticians of the performative, appears to be that language—particularly the black-on-white solidity of print culture—ought to

be as permanent as the “blacks” (his horses) whom he expects in their “original” condition. In one way or another, the oeuvre of each author focused on by Esterhammer’s study revolves around this fantasy of “a language that . . . neither deforms reality nor is deformed by it” (279).

One regret about this otherwise excellent study has to do with its overly streamlined account of performativity. Given the complexity of twentieth-century debate on this manner, it would have been useful to explore how the “greater fluidity and creativity” of the Romantic performative might compel a reevaluation of its twentieth-century successors. Yet these figures (Austin, Searle, Derrida, K. O. Apel and Habermas) are disposed of in less than ten pages, and their function appears to be mostly to attest to the topical relevance, not the conceptual tensions, of performative theories of language today. Thus Esterhammer’s argument concerning Romanticism as precursor to late-twentieth-century speech-act theories remains largely invariant throughout the book, and all figures ultimately converge in the same notion of language as bearing the imprint of a deep-structural, pragmatic motivation—the instantiation of so many realities *qua* symbolic action. By and large, this formal schema dominates over the consideration of the social and political effects produced by the very fact that the Romantics thought of themselves as inhabiting language both as the domain of political and cultural practice and as the catalyst for theoretical awareness of that very condition. As her readings of Godwin, Kleist, and Hölderlin clearly imply—though Esterhammer does not always follow up on that implication—to dwell within language as the domain of (virtual) practices *and* to grasp it theoretically as the *Reflexionsmedium* (Benjamin’s word) for performative self-constitution entails an attenuated, even skeptical perspective on political action. While the careers of the four primary “literary” figures in Esterhammer’s study (Coleridge, Godwin, Hölderlin, and Kleist) would certainly support that contention, *The Romantic Performative* curiously foregoes any consideration of the social and political effects wrought by the acceptance of its very thesis. That the book at times foregoes drawing out the implications of its central thesis seems particularly regrettable given that, as Esterhammer herself shows so well, the Romantics appeared more willing to countenance the implications and imponderables of performativity than many of the theoreticians writing on the same subject in the second half of the twentieth century.

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British Romanticism and the Science of Mind by Alan Richardson. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000. Pp. xx + 243. \$55.00 cloth.

By putting old doctrines in new ways, and using, in their exposition, more recent terms, we may deceive ourselves into the belief that we are saying something fundamentally original.

John Hughlings Jackson, *Selected Writings*
(New York: Basic Books, 1958), II, 7.

Richardson's is a book of so many virtues that it is difficult to know what to praise first. I would feel presumptuous in attempting to review it were it not for the fact that I have myself twice made brief forays onto similar ground, and can therefore judge, by the superiority of Richardson's achievements to my own earlier efforts, how much this author has accomplished. (See my "Contribution of Neurology to the Scepticism of Alfred de Vigny," *Journal of the History of Medicine and Allied Sciences* IX [July, 1954], 329–48, as well as *The Uncreating Word: Romanticism and the Object* [Bloomington and London: Indiana University Press, 1970], pp. 14–19). One also recognizes the scope and vigor of the work when one sets it beside another on a related topic, *Undertaker of the Mind: John Monro and Mad-Doctoring in Eighteenth-Century England*, by Jonathan Andrews and Andrew Scull (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 2001). By comparison, the latter seems almost devoid of informing concepts, and lacking in any theoretical framework. Jane Wood's *Passion and Pathology in Victorian Fiction* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), is in some respects a complementary work to Richardson's: it attempts a survey something like Richardson's for the later nineteenth century, but it is largely concerned with gender issues, and it pays less attention to the philosophical principles underlying the medical issues than does Richardson. For the amateur in psychoneurology, perhaps the most striking feature of the book is the easy familiarity that it demonstrates with the work of major authors in modern neuroscience and cognitive linguistics: Hobson, Damasio, Flanagan, Lakoff, Pinker, Varela, among many others in a list that stretches back to Donald Hebb and beyond. Such knowledge lifts the work out of the parochial realm of period studies into that wider historical arena in which recurrent intellectual themes are seen in action, as they revise their antecedents and prepare the way for their successors.

British Romanticism and the Science of Mind is crammed with interesting background information, much of it not usually noticed by the student of literary romanticism. A profusion of odd and unusual, one might almost say delicious, details make the book fun to read, despite its density of reference: Erasmus Darwin traces the smile to the relaxation of the infant's mouth after nursing (153); Coleridge speaks of a "sort of stomach sensation attached to all my thoughts" (62); Charles Bell finds in the "expressions, attitudes, and movements of the human figure" a universal "grammar" for the fine arts (77); La Mettrie wonders how intellectual excitement was transformed into a physical "fever" (128); Franz Joseph Gall is excommunicated (69). There is a long

and interesting section on the powers of extra-linguistic reasoning evinced by someone born deaf and blind (James Mitchell; 154–58), a detailed account of Keats's exposure, as a medical student, to the most advanced neuroscience of his day (114–24), and the hilarious tale of (later "Sir") Humphry Davy's experiments with the mind-altering effects of nitrous oxide, in which he had one subject capering about the room, Mrs. Beddoes levitating, and Coleridge beating the ground with his feet (51–52). There is also a series of striking anatomical plates from the neurological works of the day interspersed throughout the text. Those who may be inclined to dismiss these illustrations of the brain, with their numbered areas, as obsolete curiosities, should notice that they bear a strong family resemblance to the brain map of Korbinian Brodmann (1868–1918), also with its numbered areas, which remains an indispensable tool of neuroscience to this day. Cerebral localization, always in dispute, is still an essential instrument of functional neuroanatomy, and the latest online Talairach brain atlas still draws on the discoveries of early nineteenth-century science.

If one could isolate one argument from this rich and complex book, it might be that, during the later eighteenth century, psychology moved from a Cartesian mind-body dualism on the one hand, and Lockean *tabula rasa* principles on the other, through what might be called a mechanistic phase among some of the French *idéologues*, to arrive at what Richardson regards as a typically Romantic—and modern—view of the mind. This view, Richardson proposes, unites mind and body, operating as a single activity entity, in which affect and thought are one in their encounter with experience, so that, in a Wordsworthian phrase, we “half create” what we perceive, or, better still, in Shelley's terms, learn to imagine what we know. Angelika Rauch, in *The Hieroglyph of Tradition: Freud, Benjamin, Gadamer, Novalis, Kant* (Madison, Teaneck: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press; London: Associated University Presses, 2000) raises similar issues: for her, too, the mark of the post-Kantian is the mind-body fusion, and the key question is “what kind of relationship exists between sensuality and mental representation, and what role does imagination play in it?” (81). For Richardson, the mind, with all its instincts and faculties (or, if one prefers, “modules”), is anything but passive: it encounters the variety of experience already primed to deal with it in appropriate ways, organizing it, emotionally, perceptually, and linguistically to the greatest advantage of the organism. Much of this activity is unconscious, and Richardson relates the emphasis on the unconscious during this period to the emphasis on the physical aspects of the mind.

Richardson builds upon an enormous amount of careful reading in both primary and secondary sources. If there be any one area in which one could say that the greatest contribution of this book is made, it is probably in the author's exhaustive treatment of material commonly alluded to but rarely read

thoroughly. Herder, Erasmus Darwin, Gall and Spürzheim, Charles Bell, William Lawrence, not to mention Hartley and Priestley, receive the kind of sustained attention that brings out their unmistakable relevance to the work of Coleridge, Wordsworth, Keats, and Jane Austen. Richardson deals in telling detail with such obvious targets as Keats's "Ode to Psyche," but along the way he also makes frequent excursions into areas that we would not initially associate with his subject, but that he illuminates brilliantly by demonstrating their connection to neurological thinking. For instance, on the one hand, he will explore the very specific topic of the feral child (159); on the other, he will not hesitate to investigate the broad and important distinction between abstract and corporeal universalism (152–53), in which what unites humanity is understood to be, alternatively, the identity of human minds or the universal fact of their embodiment.

It is difficult to find anything to object to in this exemplary work: at most, one might say that it sometimes feels as if it proves too much. Historiography is, after all, at least partly a matter of taste, and one might be relieved to have an occasional acknowledgment that different styles of history might have emphasized different aspects of the same material. There is also occasionally the sense that we are being overwhelmed with information, or being obliged to deal with an embarrassment of riches. As a gloss on the stanza from Wordsworth's "Expostulation and Reply," "The eye it cannot choose but see, / We cannot bid the ear be still," the author offers "Wordsworth found in *Zoonomia* a theory of active perception and a conception of ideas grounded in charged physical sensations" (72). We emerge with the rather un-Wordsworthian impression that there are in fact no sermons in stones (or in the body); that every idea is a repetition of somebody else's recently published idea; that there is no such thing as an innocent or an independent statement; that no utterance is comprehensible without a footnote. It seems much easier to accept Richardson's common-sense remark that Wordsworth's poetry shows strong affinities with the physiological psychology of the time simply because of "a network of shared pretexts, ideals, and aims" (70).

Again, someone with nominalist predilections (such as myself) might not be entirely at ease with the unswerving defense of Romanticism as a hypostatized entity (e.g., 198), and with the general tendency to define, categorize, and identify movements, or to claim pristine novelty for schools of thought. After all, the science of rhetoric would never have been invented if people had not realized, long before the late eighteenth-century physiological psychologists, that the emotions influence the reasoning process. Richardson writes with a confidence well justified by his knowledge, but, in the humanities, areas of uncertainty will always persist, simply because of the room for interpretation. It is consequently a relief to find that Richardson is prepared to admit, at least once in a while, that there are ambiguities in the evidence that

supports his generalizations (86, 96, 174, 176–77, 179). The results might also have been tilted in a slightly different direction if Richardson had included references to a number of authors whose absence is puzzling in such a thoroughly researched book: Montaigne on “Cannibals,” Cudworth and Leibniz on the unconscious, Shaftesbury as precursor of Wordsworth, Vico on the history of language.

To raise the question of alternative interpretations on a larger scale: I am not quite sure that modularism (whether Bell’s or Fodor’s—and modularism is a theory that is, by the way, still very much in dispute—) really does rescue us from mechanism, as Richardson apparently believes it does. Does endowing the mind with adaptive predispositions, whether perceptual or linguistic, actually solve the problem of free will, or does it just move it back one space, substituting a lot of little machines for one big one? Writing late in the nineteenth century, the eminent psychologist Alfred Maury would still speak of us as nothing but the “tristes jouets du conflit des choses” (“unhappy playthings of conflicting forces”), in *Le Sommeil et les rêves*.

There is also another strain in the history of ideas associated with the science of the mind, this time a tendency neither mechanistic nor organic, that one might choose to notice. The awareness that the mind is active may lead gradually back, once more, to the disquieting thought that the activity of the mind is all that we can know. Physiological psychologists, who are constantly confronted with the evidence for the endogenous nature of perception (see, e.g., Richardson, 12, 32) may turn in an entirely different direction from the one indicated by Richardson. One common outcome is an inclination towards Eastern religions (Harry T. Hunt, Francisco Varela). Another is a principled solipsism. This is a tendency that we find in the tradition leading out of the “no percept without a concept” assumptions of Kant into the philosopher Fichte, the great neurologist Hughlings Jackson, on to Jackson’s later disciple, the aphasiologist Jason W. Brown. A strong awareness of the fact that the “nature” we construct is an uncertain thing may lead to a kind of intellectual resignation, or even to a variety of stoic despair.

In any case, whatever differences of perspective on this interesting body of material one may select to emphasize, it is a pleasure to argue with this book, for which I have the highest admiration and the greatest respect.

