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Practice of Clinical Sociology

Clinical Sociology and Preventing Nuclear War

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ABSTRACT

This paper outlines major kinds of social science research, especially sociological, that have relevance for nuclear war prevention and that would be relevant to a variety of clients. Research that has been done as well as work that could be done to help prevent nuclear war are noted. The research topics are related to policy suggestions about lessening the risks of nuclear war. The emphasis is on research relevant to a wide range of US clients and who are not operating in a very short time frame.

Clinical sociological work relating to nuclear war, like any clinical work, is done with clients in mind. In the case of nuclear war, there are a great variety of possible clients. They include the American public, the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, congressional candidates, the Nuclear Freeze Movement, college students, the Soviet Institute for United States and Canadian Studies, and the United Nations Institute for Training and Research. We may be working for a client at the client's request or we may be self-appointed. We may be paid by one party to provide information and service to another party, as when foundations support an educational project.

In recent years the number of possible clients in this area has grown significantly. Universities have always been a possible sponsor, since they provide students with concerns about avoiding war and support for research. Recently, student interest in international affairs and in avoiding nuclear war has grown greatly. University centers on peace and conflict studies are growing, vis, the

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University of California. In addition, many foundations have expanded their programs in the areas of peace and national security, preventing nuclear war, and conflict resolution, e.g., the MacArthur and the Carnegie Foundations. State and national institutions working in this problem area are emerging, e.g., the US Institute of Peace. In some Western European countries, peace movement organizations and centers of peace conflict studies are mutually helpful; that is beginning in the US also. In addition, the traditional government agencies and think tanks continue to support policy-relevant research.

Clinical work in this area has some unique features, but it also shares many problems with other areas of clinical work. Certainly, the threat of a nuclear war involves a uniquely extended and complex interaction of factors. In the midst of this complexity, at least one issue is not problematic. Everyone agrees that nuclear war should be avoided. But this does not mean that value issues are irrelevant. In this area, as in others, value differences exist. Different means of avoiding nuclear war have different moral implications; people differ about the morality of paying particular costs and taking certain risks. I will not address those issues in this paper; mapping out research relevant to clinical work oriented to preventing nuclear war is enough of a task.

It is assumed in this paper that we lack sociological theory and established knowledge that can be directly applied by clinicians to prevent nuclear war. We need more and better relevant research and the development of better grounded theory. Obviously, action to avert a nuclear war cannot wait until all the evidence is in. We must act on the basis of what we know. In this paper the kinds of knowledge being gathered as well as the kinds of research which are particularly needed are outlined.

For research to have clinical application, it must have reference to factors and conditions which are modifiable by particular persons. Of course, what is and is not modifiable depends on the time frame being considered. What is and is not modifiable also depends on the power of the actor who is considering policy alternatives. What kind of research has clinical relevance, then, depends on who the client is.

The sociological approach can contribute in many ways to reducing the risk of nuclear war. Thus, theoretical work on the social construction of reality and the relationship between images of reality and social action has great pertinence. For example, the varying meanings assigned to such terms as "security," "defense," and "nationalism" can channel conduct in different directions (Stephenson, 1982). In addition, sociological work on the relationships between different social levels (e.g., interpersonal relations, small groups, large-scale organizations, and societies) can be the source of significant insights. Related to these areas is the theoretical work on crosscutting and overlapping conflicts and bonds (Cosser, 1956; Dahrendorf, 1959; Kriesberg, 1982).

Sociological research methods also have useful applications in studying

factors relating to nuclear war, for example, methods related to using large data sets. But in many ways the sociological research tradition has weaknesses in analyzing the risks of war. The policy interest in nuclear war is a clinical one. Policy makers are concerned with a particular event. How general processes interact to affect particular cases requires paying attention to the historically unique conditions, and we sociologists are only beginning to reflect on how that specification is to be done. Furthermore, in considering alternative policies to avert nuclear war, we are concerned with hypothetical phenomena. We sociologists are ill-prepared to examine hypothetical events. We must think about ways to reason about future possibilities, for example, using projections, analogies, and simulations.

To organize the discussion of research relevant to policies to reduce the risk of war, I will discuss the major explanations for the emergence and escalation of international conflicts into wars. Three kinds of explanations are often given. One explanation stresses domestic factors; a second emphasizes the interactions among national governments or other transnational actors; and the third stresses the global system within which governments and other transnational actors operate (Beer, 1981).

