Planning solutions to social problems in Israel

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PLANNING SOLUTIONS TO SOCIAL PROBLEMS IN ISRAEL

by

LAWRENCE W. GORMEZANO

THESIS

Submitted to the Office for Graduate Studies, Graduate Division of Wayne State University, Detroit, Michigan in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF URBAN PLANNING

1979

APPROVED BY:

[Signature]

Adviser

[Signature] April 10, 1979

Date

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Finally, I am deeply thankful to my wife Susan for her typing and editing and most importantly, her patience, understanding and perseverance without which, alone, I would have floundered. A special thanks to my parents for their continued support and encouragement in pursuit of my education.
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Jewish Society in Israel consists of a wide-ranging mixture of ethnic, racial and religious groups. For the sake of convenience, they may be classified into the Ashkenazic Jews of European and Russian origin, Sephardim of Spanish and later North African origins, Jews of Middle-Eastern and Balkano origins, and the Oriental Jews of West Asian origin (Iran, India, Kurdistan, etc.).

Social conflicts have arisen between these groups for many complex reasons. During July through September of 1973 I had the opportunity to study these problems through the sponsorship of the World Sephardi Federation. Depending upon one's point of view, Israeli social problems stem from racial discrimination to the gross national product. Solutions are often unimaginative and repeat mistakes already made in other countries. Observation led me to believe that possible solutions to some of these problems may derive from the application of basic social and physical planning concepts, which will be explored later.

Expressing the weight of their numbers, organization, and economic and political power, Ashkenazim have directed
the Zionist movement and international Jewish organizations ever since their inception. For the most part, Oriental and Sephardi Jews were unable to play an active role in the Zionist movement for political, geographic and a number of other reasons. As a result, when they arrived in Israel many were placed in "development areas", primarily new towns without an economic base and located in high-risk border areas. They simultaneously arrived at a time when the provision of decent accommodations for newcomers was very low on the list of national priorities.

In present day Israel more than twenty percent of the population lives below the accepted poverty line. Although there are "haves" and "have-nots" in all countries, ninety percent of the latter in Israel belong to Sephardi and Oriental communities. The problem, therefore, becomes communal as well as economic. Many of these families suffer malnutrition, inadequate housing and minimal educational opportunities. Consequently, seventy percent of the juvenile delinquents in Israel come from these same communities. Most are functionally illiterate and 30,000 of these juveniles have police records.

Poverty of this type is self-perpetuating and is well on the way to creating a permanent sub-class in Israel distinguished by semi-racial characteristics. Equal opportunity is meaningless to most members of a group who are ill-equipped to break exclusionary patterns and enter the
mainstream of Israeli society dominated by Western education and manners. Israeli society has largely accepted the notion that in order to attract new immigrants from Western countries, who possess occupational skills vital to Israeli society, special opportunities and incentives will have to be provided. The Israeli Government, at the same time, responded to comparable yet lesser demands for housing and jobs from its own poor and long-time citizens by suggesting that they should patiently wait. As a result, the disadvantaged communities have displayed increasing antagonism towards olim (immigrants in residence three years or less) from Russia and the West because of the privileges granted to them.

The problem of national integration between Sephardic and Ashkenazic Jews is one of the crucial challenges facing Israeli society. There are many gaps in education, housing, income distribution, and political representation between these two groups. Sephardic families earn less than Ashkenazic ones, most families living in slums and crowded housing are Sephardic, the percentage of Sephardic children in high schools and universities relative to the total population is low, the poorer development towns are mainly Sephardic, new immigrants get better apartments than many who have been in Israel for more than twenty years, and most of Israel's welfare recipients and 350,000 people living below the poverty level are Sephardim or Orientals.

In seeking causes for the above disparities, many
organized and individual Sephardo-Orientals accuse the government of discrimination, which is to simplify the problem - even though criticism of government social policy is legitimate. A large proportion of Sephardic immigrants to Israel were unskilled and illiterate. As a result, a major reason for their lower average income is due to disadvantages in skills and education. Another major factor behind social problems is that the majority of Sephardic and Oriental Jews are relative newcomers in Israel. In any country older immigrants have a temporary economic advantage over newer ones. In any case, a large proportion of the Sephardic community has advanced rapidly on economic, social and political levels while a large minority has remained below the poverty line. An even larger proportion would have achieved an average living standard had family size not interfered. Large families only compound problems such as housing and tend to inhibit the development of children in school.

Those who protest government policies are right to demand more energetic efforts to provide better opportunities for educational and economic advancement. It is incorrect, in many instances, to analyze the problem of communal gaps strictly in terms of discrimination. The plight of uneducated, unskilled, welfare recipients and slum dwellers requires more investment and imagination in the quest for solutions.

This thesis, therefore, focuses upon the detailed
nature and causes of communal gaps between various social groups in Israel. In addition, approaches are explored aimed at diminishing inequality of opportunities for various ethnic groups in Israeli society.
CHAPTER II

BACKGROUND

Immigration to Israel varied greatly according to country of origin and time of entry. Immigrants from Moslem countries were economically, culturally, and politically ill-equipped for what they found in Israel. With different family structures, they were not prepared to change, but rather to perpetuate their existing cultures. Certainly they had no desire to assimilate any aspect of a Western style of life. Coming as they did, for the most part, from countries still lagging far behind in technological development, Sephardic and Oriental immigrants have entered the lower socio-economic strata of an Israeli society with political, social and economic patterns determined by European settlers.

The period of immigrant arrival was an important factor in creating current social problems. Depending upon when one arrived, individual development was often intimately tied to the political, ideological and economic development of overall Israeli society. Those who came to Palestine during the Mandate Period (1917-1948) were generally equipped with appropriate ideological connections even before arrival; they came to settle the land. In pre-1948 Palestine and for part of the post-1948 period, the process of bring-
ing in new immigrants involved adapting the economy to their integration, while at the same time modifying their occupational, economic and social patterns. An economic and occupational realignment was required, reversing the conventional trend and reinstituting a movement from town to country and from tertiary occupations (service, merchants, clerical) to secondary (industrial) and primary (agricultural) ones.

After the establishment of the State, authorities had to take charge of directing the sudden influx of new immigrants to various locations. Some were sent to immigrant moshavim and kibbutzim (collective agricultural settlements) while others were referred to development towns. This was only an initial distribution and the newcomers were subsequently free to choose their own places of residence. The pattern generally seemed to occur as in Table I.

Table I indicates that the greatest disparity in settlement patterns lies between those from Moslem countries and Europe. The late arrival of the former precluded a role in the development of the economy or institutions. Whereas the economy was somewhat adapted to new immigrants, it was really an adaptation to European immigrants. By the time the Sephardic and Oriental immigrants arrived, the Europeans had gone through a "rural cycle", where they had temporarily sacrificed their tertiary occupations for primary ones. Their later moves to cities and development towns were in
pursuit of greater economic opportunities, generally based upon earlier occupational training, prior to coming to Israel. The economy did not, however, adapt to later non-European immigrants because there was not much to adapt to. The paucity of their occupational skills did not allow much flexibility in adaptation to new economic life in Israel. They were placed in moshavim, often as laborers, or else in poor development towns. Those who later moved to cities had not achieved new political or economic skills along the way.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Place of Origin</th>
<th>Until 1933 Pioneering Selective</th>
<th>1933-1948 Non-Selective</th>
<th>1948 Onwards Mass Immigration initial direction</th>
<th>Subsequent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Europe</td>
<td>Rural Settlements</td>
<td>Moshavot</td>
<td>Development town or moshav</td>
<td>City and development town</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Europe</td>
<td>Rural Settlements</td>
<td>City</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moslem Countries</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>Development town or moshav</td>
<td>City and development town</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Though Table I uses the term development towns, no indication is given of the wide variations which exist between these areas. The Europeans moved to development towns.

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towns for economic opportunities, such as Ashkelon and Ashdod, with advanced port and shipping junctions, or Arad, with a number of chemical industries; these towns are economically viable. Sephardic immigrants, on the other hand, were often placed in poor towns, such as Dimona, Mitzpeh Ramon or Beit Shean. Often placed in border areas, these poorer towns have little economic viability, since the reason for their existence is artificial and their geographic site arbitrary. Their inhabitants were placed there by the government upon arrival as a means of settling otherwise undesirable areas. They remain there because they have little to offer somewhere else and, therefore, no prospect for improving themselves.

Israel has always been an ideological country, especially during its earlier years. The choice of ideology and level of one's ideological understanding were often the keys to success. Although some may view religion as an ideology, political and social ideology shaped the structure of modern Israel. Country of origin was often the determinant of one's ideological involvement.

The Jewish communities from which the immigrants came were of three types:

1. **Eastern Europe** - Jews were mainly engaged in "neutral" occupations, neither industry nor agriculture, but dependent upon rural areas for supplies and on the towns for customers. They also resided in fringe areas (neither urban
10

nor rural). The occasional militant ostracism they received from non-Jews only strengthened this behavior pattern. The result was a synthesis between rural society and an urban occupational structure and culture which characterized the shtetl (or small, only Jewish towns). Some Jews moved to major cities where they established communities in segregated neighborhoods.

2. Western Europe - Here the Jews were more integrated because of a more powerful urbanization process. Since Western cities were much more developed they found far greater economic opportunities in liberal professions, industrial-administrative positions, and the mercantile trades.

3. Moslem Countries - The situation here was different from both Eastern and Western Europe. Here the distribution of Jews was similar to the indigenous population, with a high percentage of the population found in the cities. Significantly, there was a high degree of polarization within the Jewish community between a small wealthy elite and an impoverished majority. The Jewish population in these countries, unfortunately, resembled the non-Jewish one in terms of social and economic backwardness, typical of underdeveloped countries.

The impact of background upon present day circumstances is striking. Jews from Moslem countries are deficient in political know-how and have no leadership positions or models in modern Israel. The majority of Jews
from Moslem countries had, and still have, no communication with Zionism or Zionist education. Zionism implies an entire doctrine concerning the voluntary regeneration of the Jewish people in its own land. Yet, whoever settles in Israel is not necessarily a Zionist. One must subscribe to the Zionist ideology to be considered as one. Zionism is essentially a secular movement rooted in a modern ideological conception of people and homeland. From the ideological point of view, the majority of Oriental Jews are not Zionists.

The migration to Israel of Jews from Oriental countries was due to their ties with Judaism rather than Zionism. This link to Judaism and thus, to the land of Israel, has diminished in second and third generation Oriental communities. Attachment to heritage is becoming continually weaker with the rise of new generations who have grown up in an atmosphere which is free and uncomplicated in its attitudes.

Jewish society in Israel continually builds on a foundation of technology and progress regarded as ideology, rather than Judaism. As long as this technological culture continues to exist Sephardic and Oriental Jews will find themselves on the bottom of society. While many Oriental Jews may succeed in entering the technological and administrative elite, they would only be solving their own personal problems and not those of their community as a whole.
The heritage of the Eastern European shtetl still affects the tenor of life in Israel. That heritage was a revulsion against caste and privilege and a positive commitment to social welfare and egalitarianism. Life was with the people and the source of strength was human solidarity. When East European immigrants came to Israel, therefore, they immediately adapted to the prevailing forces of Zionist and Socialist thought, whether previously familiar with it or not. From the ideological point of view, North African Jewry was very poorly prepared for immigration to Israel. In Tunisia and Algeria the Zionist movement could express itself freely during the period of French presence. In Morocco, however, the country that provided the largest number of North African immigrants, the Zionist Movement was tolerated but never legally recognized by the French; the Zionists were obliged to act with discretion. This lack of ideological preparation is at the root of many of the difficulties encountered by North African Jews on their arrival in Israel.

The Oriental immigrants brought with them traditional patterns of Jewish life which had been relatively unaffected by ideological currents, such as those which had swept through European Jewry. In the fact of their Jewishness, the Oriental and Sephardic Jews see a common bond with their Ashkenazi brethren as the key to their acceptance into Israeli society. In addition, Orientals
are anxious to distinguish themselves from Arabs, and they are accordingly likely to stress their Jewishness.

In examining the historical development of Israeli ideology it is important to note that the first wave of immigrants (pre-1930) was crucial in later development. They developed a pattern of politics and society that became the national character; all those who followed had to fit this pattern.

As in America, the first waves of immigrants developed a set of attitudes and values so powerful that even today, when the passage from pioneer society to modern industrial state is nearly complete, one still associates them with Israeli politics and manners. It will suffice to mention a few examples: 1) the party system and its unique centrality in political life; 2) the strong belief in equality; 3) the continuing informality and simplicity in manners, dress, and language; 4) the agrarian ritual; 5) the belief in voluntary action; and 6) the notion of an official (Zionist) state ideology.

In a way, all this has created problems because of conflicts between values, ideologies, and realities. Through Zionism's rural ethic, many of Israel's present values are rooted in a modern type of farm life which stresses the importance of physical work. The Israeli village fostered many important ideas - the social image of equality, respect for physical work, belief in changing the face of nature through human efforts, and looking toward development as a community responsibility.

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As Israel developed so grew its urban population at a time when emphasis was not placed on how a city should be built. Ideologically the city in Israel was considered unimportant. While rural lands were being held as public property, private persons acquired large areas in the cities for speculation. While in the West property dominated social and political thought, in Israel private property had been reduced to virtual insignificance.

In retrospect, the Zionist challenge was all embracing. It not only rejected long established notions concerning Jewish identity but also tried to abolish its secondary characteristics, such as its predominantly urban character. The early Jewish settlements, therefore, attracted people inspired by purely ideological motives of return to the land and egalitarianism. Although the latter was always deeply imbedded in ideology, equality has become a touchy issue in Israel because of importation of poverty and ignorance from areas where ideological models did not apply. The Zionist mystique of "return to the land" did not appeal to people who had lived on the land and were anxious to move to cities. The goal of a national economy owned by the workers through their trade unions had little effect upon Afro-Asian immigrants who were refugees and not ideologists.

The establishment of the State of Israel was connected with three major processes - the influx of new
immigrants, the differentiation of the socioeconomic structure, and the transformation of the pioneering elite into the ruling elite. The continuity of the process of developing a collective identity has become a major problem due to continued shifts in these processes.

The changing structural position of the elite constituted the focal point of these problems. The ruling elite has emphasized that its legitimacy depends upon an adherence to various "movement" symbols and viewed themselves as responsible for implementing major collective goals inherent in the "movement" ideology. The ruling elite maintained and intensified adherence to the pioneering-socialist ideology. Adherence to their policies was guided by a system of reward allocation achieved through the major collective organizations, such as government itself, the Histadrut (the General Labor Federation), and various settlement organizations. The elite, through its system of rewards, counteracted tendencies toward autonomy by different educational, professional, and occupational groups, thereby minimizing status differentials that tended to develop between various groups.³

Major problems have arisen as to how the pioneer image could continue to be the sole focus of identity and

how its bearers could retain exclusive elite status. In an attempt to develop an "Israeli" identity the "pioneers" and their successors tended to gloss over potential cleavages between religious and secular groups, traditional and modern, and between different ethnic traditions or cultural orientations.

With Israel's growth, for the most part, into a Western country, changes have occurred in the strength of its pioneering tradition and adherence to Zionist ideology. Such changes can also be found in other modern societies whose formative stages were ideological. Israel's future social struggle lies in the extent to which commitments to a collective ideology, through which it was hoped to forge a modern Israeli culture, can be maintained in light of technological and westernizing forces which threaten to erode it.
CHAPTER III

SOCIAL COMPONENTS OF ETHNIC RELATIONS IN ISRAEL

Large cities have always provided crucial gateways towards modernization in developing countries and they play a leading role in breaking rural migrants away from traditional social practices. Migrants to the city are more likely to be receptive to social change by being exposed to a heterogenous population. Both domestic and international movements of population to cities can be attributed to an economic "push" from the land and a "pull" attraction of city living.

Migrants to Israel responded to "pushes" and "pulls" which were spiritual, ideological, and nationalistic, rather than economic and social. Uniquely, the majority of immigrants to Israel came from urban environments in their native countries and went to rural environments in Israel. Even though the cities of North Africa differed greatly from those of Europe in terms of complexity and economic base, they were all urban environments. As pointed out in Chapter II, more universal forces of migration became operational in Israel after 1953. This is where social analysts in Israel often miss the point of origin to modern
day social problems.

Changes have occurred in Israeli patterns of domestic migration since 1948 (see Table I). A major issue concerns a sizeable population which has not yet attained either a stable residence or a stable source of employment. Rural-to-urban migrants in Israel have faced major societal changes, experiencing problems similar to migrants in other developing countries. Some of these problems include the breakdown of clan structure and abandonment of traditional values; breakdown of the extended family and the development of conflicts and misunderstandings within the family; instability of a society in flux; lack of education; conflicts between children who are in school and parents who never went; lack of understanding between educated parents and children who have acquired new outlooks and values; conflicts between husband and wife, when either begins to demand new standards; the rejection of traditional values and customs by individuals not yet able to adapt to new ways; poverty, overcrowding and malnutrition; and imitation of Western standards and behavior without a real understanding of them.\(^4\)

A question arises which remains to be explored: is it desirable for Israel's population to be composed of

ethnic blocs grouped according to country of origin or does such a composition impede effective reconstruction of a new population? On the one hand, this rather ethnically homogenous settlement pattern makes it difficult to utilize various waves of immigration and different ethnic groups as components in building a larger society, since it offers a reward to the more ethnically cohesive areas through the political process. On the other hand, if the various ethnic groups are inter-mixed and forced to integrate, they might lose necessary mutual support, available through social solidarity, which assists new-comers in adapting to a new society. There are elements of both alternatives currently operating in Israel. It becomes important to first understand those social elements which create diversity and conflict and those which minimize diversity and foster harmony. These forces are crucial in conceptualizing their interaction with and resolution through current and potential social and physical planning methods.

The Nature of Ethnic Relations in Israel

Ethnic relations in Israel are exacerbated by the complexity of defining clear-cut problem areas. There are multiple factors which both impede and promote integration of Jewish ethnic groups in Israel. It becomes difficult to say that one factor clearly promotes integration while another only impedes it. Rather, one must weigh the different impacts of these factors on society as a whole. One
could say, for example, that differences in ethnic background have been a major impediment to social integration in Israel. Although all Jews share the same language (after immigration) and religion they differ in dress, how they relate to each other, in socialization patterns and family structure. One often hears claims in Israel about how primitive were the Moroccan Jews while the Western and European Jews belonged to the most advanced middle-class of Western society. People often find it easier to cope with these extreme examples, though they be factually incorrect. Most Orientals are really quite close to a modern life-style, while many Europeans left environments only in the beginning stages of modernization, such as in the rural parts of Eastern Europe. It should be emphasized, nevertheless, that Israel contains a large variety of ethnic behavior patterns. These differences are significant where close contact and coordination are necessary such as in schools, factories, the army and when political issues have to be decided.

Religion also plays an important role in Israel and could work either way with respect to ethnic relations. There have been many differences among people in Israeli (Jewish) society over matters of religious observance and administration of the educational system. The meaning attached to religious symbols and events, such as the Biblical Exodus from Egypt, or such rituals as fasting, is quite varied depending upon background. Whatever the nature of observance, however, the same symbols are meaningful to
everyone. Differences arise in the degree to which people are prepared to act upon them. Because of religious differences, there are those who would completely separate themselves from the mainstream of Israeli society, while there are others who view these symbols as a unifying force.

Another major area for consideration is the considerable correlation of ethnic background with economic and demographic characteristics. Issues which would be defined in ethnically homogenous societies as class differences have implicit ethnic elements in Israel. While such statistics as income levels would seemingly indicate a clear-cut issue of the "haves" vs. "have-nots", there are other factors which would preclude clear impacts. The majority of Europeans immigrated prior to 1948 and seniority, besides ethnicity, plays a vital role in determining one's social position, as it would in any immigrant society. Those who have been in the country longer have had greater time and opportunity to gain more prestigious positions and more desirable housing. Thus we find that status differentials and ecological differentiation overlap with ethnic background. Once again, in the political process, the advancement of Orientals to leadership positions is quite selective. They are, therefore, less prominent in national politics but well represented in local politics when Orientals comprise the majority in a given locale.

While the overlap between socioeconomic status and
ethnic background is an aggravating factor in ethnic relations, it is in the dynamic development of the Israeli economy that improved ethnic integration is hoped for. The twenty-eight years of Israels' existence has been a period of rapid expansion. Although population expanded, resources such as land, capital, expertise and power expanded even more rapidly. While the gap between average income of old-timers and newcomers widened during the 1950's, this trend was reversed in the 1960's; the gap has diminished steadily, although slowly, since then.

Established Israelis, who are predominantly of European origin, did not lose economically in sharing with later immigrants, but actually prospered in the process due to the enormous increase in resources which became available. The economics of ethnic relations in Israel, therefore, was more a mixed sharing of economic benefits. Jews of European origin not only gained economically from the influx of Oriental Jews, but successive waves of immigration also increased social mobility. As the newcomers took over the lowest positions, more powerful and rewarding roles opened up for the old-timers. Furthermore, the establishment of the State, with all of its government branches and agencies, provided new careers for which the better educated, more experienced Europeans were natural candidates. While the Europeans benefited, so did the Orientals who attained income and standards-of-living well beyond what they possessed in their countries of origin.
Components Of Culture That Create Diversity

From the early days of the State of Israel, the subject of unity vs. diversity has been debated. To what extent should the process of cultural integration aim at producing a level of uniformity as opposed to preserving the traditions that each group developed in its previous environment? Unity is always desirable for a nation, yet each diverse element offers a special contribution to national culture.

Immigration to Israel since 1948 has added a great variety of cultural patterns to its society, although tensions and problems have inevitably developed. The roots of Israeli culture are firmly planted in Jewish tradition. This fact is fundamental to the educational system, the language, and in the general life-style of the country. The impact of tradition, however, is not uniform and it impacts differently upon religious and secular groups. Each Jewish community which came to Israel brought with it distinctive traditions. Emerging cultural expression in Israel, therefore, represents a synthesis, still in the process of formation, of communal sub-cultures based on the common denominator of Judaic heritage.

Various immigrant groups also brought with them unique identities. Attempts by these groups to resolve conflicts of interest with other groups found them shifting to
ethnicity as an organizing principle through which they could make claims on the resources of the state. Specifically, Israel's ethnic relations can best be described in terms of two major relationships: (a) that between European/Western and non-European/Oriental Jews, and (b) that between Jewish and non-Jewish (mainly Arab) groups. This is somewhat of an oversimplification. As noted in Table II, both the European and non-European Jewish groups are divided into many sub-groups which differ in their language, level of education, income, life style and other characteristics. Although such simplification does not completely correspond to demographic reality, it does organize meaningfully the complex network of ethnic attitudes and relationships. Since the scope of this paper is limited, relations between Jewish and non-Jewish groups will not be dealt with.

Any society is based upon social values. Such values are preserved by tradition through generations, bound by family ties and certain societal groupings. Western mass urbanization has undermined the traditional and close human relationships prevailing in rural and less technological societies. Those groups who came to Israel were faced with the problem of resolving their values with a new modern society. Even though they may not have thought of themselves as belonging to a particular non-Jewish group in their native country, they soon found identification with an ethnic group as an important means of protecting their value systems.
Needless to say, the development of Israeli society has become an extensive network of ethnic groups, each protective of a value system and in conflict with others.

