Copyright (c) 2009 Wayne State University All rights reserved. http://digitalcommons.wayne.edu/interlocal_coop Recent documents in Working Group on Interlocal Services Cooperation en-us Tue, 16 Jun 2009 15:00:31 PDT 3600 http://digitalcommons.wayne.edu/interlocal_coop/42 http://digitalcommons.wayne.edu/interlocal_coop/42 Mon, 26 Jan 2009 05:55:26 PST The question why a government chooses a specific service delivery tool to provide public service to its citizenry is a central intellectual inquiry in public administration. This paper develops a framework to explain the production and sector choices of public services by political-economic environment, organizational capacity, service market condition, and nature of service. Using operation and financial data of Georgia county governments during 2000-2006, we apply the framework to analyze Georgia counties' public service outsourcing decisions, focusing on the effects of fiscal condition and political interests. The logistic regression results show that the choice of external production is negatively associated with government's revenue raising capacity, managerial capacity, and citizens' political demand for local control yet positively associated with conservative ideology. The choice of private sector is positively correlated with conservative political interest, increase in discretionary financial resources, and the centrality of government's position in local service provision market. Ya Anna Ni http://digitalcommons.wayne.edu/interlocal_coop/41 http://digitalcommons.wayne.edu/interlocal_coop/41 Mon, 26 Jan 2009 05:43:16 PST This paper uses contextual explanations of regional governance to explore how the limitations to voluntary regionalism can lead to the more centralized, more regulated method of using regional special districts. An ICA perspective is used to discuss the range of choices in institutional arrangements available to jurisdictions. Motivations that jurisdictions may have to use more versus less autonomous methods of ICA are outlined to frame how regional districts fall within this spectrum. A rational choice perspective is also employed to identify the collective and selective benefits that motivate local actors to cooperate, as well as identify the potential transaction cost barriers to doing so. The analysis of this piece focuses on three specific types of special districts (fire, hospital and library districts) that are compared within the context of motivations to regional collective action. The assumptions from this analysis suggest that regional districts will act as a substitute for voluntary cooperation when the individual and collective benefits are threatened by high transaction costs. These assumptions are worked into sets of contextual propositions about how regional districts can present themselves as mechanisms of addressing collective action problems where substantial transaction cost barriers to voluntary cooperative efforts exist. Jayce L. Farmer http://digitalcommons.wayne.edu/interlocal_coop/40 http://digitalcommons.wayne.edu/interlocal_coop/40 Mon, 18 Aug 2008 08:48:34 PDT City Managers are believed to play a particularly influential role in brokering cooperative service deals on behalf of their jurisdiction (Krueger and McGuire, 2005; Thurmaier and Wood, 2002; Morgan and Hirlinger, 1991), however, their motivations for doing so are not well understood. One argument, drawn from theories of bureaucratic entrepreneurship and ambition theory suggests that cities with managers who want to move up in their career will engage in more interlocal service delivery as means of capturing economic efficiencies, which helps to build their record of career achievements. An alternative theoretical argument suggests that more altruistic motives including a desire for increased social equity, and valuing the common good of the region guide, are responsible for guiding city managers decisions for interlocal cooperation. We test these competing hypotheses using survey data from 134 city managers of large municipalities, and finance data from the Historical Database of Individual Local Government Finances. We find strong support for the first theory, and no support for the alternative argument. Managerial ambition has important consequences for the rate at which cities engage in interlocal service cooperation, but local fiscal capacity also shapes these decisions. Moreover, managerial ambition has complex effects; the desire of the city manager to move onto a larger city in the near future increases the rate at which a city sells services to other local governments, but managerial career ambition decreases the rate at which cities are willing to buy services from another jurisdiction. Kelly LeRoux http://digitalcommons.wayne.edu/interlocal_coop/39 http://digitalcommons.wayne.edu/interlocal_coop/39 Thu, 07 Aug 2008 12:13:42 PDT Many of the largest cities in the United States outsource emergency medical services. This paper develops a political economy model of city service provision. Empirical analysis of emergency ambulances in the 200 largest U.S. cities finds that a number of variables are significant determinants of amblu- ance outsourcing, including the fraction of a city's voters over the age of 65. This finding provides evidence that interest-group politics are important, and suggests a particular shape of the contracting cost curve. Matthew J. Holian http://digitalcommons.wayne.edu/interlocal_coop/38 http://digitalcommons.wayne.edu/interlocal_coop/38 Thu, 07 Aug 2008 12:13:40 PDT This report discusses findings from a survey of 660 randomly selected Michigan residents in winter 2007. The