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Wordsworth’s Profession: Form, Class, and the Logic of Early Romantic Cultural Production by Thomas Pfau. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997. Pp. x + 454. \$51.00 cloth.

If art is a forgetting of that which it encrypts, can there be room for comprehending an affective ground of aesthetic experience? Romantic scholarship has been preoccupied with questions of historical contingency for quite some time. What often seems to be lacking is precisely what Thomas Pfau addresses: the affective depth of the aesthetic precisely within the larger, anonymous historical patterns it partly constructs. The circularity of such a paradigm can be dizzying, and Pfau's ability in this study to maintain his ground is nothing short of spectacular.

Wordsworth's Profession argues that England's middling classes between 1740 and 1820 undergo a dramatic shift in self-understanding. Wishing to distance themselves from the crass consumptive materialism of the upper classes, but lacking a definable alternative in the arena of public accountability, they reconfigure value in the terms of a productive subjectivity. In this understanding, the aesthetic must be productive before it is consumptive, with productive subjectivity standing as the cherished result; the middle class thus moves towards moral and cultural prominence even as it struggles with the political and spiritual disenfranchisement that is its persistent inheritance. In fact, Pfau argues, it is this very disjunction between political disenfranchisement and cultural ascendancy that defines the period's operational structures:

To the extent that it continually stimulates 'mind' to further, more ambitious displays of imaginative mobility, Wordsworth's poetry in particular may be viewed as an encryption of its demographic unconscious: the cultural Romance of the middle-class psyche as the story of an unlimited development realized (and objectified for us) in Wordsworth's approach to discrete aesthetic forms and genres and succinctly captured in his phrase of "something evermore about to be." (8)

The reciprocal legitimation between audience and author thus becomes an important focal point, but it is one that opens onto so many avenues of historical and cultural investigation that no brief description can do justice to its breadth. Pfau is emphatically not interested in reducing the aesthetic to the demographic, or in arguing for a simple causal narrative that collapses socio-cultural history into its symbolic representations. Instead, he sees the emerging self-awareness of the middle class as the effect of Romantic cultural productivity, and he understands that "only at a concrete rhetorical (and usually textual) level can we expect to gain insight into the aesthetic (and especially the 'literary') simulation of history as the understated (always 'subtle') drama of its subjects' psychological mobility" (3). This is a study of form and genre that, following Clifford Siskin, views genre as constructing history (rather than the other way around). Thus, history becomes a forum for competing *forms* of desires and aspirations, where the cultural specificity of any

particularized idiom is not presumed to invalidate the affective yield of such forms. Rather, the very fundamentals of affective experience become part of the structure of feeling; cause and effect perform a dance here in which neither quite leads nor quite follows.

The book is divided into three sections. The first traces the history of the Picturesque in relation to the so-called "professionalization of leisure," a process by which its practitioners legitimate themselves as members of an established, respected, and above all spiritually and culturally significant community. In recognizing the Picturesque as a historically determined cultural emergence, Pfau interrogates its theoretical claims about its own aesthetic autonomy. The result is a reading of the Picturesque that situates it diacritically, and so finds "its aggressive aestheticization of political consciousness" (31). Where Wordsworth aestheticizes the landscape, then, his investment in the strategies of the Picturesque enables a subtle self-reflexivity with respect to the empirical actuality that his poetry only partly displaces. Descriptive detail in much of the poetry stands as synecdoche for the reality of suffering the poet beholds. Pfau also interrogates the critical, contemporary response to Wordsworth's picturesque technique, and does some hard worrying over the charge of near-criminal indifference to human suffering to which such descriptive exploitation has given rise. The processes of critical judgment, Pfau discovers, are no less subject to historical determinations and unself-conscious motivations than the cultural practices they would indict.

The second section of the book "explores how the languages of pedagogical theory, didactic fiction, and the Wordsworthian ballad seek to inculcate elemental, moral, and aesthetic literacy in their respective constituencies by relying on a deep-structural logic or self-surveillance" (11). As such, the hermeneutics implied by poetic diction fundamentally produces Romantic "sensitivity" until the ballad becomes the sign of the superior responsiveness of its readers. Such reflexivity becomes the special sociocultural capital of the middle class, as insight and interpretive savvy comes to stand for productive work within a new social consciousness. The economy of reciprocal affirmation, however, is only the obverse of the productive power of tacit control; here such controlling mechanisms are sublimated within the realm of aesthetic judgment. Surveillance and good taste are inseparable twins.

The third and final section focuses on *The Prelude*. Pfau is at his most impressive in this part, as he discusses the delicate process whereby Wordsworth converts self-interest into a narrative idiom that is offered as the exemplar of the poet's social role. Wordsworth's epic is founded partly on the poet's struggle to negotiate a ground between assertion of a unique interiority and the formal structure he inherits to represent that uniqueness. Indeed, a real anxiety can be found at the heart of Wordsworth's investments in his own authenticity,

and Pfau argues that “the structural antagonism between the autobiography’s aesthetic and thematic levels essentially reproduces the political and economic anxieties and contradictions against which Wordsworth works to establish his vocational ethos and poetic beliefs, a dilemma structurally reflected in the poem’s virtually unending history of textual revision” (13). Under this rubric, Wordsworth’s epic stages a dynamic tension between the idea of a national culture and the language of self-interest. *The Prelude*’s blank verse creates the illusion of an immersion in the dross of the political interests of the moment even as it protects its domain of cherished interiority. But that very autobiographical narrative itself is to be read as the “work” of civic duty, insofar as the entire enterprise is a prolonged promise of public accomplishment yet to come.

This is a dense and hard book, one whose conceptual synthesizing holds several aesthetic, historical and cultural claims in balance at once. It is not surprising, then, that Pfau’s prose sometimes tends towards the tortuous. But this is a small complaint about a remarkable scholarly achievement. *Wordsworth’s Profession* shows us not just how we come to constitute our love of cultural products, but how we come to need that which we love. In this, it is a study of the obtrusively human even as it scrutinizes the labyrinth of the impersonal to which we are bound.

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The Challenge of Coleridge: Ethics and Interpretation in Romanticism and Modern Philosophy by David P. Haney. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2001. Pp. 328. \$55.00 cloth.

Here’s a book that took me back to my first year in graduate school. It was the early eighties, and I was waiting out the Reagan years in an English department not renowned for its progressive politics but pretty highly ranked nonetheless. I took a course in what was then called “literary theory,” having no idea what to expect, but willing to learn. It was a challenge. We read *philosophy*, a serious subject that, by its own testimony and that of our professor, could explain things literature only dreamed of. There was Aristotle, and there was Hegel, and there was Saussure, and there was Lévi-Strauss, who was not really a philosopher but treated whole cultures as if they were concepts. And near the end of it all, with inscrutable pomp, loomed Heidegger, the most challenging and most serious of them all. I couldn’t understand a word. I was out of my depth. I was from the midwest, where to be philosophical means

quietly to accept your misfortune. But lucky for me and my benighted peers our professor threw us a line to hang onto, something we could understand, or at least try to, before going under for the last time: “the hermeneutic circle.” Thank God for the hermeneutic circle. It saved my career from foundering. It made literary theory suddenly intelligible and literature pertinent to the task of living.

Someone threw David P. Haney the same line, and he seems to have hung on to it with the same sense of saving grace. For the hermeneutic circle provides him a way of making the relationship between a reader and a text ethical. Drawing upon a distinguished if preferential array of recent writers on ethics (Gadamer, Levinas, Ricoeur, Vattima, Nussbaum, Williams), Haney wants to revive the hermeneutic tradition for contemporary literary interpretation. His gambit is simple: that hermeneutics connects interpretation to ethics. Coleridge is his test case not merely because Haney has a specialist’s knowledge of British Romanticism, but more importantly because Coleridge was himself a master of the tradition of German Biblical interpretation that gives rise to modern hermeneutics. As Haney puts it, “eighteenth-century hermeneutics played an important role in the thought of Romantics such as Coleridge, influenced later nineteenth-century theories of history, was existentialized by Heidegger, and emerged in Gadamer, Ricoeur, and others as an important alternative to the methods of the natural sciences” (22). *The Challenge of Coleridge* both situates Coleridge in this tradition and records the “conversations” that ensue when contemporary practitioners of hermeneutics turn to face the challenge of one of their most powerful progenitors.

And that is where the hermeneutic circle turns ethical: in the encounter between past and present, or between contemporary reader and historical text. Haney relies upon two features of the hermeneutic circle to connect ethics to interpretation. First, it enforces in the interpreter a peculiar openness to a knowledge that exceeds her. She cannot know the whole of the text’s meaning except by way of parts that communicate it, yet she cannot know what those parts communicate except by reference to the whole. The interpreter reads between the lines of total and partial knowledge, ever open to deeper understanding as it unfurls between them. Second, the hermeneutic circle conjures in the interpreter a keen awareness of her historicity. She cannot approach a text except by means of the interpretations it has produced. The interpreter reads through a history that makes her response possible, for as Haney insists, “our interpretations are always implicated in the interpretive history of which we are a part” (22). That is why Haney can describe, in good Gadamerian fashion, the encounter between reader and text in unabashedly human terms. That encounter “can be modeled on a conversation with another person” (47) because the knowledge that emerges both exceeds and unites both parties. Books are people too, or at least enough like people to converse with. What makes

this relationship ethical is its structural similarity to human communication. As Haney describes it, waxing Heideggerian, “the process by which the ‘truth’ of a poem is revealed is instructively similar to the ‘unconcealing’ that goes on in the ethical hermeneutics of being open to (instead of imposing, inserting, or conceptualizing) the truth of another person” (46). The hermeneutic relationship between reader and text is thus an ethical relationship between self and other, making interpretation an ethical activity huge with implications for human life.

It would be beside the point to question the ebullient humanism of Haney’s ethics. That is precisely what he is arguing for, against the more debasing effects of cultural and historical critique. For as he sees it, “the essential human characteristic . . . for the post-Romantic tradition . . . is a life of language and interpretation” (40). *Homo Hermeneuticus*: Haney understands the human as the interpreting animal. His own interpretations of Coleridge nicely illustrate this view. They take two forms, or rather comprise conversations of two kinds: those between Coleridge and his interpretive descendents, and those between Coleridge and Haney himself. The former intelligently adjudicate the claims, then and now, of hermeneutics as an ethical enterprise. And they address some pretty interesting issues. For instance, far from positing an autonomous consciousness to account for human agency, Coleridge sees subjectivity as thoroughly social, conscience or consideration for others providing its true ground. Or this: the copresence in Coleridge’s ethical thought of two kinds of otherness, one reminiscent of the kind of dialectical selfhood that Ricoeur theorizes, the other closer to Levinas’s more radical sense of an infinite Other incommensurable with a finite self. Such careful and nuanced discussions of Coleridge’s beliefs are typical of Haney’s labors and significantly complicate our understanding of the sage of Highgate’s sense of ethics. Similarly illuminating are Haney’s own conversations with Coleridge’s poetry. Seemingly obsessed with the infamous *Rime of the Ancient Mariner*, Haney again and again returns to its account of an apparently disturbed and disturbing old man’s compulsive account of his harrowing adventure at sea. The apparent reason for this preoccupation is the absolute Otherness of the Mariner, his irreducibility to some finite sense of self: “he gives the Wedding Guest an experience of being confronted by the absolutely other in human form” (220). What occurs in Coleridge’s poem, as Haney reads it, is the production of ethical responsibility in the witness—the reader as much as the Wedding Guest—of this Otherness.