### TABLE II

**ETHNIC DISTRIBUTION OF THE JEWISH POPULATION IN ISRAEL**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>European Descent</th>
<th>Asian Descent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>57%</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.S.R.</td>
<td>Iraq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>Yemen, Aden</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rumania</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
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At this point, we come back to the strategic efficacy of ethnicity as an organizing principle. In the most natural way, those individuals low on the socioeconomic ladder who are of similar backgrounds have the best chance of changing the system, if they behave as a group. It is as a group that their struggle becomes not merely negation, but affirmation; not merely against the norms of some other group, but in favor of the already existing norms of its own group. Ethnic groups do often differ as to what is desirable and undesirable. By contrast, one of the difficulties of social class as an organizing principle is that there is not much conflict of norms between most social classes.

There is considerable heterogeneity within the Sephardic and Oriental sectors of Israeli society. Although many are in the lower socio-economic strata, there are wide differences in socio-economic status and educational background between immigrants from different countries and between those from rural as opposed to urban regions within the same country. Some immigrants came from peasant societies untouched by any technological development, while others had already been influenced by modernization before they left. While these differences do exist, the Sephardic and Oriental communities tend to regard themselves as underprivileged as

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compared with the Ashkenazi community, which is seen as the dominant sector. With the psychology attendant on feeling "second-class", communal belonging is accordingly more central in the consciousness of Oriental communities than it is among Ashkenazi groups.

Communal "belongingness" among Sephardic and Oriental groups often manifests itself in the way people associate with each other. In their countries of origin, most Oriental Jews lived in a social structure based upon tribal associations, such as kinship groups or extended families. Upon arrival in Israel they sought to maintain such a social structure as a means of individual and community support during times of changing environments and values. This eventually became a losing battle as nuclear families, characteristic of Western environments, became the dominant form of family structure in Israel. The changing forms of social structure certainly provided sources of conflict and tension. They created instability of norms and values particularly among the younger generation. The nuclear family could not provide the support, moral and otherwise, that extended families could. As a result, many within the Oriental community are seeking this support through association with a larger community of similar ethnic backgrounds, while at the same time finding themselves in opposition to those of dif-
ferent backgrounds.

In spite of all this, one cannot say that the extended family is no longer a significant force in Israeli society. Rather, it remains a force finding itself increasingly in conflict with other social forces. In fact, a typical feature of ethnic communities from Islamic countries is their adherence to the extended family structure. Coming to Israel as part of extended families, they continue to maintain intensive relations with kin.

This family structure leads to ethnic particularism with all its social and cultural effects. Studies have shown that close social relations outside the extended family circle seem to be more of a rarity, especially among the adult population. The combination of friends who are relatives and those who are not provides for a circle of acquaintances which may be considerable, but hardly varied either in ethnic affiliation or in the type of relations maintained. This, however, is much less characteristic of the younger Israeli-born generation than of the old-timers.

Problems of intracommunal and intercommunal conflict in Israel are quite similar to what has occurred in other developing nations. While many of the conflicts are either of a generational or ethnic nature, there are indications that the major source of conflict is based upon differences

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between modern, transitional and traditional peoples. In a study of Turkish society, Marshall Clinard found such intracommunal and intercommunal conflicts. He found the lack of a stable community having norms of behavior recognized and supported by general consensus made itself acutely felt in parent-child relationships. The larger kinship group as a functioning unit has given way, in the cities, to the nuclear family consisting only of parents and children. Furthermore, occupational differentiation in urban centers has made possible the employment of married and unmarried women outside the home. These role changes have invariably altered the social status of women and affected interpersonal relationships both within and outside the home.

Shifts in values, family roles, and community structure do not fully explain the problem of conflict between Oriental and European groups in Israel. As with the Turkish experience, such intercommunal conflicts go beyond ethnicity to involve those at different stages of the modernization process. Clinard defines this process as involving four variables seen as preconditions for modernization to occur: (1) cities - which function as urban centers to provide the physical and psychosocial conditions that set in motion the need for modernization and the facilities for bringing it

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about; (2) literacy - preferably based upon a national education system (uniformity), the literacy rate among the general population must achieve sufficiently high levels; (3) media participation - conditional upon literacy, the population must be involved with media communications networks to foster information exchange, elements of decision-making, etc.; (4) political participation - people in a modern society must be capable of imagining themselves as part of the political process, making decisions of personal political involvements at whatever level, based upon their literacy and media participation.  

Israel possesses all four variables at an advanced level, symbolic of advanced modernization. Consequently, those portions of the population who are more modern often find themselves in direct conflict with those groups which are more traditional. Those who are modern belong to a Westernized and urban society; they are literate, consumers of the mass media, capable of imagining themselves in varieties of situations beyond their immediate boundaries, and willing to formulate opinions and make judgments relative to public issues. The traditionals, on the other hand, are illiterate and nonparticipants. They are incapable of imaginatively projecting themselves beyond their immediate

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9Ibid., p.222.
milieu and are lacking in interest or opinions concerning problems of a community or social character.

The strong kinship structure of Sephardic and Oriental groups, which provides mutual support to its members, has helped ease problems of adjustment to changing social and economic conditions. At the same time, successful adjustment by one group often provokes resentment in other groups. Thus success for one group may produce disharmony and conflict in the community as a whole and, more importantly, with those outside the community of different origins. Minkowitz concludes that:

...changes in the direction of social and economic modernization sometimes derive from efforts made by individuals or groups to cope with problems, feuds, rivalries, aspirations for prestige, etc., which originate from the older social structure; that is, the frame of reference in these new activities is still the traditional setting. While the end product of this course of events may sometimes be desirable in terminal modernization, it may also bring about a vicious circle where modern items may be absorbed into a traditional setting. Neglect of this possibility may lead to illusions about the process of modernization. These illusions may explain why apparently advanced communities (referring to rural settlements), which are thought to have made a good adjustment, suddenly and surprisingly collapse. It is misleading to take superficial changes for actual social modernization.\(^\text{10}\)

In spite of the fact that immigration to Israel called for drastic changes in old social structures, social

background has had an immense influence on some important developments in the new environment. Settlers arrived with few possessions and left old environments where often the occupational structure provided few opportunities for Jews. They were 'absorbed' by agencies stressing equality in material support and in opportunities for social and economic mobility. They were sent to cooperative settlements which required membership in a larger community based upon entirely different modes of behavior. From a society in which success was based upon kinship relations and social class, they came to a society which emphasizes voluntary selection in social grouping and on achievements and qualifications as criteria for social evaluation, mobility, and job holding.

Previous social structure is elemental in explaining the attitudes towards present problems of adjustment which many Oriental and Sephardic Jews developed. Claims for economic and political equality are not so much the product of principles and social ideologies as they are the result of a desire to compensate for social deprivation in the past and for the frustration of hopes in the present. The policy of equality provided by the absorbing authorities was adopted by the less successful immigrants as the legitimate norm in their new environment. Thus, they view themselves as only defending their "natural rights" against the more successful members of society.
The correlation between lower social class and membership in Oriental ethnical groups is at the root of frustration felt by those groups. Discrimination often causes sensitivity in the individual. The person feeling prejudice, whoever he may be, is never rational and the reaction to such prejudice is equally irrational. Some sociological theory maintains that ethnic conflict is simply the form that class conflict has been taking in recent decades. Other theorists say that ethnic conflicts must be decomposed into a variety of elements, including colonial conflicts, the uprising of the "internally colonized", the ambition of self-appointed leaders, and fashions and fads. A more realistic approach to the problem in Israel is to consider it as part of a system of interlinked developing and developed nations. As Moynihan and Glazer assert: "ethnic identity has become more salient, ethnic self-assertion stronger, and ethnic conflict more marked everywhere in the last twenty years. The reasons include the rise of the welfare state, the clash between egalitarianism and the differential achievement of norms, the growing heterogeneity of states, and the international system of communication."\textsuperscript{11}

The traditional modes of life and feelings of being discriminated against only serve to isolate Sephardic and Oriental communities from the mainstream of Israeli life.

\textsuperscript{11}Moynihan and Glazer, "Why Ethnicity," p.38.
The isolation is both social and physical, as these groups usually live in clearly defined districts within a city, especially Jerusalem. Social isolationism is reinforced by spatial isolationism, reducing the type and quality of contacts which diverse people in a city will have with each other. At least the possibilities of close relationships on the basis of social equality are greatly reduced. Instead, contacts tend to be formalized and confined mainly to the market place or work situation. People who work together on the job or who have contacts of a strictly economic character may live in entirely different social and sociological worlds.

There is considerable theoretical and practical interest concerning the effects of contact on ethnic relations. Y. Amir has reviewed a large number of studies relevant to this problem and has concluded that the relationship is complex. Contact influences not only the direction of attitudes but also their intensity. Initially positive attitudes, for example, tend to become more positive and initially negative attitudes tend to become more negative as a result of contact. Attitude change is specific and does not generalize to all attitudes held by members of ethnic groups about each other. Improved interpersonal attitudes are

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observed when there is equal status contact between the members of the ethnic groups, when the contact is between members of a majority group and higher status members of a minority group, when the contact is intimate rather than casual, when the contact is rewarding and pleasant, and when the members of both ethnic groups reach some important goals as a result of such contact.

Unfavorable conditions for contact include situations that are competitive, when the contact is unpleasant, when the prestige of the group is lowered as a result of contact, when the members of one group are frustrated, when the groups have moral or ethical standards that are objectionable to one another, and when the members of the minority group are of lower status than members of the majority group.

There are probably many approaches to resolving ethnic conflict in Israeli Jewish society. All will require that as people integrate into a country and society they will slowly acquire similar cultural, social, and economic values and skills as a means of fostering communications and reducing conflicts between various groups.

Social Processes That Minimize Diversity

Ethnic conflict runs deep in Israeli society. From the very inception of 20th century settlement in Palestine, Zionist ideologists were intent on creating a resurrected Jewish state, based upon a new Hebrew culture and society but uniquely Israeli. Ongoing efforts to maintain a common
culture, therefore, have become an important feature of Israeli life. The effort to physically and culturally integrate diverse Jewish immigrants into Israeli society has met with both success and failure. The mixed Israeli experience is not due to social processes unique to Israel, but to universal difficulties in bringing together people of differing social characteristics.

Acculturation, a long-term process whereby individuals acquire a new social organization, body of knowledge, and understanding of culture, begins in early stages of migration to a new environment. The problems created by migration and the motives that compel people to leave their homes and embark upon another way of life are fundamentally the same everywhere, be it from rural regions to urban centers, from cities to their suburbs, or from country to country.

The effort to find a place in a new society usually creates psychological strain among newcomers. Bitterness often arises from a feeling of not being accepted in the new environment. The distressed and embittered person often seeks escape in drinking, in venting hate on the community or the nation, and in other antisocial behavior. Some individuals opt otherwise - they attempt to hide their own ethnicity and move into another group that offers greater advantages. This process of absorption is extremely powerful; in the United States it is still a very important social process. Americans become more "American" and less
ethnic all the time, only to return to being ethnic after they have achieved some measure of social and economic success.

In adapting to a new way of life, migrating groups gradually lose their old way of life. Through assimilation minority groups incorporate into the fabric of the new host society, the end result often the loss of the minority's identity. Assimilation, however, does not always result in a total and inevitable homogenization, nor is it a one-way process in which the minority passively accepts what is offered by the dominant group, thereby losing its own character. Assimilation, therefore, is the large scale entrance by ethnic minorities into primary group institutions (political parties, social organizations, etc.) of the core society. Numbers alone indicate that migrants are shaping the culture of the city as much as they are adjusting to it. The classic sociological view of the city as an agglomeration of a large, heterogenous population in a dense, permanent settlement implies not only anonymity but also tolerance of change.13

Often times the migrants attach themselves to their own particular cultural minority and re-create, where

possible, the moral and cultural atmosphere of their previous homes. One tendency is for migrants to group themselves within the cities according to their prior origins. The issue is whether previous characteristics can be expected to fade with the passage of time and whether it is still possible to envisage a one-way adaptation of migrants to an absorptive urban culture.

Adaptation of migrants is of great importance if social engineering is to be a goal of physical planning. One must consider whether it will be necessary or even possible to achieve residential dispersion in order to stimulate the absorption of immigrants into the new social system. The present arrangements, especially the overall housing situation in major Israeli cities, may have a harmful effect not only on welfare and working efficiency but also may fail to provide adequate incentives for constructive social adaptation or satisfactory new values to replace traditional goals.

Despite the diverse backgrounds of many social groups in Israel, there is strong evidence that Israel is creating a unified, cohesive nationhood. Ashkenazi and Sephardi differences are steadily declining and giving way to an Israeli identity. The two communities thus converge culturally and become more similar with each generation. There are a number of reasons for this convergence. First, the integrative impact of a common Jewish religion and
Hebrew language is deep and tends to override divisive tendencies. Second, the dominant political ideologies in Israel are Zionism, socialism and liberalism. Zionist ideology emphasizes (1) the common origin of all Jews and is directly concerned with the basic objective of overcoming differences acquired in the Diaspora (countries other than Israel); (2) there is a commitment to the absolute and egalitarian integration of all Jewish subgroups; and (3) it perceives Jewish faith in different countries and areas as essentially the same, and Jews are considered as owing allegiance to each other. Another factor involves intermarriage between members of different ethnic groups, which is not only accepted but highly valued. The rise in intermarriage creates more Israelis, neither Sephardim nor Ashkenazim. Intermarriage rates compare favorably with those in much older heterogenous societies. Finally, the national security factor has provided great cohesiveness to Israeli society. Israel's involvement in conflict, where survival was in question, has had a unifying effect for three reasons: interdependence of fate, definition of a common goal, and provision of an outlet for aggression.14

Ethnic integration is a process whereby members of a society, regardless of background, color or cultural differences, move freely among one another, equally sharing

14 Peres, "Ethnic Relations in Israel," p.38.
similar opportunities, privileges and facilities. Differences arise, however, because individuals do not always begin at the same starting point. For an individual to achieve integration in Israel there must be a measure of desertion from one's original group and its cultural ethos. Some measure of assimilation is necessary to achieve integration in any society and, certainly, this is not wholly undesirable. Israel's dominant European social group, driven by its desire to create a common cultural identity based upon a Western model, has operated under a "You can be one of us if you become like us" attitude. Such an attitude can lead to social inequality and discrimination, particularly where the rights, attainments and privileges of an individual are clearly affected by the origin group to which one belongs by birth and, in varying degrees, by conditioning. Thus, although one ultimate goal of Israeli society has been integration, assimilation alone could not be relied upon to attain this goal. Economic opportunities had to be created to buttress the integration process.

S.N. Eisenstadt delineated several criteria which determine the ease of integration and which have particular significance for the Israeli experience:

1. The motives that induced the immigrants to come to Israel, and, in particular, their readiness for change.
2. The social configurations of the immigration process, i.e. whether immigrants came in homogenous ethnic groups or in heterogenous groups crystallized during the immigration process.

3. The extent of the immigrants' acceptance by the host population, i.e. the extent of their institutional and social integration.

4. The emergence of special ethnic immigrant groups in various spheres of life.\textsuperscript{15}

The success of any immigrant is partly dependent upon the openness of the host society, in terms of access to cultural and economic opportunities. Israeli society has remained closed in opportunities accessible to newcomers, in spite of some sharing in cultural values, particularly of religion, with old-timers. While many lower-level economic opportunities are available to immigrants from non-Western countries, more lucrative options are scarce. Of course some of the predominance of Orientals in lower economic strata is also due to the immigrants' own lack of readiness for social change. At the same time, readiness for change often depends upon the nature of social conditions in the country of origin. Conditions for Jews in most North African countries were physically and psychologically restrictive so that upon arrival in Israel their willingness to fill new social

roles was simply non-existent.

The integration of Jewish immigrants into Israeli society has always presented unique problems. Jewish identity is at one and the same time both centripetal and centrifugal, manifested in concurrent wills to survive as a nation while wanting to become like other nations. No immigrant to Israel is, therefore, only a Jew - this fact is largely responsible for communal problems in Israel. Although the primary centripetal force revolves around a common Jewish centrality, centrifugal forces are continually pushing towards different cultural, social and even ethnic perimeters.

It would be misleading to view Israeli society as split between two irreconcilable communities, Sephardic and Ashkenazic. The importance of these categories should not be exaggerated, but rather the analysis of subgroups within these categories provide more useful insights into Israeli society. For example, many problems are often more indicative of the difficulties specific strata of Moroccan immigrants are having than it is of Sephardic communities in general. Yemenite Jews, skilled artisans and largely literate, came with their spiritual leaders as a whole community and had a much easier time integrating. Those from Morocco saw many of the more skilled and educated members of their communities leave for France or North America. The remainder who went to Israel felt uprooted from their traditional way
of life, atomized, leaderless, largely unskilled and illiterate. Well educated Baghdad Jews, the "Franco"--Algerian Jews or the urban middle class from Egypt have little in common with Jews from Kurdistan or tribes from the Atlas Mountains of Morocco. Similar differences exist between Ashkenazi Jews, although they are not quite as marked. Thus, Israel is a mosaic of various communities reflecting very dissimilar conditions in their countries of origin.

The experience of integration in Israel involves immigration to a new country, subsequent movement of people within the country, and the relationship between the rural and urban sectors. There are a great number of differences between the experiences of immigrants and migrants in Israel compared to those of others in developing, underdeveloped and Western countries, yet there are similarities, too.

Differences in the Israeli integration experience has had significant implications for the planning process in Israel. The rural-urban relationship in Israel differs considerably from other countries in that the rural sector of the prestate society never developed dependency relationships with the urban sector. Immigration to Israel, and ultimately to rural areas, was entirely nonselective. It brought people from backward rural areas together with people from large cities (mostly European). The usual migrant considerations of employment opportunities, social access and prior contacts with their place of destination did not play
any significant role in the decision to migrate. Mass immi-
migration in the post-1948 period negated the possibility for 
gradual absorption. The immigrants themselves became the 
society.

Implication of Israeli Social Structure For Planning

Structuring and the spatial organization of Israeli 
society became an absolute necessity. A national policy of 
urbanization and spatial organization had to be formulated 
with a number of goals in mind:

1) Settlement in sparsely populated regions
2) Occupation of frontier regions for defense and 
   political reasons
3) Opening of natural resources frontiers in Southern 
   desert areas
4) Changing the primary structure of urban development 
   by limiting the growth of urban concentrations in the 
   central coastal plain through the establishment of 
   medium to small size towns in other parts of the 
   country
5) Building integrated regional systems through creation 
   of urban service centers within rural regions.  

\[16\] Arie Shachar, "Development Towns in Israel: National 
Policy of Urbanization and Spatial Organization" in Rehovot 
Conference on Urbanization and Development in Developing Coun-
tries (Weizmann Institute of Science, 1971), pp.89-104.
The dispersion of population as immigrants were absorbed in Israel was attempted by establishing numerous rural settlements in areas suitable for agricultural development. During the twenty year period 1948-1968, 450 rural settlements were established in Israel, of which 62% were moshavim (cooperative settlements of individual farm ownership). The total population living in rural settlements of all types was 236,954 by the end of 1972. Growth of rural population has accounted for nine percent of Israel's total population increase since 1948. Social planning in Israel's earlier years dealt mainly with the anticipated demands for public services in education, health and welfare, but not in broader aspects of cultural adaptation and social integration.

Immigrants to Israel have shared the difficulties similar to those experienced by immigrants to other countries. There are differences in adaptability, of course, depending upon the skills immigrants carry with them and whether they came from rural or urban environments. For the latter, city life becomes less stressful since experience was already acquired with living in cities. Urban dwellers also often possess greater educational and occupational skills than those from rural or peasant environments.

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Heavier burdens of adjustment, therefore, fall on immigrants without urban experience or skills. This is a universal experience, as exemplified in a 1956 study of migrants in Kampala, Uganda:

For the African peasant (moving to an urban area) in particular, who has been adapted in childhood to work, comfort and recreation in a comparatively small but comprehensive face-to-face group, the transition to a series of discontinuous impersonal relations — with employers, work-mates, officials, landlords, policemen, traders and prostitutes — is abrupt indeed. The craft and other skills acquired in early life are often useless or at least undervalued in urban conditions. The early patterns of domestic, kinship and neighborhood relations are often excluded, while the self-reliance and group solidarity for shared production and sustenance under a subsistence economy are little guide to the foresight, economizing and bargaining required in the new patterns of wage income and the need to buy most goods, while unfamiliar modes of expenditure for livelihood and display are offered and even enforced.\(^\text{18}\)

In any case, the burden of adjustment by immigrant groups often falls more heavily on the second generation. The immigrants are protected from the worst effects of disorganization by having grown up in a traditional culture whose values still guide their behavior as adults, even though they have moved to another community setting. Their children, however, are caught between the conflicting demands of their parents' standards and those of the society transmitted to them by education and mass media. The conflict of values may result in no binding set of norms.

The experience of immigrants groups in American cities indicate that many ethnic communities established in the 19th century have tended to disintegrate, whereas communities established by later migrations are still fairly distinct. After the turn of the century, many immigrants came from Southern and Eastern Europe representing cultures often at considerable variance from the ones that had become firmly established. Arriving fairly late on the American scene, after most free agricultural land had been acquired by earlier immigrants and after industrial expansion was well under way, they crowded into the larger cities, establishing segregated cultural or ethnic islands in the midst of a poly-ethnic community. As a result, they found themselves at severe economic, cultural and psychological disadvantages.

Important conclusions can be drawn from the experience of immigrants to the United States, and probably the most important is decentralization - a factor of key importance for the future success of ethnic relations in Israel. Decentralization of ethnic groups is of interest largely because of its relationship to desegregation and assimilation into American society. The classic hypothesis is that as immigrant groups move outward from the central areas of first settlement they become less segregated from the native population. The underlying dynamic of the relationship is assumed to be that they have become assimilated, or more like the native population in terms of socioeconomic status,
culture and values. This implies that as the physical dis-
tance between ethnic and native population declines so too
does the social distance.

Decentralization is not necessarily associated with
desegregation, but in the case of immigrant groups they have
gone hand-in-hand. Similarly, assimilation does not neces-
sarily correlate with integration, although immigrant groups
to the U.S. have tended to become more like the native popu-
lation. Abilities in speaking the (new) native language,
citizenship, educational level and intermarriage are charac-
teristics related to the degree of residential segregation.
Newer immigrant groups usually score poorly in these areas,
but the important question for Israel is for how long?

Comparisons between the integration of Jewish ethnic
groups in Israel and that of the Jews in the United States
have often been made, but the similarities are really no
closer than that with any other ethnic group in the United
States. There are, however, some important points for con-
sideration. The Jewish ghetto in the United States has
usually been more a voluntary segregation on the basis of
religion and kinship ties. Second generation Jews, although
generally better off economically, still lived in "ghettos".
That is, given the areas where they lived, they still carried
on their social life almost exclusively within their own
group. Thus, the second generation had become assimilated
in terms of living standard but not in terms of social
relationships. The third generation is much more assimilated in terms of living in dispersed, suburban areas, having a mixture of people in their social groupings and the increased frequency of intermarriage with non-Jews.

The experiences of East European Jews who went to Israel and those who went to the United States also provides some interesting differences. The former transplanted a social framework, as it existed in the ghettos of East Europe at the turn of the century, to a land where it faced little or no social challenges. The East European who went to the U.S., on the other hand, had to face the challenge of the new society. In the process he has generally adapted to the new environment, democracy became a part of him, and the monolithic society was unacceptable. It is not surprising that in the pluralistic U.S. society there exist independent Jewish social, cultural and educational institutions.

