Beyond The Rainbow: Predicting Intra And Intergroup Political Attitudes Of Latinx And Black Americans And The Potential For Cooperation And Conflict

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BEYOND THE RAINBOW: PREDICTING INTRA AND INTERGROUP POLITICAL ATTITUDES OF LATINX AND BLACK AMERICANS AND THE POTENTIAL FOR COOPERATION AND CONFLICT

by

RANDALL WYATT

DISSERTATION

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Approved By:

_______________________________
Advisor Date
DEDICATION

This manuscript is dedicated to the people of Dexter Avenue on the westside of Detroit. Though I do not want to lionize a harsh upbringing, certain nuanced aspects of my approach to scholarship and teaching would not exist within me had I not grown up on the impoverished streets of Dexter. So much of my work is motivated by the understanding that too many people are unseen and unserved. That understanding came when I walked out of my home on Dexter daily to see that those unseen and unserved looked much like my family and me. The only time we seen other racial-ethnicities on Dexter was when we entered store fronts and gave our money for shoddy goods, received our inferior education, or when we were accosted by law enforcement. I understood that I lived in a colony before I understood what a colony was. Dexter taught me that our salvation will only come from a collective effort from oppressed people struggling for change. This dissertation is proof that roses grow in concrete.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The writing of this dissertation was a painstaking, laborious, and stress-filled process. It would have never gotten close to completion without the heroic efforts of my committee. I would like to first thank my advisor Dr. R. Khari Brown for mentoring and guiding me every step of the way. From the helpful critiques to the long facetime discussions where you helped me to better shape and frame my ideas, your assistance was invaluable. Your tutorship helped me to not only become a better scholar and researcher, but a better professional as well. I can only hope to one day guide some young aspiring scholar as you have me.

Next, I would like to thank the members of my committee, Dr. David Merolla, Dr. Zachary Brewster, and Dr. Graham Cassano. You all pushed me to be great and I appreciate you all for demanding nothing short of excellence from me. I would also be remised if I did not thank Dr. Krista Brumley. You were not on my committee, but you have extended yourself to me and aided as if you were. My experience as a graduate student and later a candidate, would have been significantly more difficult had you not been there.

Lastly but certainly not least, I must thank my life partner Ona Wyatt. During the times when I was busy writing, reading, and researching, you held our family together. You have celebrated my triumphs and absorbed my failures and for that I am eternally grateful. It must have been difficult, but you seamlessly juggled the roles of friend, wife, mother, confidante, and psychologist. I call you my partner because the word wife is far too small to describe you.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

DEDICATION ......................................................................................................................... ii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ........................................................................................................ iii

LIST OF TABLES .................................................................................................................. vi

LIST OF FIGURES ............................................................................................................... vii

1. CHAPTER-INTRODUCTION: WHERE WE ARE ................................................................. 1

   LITERATURE ON BLACK AND BROWN RELATIONS ......................................................... 3

   THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE .......................................................................................... 6

   PLAN FOR DISSERTATION .............................................................................................. 11

   SAMPLE .......................................................................................................................... 13

   DISCUSSION ................................................................................................................... 14

2. CHAPTER: GROUP POSITIONS BEYOND THE BINARY: IMMIGRATION ATTITUDES AMONG
   BLACK, HISPANIC AND WHITE AMERICANS ................................................................. 15

   THEORETICAL BACKGROUND ....................................................................................... 19

   LITERATURE REVIEW .................................................................................................... 20

   DATA AND METHODS .................................................................................................... 25

   MEASURES ..................................................................................................................... 26

   RESULTS ......................................................................................................................... 29

   DISCUSSION ................................................................................................................... 37

3. CHAPTER: CAN’T HAVE IDENTITY POLITICS WITHOUT POLITICS: USING PERCEPTIONS
   OF NECESSARY POLITICAL ACTIONS TO PREDICT COMMONALITY AMONG LATINX
   AMERICANS .................................................................................................................... 40

   THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW ........................................... 42

   DATA AND METHODS .................................................................................................... 52

   MEASURES ..................................................................................................................... 54

   RESULTS ......................................................................................................................... 60

   DISCUSSION ................................................................................................................... 66
LIST OF TABLES

Table 2.1: Descriptive Statistics for all Variables ................................................................. 26
Table 2.2: Percentage Distribution of Nativism by Race-ethnicity ............................................. 29
Table 2.3: Cumulative Ordinal Logistic Regression Models for Nativism .................................... 30
Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics for all Variables ........................................................................ 54
Table 3.2: Zero-order Correlation Coefficients ............................................................................. 60
Table 3.3: Odds Ratios for Logistic Logit Models Predicting Commonality .................................... 61
Table 3.4: Odds Ratios for Interaction Effects on Commonality with Blacks .............................. 63
Table 4.1: Proportions and Means for Descriptive Variables ......................................................... 78
Table 4.2: Cumulative Ordinal Regression for Race-Based Policy Across Predictors .................. 82
Table 4.3: Cumulative Ordinal Regression for Moderators ......................................................... 83
Table 4.4: OLS Regression for Intraracial Black Attitudes ............................................................ 85
Table 4.5: OLS Regression for Intraracial White Attitudes ............................................................ 85
Table 4.6: Attitudes toward Affirmative Action by Group ............................................................ 86
Table 4.7: OLS Regression for Intraracial Latinx Attitudes ............................................................ 86
LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 2.1: Nativism by Immigrant Economic Threat .............................................. 32
Figure 2.2: Nativism by Outgroup Economic Threat and Race/Nationality ................. 33
Figure 2.3: Nativism by Outgroup Political Threat and Race/Nationality ..................... 34
Figure 2.4: Nativism by Outgroup Closeness and Race/Nationality ............................ 35
Figure 3.1: Racial Commonality by Acceptance of violence as a political tactic ................. 59
Figure 3.2: Traditional Political Tactics Support and Discrimination in Institutional Settings ... 64
Figure 3.3: Political Violence Support and Discrimination in Personal Settings .................. 64
1. CHAPTER-INTRODUCTION: WHERE WE ARE

For marginalized groups, the possibility for alliances with other disadvantaged groups may seem attractive and may be thought to be a means to salvation. Martin Luther King Jr. himself saw interracial coalitions as a liberating tool to radically transform the nation. In 1968, the year of his death, he and his organization, the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), scrambled to bring together Black organizations, feminist groups, working-class white organizations, and Latinx activist groups to challenge the phenomenon that he believed threatened them all, poverty (Mantler 2015). Before King, Thurgood Marshall worked closely with Mexican civil rights groups on segregation, writing briefs on and sharing notes for the *Mendez v. Westminster* case that challenged segregation of Mexican students in California (Foley 2010). King and Marshall’s attempts at collaboration with possibly their closest class and racial ally in Latinx individuals, would be later mimicked in some form by leaders such as Fred Hampton and Jesse Jackson, both dubbing their alliances a “Rainbow Coalition (Mantler 2015).” Today, the Moral Monday campaign led by the Rev. Willie Barber of Greensboro, NC adopts a similar interracial and interfaith approach to coalition building through shared interests (Wootson Jr. 2017).

However, these rainbow coalitions were, and are, often short-lived as pressing issues divide Blacks and Latinx or Hispanic groups. Many of these concerns revolved around competition, intergroup racism, and diverse understandings of the challenges each group faces. Foley (2010) writes that Mexican claims to whiteness, and more importantly their insistence on non-Blackness, often proved insurmountable for potential coalition formations. Even in the Supreme Court *Mendez* that preceded *Brown v. Board of Education*, the defense did not advocate for the end of segregation based on racial discrimination towards a minority group. They instead claimed that Mexicans were indeed White and since there was no specific law banning them from white schools
as there was for Blacks, they should be admitted (Ibid). Blacks, on the other hand, held suspicions that Mexicans would form partnerships with white workers to exclude them from seemingly scarce jobs (Ibid). Similar issues arose during the planning stages of King’s interracial “Poor People’s March” (Mantler 2015). Contemporary thinking would hold that because Hispanic Americans and African Americans occupy similar class and racialized positions, that they would naturally ally themselves with one another. However, historically this has not been the case. Similar challenges persist today in interracial faith-based coalitions like MOSES of Detroit and PICO of San Bernadino, CA in encouraging Blacks and Hispanics to form coalitions to champion one another’s issues. These contemporary endeavors will likely encounter similar obstacles as those heretofore mentioned.

The discipline of social psychology can prove invaluable in many different areas of society concerning racial-ethnic competition and coalition building. The field of social psychology includes models that place “emphasis on the individual’s connection to and embeddedness in the larger social context, the individual’s absorption of cultural and ideological norms, and the individual’s desire to fit in and become an accepted member of the social community” (Sidanius and Pratto 1999: 15). Much of the early work in social psychology focuses on the opinions and behaviors of white Americans to the detriment of the discipline. Because of the heavy emphasis on white’s attitudes exclusively, our understanding of the sociological factors associated with the views of racial-ethnic minorities is limited at a time when the United States is becoming increasingly racially and ethnically diverse. Overall, while studies of intergroup relations between various minority groups have been increasingly published over the last two decades, there still have been too few studies about how non-white groups view other non-whites. This dissertation seeks to address the gap in knowledge in social psychology concerning racial-ethnic minorities by
explicitly investigating factors related to their attitudes towards other non-whites and race-based policies.

In carrying out its goals, the dissertation looks to challenge some assumptions that have come up historically as well as contemporarily when individuals discuss the potential for partnerships between racial minorities, Hispanic and Blacks specifically. The first assumption is that Blacks and Hispanic, both racially marginalized groups, have shared interests that make them prone to form coalitions to combat white racial domination. The second assumption is that within these groups are common motivations that inform their socio-political perspectives despite internal demographic characteristics (e.g., class, immigration status and racial affiliation for Hispanics). Sociologists have long discarded notions of race as a biological construct that can predict the behaviors and attitudes of racialized groups. However, even with the discipline generally affirming race as a social construct, we still often tend to generalize and project behaviors and attitudes to these groups based mainly on skin color. Whether biological or sociological factors are being considered, it still may be unwise to assume that any of these factors lead groups to hold uniform positions.

**LITERATURE ON BLACK AND BROWN RELATIONS**

Even within racial-ethnicities, some factors cause internal divisions. For decades Hispanic Americans have been more likely than any other ethnic or racial group to have a relative that originates from a foreign country. However, historians have demonstrated that the question of citizenship has not only been a point of contention for groups such as Blacks and whites, but also for Hispanic groups themselves. Mantler (2015) highlights the anti-illegal immigration stance of major Latinx civil rights groups like the League of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC) and the American GI Federation (AGIF). These organizations petitioned against illegal immigration while lobbying against discrimination against Hispanics on the grounds that they were loyal
citizens and white patriots (Foley 2010; Mantler 2015). Joanna Dreby (2015) highlights the difficulties that arise within Hispanic families over citizenship status. Undocumented migrants often experience conflict with intimate partners and children who have citizenship status that they sometimes deploy to exercise control over the migrant’s behavior. Contemporary research conducted by Pew (2008) finds that Hispanics are more concerned than Black Americans about the possible adverse outcome of immigration. Thus, in this study, I choose to disaggregate Hispanics by nativity—between those born in the US and those born outside the US—to compare their views as two separate groups with interests that sometimes diverge from one another.

Research that looks at intergroup relations between Blacks and Hispanics tend to focus on points of commonality and competition between these groups (Kun and Pulido 2014; Telles et al. 2011). These studies find that most Hispanics and Blacks view themselves as having common interests with Black Americans, but these results are mediated by region (Jones-Correa 2011) and nativity (Mindiola Jr. et al. 2002). Jones-Correa (2011) finds that Hispanics in traditional receiving states, as Latin immigration is concerned, like New York, Texas, and California are more likely to view themselves as having more than less in common with African Americans regarding socioeconomics and politics than Hispanics in new receiving states like Arkansas, Iowa, Georgia, and North Carolina. However, higher scores of commonality measurements with Blacks were also correlated with higher scores of perceived competition measures with Blacks among Hispanics. Bobo and Hutchings (1996) study of intergroup competition found that while both Blacks and Hispanics perceive themselves to compete with one another, they perceive themselves to be more in competition with Asians and white Americans. More recent studies find that perceptions of competition with Hispanics tend to evoke distinct political behaviors among Blacks when they are made aware of the increasing presence of Latinx in the United States (Craig and Richeson 2017;
Abascal 2015). These studies find that Blacks political perspectives undergo a conservative shift when presented with information on population influxes of Latinx, and they begin to identify themselves more with Americanism than with their racial-ethnic group exclusively. These findings seem to be consistent for both whites and Asians, but not Hispanics.

Given current segregation patterns and the fact that when Blacks experience integration, they tend not to live near whites, but other racial-minorities such as Hispanics (Sampson and Sharkey 2011; Massey and Denton 1993), the population increases of that demographic may be viewed as a threat to the political and economic stability of an already vulnerable African American community. As such, Blacks may attempt to press the only advantage they have over many Hispanics—the claim of American citizenship. Scholars have found this strategy to be enacted by Blacks in places like Texas during the early to mid-twentieth century to prevent themselves from being displaced by Latin workers through the Bracero program of the Roosevelt administration (Foley 2010). Other research underscores factors like the belief that the government uses immigrants to foster anti-Black racism and economic instability for Blacks to explain the anti-immigration stances of African Americans (Nteta 2014).

In light of this information, it would seem that Black’s stances on the presence of immigrants or Hispanics, or both, is not a reflection of a conservative shift in political attitudes like those seen among whites, but a strategy to enhance racial equality for themselves. Moreover, if this is true, the same patterns may exist among Hispanics themselves if scholars took measures to disaggregate the group by nativity and observed the variances in their perceptions. Moreover, the racial fluidity among the US Hispanic population (i.e., Hispanics can identify as white, Black, or other race) adds another interesting dynamic to the study of social psychological perceptions among the group and how these identities relate to the different stances they take on policy issues.
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE

*Racial Formation*

Latinx or Hispanic Americans have a different American experience from those of Blacks who have primarily been treated as a monolith. Theirs is a history of certain factions within those ethnicities attempting to separate themselves in hopes to enjoy the benefits of citizenship. It is possible, and may even be likely, that Blacks would have done the same if only they were allowed.

Nevertheless, scholars must place these divisions between groups and within groups under greater scrutiny. Racial formation theory posits that historical, social, and political acts have led to groups of people being racialized that did not previously view themselves as such (Omi and Winant 1994). Individuals of similar backgrounds are grouped together to serve political purposes relevant to the times. Construction of various groups as "Other" served the purpose of mobilizing White animus in solidarity to justify the exploitation and alienation of said groups via slavery, colonialism, genocide, and displacement. The process of racial formation not only assigns race to groups that previously did not identify as such, but it also leads to those groups adopting those ethnoracial identities in efforts to survive. However, racial formations change over time. As seen with Arab Americans, social and political acts over periods can alter the ethnoracial assignment of a group (Jamal and Naber 2008). Consequently, I argue that historical efforts to separate Hispanic migrants from citizens has coincided with the creation of two distinct groups with similar origins. These groups hold different political attitudes that may be at odds with each other and at odds with other racialized groups that they may share class positions with (i.e., Blacks).

Despite their similar material conditions, Blacks and Latinx espouse divergent opinions on various political issues (Pew Research Center 2008, McClain et al. 2006; Mindiola et al. 2002). These public opinions vary even more when Hispanics are disaggregated by nationality. These disagreements range from issues concerning welfare, abortion rights, and immigration. Black
Americans typically express more liberal stances than Hispanics in these areas while foreign-born Hispanics tend to be the most conservative group of the three (i.e., Blacks, US-born Hispanics, and foreign-born Hispanics). Also, foreign-born Hispanics tend to feel more negatively towards Blacks than US-born Hispanics (Mindiola et al. 2002) while US Hispanics feel closer to Blacks but also in more competition with that group than foreign-born Hispanics (Jones-Correa 2011). These findings suggest that nationality and not just racial-ethnic status may have some bearing on the way individuals structure their attitudes towards racial and political issues that have significant implications. The vast differences between foreign-born Hispanics’ home country and the US might make them view the US opportunity structure more favorably and groups who still underachieve (i.e., Black Americans) more negatively. US-born Hispanics and Black Americans, having no other country as a reference, could be more pessimistic about the state of political affairs in the US and thus more positive towards groups who underachieve. The difference in national status over racial, ethnic similarities may associate with US-born Hispanics holding opinions more similar to Blacks than foreign-born Hispanics on specific issues. They may even view foreigners as threatening to their material interests even though many US-born Hispanics have close family that are migrants not yet naturalized.

Group Positions Theory

The passage above offers support for the group positions model of racial prejudice and will be used to interpret the findings expected in these studies. The group positions model, developed from Herbert Blumer’s (1958) theory of race prejudice as a sense of group position, posits that individuals view themselves as belonging to larger racial groups of which they share similar phenotypes and socioeconomic and political interests. Since these individuals view themselves as belonging to groups, they come to view people with different phenotypes as belonging to different
racial groups with competing interests to their own. The group that dominates resources is viewed as the in-group (e.g., whites in the U.S.) while the group that finds themselves struggling to gain control of resources is viewed as the out-group (e.g., Blacks and Hispanics in the U.S.). Influxes in the frequency of the out-group are thought to produce increased racial antagonism and prejudice among members of the in-group as they view their dominant material and ideological position as being threatened. This point is realized via the resistance of in-groups to social policies that redistribute power and privilege to out-groups (Bobo et al. 1996; Bobo and Kluegel 1993; Bobo 1991).

The group positions model has found consistent empirical support in public opinion research studying white American’s racial attitudes. However, there has also been empirical support that demonstrates that the theory can be extended to racial minorities (Bobo and Hutchings 1996). Though Latinx or Hispanic citizens have struggled to differentiate themselves from undocumented migrants of similar origins in the eyes of Whites and Blacks, the issue of citizenship has also repeatedly been a hindrance to solidarity within these groups. While injustices such as Jim Crow legislation have uniformly disadvantaged all or most Black Americans, individuals of Latinx origin have a unique history that has divided their interests and often stunted collective action against injustice. Foley (2010) writes

> Mexican Americans, on the other hand, have a long history of organizing in the Southwest and the upper Midwest as industrial and agricultural workers, middle-class professionals, and immigrants, but never as a single, cohesive ethnic group that prevailed over regional and class differences, much less citizenship (57).

He goes on to conclude that “stark differences separated Mexican Americans from Mexican immigrants, even as language, culture, and ancestral history bound them together (57).” The two quotes are telling. Within the African American community, studies have demonstrated that individuals hold similar attitudes and positions on political matters. Some studies even show that
despite internal class differences, middle and upper-class Blacks still feel a sense of responsibility owed to lower and working-class Blacks (Patillo 2007). These patterns may be due to a history that includes near uniform exclusion from citizenship rights, be a person slave or free (Baptist 2014), vulnerability under a Jim Crow system of terror that could bring about violence to any Black person at a moment’s notice, and the fact that many middle and upper-class Blacks live close or in the same neighborhoods as poor Blacks (Patillo 2007). Even if middle or upper-middle class Blacks escape poor ghettos, they have about a seventy percent chance to fall back to those neighborhoods (Sharkey 2011).

While they are of course various ties that bind Hispanics in the US, various other factors may place their interest at odds with one another. Studies demonstrate that the opinions of US-born Hispanics and foreign-born Hispanics are anything but uniform (Mindiola Jr. et al. 2002). Their stances on issues such as childcare, welfare, and competition and commonality with Blacks diverge from one another (Ibid.). Some scholars have interpreted conservative opinions of Hispanics as evidence that they may be unfit as allies for African Americans. Treating the group as two separate groups may uncover differences in opinions on pressing political topics and provide greater insight on how they position themselves politically and the factors involved in those stances.