That might explain why the Mariner so haunts Haney’s conversations. Like some psychic trauma or physical wound, he provides a pained reminder that absolute Otherness is beyond knowing. But this is where, to my mind at least, the hermeneutic circle snaps and becomes just another of philosophy’s old lines. For it manifestly fails in the face of the other. The conversations of

hermeneutics cannot fathom an Other whose difference is absolute. The Mariner himself is a pretty poor conversationalist. He all but silences his chance companion and leaves him stunned to depart for home alone. As absolute Other, the Mariner puts an end to conversation. He haunts hermeneutics as he haunts Haney's discussion, an emissary from the world outside the magic circle of conversation. The historical assumption of hermeneutics, that "our interpretations are always implicated in the interpretive history of which we are a part," renders its ethical possibilities at best convenient, at worst presumptuous. For under such circumstances the other becomes, as Coleridge is to Gadamer, an earlier version of the interpreter, not radically different, just less contemporary. No wonder the Mariner won't go away. He comes to remind Haney that true Otherness exceeds the capacity of hermeneutics to engage let alone explain.

That is also the lesson of Haney's attempt to demonstrate the contemporary relevance of hermeneutics. In a laudable effort to assess the alleged "copy-cat" killing that followed the release of Oliver Stone's film *Natural Born Killers*, Haney claims that "copy-cat violence may have less to do with the movies than with our modes of interpretation" (160), concluding that "if *Natural Born Killers* has 'caused' violence, it is at least partly because we have refused to teach or engage modes of interpretation in which an ethically active engagement of imagination allows works of art to challenge the spectator from a position of otherness" (162). Maybe so, but what troubles me about this diagnosis is its complacency toward the social conditions and cultural incentives that interact to motivate violence of the sort that erupted at Columbine, Haney's prime example of copy-cat killing. If the best that hermeneutics can do is hold out the hope of private edification (that "ethically active engagement of imagination") as a deterrent to social problems, I think we best put Gadamer back on the shelf. What if ethical responsibility involves not conversation but struggle? What if social justice requires not literary interpretation but political engagement? *The Challenge of Coleridge*, for all its interest in ethics, allows its commitment to hermeneutic to eclipse all regard for the social circumstances wherein alone ethical awareness might *make* a difference rather than just confront one.

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Lord Byron at Harrow School: Speaking Out, Talking Back, Acting Up, Bowing Out by Paul Elledge. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000. Pp. xiii + 221. \$39.95 cloth.

In *Lord Byron at Harrow School*, Paul Elledge focuses on Byron's checkered career at Harrow (1801–1805) and his three Speech Day performances there: as King Latinus in Virgil's *Aeneid*, the villainous Zanga in Edward Young's *The Revenge*, and King Lear raging against the storm. Byron entered Harrow at the age of thirteen, fatherless, hypersensitive about his lame foot, ill-prepared academically, spoiled by maternal indulgence, with few social connections, and poorer than many of his schoolmates. One of his instructors complained bitterly about the young lord's "Inattention to Business, and his propensity to make others laugh and disregard their Employments as much as himself" (18). During his years at public school, Byron had to contend with antagonistic tutors, the taunts of his fellow pupils (he later claimed that he won all but one of his eight fist fights), torrents of verbal abuse from his mother, and (possibly) sexual advances from his tenant at Newstead Abbey, Lord Henry Grey de Ruthyn. But in spite of his traumatic experiences, he eventually rose to prominence at Harrow, becoming the leader of the student opposition to the new headmaster and distinguishing himself in three dramatic recitations. His Speech Day declamations, which took place on 5 July 1804, 6 June 1805, and 4 July 1805, played an important role in his self-fashioning. As Byron indicates in entry 34 of his *Detached Thoughts* (written 1821–1822), his "temper and disposition" changed radically during his last year at Harrow.

Elledge suggests in an endnote that his book is a prequel to Jerome Christensen's *Lord Byron's Strength: Romantic Writing and Commercial Society* (1993). Whereas Christensen's account of the poet's identity formation commences with the publication of *Hours of Idleness* (1807), Elledge maintains that Byron's self-invention began several years earlier. His analysis of Byron's Harrow career is informed by recent studies of Romantic theatricality by Judith Pascoe and others. Growing up in a stagestruck culture, the young lord self-consciously developed and refined his theatrical skills, writing dramatic letters to his mother and half-sister, posing moodily in the Harrow churchyard, attending several performances of the thirteen-year-old acting sensation William Henry West Betty ("Master Betty"), and delivering dramatic recitations on Speech Day. These declamations become for Elledge "auditions, [the] inaugural performances of 'Byron'—in the provincial run, so to speak, before his London premiere" (1).

A partial biography like *Lord Byron at Harrow School* has an important advantage over a full-length biography: its limited scope enables it to examine a part of the subject's life in great detail. Thus Elledge is able to provide us with an exceptionally thorough analysis of Byron's sudden and unexplained break with Lord Grey. A birth-to-death biography is, however, better designed than a narrowly focused one to make generalizations about its subject and to identify patterns in an individual's life. Elledge suggests that we can detect "the seed and shape of the 1820 [1824?] defender of Greece" in the young lord guarding

Harrow “against the invasion from Cambridge [by the new Headmaster Dr. George Butler]” (100), but due to the limitations of his study he cannot develop this point. Moreover, he cannot consider the influence of the poet’s early theatrical performances on his dramas.

Although Elledge asserts that “Whether Byron’s harsh treatment of many women reflects his own misuse by Grey and others, the psychiatrists must determine” (177n.26), his account of the poet’s adolescence is clearly “psycho-biographical” (14). His approach eschews, however, “the emphasis on infantile experience in Freudian psychology and paradigms derived from it” (3), which would suggest that Byron’s personality was already formed by the time he entered Harrow School. According to Elledge, “conventionally, adolescence provides a second chance, an opportunity for dissolving or at any rate loosening the fixations in which the child is trapped by dependence upon its parents” (3). His “unapologetically inferential criticism” (15) uses relevant texts, such as Byron’s letters, poems, and speeches, to uncover the ways in which the young man created “his own separate self” (2) through performing and testing numerous roles.

Elledge argues that Byron’s quarrels with his first tutor at Harrow, Henry Drury (the Headmaster’s son), and his sudden and unexplained alienation from Lord Grey, his tenant at Newstead Abbey, profoundly influenced his emerging sense of himself. Bored by the grind of daily lessons, Byron neglected his studies and distracted his classmates, and he and Drury frequently clashed. The Headmaster, Dr. Joseph Drury, transferred the young troublemaker to another tutor, but a few months later Drury enraged his former pupil by saying behind his back that he was a “*blackguard*” (19). Although Byron had cultivated a reputation as a fighter and scapegrace at Harrow, he could not allow his former tutor, a mere commoner, to define him. He wrote a histrionic letter to his mother defending himself from the charge of blackguardism and asking her to intercede on his behalf with the Headmaster, whom he apparently regarded as a surrogate father. This quarrel was smoothed over by Dr. Drury, but a year later the Headmaster’s brother Mark Drury also called Byron a blackguard, prompting another emotional outburst from the insecure boy. Elledge emphasizes Byron’s sensitivity to the power of speech (particularly abusive speech) to “represent and affect reality, transmit messages, assault, and injure” (20).

Byron and the Drurys resolved their differences, but Byron came to regard Lord Grey as his “most inveterate enemy” (50). Soon after Grey took up residence at Newstead Abbey in November 1803 he invited Byron to stay with him, and at first they enjoyed each other’s company. Grey loved to hunt, and the two aristocrats frequently went out during moonlit nights to shoot pheasants. However, between 28 December 1803 and 22 January 1804 (Byron’s sixteenth birthday) the older man apparently did or said something that

estranged and traumatized his young landlord. According to Leslie A. Marchand and Doris Langley Moore, Grey disgusted Byron by making unwelcome sexual overtures; Elledge believes that the situation was more complicated. He contends that Byron was at least initially receptive to his tenant's advances and that his subsequent hysteria resulted from Grey's "infidelity, or flightiness, or silliness, or affectational superficiality" (33), the boy's suspicion "of aberration in himself" (37), and his awareness of the severe punishments meted out to those who engaged in homosexual acts during the Georgian period. Byron's alienation from Grey haunts his correspondence with his half-sister Augusta and may have become "the foundation and rationale for [his] later insistence on the purity of his passion for John Edleston" (38). Much to the boy's disgust, Mrs. Byron flirted with Grey and vainly insisted that her son reconcile with him. Somewhat implausibly, Elledge speculates that Byron feared his mother would "capture Grey in a relationship." Mrs. Byron, whom her son contemptuously dubbed "the dowager," was about fifteen years older than the twenty-three-year-old Grey, corpulent, and impoverished. It seems unlikely that Byron could have seriously believed that his mother's embarrassing flirtation with the young aristocrat would result in an "intimate association" (75).

While Byron honed his performative skills at Harrow, the thirteen-year-old acting prodigy "Master Betty" (also known as the "Young Roscius") was thrilling audiences throughout England with his renditions of dramatic roles ranging from Norval in John Home's *Douglas* to Frederick in Elizabeth Inchbald's *Lovers' Vows*. In a 25 April 1805 letter Byron reported to Augusta that he had seen "the young Roscius several times at the hazard of [his] life, from the affectionate squeezes of the surrounding crowd" (106). Although in the same letter Byron seems far from impressed by Master Betty's performances, Elledge conjectures that he both envied and identified with the "Infant Phenomenon." According to Elledge, portraits of the thirteen-year-old actor resemble a pencil sketch of Byron at the same age, and Master Betty's ability to transcend the "handicap" of his short stature (as a boy playing adult roles) would have been inspirational to a sixteen-year-old who hoped to achieve public success and popularity in spite of his lameness. Elledge's discussion of the Young Roscius's possible influence on Byron is intriguing but based entirely on inference: Byron's assessments of Master Betty's acting abilities were fairly dismissive, and we cannot be sure which of the boy actor's performances he witnessed.

The roles that Byron performed during Speech Day were, Elledge contends, carefully chosen. Originally, Byron planned to take on the role of Drances in a colloquy from the *Aeneid* but chose the part of King Latinus instead, possibly because Turnus's allusion to Drances's "flying feet" might have called attention to his lameness. Having been labeled a blackguard by Henry and Mark Drury, he decided to play the role of the villain Zanga, a Moor, to

impersonate and exorcise the hurtful epithet. His final performance as King Lear was also cathartic, offering him “a ritual of passage whereby he . . . claim[ed] a robust manhood that ha[d] been in part forged by his vanquishment of perceived injustices at Harrow” (159). In *Lord Byron at Harrow School*, Elledge persuasively argues that Byron’s transformation into a great poet, celebrity, and legend began at public school, in an “environment that variously allow[ed] and opportunistically encourage[d] Byron to become ‘Byron’” (4). Perhaps this fascinating book will inspire a scholar to undertake a detailed examination of Percy Bysshe Shelley’s tumultuous and histrionic career at Eton, which ended with Shelley’s recitation, during the leaving ceremony, of one of Cicero’s orations against Catiline.

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Nationalists and Nomads by Christopher L. Miller. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998. Pp. 258. \$46.00 cloth, \$19.00 paper.

The collection of six essays which constitute this study takes its title from what Christopher L. Miller describes as a troubling “conundrum in some contemporary criticism.” In his introduction, “History and Hybridity,” he describes the conundrum thus: “the world is divided between, on the one hand, those who divide the world and, on the other hand, those who don’t. Nationalists and nomads. The two sides are incommensurable, since one side does not allow for sides at all. This is a riddle of difference, and I think it is central to contemporary postcolonial studies” (6).