Much of Israeli society, on the other hand, has become increasingly monolithic. Groups from differing cultural origins do not exist as co-equals, but rather as "superior" and "inferior", even when the latter forego their ethnocultural identification in favor of a supposed common culture. The fault with a monolithic society is that it cannot be satisfied with just a common culture. It demands identical patterns of thought and it imposes the will of one sector upon another. By contrast, a pluralistic society makes individual and sectional development not only possible but also
desirable for the enrichment of the community at large.

Another major aspect of integration concerns inter-marriage among various social groups. The problem in Israel is not only how many Ashkenazim will intermarry with Sephardim but also how many Iraqis will intermarry with Moroccans or Tunisians. It is here that the traditional family structure of the Oriental communities tends to favor endogamy not only within the broad Oriental community but also within specific and narrower groups, i.e. Moroccans marry Moroccans, etc. Nonetheless, with rising economic and educational standards among the younger generation and the emancipation of the younger people from the often oppressive parental tutelage characterizing some Oriental families, the level of intermarriage between communities is steadily rising. In 1955, 11.8% of all Jewish marriages in Israel were inter-marriages between European and Afro-Asian partners. By 1970 the rate of intermarriage was 17.5% of all Jewish marriages.\(^\text{19}\) The reason for the rise is that despite some considerable differences, fundamentally the various communities in Israel regard themselves as belonging, in both fact and principle, to a single people with the consciousness of being Jewish a very strong force.

With rising levels of education and social mobility,

pre-Israeli origins become less important while intermarriage becomes an increasing reality. This is especially true among the third generation of Israeli youth who possess relative independence from parental opinions and who make their own social decisions.

Summary

Several factors which foster integration have been explored in this chapter including:

1. The existence of a body of cultural symbols which serve as a common focus of identification by a cross-section of society.

2. The need for an expanding economy in order for wide-ranging participation in economic life to occur.

3. The perception of a threat originating from a common enemy.

These factors are of universal application. Taking the first two for example, as ethnic groups in the United States expanded their participation in the country's economic life, common American cultural symbols became a greater part of their lives. In an attempt to become "Americanized", symbols of ethnic affiliation were submerged. Gradually ethnic groups moved out of ghetto-like residential areas, populated by their own ethnic group, and physical dispersion became associated with upward economic mobility.
The assimilation resulting from upward mobility and physical dispersion among ethnic groups in the United States has resulted in a noticeable decline in prejudice and discrimination against ethnic groups. For these groups, interest in and practice of ancestral traditions need no longer be submerged on account of social inferiority connotations. The important question is whether Israeli society will evolve in the same fashion and whether assimilation can be achieved in the same way by Sephardic and Oriental populations in Israel. Subsequent chapters will explore alternative choices which can direct the outcome of this question.
CHAPTER IV

THE STRUCTURE OF ISRAELI POLITICAL LIFE

The Israeli political system is complex, consisting of a myriad of parties, splinter groups, associations based upon country and area of origin, kibbutz membership, and even army unit. Israel's political structure has great potential for alleviating social problems through offering representation and participation by disadvantaged groups. Although the Israeli political system functions quite well at the local and municipal level, it seems to fall far short of competency at the national level. Due to the unwritten Israeli system of protocls, support of the status quo has become so institutionalized that there is little hope for facilitating the process of integration.

The persistence of social gaps and communal friction in Israel can, in large part, be attributed to European dominance in government and positions of power. Although this may have been a natural development, it alienates the Oriental and Sephardic elements, who have a tendency to see foul play where none exists and deliberate discrimination which was never intended.
European dominance in Israeli politics is due largely to strong political backgrounds in their countries of origin. The low political profile of Orientals and Sephardis in their countries of origin was repeated as non-participation in Israeli political life. Although certain adults had experience in Zionist youth movements, where they acquired a certain familiarity with Israeli political parties, they had not participated in the general political life of their country of origin. The proportion of those who had belonged to a political party in North Africa was very small. These immigrants also lacked political experience after their arrival in Israel. They had everything to learn; they had to become acquainted with specific institutions of Israeli political life as well as being initiated into exercising their right to vote. In this respect the Government did do a great deal to teach the immigrants the use of their civil rights. The Government organizes civic information courses in development towns and in the moshavim which are intended to cater to the needs of new immigrants. Nevertheless, active use of basic civil rights is still a far cry from participation in leadership and decision making in political parties at the national level.

In many other countries differences between the haves and have-nots are usually explained as class differences. In Israel, the problem turns out to be a communal one. More than ninety-five percent of youth and children in distress
(delinquents, runaways, etc.) are from families of Middle Eastern and North African origin. Owing to their position in society and their lack of articulation as a group, members of this segment of Israel's population remain socially disorganized. They are easy prey for political leaders who seek to control them by ephemeral economic inducements and advantages which are extended at election time. Although they comprise over fifty percent of the population, their representation in the Knesset (national parliament) and in Government and national institutions is practically nil, as the following figures indicate:

1. In the Sixth Knesset, twenty-four non-Askenazic members out of 120 possible seats were returned by all the parties combined.

2. In the Seventh Knesset, the number was reduced to eighteen.

3. In the Eighth Knesset, only twenty non-Ashkenazi members were returned.20

In addition to the twenty Sephardic members of the Knesset (out of 120), there are two cabinet ministers (Health and Police), two directors general of ministries, and almost no Oriental Jews at higher levels of government leadership. Only three percent of those in the top three civil

service grades are Oriental Jews. It is significant that day-to-day policy decisions are made at these levels and these are the people who supply the information and advice on which long-term decisions are based. Since the Sephardic community lacks representation it becomes clear that their needs are not actively considered, not because of active discrimination, but because there is no one present to assert them.

The presence of some Sephardi representatives in the various parties of the Knesset is misleading. Because of the nature of parliamentary elections in Israel, these representatives are dependent on the party that chose to put their names on its list for election. They are not free to deal with communal issues, except through the machinery of their political party. Nearly all attempts to establish ethnic parties or to exploit the ethnic factor for electoral politics have failed.

During elections for the Eighth Knesset (1973) there were six "communal" lists of candidates contesting the elections and not a single genuine communal representative was elected. There are two major reasons for such failures. In the first place the constant threat of war unites Israelis around issues of security and foreign policy, which always

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pushes social and economic problems into a corner. Secondly, the electoral system of proportional representation ties the electorate to political party lists and prevents any direct link between the elector and elected. Thirdly, the financial assistance of 170,000 Israeli pounds paid to Knesset members (for campaign financing) automatically places an incumbent at an advantage over any new aspirant. Finally, the party machinery has access to public funds which can be drawn upon from various national revenues and international Jewish contributions.

Local politics in Israel, though far less visible, is much more innovative and hopeful than the national scene. Municipal successes of Orientals is due to a higher level of direct accountability to constituencies. In many places, where the Orientals now form a majority, they have ousted European old-timers. Sephardi members of municipal councils have increased from thirteen percent in 1950 to fifty percent in 1973.22 This resembles a process similar to ethnic takeovers of local politics by bloc voting in American life, particularly in big cities, at the turn of the century. Its consequences for Israel may be equally dramatic.

It will take some time before this shift will be as visible on the national level of politics since so much

22Neuberger, Unity in Diversity, p.16.
political power grows out of provincial smoke-filled backrooms. Due to Israel's system of proportional party representation, decisions about parliamentary candidates are taken at the national, central party level and the time lag between changes in the composition of local electorates and central party response may be longer than in the Western system of constituency representation.

The integration of the Oriental immigrant into the political structure of Israeli life thus shows many similarities with the process through which immigrants became integrated into the American political structure. None of the political alienation and exclusion which, until recently, characterized the position of the American Blacks can be found in the process which Sephardi/Oriental communities are undergoing in Israel. Similar to the position which Italians and Irish had been in the United States, Oriental Israelis are still at the bottom of the economic ladder. There still exist many popular prejudices against Oriental immigrants, but if one looks for American parallels it is among the Italians and Irish that one would find something comparable, not among the Blacks.

Many of the difficulties Orientals and Sephardim are having participating in Israeli political life are due to the nature of the system itself. Diffusion of authority is a major characteristic of the Israeli political style. It explains many of the perplexing aspects of Israeli public
life, such as the amazing continuity of institutions of the pioneering era, the slow legislative process, the difficulties of reform and the permanence with which politicians hold office, irrespective of mistakes, old age, or senility.

Israelis endlessly complain that they are a misgoverned people. They continually call for abler, stronger, more effective government. And yet, at the same time, few people are so suspicious of authority, so abusive in their attitude to power, and so adept in the ancient art of circumventing it. This dual, and so often paradoxical, approach to power is a main characteristic of the Israeli political style.23

Israelis prefer their government to reflect a consensus of at least half a dozen political parties, and national policies are generally a composite of portions of each party's platforms. Israel, therefore, is governed by a plurality of elites who confederate in the national interest and for political expediency, remaining always jealous of one another. These elites constantly purport to base themselves on values sacred to Israeli society. While values may at times only be veiled greed and ambition, it is also true that abstract ideas derived from Zionist history are still a powerful force in Israeli affairs.

Various Israeli interest groups and ideologies have been represented by many political parties, which have gradually consolidated in modern times. The proliferation and fragmentation of power in Israel, however, remains an im-

23Elon, Israelis, p.379.
portant factor in the political process. The most important power factions contain six major and four minor parties; major parties are actually coalitions of smaller subdivisions. These alignments form parties representing labor interests, the religious establishment, the urban middle-class, professions, private entrepreneurs and a number of other groups in society. Each elite is aided by party-controlled financial enterprises; each gets a share of public campaign funds; each has a share in the state bureaucracy and economy; and each has its own constituency, tightly organized by well run political machines.

It is important to note, therefore, that diffusion of authority is a major Israeli political characteristic. It helps to explain the conservatism of a young society, the longevity of pioneering era institutions, the slow legislative process, the difficulties in achieving reforms, and the permanence of old-age politicians. At the same time, it also is a major reason freedom is maintained in a country possessing many preconditions for authoritarianism.

The politics of consensus are deeply rooted in the history of the pre-state period. They bear witness to the lingering strength of the institutions and procedures established early in this century by the founding fathers. The politics of 1909, or even 1921, affected a few hundred Zionist settlers only; their procedures survived the age of mass democracy. The ruling parties of today preceded the state, and not vice versa, they even preceded colonization. With the exception of a few splinter groups, the settlers' parties were founded in Eastern Europe as
Zionist clubs.24

Israeli distrust of authority allows for an extreme egalitarianism to permeate public affairs. It manifests itself in the Israeli concept of voluntarism (hitnadvut), in which response to social authority is of a higher order than state organization and legal coercion. It is reflected in the preferential regard accorded to cooperative movements and the dominant public position of the trade and labor unions and their subsidiaries. Unlike other countries, Israeli unions did not grow out of the national economy. They actively shared in its creation by establishing "labor-owned" firms and, like the political parties, they preceded the state.

**Government Bureaucracy**

The characteristic Israeli response to social imperatives before legal ones has an undeniable impact upon the structure and function of the government bureaucracy, which exerts a very powerful force upon the direction of Israeli life. Israeli bureaucratic organization consists of a hierarchy of offices representing different levels of authoritative power. There is likewise a hierarchy of statuses in which prestige is distributed among the office-

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24 Ibid., p.382.
holders according to the values assigned to the roles they perform. So as with any bureaucratic organization, there is a system in which rights, privileges, prestige and power are differentially distributed among personnel.

The bureaucratic organization places a premium on occupational specialization and most bureaucratic personnel are expected to perform more or less specialized technical functions. Throughout the bureaucratic hierarchy, but particularly on the lower levels, the emphasis is on routinization of tasks in the interest of efficiency. The hierarchy is likewise systematized into a complex of rules and regulations that define the forms and limits of power an individual has over others and this manifests itself in the formation of bureaus, agencies, departments, etc..

If the central feature of a bureaucracy is formal organization and a hierarchy of authority and status, within this framework there is an informal organization in which relationships between personnel tend to be intimate. Such informal organization commonly assumes the form of cliques and a generally close association between workers. These informal relationships constitute important channels of communication. They tend to soften the harshness of a formal organization that emphasizes impersonal relationships, glorifies efficiency and isolates personnel on different levels of authority and prestige.

The problem with Israeli bureaucracy is that much of
its formal power lies at informal levels of authority. Informal relationships often make it very difficult for outsiders to enter and allows for lower-level decision making through benign neglect. Lower level personnel can prevent action being taken by screening out and preventing decisions from reaching the appropriate level of authority.

Bureaucracy, although indispensable in a modern society, nevertheless represents a concentration of potential power that threatens existing values. It may be either a force for social change or it may harness its forces to resist social change, even when it is in the public interest. Generally speaking, the Israeli bureaucracy is very conservative due to the vested interest of its policy makers. It is at the same time both democratic and authoritarian. While its lower-level personnel may be selected objectively on the basis of competence, its policies and practices are authoritarian in nature, formulated and carried out by a managerial elite whose behavior lies in party alliances and directives.

The bureaucracy of Israel is under the auspices of a Civil Service Commission, headed by a commissioner, appointed by the Cabinet and responsible to the Minister of Finance. Present policy is to concentrate on guidance, direction and supervision, and to transfer routine implementation to the Ministries, while reserving major responsibilities for senior civil servants. Entry preference is given to university graduates - both posts requiring professional qualifications and senior administrative positions are reserved for them.
A full twenty-five percent of the Civil Service is covered by professional and technical salary scales with this percentage continually rising. While this may be viewed as a positive development in the growth of the Israeli Civil Service, it effectively excludes Sephardim, Orientals and Arabs from policy and decision-making positions at the senior levels of government, since they are at the lowest levels of educational achievement.

Israel has experienced a burgeoning civil service bureaucracy as Table III indicates (see page 65). Despite the official criterion of operational efficiency, the Israeli bureaucracy is ruled by the concept of le'histader - "to take care of oneself" or "to fix oneself up" by bending the rules to one's purpose. It is the password through the maze of authority and regulations, which may be objective and just, but the needs of the individual are superior. The average Israeli recognizes few regulations of universal applicability. In dealing with authorities the Israeli demands, firmly and loudly, exceptional treatment - he is usually accommodated.

Several power elites dominate the Israeli public scene and in all of them power is preserved by the veteran leadership. Veterans share a common suspicion of the young, newcomers, and innovators who call for reforms in the social

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and political structures established during the pioneering era. Although its very existence is denied, the operations of the Israeli Establishment are deliberately shrouded behind an elaborate edifice of conflicting ideological platforms and formal or informal committees, both inside and outside the Government. The main function of the Establishment is to direct the distribution of resources received from local taxes and from the funds contributed by Jews abroad. It also controls the assignment of top jobs within the State hierarchy.

### TABLE III

**STATE EMPLOYEES, ACCORDING TO MINISTRIES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ministry</th>
<th>1952</th>
<th>1959</th>
<th>1972</th>
<th>1952-1972 Increase</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>President, Knesset</td>
<td>328</td>
<td>535</td>
<td>677</td>
<td>106%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Comptroller</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interior, Justice, Police</td>
<td>2,452</td>
<td>3,242</td>
<td>3,769</td>
<td>54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Affairs, Defense</td>
<td>1,427</td>
<td>1,844</td>
<td>2,819</td>
<td>98%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commerce, Finance &amp; Agriculture</td>
<td>7,754</td>
<td>9,013</td>
<td>12,150</td>
<td>57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development, Housing, Immigrant Absorption</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>279</td>
<td>1,440</td>
<td>416%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health, Welfare, Religions, Education, Culture</td>
<td>4,469</td>
<td>8,261</td>
<td>14,622</td>
<td>227%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communications, Transport, Labor</td>
<td>10,418</td>
<td>14,001</td>
<td>21,537</td>
<td>107%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL CIVIL SERVICE</td>
<td>26,848</td>
<td>37,145</td>
<td>57,014</td>
<td>113%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Population</td>
<td>1,629,519</td>
<td>2,088,685</td>
<td>3,200,500</td>
<td>98%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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26 Ibid.
Elitism in Israeli Political Life

The current Establishment consists of several elites that emerged in the pioneering period and still dominate the public scene. They are largely veteran settlers who came from Jewish middle-class or lower middle-class homes in Poland or Russia; most are in their sixties and seventies - men in their fifties are scarce and in their forties a rarity. Upward mobility of younger persons in the national political system is a difficult and painful process. In the first Israeli Parliament (1949) the average age of its members was forty-three, while in the Sixth Parliament (1969) it was sixty three - indicating the same people were still in control.  

Most of these leaders live relatively modest lives, and their salaries are rarely higher than that of high school teachers. Not officially included as income, however, are numerous privileges provided political leaders in lieu of money. They do not hesitate to avail themselves of various transfer payments which do not appear as income and are, therefore, rarely taxed. There are a whole array of allowances available in addition to bills incurred privately and paid for publicly, including the use of a car with a gasoline allowance, free telephone service for both public and

personal use, travel allowances and clothing allowances. Lower income groups in Israeli society are rarely eligible for these types of in-kind income. Significantly, these kinds of "income" are never considered in any statistical accounting, making it very difficult to develop an accurate analysis of income differentials in Israeli society.

The elite establishment can be viewed, in a way, as a mandarin class maintaining a firm hold on the institutions and instruments of power they have created. Their paternalism can partly be explained as the natural reaction of former revolutionaries, if you will, who have themselves attained power. In theory, members of the Knesset do not automatically belong to the Establishment nor vice-versa. In reality, the candidacy of at least 100 of the 120 members is tightly controlled by the mandarin class. The predominance in parliament of Eastern European pioneers and their offspring reflects the Establishment even more than the electorate. In the 1969-1974 Knesset, for example, eighty percent of its Jewish members were either East European immigrants or Israeli born children (sabras) of East European parents.28

Sephardic and Oriental Jews are not completely disenfranchised, since they have experienced some municipal level successes. On the national level, however, few have reached

28Elon, Israelis, p.402.
positions of real power and their success has not been based on capabilities. It was the paternalistic attempt of the mandarins to alter their image of East European ethocentricity without having to yield substantial power. In general, Oriental and Sephardic Jews presently are unable to catch up economically with Ashkenzaim because they do not hold their share of top government and business posts.

The Protectzia System

The practice of rewarding the loyalty of the party faithful is commonplace in worldwide politics. It might be less offensive in Israel if power would occasionally change hands. What makes power brokerage difficult to tolerate is that there are several very important quasipublic agencies which run on the same system and in which Sephardi representation is very low. This pattern runs throughout the Jewish Agency, the Histadrut and a number of other major public and private industries and organizations.

In effect, Israel has three governments - the Histadrut (a national labor union), the Cabinet and the Jewish Agency.\(^{29}\) In addition a high degree of influence is exerted on the government by the World Zionist Congress and

\(^{29}\)The Jewish Agency is an independent, non-profit organization supported by voluntary dollars of worldwide Jewry, through its fund raising arm, the United Israel Appeal. It provides subventions to and deficit financing of Israeli government social and other non-military assistance programs, particularly to aid in immigrant absorption. It operated under a 1976-77 budget of $502 million (U.S.)
the Jewish National Fund. Each has its own unofficial party affiliation and bureaucracy. While there are historical reasons for these organizations and while they do important work, their continued existence is filled with vested interests and vast amounts of overlap, duplication of efforts and organizational infighting.

The Histadrut is the largest labor organization in Israel with a membership of 1,259,200 in 1973. Besides engaging in basic trade unionism, it worked to build up industry and agriculture and provides social services to its members. To a great extent the Histadrut sets policy in wages and fringe benefits, health care and various other workers' rights. In addition, it controls many of Israel's largest industries and most of its agricultural business operations. The Histadrut is governed by a twenty-one member Coordinating Committee, of which only four are Sephardim.30

The Jewish Agency has by far the greatest influence on public life and government policy in Israel. The Agency was founded in 1929 and reconstituted in 1971 to include the World Zionist Organization and all Jewish fund raising organizations in the world. Its purpose is to organize immigration, absorb immigrants, assist them in economic and social integration, distribute land and provide support for

30 Geffner, Sephardi Problems, p.50.
new settlements. The general governing board, called the Zionist Council, consists of 187 representatives of whom only six are Sephardim or Orientals. Of the twelve on the Executive Committee, only one is a Sephardi and he is without portfolio (not a department head). Only eight percent of the delegates to the Zionist Congress are Sephardim.  

Abuse of power in the Jewish Agency has not continued without notice. The Fifth General Assembly of the Jewish Agency concluded on July 20, 1976 and, surprisingly, a reform movement is beginning to emerge. An agreement was reached on how United Jewish Appeal and United Israel Appeal funds are to be allocated to the "constructive funds" managed by the various political parties in Israel. Supposedly, this new agreement provides for close and constant scrutiny by the Agency's Comptroller, but in a July 17, 1976 editorial the Israeli daily Ha'aretz attacked it as a cover-up for the continuation of the same bad situation: Jewish funds raised abroad for Israel being funnelled into party (political) instead of national coffers.  

At the same assembly the first public criticism of the Agency emerged by its own Board of Governors Chairman, Max Fisher, who called for an end to:

Politicization of job-getting and job-holding within the Jewish Agency. The Agency and its various services and programs affect the lives of more than

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31Ibid.
600,000 Israelis and it is vital that it have the best men for the top jobs without regard to their political or party affiliation. Unfortunately, this has not been the case.

The point has not been reached where Jewish Agency officials know that their advancement depend solely on their ability and not on extraneous political factors. The key of party affiliation still bars able officials within the Agency from advancing. The party key must be eradicated and the selection and advancement policies of the Agency must be based solely on merit.32

One has to wonder how these abuses of power and control by an elite group, exclusive of Sephardim and Orientals, continue to thrive. The whole system is based upon the Israeli institution of protectzia. While le'histader is the rule of life for the average Israeli, protectzia becomes the rule of thumb for the "above average" Israeli. It means that one has friends of influence from whom he can expect help with any political or bureaucratic problem he may encounter. In short, Israel runs on protectzia and the Oriental communities have none.

Protectzia is also very important in industry and agriculture, whether public, private or cooperative. The system involves more than merely knowing the right people. It is based upon where one is from, in terms of a specific region, in certain European countries of origin, what kibbutz one may have come from, the army unit one belongs to, and what political party one is affiliated with. These

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factors become particularly important in the business system when consideration is given to the awarding of contracts and securing loans. Although exact figures are not available, it is generally conceded that there are very few Sephardim in the upper levels of the Israeli business world. Thus, we get a picture of Sephardim and Orientals as outsiders looking in at the institutions that dominate Israel's economic and political life.

It soon becomes clear that this system of favoritism can only lead to discrimination. As certain groups are included in the elite, others must be excluded. If people perceive discrimination to exist, the impact is nearly the same, whether or not official discrimination exists. This point of view was conveyed to me during an interview I had with several leaders of ODED (Association of North African University Students) at Bar Ilan University, Tel Aviv, on August 16, 1973 (see footnote 64). The consensus of this group was a keen awareness of discrimination. At the same time there was recognition that it does not originate from higher levels of government (prime ministerial level), but rather is perpetrated at the lower levels of the bureaucracy. It becomes more a question of people helping their own kinsmen and thereby perpetuating the exclusion of non-kinsmen.