DOMESTIC FACTORS

That wars spring from internal sources of one or more societies is an old idea. Some countries are said to be inherently militaristic, aggressive, or expansionist. Less extremely stated, the dynamics of domestic organizations may impel governments to threaten or to attack others or to act in ways that appear threatening or harmful to people in other societies. Although attributes of countries have not been found to be highly related to wars, they make some contribution to the outbreak of war in conjunction with relational and systemic factors (Weede, 1984; Zinnes, 1980).

Four ways domestic factors contribute to escalating conflict and raising the risk of nuclear war deserve attention. First, popular identification with the nation-state and ethnocentric chauvinism may handicap responsiveness or even understanding of the interests of people in adversary countries (LeVine and Campbell, 1972; Smith, 1971).

Second, popular belief in the effectiveness and necessity of being tough and relying on nuclear weapons or other kinds of violence can interfere with taking conciliatory actions even when they are appropriate. For example, during the Cold War, some deescalating initiatives taken by Khrushchev were quickly dismissed. It is also possible that popular opposition to armed resistance makes a society appear weak and vulnerable, thus inviting aggression or even attack.

Third, leaders may tend to emphasize military power and confrontations with external adversaries (Sanders, 1983; Wolfe, 1979). They may be motivated

by expectations that this serves to mobilize support for many goals. But it may also contribute to an escalation dynamic in foreign relations. Conversely, leaders who are not resistant to external threats may lose office or invite external aggression and later war.

Finally, organizations that are charged with preparing for military defense may expand for internal reasons, unrelated to external adversaries. Other organizations or interest groups may support foreign policies which peoples in other countries experience as economically or ideologically threatening.

There is some research on how these aspects affect the likelihood of nuclear war. More is needed. There are also suggestions on how each can be changed to reduce the risk of nuclear war. But which ones are feasible and effective? Research and analysis can help us decide. Research that is clinically relevant for each of these aspects will be noted.

Chauvinism

It can be argued that reduction in popular chauvinism and exclusive national loyalties would encourage government leaders to be responsive to the concerns of their counterparts from other countries and to pursue less chauvinistic goals.

One way to reduce popular chauvinism and exclusive state loyalties might be to raise the salience of other identities and commitments. Research needs to be done on the extent to which persons and groups in the US, the USSR, and other countries have ethnic, occupational, ideological, and other transnational ties and identities. We also need research on the sources and consequences of such transnational ties and identities. For example, research might be based on interviews with persons in one or more countries who do and do not belong to international nongovernmental organizations (Evan, 1981). Research might also be based upon survey data relating transnational identities and foreign policy preferences. Such research could draw upon and contribute to our theories about system boundary maintenance, crosscutting ties, and relations among different levels of social organization (Grodzins, 1956). Theories about socialization and self-concepts are also relevant (Lambert and Kleinberg, 1967). For example, school instruction stressing nonviolence or military values significantly affects children's outlook on war (Tolley, 1973).

Popular Militance

Research on reducing popular support for toughness, militance, and reliance on nuclear weapons is pertinent to the second aspect of domestic factors. One way to lessen the risks of nuclear war is to reduce popular reliance on nuclear weapons for national defense. This might entail increasing support for reliance on con-

ventional military forces and even for using nonmilitary coercion and positive sanctions (Fischer, 1984; Sharp, 1973).

Research could help account for changing popular support for reliance on nuclear weapons and thus suggest how it could be reduced. Research could also assess how that reduction might contribute to lessening, or perhaps enhancing, the risks of nuclear war. The research needs to be historically and country specific and not limited to the US or to NATO members.

The major kind of research sociologists conduct in this area focuses on the nature, sources, and consequences of popular support for alternative means of defense. Support is usually assessed by analyzing surveys, electoral conduct, public statements, and literary products. A fundamental issue is the extent to which variations in such support arise from domestic sources or respond to the actions of adversaries. There is evidence that general shifts in such support are explicable to a significant degree in terms of domestic sources (Gamson and Modigliani, 1971; Kriesberg and Quader, 1984; Rosi, 1965).

A related issue is the degree to which popular or subelite views develop autonomously and significantly affect the conduct of holders of policymaking positions or conversely the extent to which policymaking elites control and direct the popular and subelite views. The evidence is mixed depending upon the policy matter (Hughes, 1978). At least on major, salient, and long-term matters, the public does not simply follow elite views (Barton, 1974–1975; Kriesberg et al., 1982; Lo, 1982).