This “riddle” also appears to be central to Miller’s scholarly enterprise, since chapters 2, 4, 5, and 6 in this volume were written for various journals in earlier versions. For this volume, all were revised and, in addition, chapter 2, “Hallucinations of France and Africa,” was extensively augmented. Added to these revised essays are two new chapters: chapter 1, examining “Involution and Revolution: African Paris in the 1920s,” and chapter 3, entitled “Revolution and Involution in Images,” expanding the analysis in chapter 2 of the International Colonial Exposition of 1931 and a related novel, Ousmane Socé Diop’s *Mirages de Paris* (1937).

Miller’s goals, as he moves from the colonial to the postcolonial era, are multiple: to expand the historiography of francophone colonial literature, thereby correcting our understanding of its origins; to clarify the distinctions between the colonial and the modern whose points of view have been blurred in recent years by the critical focus on the postcolonial and the postmodern;

to revalorize such colonial era works as Dipo's *Mirages de Paris*; and to engage in the debates centered on the curriculum of colonial and postcolonial literature as well as the debates surrounding the contemporary ideologies of criticism.

The meticulous scholarship that characterizes this volume is immediately evident in the opening chapter that convincingly challenges the benchmark of 1932 as the beginning of black francophone literature. This is the date of publication in France of *Légitime défense*, the Antillean student condemnation of Martinican assimilationist literature. The choice of this text as a harbinger of the birth of Negritude was made by Lilyan Kesteloot in her pioneering study, *Black Writers in French: A Literary History of Negritude*, written in the late fifties (trans. Ellen Conroy Kennedy [1961; Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1974]). Her judgment of authors and texts was based on ideological and aesthetic criteria that Miller finds insufficient. He rejects the support of 1932 as a turning point as well from literary historian Martin Steins, based on the latter's reading of African publications such as *La race nègre*. Miller invokes other scholars, such as Guy Ossito Midiohouan, whose more realistic criteria—"education, intellectual and cultural life, publishing, and intended readership"—place "the origin of francophone African literature not in France with Negritude but in Senegal with [Ahmadou Mapaté] Diagne's *Les Trois Volontés de Malic* (1920)" (13), a pro-colonial text, but the first fictional text in French by an African (see *L'idéologie dans la littérature négro-africaine d'expression française* [Paris: L'Harmattan, 1986]). This approach is clearly more consonant with Miller's concept of involution and revolution, the title of his first chapter, which deals with strategies of "identity and culture engaged in by colonized Africans" (10) in the 1920s.

In examining these strategies, Miller also puts them into an historical context, namely the effects of World War I, which brought African combatants of varied ethnic backgrounds together and made them aware of the *dette de sang* (the debt of blood) owed them by the French. In addition, he cites the radicalizing role of the Communist party. The documentation, reinforcing the reevaluation of the 1920s as the decade of the birth of black francophone literature, is indeed impressive. Miller brings to light previously obscure colonial texts of imperialist, national justification and, with the exception of the Goncourt prize-winning novel *Batouala*, by René Maran (1921), equally little-known texts, mostly of resistance and principally of nonfiction, written in French by black intellectuals living in France for the most part, where there was, ironically, greater "freedom" of publication. He does not gloss over the few fictional texts that are not anticolonial, but he clearly demonstrates that literary activity was present and, further, that the ideological stance and the publications of many hitherto obscure African journalists and leaders of political groups like Lamine Senghor, Tiémoko Garan Kouyaté, and Kojo Tovalou

Houénou of the 1920s have more in common with the works of contemporary activists than do those of the proponents of Negritude of the 1930s.

Chapters 2 and 3 address, what Miller calls, the shifting of French and francophone spaces. Taking as a point of departure the present demographic reality of a “massive” immigrant, francophone population in France, Miller turns to the past to examine significant markers in the relationship between France and its then-colonies through two cultural events: the International Colonial Exposition of 1931 and a literary work that takes this Exposition as its setting, *Mirages de Paris*. The effect of the Exposition’s re-creation of African and Oriental settings (at times modified by the French), complete with artifacts and imported indigenous people, is that of a “hallucination, mirage, anesthesia, or phantasm” (56). This event created a deliberate “fog of intercultural space” to which Fara, the Senegalese protagonist of *Mirages de Paris*, falls victim. The process of indoctrination of French values begun in colonial schools in Africa laid the groundwork for Fara’s undoing, which was completed by the unrealistic expectations and subsequent disappointments for which the Exposition was the perfect metaphor, “the apotheosis of French colonial mythmaking” (65). Ultimately, Miller shows that through the French recuperation of the structures of the colonized (the “African” villages and/or pavilions), through their verbal (the official Exposition guidebook) and pictorial interpretation (the guidebook’s images of the “races” represented and the photographs of Exposition landscapes—objects more so than people), the Exposition was meant to show “authentic differences” (69) in a “state-sponsored hallucination” (65).

To his credit, Miller is never carried away by the temptation to exaggerate a perceptive analytical device. He recognizes that not all exchanges between France and Africa were lost in an “intercultural fog” of French making. Members of the African intellectual elite, brought to France for further indoctrination and training, were the architects of two ideological views which either “reinvent[ed]” the intercultural space—the Negritude of Leopold Sédar Senghor, which first isolated the unique qualities of the African heritage, then arrived at universal values of *métissage culturel* (cultural crossbreeding)—or opted openly for nationalism in the name of “Africa for Africans” (59).

Miller pursues the evolution of the nationalist trend in the fourth chapter, “Nationalism as Resistance and Resistance to Nationalism.” Displaying admirable depth and breadth of research in several fields, he examines various modern and contemporary theories and debates concerning nationalism. He takes issue, in particular, with Ernest Gellner, author of *Nations and Nationalism* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), who accuses African intellectuals-turned-nationalists of “false consciousness,” (fomenting a lie) inasmuch as they have attempted to salvage “folk culture” with the language and tools of European high culture. Miller adeptly points to Gellner’s failure to consider the reality of the African situation and echoes the concern of African critics who object to

the use of Europe as a “norm by which all nationalisms are to be measured” (128).

In examining literary nationalism in Africa, the author sees two different “moments” in its development: first, the generalized, pre-independence “nationalism-without-a-state” and second, “the reclaiming of national borders,” a post-independence phenomenon of the 1980s. In both cases, it is a question of resistance, but “the object of resistance shifts” (121). His analysis of the first phase, generalized resistance to colonial authority, is illustrated through close readings of *Batouala*, mentioned earlier, and Ferdinand Oyono’s *Une Vie de Boy* [Paris: René Juillard, 1956]; *Houseboy*, trans. John Reed [London: Heinemann, 1990]. Independence for most sub-Saharan francophone countries occurred circa 1960. “Nations” emerged that retained the artificial borders imposed by colonial authorities, who were no respecters of “ethnic” boundaries. In the light of continued inequality and ill-concealed neocolonialism that, more often than not, also came in the wake of independence, the literary reaction to nationalism was not positive, with a few notable exceptions. As Miller indicates, the list of negative fictional works was too long to enumerate. What is more, exile, generally in France, was often the lot and/or the choice of many post-independence writers (See Benetta Jules-Rosette’s *Black Paris*, a sociological study of African and Antillean writers in contemporary Paris [Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1998]). Consequently, there is the second nationalist “moment” which Miller identifies as one born of the critique surrounding the national culture in question. Whatever the thrust of the criticism, it contributes to the “discourse community” . . . “that is *specific* to that nation-state” (147). Therefore the question that has been debated, namely “Do national literatures exist?,” is no longer the issue. They do. Supporters and detractors approve or disapprove of their existence based on their view of the role of the state: how the state’s intervention will affect the world-standing of its literature, and the character and quality of the literature that will receive state approval.

While the foregoing chapter on nationalism clearly follows the subject of “the conundrum” posited at the outset, the presence of chapter 5 on “African Literature and the Challenge of Intercultural Literacy” in this collection narrows the discussion to American academia and seems justified only by the debate on the teaching of “national culture,” understood as “one’s own culture,” that characterized the “culture wars” of the late 1980s and mid-1990s. Miller’s knowledge of theoretical and more pragmatic research on questions of curricular choice and on the evolution of critical theory itself is quite comprehensive. He builds his argument carefully and convincingly for intercultural literacy, pointing out that no culture exists in isolation. This and related observations also link this chapter to the concept of hybridity currently informing the field of cultural studies.

The most heated debate with contemporary ideologies of criticism comes in the final chapter, "Beyond Identity: The Postidentitarian Predicament in Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari's *A Thousand Plateaus*" (*Mille plateaux* [1980], trans. Brian Massumi [Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987]). It places the reader at the heart of the "riddle" Miller has been examining. In his introductory remarks, he comments on the centrality of the question of identity to various disciplines, which concur increasingly with "the theory that identities are negotiated rather than natural; contingent, constructed, and imagined rather than unmediated and necessary" (171). What is more, some in the field of cultural studies see the construct of identity as an "identitarian prison" with its categories of "gender, race, ethnicity, and nation." One of the theoretical alternatives offering a means of escape, that is, a means of moving "beyond identity," is the concept of "nomad thought" presented in the second volume of *Mille plateaux* (*A Thousand Plateaus*). Miller quotes the explanation given on the back cover of Deleuze and Guattari's work: nomad thought is "a way 'to conceive of individuality free from the confines of Identity [that is, free from identitarianism], to think difference in itself, without reference to the Same'" (173).

Miller's concerns with this mode of thought "that appears to be gaining influence" focus on what he calls its "underpinnings" and "some aspects of its validity" (173). Using the English translation (which he praises highly) and the original French (when nuances of meaning are involved), he pinpoints some of the unclear terms in Deleuze and Guattari's self-styled vocabulary and reasoning. Further, while most of their sources are in keeping with their intellectual nomadism, therefore "free" from referentiality to actual nomads, there are in these same sources links, via citations, to anthropological findings, namely to ethnographic, that is identitarian, works. Consequently, in spite of the authors' disclaimer about their ideas being "prescriptive" rather than "referential," Miller feels one cannot ignore the referential nature of their work as revealed by their footnotes. Having made these statements about their main, canonical sources, Miller then turns to an examination of "a number of obscure and outdated sources" (182) that are important to Deleuze and Guattari's project. Miller concludes that the elucidation of their ideas on nomadology "require[s] ethnographic authority" (182) and, therefore, is at odds with their stated ideological position.

He reinforces this assessment in his analysis of subsequent chapters of this work, arriving finally at the focal point of *Nationalists and Nomads*, Africa. His interest is in the treatment this territorialized space receives (keeping in mind that "deterritorialization" is one of the goals of nomadology). Again, Miller finds Deleuze and Guattari's sources often tainted by association with anthropological judgments, colonialism and/or primitivism. The "pure, prescriptive, and virtual" (198) concept of nomadism that exists in "smooth" (or

open) space, without borders, that they advocate simply does not exist when confronted with actuality. (To mention a few references: to anthropologist Georges Dumézil, *The Savage Mind*, Miller 183, 193; to Paul Ernest Joset, *Les sociétés secrètes des hommes-léopard en Afrique noire* [Paris: Payot, 1955], Miller 193–96; to Luc de Heusch, *The Drunken King, or The Origin of the State*, trans. Roy Willis [Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 1982], whose ideas on the “man of war” Deleuze and Guattari adapted, according to Miller, to meet their own concept of the “man of war” [196–97]).