The benefits of using group positions theory to view social inequality are (1) it theorizes how social structure helps to shape psychological and socially consequential behavior and (2) it provides a synthesis of racial prejudice models that have been treated as antagonistic or mutually exclusive (Bobo 1999). Group position theory makes the central claim that prejudice involves more than simple stereotypes and negative feelings but a claim to the relative positioning of groups in a racialized order. Bobo (1999) argues that “there is an intrinsically collective or group-based
dimension to racial prejudice generally, and to modern issues of racial politics in specific (448).” He goes on to assert that “the bedrock assumption of the group positions model is that the dominant group's members must make an effectively important distinction between themselves and subordinate group members (449).” This dissertation argues that internal divisions among Hispanics in the US such as nativity and racial identification play an essential role in how these groups perceive policy, which could have significant consequences for potential alliances with other racial-ethnic groups like Blacks and whites. Population predictions that indicate that the United States will be a majority-minority country by the year 2050 make endeavors such as these all the more immediate.

Although I adopt the group positions model as the theoretical framework for this dissertation, I do not altogether reject other quality theories like Social Dominance Theory (SDT) and Social Identification Theory (SIT) that have been used to interpret empirical data for studies of intergroup relations. Many of the central claims made by both theories overlap with those of the group positions model and the way I intend to use it here. For example, SDT's emphasis on social dominance orientation (e.g., socialization, group status, gender, etcetera) and how this leads to individual's adoption of legitimizing myths like racism, sexism, etcetera (Sidanius and Pratto 1999) will be explored in detail. Likewise, SIT’s insistence on conditions that shape the way individuals identify with groups as a predictor of discriminatory attitudes towards outgroups (Abascal 2015; Tajfel and Turner 1986) is a focal point of this dissertation. However, this dissertation takes a social-structural approach to analyze group attitudes. Individual's orientation and the positions they accept along with the way they identify themselves cannot be removed from larger macro-sociological processes that create the environment from which they derive. As such, exclusively psychological theories like SIT have the potential to obscure essential contextual realities for
which individuals and groups navigate. Also, SDT has been utilized to study perspectives rooted in group conflict and oppression (Sidanius and Pratto 1999). While some positions taken on policy preferences included in this dissertation may be rooted in group-based oppression, others may merely reflect ideas about the material stability of the group of the respondent and not so much ongoing attempts at bias towards outgroups. I believe that these essential points, among others, make the group positions model the best framework for analyzing results from the studies this dissertation intends to include.

**PLAN FOR DISSERTATION**

This dissertation adopts a three-article style format. Each empirical chapter will be reflective of articles that regularly appear in scholarly journals. Each chapter will have a specific theme; however, they all will attempt to build on the findings of one another by extending the applicability of the group positions model, the social identity threat hypothesis and the common ingroup identity model to Blacks, US-born Hispanics, and foreign-born Hispanics. A more detailed description of the dissertation format follows:

- **Chapter Two: Using Group Positions Theory to Understand Black and Hispanic Immigration Preferences**
  - The first study investigates the relationship between racial-ethnicity and nativism. It assesses whether the factors associated with anti-immigration preferences are consistent across racial-ethnic groups using data from the National Politics Study (NPS). Of the groups involved in the study (whites, Blacks, US-born Hispanics, and foreign-born Hispanics), a fairer immigration policy stands to benefit the Hispanic groups most. The study measures how groups position themselves in
opposition to one another based on zero-sum competition and how this positioning moderates immigration policy preferences

• Chapter Three: Using Perceptions of Political Actions to Predict Commonality among Minorities
  o This study utilizes perceptions of discrimination and perceptions of political actions necessary for fostering change to estimate commonality between Latinx Americans and other racial-ethnic groups. Interaction effects are used to predict if the effect of perceptions of discrimination on commonality differs based on one’s affinity for radical political means.

• Chapter Four: Using CIIM to Predict Political Attitudes for Race-Based Policy Initiatives
  o This study uses general perceptions of discrimination toward racial-ethnic minorities and political activity to estimate political attitudes for race-based policy initiatives like racial profiling, detainment of undocumented immigrants and affirmative action. Interactive effects test whether the effect of perceptions of discrimination toward minorities is moderated by one’s level of political activity.

• Chapter Five: Conclusion
  o These studies contribute to existing literature in social psychology by extending the use of theories mainly developed from the study of white American attitudes to other racial-ethnic groups in the US. They do not seek to mimic earlier work on white Americans merely but to discuss in greater detail the nuances of these theories and how they must be uniquely adjusted when groups such as Blacks and Hispanics are considered.
Finally, this research provides insight to individuals engaged in social justice work in various racial-ethnic minority communities. It provides information on areas where the interests of multiple groups align and areas where they disagree. This information could be used to help these communities bridge gaps with one another on important issues that affect them similarly.

These studies have several limitations. The data from the NPS was gathered during the years 2004 and 2008. While it would be optimal to have more recent data, the most critical objective of the research is to observe the patterns among the various groups concerning policy preferences and the factors shaping those preferences. With the political climate over the past ten years since the data were collected, it is likely that anti-immigrant stances and anti-affirmative action stances may have indeed increased.

Future studies will seek to expand the racial-ethnic groups observed to include Arab Americans and foreign-born Blacks and whites. These groups are quickly increasing in number in the US and thus should have their opinions considered. Later work should also seek to test factors related to positions on other policies that have racially disproportionate implications such as criminal justice preferences, social security, trade policy, and military interventions. Studying such policy positions could provide insight into the social psychological factors involved in the shaping a range of political attitudes.

**SAMPLE**

This dissertation is a quantitative project that relies on data from the National Politics Surveys (NPS) from 2004, 2008 and 2012, and the 2012 Latino Second Generation Survey. Both surveys are nationally representative studies of noninstitutionalized individuals aged 18 and over.
When describing the NPS, the principal investigators state that “the primary goal of NPS was to gather comparative data about individuals’ political attitudes, beliefs, aspirations, and behaviors at the beginning of the 21st century (Jackson et al. 2008).” A strength of the both surveys is that they include large samples of racial-ethnic minorities which provide the statistical power for quantitative methods to reveal both statistically and substantively significant variances if they indeed exist.

**DISCUSSION**

The United States looks markedly different from how it appeared some thirty years ago. It was then a mostly White nation followed by a small proportion of African Americans as the second most represented group. The nation is now increasingly Black and Brown, with estimates that in the next thirty years or so Whites will no longer be the majority group (i.e., over 50 percent of the population). Scholars, activists, and political actors alike have all weighed in on the implications of these demographic changes. While some on the political left may see them as an opportunity to build strong alliances or minority coalitions to challenge White hegemonic rule, politicians clamor to court potential ever-expanding voting constituencies. During the 2016 Presidential election, Democrats seemed confident that they would overwhelmingly win the Latinx vote. This prediction was undoubtedly guided by polls demonstrating that traditionally lower-class minority groups such as Blacks and Latinx generally vote democrat, as well as the nativist rhetoric deployed by then Republican candidate Donald Trump at the expense of Mexican migrants.

Activists such as Malcolm X have long observed that in Presidential elections, the White vote typically splits among the two major parties, and the minority vote, the Black vote in Malcolm's era, often decides the winner. Black citizens for nearly half a century have resoundingly voted Democrat, and with Trump's attacks on Mexicans, certainly, Hispanics would vote in similar numbers. Estimates demonstrate that about half of every child classified as Hispanic has a parent
that's an immigrant. There is also evidence that demonstrates that many US migrants arrive via chain migration. Thus, Trump's strongly conservative proposals for immigration reform, even suggesting building a wall along the US-Mexico border, seemed sure to gain Democrats the Mexican vote and with it, other Latinx citizens who fall under the Hispanic umbrella.

The result was entirely different, however. The Democratic nominee Hilary Clinton won the Black and Hispanic vote, but not by the margins needed to secure enough electoral votes to win the presidency. She won a smaller share of these votes than former President Barack Obama in both 2008 and 2012. Obama's first election may have been an aberration, given the significance of electing a Black President for the first time in history, but his share of the Black vote in 2012 was still seven percent higher than that of Clinton's and eight percent higher for Hispanics (Pew Research Center 2016). Not only did Clinton win a smaller share of these minority voters, but she also turned out less of these voters than 2012 rates. While Hispanic voters fell marginally from 48 percent to 47.6 percent, Black voter turnout decreased by seven percent, from 66.6 percent in 2012 to 59.6 percent in 2016 (Pew Research Center 2016).

This dissertation does not seek to address the intricacies of the 2016 Presidential election but to examine some of the underlying broader assumptions revealed by the Democratic strategy in that election as it pertains to minority voters, namely Black and Brown voters. These assumptions have implications that far transcend electoral politics.

2. CHAPTER: GROUP POSITIONS BEYOND THE BINARY: IMMIGRATION ATTITUDES AMONG BLACK, HISPANIC AND WHITE AMERICANS

Over the past sixty years, the nature of racial prejudice in the United States has shifted; today, far fewer white Americans espouse a belief in the biological superiority of whites compared to the 1950s (Schuman et al 1997; Bobo 1999; Hunt 2007). However, this shift in racial attitudes
has not led to a wide acceptance of progressive social policies that would potentially ameliorate racial inequality; instead whites continue to oppose racially progressive social policies but base their opposition on ostensibly race neutral grounds (Sniderman and Carmines 1997). For instance, rather than racial animus, many whites today oppose racial social policies based on the principle that the government should not intervene in providing equality of outcomes (Bobo, Kluegel, and Smith 1997; Krysan 2000). As researchers have attempted to understand this paradox of why a decline in prejudice has not lead to an increase in support for racially progressive social policies, a large body of research has developed which has sought to determine the covariates of racial social policy attitudes (Bobo and Kluegel 1993; Bobo 1999, Quillian 1995; Hutchings and Wong 2014; Krysan 2000; Fusell 2014; Berg 2015). This research has shown that a variety of factors including self-interest, perceptions of group economic and political threat from racial outgroups, and racial affect each play a role in shaping racial policy attitudes. To date, most of this research has been conducted within the black-white binary as researchers have been primarily interested in white Americans’ attitudes towards racial policies that would benefit black Americans such as busing and affirmative action (Krysan 2000; Fusell 2014). However, as the US becomes more diverse and the racial order shifts (Saperstein and Penner 2013), it is important for scholars to expand the purview of racial policy attitudes research to understand how individuals of varying racial backgrounds\(^1\) assess social policies that may benefit different racial groups.

For example, one specific racial policy which has been the focus of racially tinged debates for decades is immigration. Conservatives in these debates have painted immigrants, particularly undocumented Hispanic immigrants, as a nefarious out-group that may threaten the economic

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\(^1\) Despite the distinction between Hispanic as an ethnicity and white and black as races made by the US government, recent research indicates that most Americans see these concepts as interchangeable and their impacts in shaping lives are very similar (Saperstien and Penner 2013). Following this approach, we use the term race to refer to white, black and Hispanic groups.
well-being and safety of native-born US Americans. This issue became particularly contentious during the 2016 presidential campaign when then candidate Donald Trump drew on anti-immigrant sentiment and made his impracticable plan to build a wall along the entire southern border of the US a signature issue in his campaign. After Trump’s surprise victory in the 2016 presidential election, a media narrative developed which cast the 2016 election as an electoral revolt wherein the festering frustrations of the white working class bubbled over and upended conventional political wisdom (West 2016).

This narrative attributed white working animosity towards immigrants and Trump’s subsequent electoral victory to two primary drivers. First, whites blamed their poor economic predicaments and declining standard of living on undeserving minorities including undocumented Mexican immigrants who they view as robbing them of their proprietary claim to economic and political power (West 2016). Second, the electoral revolt was aided by a lingering menace of racial prejudice among working class whites, who participated in a “whitelash,” against the nation’s first black President (Blake 2016). Thus, the media portrayed white Americans as uniquely nativist and sensitive to both economic threats and racial dog whistles when evaluating immigrants. This general narrative is supported by empirical research which indicates that Trump’s victory was indeed attributable in part to strong support from white working-class voters and that voters who viewed immigration as an important social issue were the most likely to support Trump (Morgan and Lee 2018; Roper Poll 2017).

However, this framing of anti-immigration sentiment being solely associated with whites somewhat ignores the patterns found in research literature regarding the objective consequences of immigration on racial minorities. Research suggests that whites are only marginally impacted by immigration (Borjas et al. 2010) with the brunt of the negative consequences falling on Black
Americans (Shihadeh and Barranco 2010). Moreover, since immigrants from Latin America often gain employment in low skilled labor sectors, black and Hispanic citizens, who are more likely to be represented among the poor and working classes, disproportionately feel the economic consequences of immigration. Thus, it follows that any native born American regardless of racial identity may oppose immigration because immigrants could potentially be perceived as a racialized out-group which threatens their economic and social standing. However, relatively few studies have explored how racial minorities in America think about immigration or whether the factors that predict immigration attitudes vary by race, as the bulk of the research literature on immigration attitudes has focused primarily on the attitudes of white Americans (Schacter 2016; Flores and Schachter 2018; Berg 2010) or in some cases white and Black Americans (Hutchings and Wong 2014).

Additionally, the situation becomes more complicated when we consider that over a third of Hispanics in the US are foreign-born, a status which may inform their opinions on racial social policies including immigration (Waters 1999). For example, research has demonstrated that foreign-born Hispanics view African Americans more negatively and as having less commonality to themselves than US-born Hispanics (Mindiola et al. 2002; McClain 2006). However, the bulk of extant research on immigration attitudes rarely even includes Hispanic Americans let alone disaggregates them by foreign-born status. Thus, little is known about whether the immigration attitudes of Hispanic immigrants diverge from US-born Hispanics.

This paper seeks to address these gaps in the research literature by investigating two main questions. First, we ask, what are the immigration attitudes of white, Black, native-born Hispanic and foreign-born Hispanic Americans? Secondly, we ask, do race and nativity\(^2\) moderate the

---

\(^2\) Throughout this paper, we use the term nativity to refer to country of birth (US or foreign-born)
impact that self-interest, economic and political threat, and affect toward racial outgroups play in shaping immigration policy attitudes? This research contributes to existing literatures on racial policy attitudes by investigating whether typical models that predict racial policy attitudes among whites can be applied across racial and nativity categories.

THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

Much of the sociological research on racial policy attitudes draws on Blumer’s (1958) theory of racial prejudice as a sense of group position. This approach posits that individuals’ attitudes about race derive from their view of the positioning of their own racial in-group in relation to racial out-groups. For Blumer, racial prejudice or negative feelings about racial out-groups arise from the following four necessary conditions: 1) a feeling of superiority, 2) a belief that the subordinate group is alien and different, 3) a sense of proprietary claims over certain rights, statuses, and resources, and finally 4) a perception of threat from subordinate group members. Researchers who have applied this model to racial policy attitudes assert that opposition to racial policies is not due to an adherence to fundamental moral principles or even emotional dislike for racial minorities, but are instead due to a perception that benefits for racial outgroups represent a threat to the group interest of the racial in-group (Bobo 1999). For instance, the model indicates that opposition to immigration is not based on an adherence to abstract principles (e.g., belief in national sovereignty), or a dislike of immigrants, but is instead due to the perception that immigrants pose a threat to the relative position of their racial in-group.

Social psychologists have expanded Blumer’s original theory to include not only dominant racial groups in society (e.g., white Americans) but also minorities such as Asian, Black, and Latino or Hispanic Americans (Bobo and Massagali 2001; Bobo and Hutchings 1996). These scholars argue that minorities view members of other minority groups as political and economic threats and subsequently support policies that have the effect of excluding those groups from
competing for scarce resources. Based on this theoretical framework, it may follow that Black, US-born and foreign-born Hispanic Americans will espouse negative views toward immigration if they hold negative opinions of racial outgroups or believe that immigrants pose a threat to the economic or political standing of their own racial group.

However, given obdurate white hegemony in United States, we question whether the same patterns that characterize white Americans will be operative among racial minorities. Namely, given the unique position of whites at the top of the US racial hierarchy, it is possible that white’s immigration attitudes will be associated with a variety of threats to their economic and political standing, whereas policy attitudes among Black and US born Hispanic Americans will be primarily related to threats immigrants pose to their own self-interest and animosity toward racial outgroups. In the empirical models presented below, we test whether common predictors of racial policy attitudes among whites also shape the immigration attitudes of black, US born and foreign-born Hispanic Americans.

**LITERATURE REVIEW**

Given that the most prominent models used to explain racial policy attitudes are based on the premise that individuals oppose these policies due to a feeling of threat from racialized outgroups, research in this area is characterized by studies that use a variety of operationalizations of individual, group, and contextual threat to predict policy attitudes (Krysan 2000). For example, one of the primary predictors of racial policy attitudes such as immigration is perceived individual threat, often operationalized as economic self-interest (Kluegel and Smith 1986; Bobo and Hutchings 1996; Berg 2015). This reasoning suggests that individuals are generally opposed to policies that they believe will have a negative impact on their personal economic well-being. In the context of immigration, the self-interest model suggests that individuals whose employment situations would be the most adversely affected by increased immigration would be the most likely
to oppose increased immigration, a logic that leads to self-interest being operationalized simply as individual SES or with contextual variables that gauge the amount of immigration in an individual’s geographic area (Berg 2009; Berg 2015; Kunovich 2017).

However, we argue that it is also important to gauge the subjective nature of self-interest in shaping attitudes towards immigration. Given the degree to which the immigration issue has been demagogued in the past several decades (Brown 2016), many Americans may believe that increasing immigration could be a hindrance to their own economic well-being even if there is little objective immigrant threat based on SES or geography. Indeed, the literature generally indicates that subjective views of how immigrants effects an individual socioeconomic standing are stronger determinants of immigration attitudes than measures that gauge individuals’ objective positioning (Ilias, Fennelly, and Federico 2008; Fennelly and Federico 2008). In other words, we maintain that it matters less if individuals are materially disadvantaged by immigration and matters more if they believe that immigrants pose a threat to their self-interest. Thus, in the empirical models developed below, we utilize a measure of self-interest that gauges the subjective perception of respondent’s belief that immigrants pose a direct threat to their own economic well-being.

A different conceptualization of threat is group threat, a concept that directly follows the group positions model. Rather than gauging the perceived individual threat that a racial outgroup poses to an individual, group threat measures tap the degree to which individuals view racial outgroups as a threat to the economic and political standing of their own racial group (Bobo 1999). The most common of these measures are “zero-sum” threat measures developed by Bobo and colleagues (Bobo and Kluegel 1993; Bobo et a. 1997; Bobo 1999; Bobo 2000; Hutchings and Wong 2014; Fussell 2014; Kyrsan 2000; Berg 2010, 2015). This body of research is fairly consistent in showing that among whites, perceived group threat from racial outgroups is
associated with opposition towards racial social policies. As noted above, what is less clear is whether racial minorities will also base their attitudes towards immigration policy on a general belief that racial outgroups pose an economic and political threat to their own groups.

Several studies have focused on Blacks and Hispanic views of commonality and competition with one another. These studies generally find that both groups feel that they have more rather than less in common with the opposite group in areas of socioeconomics and politics (Jones-Correa 2011; Mindiola et al. 2002). These commonality attitudes differ, however, by the history that states have with Hispanic immigration (Jones-Correa 2011) and by nationality (Mindiola et al. 2002). Hispanics in states that have traditionally received Hispanic immigrants reports higher levels of commonality and competition with African Americans than Hispanics in states new immigration destinations in the southeastern US (Jones-Correa 2011). Moreover, variables measuring greater assimilation (e.g., English speaking proficiency, citizenship status, having Black friends or coworkers) correlates with both greater perceived commonality and competition with African Americans.

Country of birth may play a role as well, as foreign-born Hispanics report less contact with African Americans (Mindiola et al. 2002) and more perceived competition with Blacks than US-born Hispanics. However, but this perceived competition with Blacks is mainly reflective of their perceptions of competition with other racial groups generally as Foreign-born Hispanics also report higher perceived competition with other Hispanics than with Blacks (Morin et al. 2011). Thus, while lack of familiarity is associated with foreign-born Hispanics being more susceptible to stereotypical attitudes towards Blacks, greater familiarity may make them more susceptible to perceived competition with other Hispanics. These patterns suggest that foreign-born Hispanics
may also have a socioeconomic interest in restrictive immigration policies to insulate themselves from increased labor competition.