A more difficult research issue is the effect of increased support for non-nuclear or nonmilitary means upon the likelihood of war and war escalation. For example, research could usefully be done about the possible counterproductivity of peace movements in the 1930s in the face of Fascism and in the late 1960s during the Vietnam War. Thus, it might be argued that those peace movements reduced the resolve and the appearance of resolve of their government officials and therefore contributed to the aggressiveness of adversary governments and hence to conflict escalation. On the other hand, it might be argued that such peace movements have limited conflict escalation or could have if they had been larger and allied with peace movements in adversary countries.

Leaders' Militance

The third domestic aspect related to the risk of nuclear war pertains to the leaders' own identification with their state or organization and their reliance on military means of struggle. Reducing the identification of the leaders with their governments (the "state is me" syndrome) could improve the accuracy of their perceptions of the adversaries and facilitate their responsiveness to the adversaries (Naroll et al., 1974). Suggestions for reducing identification with the state might

include expanding other identifications and career alternatives. Leading positions in global institutions or important domestic organizations conceivably could reduce overidentification with the state, at least in small countries. That possibility is worth studying.

High officials' reliance on military means for waging conflict might be reduced if other symbols of loyalty and patriotism were available for them to use to rally support. The alternatives developed in societies with minimal emphasis on the military (e.g., Costa Rica) might be studied. Alternative ways for government leaders to express their power might also be considered in such cases.

Organizational Imperatives

The fourth domestic area pertains to the dynamics of military defense related organizations which may expand independently of adversary conduct. But sometimes organizations stagnate and decline and we need to explain both directions of change (Kriesberg, 1984). Periods of reducing military expenditures might be compared to periods of expansion, e.g., Soviet reductions in the early years of Khrushchev's regime and increases in the early Brezhnev years. How coalitions are formed to support the development of "big ticket" military items is worthy of further investigation (Etzioni, 1984).

What suggestions are there to limit or reduce the growth of defense organizations and policies driven by a dynamic that is independent of an adversary's conduct? One suggestion has been the development of conversion plans and alternative work for those employed in defense industries; more analysis of communities where defense-related industries have been closed would be useful. Comparable information about the Soviet experience would be desirable.

INTERACTION FACTORS

Conflicts are social relations; hence, interactions among adversaries must play a major role in the escalation of a conflict into war, even nuclear war. Several problems in interaction can contribute to the deterioration of relations and the outbreak of war. One side may act so antagonistically as to provoke an escalatory response. It is also possible for one side to act in such a conciliatory fashion that the adversary's expectations and demands are raised, further escalating the conflict. Even when negotiations are attempted, they may break down or produce disappointing, hence, unstable agreements.

I will consider policy suggestions about ways to 1) interrupt escalation, 2) conduct negotiations, and 3) reach lasting agreements. In each area, I will discuss clinically relevant research topics.

Interrupting Escalation

Peace researchers and students of crises have many suggestions about interrupting escalation. For example, Osgood (1962) suggests utilizing unilateral initiatives as part of a clearly announced series of actions, a strategy he calls GRIT (Graduated and Reciprocated Initiatives in Tension-reduction).

Others emphasize a "tit for tat" strategy, reciprocating the adversary's moves (Axelrod, 1984). This means reciprocating positive and negative sanctions at the same level as the adversary. The differences between positive and negative sanctions has been elaborated by Baldwin (1971). Research on the effectiveness of different mixtures of positive and negative sanctions in initiating deescalating efforts is only beginning (Kriesberg, 1981).

The works of Sharp (1973) and Wehr (1979) emphasize how nonviolent strategies can limit escalation of conflicts. More attention to the applications of self-limiting means of struggle, even in international conflicts, is needed.

Intermediaries can play a variety of significant roles in interrupting escalation or in deescalating conflicts. This can take the form of nongovernmental, informal transmission of information, facilitating meetings among adversaries, suggesting new procedures when old ones have led to stalemates, suggesting substantive ideas for new solutions, and giving legitimacy to solutions that one or another party would otherwise find difficult to accept (Burton, 1969, 1985; Fisher and Ury, 1978; Kelman, 1977).