Methodological research has borne out the prevalence of this perception among Sephardic and Oriental Jews. In a 1973 study of relations between North African Jews and other
Israelis, it was found that feelings of discrimination were a significant force among North African immigrants. The study was organized on the basis of geographic dispersion of North African immigrants to Israel and it sampled 782 persons - 325 adults, 247 pupils aged 13 to 18 years, 138 young workers and 82 college students. In one portion of the study respondents were asked: "Do you think that the treatment of immigrants, whatever their origin, is based on justice and equality or rather differences and favoritism?"

The following table summarizes the results:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Percentage Yes</th>
<th>Percentage No</th>
<th>Percentage No Answer Don't Know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Justice</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>87.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equality</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>84.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Differences</td>
<td>23.1</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>75.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Favoritism</td>
<td>49.5</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>47.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is important to note that the majority of the people interviewed refused to respond to the first three items, but one out of two confirmed that there is favoritism. Those

who replied affirmatively to the items "differences" and "favoritism" were asked to elaborate and the answers were regrouped. (see page 75 Table V)

Most of what has been discussed in this chapter indicates a considerable difference between the aspirations held of integration into Israel and the reality of it. In a general sense, one way of moderating the effects of the pattern of politics would be recognition by the government of a plurality of interests and concerns in Israeli society. A more tangible governmental recognition involves the placing of responsibility for policy making in the hands of those who will be most directly affected by that policy. To date, the approach of the Israeli government to solutions of social problems has been piecemeal decisions sparked by public outcry. Such an approach is wholly inadequate. Tackling fundamental root problems, such as housing and education, requires planning and implementation at the highest inter-Ministerial level with full Parliamentary support. The fact that so many Sephardim and Orientals feel discrimination is often the result of their neglect by official circles and the lack of clear planning efforts aimed at ameliorating their situation. While a wide-scale reform of the Israeli political system would be desirable, this paper seeks to restrict itself to the existing and possible planning aspects of solutions.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A. Percentage Affirmation of:</th>
<th>B. Percentage Negation of Discrimination</th>
<th>C. Percentage No Response</th>
<th>D. Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) Favoritism - &quot;Ashkenazis benefit&quot;</td>
<td>30.5</td>
<td>1) There is none</td>
<td>9.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) Differences - &quot;Sephardim not treated the same&quot;</td>
<td>23.4</td>
<td>2) Justify differences of treatment</td>
<td>12.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) Discrimination</td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. affirm existence</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. affirm but not personally involved</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. experienced personally</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. more in past than now</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4) Justice &amp; Equality but with reservations</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>Sub-Total</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Total Affirmative</td>
<td>73.8</td>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>21.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[34\text{Ibid.}\]
CHAPTER V

DEMOGRAPHIC ASPECTS OF SOCIAL PROBLEMS IN ISRAEL

Demographic and statistical data can often be meaningless, being conveniently manipulated to suit a particular author's needs. In the case of Israeli society, however, demographic data does point to some significant ethnic differentials in the areas of employment, income and education. This data becomes useful in identifying problem areas.

One can draw a general picture of ethnic differences in Israel by grouping certain kinds of data. For example, there are 120,000 families in Israel who require social assistance. Among these, 72% are of Asian and African origin. The average age of Oriental Jews in Israel is 30.3 years; that of the Ashkenazim is 47 years. Of 643,000 Oriental immigrants, 94,000 or 14.6% are under the age of 14, compared with only 31,000 out of 715,000 (4.3%) of European immigrants. The average size of the Oriental family (4.8 persons) is considerably larger than that of the European family (3.1 persons).

Orientals enjoy a much lower standard of living than Europeans, and this is particularly noticeable in housing. Whereas only 6.8% of post-1948 European immigrants and 3.3%
of earlier settlers from the West live with three or more people to a single room, the comparable figures for Orientals are 38.0% and 30.7%, respectively. The minimum density standard set by the Ministry of Housing, 1.00 - 1.99 persons per room, is enjoyed by 56.9% and 62.7% of post and pre-1948 European immigrants, respectively. Only 28.4% of post-1948 and 31.9% of pre-1948 Oriental immigrants live this comfortably. The same pattern is reflected in the distribution of certain household commodities. For example, only 52% of Orientals own a refrigerator, compared with 90.7% of European families. From this cursory examination of preliminary data, one can clearly gather an idea of the dimensions of the socio-economic problem that presents itself in Israel.35

Population Growth and Migration

Population growth and migration has had a highly significant impact upon the problems of planning in Israel. For the moment, I shall confine myself to several demographic traits of the North African Jewish community in Israel, since they comprise the vast majority of those "disadvantaged" Sephardic and Oriental immigrants which have previously been referred to.

Between 1948 and 1952 North Africans represented fourteen percent of the immigration to Israel. While the

immigration of Asian Jews was almost complete by then, the North Africans continued to arrive in increasing numbers. Between 1955 and 1957, 68.7% of all immigrants came from North Africa; between 1961-1964, 60%; and in 1967, 52% of the immigrants came from North Africa. A full twenty-five percent of the Israeli Jewish population consists of persons born in North African countries.36

North African immigration has had considerable impact upon Israel due to the way these immigrants have geographically distributed themselves.

TABLE VI

GEOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION OF GENERAL AND NORTH AFRICAN POPULATIONS IN ISRAEL37

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Percentage General Population</th>
<th>Percentage N. Africans</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total North</td>
<td>30.6</td>
<td>36.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Galilee</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>22.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haifa</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>14.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Central</td>
<td>58.2</td>
<td>39.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jerusalem</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>15.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tel Aviv</td>
<td>29.0</td>
<td>8.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Other</td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>16.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total South</td>
<td>(Negev) 11.2</td>
<td>25.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As Table VI indicates, there are high concentrations of population in limited geographic areas. The concentration of

36 Israel, Facts About Israel-1975, pp.71-73
37 Ibid.
nearly eighty-nine percent of the population in the central coastal strip and the north has resulted in a distribution in the supply of services and economic goods which heavily favors these geographic areas, particularly the larger urban centers. Consequently, those areas such as the Galilee and Negev, where forty-seven percent of the North African population resides, have not had equal access to these goods and services. Settlements in these predominantly North African areas, therefore, have generally lagged behind the rest of the country in economic growth and development.

In addition to the problem of population distribution there exists the problem of extreme densities in certain areas. High levels of density result from large urban concentrations, such as Tel Aviv and Haifa. Table VII indicates the magnitude of these densities.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>1948</th>
<th>1956</th>
<th>1961</th>
<th>1972</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Northern</td>
<td>44.2</td>
<td>87.7</td>
<td>101.4</td>
<td>142.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haifa</td>
<td>209.2</td>
<td>413.1</td>
<td>433.6</td>
<td>563.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central</td>
<td>100.4</td>
<td>263.5</td>
<td>327.8</td>
<td>460.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tel Aviv</td>
<td>1,834.0</td>
<td>3,464.4</td>
<td>4,113.5</td>
<td>5,324.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jerusalem</td>
<td>159.5</td>
<td>311.1</td>
<td>344.5</td>
<td>540.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>24.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Average</td>
<td>43.1</td>
<td>88.5</td>
<td>107.6</td>
<td>153.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

38Ibid.
In comparison to Tel Aviv's 5,324 persons per square kilometer, London, England has a density of 4,395 persons per square kilometer.\(^3\) The problem of density in Israel is particularly acute since a high degree of urbanization is not accompanied by a commensurate level of industrialization. Thus there is a shortage of employment opportunities relative to population density.

Israel has had the rather unique problem over the past two decades of significant changes in the location of borders, impacting upon the internal arrangement of Israeli settlements. While "border areas" are seen as constituting potential opportunities for population dispersal rather than strictly security "problems," Israeli settlement policy has often found it necessary to settle new areas to make them defensible and to establish a basis for territorial claims. Israeli settlement policy, therefore, serves multiple functions - to establish defense barriers, to "legitimize" an area, and to disperse population.

To a much greater degree than other population groups, North African and Oriental Jews have borne the burden of this settlement policy. Many of them were settled in areas which had no natural reason for existence and which functioned at an extreme disadvantage in competing economically and cul-

urally with other areas of the country. As noted in Table VI, the percentage of North Africans in the Galilee and the South, areas which contain the majority of development towns and border regions, is considerably higher than the average. The years when these areas were opened for settlement, 1955-56, coincided with the peak period of North African immigration and, therefore, it was these immigrants who were most readily available for settlement in these areas.

While the intent of Israeli settlement policy was to bring about urban deglomeration and to make for a more rational population dispersal, it has not provided for the decentralization of such intangibles as cultural assets. There is a marked disparity between economic investment in and demographic settlement of border areas on the one hand and investment in cultural assets in the same regions on the other hand. The threat inherent in this situation is considerable, since the disparity is self-propagating.

The availability of cultural resources is a primary attraction for potential settlers whose occupational qualifications provide a range of choice. The attraction of inhabitants, who desire cultural opportunities (music, art, libraries, etc.), to a given area depends on the availability of cultural assets. The presence of cultural resources, therefore, can raise the quality of life in a locale by attracting a more culturally enriched population who themselves add to the resources of the area. Conversely, areas
lacking cultural resources tend to lose population groups who find these resources desirable. Thus a culturally and economically deficient population is left behind. This type of process, in either the positive or negative direction, is self-propagating. Enrichment fosters attraction and growth while impoverishment encourages outmigration and decline.

Although in the short-run the economic system might be regarded as competing with socio-cultural infra-structure for the allocation of resources, in the long-run a settlement's development depends on the standard of education as a developed economy requires threshold levels of skill and know-how. The fact that social and cultural variables tend to set several self-propagating processes in motion makes it necessary to pay careful attention to the national distribution of cultural resources. The geographic disparity in this distribution has created a public image that border settlements are pockets of lower-class people and areas having little to offer. Over time the image becomes a reality and it is no longer sufficient to eliminate the generating factor in order to cancel the image.

Once people get used to the idea that border settlements are identified with cultural backwardness it becomes a major deterrent for new settlers and one of the main causes of outmigration. Thus, delayed investments are ultimately more costly. Those settlements to which North Africans and Orientals were more or less forced to inhabit were never
provided with cultural assets sufficient to attract a healthy mixture of population which could have brought economic and cultural strength to these areas. These towns, as a result, have struggled to maintain their viability, often reliant upon direct government subsidy.

Income Components of the Social Gap

The social gap between Western and Oriental populations in Israel is the result of various factors, both economic and non-economic. Since precise measurement of non-economic variables is difficult, conclusions on the social gap are substantiated mainly on the basis of economic variables. Such variables include level of income, distribution of income, and indices of inequality.

In the early 1950's Israel was outstanding among all countries for the high degree of equality in its income distribution. Since the 1960's, however, Israel has been gradually losing this position of high relative equality. The question arises, therefore, as to whether wage discrimination on an ethnic basis exists in Israel. To answer this question a comparison of the distribution of incomes of families of Asian-African and Western (European-American) origin is provided in Table VIII.
## TABLE VIII

**DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME BY FAMILY ORIGIN 1968-69**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Income Classification</th>
<th>Western Families</th>
<th>Asian-African Families</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Average gross monthly</td>
<td>1,116 I.L.*</td>
<td>797 I.L.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average monthly per capita</td>
<td>372 I.L.</td>
<td>159 I.L.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* $1.00 U.S. = 3.5 Israeli pounds (I.L.) in 1969, at time of this comparison

The average gross monthly income of a non-Western family was approximately 72% of that of a Western family. This ethnic comparison is even more striking when one considers that the average size of a wage earning non-Western family is five persons, while that of the Western family is three persons. Utilizing per capita income the average monthly income of Asian-African families is only forty-four percent that of Western families. These figures do not include "in-kind" income transfers which increase the disparities.

One can quickly surmise two undeniable facts from this data. The gap in income is marked and the difference in family size is a major obstacle to more equal living standards. The Israeli government generally defines a "disadvantaged" family as one with one or more of the following criteria present:

1. Wage earning head of the family with less than eight years of education

---

2. Dwelling arrangements consist of three or more persons per room

3. Monthly per capita income of 100 I.L. or less

In 1972, there were 25,000 children from disadvantaged families and an additional 45,000 from families just slightly above these criteria. It is also significant to note that of 930,000 Israelis under the age of eighteen, 190,000 (twenty percent) are from families which meet at least two of the criteria and ninety percent of these are of Sephardic and Oriental backgrounds. 41

What are the causes of this inequality? Among several factors, the most important are:

1. The gap in occupational levels
2. The gap in educational levels
3. Differences in non-wage income
4. Non-progressive income taxation
5. Income maintenance

Occupational Levels - A flood of unskilled workers to the Israeli labor market, a result of mass immigration in the 1950's, brought about a lower relative wage level. Income disparities between skilled and unskilled labor widened with mass immigration, exerting economic forces which upset the traditional balance of wage policies. There are a number of other factors besides occupational

background which exacerbate the situation. They are:

1. The number of wage-earners per family
2. The number of days worked yearly by the principal family wage-earner
3. The amount of property owned by the family
4. The proportion of income set aside as savings

Educational Levels - In Israel, as in most other countries, there is a positive correlation between education and income levels. At present, Sephardic and Oriental Jews have a much lower educational level and a lower income level as compared to European and other Western population groups.

Differences in Non-Wage Income - Although mention was made of non-wage income in an earlier chapter, it is important to reiterate two items which contribute to income inequality:

1. Individual reparations from West Germany. These payments, at the times they were disbursed, widened income differentials. In 1970, 10% of all families in Israel (64,000 families) received restitution payments totaling $200 million, either as a lump sum or regular income. Obviously, all recipients were of European origin.42

2. Fringe Benefits. In higher income brackets, an important part of real income consists of "in-kind" income - fringe benefits which are not officially included as income (expense accounts, travel, telephone and clothing allowances,

42 Israel, Facts-1975, p.87.
The proportion of these benefits increases as income increases.

Non-Progressive Taxation - Purchase or sales taxes on certain products of necessary consumption weaken the effect of progressive income taxes and promote income inequality. They are, however, one of the primary means of obtaining revenue without increasing other areas of direct taxation.

It is important to note that the problem of income gaps in Israel is not without hope for improvement. In the last decade, the standard of living of Asian and African families has shown some improvement in relation to the total population. While per capita income differentials remain at unacceptable levels, there has been a closing of gaps in percentage ownership of durable goods as conveyed in the following data:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Western Families</th>
<th>African/Asian Families</th>
<th>Western Families</th>
<th>African/Asian Families</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Refrigerator</td>
<td>69%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>97%</td>
<td>92%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gas Oven</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Washing Machine</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Television</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Automobile</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

43Neuberger, Unity in Diversity, p.13.
Table IX indicates that Sephardic and Oriental ethnic groups lag behind the level of Westerners in ownership of consumer goods. The disparity between these two population groups, however, was significantly reduced between 1960 and 1970. Hopefully, these numbers indicate some achievement in raising the living standard of the non-Western population within a relatively short period.

**Income Taxation** - The social, occupational and educational gap in Israel is largely reflected in the disparity of the income distribution. While purchase taxes on consumer goods may tend to be regressive, a recently reformed system of progressive income taxation may have the capacity to reduce the income gap. Other instruments serving similar purposes, to be discussed later, include national insurance and social service payments.

The concept of poverty can be viewed as the relative situation of a family compared to others, on an income scale. Thus, poverty appears as a gap between the lower and higher income categories. In 1972 Israeli wage policy fixed the minimum income level at I.L. 425 per month (national average = 1,000 to 1,500 I.L. per month). According to this policy families with two children at this minimum level would not be liable for income tax, but would be liable for national insurance, pension funds and health insurance payments. The net minimum income for such families, therefore, is I.L. 363 per month. In addition, these families often
receive family allowances paid by employers and the National Insurance Institute.

A major problem of Sephardic and Oriental families is their large size. In July, 1975 the Israeli government introduced a system of progressive taxation which sought to increase take-home net income for larger families. It attempts to incorporate a consideration for family size through the assignment of a point system.44

According to this reformed system, the percentage of income deducted for taxes has been decreased. Personal deductions for a citizen and his wife (as a dependent), which in the past were subtracted from one's income for the purpose of reckoning income tax, have been abolished; instead points have been assigned for each family member and their total value is subtracted from the total tax computed on the gross income. Each point is worth I.L. 100 per month. A man and his wife are allowed 1 1/2 points each, for each of the first two children one point each is allowed, a third child is equivalent to two points, and fourth and fifth children are 2 1/4 points each. An important change is that payments for large families (greater than two children) are made by the National Insurance Institute and are tax-exempt.

An example of taxes on a family with a non-working wife with three children is shown on page 90.

---

Total Monthly Earnings
less taxes (25%)
Plus 3 points (husband-wife)
---
I.L. 2,000
- 500
+ 300
---
Net earnings
I.L. 1,800

Payment from N.I.I.
for 3 children
---
400

Net monthly spendable income
I.L. 2,200

Fig. 1. Sample of 1975 Israeli tax reform as applied to monthly family income.

This point system provides equity for those families who earn more than the minimum income, but are still at a low enough level to place them in a tenuous position. Two aims of the tax reform are to allow the individual to obtain proper compensation for his efforts and to allow the government to distribute the burden of taxation more equitably among the population.

Despite any tax reform system, there are many who bear the severe disadvantage of low wage earnings and a family that is too large. These families are especially vulnerable to fluctuations in economic cycles. Supplementary income and welfare support becomes crucial for these families.

Income Maintenance - There are more than 120,000 Jewish families receiving some form of welfare assistance and services in Israel. Of these families, thirty percent
receive services without financial assistance, fifty percent receive various forms of material help, and twenty percent receive regular economic aid.

The main responsibility for insuring some minimum level of income rests with the National Insurance Institute. Payments are made to all families with many children, to those of low income, and to those temporarily or permanently unemployed. In 1974, I.L. 2.8 billion or 5.7 percent of the national income was paid for these benefits.

Sectors of the population which are not covered by National Insurance are covered by the Ministry of Social Welfare. The aged, family and child care, rehabilitation, social welfare and supervision of voluntary agencies are programs run by this Ministry. In 1974 it allocated I.L. 525 million for such purposes. Ethnic differentials are obvious among welfare recipients. In terms of continent of birth, 69.9 percent of recipient family heads were born in Asia and Africa, twenty-five percent in Europe and the Americas, and only 5.4 percent in Israel.45

The Ministry of Welfare is responsible for general welfare services as well as for those provided via the local authorities. This Ministry has a dual function - to provide services to families and individuals of all ages and to

promote community development. Those services which are intended directly for family and individual assistance are delivered by local authorities under Ministry supervision.

The 1958 Israeli Welfare Services Law established definitions and guidelines for the distribution of welfare service, but did not legally establish the citizen's right to receive such aid. In other words, the Israeli welfare system never formally adopted the principle that every citizen is entitled to aid in case of need. The same type of thinking, which never established the right to receive aid, also set the schedule of support payments to provide income that is lower than the fixed minimum wage. This disparity, as indicated in Table X, reflects the policy of stimulating welfare recipients to seek income from wages, even though the minimum wage is low.

TABLE X
RATES OF WELFARE PAYMENTS, 1972
(in Israeli Pounds per month)46

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>I.L. 126</td>
<td>I.L. 123</td>
<td>I.L. 330</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>193</td>
<td>340</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>283</td>
<td>251</td>
<td>353</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>346</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>365</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>399</td>
<td>342</td>
<td>378</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>441</td>
<td>382</td>
<td>390</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>483</td>
<td>422</td>
<td>404</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>514</td>
<td>462</td>
<td>419</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

46Geffner, Sephardi Problems, p.8.
While the rate of welfare payments varies between eighty-six percent to ninety-eight percent of the definition of poverty for a particular category, welfare recipients receive additional assistance in the form of medical insurance, food surpluses, help in purchasing domestic equipment (appliances), income tax and compulsory loan reductions, free educational services and assistance with rental payments.

A final word of explanation is due concerning the National Insurance Institute, founded in 1954 by legislative act. National Insurance, similar to U.S. Social Security, was made compulsory for the entire Israeli population from the age of eighteen until eligibility for old-age pension is attained. While it covers a broad range of the population, it is not specifically directed at solving the economic and social problems of the needy. Benefits are given to all those insured, according to criteria which determine their rights.

Of general importance, National Insurance provides income supplements to a number of deprived sections of the population, particularly families whose supporters earn low wages and have many children (Fig. 1). In a sense, such families are guaranteed a minimum income through various means, while the purchasing value of this income is safeguarded by payment adjustments linked to changes in the consumer price index.
Educational Integration of Social Groups in Israel

The dilemma in Israel today is whether social development of all sectors can be attained and whether it may be too costly. Obviously, the social gap is still the biggest internal problem Israel faces, and it is felt most in housing and education. While housing will be discussed in the next chapter, there have been certain recent developments in the educational system which exacerbate an already poor situation.

Among a number of cost-cutting measures, the Israeli government is considering the elimination of free tenth grade education. In addition, the cost of pre-school tuition averages I.L. 500 per month, or half of what most working mothers earn. Average high school fees now stand at I.L. 3,500 per year, or two months net wages for most workers. University budgets have been cut and tuition averages I.L. 4,933 per year, a sum most families are unable to afford.

With this background in mind, it is important to realize that in 1976 education comprised the third largest item in the Israeli national budget, serving one million pupils. Education is tuition-free and compulsory between the ages of five and fifteen and jointly financed by State and local authorities.47

Primary education is limited to six years followed by six years of post-primary school up through grade twelve.

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Fees in secondary schools (grades 10-12) are approximately I.L. 3,500 per year with State subsidies available to some parents. About 56.3 percent of all secondary pupils are exempt from some payment, with a large portion of the cost difference being assumed by the quasi-public Jewish Agency.

The number of school children from large families of Asian and African origin represents a majority, sixty percent, of the elementary school population. Their proportion in the school system is larger than the number of African and Asian Jews in the national population. After twenty-seven years of educational experience in Israel, a new reality has developed which casts doubt on the principle of equal education for all. Many new immigrant children from underdeveloped countries have acquired the simplest skills of reading and writing only with the greatest difficulty. They have fallen steadily behind in levels of educational attainment as reflected in Table XI. The poor record of comparative achievement for Asian and African pupils as shown in Table XI is only part of the picture. As of 1973, students of Asian and African origins in institutions of higher education comprise only thirteen percent of the student population, four percent of the B.A. degrees awarded, eight percent of those enrolled in M.A. and doctoral degree programs, and only 1.6

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48 Israel, Facts-1975, p.149.
percent of those receiving M. A. and Ph.D degrees. 49

TABLE XI
RATE OF EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT FOR JEWISH PUPILS ACCORDING TO ORIGIN, BY PERCENTAGE, 1967-1970 50

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Origin</th>
<th>Began Grade 1</th>
<th>Completed Grade 8</th>
<th>Completed Grade 9</th>
<th>Completed Grade 12</th>
<th>Graduated High School (passed exams)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Asia/Africa</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>90.5</td>
<td>72.0</td>
<td>23.0</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western/Israeli</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>95.5</td>
<td>95.0</td>
<td>63.0</td>
<td>35.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table XII compares university enrollments of students from thirteen older towns to those from twenty-five development towns (excludes major cities). Older towns in Israel have very high populations of Ashkenazim and European parent-age sabras (native-born Israelis), while the population of development towns consists more heavily of Sephardic and Oriental Jews. It is interesting to note that while overall enrollment from development towns is twenty percent the enrollment from older towns, enrollment at Ben-Gurion University in Beersheba exhibits the reverse of this pattern.