Miller devotes further attention to the section of *A Thousand Plateaus* entitled “Treatise on Nomadology: The War Machine” in which the cycle of war and peace, characteristic of nomadic behavior, is explained by the authors. Although parallels are not acknowledged, Miller makes the case for striking similarities between the “Treatise” and an earlier work by Pierre Hubac, *Les Nomades* (Paris: Marcel Daubin, 1948), which is only briefly mentioned by Deleuze and Guattari. An important assessment arrived at by Miller concerns the genuine sympathy for nomads shown in both texts, but with a major difference. Hubac’s conclusions, though perhaps idealized—“the war machine as an instrument of peace” (202)—remain in the realm of the actual, whereas the philosophers’ conclusions mutate into a sort of “earth force” which “‘asserts its own powers of deterritorialization, its lines of flight, its smooth spaces . . .’” (204). So much “nomad propaganda” (205), says Miller. What he calls for in his final section on “Mental Correctives,” among a list of recommendations, is a “less utopian, less contradictory” nomadism; one that “acknowledges something outside itself.” Primary among concepts to be dropped is the denial of “nonauthority.” Instead Miller recommends “cosmopolitanism” as a way of going “beyond identity,” one that recognizes the ever-shifting “divisions of world space” and develops ways to “think through borders” (209).

Evaluating Miller’s accomplishments in the light of his goals, I find that they have clearly been met. The wealth of data he has researched and re-evaluated will certainly change the disciplinary approach to the origins of black francophone literature. And while his clarifications of what is “modern” and what, “colonial,” have not been addressed in great detail here, they are fully compared and contrasted in his re-examination of the major concepts of the pre- and postcolonial eras. This has involved the revalorization of many works of fiction and nonfiction by African authors on the continent and in exile, mainly in France, from the 1920s onward. Indeed the contemporary phenomenon of a major number of African migrants in France, where they have created their own space and consider themselves part of the Parisian scene, has caused Miller to speak of shifting spaces, making France, as it were, an “appendage” of Africa (16). These observations have all contributed to the overarching theme of nationalists and nomads, the “riddle of difference” so central to contemporary postcolonial studies. In working through the elements of this

“conundrum,” he has demonstrated a masterful ability to engage in the debates on curricular and ideological concepts in a variety of humanistic disciplines—critical theory, francophone and French literature, philosophy, history, and anthropology, to mention the most obvious. What is more, he has been faithful to his aim of “maintain[ing] inasmuch as it is possible a visible distinction between description and prescription and, therefore, to describe what [he has] read without projecting desiderata onto it” (7). In my view, he has done that superbly well, reserving his desiderata for his conclusion, where he describes his own non-identitarian utopia.

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The National Uncanny: Indian Ghosts and American Subjects by Renée L. Bergland. Hanover and London: University Press of New England, 2000. Pp. 224. \$45.00 cloth, \$19.95 paper.

Renée Bergland has provided an insightful reading of a particular motif in American literature that presents new perspectives for those interpreters of American literature who teach American Studies—grounded survey courses in high school and undergraduate college classrooms. However, one must accept Bergland’s premise—which many, but not all, American Studies professors do—that American “land is haunted because it is stolen” (9) in order to accept her most compelling and unique conclusions. Her broad understanding of American intellectual history informs her initial discussion of the topic of “Indian Ghosts and American Subjects,” and her frame of reference ranges chronologically in the balance of the text from Cotton Mather and Mary Rowlandson to Charles Brockden Brown, Washington Irving, and Samuel Woodworth to Nathaniel Hawthorne and Herman Melville. In the final chapter, she engages in a concluding discussion concerning the “Spectral Indian” which illustrates its argument through continuing reference to Stephen King’s *Pet Sematary* (1983) and to Leslie Marmon Silko’s *Ceremony* (1977). Although her informed discussion deftly justifies the relevance both of King’s popular culture and of Silko’s work of high culture in the same paragraph (indeed, often in the same sentence!), her discussion of *Ceremony* is not as nuanced and insightful as her treatment of earlier American writers in the text.

Writing very consciously in a poststructuralist context, Bergland focuses on “the consistency and the centrality of the language of Native American spectralization” (21). Such language has its origin in the Puritan religious jeremiad, and such a perspective is familiar for teachers and critics who commonly

accept the notion of the New England colonies as a City on a Hill, engaged in a significant religious battle against the Other/Evil yet with residual guilt for the indigenous Indian whose personhood and culture are necessarily marginalized by EuroChristianity. The ethical constitution of the Puritan, as Bergland notes, is structured along the lines of an individual and cultural continuing struggle against Satan, a dual perspective which Bergland accurately attributes to earlier critics in American Studies, most notably Sacvan Bercovitch in *The Puritan Origins of the American Self* (1975). Bergland reads in Mary Rowlandson's captivity narrative (1682) the very crux of this identity dilemma in early notions of American culture, since Rowlandson represents "a subjectivity that at once represses and requires, identifies with and despises the uncanny figure of the Native American" (34). Bergland understands the spectral Indian as a marginalized and subjugated yet haunting figure; the predominant EuroAmerican culture overwhelms both geopolitically and physically, demanding exile or co-optation, yet there is residual guilt, a "haunted" (34, 37 and *passim*) feeling, in Bergland's terms, about what the culture has done to the ghostly native.

As Bergland moves chronologically into the American Revolutionary War period, she notes a national obsession with "North American ghosts" in texts as disparate as the U.S. Constitution (1787) and the Philip Freneau poem, "Indian Burying Ground" (1787). Bergland correctly notes that as the American Enlightenment was coalescing into a democratic country, the status and plight of the Indian became worse or invisible or both. The insidiousness of the linguistic marginalization lies in the fact that: "By means of the metaphors of ghostliness, Native Americans, as a race, are absorbed into the white American mind as an aspect of American consciousness" (48). Such absorption of identity not only denies the Indian a place in the American future; it also muddles the various legacies of the past, since an invisible or haunted or otherwise limited identity generally forfeits any ability to convey a coherent narrative of the past.

As the discussion moves into the early years of the American Republic, Bergland locates in Charles Brockden Brown's *Edgar Huntley* (1799) and in various Washington Irving sketches examples of American Indians that serve as "ghostly figures of the irrational" (53). It can be comforting for a mainstream, essentially conquering, culture to have a marginalized image of what it is *not*, by means of partial self-definition. Bergland sees that these writers created "Indian ghosts [that] shaped the nation and the national literature, constructing America as a haunted community rather than a simple imagined one" (59). The American Dream thereby becomes fraught with complexity and cultural guilt.

Moving into the early and middle decades of the nineteenth century, Bergland perceives in the frontier romances of Lydia Maria Child and James Fenimore Cooper the notion that mixed-race romantic alliances are futile, self-destructive and doomed, since such miscegenistic alliances are inconsistent

with the accepted notion of “Indian disappearance as an inevitability” (64). Writing about the contentious antebellum decades, Bergland makes one of her most compelling observations, that “Indian spectralization is the literary corollary to Indian Removal, removing Indians from American culture as they are removed from American territory” (65). Investigating this corollary at length in Child’s *Hobomok* (1824) and in Cooper’s *The Last of the Mohicans* (1827) and *The Wept of Wish-ton-Wish* (1829) allows Bergland to conclude later with authority that “Indian Removal was concomitant with American expansion, which was predicated upon racial, territorial, and cultural domination of European Americans over Native Americans” (150). Of course, this statement is fraught with a number of assumptions, but it serves as a fruitful point of departure from which to access some of the important culture issues of nineteenth-century American history, literature, and public policy.

Bergland’s pairing of Pequot Indian writer William Apess with canonical Nathaniel Hawthorne seems strained, yet it holds the salutary effect of bringing the life and work of the remarkable Apess to new audiences. Yet even Apess is able to imagine no better destiny for his people than contemporaries Child or Cooper, since Bergland’s reading of *A Son of the Forest* (1829, 1831) also conveys the belief that “Indians are doomed and degraded and fated to disappear” (128). Bergland’s chapter on Hawthorne is less convincing, especially her concluding contentions that in *The Scarlet Letter*, “As the novel progresses, each of the main characters is transformed into an Indian, or, at the very least, is described as internalizing Indian consciousness” (157). This one-motif-fits-all-characters argument simply does not work, even if Dimmesdale and Chillingworth sojourned briefly with Indians before the events of the novel. The suggested equation of Hester Prynne’s Scarlet “A” with “Abenaki” seems conjectural at best and in any case in no way advances her perspective on the text.

In the eleventh and concluding chapter, titled simply “Conclusion,” Bergland actually engages in a new discussion of Chief Seattle and the Ghost Dance Movement then devotes the rest of the chapter to comparing and contrasting issues of Indian ghosts and land claims in perhaps the most important American Indian novel of the twentieth century—*Ceremony* by Leslie Marmon Silko—and in an extremely popular horror novel—*Pet Sematary* by Stephen King. Bergland’s discussion allows for some insightful reflections on how King’s novel, like Silko’s, depends for part of its matriced structure on unresolved land claims (even if Penobscot or Passamaquoddy rather than Laguna Pueblo) and suggestions of spectral Indians. However, Bergland continues to use her defining lens to separate EuroAmericans from Natives as she reads *Ceremony*, reasonably citing the oft-quoted witchery story (*Ceremony* 132–38) to suggest the evilness of the European worldview and the harmony and balance of the Pueblo Indian worldview. Bergland charges: “In the novel, white

Americans are marginal, ghostly, and evil" (162). Well, sure, but recall that Betonie cautions Tayo in the novel, as he likely would Bergland: "Nothing is that simple . . . you don't write off all the white people, just like you don't trust all the Indians" (128). One of the most frequently recurring themes in *Ceremony* is that personal behavior and state of mind trump race every time. As Bergland notes, Tayo—like so many of Leslie Silko's protagonists (and James Welch's and Louise Erdrich's and Sherman Alexie's, for that matter)—is a mixed-blood Indian, so his ultimate destiny, if racially determined, is alloyed in any case.

Ultimately, Renée Bergland's *The National Uncanny* will be appreciated by teachers and students in American Studies who will be compelled to return to and reflect upon both canonical and obscure texts, to works of both high and popular culture. Although much of the Hawthorne section seems forced, and although the Melville-Poe diversion (117–19) is too brief to be worthwhile, the text is valuable in many respects, including her use of Arnold Krupat's stipulative definition of frontier ("a social setting, not fixed or mappable, but, rather, 'a culturally defined place' where peoples with different culturally expressed identities meet and deal with each other" [51]) which of course rewrites Turner's century-old definition of *frontier* and which helps to set a new agenda with new parameters for students and scholars in the area.

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Imagining the King's Death: Figurative Treason, Fantasies of Regicide 1793–1796 by John Barrell. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000. Pp. xvii + 737. \$125.00 cloth.

Of few books can one say that even though it is over 700 pages and covers only four years in the 1790s—and within those years only an aspect of the political and literary history—there is nothing wasted. Barrell has loaded every rift with ore. His thorough and painstaking historical research, excellent writing, organizational coherence, and conceptual clarity make his book a truly notable achievement.

I will try to describe Barrell's new book. Framed by the actual regicide of Louis in France and the sedition trials in Edinburgh in 1793 at one end and at the other end the passage of the "Gagging Acts" in December 1795 and the half-hearted prosecution in May 1796 of the anti-Jacobin John Reeves for libeling the constitution, the heart of the study is the 1794 treason trials in London. The story of the sedition and treason trials with which many of us would

be familiar is of course the narrative in E. P. Thompson's *The Making of the English Working Class*. Thompson's version deals little with the actual trials and the legal complexities, concerned as it is with other matters: the political fortunes of the London Corresponding Society, the emergence of a radical culture, the social history underpinning the political, and so on. There are in fact enormous gaps in Thompson's account, so capacious that Barrell in his own history rarely has occasion to make reference to Thompson. Barrell describes vividly each of the three treason trials, but that is only a small part of the larger story, which is a contest of interpretations over key words: imagine, compass, sedition, treason, convention. And it is a real conflict; the outcome was not predetermined.