Using an experimental design, Craig and Richeson (2018) find that when engaged with content that emphasizes the influx of Hispanics in the population; non-Hispanic racial minorities identify as more conservative and support more conservative positions; however they find no evidence that Hispanics experience the same conservative shift under such conditions. Yet this study is characteristic of the literature as they examine Hispanics as a monolith and do not separate the group by nativity. Abascal (2015) similarly finds that African Americans tend to adopt a more nationalist than racial identity under similar conditions later tested by Craig and Richeson. That is, when presented with information suggesting that the proportion of foreign-born Hispanics is behind the increase in population, Africans Americans score higher on scales measuring conservatism than they did before being presenting with such information. While this research places Blacks, whites, and Asians within the model, US-born Hispanics are not analyzed. This research, while instructive, implicitly assumes that Hispanics generally do not feel threatened by Hispanic immigration despite many empirical findings to the contrary.

Thus, the overall research literature paints a complex picture on whether black and US and foreign-born Hispanic Americans view group-based competition with each other. Moreover, it remains unclear if these perceptions of group-based competition lead to variation in policy attitudes. As noted, the group positions model was developed to explain whites’ attitudes towards subordinate groups; as such, applying the model directly to relations among minority groups may be questionable. In particular, it is unclear if black and US-born Hispanic Americans will have the same sense of proprietary claims over certain rights, statuses, and resources as white Americans do. Given that it is this proprietary claim to the spoils of society that link perceptions of threat into
opposition to racial policies, we question whether the policy attitudes of black and Hispanic Americans will have the same association with perceptions of threat as whites do.

The final predictor of racial policy attitudes that we employ in our empirical models is racial affect. As opposed to individual or group threat, racial affect refers to how people feel emotionally about racial outgroups. In this context, affect is also different from prejudice as it is an emotional rather than a cognitive concept. As noted by Krysan (2000) affect’s role in shaping racial policy attitudes has been studied less often in sociology than measures of threat and or measures of old fashioned or symbolic prejudice. However, the research that has investigated of affect among whites has generally shown that affect does play a role in shaping racial policy attitudes (Hughes 1997; Gilens; Kinder and Sanders 1996). Gilens found that negative feelings generated towards Blacks was associated with opposition to welfare while Kinder and Sanders (1996:291) found that whites who scored high on scales of symbolic racism, or "abstract, moralistic racial resentments" concerning Blacks, were more likely to oppose policies with perceived racial undertones such as fair employment, school desegregation, preferential hiring, and college quotas.

Regarding affect among racial minorities, some studies have found Black resistance to immigration to be less racialized in nature than whites’ opinions. Nteta (2014) suggests that Black opposition to Hispanic immigration is driven by similar factors that were found to be associated with their earlier opposition to white ethnic immigration (e.g., the Irish and Italians) in the 1900s. These factors included political and economic competition, egalitarianism, the perception that new immigrants seek to alienate Blacks, and the perception that racism fueled immigration policies. Research on intergroup stereotypes finds that while Blacks hold some negative views of Hispanics, they also view Hispanics as having positive qualities (Mindiola et al. 2002). For example, African
Americans were found to believe that Hispanics were more family oriented and hardworking than Blacks themselves. Hispanics have consistently been found to view Blacks more negatively than Blacks view them (Mindiola et al. 2002) with some studies demonstrating that foreign-born Hispanics view Blacks more negatively than both US-born Hispanics and whites (McClain et al. 2012). Here again, while the research literature has investigated how racial minorities view each other, less research has looked at whether these views also translate into attitudes towards social policies that putatively benefit particular racial groups. In the analyses that follow, we examine whether racial affect shapes attitudes towards immigration among white, black, US born and foreign-born Hispanic respondents.

DATA AND METHODS

Sample

This study utilizes data from the 2004 and 2008 National Politics Study (NPS). The NPS is a nationally representative survey of non-institutionalized individuals, aged 18 and over, designed to compile information on individuals' political opinions, aspirations and behaviors concerning contemporary issues in U.S. politics (Jackson et al. 2008). One of the strengths of the NPS is that it includes large enough samples of various racial groups in the U.S. For this study, the NPS has a large enough sample of Hispanics to allow us to distinguish between native-born respondents and foreign respondents for comparison to the other race groups.

For the 2004 survey, a total of 3,339 interviews were conducted from September 2004, shortly before the presidential election, until February 2005. These interviews consisted of 756 African Americans, 919 non-Hispanic whites, 404 Caribbean blacks, and 503 Asian Americans. The 2008 NPS was conducted from September 2008 to December 2008. There were fewer completed interviews in 2008 compared to 2004. There were 1,477 respondents in total, which included 519 non-Hispanic whites, 329 African Americans, 444 Hispanics, 88 Asian Americans,
and 97 Caribbean blacks. Although both data sets include data from five racial groups, this study is only concerned with the views of four groups: whites, blacks, US-born Hispanics, and foreign-born Hispanics. We utilize multiple imputations (M=10) to account for item-level missing data, yielding a sample of 3,107 respondents.

Table 2.1: Descriptive Statistics for all Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>SD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nativism</td>
<td>2.12</td>
<td>.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPS 2004 Control (1=Yes)</td>
<td>.76</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American Hispanic (1=Yes)</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black (1=Yes)</td>
<td>.30</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White (1=Yes)</td>
<td>.34</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigrant Hispanic (1=Yes)</td>
<td>.21</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Under 30 yrs of age (1=Yes)</td>
<td>.17</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Between 30 to 50 (1=Yes)</td>
<td>.51</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low Income (1=Yes)</td>
<td>.53</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South (1=yes)</td>
<td>.45</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West (1=yes)</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High School Dropout (1=Yes)</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College Graduate (1=Yes)</td>
<td>.30</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservative (1=yes)</td>
<td>.18</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parent US Born (1=yes)</td>
<td>.74</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women (1=yes)</td>
<td>.60</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Racial Stratification Belief</td>
<td>2.81</td>
<td>1.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigrants Take Jobs (1=Yes)</td>
<td>.34</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outgroup Job Threat</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Out Group Political Threat</td>
<td>2.11</td>
<td>.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Out group Closeness</td>
<td>2.67</td>
<td>.70</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source, National Politics Study (2004; 2008); N=3,071; Imputed Data

MEASURES

Dependent Variable: Attitudes Towards Immigration

Table 2.1 presents descriptive statistics for all analysis variables. Respondents were asked one question to measure their attitudes towards immigration. The question asked if they believed the U.S. government should increase immigration, leave it as it is, or decrease immigration. The variable was coded so that higher values indicated greater opposition to immigration.

Independent Variable: Race/ Foreign Born Status
The primary independent variable is the race/nativity of the respondent. As mentioned, this study is interested in the views of whites, blacks, and both native and foreign-born Hispanics. We coded Hispanic individuals who answered that they were raised or born in a foreign country as foreign-born (immigrant) Hispanics while coding all other Hispanics as US-born Hispanics. The number of blacks and whites who qualified as foreign-born under this coding was too small to produce precise estimates; as such, they were excluded from the sample. This procedure yields a four-category measure of race/nativity: US Born Hispanic, Black, White, and Immigrant Hispanic. For the ordinal logistic regress models estimated below, we use foreign-born Hispanic as the reference category.

*Moderators*

To measure self-interest, we use a question that asks respondents if they believe that immigrants take jobs from American workers. The variable is dichotomous with an answer of “yes” coded 1 and “no” coded 0.

Our second moderator assesses the degree to which respondents generally see racial outgroups as a threat to their racial in-group’s economic security. All respondents ranked their agreement on a four-point Likert scale with two items that said, "more jobs for (blacks/whites/Hispanics) means fewer jobs for people like me," one for each outgroup (e.g., black respondents were asked about whites and Hispanics). We averaged both of the outgroup measures for each respondent to create a measure for general outgroup economic threat, with higher numbers indicating more perceived outgroup job threat.

The third moderator measures outgroup political threat. This measure is parallel to the economic threat measure. The respondents rated their agreement on a four-point Likert scale with the statement “more political influence for (blacks/whites/Hispanics) means less political influence
for people like me.” Again, the responses to the two items, one for each outgroup, were averaged to create the measures of outgroup political threat with higher values indicating more political threat.

Our final moderator is a measure of racial affect. All respondents were asked on a four-point scale how close they feel to whites, Blacks and Hispanics. For each respondent, we took the average of respondents' ratings of the two racial outgroups. This procedure yields an outgroup closeness measure coded so that higher numbers indicate a closer feeling to racial outgroups.

Control Variables

The multivariate models presented below also control for a variety of demographic factors that may impact immigration attitudes. First, we control for age using two dummy variables. The first dummy variable indexes those who are under 30 years of age (1=yes) and the second indexes respondents who are between 30 and 50 years of age (1=yes), with respondents over 50 years old serving as the reference category. We expect older individuals to display more opposition to immigration than their younger counterparts. We control for economic standing using a variable indexing low income (1=yes) individuals from their higher income counterparts. We expect that low-income individuals will show more opposition to immigration than respondents with higher incomes. We account for regional differences using two dummy variables for the south (1=yes) and west (1=yes), comparing these regions to the rest of the country. Education is accounted for using two dummy variables, which compare individuals who completed less than high school (1=yes) and those who are college graduates (1=yes) to respondents with a high school diploma only. We expect individuals with less than a high school diploma to display more opposition to immigration, and those with a college degree to display less opposition to immigration compared to respondents with a high school degree. Political ideology is indexed by a dummy variable
comparing respondents who self-identified as *conservative* (1=yes) to those who identified as either political moderate or liberal. *Parent US-born* (1=yes)\(^3\) compares individuals whose parents were born in the US to second-generation immigrants. *Women* (1=Yes) compares women to men. We expect women to be less opposed to immigration than men. Finally, *racial stratification belief* is a measure of an individual's beliefs about the causes of racial stratification. This variable asks, "If ethnic minorities are poor, they should blame themselves;" this variable ranges from 1 to 4, with higher values indicating a greater endorsement of this statement. We expect individuals who express greater endorsement of this item to display higher levels of opposition to immigration.

**Table 2.2: Percentage Distribution of Nativism by Race-ethnicity**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Immigrant Hispanic</th>
<th>US-Born Hispanic</th>
<th>Black</th>
<th>White</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Increase Immigration</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>22.8</td>
<td>15.8</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>12.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Keep Immigration the Same</td>
<td>59.4</td>
<td>68.7</td>
<td>59.6</td>
<td>59.2</td>
<td>53.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decrease Immigration</td>
<td>26.7</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>24.7</td>
<td>32.2</td>
<td>34.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>3,071</td>
<td>645</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>933</td>
<td>1,043</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source NPS (2004; 2008) Imputed Data; Pooled from 10 imputations; chi square 184.921 p<.001

**RESULTS**

Table 2.2 shows the percentage distribution of immigration attitudes by race/nativity. Table 2 indicates that among the four groups, immigrant Hispanic respondents are the least nativist with the highest percentage indicating that immigration should be increased (22.8%) and the lowest percentage indicating that immigration should be decreased (8.5%). US-born Hispanics are the second least nativist group with 24.7% suggesting that immigration should be decreased and 15.8% support increasing immigration. Immigration attitudes among whites and blacks are similar.

\(^3\) 6.7% of immigrant Hispanic respondents, 64.2% of US Born Hispanic respondents, 98.8% of black respondents, and 96.5% of white respondents had US-born parents. Models estimated without this variable were substantively identical to those presented here.
almost identical percentage of white (34.0%) and Black (32.2%) respondents favor decreasing immigration, while somewhat more white respondents favor increasing (12.3%) immigration compared to Black respondents (8.7%). The multivariate models estimated below seek to determine if this association remains after controlling for a variety of background variables and if the sources of these attitudes vary by race/nativity.

Table 2.3: Cumulative Ordinal Logistic Regression Models for Nativism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
<th>Model 5</th>
<th>Model 6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NPS 2004 Control</td>
<td>1.06</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>1.02</td>
<td>1.04</td>
<td>1.03</td>
<td>1.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US-Born Hispanic</td>
<td>2.12***</td>
<td>1.62**</td>
<td>1.48*</td>
<td>1.27</td>
<td>1.76</td>
<td>2.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>3.39***</td>
<td>2.07***</td>
<td>1.82**</td>
<td>1.18</td>
<td>1.71</td>
<td>4.19</td>
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<td>White</td>
<td>3.37***</td>
<td>2.42***</td>
<td>1.89**</td>
<td>0.71</td>
<td>0.94</td>
<td>8.01</td>
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<td>Under 30 years of age</td>
<td>0.58***</td>
<td>0.58***</td>
<td>0.58***</td>
<td>0.59***</td>
<td>0.58***</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Between 30 to 50</td>
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<td>0.99</td>
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<td>Low Income</td>
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<td>0.93</td>
<td>0.93</td>
<td>0.94</td>
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<td>1.23</td>
<td>1.27*</td>
<td>1.27*</td>
<td>1.28*</td>
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<td>High School Dropout</td>
<td>0.59***</td>
<td>0.59***</td>
<td>0.62***</td>
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<td>0.60***</td>
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<tr>
<td>College Graduate</td>
<td>0.71***</td>
<td>0.73***</td>
<td>0.75**</td>
<td>0.73**</td>
<td>0.72**</td>
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<td>Conservative (1=yes)</td>
<td>1.41*</td>
<td>1.43**</td>
<td>1.39**</td>
<td>1.37**</td>
<td>1.38**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parent US Born (1=yes)</td>
<td>1.39*</td>
<td>1.38*</td>
<td>1.41*</td>
<td>1.42*</td>
<td>1.41*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women (1=yes)</td>
<td>1.20**</td>
<td>1.20*</td>
<td>1.21*</td>
<td>1.22**</td>
<td>1.21**</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Racial Stratification Belief</td>
<td>1.30***</td>
<td>1.29***</td>
<td>1.29***</td>
<td>1.28***</td>
<td>1.30***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigrants Take Jobs</td>
<td>2.48***</td>
<td>1.06</td>
<td>2.35***</td>
<td>2.43***</td>
<td>2.45***</td>
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<td>Outgroup Job Threat</td>
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<td>0.85</td>
<td>1.11*</td>
<td>1.12*</td>
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<tr>
<td>Out Group Political Threat</td>
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<td>1.06</td>
<td>1.06</td>
<td>0.92</td>
<td>1.06</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Out group Closeness</td>
<td>0.83***</td>
<td>0.84**</td>
<td>0.31**</td>
<td>0.84***</td>
<td>1.06</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Main Effects Models

Table 2.3 presents odds ratios from a series of cumulative logistic regression models designed to test this study’s hypotheses. A control variable for the 2004 NPS is included in each model to ensure that the results derived from the analyses are independent of the year from which the survey was taken. In each model, this control variable is not significant, meaning that immigration attitudes do not vary by survey year. Model 1 enters the dummies for race/nativity alone, this model demonstrates that each group, whites (Odds Ratio (OR) = 3.37; p<.001), Blacks (OR=3.39; p<.001), and US-born Hispanics (OR=2.12; p<.001), are more likely than foreign-born Hispanics to endorse the nativist belief that immigration should be decreased from its current levels. Moreover, this model shows that there is no difference in the immigration attitudes of black and white Americans.
Model 2 adds demographic control variables. Individuals under the age of 30 display less opposition to immigration than those over 50 (OR=.58, p<.001). Both variables indexing educational attainment have significant effects on nativism. Contrary to our expectations, respondents who did not graduate from high school (OR=.59, p<.01) and those who obtained college degrees (OR=.71, p<.001) display lower levels of opposition to immigration compared to respondents who obtained high school diplomas. Political conservatives (OR =1.410, p<.01) display higher levels of opposition compared to their more liberal counterparts, as do women (OR=1.20, p<.01) and those whose parents were born in the US (OR=1.39, p<.01). Finally, individuals who believe that racial minorities should blame themselves for their lower social standing are more opposed to immigration (OR=1.391, p<.001).

Model 2 also adds the main effects of the moderating variables. Three of the four moderators have significant main effects in the whole sample. Individuals who agree that immigrants take jobs (OR=2.48, p<.001) have more nativist feelings, as do individuals who perceive a greater general outgroup economic threat (OR=1.12, p<.05). Individuals who view themselves as closer to racial outgroups are more opposed to immigration (OR=.83, p<.001). Outgroup political threat measure does not have a significant effect on immigration attitudes in Model 2. The inclusion of additional variables in Model 2 reduces the odds of opposing immigration slightly for each race/nativity group; however, each group is still more likely to do so than immigrant Hispanics. The interaction effects models that ensue are designed to determine if the factors that shape immigration attitudes vary by race and nativity.

**Figure 2.1: Nativism by Immigrant Economic Threat**
Models 3-6 present multiplicative effects between the four moderators and the race/nativity dummy variables. Model 3 adds interaction terms between race/nativity and self-interest. Model three shows that the interaction effect for each race/nativity group is significant, indicating that self-interest increases opposition to immigration among these groups more than does among immigrant Hispanics. Figure 2.1 shows this effect graphically by displaying the probability of believing that immigration should be decreased by race/nativity and self-interest. Figure 2.1 shows that among blacks, whites and US Born Hispanics, opposition to immigration is substantially lower among those who do not believe that immigrants pose an economic threat to native-born Americans compared to those who believe that immigrants pose an economic threat. However, among immigrant Hispanics, there is little difference based on self-interest. These findings indicate that the effect of self-interest on shaping nativism is not observed only among white Americans; instead, self-interest increases nativist tendencies among all native-born Americans.

**Figure 2.2: Nativism by Outgroup Economic Threat and Race/Nationality**
Model 4 presents the interactions with general outgroup economic threat. In Model 4, we find a significant interaction effect between the economic threat measures and the dummy variables indexing both black and white respondents. This pattern suggests that the effect of general economic threat on immigration attitudes is most pronounced among black and white respondents. Figure 2.2 shows this pattern graphically. Figure 2.2 shows that among those with low levels of outgroup economic threat (-1 standard deviation) there are relatively small differences in immigration attitudes among the race/nativity groups. However, as perceptions of economic threat increase, there is a marked increase in opposition among white and to some degree black respondents. The resulting pattern is that among those with higher levels of outgroup economic threat (+1 SD) there is substantial variation immigration attitudes.

**Figure 2.3: Nativism by Outgroup Political Threat and Race/Nationality**
Model 5 includes interactions between the race nativity dummy variables and the measure of outgroup political threat. Model 5 indicates that the effect of outgroup political threat is far more pronounced among white respondents compared to the other three groups. This interaction is presented graphically in Figure 2.3. As Figure 2.3 shows, there is virtually no association between outgroup political threat and immigration attitudes among US Born Hispanic, Black, or immigrant Hispanic respondents. However, among white respondents, there is a 17% great chance of endorsing nativist beliefs among those high on outgroup political threat compared to those who are low on outgroup political threat.

**Figure 2.4: Nativism by Outgroup Closeness and Race/Nationality**
The final model includes interaction terms between the race/nativity groups and outgroups closeness. Similar to Model 5, the results indicate that the negative effect of outgroup closeness on immigration attitudes is primarily observed for white respondents. Figure 2.4 shows this pattern graphically. As Figure 2.4 shows, among those with low levels of outgroup closeness, whites display the highest level of opposition to immigration compared to the other three race/nativity groups. As outgroup closeness increases, whites’ opposition declines more rapidly than opposition of the other groups. The result is that among those with higher levels of outgroup closeness, there are few racial differences in attitudes towards immigration.

In the models above we use the outgroup closeness as a measure of racial attitudes. To determine the robustness of this pattern, we also estimated models (not shown) that included an interaction between the racial stratification belief and the race/nativity groups. The results from this model were substantively consistent with the results from model 6. Namely, the results indicated that the positive effect of racial stratification beliefs (indicating the belief that minorities are to blame for their lower standing) was primarily observed among white respondents. This pattern adds further evidence for the pattern that the immigration attitudes of white are animated by a desired to maintain economic and political control, as well as negative feelings towards racial minorities.
DISCUSSION

This study adds several new findings to current understandings of immigration policy attitudes and the applicability of the group positions model across racial and nativity groups. By examining the correlates of immigration attitudes across four race/nativity groups, we show important similarities and differences in the predictors of immigration attitudes among whites, Blacks, US-born and foreign-born Hispanics. Specifically, we show that while the immigration attitudes of whites are animated by a variety of factors, the attitudes of US born Hispanics and black Americans are mainly linked to their own economic self-interest, rather than group-based views of out-group economic and political threat.