Here the enrollment by older town residents is 54% that of development town residents. Ben-Gurion University is an example of a planned government attempt to upgrade the educational opportunities of economically deprived Oriental students, partly by locating the school in proximity to the development towns where these students reside.

### TABLE XII

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institution</th>
<th>Older Towns</th>
<th>Development Towns</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bar-Ilan University</td>
<td>1,644</td>
<td>139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Tel Aviv)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ben-Gurion University</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>252</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Beersheba)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haifa University</td>
<td>256</td>
<td>165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hebrew University</td>
<td>1,828</td>
<td>601</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Jerusalem)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technion</td>
<td>1,298</td>
<td>286</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Haifa)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tel Aviv University</td>
<td>2,239</td>
<td>119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weizmann Institute</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Rehovot)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>7,755</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,571</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Government established Ben-Gurion University in 1969, after a study of national needs, to help spearhead the development of the Negev area. Beersheba was chosen as a

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site due to its proximity to the Negev (Southern desert) region and because it is one of Israel's main centers for absorbing new immigrants. The University is an integral part of the absorption facilities in the area.

Ben-Gurion University has a unique national role to play in educating the large proportion of disadvantaged youngsters in the Negev area. The population of the Negev is seventy percent Sephardi and Sephardi students comprise twenty-five to thirty percent of the 4,500 students, or twice the national average. The University's policy of serving primarily as a community oriented center of education will lead to a planned increase in the number of Sephardi students. As an example, the University has a preparatory school program which trains culturally deprived students and high school dropouts to specialize in subjects related to technology and science. It also attempts to bring them up to general university standards in other academic disciplines.52

The relatively low achievement level and high dropout rate among Asian and African children can generally be attributed to a number of environmental variables such as poverty, educational deprivation in the immediate surroundings, and limited family cultural background. Furthermore,

52Simson Carlebach, "Desert University," The Jerusalem Post, October 19, 1976, p.11.
the cultural upheaval often involved in immigration from an
Oriental to a Western culture has also had a significant
impact. As a direct result of this "clash" of cultures,
the absorbing society contributed to educational failures
among Sephardic and Oriental children. Despite concerted
efforts, study curricula and teaching methods employed in
Israel's educational system were not adapted to the vast dif­
ferences between pupils of different backgrounds and teachers
lacked adequate experience and training to respond to the
difficulties of these immigrant children.

In recent years a number of changes in Israeli
educational thinking have occurred, mainly in terms of ques­
tioning assumptions on the superiority of the absorbing
culture. Similarly, the validity of the principle that
education ought to be egalitarian and uniform has been chal­
lenged. With the notable example of Ben-Gurion University
as a case in point, Israeli educators have begun to devote
more attention to equality of educational opportunity rather
than uniformity of education.

More important than increasing opportunities at the
university level is doing so at the elementary level.
Israel's Ministry of Education and Culture has implemented
a number of special programs to raise educational levels
and opportunities for Asian and African pupils. They include:

  a. Free elementary studies (8-9 years) for all;
     free secondary school studies for under­
     privileged children - 77.4% of children who
do not pay fees are of Asian and African
origin; enrichment syllabuses in arts, the theatre and music for children whose natural environment does not stress such values (7,300 benefited in 1972/73).

b. A longer school year for such pupils.

c. A longer school day for 71,000 pupils in 1973/74 and hot lunches for 210,000.

d. Special tutoring.

e. Special annual grants for textbooks.

All this is meant to constitute a continuous flow of support to children from the age of 3 up to grants and loans at universities; the purpose to create equal opportunities, and not merely equality of treatment.53

As a result of changes such as these, the concept of "disadvantaged" or "deprived" defines children in need of relatively intensive educational care due to some form of so-called cultural deprivation. This concept is an Israeli innovation and was developed out of educational work in the particular situations of an immigrant absorbing country. Cultural deprivation, nevertheless, implies one culture is inferior. In fact, the deprivation is actually economic, with Asian and African families lacking the economic means or goals for self-advancement. While new Government educational programs are anticipated to have widespread impacts on equalizing educational opportunity, their effectiveness remains to be proven.

Differing origins and socio-economic characteristics of immigrants influenced the occupational mobility of African and Asian Jews upon their arrival in Israel. One cannot talk of these Jews as a monolithic population. The economic success of each group was predicated by the particular conditions in the country of origin.

In Morocco, Jews were mainly artisans and small traders. In Tunisia and Algeria, Jews had been craftsmen, commercially employed persons and, in modern times, clerical workers and liberal professionals. These clericals and professionals required advanced education based upon French culture and educational methods. This provided better abilities for adapting to Western life. A large portion of this educated Tunisian and Algerian Jewish population preferred emigration to France. Those who came to Israel, the craftsmen, generally lacked the skills for economic integration into a new society in the process of industrialization.

Without clear occupational skills, the masses of immigrants to Israel posed serious problems. While some could be integrated into the rural sector and others into the urban working class, mass immigration brought about radical transformations in the structures of the North African communities. The immigrant often rejected transformations that were imposed by the demands of a developing
Israeli society, preferring to attribute them to discrimination.

In any society there is a threshold of educational capital and skilled manpower levels below which a settlement cannot exist. Without a mix of manpower resources in a given area, pockets of extreme deprivation develop. In the industrialized countries, a highly developed division of labor is found. There is a range of specialization which expands in line with the demands of technological progress. In such cases, the main manpower problem is to increase the levels of diversification. In developing countries that are just beginning to industrialize, the manpower problem becomes that of inculcating initial specialized skills in line with new industrial plants.

Due to high levels of immigration within a relatively short time, Israel is unique in that it does not fall into either of the above categories. While Israeli industrialization is in full swing, its labor force is characterized by a highly polarized occupational structure. On the one hand, there are masses of immigrants from underdeveloped countries who are not attuned to modern industrial production. Many of them are illiterate or poorly educated and lack vocational training. On the other hand, there is a cadre of immigrants with a high level of professional training and skill who are prepared to move into skilled trades and management positions.

Israel has wide geographic variations in terms of industrialization and development. Those areas which were
underdeveloped and exhibited deprivation, such as development towns, found that their major problem was a lack of skilled workers and professionals. Government attempts at rehabilitation never worked because most of the initiative came from above and little from below. As a result, small and medium-scale industry and services did not develop.

Israel has moved through a transition period between stagnation and development in its attempt to cope with immigration from abroad as well as internal migration, both of which created demographic pressures on Israel's employment structure. When Israel, a country of small population, absorbed a high proportion of immigrants, it became necessary to adopt a policy of maximum manpower utilization through the institution of what is termed "rapid reserves." This was roughly equivalent to a combination of the Civilian Conservation Corps during the Depression era in the United States and a private employment bureau.

The utilization of these reserves was born out of a need to provide jobs for all immigrants and to develop a given technical production capacity. The system was advantageous because large numbers were activated for the labor force, including many who had never worked before. The need to provide the newcomers with the minimum means for existence, however, became a barrier to specialization. While it has been essential for Israel, as a developing country, to place theoretically equal emphasis on maximal exploita-
### TABLE XIII

**ISRAELI EMPLOYMENT BY ECONOMIC BRANCH, 1968-1972**

(In Thousands and Percentages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>94.3</td>
<td>91.3</td>
<td>84.8</td>
<td>84.5</td>
<td>83.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10.3%</td>
<td>9.7%</td>
<td>8.8%</td>
<td>8.5%</td>
<td>8.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industry &amp; Mining</td>
<td>217.6</td>
<td>226.1</td>
<td>233.3</td>
<td>239.6</td>
<td>248.4</td>
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<td></td>
<td>23.9</td>
<td>23.9</td>
<td>24.2</td>
<td>24.0</td>
<td>23.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electricity &amp; Water</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>9.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>72.9</td>
<td>75.9</td>
<td>80.1</td>
<td>88.3</td>
<td>99.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>9.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation &amp; Communication</td>
<td>68.4</td>
<td>74.7</td>
<td>72.2</td>
<td>74.0</td>
<td>76.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>7.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commerce Hotels &amp; Restaurants</td>
<td>120.4</td>
<td>125.0</td>
<td>125.0</td>
<td>126.4</td>
<td>137.0</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>13.2</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>13.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Services</td>
<td>205.4</td>
<td>213.9</td>
<td>230.3</td>
<td>241.3</td>
<td>252.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>22.6</td>
<td>22.6</td>
<td>23.9</td>
<td>24.2</td>
<td>24.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finance &amp; Other Service</td>
<td>120.3</td>
<td>128.3</td>
<td>126.5</td>
<td>132.0</td>
<td>136.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>13.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>910.9</td>
<td>945.8</td>
<td>963.2</td>
<td>997.1</td>
<td>1,047.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100 %</td>
<td>100 %</td>
<td>100 %</td>
<td>100 %</td>
<td>100 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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tion of available manpower and on large capital investments, the waves of immigration at various periods intensified the need for the former. As experience has shown, such emphasis did not solve the basic problem of many deprived areas - that of professionalization. The utilization of rapid reserves brought about full or almost complete employment, but it often served to conceal the invisible unemployment, such as relief work, and the basic lack of skills in the labor force.

While patterns of employment in Israel, by type of activity, remain relatively stable, the pressures on manpower due to shortages of skilled labor and professional management have increased. While Table XIII illustrates general employment in Israel, it does not say anything about ethnic differentials by type of employment. Table XIV, on the other hand, illustrates the predominance of Asian and Africans in "blue-collar" occupations (the latter three categories) while Europeans and North Americans predominate in professional and "white-collar" occupations.
TABLE XIV
PERCENTAGE EMPLOYMENT IN ISRAEL, BY CATEGORIES,
ACCORDING TO ETHNIC ORIGIN, 1972

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Employment Category</th>
<th>Asian/African</th>
<th>European/N. American</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Work Force</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professionals</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White Collar</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industrial</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Key variables that determine levels of occupational and income achievement are length of residence in Israel, the educational level of the household head, and increasingly, the education of other family members. Widening educational opportunities in Israel does offer hope for a more equitable sharing of occupational opportunities by all segments of Israeli society in coming years.

The importance of ethnic influence on the Israeli economy stems from the fact that a modern economy is not constituted solely by means of material resources; for its operation, it also needs a well consolidated social and cultural structure.

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55 Israel, Black Panthers, p.4.
The approach which regards large capital investments as the magic solution to the problems of underdeveloped regions is incorrect. In most cases advancement will not be attained if the necessary attention is not devoted to raising the professional level of manpower. It is all the more necessary to pay attention to this aspect when the lives of the persons employed are themselves inadequate. When their education is faulty and the regional development is unbalanced, when there are slums and the health services are insufficient, when cultural opportunities are unequally distributed, and there is neglect of entertainment facilities it is still more obvious that priority must be given to education, slum clearance, better health service and development of backward areas. If it turns out that it is these aspects which account for unemployment and retardation in economic growth, there is every justification for unemployment and economic growth not being regarded as top priority.56

While the Israeli Government publicly claims to be making advances into those areas mentioned by Galbraith, there are wide variations in the realities of individual, neighborhood, and community advancement in raising levels of personal, economic and cultural growth. Successes in such advancement and growth, therefore, depends upon the motivations of the people who are themselves seeking (or not seeking) to advance.

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CHAPTER VI

SOCIAL AND PHYSICAL PLANNING LINKAGES IN ISRAEL

The Relationship Between Physical and Social Problems in Israeli Urban Environments

An unbalanced distribution of population and urban centers has posed serious problems for planning in Israel. Where centralization of human activities has its advantages, unplanned development negates them. A hierarchy of rural communities, regional commercial centers, and national urban centers is a system which provides greatest opportunities for economic and social progress and easing of social integration. With exceptions, Israel has been largely unsuccessful in its attempts to establish a hierarchy of human settlements.

There are three types of social problems associated with urbanization: (1) those that stem from the inherent nature of the urban life style, (2) those that arise from a transfer, through migration, of rural problems-poverty, illiteracy, unemployment-to urban areas where they become more conspicuous, and (3) those that result from the process of rapid change inherent in urbanization. Thus, social problems are created by increase in physical numbers, more congested living, more complex social institutions, and by the difficulties of transition from the
rural to the urban way of life.

Social problems associated with urbanization have had great impact upon Israel. Due to the absorption of large numbers of immigrants, temporary settlements were constructed during the earlier waves of immigration to cope with the large and sudden influx of people. The exact legal status of these settlements was always unclear. Depending upon time of arrival, immigrants were housed in a variety of dwellings. Large numbers were housed in small, asbestos covered buildings. While these housing provisions were originally intended as temporary, allowing the immigrant a transitional period while adapting to a new environment, the temporary gradually became permanent. These settlements could be found in rural areas, development towns or within major cities. Subsequently, a family of six living in a one or two room dwelling originally intended for two or three persons became commonplace in these settlement areas.

Another type of transitional settlement, largely a problem in areas surrounding Jerusalem, are squatter colonies resulting from wars. Following Israel's wars of 1948 and 1967, certain areas which were under Arab control were vacated. These areas contained a large proportion of sub-standard housing, usually in the form of old hotels or apartment buildings, damaged by shelling and subsequently condemned by the Israeli government. Large numbers of Israeli Jews, particularly slum-dwelling North Africans, quickly moved in
as squatters; attempts by the government to remove them failed and many remain to this day.

The term "transitional settlement" embraces many forms of slums, squatter settlements, and other uncontrolled environments. These areas are transitional in the sense that their inhabitants are undergoing a social and economic change as they adapt to an urban economy. The effective land use of these originally temporary settlements have now assumed a permanent residential classification. People who continue to populate these areas intensify planning problems by increasing living densities in central low-rent and low-income areas and by invasion of vacant public and private land, typically in peripheral areas, which impedes efforts required for long-term improvement and development of these lands.

While it may be desirable for transitional areas to be vacated, their continued occupation by large numbers of poorer immigrants is a function of benefits produced. They provide their inhabitants: housing at rents within the means of the lowest income groups; informal reception centers for newly-arrived immigrants, easing their adjustment to urban life; employment in marginal and small-scale enterprises; accommodations in close proximity to place of employment; and adequate social support during unemployment and other periods of difficulty.

Transitional settlements, while not isolated to a
particular region in Israel, have significant impacts upon Jerusalem and Tel Aviv. Conditions of distress created by transitional areas, however, prevail in other areas as well. Whether in development towns or in large cities, poor conditions have been created by immigrants left to their own devices. Often immigrants settled in neighborhoods based upon common periods of arrival and/or country of origin. These bases for neighborhood organization, therefore, did not favor positive intergroup social relations, integration, or economic advancement of disadvantaged groups. Conditions of distress and deterioration, therefore, came to prevail in three types of areas:

1. Certain development towns. Some development towns are distressed, especially those located a considerable distance from established urban regions. These towns lag behind in basic municipal services and cultural resources are limited to only occasional contact between the town's inhabitants and Israeli institutions. Relations between immigrants and veteran Israelis and between people of differing national origins are often tense. Economically disadvantaged towns also have difficulty maintaining population since residents leave as soon as they find better opportunities elsewhere.

2. Pockets of distress in established settlements. Pockets of distress are older sections of rural or semi-urban settlements. These pockets were temporary "dumping grounds"
for immigrants in the early years of the State, much like transitional settlements in urban areas. As the settlements in proximity to these pockets established themselves, developing economically, residents of distressed areas, lacking skills and not having been absorbed into the mainstream of Israeli society, became locked out of the economic and social life of the settlements.

3. Distressed neighborhoods in large cities and on their outskirts. In the three large urban centers of Jerusalem, Tel Aviv and Haifa, integration poses problems different from those in the two aforementioned areas. North African immigrants frequently settled in very old neighborhoods or in katamon quarters. In Jerusalem they were hurriedly constructed to accommodate mass immigrant arrivals. These quarters at times can be found in close proximity to affluent neighborhoods, exacerbating feelings of deprivation and frustration and sometimes leading to violence and criminal behavior.

Housing Problems In Israel

The combination of short supply and high cost of housing in Israel has caused overcrowding, impacting on middle and upper-income families as well as the poor.

57 The Hebrew word katamon literally means "district." While comparisons are difficult, connotations in common usage are akin to the American concept of a hard-core inner-city slum or a skid-row area.
The problem transcends regional distinctions. The shortage is felt in urban centers, development towns and rural areas. Mass migration and rapid urbanization created a demand for housing that far exceeded the supply. All types of housing were in demand, even sub-standard dwellings. Concentrations of low-income populations were forced into slums where living conditions are characterized by deteriorated buildings, high population density per unit, concentrations of populations having similar ethnic origins, high frequencies of welfare, crime, and broken families. Public services are unavailable or insufficient in these areas and there is a high incidence of depression and isolation among inhabitants. Other city residents look at these areas with disdain, as do the slum residents themselves.

While there has been a steady improvement in housing conditions in Israel over the years, it has not been felt by the entire population. The system of public housing has succeeded in increasing the average size of apartments from thirty-one square meters (334 sq. ft.) in the early 1950's to about seventy-five square meters (807 sq. ft.) in the early 1970's. There has also been considerable improvement in the structural quality of housing since 1950. Although available units have improved, the major problem of supply shortages remains.

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The reasons for Israel's housing shortage vary from the technical to the political. In addition to natural population growth, Israel adds about 40,000 new immigrants per year to its population. Furthermore, the need to replace a significant percentage of existing substandard housing units increases the demand. When this is added to the construction of public buildings, industrial plants and commercial space, the result is a limited labor force not able to meet these needs.

The high cost of housing, partially due to demand, is driven upward by government land policy. Due to Israel's Socialist history, the scarcity of land and the need to carefully control land development, the government is the owner of most land suitable for housing. Government practice has exhibited a reluctance to release land in large parcels and instead has favored land appropriations on a piecemeal, short-term basis. Thus, a continual shortage of lots has resulted in an escalation in housing costs. Furthermore, property tax policy falls more heavily upon buildings than land. This encourages private landowners to withhold lots for development until market prices rise sufficiently for owners to realize a substantial profit.

Housing has been a tremendous burden on the Israeli economy. Although in the long-run it is an essential part of the social cost of development, it is inflationary in the short-run. Housing expenditures involve large sums expended
on materials and labor without an immediate return in the form of consumption or export goods. Inflationary pressures and resultant high interest rates have made it extremely difficult to construct housing at reasonable costs without heavy government subsidies. Most housing has to be purchased and, despite government assistance in the form of credits and subventions, the purchase of decent housing is beyond the reach of the poor. Israel has an economy with considerable governmental intervention. Housing problems, therefore, may be viewed as a failure in policy to control costs through regulation and manipulation of vast land resources and through construction contracts that are awarded by the government to private contractors.

With this background in mind, a picture emerges in which social problems and distress in urban neighborhoods may be attributed to two major factors:

1. The various relief services in the country are ineffective in solving the total complex of problems, particularly those involved with the creation of an infrastructure for social and community services.

2. Poor neighborhoods are islands of physical, social and economic neglect in the midst of comparative prosperity. The proximity of two opposite lifestyles deepens the sense of helplessness and anger in the distressed population.

Degrees of neglect and of social and economic gaps
between different populations in Israel vary greatly, whether between one urban neighborhood with another or between one region of the country and another. Two case studies will be examined: Nahla'ot in Jerusalem and Kiryat Gat in the Lachish Region. The former is a Jerusalem neighborhood which typifies neglect and inefficiency of services as a major source of problems, while Kiryat Gat and the Lachish Region represent directed planning aimed at achieving viable solutions to social and economic gaps in Israeli society.

The Nahla'ot Quarter In Jerusalem, A Distressed Neighborhood

The development of Nahla'ot, now a distressed neighborhood in Jerusalem, has been closely linked to the growth of modern Jerusalem. According to Shlomo Gadish, Deputy Mayor of Jerusalem, many modern-day planning problems stem from the varied origins of Jerusalem's Jewish population. Prior to 1948, Jews on both the east and west sides of the city shared the same facilities, services, and infrastructure, all of which were relatively poor, but after 1948 disparity developed between the Jordanian (east) and the Israeli (west) sides of the city. A population migration, mostly of Jews, took place as people sought the better services and facilities available on the Israeli side of the city.

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59 Interview with Hon. Shlomo Gadish, Deputy Mayor of Jerusalem, Hotel Reich, Jerusalem, August 20, 1973.
city. In addition, between 1948 and 1952 the Israeli government moved new immigrants directly to Jerusalem in order to fortify the Jewish population, and many were placed in unfit housing. The combination of these two population movements together with a third - voluntary migration due to the spiritual attraction of Jerusalem - has resulted in a city built as a patch-work of neighborhoods and adjacent incompatible land uses. A major problem confronting Jerusalem's planners is the difficulty in enforcing an already weak Master Plan (Tochnit Ha'av) as a means of controlling this "patchwork" of neighborhoods and land uses. As Mr. Gadish went on to explain, Jerusalem's Master Plan is no more than a general scheme, projecting the commercial, social and transportation system of the city several years hence. The Master Plan, derived from the British Mandate era (circa 1935), is archaic in that it only works from the top to the bottom; there is little flexibility in response to changing needs and changes are implemented without consultation or public participation.

Jerusalem, built on hilly terrain, is not a large city in area and distances between the outermost suburbs are not very great. The center of the city is the business and shopping district near Zion Square. Not far from this location is the spiritual heart, the old walled city and its numerous holy places. The commercial center, however, is the focus of the Master Plan, which calls for dense building
near the center of the capitol, resulting in a virtual doubling of the central city population density. It was thought that centralization would unite the population socially, bringing together diverse segments, while simultaneously offering increased employment opportunities. This approach, however, became standard practice even in non-central city areas and, therefore, open spaces have not generally been preserved in residential neighborhoods. Thus, starkness and high densities in many local neighborhoods have intensified physical deterioration.

Finally, the major problem with the Master Plan is that it is often honored in the breach. Although there are strict limitations on building height in certain parts of the city, zoning variances are often easily granted. Several major projects, such as the French Hill and Nebi Samuel developments (housing projects built on the Judean Hills surrounding the city), contradict the basic assumptions of the Master Plan with its centralizing guidelines. In fact, a number of planned and already constructed hotels such as the Jerusalem Hilton Tower (30 storeys) are totally opposed to the spirit of the plan, which aimed at eliminating the spread of the city. Architectural aesthetics, as a result, are not consistent with the city's history.

It is against this backdrop that one can understand the great difficulties the municipality has had to face in coping with a population which has mushroomed from 201,000
in 1967 to 361,000 in 1976. It is doubtful that Jerusalem has established the proper planning procedures that will enable it to avoid the blight that threatens the city. Jerusalem's objective problems become even more difficult when one examines some recent statistical characteristics of its population. Fifty-three percent of all Jerusalemites are of Asian and African origin, with a large majority of these being in lower income categories. Thirty-one percent of Jewish families in Jerusalem have five members or more; and only forty-five percent of Jerusalem's population is in the labor force.  

Jerusalem, therefore, lacks the social and economic resources to support itself. Its population structure is cumbersome to a city which must be concerned with delivery of social services and rehabilitation of distressed neighborhoods.

With regard to economic and social resources, Jerusalem is inferior to Tel Aviv. For example, the number of families receiving welfare in Jerusalem is fourteen percent; in Tel Aviv 9.5%. Of all housing units in Jerusalem, forty-eight percent are substandard; in Tel Aviv twenty-two percent of the total housing units available are substandard. These figures clearly indicate that Jerusalem must cope with severe urban problems while it remains a poor city.