There are an introduction, four lengthy parts, and an epilogue. The introduction lays out the legal controversy, which is also a hermeneutical conflict. The statute 25 Edward III defined treason as imagining and compassing the death of the king; such imagining had to be accompanied by "overt acts" to qualify as treasonous. Subsequent legal rulings had discriminated between the "majesty" and the person of the king; it was treason only if the person of the king were threatened with death; it was not treason to threaten some aspect of the king's political rule; such threats might be seditious—a misdemeanor, not a capital crime—but the weight of judicial opinion and commentary was against what it called "constructive treason." Faced with the threat of universal suffrage and radical democracy, the government and courts tried to legitimate constructive treason to meet the dangers of "modern treason." Opponents of the government, however, had the weight of traditional judicial thought on their side. The plain sense of the Edward treason statute could be pitted against the "wild" imaginings of the prosecutor, who tried to link nonviolent political association for parliamentary reform with the hypothetical social disorder that "might" follow from the conflict. In this disorder it was possible that the king could be killed; therefore, proposing conventions favoring universal suffrage is tantamount to imagining and compassing the death of the king.

If constructive treason seems to have a tortured logic to us now, so it struck many jurors in 1794. Also, although an anxious government was able to pass statutes that adopted the logic of constructive treason in December 1795, the government never prosecuted anyone under the new treason statute. The government found other ways, legal and propagandistic, to combat democratic threats—libel prosecutions for sedition and blasphemy, "taxes on knowledge," subsidies for a loyalist press, and so on. Barrell shows that the government and the courts were manipulating the older definitions of treason because the danger they faced really was novel. The threat was no longer from aristocratic conspirators who wanted a republic or a Stuart restoration; rather, the governing elite, which was numerically quite small, faced the prospect of a mass democracy. Chapter 16 depicts vividly the angry London crowd that

greeted the king and his parliament upon the opening of parliament in 1795, a famine year. Even John Thelwall and other leaders of the London Corresponding Society were worried about violence. The government surely exaggerated the physical attacks against the king—the absurd “pop-gun plot” and the broken window in the king’s carriage—but there truly was reason for the government to worry.

As an historian, Barrell relies on primary documents, contemporary reports, and material in government archives. He tells a sensational story with restraint, immersing the reader in a sea of details and 1790s references. Barrell’s history is also theoretically and politically restrained. He notes for example the obvious psychoanalytic richness of the ever-present regicide theme, but he leaves these interpretive opportunities for someone else because he could not do anything with them beyond what seemed “obvious” (p. 45). There is little speculation of any kind in the book; the narrative rather unfolds with a rich factual density that earns Barrell a great deal of credibility. Neither Foucault nor Marx is allowed to simplify the fascinating story that, on its own terms, deserves to be heard.

Barrell tells a good story, but he also pays attention to the literariness of the historical material, the textuality of events, and the recurrent theme of “imagination.” In the 1790s radicals and loyalists accuse each other of having too much imagination: according to radicals, loyalists concoct treasonous conspiracies out of constitutionally sanctioned political actions, and according to loyalists, radicals go beyond customary norms to imagine illicit transgressions of an already constituted political order. In fact, the loyalists loosened the rules of interpretation to cast suspicion on the words and actions of the radicals who, in contrast, urged a hermeneutical approach that discriminated carefully between literal and figurative, actual and hypothetical, real and fictive. Loyalists were aggressive readers, practicing a hermeneutics of suspicion, penetrating behind the apparently innocent text of a convention for parliamentary reform to discover the real meaning, king-killing, republican revolution, the guillotine. Radicals were proponents of the “plain sense” of words and struggled against overly symbolic interpretation. Barrell shows, however, that words are never as plain and unambiguous as either side assumes. Rather, contradiction and unintended consequences are the rule not the exception. Loyalists represented King Louis’s private virtues to contrast with revolutionary public “benevolence,” but the radicals could also use those sentimental conventions of the family to promote a very different kind of politics (ch. 1). Burke’s words in the 1788 regency crisis come back to haunt him, as his opponents repeat to him the image of kings from divine disfavor being hurled from their thrones (ch. 2). What exactly did the British radicals intend to do with their conventions and political organizing? Barrell shows that the radicals were

never a realistic military threat, but at a rhetorical level radicals were not as moderate as they wanted to appear to be at their trials.

The literariness of history is apparent in chapters like the fourteenth, “The Pop-Gun Plot: A Tragicomedy by Thomas Upton.” The spy Upton could settle some personal scores and exact revenge upon some London Corresponding Society members with allegations of a violent plot against the king that were convenient for the government in 1794 during the treason trials. Upton provided a narrative that fit neatly into the government’s plans. Whether the narrative was “true” or not did not seem to matter much to the government, which was willing to play some tricks to gain a conviction. The guilt or innocence of one of the defendants, Crosfeild, hinged over a song, “Plant, plant the tree.” Did singing a regicidal song mean that the singer was himself a regicide? Did the song have any legal meaning at all? The jury, by acquitting Crosfeild, seemed to grant an aesthetic dispensation to the song and its singer.

The Epilogue on Coleridge’s “Fire, Famine, and Slaughter” is an apt conclusion, as the book’s overall theme has been the dangers of uncontrolled imagination. Coleridge in the *Biographia Literaria*, however, argues that imagination is actually an antidote to the dangerous excesses of the body and the passions. He had earlier—in 1795 when he opposed actively the Gagging Acts—linked the imagination to desire, ethical actions, and improving the world. The later conception of the imagination is convenient for a more conservative Coleridge who wants to make innocuous his apparently seditious poem, “Fire, Famine, and Slaughter,” which was republished in *Sybilline Leaves*. In the “Apologetic Preface” Coleridge makes the paradoxical argument that the very figurative nature of the seditious imagining of Pitt’s death is proof that he did not *really* want to harm Pitt. Imagination dissipates the energies that fuel actual deeds, just as—so Coleridge argues—Shakespeare’s *Venus and Adonis* imaginatively represents and desexualizes the eroticism of the poem. Shakespeare’s poem is not obscene, and Coleridge’s is not seditious, thanks to the alchemy of the imagination. The reader at this point is more than a little skeptical of Coleridge’s argument, but Barrell has not made a simplistic case for a merely political imagination. To have convicted Crosfeild for singing a regicidal song would have been unjust and even preposterous, so that at least legally there has to be some kind of aesthetic dispensation, aesthetic free space for strong expressions. On the other hand, Coleridge’s 1817 argument sounds merely like an excuse, not a persuasive description of how the imagination actually works. Appropriately enough Barrell leaves the reader with questions, problems, and points of inquiry for further investigation. As we continue the conversation about the “imagination” we have also Barrell’s enormously rich study of a political, social, and legal conflict over what and how the imagination imagined.

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The Crowd: British Literature and Public Politics by John Plotz. Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 2000. Pp. xii + 263. \$48.00 cloth, \$18.95 paper.

The subject of this book, “the crowd” and how we find it represented in six British texts, which are dated between 1800 and 1850, is a fascinating and challenging one. In the western capitalist tradition of individualism in particular, the idea of “crowds,” of grouping in any form, triggers uncomfortable reactions which are related to a perceived lack of control over the forceful, amorphous anonymity of the crowd. In his introduction, Plotz points out that new crowds emerge in England between 1800 and 1850, and that his book is “about the effects of these new crowds, riots, and demonstrations on the period’s literature” (2). The period’s literature is represented in this book by six works which are dealt with in successive chapters: Book Seven of William Wordsworth’s *The Prelude* (1805), Maria Edgeworth’s *Harrington* (1817), Thomas De Quincey’s *Confessions of an English Opium-Eater* (1821) and “The English Mailcoach” (1849), Thomas Carlyle’s *Chartism* (1839), and Charlotte Brontë’s *Shirley* (1849). The book’s overall argument is summarized as follows:

I argue that the unprecedented and unparalleled range of observations about and reflections upon crowds in aesthetic texts comes about because the enormous changes in the rules of public speech and public behavior between 1800 and 1850 make crowds, variously defined, into a potent rival to the representational claims of literary texts themselves. Sometimes the crowd comes to embody all the chaos that a literary text may revile and yet admire; at other times crowds offer a variety of new structures that help a writer delineate some future order. But every text centrally concerned with crowds proves interested in establishing the role of literature itself within a public discursive space at least partially defined by those very crowds. (2)

Plotz’s penchant for superlatives and absolutes in this paragraph (“unprecedented,” “unparalleled”) is indicative of the exuberant confidence with which he addresses his topic. This confidence works well in the initial delineation of the “inherent unfixity” (7) of definitions of the crowd, but any detailed exploration of the issues is unfortunately undermined by the rash, impatient conclusions which are drawn about the texts.

The most exciting aspect of Plotz’s thinking is his departure from Habermas’s idea that “the public sphere is essentially defined by rational interaction without contingent pressure or power exerted from without” (9). Instead,

Plotz posits that “the public sphere in early nineteenth-century Britain was not a site where rational-critical conversation either took place or failed to take place, but the arena wherein the disputes between various discursive logics were staged: the space, one might say, in which it was decided what would come to count as public conversation at all” (10). The insight that the public sphere is not necessarily characterized by a rational-critical conversation is a useful one, but it needed development beyond the idea that the public sphere is “always the product of a struggle to order meaning, a struggle at once epistemological and ideological” (10). At the end of the rather impressionistic but enthusiastic introduction Plotz argues that “the trick, then, is not to find the particular ideology that trumps all others, but to describe the matrix, the shared public space, within which competition among ideologies can take place” (12).

Unfortunately, Plotz’s readings did little to enlighten me about the matrix. Instead I was greatly troubled by a whole range of problems, some of which could be attributed to the editors and publishers of this book. Despite the flexibility and openness displayed in the introduction, I got a strong sense that Plotz had made up his mind that the authors of his six texts all had a serious (and similar) axe to grind with the “crowd.” It remains unclear throughout the book what exactly the perceived threat consists of, apart from the obvious one of being overwhelmed and annihilated by the crowd. It probably does not even matter very much, because Plotz’s teleological readings manage to distort all texts into limited manifestos of the kind of individualism which is obsessed with sole control over everything. Somehow, bafflingly so, these texts are all reduced to attempts to control or even nullify potentially crazed crowds within aesthetic boundaries, and as a result Plotz sees adversarial relationships between individuals and crowds everywhere but not very much else.

The conclusions about Wordsworth’s Book Seven, “Residence in London,” focus, not surprisingly, on Wordsworth’s efforts to establish an aesthetic realm, “a realm dedicated to the proposition that the educated reader will look for ‘some sequestered nook’ (7, 186), available on the busiest street, and pleasantest perhaps when the roar is busiest outside” (39). Wordsworth’s desire for immersion and distance, and the conflicting emotions inherent to that desire, are, however, simplified into a rather rigid control game. Because he wants to emphasize Wordsworth’s wish for “manageable” (32) scenes, Plotz refers to the Westminster Bridge sonnet, distorting Cleanth Brooks’s reading in the process: “The ‘Ships, towers, domes, theatres and temples’ that ‘lie / Open unto the fields and to the sky’ can be granted ‘still’ life, as Cleanth Brooks has famously pointed out, because ‘all that mighty heart is lying still’ (6, 13–14). Indeed, this same trope of a city *beautiful because dead* recurs in interesting later poems” (32, my emphasis). Plotz’s hasty “dead” conclusion is

based on the absurd equation of stillness with death. Since there is no endnote, no bibliographical reference to Brooks, I can only surmise that Plotz has not properly consulted *The Well Wrought Urn*, where he would have read the exact opposite: "In the same way, the tired old metaphor which sees a great city as a pulsating heart of empire becomes revived. It is only when the poet sees the city under semblance of death that he can see it as actually alive—quick with the only life which he can accept, the organic life of 'nature'" (University Paperbacks edition, 1960, 4).