survey examined attitudes of Michigan residents toward eight strategies to resolving situations where current revenues are inadequate to support local services at past levels. The strategies examined fall into two broad categories. The first set (tax increases, state and federal aid) seeks to increase local revenues available to support services at previously existing levels and quality. The second set of strategies focus on reducing the costs of providing services with the objective of maintaining previous levels at a lower cost. This set includes two subgroups of strategies: those that reduce labor costs (layoff employees, reduce employee compensation) and those that alter existing service delivery arrangements (transfer responsibility for the service to the county, state, or a special district government; consolidate the municipality's service operations with that of another local government; and contract for services from a for-profit organization, a nonprofit agency, or another local government) to reduce the costs of provising local services. Respondents were asked to indicate the extent to which they agreed with the use of each strategy to resolve funding shortfalls in five different local public services: (1) maintaining and repairing local streets and roads, (2) operation of parks and recreational programs, (3) fire fighting, (4) trash and garbage collection, and (5) police street patrol. Jered Carr http://digitalcommons.wayne.edu/interlocal_coop/37 http://digitalcommons.wayne.edu/interlocal_coop/37 Thu, 15 May 2008 08:34:53 PDT While much can be learned about the roles of interjurisdictional agreements between two jurisdictions, little is known about the range and scope of multilateral agreements (MLAs) in the provision of collective goods. Based on the theory of institutional collective action, this paper explores two characteristics of agreements: restrictive and adaptive, and seeks to understand why local governments enter into one arrangement and not the other. This paper argues that the local government decisions to enter into MLAs are influenced by the characteristics of goods and services, the nature of interjurisdictional relations, the geographic configuration of governments, and the number of signatories involved. An analysis of public safety activities in Florida provides support for these propositions. Simon Andrew http://digitalcommons.wayne.edu/interlocal_coop/35 http://digitalcommons.wayne.edu/interlocal_coop/35 Mon, 03 Sep 2007 10:36:24 PDT Kelly LeRoux http://digitalcommons.wayne.edu/interlocal_coop/34 http://digitalcommons.wayne.edu/interlocal_coop/34 Wed, 29 Aug 2007 07:37:46 PDT Michigan local governments engage in a wide range of cooperative activities. Little is known, however, about what factors motivate local governments to engage in intergovernmental cooperation and how local government officials choose among various forms of collaboration. We develop and test a theory of intergovernmental cooperation that explains differences in the factors that lead local governments to engage in horizontal cooperation with other local units versus vertical cooperation with county or state governments. Our primary focus is on fiscal capacity: we hypothesize that limited fiscal capacity leads many local governments, especially townships, to work collaboratively with state or county actors to provide government services. Local governments with greater fiscal capacity, especially cities, are stronger potential partners and so are more likely to collaborate with other local governments using horizontal arrangements. We expect other factors, such as population characteristics, local and regional economic factors, federal or state mandates, and the existence of collaborative partners, to matter as well. We test these hypotheses with survey data collected in 2005 by the Citizens Research Council of Michigan on the mode of service provision employed by 460 Michigan local governments across 115 service categories. We find strong support for our propositions about the linkage between local fiscal capacity and intergovernmental cooperation on public services. Jered B. Carr http://digitalcommons.wayne.edu/interlocal_coop/33 http://digitalcommons.wayne.edu/interlocal_coop/33 Mon, 23 Jul 2007 10:32:48 PDT Local elected officials provide a representation function for their constituents, expressing citizen preferences for public goods and services and integrating public preferences into government decisions about how to provide and produce public goods and services. In an increasingly networked world, the provision and production of public goods and services frequently occurs through intergovernmental collaboration and inter-local agreements. Public administrators are often viewed as the primary actors in forming intergovernmental agreements, but what role do elected officials play in policy decisions about collaboration? I argue elected officials' representation function in intergovernmental policymaking can be conceptualized through the analysis of three dimensions of a typological theory: stimuli for collaborative action, perceptions of the terms of collaboration, and perceptions of intergovernmental partners. Existing research and interviews with local elected officials are used to explain the dimensions of the intergovernmental collaboration decision typology. This paper offers a preliminary outline of my current research. Analysis of the data is ongoing, and feedback and comments are welcome. Eric Zeemering http://digitalcommons.wayne.edu/interlocal_coop/31 http://digitalcommons.wayne.edu/interlocal_coop/31 Thu, 05 Jul 2007 14:23:55 PDT Art Holdsworth