There have been many analyses of cases to assess the applicability of particular strategies. For example, Etzioni (1967) analyzed President Kennedy's American University speech and subsequent actions relating to the 1963 Partial Nuclear Test Ban Agreement as an example of the effectiveness of the GRIT strategy. Holsti, Brody, and North (1964) analyzed President Kennedy's handling of the Cuban missile crisis, arguing that the US government's responses were measured and equivalent in intensity to the Soviet government's actions; thus successfully managing the conflict without uncontrolled escalation. Leng (1984) examined three US-Soviet crises and found that US threats of force were generally reciprocated with defiance, which was not likely when other inducements were used.

Several studies have been done of intermediaries in international conflict. For example, Wolf (1978) examined the major international conflicts between 1920 and 1965; those which involved the intervention of global institutions were much less likely to be resolved by recourse to violence than were those which used only state procedures.

Despite the many studies about interrupting escalation, controlling crises, and initiating deescalation, the inconsistencies among the ideas have not been reconciled. We need much more specification to assess the relative contribution

of the balance of coercive and noncoercive inducements, of unilateral initiatives, of intermediaries, and of the content of the proposals in limiting escalation and beginning deescalation. Such specification must include the conflicts' structure, stage, and environment. In developing propositions and hypotheses about crisis management, interrupting escalation, and initiating deescalation, many middle-range social theories are relevant. Specially pertinent are theories of social exchange, coalition formation, influence, and the bases and emergence of social conflicts.

Conduct of Negotiations

Many suggestions have been advanced describing how to negotiate successfully, but not all of them are consistent. For example, it is argued that conflict resolution would be facilitated if a conflict were broken into many issues, if it were fractionated (Fisher, 1964). On the other hand, it is argued that the linkage of several conflict issues can provide the basis for trading off benefits from one outcome against losses from another.

Another issue concerns the content of the proposals being made—to what extent do the proposals recognize the adversaries' interests and not merely assert one side's positions (Fisher and Ury, 1981). Paying attention to the adversary's interests requires openness in the course of negotiations. In international negotiations, however, the complexity of matters in dispute often leads to lengthy domestic negotiations, then rigidity in international negotiations.

It can also be argued that careful preliminary work is very helpful to successful negotiations (Raiffa, 1982). The negotiators can better assess their priorities, consider the possible priorities of the adversary, invent possible outcomes which would maximize mutual benefits, and also assess what is their best alternative to a negotiated agreement as a fall back position.

The role of mediators is also a matter of contention. Some analysts argue that mediators should play an active role, suggesting possible solutions; others argue that mediators should be essentially facilitators and avoid making suggestions about possible outcomes (Burton, 1969; Fisher, 1978). Some analysts argue that mediators should be—or at least strive to appear to be—neutral; others argue that neutrality is not possible and honesty and fairness in conduct is what is important (Kriesberg, 1982; Laue and Cormick, 1978).

To assess these and other ideas about mediation, we need to specify the kind, stage, and context of conflict under consideration. In the case of US-Soviet relations, nongovernmental intermediaries, international organization officials, and representatives of nonaligned and allied governments have all attempted to play intermediary roles. We need systematic comparisons of varying consequences of different kinds of intermediary activity for different kinds of conflicts (Touval, 1978; Young, 1967).

Research is needed to assess these different policy alternatives. Comparisons are needed of many cases which vary in the characteristics of the adversaries, the nature of the conflicts, and the negotiators (Snyder and Diesing, 1977). Alternatively, detailed analyses of carefully selected cases might be undertaken. Analyses have been made of concession rates (Jensen, 1984), persuasive arguments (Stone, 1967), bureaucratic politics of each side in the negotiations (Newhouse, 1973; Talbott, 1979), and different kinds of intermediaries.

Theories about bargaining and negotiation have proliferated and expanded (Bacharach and Lawler, 1981; Strauss, 1978; Zartman, 1977). In addition, work on exchange theory, linguistics, communication, symbolic interaction, and conflict theory all can be drawn upon to suggest processes and conditions affecting the conduct of negotiations.

Equitable and Long-Lasting Agreements

Even when deescalating agreements are reached, they often are short-lived. They can sometimes generate reactions that reveal the agreement to be counterproductive. Much of the literature on conflict resolution stresses the possibility that a conflict can have an integrative outcome—one in which the adversaries all benefit or at least do not lose—rather than an outcome by which one party wins at the expense of the other (Deutsch, 1973; Walton and McKersie, 1965). Presumably, integrative outcomes are equitable and should be long-lasting; they should even lead to further conciliatory moves.