Self-interest was a predictor of immigration attitudes among all of the US born racial groups. This finding indicated that when individuals perceive that immigrants pose a direct threat to their economic self-interest; they subsequently favor reducing immigration into the US. These findings suggest that the standard argument posited by prominent political figures that immigrants are a threat to US-born workers may be effective across racial and nativity lines. Moreover, this pattern adds further evidence that subjective self-interest is a more important factor in shaping policy attitudes than objective self-interest as measured by socio-economic as individuals’ perceptions about the specter of immigrant threat outweigh the reality of this threat. This interpretation is further buttressed by the pattern of no association between income and immigration attitudes and a counter-intuitive pattern of college graduates evincing great opposition to immigration than those with a high school degree alone. This pattern indicating the power of subjective perceptions of individual threat underscores the important role that political and media framing of the immigration issue can have on individuals’ attitudes regarding immigration policy (Brown 2016; Abascal 2015; Craig and Richeson 2018).
In contrast to self-interest, the racial groups examined in this study displayed differences in how group-based threat measures shaped immigration policy attitudes. Whites were the only group shown to display significantly higher opposition to immigration when adhering to both economic and political out-group competition. Although Blacks were also found to be slightly more likely to display nativism tendencies if they perceived an economic threat from out-groups, this difference was modest relative to the way that both economic and political outgroup threat shaped the attitudes of white Americans. Consistent with Abascal (2015), we believe that these findings suggest that the group positions model is mainly applicable to whites. Specifically, we argue that these patterns indicate that whites uniquely attempt to preserve their privileged group position at the top of the racial hierarchy in the US. In some ways, the obdurate hegemonic hold on economic and political power that whites enjoy also appears to make them more sensitive to economic and political threats from racial outgroups.

One irony here is that while discussion of “identity politics” are often code words for racial minorities, it is whites who seemingly have the most stake in retaining a group based hold on economic and political power in the US and are the most sensitive to group based threats to their economic and political power (Lipsitz 2006). The totality of the effects of self-interest, group-based economic and political threat, and racial affect among whites can also explain how the nativist identity politics of the Trump campaign gained such traction among whites; the demonization of immigrants activated several mechanisms that increase white nativism. These effects were most evident in Trump winning among non-college educated whites by nearly 40% (Pew 2018).

As noted, Black’s tendencies to oppose immigration were also somewhat related to perceptions of heightened economic vulnerability brought about by out-group competition with
other racialized out-groups. The critical difference for us, however, between Blacks and whites is that whites occupy a position of power in comparison to other racial groups while Blacks rank at or near the bottom in nearly every socioeconomic indicator. Thus, while white’s inclination towards nativism when they feel threatened by out-groups may reflect an attempt to maintain a group based racial hierarchy, whereas Blacks’ tendency towards nativism may reflect an attempt to preserve their personal, but not group based self-interest. Other researchers have interpreted these types of patterns among Blacks as a shift towards conservatism (Richeson 2018; Abascal 2015), but we see them as strategies deployed by two marginalized groups (i.e., Blacks and US-born Hispanics) to protect certain material benefits of citizenship that their groups still mainly struggle to attain.

Further, this study contributes to by uncovering patterns among Hispanics. Popular media and social scientific research seem to have assumed that commonality exists among Hispanic individuals which override other sociological factors and leads them to mostly prefer policies like increased immigration as a shared interest among their group. Our research suggests that within the Hispanic community, there is a divide in public opinion regarding immigration policy between those born in the United States and those from foreign lands. This variance is related to the perception held by US-born Hispanics that those born outside the US are an out-group that threatens their personal economic well-being.

We encountered several limitations while conducting this study. This NPS dataset contains data from the years 2004 and 2008. While we would have preferred more recent data, the patterns found in the study provide valuable insight into the social psychological calculations involved in the policy preferences of individual Americans. We believe these patterns may have only gotten more robust with the passing of the years due to the increasing political tension surrounding
immigration policy and popular rhetoric concerning immigrants' threat to the economic well-being of the average American worker. Another limitation of the study was the low sample sizes of foreign-born Blacks and whites that led us to exclude them from the study. If sample sizes permit, future studies should consider testing the ideas proposed in this research with foreign Blacks and whites included. This decision would enable us to learn if the concept of immigrants as an out-group only applies when individuals think of Hispanic immigrants.

Lastly, the study does not account for the irrational aspects of racial bias that often motivate antipathy towards different groups. Sociological studies have long demonstrated that some conflict between groups is not rooted in a material reality but in illogical fears or desires. These factors are difficult to capture while using a quantitative survey methodology. It would be difficult for quantitative scholars to know what questions to ask to measure these phenomena and even still, those questions would likely require detailed responses not suitable for research of this type. While measurement of such phenomena was not the goal of this study, it is necessary to mention this as a limitation of the research.

3. CHAPTER: CAN’T HAVE IDENTITY POLITICS WITHOUT POLITICS:
USING PERCEPTIONS OF NECESSARY POLITICAL ACTIONS TO PREDICT COMMONALITY AMONG LATINX AMERICANS

The prospects for a large-scale multiracial coalition between racial ethnic minority groups seems more likely in current times than ever before in the United States (US). Due to the constant influx of migrants from nations across the world, the US projects to be a majority-minority country by the year 2050 (Frey 2018). Despite these gains, racial ethnic minority groups such as African Americans and Latinx Americans still earn far less income, have less wealth, and own homes at much lower rates than white Americans (Pew Research Center 2013). Consequently, these groups
are incarcerated at disproportionate rates in comparison to whites and experience the marginalizing weight of over policing in every aspect of their lives (Alexander 2010; Rios 2011). Asian Americans, while better off materially than Blacks and Latinx Americans, are also underrepresented in various social spheres of American politics and entertainment, and their “model minority” status often obfuscates their unique experiences with racial ethnic discrimination (Wu 2002; Zhou 2004; Okihiro 1994). Thus, there is much to be gained through a large-scale political alliance between the three groups.

Much of the research in social psychology that seeks to measure the potential for such alliances relies heavily on perceptions of discrimination (Craig and Richeson 2012; Richeson and Craig 2011), in-group commonality (Sanchez 2008; Kaufmann 2003) or linked fate measures (Hurwitz et al. 2015; Correa 2011) as possible predictors for commonality between African Americans and Latinx Americans, without placing much emphasis on measures that investigate individual’s openness to different political tactics as possible predictors for such coalitions. Asian Americans, in some of these studies, are treated as whites and consequently, efforts to measure commonality between them and the other racial ethnic minority groups most represented in the US are not taken up. For commonality between racial ethnic minorities to be viewed as a building block to interracial coalitions as some studies suggest (Kaufmann 2003), predictors that imply that individuals adhere more strongly to a politics that attempts to challenge structures of power must be taken into account. Scholars and media members predicting more racial equality driven by demographic change make the case that this change will lead to an increase of progressive “identity politics”—the idea that oppression on the basis of identity, whatever that identity may be, will be “a source of political radicalization” (Taylor 2017: 8). However, scholarship investigating
demographic changes and possible interracial coalitions coming from them have not always recognized that you cannot have an identity politics without politics.

Furthermore, any successful interracial alliance would likely need to include more than just Blacks and Latinx Americans as their numbers alone will not constitute a sizable enough electorate, and possibly not even substantial enough numbers in protest, to radically transform the US into a more ethnically equitable society. This chapter seeks to answer three central questions: (1) Do constructs measuring individual’s openness to different political tactics, both traditional and radical forms, improve the prospects for Latinx affinity for racial ethnic minorities? (2) Do the relationships between these constructs and affinity with other racial groups differ based on the group they are referencing (i.e. whites, Blacks, or Asians)? And (3), Do these measures of openness to different tactics among Latinx Americans moderate the effects of perceived discrimination on perceptions of interracial commonality?

THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW

The theoretical premise that guides this work is the understanding that experiences with racial discrimination do not alone motivate perceptions of commonality between oppressed groups. Evidence from historical works suggest that alliances between marginalized groups are formed when groups have experienced similar forms of oppression and were of a political disposition that something radical needed to be done about it. In the past, doing something about it has meant engaging methods beyond, but not excluding, electoral politics. Traditional social movements like those involving the Southern Christian Leadership Conference of Martin Luther King Jr. (Morris 1986; King Jr. 2010) and the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (Ture and Hamilton 1992), relied on methods that included voting, protesting, taking issues to court, and lobbying government officials for policy changes. More radical organizations like those led by Malcolm X (Myers 1993) and Robert F. Williams (2013) advocated more extreme political
methods that did not exclude violence. Both types of efforts were able to draw support from other racial-ethnic groups who had experienced racial discrimination.

Even present-day efforts such as the 2015 Ferguson protests after the shooting of a young African American male by police, drew interracial political support from Palestinian onlookers (Hill 2016; Davis 2016). This support was given not only because Palestinians had experienced similar state-sanctioned racism, but also because they engaged political struggle in ways similar to the protesters. Watching from Palestine, they tweeted helpful tips to make gas masks to protect from tear gas deployed by police to break up protests (Hill 2016; Davis 2016). This example suggests that similar experiences with discrimination bolstered by a worldview that sees society as flawed but changeable through political means can be a bridge to interracial collaboration.

I use quantitative evidence to argue that efforts to bring together the most politically engaged segments of aggrieved minority populations is essential to efforts to build viable interracial coalitions that could challenge current racial hierarchies that position minorities at the bottom. By politically engaged, I refer here specifically to Latinx Americans who adhere to an array of traditional political tactics (e.g. voting, protest, lobbying public officials, professing grievances in court etc.) to produce change on one hand and those who support the most radical political strategy of violence to produce change, on the other hand. I argue that this construct strengthens the positive association that perceptions of discrimination can have with commonality between minorities like Latinx Americans and Blacks, which could help build future coalitions to struggle against racial inequality.

Theories Emphasizing Perceived Discrimination

Several studies emphasizing the effects of perceived discrimination on intergroup relations have underscored social identity theory (SIT) and common in-group identity theory (CIIT) as
useful frameworks for understanding the shifts in racial minorities’ opinions towards other minority groups amidst changing national demographics (Richeson and Craig 2011). SIT posits that individuals derive self-esteem from group memberships and attempt to enhance their esteem by perceiving their own group (the ingroup) more positively than outgroups (Tajfel and Turner 1979; Branscombe et al. 1999). In this sense, common experiences of racial discrimination, for example, will lead marginalized groups to attempt to make themselves appear more favorable to dominant groups (i.e. whites) by rejecting other outgroups.

Contrarily, Richeson and Craig (2011) write that “the Common In-group Identity Model (CIIM) asserts that categorizing oneself and outgroup members in terms of a common, superordinate identity leads to more positive attitudes toward outgroup members than when individuals think of themselves as members of distinct group (167).” The social identity threat model hypothesizes that, for minorities, knowledge of discrimination against one’s in-group will incite motivations to make one’s group identity more favorable and thus will lead to rejection or derogation of other outgroups. The common in-group identity model, however, argues that minorities may develop dual identities when faced with discrimination against their group that may trigger a common identity with other outgroups (Richeson and Craig 2011; Craig and Richeson 2012).

Whatever theoretical framework is applied, the significant relationship between perceived discrimination for racial ethnic minorities and attitudes towards other outgroups is undeniable. In some research offering support for SIT, knowledge of an increasing presence of Hispanics has resulted in African Americans developing a more nationalist identity that coincides with more identification with white Americans (Abascal 2015), a shift towards conservatism (Craig and Richeson 2018), and rejection of immigration (Nteta 2014). Other studies supporting CIIM have
highlighted the positive effects of perceived discrimination in non-zero-sum contexts (Hurwitz et al. 2014; Craig and Richeson 2012). Hurwitz and his colleagues (2015) found that Blacks’ and Latinx Americans’ perceptions of discrimination are positively correlated with linked fate, or the perception that the experiences of others is bound together with one’s own life chances (Dawson 1994), between the groups and perceptions that the criminal justice system is unfair towards the opposite group⁴. Jones-Corra (2011) found similar results as linked fate was positively associated not only with Latinx commonality with Blacks, but also greater competition.

Perceived discrimination has also been found to differ in its effects by the type and the site of the acts. For example, Craig and Richeson (2012) find that perceptions of discrimination that one personally experienced produces a stronger effect on perceptions of other groups than perceptions of discrimination towards one’s group. Moreover, research on sites of discrimination find that settings of discrimination in certain public spaces where racial minorities expect to be protected by law, trigger a cognitive triangulation that links acts directed towards the person in the present to acts directed at the individual’s group in the past (Feagin 1991). Perceptions of discrimination are complex and may not necessarily translate to more positive outlooks of similarly positioned groups.

The aforementioned research offers invaluable information and insight to the field of social psychology and those interested in intergroup relations. However, a limitation of that work is that much of the research often discusses political attitudes in passing; typically something to be accounted for by using traditional measures of political party or political ideology measured by scales of conservatism and liberalism (see Wallsten and Nteta 2011 and Knoll et al. 2011 for some research to the contrary). This fact belies the implicit political nature of the category of race itself.

⁴ Latinx Americans perceptions of discrimination were positively associated with perceptions of unfairness in the criminal justice system towards Blacks and vice versa (Hurwitz et al. 2014).
The current study follows the work of Kaufmann (2003) in that it approaches commonality between minority groups as a basis for further political collaboration between the groups. So, while factors such as perceived discrimination may predict commonality, this commonality may not necessarily be the type that motivates future political cooperation. A bevy of evidence exists that demonstrates the importance of political engagement among racial ethnic minorities in coalition building and interracial political mobilization.

*Alliances formed through Politics*

Interracial coalitions throughout history have been sites where innovative and radical political alternatives have developed (Dawson 2013; Mantler 2013; Ortiz 2018). Much of this development of innovative or radical alternatives has been by necessity since dominant white groups have largely outnumbered racial ethnic minority groups, even when those groups are summed together. By virtue of mathematics, voting will not alone lead to minority victories since they would not possess enough electoral power to achieve a majority. This kind of thinking motivated the formation of coalitions between groups who possessed an analysis that recognized the importance of political structures in producing and reproducing their similar marginalized positions (Mantler 2013; Bloom and Martin 2013; Foley 2010). Interracial movements such as second wave feminist efforts in the 1980s (Taylor 2017), Black power endeavors in the 60s and 70s (Bloom and Martin 2013), and civil rights efforts in the 50s and 60s (Mantler 2013) all provide evidence of groups who began to work together not only because of their common experiences with oppression but also due to a basic agreement that their struggle was political and necessitated specific tactics to transform the way government works for marginalized groups.

Some of these tactics were exemplified by the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) who, before Martin Luther King Jr.’s death in 1968, organized groups from multiple racial
ethnic and gendered backgrounds for the Poor People’s Campaign (Mantler 2013). These groups utilized a collection of political strategies to enact change that including voting, lobbying the President of the United States, boycotts, sit-ins, and marches (Morris 1986). The efforts of African American political movements striking for freedom readily gained the attention of important Latinx political figures such as Reies Tijerina and Cesar Chavez (Mantler 2013). Both figures, among many other Latin American activists, sought to build alliances with similarly motivated Black activist groups. While racism or discrimination was a phenomenon that impacted more people than those who participated in these coalitions, the readiness to connect those experiences with political mobilization efforts is what brought those who did participate together. Thus, political engagement combined with an identity that was connected to oppressive treatment from the state and dominant groups (e.g. whites) seemed to be the locus of endeavors for interracial cooperation.

Kwame Ture (formerly Stokely Carmichael) and Charles V. Hamilton (1992) argued that conscience-based alliances, or those formed because a more privileged group feels sympathy for a disadvantaged group, always break down when the privileged group’s interest is threatened (Ture and Hamilton 1992). They identified failures to build sustainable political alliances with liberal whites in Mississippi, the Black Belt of the South, and in Tuskegee as evidence for their claims. In Mississippi for example, Blacks supported an innovative political strategy of creating their own party, the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party (MFDP), and being seated as delegates independent of the mainstream Democratic party. This innovative strategy placed them at odds with liberal whites whom they had previously allied with. These whites did not support the strategy of moving beyond conventional electoral politics by splitting from the mainstream Democratic party.
Blacks again attempted to align with whites in Tuskegee by assuming a “politics of deference”\textsuperscript{5} that long worked well until Blacks gained a significant portion of economic strength and attempted to parlay this strength into political power (Ture and Hamilton 1992: 124). When Blacks attempted to gain significant political power, the county rewrote the Constitution and made complicated literacy tests the standard citizens had to meet in order to vote. In both instances, Mississippi and Tuskegee, the coalitions may have enjoyed more success if whites were more politically engaged partners that relied on multiple tactics in addition to conventional electoral politics to reach common goals. In doing so, they may have realized how pervasive the discrimination was and that more political effort was necessary for substantive change. It would have also showed Blacks that they were dependable partners willing to sacrifice some of their group interests as whites for racial equality. However, whites’ privileged position in society acted as an incentive against more politically innovative practices.

Ture and Hamilton argued that “the major mistake made by exponents of the coalition theory is that they advocate alliances with groups which have never had as their central goal the necessarily total revamping of the society (Ture and Hamilton 1992: 60 – 61).” Thus, the best coalition partners would be those groups who have the most to gain from a restructuring of political structures and those committed to radical political methods and ends to achieve these goals. Although Ture and Hamilton viewed any alliance or aligning of interests between Blacks and whites as short-lived and doomed to fail due to whites’ refusal to concede privileges that skin color offers them; they did not offer much analysis on the potential for Black cooperation with other disadvantaged racial groups despite multiple examples of such endeavors throughout history. Evidence exists of Blacks and Mexican Americans working together for fair employment practices.

\textsuperscript{5} Ture and Hamilton borrow this term from Dr. Paul L. Puryear. This sort of politics relinquishes the responsibility of governing to white civil society while Blacks focus on their own material stability.
in Texas during the 1940s, Black and Mexican American lawyers working together to dismantle segregation in public schools during the late 40s and early 50s (Foley 2010), and Blacks and Latinx American groups joining together in Washington D.C. to march for jobs in the 1960s (Mantler 2013). These instances of togetherness as well as other examples were typically motivated by the realization that both groups faced similar obstacles to achieving self-determination and equality.

Ture and Hamilton (1992) admitted that even the innovative political strategies that they supported in their book would only achieve reforms and more drastic political tactics may be needed to achieve substantive change for Blacks. During the late 1960s, continued disadvantage for racial ethnic minorities despite the legislative successes of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, the 1965 Voting Rights Act, and other bills to promote racial equality, made the political philosophy of figures such as Malcolm X and Robert F. Williams more popular among minorities (Bloom and Martin 2013). These philosophies promoted substantive change by any means necessary; the means being not excluding violent alternatives (Williams 2013; Ball and Burroughs 2012). The Black Panthers, motivated by thinkers like Williams and X, achieved some success building interracial coalitions, largely due to their militant stance in combatting inequality (Bloom and Martin 2013). Popular leaders who advocated radical tactics that included violent self-defense such as Huey Newton, Eldridge Cleaver, and Fred Hampton garnered broad support from militant whites, Latinx Americans, and other groups. Bloom and Martin describe a rally held by the Black Panthers thusly:

The crowd gathered in the hot sun and under the cool shade of the park’s oaks to listen to the speakers and show their support for Huey Newton. Although Hutton Park lies in the heart of Black west Oakland, more than half the people who turned out that day were whites, Latinos, and Asian Americans. The crowd was a rich tapestry of the times and vividly represented the diverse allies that increasingly supported the Black Panther Party (125).