The argument for an "inward-looking family-based sociality" (54) in Edgeworth's *Harrington* which "aims to create safe spaces within which objects, as well as women and harried minorities, are exempt from both promiscuous reproduction and deformation" (57) makes sense, but the chapter as a whole is marred by a flimsy extended excursion to *The Absentee*. The most irritating blunder is the consistent mistake (at least seventeen times over the course of four pages) of the main family's name ("Colodny" as opposed to the correct "Clonbrony"), and I am amazed that the book was allowed to go to press like this. Similarly, the coachmaker's name is not Mordecai Lazarus (45) (which was the name of Edgeworth's real life correspondent, Rachel Mordecai Lazarus), but Mordicai. The attribution of intentions unsubstantiated by the plot did nothing to bolster my faith as to whether this book had been carefully read at all: "Mordecai is the force of absenteeism itself, happy only when he can force those of other nationalities to live away from their homelands" (46) does not make sense. Equally absurd is the idea that Mordecai's laborers "have returned to Ireland to help bring in the Colambre/Nogent harvest" (46). For the record: the book ends with Pat Brady receiving a letter from his brother Larry urging him to return to Ireland. It is late autumn (past harvest time), and Grace Nugent (who turns out to be Reynolds) is not called Nogent. Pat is still in London, "at Mr Mordicai's, Coachmaker, London" (*The Absentee*, Penguin edition, 252), where Mordicai remains firmly ensconced (not a "Wandering Jew" (49) at all), contrary to Plotz's statement that "[a]t the novel's end, Mordecai's Irish employees return to the Colambre estate, but the Jew has no place" (49). "The plot is easily told" (45) sounded particularly unfortunate considering the garbled inaccuracies which followed.

Both De Quincey's texts formed a good choice, and the rarely discussed "The English Mail-Coach" in particular, yielded some instructive comparisons with Benedict Anderson's construction of nationalism: "England is united—but not by the way of what Benedict Anderson has described as the concurrent or parallel consumption of news distributed in identical form in a thousand newspapers. Instead, De Quincey imagines the moment of serial diffusion along a single line, with each English citizen corporeally connected by the projected joy of the citizen next down the line, or one hundreds of miles away, who will receive the same tidings and rejoice in the same manner because of

the same mail coach" (107). Unfortunately the conclusions are pushed too far: "Just as the crowds in Lombard Street can celebrate with greater vigor because of the anticipated celebrations all down each line, so too the reader's pleasure in the first page of De Quincey's essay is intensified by the secure knowledge that a fourth and fifth and fiftieth page will follow—each experienced in immediacy, yet each in its linear place" (119).

The cunning, heroic rhetoric of Carlyle's *Chartism* is analyzed convincingly in Chapter Five: Plotz argues that Carlyle on the one hand denies the possibility of articulate speech from the crowd while at the same time borrowing the energy from the crowd. The idea of the "demonstration" (130) as the crowd's speech act, with its simultaneous meetings which defy local control, could have done with some elaboration, and maybe some of the information buried in the endnotes could have been integrated into the body of the chapters. (Forty pages of notes in a small font size are rather excessive for a 193-page book.) The final chapter on *Shirley* is based on the assumption that "Brontë picks out the story of the 1811 Luddite unrest to make it seem that the danger of working-class crowds actually engendered the need for middle-class female domestication" (156). Judging from Caroline's characterization in the first half of the novel, however, I do not agree with the assertion that she started out as a "free unattached subject[s] moving in a landscape of unclear economic utility and political orientation" (157).

A bright idea underlies the origin of this book, but it has not been developed into a mature, considered argument. There is plenty of confidence and intensity in evidence, but its pyrotechnics failed to persuade me. Most disappointingly, a university press should maintain far higher standards for proof-reading and final production.

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James Joyce's Judaic Other by Marilyn Reizbaum. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999. Pp. 246. \$51.00 cloth; \$16.95 paper.

In *James Joyce's Judaic Other*, Marilyn Reizbaum has written a lively, if often quirky account of Joyce's engagement with images of Jewishness in *Ulysses*—what she refers to as his "poetics of Jewishness." It is an important project, and marks a propitious start to a more sophisticated analysis, of either Bloom's character or the complexities of Joyce's philosemitism, than we have seen until now. As Reizbaum herself points out in her Introduction, Bloom's Jewishness was traditionally overlooked or treated with painful literalism—"Is

he or isn't he?"—in Joyce criticism. The query was usually answered in the negative, so that scholars such as Ellmann felt it unnecessary to dwell on those questions and configurations now understood precisely to define both modern Jewish consciousness and the diverse shapes of antisemitism (itself a phenomenon of modernity). To Reizbaum's credit, she engages fully with the current understanding—propounded by the new Jewish cultural studies—of Jewishness as construct rather than given. But she neglects to specify that this idea of constructedness—what Reizbaum calls "impossibility"—does not necessarily speak to either the central concepts of Judaism or to the self-definition of large numbers of Jews. That is, her book—which is part of Stanford's "Contraversions" series subtitled "Jews and Other Differences"—rests firmly (or wobbles deliberately) on the "difference" side of perspectives on Jewish history and consciousness; there is no Jewish "same" in Reizbaum's poetic or cultural view. It should be acknowledged here, however, that Reizbaum is not interested in "Judaism" but in "Jewishness"—or, as she provocatively calls it at one or two points, "Jew-ishness."

So central is Reizbaum's notion of the "impossibility" of the modern Jew, and of Joyce's Bloom in particular, that her book might—and perhaps should—have been entitled "James Joyce's Impossible Jew." The motif is unquestioningly compelling, and Reizbaum's delineation of Joyce's fascination with antisemitic stereotypes as well as with the tortured self-image of modern, assimilated, Jewish intellectuals is a true contribution to Joyce studies as well as to Jewish cultural studies. In a clever, surprising sleight of counterintuitive thinking, Reizbaum argues that Leopold Bloom is believable and memorable precisely because he represents a compound of preconceptions and familiar images of the European Jew—the "stage Jew," as it were. He is also "impossible" in that he is not permitted to exist. While Reizbaum does not say so outright, the late-nineteenth, early-twentieth century corpus of antisemitic writings did lead, diabolically, to this very conclusion: the Jew is not a true human, and must therefore be eradicated. Far from endorsing this view, however, Joyce, as Reizbaum indicates, continually, concertedly, and creatively inverted the negative definition of impossibility and made it the emblem of endless possibility: inconclusiveness, restlessness, the erasure of damning delineations. Thus antisemitism is employed against itself, and modern, secular Jewishness becomes an emblem of modernist writing par excellence: elusive, disruptive, uncategorizable.

Again, both Joyce's inversions and Reizbaum's attention to them are imaginative and admirable. But is it altogether fair to attribute Bloom's credibility—the way Joyce makes him live in the minds of readers—to his "impossibility," his construction from a conglomeration of notions *about* Jews, whether spawned by antisemites or by Jews themselves? What about those readers who know nothing of such notions; why is Bloom so palpable and human to them?

And why not pay attention precisely to those factors (dismissed, as Reizbaum argues, by the critics who have used them to discount Bloom's Jewishness) that make Bloom both "impossible"—unacknowledged as subject by either the culture he inhabits or by strict definitions of Jewishness—and fascinating: his uncircumcised condition, his non-Jewish mother, his Hungarian father, his baptism, his self-conscious ruminations about all of these as well as about Zionism, Jewish liturgy, Catholic liturgy, Hebrew language, and a multitude of other vital trivia? The somewhat confusing title of Chapter 1, "The Historical Context for Joyce's 'Other' and the Thematics of Jewishness," indicates that Reizbaum's interest lies in the vocabularies of difference that formulated the Jew in early-twentieth century Europe. She details the pervasiveness of anti-semitism in the geopolitical setting of *Ulysses* and the stereotypes incorporated and upended by Joyce: that of the money-hungry Jew, the bloodthirsty Jew (falsely accused of murder and even cannibalism), the self-hating Jew. The first stereotype or libel occasions Reizbaum's initial coinage of the notion "Jew-ish"; Reuben J. Dodd, the moneylender other characters think Jewish, is so only through their crude association of Jews with usury. A teasing out of the differences between "Jewishness" and "Jew-ishness" might have been fertile; as would a further, and more sophisticated, exploration of the complexities of self-hatred (as first defined by Theodor Lessing in 1930 and more recently re-examined by Sander Gilman). To call the poet Heinrich Heine "a 'Jewish' anti-semite," as Reizbaum does, is both inaccurate and confusing to the uninformed reader. Has she placed "Jewish" in quotation marks because Heine converted to Christianity (in the hope of attaining a professional position from which he was barred as a Jew), and is he an "anti-semite" for this same reason? Reizbaum does not explain, and thus fails to do justice to the richness of her own insight: that to be Jewish in modern, secular Europe was to find oneself in an impossible position, constantly labeled and forever misconstrued; that this notion of an "impossible" identity (as poignantly evinced by a figure such as Heine) appealed to Joyce and helped shape Joycean modernism; and that modernism itself is therefore implicated in the very stereotypes of Jews spawned by antimodernists who associated Jewishness *with* modernism.

All this is implicit in Reizbaum's opening chapters, and indeed throughout the book. The very exuberance of her prose echoes what she sees as the excitement in Joyce's appropriation of Jewishness's internal contradictions, and her occasional breathlessness can be attributed to the vertiginous nature of the inversions and reversals she describes. Indeed, Reizbaum carries the reader along on the strength of this excitement, and helps us not to read Bloom naively but to understand his character as generated both by a set of historical conditions—the modernization of Jewish culture and the rise of antisemitism as a sociopolitical movement—and by a Joycean poetics partly shaped by what the author knew of Jewish culture through friends and books.

Reizbaum details Joyce's reading of authors as diverse as Victor Bérard (*Les Phéniciens et l'Odyssee*) and Leopold Sacher-Masoch (*Ghettogeschichten*); in the meatiest chapters of the book, she focuses on three figures—Friedrich Nietzsche, Sigmund Freud, and Otto Weininger (the last truly a case study of a self-hating Jew)—“whose work has . . . instantiated a method of ambiguity and contradiction, for Joyce's work and for the twentieth century.” Before moving to these European examples, she spends a pithy Chapter 2—“A Nightmare of History: Ireland's Jews and Joyce's Texts”—on Irish nationalist antisemitism and its ironies, pointing out that the Jews were preeminent scapegoats in a country of scapegoats, and that this irony was not lost on Joyce. An expanded focus on these provocative questions could contribute valuably to current postcolonial scholarship in Irish literature as well as the new Jewish cultural studies by forging a stronger linkage between the two areas of investigation. One hopes, therefore, that other scholars will indebted themselves to Reizbaum by drawing out threads implicit in her chapter, such as the affinities between the “Jewish question” (a phrase she invokes briefly in the Introduction) and the question of Irish self-definition and self-determination; Zionism and Irish nationalism; the psychic consequences of homelessness and of the centuries'-long annexation of one's own home.

