Access Type

Open Access Embargo

Date of Award

1-1-2012

Degree Type

Dissertation

Degree Name

Ph.D.

Department

Political Science

First Advisor

Daniel S. Geller

Abstract

As a quantitatively large-scale empirical analysis, this study examines the behavioral patterns of state-actor types in the bilateral militarized interstate disputes (BMIDs) that occurred between 1946 and 2001 according to the existence of nuclear weapons such as the possession of nuclear-weapons and the patron-client relationship (PCR) as the special relationship with a nuclear-weapon hegemon in statistical and probabilistic methods based on a stepwise typology approach. Its main results are as follows as regards initiation, such as initiation-proneness and matchup-proneness, and dispute path, such as escalatory and de-escalatory patterns, deterrence-intention, and hostility-level choice. First, the behavior-patterns seem to be different between nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon states in the bilateral militarized interstate disputes. Second, the patterns of behaviors seem to be different between the-number-one and the-number-two nuclear-weapon hegemons in the dispute. Third, the behavior-modes seem to be different between non-nuclear-weapon client-states and non-nuclear-weapon non-client states. Last, the modes of behaviors are likely to be similar between the nuclear-weapon hegemon and its non-nuclear-weapon client-states in the bilateral militarized interstate dispute.

Available for download on Wednesday, September 26, 2018

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