This ability for a radical organization to build alliances across racial lines should not be viewed as historically unique. Racialization and its negative consequences have consistently linked
the fates of groups such as Mexican Americans and African Americans throughout history. (Gomez 2018). Gomez argues (2016; 2018) that the one drop rule for Blacks and the reverse one drop rule for Mexicans⁶ has shaped relations between the groups, both positive and negative. On a positive note, the marginalization and dispossession of Mexican American rights, which is likened to the treatment of Blacks, has at times sparked political resistance and short-term alliances with African Americans and, to some extent, Indigenous Americans. On a more negative note, the configurations of racial formation have, at other times, isolated these groups from one another and led to a tempering of political radicalism in favor of more moderate approaches.

Dawson (2013) credits the isolation of the most radical segment of the Black left is a primary reason behind the weakening of multiracial alliances up until present day. In his work, he demonstrates that some of the most radical Black thinkers such as W.E.B. Du Bois, Claudia Jones, Paul Robeson, and William L. Patterson were responsible to connecting Black movements to struggles of other marginalized groups inside and outside of the United States. He traces the narrowing of the Black freedom movement from a broad struggle that incorporated the struggles of a multitude of groups to concerns with issues directly affecting Blacks, and hence limited in its scope, to the isolation of these figures and other Black proponents of militancy via the draconian practices occurring during the McCarthyism era that saw US citizens like Du Bois and Robeson and longtime migrants like Jones ousted from the country and marginalized (Ibid.).

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⁶ The one drop rule refers to the rules of hypodescent for US Americans of African descent. Any trace of African blood in one’s lineage is used to categorize an individual as African American (see Omi and Winant 2015). The reverse one drop rule for Mexican Americans, and many other Latin Americans, holds that any trace of Spanish blood makes an individual white. Gomez (2016; 2018) asserts that the reverse one-drop rule both confers privileges and disadvantages for Mexican Americans as they are viewed as being above both Blacks and Indigenous folk, but below whites who have not mixed with American Indians. Any benefits accrued by this status are marginal.
It seems clear from this literature and other work, that groups’ political imagination is vital for any attempts at coalition building. Much of the work reviewed here derives from case studies of which scholars should take care not to generalize about larger populations. This study uses quantitative techniques to place these patterns of multiracial alliances under greater empirical scrutiny in an attempt to provide generalizable insight about factors that improve the prospects for commonality among groups marginalized due to racial ethnicity. This current study looks to measure the extent to which engagement with politics among US-born Latinx Americans predicts commonality with racial ethnic minorities like Blacks and Asians in comparison to the dominant in-group (i.e. whites). The vast major of research investigating commonality between racial ethnic minorities studies Blacks and Latinx Americans primarily. This research implicitly removes racial minority status from Asian Americans and inherently treats them as whites despite the misleading nature of endorsing such a position (Zhou 1999; Wu 2002). While there are socioeconomic indicators that would assuredly place Asian Americans closer to whites than they are to Blacks and Latinx Americans⁷, this material success obscures the political efforts of Asians to achieve equality in the US. Common understandings of Asian American success emphasizes their eschewal of identity politics in lieu of a studious approach to academics and immersion into hard work despite examples of political endeavors to end school segregation (Okihiro 1994) and to participate in interracial coalitions to elect racially progressive officials in central cities (Saito 2001; Saito and Park 2002). Thus, this study measures not only perceptions concerning Blacks and whites that is commonplace in social psychological research, but those concerning Asians as well. In doing so, the study posits several hypotheses:

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⁷ See Pew 2013 for socioeconomic comparisons of income, wealth, and homeownership rates between whites, Asian Americans, Hispanics, and African Americans. Whites and Asian Americans are comparable in income and wealth data, Asians fall slightly behind whites in homeownership but above blacks and Hispanic Americans. Blacks and Hispanic income, wealth, and homeownership rates fall far behind the two other groups.
**H1**: Perceived commonality with minorities (i.e. Blacks and Asians) will be more likely as support of political tactics to produce change increases.

**H2**: Latinx Americans who support violence as a tactic for change will be more likely to perceive commonality with minorities than those who do not.

**H3**: Perceptions of discrimination will improve the probability of Latinx perceived commonality with minorities.

**H4**: Perceived discrimination will decrease the likelihood of perceived commonality with whites.

**H5**: The association of perceived discrimination measures with perceived commonality with minorities will be greatest among Latinx Americans who support violence as a political tactic for change.

**DATA AND METHODS**

*Sample*

The current study uses data from the 2012-2013 Latino Second Generation Survey. The Latino Second Generation Survey is a nationally representative survey of 1,050 US born second generation Latinx Americans of foreign-born parents (Jones-Correa et al. 2017). The study’s stated goal was to advance scholarly understandings of political socialization and the effects of immigration on civic participation. The survey also provides a unique range of variables that measure political engagement among this group. In the past, US born Hispanics have been found to perceive more commonality with racial minority groups such as African Americans (Barreto et al. 2014; Morin et al. 2011; Mindiola et. al 2002), so this particular survey provides a great amount of latitude for deeper investigation of the factors related to that commonality. A set of post-stratification item weights supplied by the principal investigators for the research were applied to adjust the data to reflect general population data for Latinx Americans. Multiple imputation (M=5)
was used to account for item-level missing data, yielding a sample size of 1,050 total respondents for the final multivariate models.
Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics for all Variables

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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Index score of Traditional Tactics</td>
<td>1.75</td>
<td>1.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Violence necessary (1=Yes)</td>
<td>31.39%</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Perceived Discrimination</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Index score of discrimination setting (personal)</td>
<td>.5024</td>
<td>.743</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Index score of discrimination setting (public)</td>
<td>.6793</td>
<td>.984</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Controls</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female (1=Yes)</td>
<td>48.92%</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South (1=Yes)</td>
<td>25.27%</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Midwest (1=Yes)</td>
<td>8.12%</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northeast (1=Yes)</td>
<td>13.95%</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democrat (1=Yes)</td>
<td>77.33%</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent (1=Yes)</td>
<td>3.10%</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aged 25 and Up (1=Yes)</td>
<td>36.78%</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College Education, no degree (1=Yes)</td>
<td>44.91%</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College Education with degree (1=Yes)</td>
<td>10.05%</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Head of Household (1=Yes)</td>
<td>39.96%</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rent home (1=Yes)</td>
<td>49.06%</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household Income scale</td>
<td>10.42</td>
<td>4.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexican (1=Yes)</td>
<td>63.79%</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>English Dominant (1=Yes)</td>
<td>25.54%</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dependents</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some to a lot in common with whites (1=yes)</td>
<td>47.50%</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some to a lot in common with Blacks (1=yes)</td>
<td>67.13%</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some to a lot in common with Asians (1=yes)</td>
<td>47.57%</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N= 1050; Imputed data; Pooled from 5 Imputations

**MEASURES**

Dependent Variables: Commonality with whites, Blacks, and Asians

Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for all analysis variables. Respondents were asked “How much would you say that Latinos in the US have in common with other social groups?” This question was asked for whites, African Americans and Asians. Respondents could answer a (1) a lot in common, (2) some things in common, (3) little in common, or (4) nothing at all in common. These variables were recoded dichotomously, with a score of 1 equivalent to respondents stating they had some to a lot in common with the group and 0 meaning that they stated they have little to nothing in common with the group. Commonality is suggested to be a precursor to coalition
formation (McClain and Stewart 2010; Morin et al. 2011), so I assume that those who answer that they have little or no commonality with others will not be likely political partners for other groups. Following this logic, those who would be potential partners would at least need to perceive that they have more than just a little in common with others. Because the dependent variable is coded dichotomously, I use binomial logistic regression to estimate the multivariate models that follow below. Positive values indicate that the variables improve likelihood for commonality with groups.

Linearity of the continuous variables with respect to each of the dependent variables was tested using the Box-Tidwell (1962) procedure. A Bonferroni correction was applied using all 22 terms in the model resulting in statistical significance being accepted when $p<.0022$ (Tabachnick and Fidell 2014). Based on the results of this assessment, all continuous variables were found to be linearly related to the logit of the dependent variables. There were 19 cases of standardized residuals with values greater than 2.5, which were kept in the analyses.

Support of Political Tactics

This study includes several primary independent variables. Perceptions of the methods individuals believe to be necessary tactics for change are measured using two primary variables, one that measures support for traditional political tactics and the other for support of extreme or radical tactics. The first variable is measured by responses to questions asking about what political behaviors the respondent may think are necessary for change. Respondents were asked several questions regarding political methods for change. The sequence of questioning went as such: “What kinds of activity do you think are effective in pushing for political change?” Each question dealt with a different aspect of political methods including (1) voting, (2) participating in legal protests such as rallies, (3) taking issues to the courts, and (4) lobbying politicians such as the President, Congress, the Senate, or local political bodies. Each variable was originally coded
dichotomously in the sample as “1” for yes and “0” for no. An alpha test was estimated to measure how well these variables coincided with one another. The test yielded a score of .728, which suggests that combining these variables is appropriate. An index was created summing the scores of all these variables so that higher numbers equated to respondents being more willing to support several political mechanisms for change. In the data tables, this variable is referred to as an index of traditional tactics. Respondents score for the index variable could range from 0 (not open to any of these methods) to 4 (open to all of these methods). The average openness to traditional social movement methods score was 1.75, indicating that the average respondent supports just under 2 of the aforementioned tactics to bring about societal change.

Many of the measures outlined in the first perception of political methods variable represent more traditional political methods employed in the United States. These measures may not capture the full depth of political engagement among the most radical segments of society. To account for this issue, a measure for support of radical methods is employed. Respondents were asked “Do you think it is ever acceptable to break the law in order to make a political statement, for example through an illegal protest, by damaging property or putting people's lives at risk?” They could answer (1) never acceptable, (2) only under exceptional circumstances, (3) this kind of activity is sometimes legitimate, or (4) don’t know. This variable was recoded dichotomously with “1” corresponding with respondents answering that this behavior is acceptable under certain circumstances or this kind of activity is sometimes legitimate and “0” corresponding with respondents who were either unsure (answered don’t know) or believed that it is never acceptable. Nearly a third (31.39%) of the sample agreed that violence is sometimes acceptable or legitimate to make a political statement. This variable and the previous variable taken together measure the concept of support of political tactics for change.
Perceived Racial Discrimination

The second set of independent variables measure respondents’ perceived experience with racial discrimination. Following the research of Craig and Richeson (2012), perceptions of racial discrimination are measured in two separate manners, one being discrimination that one perceives in interpersonal settings and the other being discrimination that one perceives as being targeted towards their group or via societal institutions. For both measures, respondents were asked “Have you ever been unfairly treated because of your race or ethnicity? If yes, in what context was that?” Responses were coded as “1” for yes or “0” for no for 7 different locations (read 7 variables). An index was created of the sum of scores for those who selected “a club or restaurant”, “a store”, or “some other context” to represent intimate interpersonal experiences with racism. The scale of possible scores ranged from 0 to 3. Another index was created of the sum of scores for those who selected “at work”, “at school”, “by the police”, or “in a government office” to represent experiences with discrimination in institutional spaces. The scale of possible scores ranged from 0 to 4. Both averages for the sample were less than 1 experience (e.g. .5024 and .6793 respectively) meaning that on average, respondents did not experience much racial ethnic discrimination in either types of settings.

Control Variables

The study uses several basic control variables in the multivariate statistical models that are consistent across research of this nature, as well as a couple others. Those variables are age, region, sex, income and education. The oldest respondent in the LSG is 34 years of age. Age is coded to compare individuals 25 and up\(^8\) to those younger than 25. Region is recoded into four variables to

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\(^8\) The Bureau of Labor Statistics characterizes the 25 – 34 age range as a prime working age. Unemployment rates for this category are typically the lowest of any age range. Work status has been found to be a predictor of commonality between Latinx Americans and Blacks.
measure individuals from the South, Midwest, and Northeast in comparison to those born in the West. Sex is recoded to compare females to males. Income is coded as an ordinal variable that changes in dollar increments as an individual move higher up the scale. Lastly, education is coded to compare individuals who attended college but did not graduate with a degree and individuals with a four-year college degree to individuals who never attended college.

In addition to these basic demographic variables, two other variables are used to measure socioeconomic standing. A variable is used to measure if an individual considers themselves as the head of their household. These individuals may feel more responsible for assuring their family’s wellbeing, which may impact how they view themselves in relation to other groups. A control variable was included to measure if a respondent owns their home or rents it. This variable is dummy coded with “1” indicating that individuals rent their home. People renting homes may be more socioeconomically vulnerable, which could factor in in how they position themselves in relation to other groups.

Lastly, the study includes two variables to measure culture and ethnicity. The first measure is strong Mexican background. Respondents were asked “In what country was your father born?” This sequence of question was repeated for mothers with respondents being asked “In what country was your mother born?” There were twenty-one specific Latin American countries mentioned for both fathers and mothers. Respondents with both parents originating from Mexico were coded as having a strong Mexican background. Respondents with parents from other Latin American countries or only 1 parent from Mexico were coded as not having a strong Mexican background. Among Latinx Americans, Mexicans are known for strongly working to retain their distinct culture which at times distances them from groups like Black Americans (Sanchez 2008; Kaufmann 2003). Very few respondents had only one parent from Mexico. The overwhelming majority of
respondents had two parents that originated from the same country. Sixty-four percent of all respondents in the study have a strong Mexican background.

The second measure of culture and ethnicity is the respondent’s primary language. Respondents were asked about their language proficiency. They could respond with (1) English dominant, (2) bilingual, or (3) Spanish dominant. Language proficiency was dummy coded with “1” accounting for respondents who said they were English dominant and “0” for respondents who selected bilingual or Spanish dominant. Past research has demonstrated that language as a measure of acculturation or assimilation predicts attitude towards other groups among Hispanics (Kaufman 2003). Individuals who speak heavy Spanish in comparison to English are thought to be more resistant to letting go of important cultural attributes that keep them connected to their home country and more socially distant from native-born US American groups. Just over a quarter of the sample (26%) reported as predominant English speakers.

**Figure 3.1: Racial Commonality by Acceptance of violence as a political tactic**
RESULTS

Figure 3.1 and table 3.2 presents bivariate results of the distribution of levels of perceptions of violence as a political tactic across the three dependent variables. Figure 3.1 and table 3.2 demonstrate preliminary support for hypotheses 1 and 2, exhibiting greater levels of commonality with Blacks and Asians as individuals support of traditional political tactics increases and among those who support political violence in some circumstances. The correlation between support of traditional tactics and commonality with racial minorities is weak to moderate (see table 3.2). Latinx Americans who adhere to radical tactics such as limited violence for political change, are more about 15 percent more likely to perceive commonality with Blacks and about 11 percent more likely to perceive Asians than those who do not adhere to this political option (see figure 3.1).

Table 3.2: Zero-order Correlation Coefficients

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
<th>(4)</th>
<th>(5)</th>
<th>(6)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1) Traditional tactics (index)</td>
<td>.216*</td>
<td>.117**</td>
<td>.026</td>
<td>.233***</td>
<td>.137***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Discrimination (personal settings)</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>.541***</td>
<td>.075*</td>
<td>.175***</td>
<td>.027</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) Discrimination (institutional settings)</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>.005</td>
<td>.165***</td>
<td>-.004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4) Commonality with whites</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>.186***</td>
<td>.292***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5) Commonality with Blacks</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>.450***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(6) Commonality with Asians</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Latino Second Generation Survey (2012 – 2013) Imputed from 5 imputations

Table 3.2 offers preliminary support for hypothesis 3 and partial support for hypothesis 4. It shows that perceptions of discrimination, whether in personal settings or institutional settings, improves feelings of commonality with Blacks and Asians (hypothesis 3). More perceptions of discrimination in personal settings correlate with less commonality with whites, while discrimination in institutional settings is unrelated to commonality with whites (hypothesis 4). Among Latinx Americans, more experiences with racism coincide with less commonality with whites, possibly due to those experiences involving whites. Commonality with any of the groups
is positively correlated with commonality with all the groups, however, the factors involved in predicting commonality with individual groups appears to differ. The bivariate analyses provide support for several of the research hypotheses. The multivariate analyses estimated below allow for statistical control of multiple demographic variables to measure the unique relationship between the independent variables tested here and levels of the dependent variables.

**Table 3.3: Odds Ratios for Logistic Logit Models Predicting Commonality**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Support of Political Tactics</th>
<th>White Commonality</th>
<th>Black Commonality</th>
<th>Asian Commonality</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tradtional Tactics (index)</td>
<td>0.968</td>
<td>1.297***</td>
<td>1.114^</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Violence Necessary</td>
<td>1.249</td>
<td>1.583**</td>
<td>1.312^</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perceived Discrimination</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal setting discrimination</td>
<td>0.724**</td>
<td>1.308*</td>
<td>1.096</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutional setting discrimination</td>
<td>1.094</td>
<td>1.283**</td>
<td>0.915</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Controls</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>0.798^</td>
<td>1.395*</td>
<td>0.844</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>1.021</td>
<td>0.840</td>
<td>0.924</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Midwest</td>
<td>2.207**</td>
<td>0.624</td>
<td>0.872</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northeast</td>
<td>0.711</td>
<td>0.327^</td>
<td>0.657</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democrat</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>1.348</td>
<td>1.105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>1.001</td>
<td>1.430</td>
<td>0.705</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aged 25 and up</td>
<td>0.959</td>
<td>0.736^</td>
<td>0.774</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College Educated no degree</td>
<td>1.233</td>
<td>0.939</td>
<td>0.991</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College Educated degree</td>
<td>1.066</td>
<td>0.918</td>
<td>1.092</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>earned</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income Scale</td>
<td>0.976</td>
<td>1.055**</td>
<td>1.049*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Head of Household</td>
<td>2.781***</td>
<td>1.211</td>
<td>1.593**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rents Home</td>
<td>0.753^</td>
<td>1.123</td>
<td>1.148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexican (1=Yes)</td>
<td>1.084</td>
<td>0.714</td>
<td>1.021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>English Dominant</td>
<td>0.909</td>
<td>1.713**</td>
<td>1.188</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Log Likelihood: 1366.378  1197.404  1397.962

N: 1,050; ^=p<.10; *=p<.05; **=p<.01; ***=p<.001
Imputed Data: Data pooled from 5 imputations

**Commonality with whites**

Table 3.3 presents odds ratios from a binomial logistic regression model to test the research hypotheses of the study. The first column of odds ratios provides the results from the model used to predict commonality with whites. Variables used to measure support of different political tactics
appear to have no effect on Latinx Americans perception of commonality with whites. The association between experiences with personal discrimination and commonality with whites from the previous correlation analysis remains even when controlling for several demographic attributes, offering partial support for hypotheses 4. Other variables that were statistically significant were residence in the Midwestern region of the US (Odds Ratio (OR)=2.207; p<.01) and being the head of household (OR=2.781; p<.001). The ratio produced by both variables suggest that they increase the likelihood that Latinx Americans will perceive commonality with whites.

*Commonality with Blacks*

The results from the second column provide results for the model used to predict commonality with Blacks. Nearly all the independent variables produce statistically significant changes in the dependent variable. Both variables measuring political engagement and both variables measuring experiences with racial ethnic discrimination significantly and substantially increase the likelihood for Latinx American respondents to perceive commonality with African Americans, supporting my predictions for hypotheses 1 through 3 concerning commonality with the African American group. The strongest predictor of these variables appears to be tolerance for radical politics. Latinx Americans who perceive political violence as necessary under certain circumstances are about 58% (OR= 1.583; p<.01) more likely than their counterparts who do not hold similar beliefs to perceive commonality with Blacks. Other variables of note for predicting perceptions of commonality with Blacks were sex (OR=1.395; p<.05), with females more likely to perceive commonality than males, and income (OR=1.055; p<.01). Respondents displayed greater levels of commonality with Blacks as they moved up along the income scale. Lastly, cultural acculturation measured by proficiency with the English language (OR=1.713; p<.01)
increases the likelihood that Latinx American respondents will perceive commonality with African Americans.