Research on the achievement and the consequences of integrative outcomes has been inadequate. Research has focused on more easily assessed outcomes such as disappointment. Not infrequently, after US-Soviet agreements have been signed, some groups are disappointed and believe themselves to have been unfairly treated. Policies should be pursued so that agreements do not create undue disappointment but rather generate vested interests furthering the expansion of the agreements. Expanding the coalitions to gain adherents for the agreement may succeed initially but then undermine the long-run survival of the agreements (Kriesberg, 1984). For example, commitments to modernize weapons systems in order to gain armed services acquiescence to an arms control agreement can nullify many of the presumed benefits of the agreement.

Sociological research on the rise and fall of detente is needed, comparing the consequences of its many component agreements. The deterioration of other US-Soviet deescalatory episodes also needs to be examined. A comparison of the more enduring detente between the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic could be undertaken fruitfully. The role of domestic and transnational groups in the endurance of US-Soviet agreements would be particularly appropriate for sociological analysis. For example, research is needed about the role played by groups in the US and in the Soviet Union upon

the rise and fall of detente. In the US, such groups include business leaders, grain growers, trade unions, research institutes, multinational corporations, East European ethnic organizations, and Jewish organizations. In the Soviet Union a comparable set of groups exist and play analogous, if less significant, roles.

Especially relevant to developing policies leading to equitable and long-lasting agreements is knowledge about the processes of institutionalization and the development of norms. That knowledge needs to be brought to bear on international as well as national rule development. Similarly, theories of the state and of interest groups in capitalist and noncapitalist countries could be fruitfully related to foreign policy.

GLOBAL FACTORS

Finally, we turn to the global system within which the US and Soviet governments contend. Three aspects of the world system increase the dangers of nuclear war between them. First, the world system consists of nominally sovereign states in a highly stratified system with many transnational interpenetrating organizations. The varying power and domestic stability of many countries provide a tempting arena for US-Soviet rivalry. Second, the world system lacks a significant shared culture and in many areas of life there is considerable autonomy among countries. In some ways this reduces the bases for conflict; but the lack of shared understandings and profound integration increases the chances that a fight will escalate, once it erupts. Third, the lack of transnational institutions with authority to develop and impose rules for conflict management raises the odds that a local or limited fight will escalate into a major war or even a nuclear holocaust. Policy suggestions and pertinent research possibilities in each problem area will be noted.

Instability and Inequality

Policies might be pursued that enhance domestic stability and justice within all countries, reduce inequities among them, or limit US-Soviet rivalry. Significant sociological research has been done in each of these policy areas, but much more is needed. The work in the area of domestic stability and justice has focused upon studies of the relations between socioeconomic development and political order, revolutions, and domestic equality (e.g., Jackman, 1975; Paige, 1975; Weede, 1984).

We need more analyses of how domestic troubles in developing countries do and do not attract US-Soviet rivalry and intervention. Sometimes there is little intervention by either superpower, sometimes there is intervention by one alone, sometimes there is simultaneous intervention by both or by their allies. Systematic comparisons of such cases might suggest ways to better limit the

opportunities for the US and the Soviet Union to seek unilateral advantage. This may include ways to limit the escalation of domestic fights or ways of involving international governmental and nongovernmental organizations.

The second policy area pertains to the development of shared understandings and greater integration. Policies might be pursued to increase the cultural, social, and economic exchanges in a manner that increases mutual and balanced dependence. Three major kinds of relevant research should be noted: mapping the variety of forms of transnational interactions and bonds, particularly between Soviet and US citizens; explaining the expansion and contraction of various kinds of transactions; and examining of the consequences of different kinds of transnational interactions.

International transactions include the movement of people, goods, and ideas. The movement takes the form of trade, of letter writing, of cultural and scientific exchanges, of emigration, and of reading, viewing, and listening to cultural products. The transactions also occur within a variety of organizational settings: international nongovernmental as well as international governmental organizations. The extent of such transactions between different kinds of people and over different time periods needs to be more fully known.

The sources of expansion and contraction in different kinds of transactions need to be examined. A fundamental issue is the extent to which some of these kinds of transactions develop autonomously and the extent to which they are controlled by governmental policies. Another issue pertains to the relative importance of technological, normative, and organizational determinants of the transactions' expansion and contraction.

