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Israeli Coalition Governments: Formation and Duration (1949-1999)

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Israeli Coalition Governments: Formation and Duration (1949-1999)

by

IMAD SALAMEY

DISSERTATION

Submitted to the Graduate School
of Wayne State University,
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Advisor Date

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DEDICATION

The thought of Maysoun Chehab is attached to every word written in this work. Her encouragement and inspiration were of the essence in resolving difficulties and stimulating ideas. Her support followed my work from the libraries to the computer room. Her love and motherhood filled my enthusiasm for a future of world peace. To her this doctoral dissertation is dedicated.
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CHAPTER 1

COALITION GOVERNMENTS: FORMATION AND DURATION

This study examines the reasons responsible for the various formations and durations of Israeli governments.¹ What makes certain Israeli coalition governments large, with many participating parties while others are established small? Why do particular coalition governments last longer in office than others? The significance of these questions becomes apparent when we recognize that a coalition government’s formation reflects various national and international political developments. Economic circumstances, foreign policy, and immigration influx are among the various factors that impact coalition politics and determine the extent of government partnerships. Coalition government formation also expresses the structural constraints of the electoral institution. The number of parties and their relative electoral strength may also determine the level of cooperation, opposition, or parliamentary competition that can alter the formation of governments.

Understanding the factors shaping governments’ formations can further help us understand why particular ruling coalitions last longer in office than others. This study addresses the institutional and political factors that shape the particular formation of a coalition and explores the types of circumstances that contribute to coalition governments’ early breakups or prolonged duration. The examination of coalition government formation and duration helps political strategists design enduring coalitions

¹ By coalition duration is meant the number of days the alliance lasts in power before being dismantled and replaced by a new government.
capable of adapting to changes that are storming nations while taking institutional constraints into consideration, thus contributing to a stable polity.

**Coalition Formation Debate**

Past literatures examined variables responsible for the formation and duration of particular coalitions. Following William Riker's infamous coalition theory in 1962, researchers were divided between adherents and critics. Riker advocated the view that coalitions form as the outcome of zero-sum games calculation (Riker, 1962). He viewed parties as rational players aiming to achieve maximum power in the game play. Thus, the sum calculation of all parties in a rational game, he maintained, contributes to the formation of a coalition that includes the minimum possible number of partners. This configuration, Riker believed, provided respective coalition members maximum benefits by dividing resources among the least number of beneficiaries.

Riker's followers sought to enrich his research program by widening its protective belt, to use Lakatos' terminology.\(^2\) Influential contributions to Riker's theory were elaborated by periodical publications associated with J. Harasanyi (1969), W. Wright (1971), J. Dodd (1974), K. Strom (1984), and M. Laver and K. Shepsle (1990, 1996). Their contributions to the research program focused on innovative aspects and measures, which were associated with the costs and benefits to parties joining a particular coalition formation. Party electoral seats, cabinet ministries, ministry budget allocations, and other

similar variables represented the foundations of parties' strategies to join a particular coalition formation.

An antithetical paradigm to Riker's was associated with the work of Robert Axelerod, whose "Conflict of Interest" (1970) prioritized the interest of social cleavages over the benefits associated with the particular structure of a coalition. Political alliances, Axelerod perceived, reflected shared interests between social groups, and was not merely a product of parties' sharing calculations. He asserted that coalitions needed to have minimum common values and programs, and that governments are formed among ideologically close networks (Axelerod, 1970). Contributions to Axelerod's thesis were made by various authors including S.M. Lipset and S. Rokhan (1967), A. DeSwan (1973), A. Lipjhart (1977), I. Budge (1978), P. Warwick (1979), D. Baron (1993), and Dunleavy (2001). Their research provided continuous support to the perspective that parties reflect the political, economic, or social interest of respective classes, groups, or cleavages in society and their decisions to join, defend, or abort a coalition are closely linked with the momentum of social conflict and political change. Policy programs were found to be among the best indicator of parties' ideological positions in predicting coalition formation (Budge 1978, 90, 94; Baron, 1993).