Commonality with Asians

The third and final model in table 3 displays results for variables predicting commonality with Asians. Variables measuring support for certain political tactics were just short of statistical significance at the p<.05 level. Experiences with racism whether in personal settings or in formal institutional settings were not a factor in predicting commonality with Asians, whereas they were completely a factor for predicting commonality with Blacks and a partial factor in predicting commonality with whites. Hypotheses 3 is unsupported when predicting commonality with the Asian group. Finally, similar to model 1 predicting commonality with whites, the demographic variable measuring if a respondent considers themselves as the head of household (OR=1.593; p<.01) increases the probability for perceiving commonality with Asians. This variable appears to be the strongest predictor of Latinx commonality with both whites and Asians.

Table 3.4: Odds Ratios for Interaction Effects on Commonality with Blacks

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political Engagement</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traditional tactics (index)</td>
<td>1.416***</td>
<td>1.299***</td>
<td>1.365***</td>
<td>1.289***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political violence necessary</td>
<td>1.548**</td>
<td>1.462^</td>
<td>1.606***</td>
<td>1.243</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perceived Discrimination</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal setting discrimination</td>
<td>1.314*</td>
<td>1.312*</td>
<td>1.678**</td>
<td>1.103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutional setting discrimination</td>
<td>1.656***</td>
<td>1.231^</td>
<td>1.267*</td>
<td>1.299**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interactions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political tactics index*institutional disc</td>
<td>0.861*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political violence*institutional disc</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.146</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political tactics index * personal disc.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.877^</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political violence * personal disc.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.856*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIC</td>
<td>1191.299</td>
<td>1196.748</td>
<td>1194.903</td>
<td>1191.663</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N: 1,050; ^=p<.10; *=p<.05; **=p<.01; ***=p<.001
Imputed Data: Data pooled from 5 imputations
Figure 3.2: Traditional Political Tactics Support and Discrimination in Institutional Settings

Figure 3.3: Political Violence Support and Discrimination in Personal Settings

*Interaction Effects*
The interaction results are presented in table 3.4 and figures 3.2 and 3.3. Control variables were used to predict these models, but they were not shown here to save for space. Table 3.4 displays results for multiplicative effects of the main independent concepts support of different political tactics and perceived discrimination as moderators for one another across levels of perceived commonality with Blacks. Multiplicative effects were not produced to predict commonality with whites and Asians since neither concept proved to be a significant predictor for Asians and only one measure of a concept proved to be a significant predict for commonality with whites (discrimination in personal settings). These interaction models help to determine if associations found using the primary independent variables to predict commonality with Blacks vary across different levels of one another.

Statistically significant interaction effects are shown in models 1 and 3. Both effects are between the concepts of political engagement and perceived discrimination, but in opposite directions. Model 1 demonstrates that support of traditional political tactics for producing change (i.e. Political tactics index) interacts with perceived racial ethnic discrimination in more formal or institutional spaces (OR= 0.861; p<.05). Experiences with discrimination in formal institutional settings decreases the likelihood of perceiving commonality with Blacks among the most politically engaged Latinx Americans. This finding suggests that the difference in the magnitudes of the effects of these variables on commonality with African Americans decreases as levels of the variables simultaneously increase. Contrary to support of political violence, which can be emboldened by experiences with racial inequality, the traditional political tactics index variable measures one’s adherence to relatively traditional and legitimate methods for conducting transformative politics. Negative experiences in these types of more formal settings may discourage these politically engaged individuals from working with other groups, especially if
these experiences are produced by members of that group. The findings from this interaction effect are consistent with the core assumptions of social identity threat.

Model 4 of table 3.4 demonstrates the opposite effect between tolerance for violence for political goals and experiences with racial discrimination in more personal settings (OR=1.856; p<.05). The odds ratio for this interaction demonstrates that for those tolerant of politically radical tactics like violence, experiences with racial discrimination in personal settings increases their likelihood for perceiving commonality with Blacks by over 85 percent. This finding suggests, that among those already susceptible to more dramatic outlooks of politics, experience with injustice or inequality heightens their perceptions of affinity with other marginalized groups, similar to the core assumptions made within the common in-group identity model. Figure 3.3 shows strong support for hypothesis 5 as the positive association of perceived discrimination on perceived commonality with Blacks is displayed to be greatest among those who support violence in some cases to meet political objectives.

**DISCUSSION**

The above study adds to current understandings of intergroup relations and commonality in several ways. First, it suggests that research in social psychology should focus more on the political sensibilities of racial ethnic minority groups beyond traditional measures of political party membership or ideology. In social psychology, we tend to discuss, at length, the relationship between linked fate ideologies or experiences with discrimination with perceptions of commonality which could lead to intergroup cooperation (see Kaufman 2003; Hurwitz et al. 2014; Barreto et al. 2014; Morin et al. 2011; Sanchez 2008). We do this without also considering that race has often been a designation with political implications and consequences. Thus, what is important in predicting commonality, and potentially cooperation, amongst historically marginalized groups is not only negative experiences that can be associated with those of another
group but a willingness to engage structures of power measured by adherence to certain political mechanisms as possible methods for political agitation.

This study looked at the manner in which political engagement predicts commonality among Latinx Americans with whites, African Americans, and Asian Americans. I find that the more political mechanisms for change that one is willing to engage, as well as a willingness to adhere to radical political methods increases the likelihood that US-born Latinx Americans will find commonality with Blacks, but not with whites and Asians. In addition, the positive of association of perceptions of discrimination on commonality with Blacks is moderated by support of these political tactics. However, in some circumstances that interaction may produce an outlook more akin to the assumptions made in the common in-group identity model, and in others that interaction could associate with an outlook more akin to the core assumptions of the social identity threat model. Among individuals who have experienced discrimination, radical outlooks on political possibilities associate with greater affinity between groups, consistent with CIIM’s thesis. Among those same individuals the positive relationship between perceptions of discrimination and commonality is weakened by greater support of traditional political tactics, consistent with SIT’s core assumptions.

In identifying political engagement as a predictor for perceived commonality among Latinx Americans with minorities, this study uncovered a pattern that still deserves further investigation in the field. Asian Americans are often propped up by society as a model minority and equated socially to whites because of their educational and financial resources (Zhou 2004; Wu 2002). Even some research in social psychology has repeated this pattern of equating Asians to whites (see Hurwitz et al. 2015), which implicitly assumes that the views of more materially disadvantaged racial ethnic minority groups like Blacks and Latinx Americans will resemble the
attitudes they hold towards whites. This assumption is made despite insights that suggest that minorities such as Latinx Americans may have more in common with Asian Americans due to their history of immigration and their ability to mix more freely with whites than Blacks are capable of (Lee and Bean 2007). This study produced results that are in some ways consistent with those assumptions but in other ways contradicts them.

Perceived discrimination or political engagement for Latinx Americans did not improve the prospects for affinity with Asians. Measures for head of household were important factors for predicting commonality among Latinx Americans with whites and Asians. This finding possibly suggests that Latinx Americans view Asians and whites as providers more so than they do for Blacks, which could be related to negative stereotypes held by the group towards African Americans (see Mindiola et al. 2002; McClain et al. 2006). Taken together, the results found among measures of perceived commonality with Asians suggests that Latinx Americans hold a perception of Asians similar to their perceptions of whites, which is consistent with other research in this area. This idea would explain why perceived discrimination improves the prospects for perceiving commonality with Blacks but not with the Asian group.

This study included several limitations of which I will make mention of a few. First, the sample relies on data exclusively from second generation Latinx Americans. While this group is an interesting group to observe, it would be invaluable if researchers could analyze if these findings hold among later generations who have had more time to become acculturated into US American society. The amount of predominantly English speakers was only a third of the sample, which proved to be an important measure in the statistical model. A sample including more third and fourth generation Latinx Americans would produce more English dominant speakers and allow
researchers to compare the generations and determine if acculturation is as strong of a predictor as this research and similar studies shows.

Secondly, other racial ethnic groups should be included in similar models to measure if the importance of political engagement for commonality holds across groups. The core assumption of work that seeks to measure attitudes concerning intergroup commonality is that it can potentially measure the likelihood for cooperation between groups. However, likeness does not always equate to cooperation and political success. Similar findings across groups would suggest that not only do these groups see similarities between themselves and others, but they are also willing to engage politics as method for substantive change.

Moreover, the sample used in the study only included individuals from the ages 18 to 34. Research has demonstrated that younger Latinx Americans view minorities such as Blacks more favorable in general (Hurwitz et al. 2015), thus this fact may have caused some bias in the results and affected the generalizability of the findings. The principal investigators did provide post stratification weights to make the sample more representative, however this act may not have completely addressed the issue. Future studies would benefit from samples that reflect the population of interest more closely.

Lastly, on the aforementioned point on the potential of commonality studies, the current study did not measure commonality as a predictor for policy prescriptions. While it’s important that groups see similarities between one another if they hope to work together, these similarities may not equate to support of radically transformative policy positions such as reparations for slavery (in the case of Blacks) or a borderless society (in the case of individuals who have a long history of migration such as Latinx or Asian Americans). Future studies should attempt to measure how these attitudes concerning commonality associate with particular policy preferences. At the
any rate, the current study is an addition to works that look at the conditions for which groups find common ground in hopes for the days when they use it to take a stand side by side.

4. CHAPTER: PERCEPTIONS OF MINORITY DISCRIMINATION, POLITICAL ACTIVITY, AND POLICY PREFERENCES: USING THE COMMON INGROUP IDENTITY MODEL TO PREDICT ATTITUDES FOR RACE-BASED POLICY INITIATIVES

Scholarship that looks to assess factors that may improve the prospects for interracial or interethnic coalition building between minorities typically focuses on individual’s perceptions of personal or group-based discrimination as a predictor of affinity for other groups. In many cases, these researchers find one’s personal or perceived group experiences with racial-ethnic motivated discrimination to be positively associated with one’s perception of commonality. These experiences are also associated with linked fate with other historically marginalized groups (Hurwitz et al. 2015), with personal experiences of discrimination displaying stronger associations than perceptions of discrimination against one’s group (Craig and Richeson 2012). Thus, the logic follows that racial-ethnic minorities who have experienced racial-ethnic discrimination are more likely to be potential political collaborators with members of groups who have similar histories. While this research has advanced scholarship in social psychology, there are still associated questions that are left unanswered.

First, in a society where traditional overt forms of racial prejudice or discrimination have been severely abated over the past sixty years (Bobo et al. 1997; Kinder and Sanders 1996; Bonilla-Silva 2015), is it a sound strategy to base interracial alliances on whether people have faced experiences that are more difficult for one to be cognizant of in the post-Civil Rights era? Research focusing on individual’s acknowledgement of discrimination towards other racial minorities in
general may uncover patterns that are more workable to base coalitions on than individual’s own experiences. Those experiences may be more difficult to notice in a post-Civil Rights society that is far less overtly discriminatory.

Secondly, scholarship purporting that perceptions of discrimination (Kaufmann 2003; Craig and Richeson 2012), linked fate (Correa 2011; Barreto et al. 2014; Hurwitz et al. 2015), or factors like internal group consciousness or pan-ethnic identity (Sanchez 2008) have positive relationships with intergroup affinity tend to make their case using measures of intergroup commonality as outcome variables. Far less research observes how these concepts predicting commonality relate to race-based policy preferences. Since public policy acts as a mechanism for changing an individual’s material condition, work on this front is not only intriguing but necessary to advance knowledge in the field of social psychology further.

Lastly, there are still questions on how different group’s political disposition figures into their potential to perceive affinity with minority groups and to work collaboratively with them on political matters. In chapter 3, I found that individuals more open to political tactics that go beyond traditional methods (e.g. voting) are more likely to perceive an affinity with racial ethnic minorities. However, a limitation of that study is that it was restricted to second-generation Latinx Americans and it did not look at how these patterns related to specific policy preferences. The opinions of other racial-ethnic minority groups as well as white Americans need to be analyzed in order to ascertain the potential efficacy of allying with politically liked-minded individuals as a strategy for interracial coalition building. This chapter seeks to fill the gaps in the literature by addressing three main questions:

1. Are general perceptions of racial ethnic minority discrimination related to more liberal preferences for race-based policy?
2. Is this relationship moderated by an individual’s level of political activity?

3. How do these patterns differ across racial ethnic groups?

What follows is a review of the review of the theoretical framework used for this study and the relevant literature.

THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW

This chapter utilizes the common ingroup identity model (CIIM) as a theoretical framework for building and interpreting the analysis that follows. CIIM is a constellation of ideas developed by Maureen Craig and Jennifer Richeson through the use of experimental research. The theory purports that when members of outgroups categorize themselves and members of other outgroups as having a common superordinate identity, usually one characterized by disadvantage, they express more positive attitudes towards those groups (Richeson and Craig 2011; Craig and Richeson 2012; Craig and Richeson 2018). In line with this theory, I argue that identification of racial minorities with misplaced disadvantage (i.e. discrimination) is associated with more progressive policy preferences that disproportionately benefit minority groups.

In a study where four separate experiments were conducted, researchers measured Asian American’s and Latinx American’s feelings of similarity with Blacks, anti-Black attitudes, and bias towards Black Americans. They found that the experiment group (i.e. those primed with news articles highlighting discrimination against their group) rated Blacks more positively than those in the control group (i.e. those who received an article related to something else). Asian Americans and Latinx Americans primed with articles highlighting discrimination against their group also reported higher ratings of similarity to Blacks. Lastly, for members of both groups, perceived similarity with Blacks mediated the effect of perceived discrimination on automatic attitudes such as outgroup affinity. Said differently, perceptions of discrimination imbue a feeling of closeness with Blacks which is then correlated with more positive ratings of African Americans. This finding
demonstrates that commonality may be an avenue to more positive perceptions and relations between groups (Craig and Richeson 2012). These experiments suggest that perceptions of racial discrimination, in some cases, lead to the development of a common disadvantaged identity among minorities that promotes commonality or coalition potential between groups.

Other studies demonstrate that linked fate, or the perception that the experiences of others is bound together with one’s own life chances (Dawson 1994), is associated with perceptions of commonality\(^9\) between minorities (Hurwitz et al. 2015; Barreto et al. 2014; Morin et al. 2011). Hurwitz and his colleagues’ (2015) research show that when groups are not positioned against one another in a zero-sum context, perceptions of experience with racism lead to greater affinity with other racial ethnic groups. They find support among Black respondents for the linked fate hypothesis, demonstrating that Blacks who perceive a linked fate with Latinos are more likely to perceive anti-Black discrimination in the criminal justice system. They find partial support for this hypothesis among Latinos perceiving anti-Latino discrimination. These patterns are consistent among Blacks’ perceptions of anti-Latino discrimination and for Latinos perceiving anti-Black discrimination. For the latter, the effects of linked fate on perceptions of anti-Black discrimination find more support than was found for anti-Latino discrimination among Latinos. The authors conclude by arguing that these findings suggest the potential for a multi-racial coalition between blacks, Latinos, and a minority of whites (Hurwitz et. al 2015).

Hurwitz and his colleagues’ research give more insight into the debate in social psychology between the Social Identity Threat (SIT) hypothesis and CIIM. In many ways, SIT stands in contrast to CIIM. Studies emphasizing SIT have demonstrated that perceptions of discrimination

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\(^9\) Linked fate and commonality are two different concepts, although they possess some similarities. Linked fate is the assumption that an individual’s fate is tied to another’s. Commonality refers to the belief that groups have something in common, though they may not view themselves as being bound to others.
by an outgroup at times tend to be negatively associated with commonality with other outgroups (Tajfel and Turner 1979; Branscombe 1999). Consequently, several empirical studies in political science and social psychology have observed conflict between groups with comparable histories of disadvantage that positively associate with competition between the groups. McClain et al. (2006) found that migrant Latinx Americans in North Carolina feel closer to whites than they do to Blacks, despite their similar economic predicaments. This finding may be a result of competition for scarce resources that is amplified by racial-ethnic discrimination (McClain 1993; Mindiola et al. 2002; McClain et al. 2006; McClain and Stewart 2010; Nteta 2014; Wilkinson 2014). Using data from the Latino National Survey (LNS 2006) and the 2006 – 2010 US Census, Wilkinson (2014) finds that the economic context that Latinx reside in effects their perception of closeness with Blacks and whites. Latinx residing in poorer areas were more likely to report lesser feelings of commonality with Blacks and more affinity with whites. These findings reflect SIT’s predictions that when faced with discrimination due to outgroup status, members of the outgroup will attempt to make themselves more favorable to the ingroup (i.e. whites) by distancing themselves from other outgroups. However, in non-zero-sum situations\textsuperscript{10} (i.e. situations where there is not a competition for scarce resources), the opposite occurs with outgroups’ perceptions of discrimination being linked to increased feelings of closeness with other outgroups (Hurwitz et al. 2015; Craig and Richeson 2012; Craig and Richeson 2018).

Moreover, some studies investigating intergroup commonality and competition have produced perplexing findings. In many studies of affinity between African Americans and Latinx

\textsuperscript{10} Non-zero-sum contexts also involve circumstances where each group stands to benefit or lose out similarly. For example, since both Blacks and Latinx Americans are disproportionately incarcerated, both groups stand to benefit from criminal justice reform. This example is a situation where neither group may perceive disadvantage if the other benefits.
Americans, the social contact hypothesis\(^{11}\) (Sigelman and Welch 1993) has been confirmed as these groups report greater levels of commonality with one another as their time around the other group increases (Jones-Correa 2011; Wilkinson 2014). While other studies have demonstrated that Blacks and Latinx Americans perceive heightened levels of competition with the other group as the opposite group’s population increases (Barreto et al. 2013; Abascal 2015), other research details this competition to be positively correlated with commonality (Jones-Correa 2011). Thus, findings highlighting associations for measures of competition or commonality between minority group members may not necessarily suggest that these groups will be more or less likely to participate in a “rainbow coalition” (Kaufmann 2003) or interracial political practice that seeks to benefit racial-ethnic minorities. Generally, an approach that may be more intuitive in our assessment of the potential for interracial coalitions would need to investigate the way measures of perceptions of discrimination predict policy preferences for ostensibly race-based political initiatives.

Historically, experiences with racial-ethnic discrimination have been politically useful when groups use them as motivation to mobilize political endeavors to transform their conditions. In the Civil Rights era and the era leading up to it, African Americans and Latinx Americans have identified a commonality in racial oppression and used this likeness to form political unions (Ortiz 2018; Mantler 2015; Foley 2010). Asian Americans have also often played a role in these interracial alliances in areas such as Los Angeles and New York. Anti-immigrant stances taken by governments have been a catalyst for Latinx American-Asian American unions in LA (McClain and Stewart 2010; Lipsitz 2006) while efforts by these groups achieve more diverse political representation have motivated interracial coalitions by the two in New York (Saito and Park 2000;)

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\(^{11}\) The social contact hypothesis suggests that increased social interaction with a minority group positively impacts the likelihood that individuals will view that group in a favorable light (Sigelman and Welch 1993).
Saito 2001). Asian Americans’ upward mobility and socioeconomic proximity to whites often obscures their historical and contemporary bouts with racial-ethnic discrimination and their subsequent struggles to engage structures of power to mitigate the effects of such acts (Okihiro 1994; Wu 2002; Zhou 2004).

While there is historical evidence that experiences with discrimination have emboldened Asians and other racial-ethnic minority groups to build political coalitions, work investigating this potential relationship is scant in the field of social psychology. Moreover, in the apparent link between these experiences, a certain level of political activity, and potential for cooperation with other racial-ethnic groups, it remains unclear if an individual’s own experience with mistreatment is a necessary prerequisite. Could a general outlook that recognizes the mistreatment of others operate as a substitute for one’s personal experiences to predict cooperation? There is some evidence that this relationship could be the case. Most work emphasizing CIIM as a framework to understand interracial coalition building uses an individual’s personal experiences with discrimination to predict commonality with other outgroups (Craig and Richeson 2012; Craig and Richeson 2018). An important departure from prior research in Hurwitz et al. (2015) study is that they measured perceptions of discrimination against a group that one does not identify with. In doing so, they found that these perceptions are associated with perceptions of pessimism towards the criminal justice system, an institution that has received much criticism for its racial bias. That said, they have demonstrated that one’s personal experiences with racial ethnic injustice may not be a prerequisite for intergroup commonality, only a general outlook towards fairness for people of diverse backgrounds may be required.