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61 Ibid.
Since the post-1967 unification, the municipality has devoted insufficient attention to city planning problems. It has approved the erection of new suburbs on the periphery of the city without a balanced strengthening of the infrastructure and service networks in the city center. Older districts such as Nahla'ot, therefore, remain neglected; their needs for social and physical rehabilitation are a major part of the developmental problems facing Jerusalem.

General Description of Nahla'ot

Nahla'ot is an older, neglected area physically adjacent to two expensive and well cared for neighborhoods, both of which are structurally opposite Nahla'ot - to the southeast is Rehavia and to the west lies Kiryat Wolfson (Fig. 2). At one time the impact of such an arrangement, although unplanned, pointed to hopes for at least a limited success in achieving social integration. As design had it, poor and affluent neighborhoods bordered each other and the children had to attend the same school. While details of this process will be discussed later, social integration has not been fostered in general. Instead, the poorer children confronted the problem of raised expectations, which only heightened feelings of frustration.

Nahla'ot is a downtown Jerusalem slum near Government offices and the Knesset to the west and the Mahane Yehuda central market area to the northeast. Because of its central location, construction is going on all around the
Fig. 2. Nahla'ot in relation to greater Jerusalem

62 Carta's Jerusalem Map (Jerusalem: Carta Ltd., 1969).
quarter's periphery. The area is an old Jewish quarter embracing several smaller neighborhoods - Sha'arei Hessed, Nahalat Zion, and Sha'aeir Rabanim, built between 1900 and 1910, and Nahalat Ahim and Zichron Ahim built in the early twenties and thirties (Fig. 3). In the late fifties some new buildings were built on the foundations of the old.

The quarter is located on a steep westerly slope which makes construction difficult. Most of the buildings are made of stone. The narrow streets are clean and the walls whitewashed. Clothes lines are strung across the streets from one balcony to the other. The quarter is so full of houses that there is little space left for parks, and children usually have to play in the streets. Apart from a few swings in one small park there are no playgrounds. Narrow alleys, sidewalks difficult to travel, old buildings, courtyards with dilapidated walls, and overcrowding compose the fact of Nahla'ot.

Many of Nahla'ot's problems are derived from its pattern of growth. Many early Yemenite settlers built their own homes, constructing one room and adding others over time as they were able. Plumbing was practically non-existent at first, although added later in most cases. Thus, a maze of flat little houses grouped around small inner courtyards sprang up, helter-skelter. During the 1948 war many Jews, fleeing battles raging in the Jewish quarter of the Old City, settled in the Nahla'ot quarter; they were accommo-
Fig. 3. Detail of Nahla'ot and Rehavia (enlargement of Fig. 2.).
dated in additional housing built upon a patchwork of streets and alleys. As a result of its history, Nahla'ot today has deteriorated to a point where physical and social decay are extant throughout the quarter, which is populated by large, low-income families.

The National Insurance Institute, as may be recalled from Chapter V, plays a major role in providing financial assistance to low income and/or large families. In a personal interview with the director of the Institute, Dr. Israel Katz, an assessment of problem areas like Nahla'ot was developed. While the hard facts of low income, poor housing and education are undeniable, he noted other problems arise beyond low-income levels, which involve life styles and value systems. Children in areas such as Nahla'ot develop an acceptance of limitations which impede their ability to make choices that might allow improved social and economic opportunities in their future; the cycle continues with their children.

Dr. Katz felt that education for the children in neighborhoods such as Nahla'ot should not occur solely in the classroom. Rather many of Nahla'ot's disadvantaged children, and their parents, have failed to respond to the general pressures and demands put upon them when changing their environment from a Casablanca, for example, to a Tel Aviv.

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63 Interview with Dr. Israel Katz, Executive Director, National Insurance Institute, Hotel Reich, Jerusalem, August 21, 1973.
Failure to adapt to a changed environment creates disparities in family life and home environments significantly different from higher-income European quarters.

Education, therefore, begins in the home environment at an early age and instills a perception of the outside environment. It provides basic skills for adaptation to that environment. Failure to provide such a learning environment in places like Nahla'ot is exacerbated by problems of poor self-image. As Dr. Katz explained, in any society different groups have varying degrees of social honor and prestige. People often behave in the image of themselves cast by other people. Similarly, one’s perceived opinion of oneself is often based upon the social group to which one belongs. While this is not a new revelation in social theory, it is significant for Nahla'ot. The residents often exhibit negative behavior - juvenile delinquency, prostitution, gambling, drug-use - due to poor self-image.

Being mostly North African and Yemenite, Nahla'ot's residents came from countries where they were by law, second-class citizens. This fact, in turn, fostered a second-class self image which remained even after resettlement in Israel. Nahla'ot's residents compared themselves to western or Ashkenazi Israelis, and self-esteem was lowered even further.

In another private interview, Asher Malke, a leader of O.D.E.D. (North African University Students Association) at Bar Ilan University, confirmed the cycle of negative self-
image from his own childhood. By the time the child achieves some level of social consciousness, two things occur: (a) a complete rejection of the parents' value system which usually results in the breakdown of family life, and (b) a shame and denial of one's Sephardic background stemming from a false recognition that to be lavan (white) or Ashkenazic is the standard. He felt that much of the integration between Sephardim and Ashkenazim occurs only after a Sephardi submerges his ethnic identity, even though the Ashkenazi never really establishes such a precondition for interchange. Mr. Malke quipped that the most extensive integration between Sephardim and Ashkenazim usually occurs when these youngsters come together to drink and smoke hashish. 64

While the psychological framework of Nahla'ot's residents are a significant contributing factor to their generally poor standard of living, the physical realities of life in the quarter are equally important in gaining an overall picture of life in the district.

Housing Characteristics of Nahla'ot

A number of building types characterize Nahla'ot. One is the single or two-storey house built of concrete with stone facing. These houses are built around a courtyard with the kitchen and toilet outside against a courtyard wall. A

64 Interview with Asher Malke, President O.D.E.D., Bar-Ilan University, Tel Aviv, August 31, 1973.
second type is the two or three storey stone building with an outside stairway leading to entrance-way balconies. The kitchen and toilets are indoors, but shared by a number of families. Finally, Nahla'ot is characterized by the single storey stone house not built around a courtyard, which usually contains a basement where people live. In addition to these three housing types, there are also tin or wooden huts scattered throughout the quarter.

Small apartments and serious overcrowding are the pattern of the low housing standard in the quarter. Most apartments in Nahla'ot are much smaller than the Jerusalem average. The average number of occupants per room is 3 to 3.9, compared to 1 to 1.9 for the city as a whole. Most of the apartments consist of one or two rooms; some families have their own kitchen and bathroom, while others share these facilities. Interestingly this contributes towards improved neighborly relations in many instances, as sharing the facilities involves needs for communication and social interchange between those neighbors sharing the facilities. Most of the kitchens are narrow and their small size makes them inefficient. Frequently they are not more than cooking corners inside the living space. In the numerous apartments where there is neither shower nor bath, the family has to wash in the corner of the living-room. Some of the apartments lack

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a hot water system and the occupants heat water on the gas or oil stove. These same facilities serve to heat the house in winter, although some families have kerosene room heaters.

The dismal picture of structural conditions is largely due to a housing standard rooted in the past, when toilet facilities were not regarded as an integral component of apartment facilities. A substantial number of the residents make some improvements to their apartments, including both owner-occupants and tenants. While alterations are an attempt to improve housing standards, they tend to spoil the outer appearance of the neighborhood. Large families close off their balcony with shutters to make an extra bedroom or even another storey. Most who do make improvements aspire to a proper bathroom. The resulting jumbled patchwork, while improving the area structurally, adds to the crowded and rundown appearance in Nahla'ot.

As was explained by a social worker in the quarter's local community center, the main housing problems in Nahla'ot are dampness and overcrowding. These affect both the physical and mental health of all who live in the area. Add to this the common practice of several children sleeping in one bed and, at times, even in the stairways. What emerges is a picture of high failure rates in school, low levels of educational attainment and high rates of crime and juvenile delin-
The Demographic Structure of the Quarter

Population and Family Size

Nahla’ot is an old quarter founded in stages between 1900 and 1920. The first settlers were native born Israelis who moved from the Old City and immigrants from Afro-Asian countries. Approximately ninety percent of its present residents arrived in Israel by 1945. Kurds, Yemenites, Syrians, Sephardis, Iraqis, and native-born Israelis predominate in the quarter. Most of the families in the neighborhood are large, sometimes consisting of nine or more people. There are also many families numbering more than six persons. Much of this is due to the traditional mode of life in the quarter, which encourages women to marry by the age of 18 and even younger. Only a small percentage of families have only one or no children. The percentage of younger households in the neighborhood is very low, due to an exodus of those younger residents who have more mobility.

In spite of the high rate of natural population increase in the quarter, the area is in a condition of stagnation and decline due to self-selective emigration. The population of the neighborhood, therefore, is gradually becoming older and the permanent residents are mature adults.

66 Interview with Menachem Sadinsky, Director Beit Pomerantz Community Center, Jerusalem, August 15, 1973.
and their elderly parents who immigrated with them, all living in the same flat. Those few families that purchase a flat for their children one flight above or below them actually live in a "clan" structure with four generations in one household - grandparents, parents with their children, one married son, his wife and their babies.

**Educational and Occupational Levels**

There are some young adults who, after military service, have not yet married and are still living in the parental home. While they constitute some of the work force, the economically active population consists principally of the older adults. The children go to elementary school to age 14, while some, including girls, continue for two years beyond in vocational studies. Others who neither study nor work find their outlet in deviant behaviors, such as delinquency and prostitution. Children in school and those serving in the army constitute an additional burden on the family budget, requiring pocket money and clothing. There are many youths of working age, therefore, but the father remains the principle source of income.

There are families where the father is ill and the wife works. This often undermines the value system and authority in the family. Furthermore, there are other families where neither of the parents work and must exist on welfare allotments and relief. The percentage of families where both parents work is negligible.
Educational level is difficult to determine in an ethnically varied population, but generally, a picture of low educational standards and achievement emerges. According to Mr. Sadinsky, surveys made in the quarter show a large gap between level of formal education in Nahla'ot and the national average. Low educational level prevents the residents from making progress and integrating in the stream of modern life.\textsuperscript{67}

There is a positive correlation between educational level and occupation with job skills rising as education rises. The proportion of those engaged in service industries, construction and trades, drivers and peddlers, is much higher in Nahla'ot than those employed in technical and manufacturing occupations. Few of the residents, however, are unemployed.

\textbf{Income}

The average family income of IL 500-800 per month derives from either wages or direct social welfare payments. The proportion of wage income is low due to a low ratio of breadwinners to family members. The origin of the breadwinner has a considerable bearing on income level. Income of Asian and African immigrants is lowest in the quarter, while that of native-born Israelis is the highest. As Afro-

\textsuperscript{67}Ibid.
Asian residents are a high percentage of the district's population, there is a concentration of low-income families in Nahla'ot.

The existing welfare methods are of little impact in raising the income levels of deprived families. A chief reason is the social stigma attached to the welfare supported population and its effect on the family's chances for improving their situation. Some families, therefore, avoid using welfare services for which they are eligible. The structure of the welfare support system, which does not allow outside employment, also has a deleterious effect upon lower income families. Where the head of a household may want to work in order to supplement direct social welfare payments, but where wage-income is inadequate to totally forego welfare payments, the family will opt for the higher income available through welfare. These families are most vulnerable to fluctuations in economic conditions, a frequent occurrence in Israel.

Life-Pattern of a Family in Nahla'ot

When one visits a family in Nahla'ot, the implications of income, education, family size and housing become clear. Entering the family dwelling one finds no hall but steps directly into a living-room which doubles as a bedroom. There are a number of open shelves with a small collection of

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68 A teacher/social worker from the Beit Pomerantz Community Center accompanied me on a visit to a family in Nahla'ot, acting as interpreter and adding some of the descriptive material.
china, utensils and glassware. Some prayer books are also visible. In the center of the room is a wooden table with five chairs. The tabletop is strewn with schoolbooks and writing materials. In a corner of this central room is a small kitchen containing a sink, cupboards, and a small electric refrigerator.

There is an inner room which is smaller and contains the parents' double bed, two folding beds for the children, and a clothes cupboard. The toilet and shower is beside a stone wall in a cubicle separating two apartments. These are shared with another family. The showerhead is open to the floor and one must light a kerosene burner which heats a small holding tank for hot water. In spite of a generally overcrowded appearance, the apartment seemed very clean.

In this two room apartment lived a family of ten—husband, wife, six unmarried children, and two aged parents. The two youngest children sleep in the parents' bedroom. The other four sleep with the grandparents in the living-room. The father earns IL500 per month and the mother works part-time as a domestic. While they are at work the children play in the streets without supervision, although the grandparents do provide supervision in the home. The parents are not concerned if the older children do not attend school. Often they are indifferent, or they prefer them to help with the housework and care for the younger children. It becomes clear that the children are deprived of a basic education because of frequent absences.
While poor attendance contributes to the lack of success at school, noise and overcrowding at home prevent those who do attend from adequately preparing their lessons or studying. Most of Nahla'ot's children drop out of school at age fourteen. Those who do go on to high school (usually a vocational one) are most often low achievers. Many of these drop out of high school so that they can contribute to the family income.

Another element which contributes to the educational failure of Nahla'ot's (and other Oriental) children was explained by Dr. Avner Shaki, former Deputy Minister of Education. The Israeli schools have a uniform curriculum drawn up by the Ministry of Education, whose members are of east European origin. The curriculum is structured by a value system originating in eastern Europe. This does not coincide with the scale of values of sixty percent of Israel's population, which is of Mediterranean origin. Educational values that originate in the Middle East were pushed aside in the Israeli school curriculum as in other aspects of Israeli life.

Educational theory holds that a child learns more effectively when the curriculum is geared to his environment and experience. The learning process becomes one of drill and memorization if content and standards appear meaningless and unrelated to the child's experience. The failure to provide Sephardic and Oriental music, literature, folklore
or religious philosophy deprives these children of positive and meaningful self-identity and self-pride. The monolithic centralist approach can only result in the ultimate obliteration of the ethnic identity of those who cannot resist effectively. It is not surprising that children who have a poor image of themselves and their cultural background fail in school.

Of those who drop out of school, some enter the labor market for long-term but unskilled, low-paying jobs. Others find casual, low status work which often leads to eventual delinquency. Youth clubs and movements do not attract these children, who are filled with resentment, frustration, and a sense of being discriminated against. Even the Israel Defense Forces reject many youths because of delinquency, lack of education and adjustment problems. Those who do make progress in the armed forces, through acquired technical and occupational skills, find their problems more acute upon discharge. They find it impossible to return to their old milieu and they do not fit into a new social framework outside the quarter.69

Overcrowding makes it difficult to maintain proper standards of hygiene in Nahla'ot. The chances of illness, mental or physical, are high. Infections are spread more

readily under these conditions. From an early age the normal mental development of children may be impeded and normal motor and intellectual development can be delayed or prevented altogether.

It is also difficult for the parents to live a private conjugal life under these crowded conditions and it is not unusual for young children to witness their parents' sexual activity. Grandparents living with the family also suffer from chronic physical and mental illness and their economic problems are added to those of the family. Problems of loneliness and boredom, and the need for help in performing basic chores are common problems of the elderly, but they are aggravated by the difficult physical conditions in Nahla'ot.

The older people who came to Nahla'ot attempted to build a home in accordance with cultural and religious traditions. While these traditions have left some imprint, family life has since become much less rigid. On the one hand tradition preserves the family framework, but on the other hand it inhibits the development of the younger generation. For instance, the father might prohibit a daughter from attending school past the compulsory age of fourteen or from working outside the home. The younger generation is ambivalent with regard to tradition which, while still an obstacle in their path, exercises a powerful influence. In addition to living conditions, the ignorance and primitive
outlook of the adults hold back the younger generation, maintaining the family framework, but in an undesirable state of stagnation.

The younger generation is obviously an important concern in Nahla'ot households and the nagging feeling that their children are not keeping up with some other segments of society is common among the parents. As the mother of a household summed it up:

We aren't social cases, just average working people. But, somehow we haven't moved ahead with the country. Why? Because we are uneducated and without good jobs. That's why the children's education is our only hope. Our children should have the same opportunities as European children. Our most serious problem is youth, especially the delinquents and those who feel they don't belong anywhere. Many are bitter after being in the Army and some others don't serve at all. We should have the best schools with best teachers, so that our children can become part of Israel.

Ironically, as the social worker emphasized, this same mother, who is so anxious about education as a miraculous equalizing factor, so indulges her children that she unwittingly prevents them from forming sound work habits. Even small children watch television until 11:00 p.m. and do not get sufficient rest. When asked how her children could stay awake in school when they go to sleep so late, the mother replied, "Just because the children are sleepy in the morning, they should have the best of teachers to arouse their interests."

It is evident that Nahla'ot has an unsatisfactory
way of life. Material conditions are poor, presenting the prognosis of a hopeless future for its inhabitants. This is especially devastating for the young who feel that it is impossible to break out of the quarter's poverty stricken environment. Youth is torn between loyalty to the traditions of the past and the modern life style which offers possible satisfactions not provided by the old ways. This conflict is expressed by mental stress and, at times, delinquency and violence.

Community Leadership in Nahla'ot

While Nahlaot's residents may not have ready solutions to social problems, they certainly are not apathetic about their needs. There is a well defined leadership in the quarter which formed originally to secure improved housing, schools, cultural facilities, and community services. These leaders form a thin stratum of Nahla'ot society. Most of them are native born Israelis of Yemenite origin and are religiously observant Jews. They are in a better economic position than most other residents, having had a satisfactory education and decent jobs.

The leadership group could well have left Nahla'ot long ago. They chose to remain and involved themselves in local resistance to a government renewal program. These people have not left the quarter or cut themselves off from local activities. They work through the "Committee of Little Nahla'ot" which was formed in 1972. At that time, its work
was aimed at opposing a proposed government plan for rehabilitating the quarter. It has since expanded its role to receive complaints on such matters as schools and municipal services.

Nahla'ot was the first neighborhood in Jerusalem where residents formed a community action group to successfully oppose a government rehabilitation plan. The plan proposed by the government at that time was thought to be a rational, comprehensive approach to slum clearance; it involved evacuation of the population, building demolition, and construction of replacement high-rise apartments. Israeli planners seem to insist on high-rise solutions to slum clearance, although this approach has long been discredited in the United States and other Western countries. The citizen committee's opposition to the plan was based upon two considerations: (1) an unwillingness to give up assets in the quarter for what was felt to be inadequate compensation, and (2) a feeling that the area did not require restoration. In addition, community leaders feared that while demolition of derelict structures characteristically proceeds according to plan, their replacement with low-cost housing often does not. The Committee felt that Nahla'ot's residents could best be assisted by low or no-interest loans to rehabilitate their homes. In their opinion the evacuation of residents would not have been helpful and would have negatively impacted upon low-income families.
The Committee conducted an intensive and broad campaign against the renewal plan consisting of petitions, meetings with government officials, protest demonstrations, sit-ins, and lawsuits. The campaign was carried on for two years and in late 1975 the Government rescinded the renewal plan and decided to explore other alternatives. The Committee still remains quite active, is trusted by residents, and acts as an advocate on many issues.

At the same time as the "Little Nahla'ot Committee" was formed, the "Public Committee for Zichronot and Nahla'ot," headed by a member of the Jerusalem Municipal Council, convened to support the renewal plan on grounds that new houses would replace the demolished ones. Few of the members or supporters of this committee were home owners as was the case with the former committee. This Committee's influence is very great in Zichronot (the neighborhood directly bordering on Nahla'ot's north) but weaker in Nahla'ot. As changes occurred, the Zichronot group became active on the issue of education and it induced the Jerusalem municipality and Ministry of Education and Culture to integrate the schools of Nahla'ot with those outside. It conducts campaigns among the residents and urges parents to provide adequate study conditions for their children.

Each committee denies the other's right to represent the residents of the quarter. The Nahla'ot-Zichronot group regards the other as a clique of house-owners fighting for their petty interests, while the Little Nahla'ot Committee
sees the other as government pawns, dictated by political ambition. Conflicts often arise which relate to personal power struggles for local leadership. These may, from time to time, stir up the community and cause a great deal of excitement, but in fact do not impinge upon the deeper problems of the quarter's future development. Fighting is usually about positions of power and not about alternative development policies or other local concerns.

Social Structure

Life in Nahla'ot is organized around ethnic-clan associations which have political and economic influence in proportion to their size. Consequently, the Kurdish community has the greatest influence. Economic and social organization is also established on a clan basis, drawing on tradition as a guiding force. Social life revolves around twenty small synagogues organized by ethnic affiliation.

Ethnic solidarity in Nahla'ot contributes to the strength of the group and, in time of need, applies organized pressure to resolve a problem. In the past the veteran families were the wealthiest, which endowed them with leadership status among their groups. Today, for the third and fourth generation of Nahla'ot residents, familial wealth has diminished in importance as a base upon which social relations are built. Later generations now possess more political acumen and their sights are set more on municipal and
national trade unions and political organizations. Thus, ethnic solidarity within Nahla'ot has been weakening over time. Nevertheless, veteran residents are bound to the area by memories. Their sons, who also created their own special social pattern, are attached to the quarter in a way which takes into account neither poverty nor bad housing conditions. Thus, ethnic solidarity and special cultural patterns of the residents create a social framework to which the residents are attached.

Inter-generation conflicts remain in Nahla'ot, however. The young view political leadership within an organized council and committee framework. The elders, who maintain traditional cultural patterns, maintain belief in traditional, non-institutional leadership by heads of extended families. This generational conflict causes two problems. First of all, the leadership of the elders and clan leaders is basically particularistic and hinders the growth of a democratic way of life. Secondly, this leadership is usually conservative and does not answer the needs of groups in a modern society. As a result the social framework in Nahla'ot does not solve the economic and educational distress of the family.

Services and Institutions

Services provided to the residents in Nahla'ot are mostly public and include education, culture and entertainment, health, leisure, and general welfare services.
Educational services. Educational services consist of two municipal nurseries and a limited number of kindergartens. The shortage of kindergartens forces many parents to send their children outside the quarter. Some of the children go to local elementary schools, while others, as was mentioned in the general description, go to the Rehavia elementary school. In the Rehavia school, an attempt has been made to implement a plan to integrate children from Rehavia and Nahla'ot.

Up until 1970 the Israeli educational system was based upon local districts. The effect was that school systems became differentiated according to the surrounding ethnicity with wide disparities in school quality. In 1970, the Israeli Knesset voted to overhaul the school system, providing for six years of primary, three years of intermediate and three years of high school education. While the primary schools generally are neighborhood schools, the intermediate schools take in larger areas and necessitate integration, whether by bussing or some other means.

Eliezer Shmueli, Director-General of the Ministry of Education and Culture, explained that when Rehavia received an influx of children from Nahla'ot in 1972, the children soon made significant progress with the help of additional teachers. Unhappily, some parents from Rehavia were so upset by the integration effort that in that same year they filed a court suit challenging the right of the city to send
children to school outside of their neighborhood. It was anticipated, Mr. Shumueli noted, that it would be difficult to integrate people who, in certain ways, are not equal. Many parents in affluent neighborhoods do not want their children going to school with children whom they perceive to be of lower social and cultural capacity and of inferior intelligence.\(^7\) Ultimately, the principle of school integration was upheld in court. To promote cooperation between Rehavia and Nahla'ot's residents, however, the Municipality voluntarily developed a modified, scaled integration plan which approached integration gradually, grade-by-grade, until integration through high school would be achieved over a period of years.