Chapters 3 and 4 are the most ambitious of the book, and perhaps the most problematic for that reason. To detail the interimplications of Joyce's Jewish poetics and the Jew as characterized by Nietzsche and Freud—not to mention the deeply disturbed, sadly influential, Weininger, whom Reizbaum promises to explore in Chapter 3 but leaves for a very brief section in Chapter 4—in so short a space would be a feat even for a practitioner of concise prose. Reizbaum's writing is not concise, but rather an engaging, often charming but sometimes disconcerting, combination of expansiveness and compression. This compression is generally a virtue but occasionally leaves the reader guessing at the direction of Reizbaum's argument. She also tends to abruptly introduce new terms to her discussion, as in Chapter 3, “A Poetics of Jewishness,” when she states that Bloom's role in *Cyclops* is to undermine identity politics. The reader has not heard about identity politics up to this point and is unsure whether a new motif has been raised or merely a new term added to the increasingly complex mix of ideas. Her summaries of Freud on the subject of Jewish humor, in particular of the “types” he identifies therein, or of the derailed memoirist Daniel Paul Schreber, are lively but too compacted to enlighten the nonexpert reader who has never heard of “Schadchen” or “Schnorrer” or read Sander Gilman on these subjects. In this part of the book Reizbaum also introduces two other German terms, “mauscheln” and “Mischling,” which are central to her discussion and highly intriguing but deployed with some abandon (including grammatical abandon, since “mauscheln” is an

infinitive and cannot therefore be used as a noun, as in “a mauscheln of English” or “Bloom speaks mauscheln”). “Mauscheln,” referred to by Gilman as “the hidden language of the Jews,” is a derogatory word, dating back to the seventeenth century. It refers to a version of German spoken at that time by certain German Jews and suggests a mangling of the German language and an unsavory mode of business and dealmaking talk. Reizbaum seems to imply that Joyce’s own text enacts a version of “mauscheln”—that is, an unorthodox use of language and a subversion of fixed concepts such as gender, religion and nationality. It is a clever, even a useful suggestion—but Reizbaum fails to indicate whether Joyce himself was familiar with the term or the concept.

What makes *James Joyce’s Judaic Other* sometimes frustrating is also what makes it often delightful and most certainly fruitful for further studies of Jewishness in Joyce: the sheer energy and imagination with which Reizbaum lays out terms and concepts for our consideration. “Mischling” is another such term; Reizbaum declares it a trope for Chapter 4, “The Temptation of Circe,” and again, one wishes the chapter title had named what appears to be the chapter’s central concept. Technically, “Mischling” means simply mongrel—the offspring of a mixed union—itsself, of course, a concept with derogatory implications. Until the Nazis adapted it to refer to any person with at least one Jewish grandparent, however, the word had no particular association with Jewishness, and one wonders why Reizbaum uses this loose term rather than Joyce’s more eloquent “mixed middling,” the funny and loaded phrase from Circe. What Reizbaum seems to mean by “mischling” is “hybrid,” and indeed she uses the term to refer to any and all hybrid figures; how and why the German is particularly apt here remains unclear. Here and throughout the book, Reizbaum falls just short of a specifically Jewish reworking of postcolonial theory; because the new Jewish cultural studies has been so much influenced by the vocabularies of Bhabha et al., this remains a tall order—and a necessary one, if Jewish studies is to come into its own as a postmodern discipline. We can thank Reizbaum for launching us in this direction, and hope that perhaps a sequel or an expanded version of *James Joyce’s Judaic Other* will go further. We can also hope that the “Contraversions” series will work a bit harder to attract readers new to, or outside the area of, Jewish studies. Again, students and scholars of Joyce for whom *any* languages of Jewishness are “hidden” and unfamiliar may find that Reizbaum gives insufficient explanation to draw them into her discussions. And any reader at all must be bewildered by unedited sentences like this one: “That is, while Weininger was undone by the implications of his rearrangements of the concepts of race and sex, what becomes the inescapability of the potential for Jewishness, Circe’s ‘unmanning’ has productive potential (if only by comically uncovering), making possible, whether through sexual or linguistic error or both, Eunuch’s reproduction, father, no less, in Joyce’s scheme, to O’Halloran.” After several attempts, such a sentence

does yield meaning and rewards the reader with insight. If only Reizbaum and her editor had spent more time over the manuscript, the finished version might have offered considerably more in the way of fine revelations about gender inversion, language, and identity.

James Joyce's Judaic Other ends, wittily, with "A Pisgah Sight of the Promised Land" (Chapter 5)—an "anti-coda" which insists on *Ulysses*' own purposeful inconclusiveness and "impossibility." Here Reizbaum turns our attention to Molly/Penelope, an embodiment of the ambiguities of Jewishness whose identity surpasses even Leopold Bloom's for uncertainty; and, finally, to Molly's bed, inherited from "old Cohen" in Gibraltar—resting place for the wanderer and final seat of indeterminacy. If indeterminacy seems at times to afflict Reizbaum's own argument, her very fidelity to a Joycean poetics is the cause. As every member of a labeled group knows, one would rather go unnamed than pinned in place; but naming has its uses, too, if only to designate the place where one stands at a given moment. As it is, we must welcome this book—for its humor, its skepticism, its helpful debunking of a sentimentalized Bloom.

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Voices and Values in Joyce's Ulysses by Weldon Thornton. Gainesville, et alia: University Presses of Florida, 2000. Pp. 238. \$49.95.

Despite a somewhat misleading title, veteran Joycean Weldon Thornton's new book is a fairly traditional narrative study of the styles of *Ulysses* and Joyce's artistic designs in employing them. Joyce's work always has and still continues to invite widely varied critical approaches, which give his oeuvre plenty of room to breathe, withstand any analysis, and leave open the possibility of other readings. One of the hallmarks of Thornton's interrogation of *Ulysses* (and that is the best way to describe it), however, is an absolutist bent regarding the character of Joyce's perspective towards narrative. It seems that Thornton has thought long and deeply about Joyce's art, but his odd contention that Joyce's employment of narrative "styles" in *Ulysses* belies a moral imperative to educate his readership about the dangers of rhetoric appears to give Thornton license to browbeat the reader into accepting his conclusions. Some invective against classic texts on Joycean narrative by Steinberg, Lawrence, and Bernard Benstock adds to the already tendentious tone, and in reading this book, this reviewer felt as if he had wandered in on a heated argument fifteen years too late, long after most of the interlocutors had left the room.

The structure of the book, as would befit any traditional reading of narrative in *Ulysses*, is divided into two main parts devoted to *Ulysses* itself. In the introductory chapters, Thornton outlines his impressions of the historical development of the novel, contrasting the nineteenth-century adherence to realism with the modernist insistence on the impersonality and detachment of the author. The theme of this book arises out of Thornton's desire to locate the modern novel within the tradition of realist fiction (as the title of his previous book *The Antimodernism of Joyce's Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man* will attest). More specifically, his aim is to explode the question of Joyce's experimentalism and in a way reclaim Joyce's identity as an artist rather than as another High Modernist reactionary against flabby Victorian prose. Thornton's basic point is that Joyce's alleged experiments with style are merely a foil for the underlying moral message of *Ulysses*; namely, that Joyce's shifting between voices serves to underscore moral themes:

Joyce's rejection of valuational and stylistic relativism—the second alternative—is a broader and more complex issue, and in a sense this entire book is devoted to it, since I am arguing that Joyce persistently makes value judgments about the various styles of *Ulysses*. But there is evidence of several kinds that Joyce is not a relativist. One is that Joyce's earlier works—*Dubliners* and *A Portrait*—clearly do involve values, including the ways that certain modes of language can paralyze us, and it seems plausible to see *Ulysses* as consistent with those human and aesthetic values, rather than having abandoned them. (39)

Thornton goes on to assert that among the clues that Joyce's intent is highly moralistic are Stephen Dedalus's artistic grasping for a coherent outlook, Bloom's concerns for the other characters he encounters during his day (not the least of whom is Stephen) and the general pillorying of hardened Irish stereotypes, provincial attitudes and nationalistic sentiment (exemplified by Mulligan, Deasy, and the Citizen, among others). Thornton elaborates in this portion from his discussion of *Ulysses*' latter half:

One recurrent theme of Joyce's work, from *Dubliners* and *A Portrait* through *Ulysses*, is his concern to reveal the dangers of various ideas, institutions, and modes of discourse that have the capacity to frustrate the potential of his fellow citizens. Joyce lived in a time when an increasing array of voices and media and modes of discourse—nationalistic, religious, commercial, journalistic—arose to assert a claim on people's lives. He subsumed some of these modes and voices into his works in order to take their measure, to display for his readers their baneful effects. (95)

However, Thornton's argument, such as it is, relies upon descriptions of Joyce's technique as opposed to contextual, biographical or epistolary evidence. In other words, the majority of the book consists of an exposition on Joyce's narrative technique alone, with little or no attention to the content or context of the material Joyce wrote. The first portion of the book devoted to *Ulysses* covers what Thornton terms Joyce's initial style, which continues more or less in the same narrative mode as *Portrait*. It is typical of Thornton's approach to declare Joyce to be plagued with an unseen problem and then miraculously have Joyce resolve it in his work; the principal issue in the first part of *Ulysses*, according to Thornton, is that the initial style overcomes the modernist dichotomies radically afflicting the literature of the time. Thornton goes to great pains to lay bare the technique Joyce employs in weaving Dujardin's internal monologue into the novel, going from sentence to sentence in an effort to walk the reader through Joyce's prose in "Calypso." This is all well and good, and at times enlightening, but at the same time, Thornton's claims for what Joyce is really trying to accomplish as an artist is idiosyncratic at best: "Through its melding of these elements, Joyce's technique achieves the virtual inextricability of the authorial and figural perspectives—and thus (by implication) of inner and outer, individual and cultural, conscious and unconscious. Thus, rather than sanctioning modernist dualisms, this unified style carefully and systematically subverts them" (61).

Are we to understand Joyce's emergence as a remedy to modernist fragmentation, or as glorious endpoint in the tradition of the English novel? Thornton himself does not appear to be sure if Joyce is a closet Edwardian or not. Thornton's point about the first six chapters of *Ulysses* is just that—it comprises Joyce's subversion of High Modernism—and nothing more. It is as if Thornton harbored an unspoken grudge against the Eliot-Pound axis that demarcates the beginnings of High Anglophonic modernism, which occurred wholly apart from Joyce's artistic milieu, just as the multifarious modernisms practiced by Lawrence, Musil, Dorothy Richardson, David Jones, Djuna Barnes, and even Edna St. Vincent Millay did—each with different artistic aims, techniques, and principles.

The second half of the discussion on *Ulysses* covers the highly problematic stylistic territory of *Ulysses* from chapter seven to the end. Curiously enough, the lion's share of this section consists of discussions of the various chapters in almost entirely abstract terms. The various chapters are discussed with none of the blow-by-blow commentary that made the first part valuable, except with "Aeolus"; those portions that do include such expositions simply offer value judgments about whether the Joyce's chosen technique is any good or not. It may be hard to believe, but Thornton offers highly subjective opinions as to whether "Sirens" is up to scratch as a piece of literature. This approach is taken to an extreme at the very end of the book, where Thornton discusses

“Circe.” This episode is arguably the most problematic stretch of *Ulysses* from a narrative standpoint, but for fifteen head-shaking pages Thornton examines it without a single excerpt from the text of the chapter itself (save for an excerpt from Fritz Senn’s work), and claims it to be Joyce’s crushing refutation of psychoanalysis. This reader was left with the distinct feeling that Thornton should not have bothered to complete this study.

On the positive side, I believe it is impossible for anyone to spend a good deal of time and effort writing about Joyce at length and have nothing interesting to say; Joyce attracts to his work a unusually creative readership, and every new reading is more than likely to spark something new and rewarding. Thornton’s pages on “Oxen of the Sun,” which is for my money the most treacherous stretch anywhere in Joyce’s work (the *Wake* included), are the most enlightening and enriching I have read anywhere, by any critic. His compact synopsis of Joyce’s bearing on questions of language and medicine are a boon to anyone who needs inspiration to tackle this difficult read, and I heartily recommend that anyone with an interest in this bit of Joyceana to skip to the back of the book to study it. The rest of *Voices and Values* is more likely to aggravate than instruct.

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