Findings such as these can provide a roadmap for future coalition building not only between Latinx and African Americans who have storied histories with discrimination, but with
Asians and whites whose experiences of the like have been more minimal in comparison with the former groups. This suggestion could also mean that more support for progressive political stances across groups can be achieved even when that stance may not coincide with an immediate improvement in the life chances of a particular individual. Fairer treatment of non-citizens, rejection of racial profiling, and acceptance of affirmative action practices are all examples of policy initiatives that not all racial-ethnic groups may benefit from evenly. Some may even be modestly negatively affected by such policies. The argument for CIIM as a workable theory for interracial coalition building could be made stronger if research finds that general perceptions of discrimination are positively related to more progressive political stances even when that stance does not ostensibly benefit one’s racial-ethnic group. Considering these thoughts, I propose the following hypotheses:

1. Acknowledging racial discrimination towards racial-ethnic minorities will be associated with support for progressive race-based policy initiatives.
2. Increased political activity will be associated with support for progressive race-based policy initiatives.
3. Acknowledging racial discrimination maintains a stronger relationship with supporting race-based policies among political activist than among non-activists.
4. Acknowledging racial discrimination maintains a stronger relationship with supporting race-based policies among racial minorities.

Following are the methods, data, and measures that I use for this analysis.

**DATA AND METHODS**

*Sample*

This study utilizes data from the 2008 and 2012 National Politics Study (NPS). It is a nationally representative survey of non-institutionalized individuals, aged 18 and over. Its aim was
to compile information on individual’s public opinions, attitudes, and actions regarding contemporary political issues (Jackson et al. 2008). A strength of the study is that it provides large samples of racial-ethnic minorities such as African Americans, Latinx Americans, and Asian Americans. These samples are large enough to provide statistical power for researchers to uncover significant variances between groups if they indeed exist.

The 2008 NPS was conducted from September 2008 to December of that year. There was a total of 1,477 respondents which included 519 non-Hispanic whites, 329 non-Hispanic African Americans, 444 Hispanics, 88 Asian Americans, and 97 Caribbean Blacks. The 2012 version of the survey had fewer respondents, totaling 430 individuals. Of these 430 respondents, 182 were non-Hispanic whites, 97 were non-Hispanic African Americans, 53 were Hispanic, 78 were Asian, 1 was a Pacific Islander, and 9 were of another race not listed on the survey. Ten respondents did not identify as any of the races. Although the data includes various racial-ethnicities, this study only analyzed the opinions of whites, Blacks, Latinx, and Asian Americans. The datasets were merged and multiple imputations (M=5) were conducted to account for item-level missing data, to give a sample size of 1,796 respondents.

Table 4.1: Proportions and Means for Descriptive Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Blacks</th>
<th>Whites</th>
<th>Asians</th>
<th>Latinx</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Women (1=yes)</td>
<td>64.26%</td>
<td>61.23%</td>
<td>37.35%</td>
<td>57.26%</td>
<td>58.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College Grad. (1=yes)</td>
<td>32.15%</td>
<td>51.28%</td>
<td>84.46%</td>
<td>20.94%</td>
<td>41.35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Born (1=yes)</td>
<td>4.55%</td>
<td>6.00%</td>
<td>67.59%</td>
<td>55.06%</td>
<td>25.06%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican (1=yes)</td>
<td>2.54%</td>
<td>26.07%</td>
<td>18.56%</td>
<td>13.22%</td>
<td>16.31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democrat (1=yes)</td>
<td>73.64%</td>
<td>41.73%</td>
<td>36.99%</td>
<td>52.95%</td>
<td>51.81%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
MEASURES

Dependent Variables: Race-Based Policy Attitudes

Three variables are used in this study to measure race-based policy attitudes. The first variable used relates to racial profiling and reads “Law enforcement should be able to stop or arrest people of certain racial or ethnic backgrounds if they are thought to be more likely to commit crimes”. Respondents could select “strongly agree”, “somewhat agree”, “somewhat disagree”, or “strongly disagree”. The variable is coded such that higher values suggest stronger disagreement or rejection of the policy initiative.

Next, a variable is used to measure preferences towards detaining undocumented migrants and reads “The government should be able to imprison a non-citizen as long as they see fit if that person is suspected of belonging to a terrorist organization”. Respondents could select “strongly agree”, “somewhat agree”, “somewhat disagree”, or “strongly disagree”. The variable is coded in

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12 Descriptive statistics were computed by selecting cases by race and running analyses listwise with other variables included in the model. For this reason, the total sample size was slightly lower than the 1,796 cases that were included for the rest of the analyses.
an order such that a higher value suggests stronger disagreement or rejection of the policy initiative.

Lastly, respondents were questioned about their preferences for affirmative action policies. They were asked “How strongly do you favor or oppose preferential hiring and promotion?” Respondents could select “strongly favor”, “somewhat favor”, “somewhat oppose”, or “strongly oppose”. The variable is coded such that higher values suggest stronger support of the policy initiative. All three variables act as a proxy for race-based policy initiatives.

*Independent Variables: Perceptions of Discrimination*

There are three independent variables that are the focus of this study. The first is an individual’s general perception of the amount of discrimination that racial-ethnic minorities face. Respondents were asked “How much discrimination or unfair treatment you think different groups face in the U.S?” They were asked this question for five different groups: Blacks, whites, Asians, Hispanics, and Caribbeans. Respondents could answer “a lot”, “some”, “a little”, or “none”. The variables were reverse-coded so that higher values would reflect stronger perceptions of discrimination towards groups. For the full multivariate models, the mean was taken of individual’s responses to discrimination facing the four minority groups (e.g. whites were excluded) to create a composite variable of perceived discrimination towards racial-ethnic minorities. Before this variable was created, an alpha test was performed that revealed a Cronbach Alpha score of .78 between the four separate variables. Thus, combining the variables in this matter was deemed appropriate.\(^\text{13}\) For the models that look at one racial-ethnic group at a time, perceived discrimination towards the group for which the individual belongs is not included in the composite

\(^{13}\) An alpha test between all five variables yielded a much lower score of .5. Thus, perceptions of discrimination towards whites was not included in the composite variable.
variable and is instead used as a control variable in the models. The average score for perceptions of discrimination towards minority was a score of 2.96, meaning on average that respondents perceive that minorities face some discrimination. Latinx Americans in the study, on average, perceived discrimination towards minorities to occur most frequently (mean= 3.27) compared to the other racial-ethnic groups in the study, followed by Blacks (mean=3.04).

**Political Activity**

The second independent variable used in this study measures the respondent’s level of political activity. The NPS provided several questions to gauge an individual’s political activity. These questions ask “In the past 12 months have you done any of the following: (1) “Did you take part in a protest, march, or demonstration on some national or local issue (aside from a strike against an employer)?” (2) “Did you work with other people to deal with some issue facing your community?” and (3) “Did you participate in any groups or organizations, including your place of worship, that are working to improve the conditions of racial or ethnic minorities?” Respondents could answer “yes” or “no”. A “yes” response was recoded as “1” while a “no” response was recoded as “0”. The sum was taken of a participant’s response to all three questions to create a composite variable measuring their total political activity. Scores could range anywhere from 0 (e.g. no to all three questions) to 3 (e.g. yes to all three questions). The average score for political activity was just under 1 activity at .7457 (std. .9139). Blacks appeared to be the most politically active group, followed by whites.

**Race-ethnicity**

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14 For example, in the model analyzing only Blacks, the perceived discrimination composite variable is the mean of Blacks response to perceptions of discrimination faced by Asians, Hispanics, and Caribbeans. Perceptions of discrimination towards Blacks is used as a control variable in that model. This approach is utilized for each racial-ethnic minority group. For whites, the same composite variable used in the full models is used in this model with perceptions of discrimination facing whites being included as a control variable in the model to remain consistent with the approach used in the other models.
The last independent variable of focus for this study is race-ethnicity. Respondents were asked “Which do you feel best describes your racial background?” This study includes individuals who selected Black, white, Latinx, or Asian as their racial-ethnic background.

Control Variables

Several control variables are included in the statistical models. These controls are included to adjust for differences in demographic measures that prior research has been found to factor into individual’s attitudes concerning the topics of interest in this study. Those variables include gender, education, nativity, political party affiliation, work status, and age. Gender is recoded to reflect the responses of women with men as a reference category in the models. Education is recoded to single out individuals with a four-year college degree or higher. Nativity compares individuals born outside the US to those born in the country. Political party affiliation is recoded to compare the responses of Republicans and Democrats to individuals who select any party other than these two. Work status compares individuals working full time to all other work statuses. Lastly, age is coded from 1 to 13. The value 1 represents individuals aged 18 to 24. The values after 1 code age in 4 year increments up until the value 13 which represents individuals aged 80 and over. Table 1 details the mean for age as 7, which means that the average age of the respondents in the sample is 50 – 54 years old.

RESULTS

Table 4.2: Cumulative Ordinal Regression for Race-Based Policy Across Predictors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Racial Profiling</th>
<th>Detaining Immigrants</th>
<th>Affirmative Action</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NPS 2012 control</td>
<td>.278* (.1245)</td>
<td>.019 (.1079)</td>
<td>.194^ (.1133)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perceived minority</td>
<td>.510*** (.0846)</td>
<td>.282*** (.0793)</td>
<td>.473*** (.0810)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>discrimination</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Table 4.3: Cumulative Ordinal Regression for Moderators

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Racial Profiling</th>
<th>Detaining Immigrants</th>
<th>Affirmative Action</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political Activity sum</strong></td>
<td>.279***</td>
<td>.149**</td>
<td>.154**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.0610)</td>
<td>(.0509)</td>
<td>(.0518)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Black</strong></td>
<td>-.325*</td>
<td>-.428***</td>
<td>.808***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1=yes)</td>
<td>(.1436)</td>
<td>(.1227)</td>
<td>(.1241)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Latinx</strong></td>
<td>-.354*</td>
<td>-.394**</td>
<td>.386**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1=yes)</td>
<td>(.1529)</td>
<td>(.1372)</td>
<td>(.1405)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Asian</strong></td>
<td>-.369^</td>
<td>.059</td>
<td>.242</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1=yes)</td>
<td>(.1978)</td>
<td>(.1800)</td>
<td>(.1833)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Woman</strong></td>
<td>-.054</td>
<td>-.366***</td>
<td>-.075</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1=yes)</td>
<td>(.1027)</td>
<td>(.0926)</td>
<td>(.0944)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>College Grad.</strong></td>
<td>.386**</td>
<td>.745***</td>
<td>.519***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1=yes)</td>
<td>(.1144)</td>
<td>(.1045)</td>
<td>(.1062)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Foreign Born</strong></td>
<td>-.622***</td>
<td>-.024</td>
<td>.200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1=yes)</td>
<td>(.1383)</td>
<td>(.1296)</td>
<td>(.1348)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Republican</strong></td>
<td>-.760***</td>
<td>-.917</td>
<td>.604***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1=yes)</td>
<td>(.1502)</td>
<td>(.1416)</td>
<td>(.1514)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Democrat</strong></td>
<td>-.040</td>
<td>.088</td>
<td>.354**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1=yes)</td>
<td>(.1274)</td>
<td>(.1013)</td>
<td>(.1030)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Working full-time</strong></td>
<td>.182^</td>
<td>.046</td>
<td>-.141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1=yes)</td>
<td>(.1085)</td>
<td>(.0972)</td>
<td>(.0992)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Age</strong></td>
<td>-.051**</td>
<td>-.040*</td>
<td>-.028^</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.0173)</td>
<td>(.0155)</td>
<td>(.0151)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pearson Chi Square</strong></td>
<td><strong>8043.118</strong></td>
<td><strong>5140.924</strong></td>
<td><strong>5439.810</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| N                     | 1796             | 1796                  | 1796              |

Source: NPS (2008; 2012)

15 Control variables were included in this model; however, the coefficients are not shown to save for space. Estimates for coefficients are available upon request.
Racial-ethnic Comparisons

The full models for the analyses are reflected in tables 4.2 and 4.3. Cumulative ordinal regression was completed to get the results for these models. Concerning attitudes towards racial profiling and detaining undocumented migrants suspected of terrorism, Black (-.325; -.428) and Latinx Americans (-.354; -.394) are more likely than whites to support both policy initiatives, when controlling for the demographic variables included in the model. Both groups are also more likely than whites to favor affirmative action initiatives (Blacks=.808; Latinx=.386; p<.05). There were no differences between whites and Asian Americans on any of the race-based policy initiatives.

Perceptions of Discrimination, Political Activity and Race-Based Policy Preferences

Table 4.2 indicates that individuals that acknowledge racial discrimination against racial minorities and those who are most politically active are more likely to oppose racial profiling (.510; .279; p<.05), support affirmative action (.473; .154; p<.05), and reject detaining undocumented immigrants suspected of terrorism (.282; .149; p<.05). The results of these analyses

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Political Activity sum</th>
<th>Black (1=yes)</th>
<th>Latinx (1=yes)</th>
<th>Asian (1=yes)</th>
<th>Minority Disc. * Political Activity</th>
<th>Pearson Chi Square</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.141 (.3116)</td>
<td>-.328* (.1437)</td>
<td>-.355* (.1530)</td>
<td>-.369^ (.1978)</td>
<td>.047 (.1028)</td>
<td>8036.634</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.230 (.2675)</td>
<td>-.428*** (.1227)</td>
<td>-.393** (.1372)</td>
<td>.057 (.1800)</td>
<td>-.027 (.0856)</td>
<td>5140.456</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-.958** (.2970)</td>
<td>.807*** (.1243)</td>
<td>.372** (.1410)</td>
<td>.247 (.1837)</td>
<td>.363*** (.0944)</td>
<td>5496.866</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N 1796

Source: NPS (2008; 2012)
offer support for hypotheses 1 and 2. The interactive effects displayed in Table 4.3 indicate that acknowledging racial discrimination against minorities more strongly associates with political activists supporting race-based policies than it does for non-activists. This finding supports hypothesis 3.

### Table 4.4: OLS Regression for Intraracial Black Attitudes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Racial Profiling</th>
<th>Detaining Immigrants</th>
<th>Affirmative Action</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>2.360</td>
<td>1.740</td>
<td>1.929</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPS 2012 control</td>
<td>.118 (.125)</td>
<td>-.010 (.139)</td>
<td>.189 (.121)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discrimination on Blacks</td>
<td>.147 (.095)</td>
<td>.095 (.102)</td>
<td>.074 (.088)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perceived Minority discrimination</td>
<td>.162 (.111)</td>
<td>.019 (.119)</td>
<td>.061 (.104)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Activity Sum</td>
<td>.116* (.053)</td>
<td>.067 (.058)</td>
<td>.106* (.051)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R square</td>
<td>.100 (.053)</td>
<td>.037 (.058)</td>
<td>.083 (.051)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N 417 417 417

Source: NPS (2008; 2012)

### Table 4.5: OLS Regression for Intraracial White Attitudes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Racial Profiling</th>
<th>Detaining Immigrants</th>
<th>Affirmative Action</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>2.902 (.222)</td>
<td>2.269 (.266)</td>
<td>1.017 (.209)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPS 2012 control</td>
<td>.170* (.077)</td>
<td>.159^ (.091)</td>
<td>.066 (.072)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discrimination on Whites</td>
<td>-.141*** (.037)</td>
<td>-.257*** (.048)</td>
<td>-.137*** (.035)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perceived Minority discrimination</td>
<td>.275*** (.057)</td>
<td>.198** (.067)</td>
<td>.261*** (.056)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Political Activity Sum \( .122^{**} \) \( .106^{*} \) \( .069^{\wedge} \)  
(\( .038 \)) (\( .046 \)) (\( .037 \))  
Adjusted R square \( .110 \) \( .247 \) \( .160 \)  
N 702 702 702  

**Source:** NPS (2008; 2012)

### Table 4.6: Attitudes toward Affirmative Action by Group

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Racial Profiling</th>
<th>Detaining Immigrants</th>
<th>Affirmative Action</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>3.151</td>
<td>2.095</td>
<td>1.007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.490)</td>
<td>(.599)</td>
<td>(.453)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPS 2012 control</td>
<td>-.114</td>
<td>.090</td>
<td>.073</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.145)</td>
<td>(.171)</td>
<td>(.137)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discrimination on</td>
<td>-.146</td>
<td>-.037</td>
<td>-.043</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asians</td>
<td>(.123)</td>
<td>(.143)</td>
<td>(.113)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perceived Minority</td>
<td>.399^{**}</td>
<td>.239</td>
<td>.341^{**}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>discrimination</td>
<td>(.134)</td>
<td>(.155)</td>
<td>(.123)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Activity Sum</td>
<td>-.061</td>
<td>-.141</td>
<td>.034</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.089)</td>
<td>(.105)</td>
<td>(.082)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R square</td>
<td>.145</td>
<td>.081</td>
<td>.159</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>165</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** NPS (2008; 2012)

### Table 4.7: OLS Regression for Intraracial Latinx Attitudes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Racial Profiling</th>
<th>Detaining Immigrants</th>
<th>Affirmative Action</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>3.061</td>
<td>1.622</td>
<td>1.580</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.296)</td>
<td>(.303)</td>
<td>(.260)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPS 2012 control</td>
<td>.291</td>
<td>.265</td>
<td>.156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.162)</td>
<td>(.180)</td>
<td>(.145)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discrimination on</td>
<td>.117</td>
<td>.125^{\wedge}</td>
<td>.079</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latinx</td>
<td>(.079)</td>
<td>(.085)</td>
<td>(.070)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Perceived Minority discrimination | .046 | .053^ | .103
| (.087) | (.090) | (.075)

Political Activity Sum | .129* | .092* | .012
| (.060) | (.063) | (.052)

Adjusted R square | .101 | .036 | .020

N | 492 | 492 | 492

Source: NPS (2008; 2012)

Intraracial Attitudes and Policy Preferences

Tables 4.4 through 4.7 display the intra-racial factors that predict preferences for the race-based initiatives addressed here in this study. Ordinary least squares (OLS) regression analyses were used to predict these models and graph the effects of the measures of greatest interest for the study. The dependent variables are ordered in such a fashion that allows for use of OLS. The strength of OLS regression is that it enables researchers to predict scores while controlling for multiple control variables (Tabachnick and Fidell 2013). Used here, it can predict the score of the independent variables necessary for an individual to theoretically fall in a particular category of the dependent variables.

Among Blacks, there are positive associations for political activity on preferences for racial profiling (.116; p<.05) and affirmative action (.106; p<.05), suggesting that more politically active Blacks report more progressive stances concerning both policy initiatives than less politically active Blacks. Among whites, perceptions of discrimination toward minorities are associated with more progressive stances toward each policy initiative. Whites that recognize racial discrimination against minorities are more likely to take progressive stances on each race-based policy initiatives (.275; .198; .261; p<.05). Political activity is associated with more progressive stances towards preferences for racial profiling (.122; p<.05) and detaining undocumented migrants suspected of terrorism (.106; p<.05). Political activity was just short of being statistically significant at p<.05.
for affirmative action preferences. Whites were also the only group to display a negative association for perceived discrimination against their group on policy preferences. This finding suggests that the more whites perceive reverse racism, the more likely they are to resist race-based policy initiatives.

Among Asian Americans, perceptions of discrimination toward minorities was associated with more progressive stances toward racial profiling preferences (.399; p<.05) and affirmative action preferences (.341; p<.05). Political activity was not a factor among Asian Americans when estimating policy preferences. Lastly, among Latinx Americans, political activity was associated with more progressive stances toward racial profiling preferences (.129; p<.05) and preferences for detaining undocumented migrants (.092; p<.05) suspected of terrorism. Similar to the findings for Blacks and whites, the most politically active Latinx Americans in the sample tended to hold more favorable positions toward the race-based policy initiatives measured here than those Latinx Americans who are less politically active. Hypotheses 4 was partially supported.