Follow-up research exposed shortcomings and faults in both paradigms. Mogens Pedersen and Peter Mair, for example, found that electoral volatility in several countries was associated with ideological detachment and the ideological commitment of declining parties (Pedersen, 1990; Mair, 1983). Pedersen and Mair cited Otto Kirchheimer's
assertion (1966) that ideology can no longer be taken as a determinant of a party's behaviors and coalition strategies. On the other hand, views associated with Lipset and Rokhan's work "Party Systems and Voter Alignments" (1967) proposed the contrary. Studies by Michael Taylor and Michael Laver of twelve European countries between 1945 and 1971, as well as Abram De Swaan's study of eight European democracies and Israel between 1918 and 1972, found Riker's theory of minimum winning formation was contradicted in most cases (De Swaan, 1973; Taylor and Laver, 1972). Also, Arend Lipjhart opposed Kirchheimer's thesis on the basis that "parties' policy preferences cannot be ignored" (Lipjhart, 1984, p.53) and found that many oversized or "grand" coalitions are often formed in pluralistic societies.

Synthetic research attempted to bridge both paradigms. Yet, these efforts often provided a greater weight of variables that supported aspects of one paradigm over the other. Mark Franklin and Thomas T. Mackie's (1984) reassessment of parties' size and ideology, for example, found size to be a more significant explanatory variable in coalition formation, although in specific countries the significance may be reversed (Franklin & Mackie, 1984). Recent research, associated with the 'Manifesto Project' has aimed at isolating indicators from party platforms that, along with size considerations, orient coalition formation (Budge; 1993, 1994). Other synthetic research is found in the work of Carol Mershon (1996, 2001), Itai Sened (1996), Martin Lanny and Randolph Stevenson (2001) who predicted coalition formations based on both party's size and policy position while controlling for institutional variations.
Coalition Duration Debate

Contemporary theoretical analysis of coalition politics has begun to demonstrate a growing interest in formation predictions, as well as an even greater interest in coalition stability analysis. Starting with P. Warwick (1979) many theorists believe that the question of coalition formation is fundamentally connected to that of coalition stability. A party's decision to join a particular coalition formation is necessarily linked with the capacity of such a coalition to confront arising political and economic pressures, thus avoiding early divisions and breakups. The research question thus became associated with the question of what makes a particular alliance more durable than another. The answer to this question was thought to provide additional insight into the rationale of parties joining a particular coalition formation.

As was the case with formation research, the duration question polarized researchers into various theoretical camps. The division was between those who supported Riker's styled coalition (Robertson, 1983; Mershon, 1996) and those who advocated Axlerod's styled coalition (Warwick, 1979), with each camp predicting durability. Synthesizers also emerged (Lijphart, 1984; Ingelhart, 1987; Budge, 1990). The challenge to both theoretical core assumptions, however, came with E.C. Browne, J. P. Frendreis, and D.W. Gleiber's milestone work "An 'Events' Approach to the Problem of Cabinet Stability" in 1984 and was followed by supporting publications in 1986 and 1988. Browne and his co-authors found that the structure of any political alliance was subject to permanent accumulative pressures due to randomly occurring events that, throughout its life, undermine its duration. Whether formed according to Riker or...
Axlerod's model, coalitions age and dissolve as the probability of shocking events increases with time. In this context, P. Warwick (1992) speculated on the relevance of coalitions' structural formations with respect to duration. J.D. Robertson (1983, 1984, 1986), G. King (1990), P. Warwick (1992, 94), Lupia and Strom (1995), Grofman and Roozentaal(1997), Laver and Shepsle (1998, 1999), D. Baron (1998), and Diermeir and Stevenson's (1999) respective studies rejected the idea that coalition structural formation is irrelevant in duration analysis. However, they disagreed over the extent to which structural formation or events impact duration.