Other educational changes, beside integration, have been instituted in Nahla'ot as well as other poor areas. Kindergartens and primary grades are open all day, from 8:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m., instead of half-days as in wealthier areas. There is special tutoring for those who require it. In addition, the school year is longer and lunches are provided. Part of a special program for Nahla'ot children educates them on an "activity method" basis whereby the children study in work groups with two teachers in the classroom, one the class teacher and the other working with weaker pupils.

\(^7\) Interview with Eliezer Shmueli, Director-General Ministry of Education and Culture, Hotel Reich, Jerusalem, August 15, 1973.
While eight years have passed since these reforms were instituted, adequate time has not elapsed to allow for conclusive evaluations. Mr. Shmueli did have some general observations at the time of the interview.

Not long ago Israel's education system had almost entirely neglected families and communities. So we had the problem of creating equal opportunities and not merely equality of treatment. This necessitated, in part, inter-ethnic integration between neighborhoods and integration between the native-born and more recent immigrants.

The communities Shmueli refers to are particularly disadvantaged ones, of Asian and African origin, as is the case with Nahla'ot. The generations of immigrant parents in these communities, he noted, have undergone an important change due to some of these educational reforms.

They have gone from apathy about their children's education to an aggressive interest in it ... Perhaps because they believe that education is the only chance their children have to break the social barrier. Contrary to the findings of such researchers as Christopher Jencks in the United States, education in Israel is the main tool for social mobility.71

Welfare services. Direct payments aside (refer to Table X, Chapter V), welfare services in Nahla'ot consist of a welfare bureau office, a mother and child care center and a Kupat Holim (Histadrut sick fund) clinic (see Chapter IV, "The Protectzia System").

71Ibid.
The services of the welfare bureau are aimed at problems of illness and disablement, families with a large number of children, marriage problems, unsatisfactory housing, and other problems. Relief takes the form of financial aid to cover the expenses of subsistence, rent, vocational training, and child-care. The mother and child care center helps mothers look after their children and also instructs them during pregnancy in prenatal care. The medical personnel at this facility and the Kupat Holim Clinic often serve unofficially as social workers in addition to their regular duties.

Recreational opportunities and community centers. The problem of relations between ethnic groups stems from two factors: (1) the differences in way of life, culture and tradition, which are very real and can only be overcome gradually, and (2) the socio-economic gap between Asian/African immigrants and Western ones. It is obvious that there is no magic solution to these problems, nor is there room for a policy aimed at "homogenizing" the different ethnic groups.

A policy which the Israeli government has developed to deal with some of the problems created by the above factors is a system of neighborhood and community centers, particularly in the more disadvantaged areas such as Nahla'ot. The function of these community centers falls in the following areas:
1. To bring together different social segments of neighborhood communities; to narrow the social gulfs separating different age, religious, educational, national, and income groups. These efforts bring Nahla'ot residents together with those of Rehavia and Kiryat Wolfson.

2. To engage in efforts to combat juvenile delinquency by providing alternative options in recreational, cultural and educational opportunities.

3. To supplement "in-school" education to foster higher levels of educational achievement, particularly among disadvantaged groups. These efforts include special after school tutorial programs to improve reading and study skills.

4. To provide adult education aimed not only at personal development but also parent education in creating the proper atmosphere for their children's educational development.

5. To encourage the appreciation of local and national cultures through mutual exchange programs. Cultural activity is seen as one bridge to the absorption and integration of the different groups and as a starting point for communal activity.72

Nahla'ot enjoys the benefit of two community centers, a small one in the heart of the neighborhood that serves mainly children and the larger Beit Pomerantz Community Center just outside Nahla'ot. The youth center in the neighborhood

72Sadinsky interview
has activities occurring from 4:00 - 11:00 p.m. Youth are offered a diversified program including sports, handicrafts, dance, films, trips, holiday parties and a summer day-camp. A social worker is employed full-time in the center and a part-time teacher gives supplementary lessons to children who have difficulty in school.

The Beit Pomerantz Center is located just northwest of Nahla'ot. It was founded by private donations from members of the Jewish community of Los Angeles and later supplemented by Jewish Agency funds. Its location purposely serves the residents of Nahla'ot, Kiryat Wolfson and Rehavia, although it is somewhat distant from the latter. The intent of the location is to provide a point of contact between children of the various ethnic groups as well as between religious and secular youth.

The Center provides extensive and varied activity such as sport and handicraft groups, workshops and drama groups. It also offers a library and swimming pool. According to the Center's Director, Mr. Sadinsky, of the 3,500 members registered, some fifty percent come from Nahla'ot, the greater part of whom attend the center frequently (three times per week or more). The young people of Nahla'ot (and in theory any other district) are given reductions in membership dues based upon family income. Special activities are organized for them, such as supplementary afternoon lessons and vocational training in wood and metal work etc., for those not working or in school.
A special educational project at Beit Pomerantz, as well as other centers around the country, is the use of volunteers, mostly college students, to help Nahla'ot high school students in their weak subjects. The municipally sponsored program seeks to at least limit, if not eliminate, the educational gap. Even those who did well in their local elementary schools often have trouble adjusting to the requirements of high school, because they missed so much that neither home nor school could provide. If they are not helped at the outset, they cannot keep up, and after a year or two they drop out of school.

The volunteers in this tutorial program work with two students each, usually meeting with them in their homes in order to extend some influence on the family. Sometimes the volunteers persuade parents to keep their children in school instead of sending them out to work. They also assist the families in many other ways, such as explaining the contents of official letters and what must be done about them. It is hoped that through this process families will learn to keep the house quiet during study period and will come to understand the conditions required for effective learning.

Another of the Beit Pomerantz Center's most valuable activities is the preventive family counseling service. Parents, usually mothers, come to see one of the social workers at the Center to talk about troubles they are experiencing with their children. The children, when they want to, are provided an opportunity to tell their side of the
story. When they are ready, parents and children may discuss their family problems at weekly meetings where parents gather to discuss family relationships.

According to Mr. Sadinsky, the preventive counseling service has proven to be quite successful and, in many cases, invaluable to families where traditional authoritarian patterns are giving way under the impact of new social forces. Youngsters in such families often rebel against seemingly arbitrary parental authority and break away before they are prepared to take care of themselves. The program at Beit Pomerantz tries to prevent young people from becoming delinquents.

Despite the varied activities offered by the two centers, many of the children and adults of the neighborhoods do not participate. Young people in particular, who are not in any formal framework, constitute the potential for delinquent activity. The youth of Nahla'ot have problems similar to those of other low-income, disadvantaged youth in the country. They drop out of school, have difficulty in obtaining fixed employment, and have problems of adjustment to military service.

While some progress has occurred in terms of inter-ethnic or inter-class integration at the Beit Pomerantz Center, it usually involves children rather than adults. In spite of numerous efforts, most residents of the higher-income Kiryat Wolfson and Rehavia simply do not want to
participate in activities at the Center. They avoid the adult and "inter-cultural" functions in particular. It is obviously quite difficult to change the mentality of people who do not want to mix. At the same time, many of the adult residents of Nahla'ot also fail to participate for the same reasons.

One other important reason for the lack of participation in community center activities are religious institutions. These consist of several synagogues and a number of yeshivot (theological seminaries). The synagogues are small, usually having one ethnic group as its congregants. These synagogues express the religious character of the quarter. While the synagogues are clearly centers of prayer, they also constitute a social center for a large number of the older residents. When the synagogue serves in such a capacity, it is common for these people to ignore the community center which may be viewed as a distant government project.

Summary and Conclusions

Nahla'ot is characteristic of distressed neighborhoods within large Israeli cities. Living side-by-side are residents of a low economic standing and those well-to-do and long established. Economic and social gaps between them widen as relations between the generations deteriorate. At the same time, institutions charged with improving social and physical problems are not equal to the task. Some pro-
progress has occurred in improving education. Hopefully, third and fourth generations will be able to free themselves from the distress of their parents and grandparents.

It is possible that Nahla'ot can be rehabilitated. The ethnic character of the area, however, must be respected and preserved. Only then will it be a pleasant place to live, with good services, and social and cultural integration. The quarter has great potential for change. There is hope that the gap between life patterns will diminish. With this end in view, integrated and coordinated action is required based upon the following conclusions:

1. Physical conditions, particularly those of housing, must be improved in order to alleviate the problems of families living in overcrowded conditions. The burden of young families living in high densities must be relieved by providing a greater number of structurally adequate dwellings.

2. The system of delivering social services must be made more effective.

3. Deviant behavior, especially among youth, must be uprooted by coordinated educational and law enforcement action.

4. New dialogue between veteran residents and newer immigrants should begin as a means to create a healthier social climate.
Regional Planning in Israel: Kiryat Gat and the Lachish Development Region

The Lachish Region is the result of a mid-1950's development plan which became the prototype of regional planning in Israel. The overcrowding of Israel's major cities, causing problems such as those of Nahla'ot, were already foreseen in the early 1950's by some Israeli planners. They attempted to develop a strategy of dispersing population when waves of immigration were at their peak.

An urban neighborhood, such as Nahla'ot, is characterized by a generally homogenous population, clinging to a culture and ethnic background. The inhabitants have not been able to integrate into the mainstream of Israeli economic, social and cultural life. Problems in Nahla'ot-type neighborhoods often result from the failure of planning to provide opportunities both for physical and personal development. The Lachish Region, with Kiryat Gat as its urban center, on the other hand, can be viewed as a planning effort which successfully intervened in the physical, social and economic development of the area. Included in this process was the provision of opportunities for the personal development of its residents, comprised of a large number of ethnic groups. These groups were able to retain and maintain their cultural heritages while mixing with other segments of Israeli society.

Physical Description

Lachish is a development region in southeast-central
Israel, comprising a 275 square mile area (see Figs. 4-6). The region includes three geographically distinct farming areas:

1. The western part, belonging to the coastal plain, contains mostly light soils suitable for citrus cultivation.

2. The central portion consists of heavier soils utilized for intensive field crops.

3. The eastern part belongs to the foothills of the Judean Mountains and is characterized by fruit orchards, tobacco, sheep pasture, and field crops.

Outpost settlements of Negbah and Gvar Am were established in the western part between 1939 and 1947. After 1948 a network of thirty-one moshavim and kibbutzim were established. Development in the central and eastern portions, however, was thwarted by an insufficient water supply. With construction of the Yarkon-Negev conduit in 1954, the Lachish Development Project was established as a regional planning scheme for agricultural and later industrial development.

Background

Immigrants arriving in Israel during the post-independence waves of immigration began to settle the Lachish area in 1955. The Ministry of Absorption placed a certain proportion of immigrants in rural areas. At that time, thought was not given to ethnic background in immigrant placement. The many ethnic groups who were placed together, therefore, encountered many cultural discrepancies which had to be reconciled. Many of these new immigrants, originating from back-
NORTH-EASTERN SUB-DISTRICT Suitable for intensive fruit tree cultivation (apples, deciduous fruits), carrots, almonds, figs, etc. Also grain crops and grazing. Here will be built farms of up to 40 dunams, of which 15–20 dunams will be devoted to fruit trees. Each farm to have additional 40 dunams of grazing land.

WESTERN DISTRICT In part suitable for oranges, to have orange farms or mixed farms consisting of up to 30 dunams per farm unit.

CENTRAL SUB-DISTRICT Conditions are suitable for irrigation. Farm units will consist of 40 irrigated dunams, to stress cultivation of industrial crops (sugar-beets, cotton, etc.).

EASTERN SUB-DISTRICT Conditions are suitable to dry farming and grazing. Border settlements, organized as kibbutzim, to be established.

Fig. 4. Land utilization in the Lachish Region

Fig. 5. Lachish Region in relation to central Israel

74 Israel, Ministry of Labour-Dept. of Surveys, Survey of Israel, 1977.
Fig. 6. Detail of Lachish Region

Avshalom Rokach, Israel Today-Regional Rural Development (Jerusalem: Israel Digest Publ., 1964), Appendix A.
ward environments, were suddenly required to learn new lifestyles.

Keeping in mind that Lachish was an agricultural settlement plan, passions and economics became enmeshed in the region's main problems which were:

1. How to reconcile the differences between veteran Israelis and new immigrants.

2. How to resolve cultural conflicts among various ethnic groups.

3. How to train immigrants to become farmers and workers capable of managing both their complex farm economy and their own regional affairs.

4. How to attract technicians and public service workers to the rural areas.

The problems faced by the Lachish Region in 1955 were solved in great measure by the nature of the agricultural settlements themselves. The original settlers of Lachish are currently veteran farmers of the region, a phenomenon inextricably linked to the growth of the State of Israel. From its inception, the structure of agricultural settlement in Israel has been based on the cooperative idea. This was a result of not only a desire for economic efficiency and intelligent organization of marketing and purchasing but, in many cases, the social and ideological propensities of the settlers.

The Lachish Region was a success because planners
recognized the importance of the Moshav, which became the basis of the Region's organization. In fact, between 1948 and 1972, 442 new villages were established in Israel, of which ninety-eight are kibbutzim and 291 are moshavim. Most of the new immigrants who have chosen agriculture as their livelihood, therefore, have shown a preference for the moshav, whereby families own and manage each farm, over the kibbutz, where property is owned by the commune (i.e. cooperative moshav versus collective kibbutz); (see Figs. 7-9).

The residents of moshavim are much more strictly organized than those in villages or towns. Such organization does require sacrifice of a certain amount of individual autonomy over land management and profits. This lack of independence, however, has transformed many Jews from North African countries, who never had contact with the soil, into real farmers using modern agricultural techniques. Immigrants who had neither formal education nor vocational training were often directed towards the moshavim of Lachish during the mid-1950s. Since that time these same immigrants have learned to calculate the profits of their agricultural labors. It may be that what is most important to them is the profit these territories yield rather than the Zionist ideology of exploitation of the soil. Even if the moshav may not be ideologically successful, it is economically.

The moshav concept in Lachish served particularly

76Israel, Facts-1975, p.61.
Fig. 7. Schematic detail of a kibbutz

Fig. 8. Schematic detail of a moshav shitufi. \(^{78}\)

\(^{78}\) Ibid.
Fig. 9. Schematic detail of a moshav ovdim\textsuperscript{79}

\textsuperscript{79}Ibid., p.16.
well to integrate diverse peoples into wider Israeli society. The Lachish plan sought to group people according to country of origin in the same moshav and even in a series of moshavim comprising a settlement area. People from these moshavim, however, have had to mix with other types of people when utilizing services available only at a series of rural and regional centers. The effect was maintenance of ancestral traditions while allowing for gradual modernization. These immigrants, who were often very close to the secular tradition they brought with them, learned to develop a cooperative structure for rural land development and to accept transformation in agricultural technique as new technology was introduced. The younger generation, enjoying the benefits of more advanced education, led their parents towards rational exploitation of the land, social integration and very strong Israelization.  

The Lachish Plan

As the success of the moshav settlements became apparent, both the settlers and the government agencies involved in settlement projects saw the utility of implementing the cooperative concept on a regional scale, integrating agriculture, industry and services within a defined

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area. Such a plan required the improvement of agricultural production and the laying of a basis for a different system of services. These changes required a new framework for organization of rural life on a regional scale.

The initial base for the restructuring of rural, moshav life became the rural center, which served to introduce educational facilities and higher order health, commercial and technological services. The functions of the rural center, however, had to reach beyond mere provision of services. As agriculture improved, less people were required as farmers and it became important to retain these people in the area. To achieve this, light industry of small economical units had to be introduced (e.g. packing and sorting operations).

In the search for a solution to the introduction of industry as a means of retaining population, the notion of a composite rural structure crystallized. It was comprised of agricultural, service and industrial personnel.

The scheme depicted in Fig. 10 aims at combining optimal exploitation of local natural features with the speedy absorption of a maximum number of immigrant settlers in productive employment. It provides for the establishment of clusters of four or five farming villages, each having forty to one-hundred families, grouped around rural centers. Whereas the villages have local services (elementary schools, groceries), the rural center offers higher
order services (middle schools, clinic, central market, etc.).

Fig. 10. Schematic detail of a composite rural structure

The rural center also serves as a meeting ground for immigrants from different countries, thereby furthering their mutual integration and distributing service costs over several hundred families. Each ethnic group, housed in their own settlement, has the opportunity to perpetuate its own traditions without needless friction and, at the same time, share a rural center with other groups. This arrangement has helped the settlers of each group to cement themselves together as a cooperative unit.
Fig. 11. Schematic map of a rural center in relation to adjacent moshavim.\(^{81}\)

\(^{81}\) Atlas of Israel, p. 17.
Fig. 12. Schematic map of a regional town in relation to its surrounding area and associated rural center.\textsuperscript{82}

\textsuperscript{82}Ibid., p.18.
The Lachish Region is a hierarchical arrangement of settlements which increase in size and complexity of economic function as one moves closer to the Region's center. In this hierarchy the rural centers and their adjacent villages, depicted in Fig. 11, are the basic economic unit. The rural centers are in turn linked to a rural-regional town (Fig. 12) which provides economic, social and cultural opportunities, including banking and secondary education. A region in the Lachish sense, therefore, consists of a network of composite rural structures (Fig. 10) ultimately linked to the Region's urban center of Kiryat Gat.

Kiryat Gat functions as the Lachish Region's highest order urban center. Therefore, it provides employment in regional administration, processing of the region's agricultural produce, and services. In 1954 Kiryat Gat was planned for a population goal of 7,500. The current population is 25,000 and the city's revised master plan calls for an 80,000 population by the year 2,000. Of the current population, fifty percent originate from Asian and African countries including a large Indian-Jewish community. Twenty-five percent are from Europe, South America and the U.S.S.R. and twenty-five percent are native-born Israelis.83

83 Interview with Havi Shlag, Senior Planner, Department of Rural Settlement and Municipal Planning, Office of the Mayor, City of Kiryat Gat, August 27, 1973.
The road network links villages to their rural centers and these in turn are linked to Kiryat Gat. The location of Kiryat Gat was planned to achieve regional centrality with its site at a crossroads of regional traffic, thus facilitating its development as a center of regional economic activity.

**Economic Development**

The origin of Kiryat Gat was initially to provide higher order services requiring a larger minimum population threshold than rural towns could provide. Among these services were a hospital, secondary school, police and certain professionals such as physicians and lawyers. It was not long before an economy based upon more than services was felt important to the future development of both Kiryat Gat and the Lachish Region.

The development of the city's economy began not only with services rendered to the Lachish Region's rural settlements but also with industries based on farming products. The enterprises first to become operative included grain storage and processing, cotton gins, a sugar refinery, and various produce sorting and grading plants. Before long other industry came to Kiryat Gat, not all directly connected with agriculture. A cotton spinning mill, three cotton weaving mills, a wool processing plant, three knitwear factories, a clothing factory, a diamond cutting plant, and an electronic equipment plant, are just a few.
One of the main factors in this acceleration of growth in Kiryat Gat was the water piped to the area and its surrounding region, which has tripled the irrigated area from the time of the Lachish Project's inception. Of the nearly 500,000 dunams\textsuperscript{84} cultivated today, 150,000 are under irrigation.\textsuperscript{85} The development of newly established settlements allowed greater functional specialization in the area so that, for example, dairy farms in the eastern district could rely on the field-crop farms in the center district for many of their supplies. Development of the entire region was boosted in this fashion.

Ashkelon, on the west coast, is the largest city in the Lachish Region. It has also profited greatly from the Lachish Project, although not by original design. Whereas Kiryat Gat was planned from the start as a center for the surrounding agricultural region, Ashkelon depends on industry focused upon its port facilities and tourism. Mostly for reasons of convenience, villages in the western coastal belt prefer to use the services of Ashkelon rather than those of Kiryat Gat. Not all services, however, are available in Ashkelon. Lachish farmers, regardless of proximity to Ashkelon, require agricultural processing plants, warehousing, and marketing facilities, available only in Kiryat Gat. Farmers must also look to Kiryat Gat's

\textsuperscript{84}one dunam equals one-quarter acre.

\textsuperscript{85}Shlagi interview.
Fig. 13. General plan of Kiryat Gat

86 Israel, Ministry of Labour, Dept. of Surveys, Kiryat Gat-1975.
government offices for technical guidance in connection with farm planning and development loans.

**Physical Structure of Kiryat Gat**

Kiryat Gat developed in stages and it was felt important to ensure that industrial and economic services be physically separate from other amenities Kiryat Gat was to provide. The general layout of Kiryat Gat (Fig. 13) consists of three residential areas, a central block housing administrative offices and a cultural center (civic plaza), a commercial district, scattered areas reserved for parks and playgrounds, and an industrial belt near the railway line.

The industrial area, to the southeast of the city, was left open to one side to allow room for growth to the south and southwest. Since its inception, the industrial area was twice enlarged to make room for new enterprises, while the commercial region in the center was replanned and a municipal park designed. At the same time, the local labor demand also made it necessary to attract additional population by stepping up housing construction.

Employment in Kiryat Gat is fifty percent industrial, thirty percent services and the remainder in agriculture, housing and miscellaneous related occupations. Those in industrial occupations work in plants in the industrial belt which occupies 300 acres. Each industrial facility is responsible for providing certain services for its workers.

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87 Shlagi interview.
including transportation to and from the plant and day-care centers for female employees.

From the beginning, a modest commercial center was built, principally for the use of the villagers. As the industrial district grew, the commercial district has undergone vast expansion, with many more shops, a hotel and several cinemas. District offices of the various Ministries, local government offices, the office of the Lachish Regional Authority, and branch banks were opened in Kiryat Gat to serve the entire region. Educational services have gradually been built up to include, at present, nine primary schools and two secondary schools. Two more post-primary vocational schools are planned as well as adult education facilities.

**Housing and Neighborhood Design in Kiryat Gat**

Neighborhood structure in Kiryat Gat is similar to the composite rural structure of the Lachish Region in general. Each small neighborhood has its center equipped with a grocery store and other small-scale facilities which provide for daily basic necessities. At the same time, neighborhood centers are not allowed to develop to the point of competition with the large commercial-cultural district in the center of town. This serves to foster the interaction of ethnic groups from the neighborhoods. The town center, by providing a social, cultural and commercial milieu, has developed a broader outlook among Kiryat Gat's
residents, emphasizing their belonging to a city as a whole rather than the confinement of the neighborhood alone. This confinement was experienced by many of Kiryat Gat's residents in their countries of origin.

Several types of standard housing were planned and built in Kiryat Gat, ranging from two to five rooms. As of 1973, 12,200 housing units had been built and 1,000 were under construction. Many of the units are low-rise semi-detached and extensible, allowing the owner to enlarge the living space as the standard of living rises.

As is the case in most of Israel, residents of Kiryat Gat live in cooperative housing managed by tenant committees. While there is more architectural and size variety in Kiryat Gat's housing than in many other Israeli cities, it is nevertheless based upon a characteristic Israeli institution - the neighborhood unit of near identical, cooperatively owned apartments known as the shikun. The shikun is a planned housing development, often built as a housing estate for people who already know each other, which may be owned by specific ethnic groups, professions, or political party members. In Kiryat Gat shikunim are based upon ethnic ties. Thus, a large part of the population lives within the confines of a particular ethnic group and usually speaking the same mother tongue. Because the city is so small, it is still much easier to know "practically everybody in town" than it would be in a larger city.
In a residential neighborhood the most restrictive factor affecting way of life is population density. Ideally, a city should offer a range of residential options with respect to densities. Generally, neighborhoods are physically distinct from each other based upon their particular land use arrangement. In order to foster social cohesion and, thereby a sense of community belonging, residential neighborhoods in Kiryat Gat were established with assumed optimal building densities in mind. Such a density ought to avoid, on the one hand, sparsely built areas whereby large distances between residential districts would tend to create architectural and social voids. On the other hand, an overly dense environment which threatens the individual and intrudes upon privacy is also undesirable.