DISCUSSION

This study set out to test the potential of CIIM when predicting preferences for ostensibly race-based policy initiatives. CIIM posits that in some circumstances, experiences with discrimination lead members of racial-ethnic minority groups to characterize themselves with members of other historically marginalized groups, which can possibly serve as an impetus to commonality and cooperation between the groups (Richeson and Craig 2011; Craig and Richeson 2012). Few studies look at the association of perceptions of discrimination towards minority members in general, even fewer studies look at how these perceptions relate to policy positions that have racial implications, and no study that I have uncovered looks at how political behaviors factor into these potential relationships. This study contributes to the social psychological literature by embarking on all three endeavors while also controlling for the effect of perceived
discrimination against one’s group to tease out the unique contribution of these constructs on race-based policy initiatives.

Results from the multivariate analyses reveal that a general awareness of mistreatment of racial-ethnic minorities as well as increased political activity improves the likelihood that individuals take a progressive position on race-based policy initiatives such as racial profiling, detention of undocumented migrants suspected of terrorism, and affirmative action initiatives. Even when controlling for perceived discrimination against one’s group, the significant associations found between the independent variables in the study and the proxies for race-based political initiatives held in most cases. These findings add to common understandings of CIIM by suggesting that not only is one’s own experience with racial-ethnic injustice a factor in that individual forming a more positive image of other minorities, but what is also important is how that individual views the position of historically marginalized groups in general and the amount of political activities they engage in as well. The fact that the effect of those measures held even when controlling for perceived group-discrimination demonstrates that net of personal experiences, one’s worldview towards fairness and their actions to achieve fairness could be prerequisites to future coalition building. These findings are of great importance in an environment where personal experiences with racial-ethnic discrimination are more difficult to notice due to the changing nature of these acts in the post-Civil Rights era (Kinder and Sanders 1996; Bobo et al. 1997; Bonilla-Silva 2018).

The importance of political behaviors in estimating support for the initiatives used in the study confirm arguments made by others in the past that coalition building is contingent on individual’s willingness to mobilize politically (Du Bois 1992; Ture and Hamilton 1992; Dawson 2013; Mantler 2015; Bloom and Martin 2016). Moreover, findings detailed in the intragroup
models for whites and Asians suggest that there may be potential for a multiracial coalition that includes not only Blacks and Latinx Americans who have typically been the focus of studies of this form. In contrast to most studies investigating potential alliances between groups and using CIIM as a framework, this study demonstrates that more research needs to be invested into how our social psychological theories help to estimate positions on policy prescriptions. Doing so not only builds a case for what factors improve the likelihood of cooperation between groups, but it also provides valued insight into what particular issues these groups can possibly organize around. Said differently, future studies using frameworks such as CIIM should look to into potential coalition building should also look to research the potential for those coalitions to materialize into something concrete that would benefit people of color.

LIMITATIONS

There were many limitations that this study could not address. First, the latest date from which the data was derived was the year 2012. While this data is not so dated that the findings are not useful or instructive, it would be significantly beneficial to observe data derived during the Trump era, which occurred alongside a resurgence of racial discourse not experienced in the US for several years (Bonilla-Silva 2018). During this era, racial-ethnic discrimination targeting groups such as Latinx Americans, particularly Mexicans, and Muslim Arab Americans has become more apparent and intense. Issues such as the travel ban\textsuperscript{16} and the Trump Administration’s handling of undocumented Mexican Americans at the border\textsuperscript{17} may have affected the way many Americans judge the experiences of minority groups in the contemporary US. Thus, it would have

\textsuperscript{16} The Trump Administration issued a travel ban in 2017 that restricted entry into the United States from seven mostly Muslim Arab countries. Recently, the ban has been expanded to include 13 countries, all of which are predominantly Muslim Arab countries or African nations. See Sacchetti et al. (2020) for more information.

\textsuperscript{17} See Romero et al. (2019).
been interesting to observe not only if the findings from this study held up when using more recent data, but if those findings produce stronger relationships with the dependent variables.

Another limitation of the study and a possible direction for future research, is that the methodology used to produce the results is not adequate for understanding the nuances of the constructs used as predictors here. For instance, quantitative survey research is incapable of providing insight on how individuals understand the discrimination faced by certain racial-ethnic groups to be different. This point is an important one as historical research on Latinx, and African Americans alliances has argued that in some circumstances, recognition of the other group’s mistreatment led those groups to push for different and sometimes conflicting solutions (Foley 2010; Mantler 2015). The locus of these groups’ oppression is often divergent and thus recognition of such may lead individuals not affected by that form of oppression to support different political remedies to address it. Qualitative research could help us to better understand how the nature of one’s understanding of an outside group’s marginalization affects how those individuals perceive of possible solutions. Nevertheless, the current study accomplishes its goal by providing information on how these very general perceptions relate to political opinions that an individual may hold.

5. CHAPTER: WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE AND WHAT MEANS ARE NECESSARY TO GET THERE?

The Civil Rights Movement and subsequent Black Power era, contrary to how they are portrayed in popular media, were not social movements consisting solely of African Americans. There was significant participation from Latinx Americans, white Americans, and even some Asian Americans in each era of activism. Major wins such as school desegregation would not have been possible without political mobilization efforts from Asian Americans (Okihiro 1994), Latinx
Americans (Foley 2010), and of course, African Americans. After the 1960s, interracial social activism was pivotal in the acquittal of Joan Little, a woman tried for the murder of a correctional officer who had raped her while she was incarcerated (Davis 1981; McGuire 2010). White women and Black men and women worked together for Little’s exoneration, which was seen in some circles as the culmination of nearly a century’s long effort for Black women particularly and Black people collectively to gain autonomy over their bodies (McGuire 2010).

Possibly influenced by knowledge of these efforts, and aware of similarities in the social location of marginalized racial-ethnic groups, scholars have attempted to gauge the potential of multiracial coalitions in contemporary times. Their thinking follows the logic that groups such as Latinx Americans and African Americans have the least to lose, in terms of material resources, and the most to gain from forming interracial coalitions with one another. On its face, that logic seems to make sense. Black and Brown men account for about 60% of the prison population despite both groups only accounting for about 30 percent of the United States’ population (Prison Policy Initiative 2014). Both Blacks and Latinx Americans hold far less wealth, earn less income, and own homes at much lower rates than white Americans (Pew Research Center 2013). Furthermore, while these groups are overrepresented among inmates and homicide victims, they are underrepresented in occupations well known for providing the most remuneration in terms of finances, prestige, and influence (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2020). The genesis behind these disparities include years of discrimination on the basis that people not born white were thought to be of inferior stock and were unworthy of such American benefits (Horsman 1981; Harris 1995; Lipsitz 2006). Thus, ostensibly, African Americans and Latinx Americans seem to be a “match made in heaven” as political collaborators.
Decades of social psychological research, however, seem to suggest the contrary. Any cooperation between these groups and others have been short-lived and much of the research points to Blacks and Latinx being more likely competitors than collaborators. In one study, Latinx immigrants in North Carolina report being closer to whites than Blacks (McCain et al. 2006), and other studies demonstrate Latinx immigrants reporting associating more negative than positive qualities with African Americans (Mindiola et al. 2002). Some efforts to mobilize together have involved tensions over real and imagined zero-sum competition. Some studies find that Hispanic migration to the United States coincides with a loss of wages and an increase of incarceration (Borjas et al. 2010) and violence for African Americans (Shihadeh and Barranco 2010). On the other hand, a study of municipal employment demonstrates that Latinx Americans become disadvantaged when working in areas that gain a substantial population increase of Blacks (McClain 1993).

Other work rejects this idea, suggesting that, in most cases, African Americans and Latinx Americans do not compete for the same jobs, so Hispanic migration does not pose a realistic threat to Blacks and vice versa (Bean et al. 2011). Whatever the case, the perception that competition over scarce resources exists between the groups undoubtedly skews their perceptions of one another (Abascal 2015; Craig and Richeson 2018). Abascal (2015) reports that African Americans begin to identify more with white Americans when presented with information of a Latinx increase in population.

While Latinx immigrants consistently express more social distance from Blacks, US-born Latinx Americans routinely view Blacks more favorably (Mindiola et al. 2002) and express a linked fate with the group (Correa 2011; Hurwitz et al. 2015). These findings, however, are complicated by the fact that the same measures found to improve perceptions of affinity between
the groups are also associated with competition between them (Correa 2011). Moreover, the ability of racial-ethnic minorities such as Latinx Americans and Asian Americans to blend in with white Americans (Bean and Lee 2007) and become privy to some of the “wages of whiteness” (Roediger 2007) have pushed some scholars to doubt the likelihood of the formation of a new age “rainbow coalition” (Kaufmann 2003). For these scholars, the increased coloring of the United States racial landscape will not erase the white supremacy that organizes the nation and arranges the maldistribution of green dollars based on skin pigmentation. While I recognize the legitimacy of this pessimism, this dissertation attempts to offer some light out of the dark abyss of current racial politics.

Where to Go?

In Martin Luther King Jr.’s last book, he posed the question “where do we go from here” to discuss the state of the Civil Rights Movement after the signing of the 1964 and 1965 Civil Rights Acts (King Jr. 2010). This legislation had been a momentous achievement, but King realized that it did not have the effect that it should, given the fact that Black’s still did not possess the intrinsic resources needed to fully participate in a democracy. They were still largely impoverished, America was entrenched in war with Vietnam, and the militant notion of “Black Power” was becoming increasingly popular among Blacks, drowning out the more tamed message of the less radical Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) of which King headed (King Jr. 2010).

In 2008, the US has experienced another momentous achievement in electing its first President of African descent. But like King realized then, there is still a long way to go before Blacks in particular, and racial-ethnic minorities in general can claim self-determination. The Economic Policy Institute (Jones et al. 2018) drafted a report on the current status of Blacks,
displaying only modest improvements in some socioeconomic categories and declines in others in comparison to their 1968 status—the year of King’s death. Pew Research Center (2013) displays similar results when looking at the socioeconomic status of Latinx Americans and, to some extent, Asian Americans. The assassination of an Iranian general may be a harbinger to another war involving the US and internal strife domestically has led to the creation of militant groups like ANTIFA (Anti-fascists) and Black Lives Matter. King’s 1967 question seems to be just as relevant in 2020 as we are confronted with problems eerily similar to the ones he faced.

By Any Means

While there is enough hardship to go around, disadvantage falls heaviest on racial-ethnic minorities. President Trump’s aggressive racial stances have alienated migrants to the US, which puts Latinx and Asian Americans most at risk. These issues can be challenged through a concerted collective effort by various racial-ethnic minorities to work together to achieve change. Chapter 2 demonstrated that while groups such as Blacks and Latinx Americans do perceive competition with incoming migrants, and that competition moderates nativist sentiments, they do not do so in a specifically racialized manner. Said differently, the vulnerability of these groups as laborers helps estimate their anti-immigration stances, not competition with groups such as Latinx Americans and whites specifically. These findings suggest that there is room for common ground between the groups.

Chapter 3 demonstrates that that commonality can be forged through politics. Second generation Latinx Americans are more given to radical political techniques were more likely to report commonality with racial-ethnic minorities such as Blacks and Asian Americans. While numerous studies prior to this one focused on the way perceptions of discrimination by minorities

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18 The largest portion of US migrants in order derive from Mexico, China, India, the Philippines, and El Salvador. These are all Latin American and Asian countries (Pew Research Center 2019).
related to commonality with other minorities, this study identified another important predictor of affinity between groups that had not yet been explored. Findings detailed that Latinx Americans who hold a more encompassing view of the political means necessary to generate change are more likely to express an affinity for other racial-ethnic minority groups. Not only did the relationship between this measure and commonality hold even when controlling for perceptions of discrimination, it was also found to moderate perceptions of discrimination. Thus, the positive relationship consistently found between perceptions of discrimination and affinity with other minorities is strongest among Latinx Americans with the most radical imagination for political tactics necessary for change. I argue that a possible reason this measure is related to commonality between racial-minorities is due to a history of interracial coalition building that was generally motivated by the radical politics of the groups. Potential collaborators were not only attracted by the common experiences they shared with other groups, but the methods they used to transform the political landscape (Mantler 2013; Dawson 2013; Bloom and Martin 2016).

Chapter 4 took these findings a step further by estimating how these measures related to policy preferences. The potential for commonality between racial-ethnic minority groups is fruitless if it does not aim to produce material gains for disadvantaged populations. Therefore, it was important for social psychological research to investigate if the measures associated with increased affinity between groups have any bearing on the policy positions that individuals take. The material circumstances of individuals, short of a political revolution, is most changed through policy creation and enforcement. Building on the work in chapter 3, chapter 4 included not only individual’s perceptions of political techniques as a measure but their political actions as a predictor of preferences for ostensibly race-based policies. It also investigated the relationship between individual’s perception of racial-ethnic minorities experiences with discrimination and
policy preferences. Both measures detailed positive associations with progressive stances on race-based policy attitudes. The variables also demonstrated interactive effects, suggesting that, like with chapter 3’s findings, the positive relationship between perceptions of discrimination toward racial minorities is strongest among the most politically active individuals. Separate analyses run by race, demonstrated that the effects of these measures are consistent among groups like whites and Asian Americans as well as Blacks and Latinx Americans. The findings suggest that the potential for a multiracial alliance may not be as bleak as other studies suggest.

Limitations: Methodology and Analyses

The general limitations of quantitative research that utilizes secondary data analysis are apparent in this dissertation. Perhaps, the greatest limitation relates to the questions that can be asked and answered. If the power to ask questions is the greatest power of all, as afro-pessimist Frank Wilderson (2015) presumes, then it could be said that a method which does not allow the researcher to engage their own questions offers no power at all. Many of the establishments that Robert Allen (1992) once critiqued in his book Black Awakening in Capitalist America, for funding neocolonialism in urban ghettos, also fund many of the expansive, financially taxing, painstaking surveys that provide the data from which we researchers analyze and test hypotheses. That said, there may be a reticence to ask the penetrating questions that could potentially scrutinize the very establishments making some of our research possible. I acknowledge that some important inquiries that I would like to engage which include prompts that gauge not only if one perceives a group to have been mistreated but who or what do they believe is responsible for the mistreatment, are not present in most surveys.

However, the fact that some of the more piercing questions that researchers may want to analyze are absent from most surveys does not mean that the work produced using this data is
without value. There is much that can be gleaned from observing the data in its present form. Attitudes concerning what some radical scholars and activists may consider reformist positions could help us to infer which positions individuals might take on more revolutionary programs. More importantly, quantitative research affords researchers the ability to generalize their findings to a much broader population. This dissertation was concerned with understanding the political opinions and behaviors of racial-ethnic minorities on a large scale in hopes that they can provide some prescience on the political possibilities of a soon-to-be majority colored US nation. I attempted an empirical investigation of a theoretical picture that others before, have painted (see Lee and Bean 2007 and Bonilla-Silva 2004). In doing so, I broached the question, “Could an increase in the colored population coincide with a decrease in white supremacy?” If one is to infer from the results of this dissertation, then the answer would be “possibly”.

Another limitation of the dissertation relates to the manner in which I define and analyze racial-ethnic groups. Some US datasets, attempting to be representative of the general public, possess samples of groups too small for researchers to disaggregate groups for more nuanced analyses. This reality is especially problematic when researchers seek to analyze people of Latin or Asian heritage. Small samples often force quantitative scholars to ignore important differences within these groups that may be of significance to the respondents in question. Whether people of Latin or Asian descent perceive themselves as belonging to a distinct racial group irrespective of differences in nationality is an empirical question in itself. While research demonstrates that groups such as white and Black Americans do not distinguish between nationalities when observing these groups (Wilkinson 2009), and indeed others have argued that Latinx (Cobas et al. 2016) and Asian Americans (Zhou 2004) have been racialized in the US as a collective, the way these individuals define themselves is of great importance. Future studies should emphasize
observation of data with oversamples of Latinx and Asian Americans that includes measures of nationality. These data could provide more insight into divergences of opinion within groups whose differences are often obfuscated.

**Directions for Future Research**

My later work will look to address the limitations I have laid out above and to expand on this work I have completed here. I look to observe datasets with more robust samples of foreign-born Blacks as well as Arab Americans. Blacks are generally treated as a political monolith. In some instances, this treatment is justified as research demonstrates that a large majority of Blacks support similar political preferences and largely identify as Democrats (Dawson 1994). The political similarities are consistent in this work as many of the independent variables used in the selectively Black analyses were insignificant, demonstrating some political uniformity among the race. But these examples generally look at Black Americans and do not include large enough samples of foreign-born Blacks to draw comparisons. Foreign-born Blacks typically espouse worldviews dissimilar from US-born Blacks, in some cases, and do not categorize themselves with US Blacks upon migration to the country (Waters 1999). An increasing proportion of migrants to the US are arriving from parts of Africa. Social psychology must accommodate these demographic changes by analyzing the opinions of these individuals and the way those opinions shift as the context in which they live shifts.

Regarding Arab Americans, my future work will look to observe how these individuals perceive commonality and cooperation with other racial-ethnic groups. Some argue that the racialization of Muslim Arab Americans has been a process that has spanned several decades (Jamal and Naber 2008). Recent alienation of Muslim Arab Americans by the Trump Administration has only intensified this outlook. Future research should look to investigate how
Muslim Arab Americans’ perception of discrimination relates to their policy preferences and affinity for historically aggrieved groups. Arab Americans share many similarities to Latinx and Asian Americans. Their appearance and socioeconomic status afford them a proximity to whiteness that provides some benefits, both material and symbolic (Cainkar 2008). However, in some circumstances, they are racialized and treated as “the other” when they exhibit cultural adornments like the hijab (Selod 2015). The racial profiling some Arab Americans experience while flying (Alsultany 2008) in some ways resembles the treatment accorded Blacks while driving (Bates and Fasenfest 2005). Their proximity in urban spaces to other racial-ethnic minorities and increasing presence in the US demands greater attention from social scientists doing work on intergroup relations.

In conclusion, there is much more work that needs to be done before social scientists have a great understanding of what the demographic changes in the US mean to our political future. Some have noted that the US racial order is transforming from its traditional biracial model, characterized by divisions between whites and non-whites, to something different altogether (Bonilla-Silva 2004; Lee and Bean 2007). It remains to be seen if this transformation leads to a fairer and more just society.
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ABSTRACT

BEYOND THE RAINBOW: PREDICTING INTRA AND INTERGROUP POLITICAL ATTITUDES OF LATINX AND BLACK AMERICANS AND THE POTENTIAL FOR COOPERATION AND CONFLICT

by

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This dissertation uses social psychological theory and methods to better understand the political attitudes of whites, Blacks, Latinx Americans and Asian Americans in the contemporary United States. Using quantitative methodology and survey research, I estimate the potential for cooperation and conflict between racial minorities and the political implications that these measures may have. I show that perceptions of competition with immigrants are strongly associated with anti-immigration preferences even among racial minorities such as Blacks and Latinx Americans, of who have a long history of migration to the United States. However, I also show that there is potential for interracial cooperation among groups with an awareness to racial injustices faced by themselves and others, as well as those who are open to various political tactics to push for change and those who are the most politically active. In addition, I demonstrate that these concepts that improve prospects for commonality between groups also help estimate progressive stances for race-based policy initiatives such as racial profiling and affirmative action. These findings suggest to me that the changing demographics of the United States could potentially lead to dramatic transformations of the US racial landscape that leads to more racially equitable outcomes.
Randall Wyatt received his bachelor’s degree from Wayne State University in 2014 and his master’s degree from Wayne State in 2016. Mr. Wyatt’s research focuses on the social psychological factors that help to shape the political opinions of US Americans, specifically racial-ethnic minorities. His research seeks to engage the political implications of demographic change in the United States by investigating associations between racial attitudes, political activity, perceptions of political struggle and public policy preferences. His work looks to estimate the prospects for interracial collaboration around issues of concern for minorities. Mr. Wyatt’s future work will continue to explore the perspectives or opinions of historically marginalized groups that have too often been unrecognized in social science research.