The "event" theories marked a turning point in the study of coalition behaviors; the need to unify event and structural paradigms appeared urgent. Robertson, Warwick, King and various authors took on this task. In linking event to structure, Warwick established causality between economic indicators and government stability (Warwick, 1992). Similarly, Robertson suggested that the economy is an important determinant of structural behaviors (Robertson, 1983; 1984). Finally, King established a unified statistical model that combined both "event" and "structural" propositions in duration analysis (King, Alt, Burns, and Laver 1990). In its turn, the unified model presents some problems in the literature. These problems were associated with the questions of which event(s) should be considered most critical in determining coalition behaviors. Do events exhibit a pattern in their impact on duration or is each unique in its implication(s), as a historian may suggest?
Persisting Anomalies

In order to address these questions this study attempts to build bridges between both formation and duration theories while strengthening core positions. We analyze both coalition formation and duration perspectives by considering explanatory variables common to both phenomena. Adopting coalitions as the unit of analysis, we distinguish between structural and event variables. We assess each in light of the size and ideological formation of the coalition. Then, we replicate our analysis in respect to coalition duration, revealing variables that impact formation and, in turn, duration.³

Before applying our research design, however, we recognized important shortcomings in most coalition studies, particularly their tendency to undermine important historic, cultural, religious, political and institutional differences between countries. While we admit that democracies do share core values and institutional dynamics, we believe that each maintains a unique set of attributes that often yield peculiar political outcomes. Taking Israel, for example, we instantly recognize the dramatic prospect of the ongoing national conflict with the Arabs and the Palestinians, the influence of Israel’s inner religious-secular-ethnic divisions, and the impact of economic, industrial and technological transformations shaping Israeli politics (Arian, 1998). Historic transformations specific to a given democracy, particularly in light of globalization and modern global integration, may diminish or exaggerate certain national peculiarities and distinctively shape political momentum.⁴ In Israel, this became apparent

³ We use two-stage quantitative statistical regression analysis in order to examine the formation then the duration models.
⁴ Such a view supports Browne’s reasoning for having ‘event’ variables determining the various durations of coalitions in democracies (Browne 1984, 86).
after 1969, when conquest of new territories, the development of mass industry, and the increasing fragmentation of political parties marked a substantial shift in normal politics.\textsuperscript{5} Such transformation presented further complications to the generalizations associated with coalition theories. Not only can we find important differences in the attributes of democracies, but we can also recognize significant distinctions within the development of each country's political history.

Thus, we find ourselves compelled to reexamine coalition theories in light of the peculiarities of each country, hoping to accumulate political knowledge about various nations via this process and consequently to provide, through their common behaviors, a mean to validate or reject aspects of coalition theories. This study begins this mission by examining the behaviors of Israeli coalitions in light of changing institutional and political circumstances. We study Israeli coalition behaviors while projecting various general theoretical propositions relevant to formation and duration analysis. We implement two analytical approaches: quantitative and qualitative. The former incorporates the populations of 28 Israeli governments since independence in 1949 through 1999, in order to reveal a general pattern and relationship between the independent and dependent variables; the latter includes eight coalitions evenly divided between shortest and longest lived governments and distributed between the periods before and after 1969, in order to reveal comparative behaviors.

\textsuperscript{5} Following the 1967 Six Day War, the Labor groups became further divided between "territorialists", or those who claimed national right to the new Occupied Territories, and the "peace camp", or those who advocated the return of conquered land in exchange for peace (Isaac, 1976; Perlmutter, 1985). The Labor party's traditional influence deteriorated in favor of the Right Likud party (Elazer and Sandler, 1990; Arian 1998). Following an industrial surge,
A Synthetic Research Design