Particularly important are studies of the consequences of different kinds of transactions. We might ask: What impact do they have upon American and Russian perceptions of each other? Which stereotypes are reinforced and which are changed? What are the effects upon perceived self-interest relative to US-Soviet relations? For example, do people in businesses which have no, some, or significant trade between the US and the USSR differ in views about each country and their relations (Jamgotch, 1985)?

Deutsch and associates (1957) have examined the development of "security communities"—countries which come to pose no security threat to each other. They found that high levels of integration, measured particularly by the movement of people, led to "security communities." In the past, considerable research has been done on views of peoples as affected by visits and media exposure among European countries and between the US and developing countries. We need to conduct such research in the present circumstances in US-Soviet relations (Jamgotch, 1985).

Many bodies of theoretical work are relevant to the research questions listed—work, for example, on the effects of the mass media, on cultural diffusion, opinion formation, socialization, prejudice, ecology, and occupations.

The third policy area pertains to developing means of managing conflicts and mitigating their most adverse effects. Included in this area are three kinds of policy considerations. First, rules for guiding rivalry, disputes, negotiations, and even wars might be developed. Second, existing international governmental organizations (IGOs) might be improved to limit conflict escalation more effectively. Third, new and more supranational regional and global organizations might be created.

Relevant research for each kind of policy should be undertaken. The development of rules for controlling disputes is particularly important. Even some modern wars have been limited. We need to know how that occurs. To what extent does it rest on constraints resulting from fear of retaliation? To what extent does it rest on shared understandings of the appropriate level of coercion between the adversaries regarding the particular issue in contention? What is the role of domestic constituencies, and potential or actual allies of each side? What kind of previous agreements are and are not effective in controlling the way fights are waged?

One way for existing international organizations to better serve in controlling international conflicts is to expand their membership and/or functions. Significant work has been done on the emergence, growth, and collapse of regional, specialized, and global international governmental organizations (Etzioni, 1965; Haas, 1964). Again, more research needs to be done on present-day IGOs and on IGOs involving the US and the USSR. We also need much more research on the way in which the United Nations Secretary-General, Secretariat, General Assembly, and Security Council affect the course of international disputes. What kind of mediating and peacekeeping activity has had what kind of consequences under what conditions (Moskos, 1976)? We need to understand the consequences not only of the use of violence but also of the nature of the conflict outcome.

Finally, research is needed regarding the prospects of developing truly supranational global institutions. World government is not likely to be enacted all at once. The ways in which regional supranational organizations have grown and have been limited in the expansion of functions and members needs examination. The shifting course of development of the European Economic Community provides many cases worthy of analysis (Lerner and Aron, 1957).

Sociological theory about the processes of institution building and the sociology of law are obviously relevant. In addition, studies of the development of the state, formal organizations, and the ecology of organizations are relevant. One area of relevant research that has been investigated is that of international nongovernmental organizations. These organizations precede and solidify IGOs; they also provide opportunities for interactions which can mitigate international conflicts (Evan, 1981; Galtung, 1980).

CONCLUSIONS

I have indicated that sociologists need not feel irrelevant and powerless in the face of the threat of nuclear war. Research that we can do with our sociological skills is relevant to nuclear war avoidance. Awareness that we are part of networks of co-workers enables us to recognize that we can make a contribution to a cumulative enterprise.

Clinical work to prevent nuclear war is not restricted to work with the President of the United States or the Secretary General of the Communist Party of the USSR as clients. Research of the kind outlined here has policy relevance for other significant clients. They include students, peace movement organizations, national governmental agencies, peace research institutes, and international governmental organizations. The major kinds of research outlined above have varying pertinence for different kinds of clients.

The research related to domestic conditions affecting the likelihood of nuclear war is most likely to be relevant for the practice of peace movement organizations, foundations supporting efforts to educate the public, churches, and educational institutions.

The research on intergovernmental interaction is of most relevance to government agencies engaged in international negotiations; the research results could be provided through consultations or through training. Such research also has pertinence for nongovernmental international actors, such as multinational corporations.

The research on global factors and reducing the risks of nuclear war has particular importance for transnational organizations—governmental and nongovernmental. It is also relevant for educational institutions and government agencies.

Neither war nor peace is the result of any single factor or condition. Each event is a configuration of many converging factors. We can change that configuration by changing *one* of the constituent conditions.

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