During Israel's early years, the ruling architectural style in development towns was low building density. In addition to social disadvantages, this style created economic burdens of land wastage and increased expenditures for municipal services per capita.88 Planners in Kiryat Gat, contrary to common practice at the time of its establishment, favored greater building density as a means to create a more urban way of life. Thus, economic problems resulting from a policy of sparse building have been alleviated.

Social relationships also have been strengthened because the neighborhood in Kiryat Gat was viewed as an instrument for social integration. The composition of population was planned with homogenous groups living together closely, yet still part of a larger heterogenous community. All people would have opportunities to meet, share common interests and develop neighborly relations.

Urban development in Kiryat Gat, therefore, is largely the product of communal organization, within which the residential neighborhood is seen as a subsystem of the larger urban settlement. Residential neighborhoods, therefore, were physically structured so as to enhance the pursuit of city-wide communal activities. Just as there is a hierarchy of villages and towns there is a hierarchy of residential neighborhoods.

There are, however, always caveats in the implementation of any development plan. For Kiryat Gat it centers on the neighborhood.

The problem of the status of the neighborhood in development towns has been a controversial one. On the one hand, there are planners who believe in the concept of a town without neighborhoods (among others, those who advocate linear planning). On the other hand, there are planners who emphasize the clear need for neighborhoods . . . both extremes should be avoided. The neighborhood unit, in which all of the inhabitants know one another, can constitute an important factor in the social and psychological

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89 Shlagi interview
integration of immigrants in the cohesive Israeli society. One must, however, avoid over-emphasis on the neighborhood, since this might lead to particularism, exaggerated fragmentation and over-seclusion of the population of the neighborhood. A small-town mentality, hostile to the growth of a large urban society, could develop in the town as a result.90

The Future of Kiryat Gat and the Lachish Region

Although Kiryat Gat has outgrown the limits set in the original plan, its economic basis is still the agricultural region that surrounds it, with its numerous villages and farming families. All the services and amenities which the rural centers cannot provide are supplied by Kiryat Gat and, therefore, a large part of the income of the city's business enterprises are derived from this farming population. Conversely, many of Kiryat Gat's inhabitants find seasonal employment in the farming villages at harvest time. The city's growth and progress, therefore, has been the result of the Region's agricultural output and the farmer's utilization of its urban facilities.

The regional structures of the larger Lachish District has enabled individual settlements in a particular area to pool resources. Central economic and consumer services were cooperatively established to the advantage of all residents. The cooperative experience has meant the institution of, for example, cultural activities, tractor stations,

and product processing plants, as well as the employment of high-level technicians to serve the Region. Due to cooperative production, profits of enterprises have remained in the hands of these rural communities. In a more conventional economic arrangement, however, the benefits of agricultural production and processing would have been siphoned off to external urban centers.

The educational network in the Lachish Region is based upon equal opportunity and uniform curriculum. The impetus which established the school system stemmed from the settlers wish to educate their children within a rural setting while still meeting urban educational standards. The result has been a minimizing of the cultural and educational gaps between rural and urban sectors. In addition, by dispersing population, the Lachish notion of regional planning has provided an alternative to the dilemma of urban sprawl.

Retention of rural population

Regional settlement in Lachish has, so far, proven a success in yet another direction. It has played an important role in preventing the drift of population from rural areas to the town and city. One factor which usually encourages such migration is the gap in standards of living between rural and urban areas. This phenomenon is common in countries where technology and industrialization are moving rapidly ahead, where industrial expansion brings
TABLE XV

Characteristic Development Stages of the Family Farm

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Farm Characteristics</th>
<th>Subsistence Farming</th>
<th>Mixed Farming</th>
<th>Specialized Farming</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Composition of branches:</td>
<td>Basic foods</td>
<td>Varied products</td>
<td>Key crops</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purpose of production:</td>
<td>Own consumption</td>
<td>Own consumption plus marketing</td>
<td>Marketing only</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income:</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ratio of income to output:</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work schedule:</td>
<td>Seasonal</td>
<td>Balanced</td>
<td>Seasonal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labor/Capital ratio:</td>
<td>Hidden unemployment</td>
<td>Primarily labor</td>
<td>Primarily capital</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dependence on supplementary industry:</td>
<td>Slight</td>
<td>Partial</td>
<td>Complete</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

economic prosperity and a rising standard of living, and where manpower demands siphon rural migrants into urban areas.

In Israel, population movement from rural to urban areas has not been as marked as in some other countries. With agricultural and rural development there has been, in fact, some migration from the cities to rural areas, partly as a result of significant government economic incentives. This situation, however, is changing and recently the problem of absorbing surplus manpower has arisen in Lachish.

There are several reasons why a surplus of manpower may be expected in Lachish. The farm units are constructed so as to sustain one family each. As the children of the family form their own households, they often lack non-agricultural sources of livelihood. As a rule, only one son can take over the parental farm, and even that is not possible if the father has younger children and is physically capable of running the farm.

As the moshavim in the Lachish Region have gone from subsistence to specialized farming (Table XV), there is hope that more non-agricultural branches of industry will be expanded and created to cope with a growing labor force. The pressure for industrial expansion arises not only to provide non-agricultural pursuits for the second and third generation in the Region, but also due to the difficulty of increasing agricultural production much further. Fortunately, the impact of an outmigration has yet to be seriously felt
in Lachish. Indeed, pressure has been exerted on the settlement authorities by young farmers and married couples to find a means of settling them near their parents and kin, even if they must engage in non-agricultural occupations.

The process of rural-to-urban migration, while accepted universally as a natural phenomenon in "modernizing" societies, is not in line with the rural-regional structure as it exists in Lachish. A sizeable portion of the Region is inhabited by Asian/African immigrants who still adhere to a traditional patriarchal social structure, even in the second and third generations. There is a strong inclination among these rural inhabitants not to leave the area, but rather to find a way of remaining, whether it be through a farming livelihood or otherwise.

The inclination to remain in Lachish has led to the establishment of development companies which also engage in industry. At first, the main endeavors in Kiryat Gat were industries connected with agriculture and its development, including those which supply agriculture with inputs purchased outside and those based on the processing of raw materials provided by agriculture. Today, Kiryat Gat is experiencing the development of companies which have gone into neutral industries as well, not connected with farming and with the main goal being to create non-agricultural employment.\[92\]

\[92\]Shlagi interview.
The experience of Kiryat Gat and The Lachish Region points to the importance of a flexible approach to regional development, which is capable of recurrent adaptation to changes in the structure and organization of the rural communities on which the region is based. The Lachish program has responded to each of the development stages in Table XV according to changing production needs. The physical and organizational framework of the Region has changed with shifts in the character and production level of the moshavim, which comes as a result of improving technological conditions and population growth.
CHAPTER VII

PERSPECTIVES AND CONCLUSIONS

The nature of early Jewish immigration to Israel created the character of the modern state. Israel today is struggling with the twin problems of culture and community along several dimensions, one of which concerns country-of-origin communities. Israel is a composite of distinct communities, each sharing a common ancestry and cultural heritage. For most of Israel's modern history, the perpetuation of such communities was discouraged because they conflicted with the Zionist goal of creating a new Jewish unity which would be impeded by cultural pluralism. Cultural conflicts arose, in great part due to disagreements over whose values would form the focus for a new Jewish identity.

Zionist pioneers from Russia and Poland, possessing a socialist orientation, represented the driving political force and pioneering efforts of modern-day Zionism. They have, therefore, dictated the patterns of cultural, political, social and economic organization that have formed the new state since the 1920's. These twentieth century pioneers obfuscated the importance of earlier waves of immigration, mostly Sephardi, which began as early as the fifteenth cen-
tury, long before Zionism as a political movement had any meaning. Sephardim, who had long established their settlements in Jerusalem, Jaffa, Safed and Hebron, were not oriented towards rural development or collective economic activity. Though they were long the established majority in Jewish Palestine, they lost their dominant status after World War I. Sephardim were replaced by Zionist elements of East European origin, who placed new emphasis upon cooperative land settlement rather than urban development. Thus, the ideologies of modern day Zionists were new and aggressive; they became the basis for shaping Jewish life in the land.

By the time Israel was established in 1948, the organized and dominant community was virtually an extension of East European communities. After statehood Sephardic and Oriental Jews began coming to Israel in large numbers and within a short time were equal to the European population. While European immigrants were easily absorbed into a culture that was predominantly theirs, the Sephardim and Orientals had to adapt to a strange culture presented to them as the only authentic modern and Jewish culture. Before long Oriental and Sephardi Jews became the numerical majority, due to a higher birthrate, while remaining a cultural minority. Immigrants from outside the Yiddish speaking world of the Israeli establishment were labelled "backward", even though many Sephardic and Oriental Jews originated from highly developed societies. The veteran Ashkenazim, therefore,
sought to "civilize" their Sephardic brethren by bringing them into East European Jewish culture, in the guise of Western civilization. In the process, the indigenous culture brought by the Sephardim and other non-Europeans was undermined. As a result, these populations lost not only their self-respect but also the respect of their children, who thought they had brought nothing of real value to contribute to the State. This notion has been perpetuated by the Israeli educational system, which in a number of ways taught all children that Ashkenazi culture, as filtered through the Zionist movement, is Israeli culture.

While the development of Israeli society and the communal tensions which were created along the way may hold special sociological interest, the impact of this social development has created difficult problems from a planning perspective. The end result (until today) of Israel's social development was not only the creation of economic gaps between Sephardim and Ashkenazim but also a cultural disruption which may be even more severe.

Both economic and cultural disruptions in Israel have serious consequences for intercommunity relations because they are so closely linked with ethnicity. Economic gaps between communities have, in large part, resulted from a national effort to achieve rapid economic growth. Such an effort necessitated the provision of incentives for those engaged in needed enterprises and possessing certain skills.
Differential pay rates in favor of needed skills obviously resulted in wage inequalities. Policies aimed at providing incentives to encourage immigration of needed occupations to Israel were intended to raise the standard of living of all sectors of the population through long-term development of the national economy. The short-term effect, however, was to increase income differentials to the disadvantage of Sephardic and Oriental populations.

In any society there exist higher and lower income groups with economic and social polarization developing between them. This polarization has more serious implications in Israel, however, because socio-economic status differences are so directly linked with ethnic origin. The denigration of cultural and economic capabilities of Sephardic and Oriental Jewish communities in Israel did not cause the destruction of the overt or manifest dimensions of community life and did not lead to the disappearance of these communities. Rather, these communities have persisted in a deculturated and economically deficient form, frequently exhibiting a great deal of hostility towards those whom they see as having deprived them. In Israel, therefore, the process of assimilation is still incomplete and these communities will continue to represent basic elements in the compound of Israeli society.
Israel's Social Development-Implications for Planning

Given the nature of Israel's social development and structure, an overriding question emerges as to the nature of future planning in Israel. In addition, one may ask what are the lessons of Nahla'ot and Lachish in terms of their links with both the economic and cultural dimensions of communal life in Israel.

In general, Nahla'ot is an example of a community in which both the economic and cultural dimensions of communal conflict have been perpetuated. No example better illustrates this condition than the educational system. While the effort to integrate the school which serves both Nahla'ot and Rehavia has generally been successful in achieving a physical mix of different ethnic groups, children from Nahla'ot are alienated from the educational system due to the structure of the Israeli educational curriculum. In this connection it should be noted that, as in most modern industrial countries, Israel's educational system represents the norms and values of the middle class. In Israel these values are practically identical with the European population whereas most of the disadvantaged youth are of Asian-African origin. Consequently, the child begins his education by exposure to a foreign value system and a gap develops between expectation and achievement. The child from a slum area, such as Nahla'ot, finds himself at a disadvantage when entering the school system and the chances of pupil alienation from school
are greater. Dropping out of school naturally leads to later problems in securing employment and in adapting to the structure and responsibility which employment involves. From this point it is only a short step to social deviance and an inability to enter normal economic life.

While the problem of Israel's educational system remains a difficult one it may be outside the realm of the planner to implement change in this area. The efforts of the planner in Israel, however, can go a long way in alleviating the cultural dimension of communal conflict in Israeli urban environments. The source of a great deal of communal conflict in Israel stems from the lack of social interaction between different ethnic groups in its society. This fact is particularly striking in Nahla'ot, which is characterized by communal insularity, even though Rehavia and Kiryat Wolfson border upon it. How then can the planner direct efforts towards providing opportunities for residents of Nahla'ot-type neighborhoods to participate in social, cultural, and economic life outside its immediate environs?

Government participation in the planning process is a critical factor in accomplishing a broad range of social and human goals, including the supply of low and moderate-income housing, to provide for optimum use of space and recreation areas, and to stimulate the economic and social development of disadvantaged neighborhoods. While the motivations of planners in Israel may be well-intended, two traditional approaches have dominated: (1) local imposition
of plans from the "top-down", and (2) that physical rehabilitation alone results in the improvement of social conditions. In Nahla'ot and elsewhere planners have felt that improving the physical environment and forcing people to physically mix would somehow generate social cohesion and community between differing ethnic and social groups. If the experience of Nahla'ot and Rahavia illustrates anything, it is that social interaction is difficult to foster across differing population groups. As seen in Nahla'ot and Rehavia there is an extreme reluctance of different populaces to mix. Even within Nahla'ot there exists a reluctance by many of its residents to extend their realm of social interaction marginally, such as crossing outside the neighborhood boundary to participate in activities at the Beit Pomerantz Community Center.

The Lachish Experience-Implications for Urban Israel

The experience of the Lachish Region and Kiryat Gat in particular, while rooted in a rural framework, does have application to a more common urban context. The Lachish Plan, unlike the experience in Nahla'ot, has been a directed attempt to reverse the economic and cultural dimensions of communal conflict in Israel. It aims to provide more satisfying physical, social, and economic environments for its residents. By contrast, planning in Israel's urban neighborhoods has stressed the development of physical environments to the neglect of social and economic ones.
Economic Development of the Lachish Region

It would be misguided to convey a sense of utopian existence for the Lachish Region's inhabitants based upon a grand social experiment. Rather, some measure of social harmony which exists in the Region and in Kiryat Gat has resulted more from the Region's economic success than social design. The goals of the Lachish Development Plan were of a spatial, economic, and social nature. Achievement of these goals was intended to serve as a model for incorporating a region with development potential within a national system of decentralized economic regions. It was seen as a method of counteracting urban agglomeration, populating vacant regions, tapping resource potentials, settling large numbers of immigrants who would otherwise create an imbalanced population distribution, and integrating diverse social elements.

The success of the Lachish Plan and Kiryat Gat depended upon those economic opportunities it could provide to potential residents of the area. While new immigrants could, in a sense, be forced to live in a region, they could not be persuaded to remain without available economic opportunities. Similarly, it would not have been possible to attract established and educated middle-class Israelis to Lachish without economic opportunities and incentives. The social success of Lachish relied on the creation of economic opportunities which, in turn, depended upon Lachish's situation in a national urban hierarchy of settlements.
The higher Lachish ranked in Israel's regional hierarchy the greater its draw upon population outside the Region, who responded to opportunities for employment and its rewards and the provision of local services for consumption.

The development of the Lachish Region with Kiryat Gat as its urban center has been successful in attracting and subsequently increasing its population. It has been a social success because it has been successful economically, providing a standard of living which promotes the interaction of diverse ethnic groups who inhabit the area. Thus, a large measure of the Region's economic success may perhaps be due to its close adherence to the principles of central place theory, which guided the development of Lachish's economy and society since its inception in 1954.

Christaller's Central Place Theory maintains that a certain amount of productive land supports an urban center. The center exists, in turn, because essential services must be performed for the surrounding land. This theoretical framework can be most easily applied to rural, thinly settled areas such as Lachish in its earlier days. Central place theory envisions a system consisting of "hamlets which perform a few simple functions such as limited shopping (Lachish's rural centers), to larger towns which serve

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as market and service centers for a small contiguous area comprised of several hamlets (Lachish's rural towns), up to a centrally located large city (Kiryat Gat) with a large tributary area composed of a network of hamlets and smaller towns, which serves to provide more complex services such as wholesaling, large-scale banking, specialized retailing and the like.\(^94\).

Lachish is not a self-contained community and, as one would expect, various forms of interaction between the Region and other parts of Israel occur. Israel, being a small country, has larger urban centers in relatively close proximity to Lachish. Its residents, therefore, frequently travel to Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, Ashkelon, Beersheba and elsewhere for higher order economic and cultural services. Nevertheless, as an independent economic region, Lachish conforms fairly closely to central place theory. The impact of central place theory on Lachish has generally been to ensure the economic and subsequent social success of Lachish as a regional development scheme.

The Lachish Development Plan corresponds to two objectives of Israeli policy in connection with spatial organization. The first objective was to achieve a change in urban structure by facilitating a diffusion of hierarchi-

\(^94\)Ibid.
cally arranged smaller size population centers in undeveloped areas. The second objective was regional integration of a network of central place-type hierarchies:

Regional integration envisaged the new towns as service centers for the agricultural hinterland, enabling the agricultural population to get commercial services within their vicinity. The new towns had to fulfill an important economic role in the processing and marketing of agricultural products and in absorbing labor surpluses from the rural settlements. For the implementation of this objective, the size and location of a considerable number of new towns were determined according to the so-called central place theory, under which is established a full hierarchical structure. . . . New towns in the role of service centers were designated to increase the efficiency of the marketing and distribution system throughout the whole country.

. . . the new urban centers also serve as focuses of culture and entertainment, and as filters to reduce by absorption the flow of rural migrants to the big towns.95

Social Development of the Lachish Region

Lachish is more than a set of spatial and economic goals. There were social goals to the region as well. A hierarchical system of settlements was applied in the Lachish Region not only to stem rural-to-urban migration, as suggested by Shachar, but also to integrate diverse social elements within a singular framework. Lachish's economic success, however, was a precondition for social integration

to occur due to its catalytic role. Experience in Lachish indicates that when people of different cultural backgrounds interact with each other on an equally competitive economic footing they also relate to each other more as social equals. In comparison, relationships between Rehavia's residents and those of Nahla'ot did not achieve any measure of social equality because no economic parity exists between the residents of the two neighborhoods.

Physical as well as economic development also played a significant role in the social development of Lachish. A city such as Kiryat Gat has promoted the integration of diverse social elements in a physical way. A variety of building types placed around open malls and parks and interspersed with walkways, playgrounds and public spaces provide a psychological and architectural focus for promoting social integration of the different ethnic groups which reside there. Thus, the close proximity of opportunities for social interaction based upon an architecturally human scale was employed as a means of reforming rather than rejecting city life.

Planners in the early years of Kiryat Gat had a keen perception of the impact of physical development upon human behavior. While Kiryat Gat's planners provided opportunities for various ethnic groups to live within their own neighborhoods, they also created a physical environment of public places which helped these groups cope with the cul-
tural shock of interacting with others.

Final Comments

It is apparent from the case studies in Chapter VI that the twin goals of achieving a socially balanced community on the one hand and a high quality of urban life on the other are very difficult to achieve. In Kiryat Gat it was observed that the goal of a socially balanced community is attainable when the balance is supported by economic opportunity.

Kiryat Gat and the Lachish Region in general have developed, over a long period of time, a means for equalizing housing and employment opportunities, for bringing together population groups of different ethnic backgrounds, for creating a physical framework that encourages social interrelationships and integration, and a means for improving the quality of life through use of an efficient land-use pattern and attractively designed housing and public areas.

From the Lachish experience one could derive three social goals to guide Israel's future social development, whether applied to urban areas, new towns, or rural development regions:

1. Developing a higher and more uniform quality of housing and higher standards of living for those segments of Israeli society which do not currently possess either,

2. Integration of various ethnic groups within Israeli society, and
3. Closing economic and social gaps which exist due to time of arrival in Israel.

If there is one common thread which links Lachish, Nahla'ot and Israel it is the need to introduce improved ways of building communities of people. This recognizes that the individual is at the same time an independent unit, a member of an extended family, and a member of different arrays of groups, called communities, upon which a national community is built. In all these respects the individual needs opportunities to develop his human potential.

It is unfortunate that there is a tendency among Israeli planners to think of cities as physical structures with technological and economic bases manned by labor forces rather than as systems of social organization. As a result Sandberg notes that:

One of the striking anomalies of . . . Israel is that social planning is not very advanced. This is particularly interesting for, as a consequence of their socialist orientations and the creation of a broad complex of social welfare programs, it could well have been expected that meaningful social planning processes would have been developed. We find instead . . . that planning is geared to physical and economic concerns and less to social needs, particularly the problems of the poor and minorities.

Social planning as defined by Perloff is "an interrelated system that introduces socio-economic and human behavior considerations into the making of governmental and private group decisions."

The critical need is for the integration of physical, economic, and social planning at the national level, because social gains often depend on the use of the power of the national government. This can facilitate the establishment and ranking of social goals, the creation of programs for human resources development and problem solving, and the collection of data.
for systematic analyses of social indicators.\textsuperscript{96}

Sandberg's comments suggest certain conclusions as concerns Israeli planning efforts aimed at promoting future physical, social, and economic development. If planning for people is to be taken as a reality, then plans for the welfare of those people must be put at the forefront of the planning process. The various aspects of planning—plan making, physical design and development, and community development—should be considered as one interrelated process concentrated on the provisions of a healthy community life.

Israel's social development in the twentieth century found Sephardi and Ashkenazi Jews, more specifically the northeast European and the southeast Mediterranean Jew, pitted against one another for cultural dominance in the new State of Israel. The East European Jew emerged in a dominant role. In the Lachish experience provision of economic opportunities were a prerequisite in order for the cultural and social restoration of non-East European ethnic groups to occur. Thus this discussion has come full circle.

While economic opportunities are certainly not the only basis on which to diminish social inequalities in Israeli society, they are most important when seen as part of the wider opportunities that people need in order to

achieve their human development potential. If social integration is to be achieved in Israeli society the major planning thrust must be the provision of wider opportunities for low-income groups to more equally participate in Israel's economic life. Only through future efforts at closing gaps in economic opportunity can Israel succeed in closing gaps in social opportunity.
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AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL STATEMENT

Lawrence W. Gormezano was awarded his B.A. degree by Wayne State University with majors in political science and history. During his undergraduate studies he served as an accounting assistant at Sinai Hospital of Detroit and as Youth Director of Congregation Beth Shalom in Oak Park.

He served as a Public Health Advisor for the United States Public Health Service-Center For Disease Control from 1974 through 1976. Since 1976 he has served as Community Planning Associate for the Jewish Welfare Federation of Detroit having direct responsibilities in program development and evaluation, budget review and analysis, and working with social service delivery systems in the development of social welfare programs. In this capacity, he was recently selected to represent his organization at the International Conference of Jewish Communal Service in Jerusalem, Israel.

Mr. Gormezano is a member of the American Society of Planning Officials and the Association of Jewish Community Organization Personnel. He serves as Vice-President of the Sephardic Community of Detroit and is a member of the board of directors of the Jewish Historical Society of Michigan. He is married and resides in Southfield.