Our study is divided into a two-stage design consisting first of formation and then of duration variables. In the formation stage we aim at explaining the variant formation in coalition size and ideology. What makes particular coalitions form large, or consensual, while others are small, or exclusive? Why do certain governments adopt strong, narrow, or tight ideological policy positions while others lack such orientation, incorporating wide-inclusive policy programs? The answer to these questions will provide some analytical perspective to the Riker vs. Axelerod debate as well as an examination to the Lipjhart “consensual thesis” in pluralistic systems. Riker’s view asserts that coalitions will always form as minimum winning (Riker, 1962), Axelerod projects that coalition ideological programs will always form tight (Axelerod, 1970), and Lipjhart proposes that coalition in pluralistic Israel will always form large, expanding beyond minimum winning requirements (Liphart, 1977; 1984).

Our explanatory variables are of two types: structural and event-based. The structural variable we introduce in this study is “coalition competition,” or the degree to which there is an increased opportunity of rival coalitions to win a majority number of seats in the Knesset. Because Israel has maintained a dominant party tradition, i.e., there has been in each Knesset a party that maintained a substantially large number of seats and to which the formation of government has been traditionally assigned, the change in the dominant party’s power index to form winning coalitions has become the standard for measuring competition. The increase in the power of the dominant party to form a
winning coalition undermines competition, while the decline of such power fosters parliamentary fractionalization and competition. How does competition impact coalition formation and duration? Mershon proposed that competition makes coalitions expensive, therefore, forming small and tight. This is particularly the case because parties in a competitive environment can choose from various potential coalition formations forcing the dominant party to make urgent concessions in budget and ministry allocation in favor of joining parties. Dominant parties, therefore, have grown less capable of affording large partnerships. By the same reasoning, Mershon thought that the cost associated with dismantling a coalition increases with competition since the dominant party cannot guarantee the reformation of a winning coalition. Mershon predicted that coalitions will, therefore, last longer in power as structural competition increases (Mershon; 1996,2001).

The other set of explanatory variables are event pressure variables, i.e., variables associated with political, social, and economic change independent of institutional structure. We propose two types of events: external and internal. The first is associated with foreign policy issues such as annual severity of conflict, annual U.N. resolutions, and annual foreign assistance; the second is associated with indicators such as the annual

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6 Mershon’s model resembles a free market in its supply-demand relationship having the dominant party acting as the supplier of a coalition and the minor parties as membership buyers. In situations where many suppliers compete to sell to buyers (many dominant parties), suppliers grew desperate to sell membership at low prices, jeopardizing profitability (forming expensive coalitions by providing maximum benefits to minor partners). Because the coalition, under competitive circumstances is costly to the dominant party, the coalition is often formed small-tight. Continued competition forces coalition suppliers to maintain low membership cost, and therefore saves the coalition from early collapse (minor parties maintain rank and do not defect to a competing coalition, due to their respective maximum profitability). The situation is totally reversed when a supplier turn to be a monopoly (no competition), thus dictating prices (providing the least possible benefits to minor partners by controlling most government resources). Such a situation increases membership cost with the suppliers looking for greater profit by having more members (more supporters with the least possible benefits at higher return to the monopoly). The same situation provides the monopoly supplier with the luxury to dismantle the partnership whenever a feasible enterprise emerges as a more profitable alternative (more partners accepting lower benefits).
number of immigrants entering the country relative to the total population, annual GDP rate change, annual unemployment rate, annual number of strikers per strike, annual inflation rate, and annual growth rate. The general theoretical perception is that event pressure leads to political consensus, where political parties undermine their ideological differences and unite to address obstacles confronting the nation. Robertson proposed that event pressures, and economic pressure in particular, are responsible for larger formations (Robertson; 1984, 1986). Browne’s aging thesis predicted that event pressures or “shocks” undermine the durability of the coalition (Browne; 1984, 1986). Our design will allow us to examine these views while making the necessary distinction between the variant impacts of the different event pressure variables on both the formation and the duration of the government.

In the second duration stage analysis the dependent variables, analyzed in the first formation stage analysis, become additional structural explanatory variables. The question we attempt to address in this stage is how the size and the ideological orientation of a coalition determine its duration. If Riker was correct, one would expect that the larger and ideologically wider coalitions are the least efficient, and therefore the less durable. Efficiency implies that minimum-tight coalition is the most lasting coalition while maximum-wide coalition is the least durable (confirming Mershon, 1996). If, on the other hand, Liphart was correct, we should expect in Israel’s pluralist society the contrary to be the case with larger inclusive (consensual) coalitions having longer duration.
Significance of the Study

In formulating the various relationships existing between structural and event independent variables with formation and duration dependent variables, this study assesses the relevant strength of each relationship. What events and institutional settings matter the most in government formation and, consequently, respective durability? The answer to this question leads us to examine the relationship between government formation and duration. Does predicted formation lead to durable coalitions, or is duration determination dependent on structural and event pressure changes? This study will provide further assertion to the linkage existing between formation and duration analyses. It will show that a coalition government's structural formation determines duration (confirming Warwick, 1994). It will further demonstrate that event pressures, responsible for particular government formation, may effect duration differently. For example, this study reveals that internal event pressure responsible for small government formation undermines duration. On the other hand, external pressure, associated with larger coalition formation, may prolong government duration (contrary to Browne, 1984, 1986).

We recognize that the prospective validity and reliability of our study may change between countries and across time within each country. Many examinations of modern political process have hinted at fundamental changes in the shape and behavioral pattern of political alliances in democratic nations (Kirchheimer, 1966; Mair, 1983; Pedersen, 1990). In this study, we consider these views by careful analysis of the annual trends in our variables. Early observations confirm the proposition that since the 1969 Israeli
Knesset’s election, a serious shift has occurred in important variables. Most significantly, we noted, was the shift in structural competition among rival dominant parties within the Israeli Knesset (Chapter 3). Since 1969, Israel witnessed a rapid process of industrialization and territorial expansion, and its Knesset became further fragmented providing the ground for serious competition among rival dominant parties (Issac, 76; Perlemutter, 85; Arian; 98). Such situations instigate serious reconsideration of our two-stage models. The question we ask is: what historic development, if any, altered coalition behaviors in formation and duration perspectives? In order to answer this question, in this study our quantitative examination of 28 Israeli coalitions is reconsidered by applying our model qualitatively to 13 coalitions formed before 1969 and 15 coalitions formed after (Chapters 5 and 6). In examining the general relationship between independent and dependent variables for all 28 Israeli governments we first implement a quantitative multiple linear regression analysis (OLS) and compare the result to a robust regression analysis (Chapter 4). Then, in order to examine the impact of historic developments in coalition behaviors, we divide our governments’ population into two sets of coalitions that were formed before and after 1969 and implement a qualitative case comparative study approach, as proposed by Alexander George (1969). We compare coalition formation and duration before and after 1969 by selecting and examining the two shortest and the two longest-lived coalitions in each time period. Thus, while the quantitative approach provides us with a means to evaluate the general application of our theoretical models, the qualitative approach allows us to highlight the

7 Both analyses are further discussed in chapters 4 and 5.
comparative impact of historic developments on the formation and duration patterns of Israeli coalitions.

**Data Sources**

The data used in this study is compiled from various sources. Coalitions' ideological measures were based on documents (1949-1999) titled "the Principle Guidelines of Government" and were primarily obtained from the Israeli Knesset Archive. They were content coded according to Ian Budge's 55 identified sub-policies (Budge, 1993). Dominant Parties ideology (1949-1988) data were obtained from Essex University, which was compiled by Ian Budge (Dataset CMPr3). Party manifestos from 1988 to 1999 were obtained from the *Jerusalem Post* and *Israel Yearbook and Almanac* and were content coded using Ian Budge's approach. A third data set consisting of information about duration, the various shuffles, defections, and changes in cabinets (1945-1990) was also obtained from Ian Budge’s “Handbook of Democratic Governments in 20 Democracies (1945-1990)” (Budge, 1993); the data was updated to 1999 using Keesing's Contemporary Archive. A fourth source of statistical data (1949-2003) was obtained from “Statistical Abstract of Israel”. The fifth data set consists of foreign aid to Israel (1949-1999) and was obtained from the following authors: Clyde R. Mark, “Israel: U.S. Foreign Assistance,” Congressional Research Service, (May 11, 2000); Larry Q. Nowels, “Israel: An Overview of U.S. Foreign Assistance, Congressional Research Service, (May 20, 1993); A. F. K. Organski, “The $36 billion bargain”, NY: Colombia University Press, 1990. The sixth data set consists of war data by D. Singer’s “Correlate of War Project” (1949-1992). The data was updated using “The Jewish
Online Research Center”. “Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs” provided further information and data regarding Israeli parties’ respective electoral strength and political positions.

**Chapter Summaries**

The following chapters are divided as follows: Chapter 2, “Coalition Theories and a Synthetic Model of Coalition Formation and Duration,” reviews the various research on coalition formation and duration theories. It discusses the main tenets of structural theory and its various sub-disciplines. It also considers ‘event’ theory as a competing theoretical model to coalition research. Synthetic approaches are examined for their contributions and shortcomings. An alternative synthetic theory of coalition formation and duration is advanced. This theory argues that coalitions need to be examined as the unit of analysis. Structural analysis must take into consideration the competitiveness of the coalition system while event analysis must distinguish between the type of events (external vs. internal). The theory predicts coalitions’ structural formations and durations while taking into consideration important national transformations. It further provides means for examining the ‘event aging thesis.’

Chapter 3, “Methodologies and Measurements” examines two methodological approaches to evaluate the theory presented in chapter 2. The first is a quantitative method using multiple linear regression analysis. The second is a qualitative method using comparative case study analysis. The purpose of having two methodologies is related to the small number of cases being examined in this research. Such a shortcoming
makes a quantitative examination difficult to verify. An inductive comparative qualitative approach, on the other hand, allows rigorous examination of cases studied and provides further verification and/or refinement to theoretical assumptions. This chapter discusses the unit of analysis, independent, and dependent variables implemented in both methods. It defines operational variables and measures employed in the quantitative analysis. It further discusses the qualitative method, its various phases, the criteria of case selections, and systematic case evaluation and comparison.

In Chapter 4 the data is quantitatively examined to reveal the relationship between coalition size, ideological parameter, and duration, with structural and event pressures. The data were plotted to reveal trends of every variable throughout the years since Israel was founded. Multiple linear and robust regression analyses were conducted to show the significance of the model developed in chapter 2. While the model was not found significant, partly in light of low sample size, trend analysis showed that the dominant party power index has consistently declined, foreign aid increased, and numbers of strikers per strike also increased over the years. These changes in trends have become apparent since 1969.

In Chapter 5 a qualitative approach is conducted to analyze Israeli coalition formation and duration. The shortest-lived Israeli governments were selected in order to examine the most evident variables associated with governments' early breakups and terminations. The sample examined includes four Israeli cabinets evenly divided between pre and post-1969 periods. This selection has been followed in order to provide
comparative evidence as to whether a transformation in coalition behaviors has occurred following the 1969 general election in Israel. Explanatory variables examined include economic, immigration, and external pressures as well as the structural competitiveness of the Knesset upon the formation of the coalition government. Changes in pressure variables as well as the structural competitiveness of the Knesset, the coalition's size, and the coalition's ideological parameter are further examined in a second stage analysis in order to reveal factors determining the short duration of the governments.

A comparative qualitative analysis of longest duration governments, compared to shortest duration governments, is made in Chapter 6. The variables analyzed in this chapter are the same examined in Chapter 5. A comparative result of shortest vs. longest duration governments are also provided. Further comparison to quantitative vs. qualitative analyses is also shown.

Chapter 7 summarizes the findings of our quantitative and qualitative data analyses. It discusses the findings in light of our proposed hypotheses. The findings appear to support our null hypotheses that high coalition competition presses toward tighter ideological parameters and smaller-sized cabinets and results in short duration coalitions, particularly for the period that followed the 1969 Israeli Knesset election. Economic and external pressures responsible for the formation of large coalitions before 1969 appear to have had the reverse impact afterward, leading to the formation of many contemporary minimum-winning coalitions. Immigration pressure through the post-1969 period also appears to have contributed to political polarization and smaller coalition
formations. Supports to our duration hypothesis emerge in the significant negative association existing between the rise of domestic and external pressures and government duration. While competition is found to contradict long-duration proposition, large-sized and wide-ideological coalitions are found to have conditional impact, contributing to government longevity in situation of external threat. Supports to the ‘aging’ thesis also demonstrate negative associations between economic as well as external ‘shocks’ and government duration.

Our comparative examination of Israeli coalitions reveals a significant behavioral shift following 1969’s Knesset election. Increasing parliamentary fragmentation and coalition competition marks the transformation. Throughout the ‘post-national’ period, with the exception of grand alliances forming to repel external threat, coalitions have gown more competitive and less tolerant of policy differences, forming narrow agendas and smaller sized cabinets in response to domestic and external pressures. This transformation appears to instigate shorter duration governments, and consequently, instable polity.

The limitations of our proposition are due to the small number of cases studies and to the cultural and political peculiarities of the country examined. The contribution to the general coalition theory, however, shows that coalitions need to be examined in light of important historic-national transformations. Theoretical models must take into consideration the country’s level of national fragmentation arising as a consequence of global transformation to reveal proper conclusions about coalition behaviors. Future
studies, we propose, can analyze countries with similar ethnic-cultural-political attributes, clustering them into levels of national fragmentation while taking global developments into consideration. The significance of such a proposition lies in forecasting the formation of durable and stable post-national governments.
CHAPTER 2
COALITION THEORIES AND A SYNTHETIC MODEL OF COALITION FORMATION AND DURATION

This chapter reviews the various research on coalition formation and duration theories. It discusses the main tenets of structural theory and its various sub-disciplines. It also considers 'event' theory as a competing theoretical model to coalition research. Synthetic approaches are examined in their contributions and shortcomings. An alternative synthetic theory of coalition formation and duration is advanced. This theory argues that coalitions need to be examined as the unit of analysis. Structural analysis must take into consideration the competitiveness of the coalition system while event analysis must distinguish between the type of events (external vs. internal). The theory predicts coalitions' structural formations and durations. It further provides aspects for examining the 'event aging thesis.'
Two Competing Structural Models of Coalition Behavior: Size vs. Ideology

The tendency towards a practical rationalism in conduct is common to all civic strata.8

The question concerning the formation of stable, effective, and durable coalitions is a classical research investigation approached in much of the comparative political literature. Research questions concerning coalitions have evolved into various sub-fields and many competing traditions. Most analyses, however, have been primarily focused on two important attributes of coalition making. The first considers the question of how coalitions are formed and the factors responsible for the emergence of one type of coalition rather than another. The second focuses on coalition duration and the variables leading to alliance stability and effective policy outcomes (Warwick, 1979, 94).

These traditions draw their analyses based on party behaviors. The first view can be labeled the Rational-Efficient model, where coalition formation and duration are strictly associated with the rationality of parties achieving and holding power (Wright, 1971, pp. 17-54; Harsanyi, 1969). The rationality of coalition formation and duration in this model is found to be quantitatively calculable. The calculation is simply based on the net benefit of parties joining or leaving a coalition. The total benefit to all parties in a coalition determines both formation and duration of the alliance. The rest of this model’s analysis, focusing on coalition duration, lies in determining the cost and gains of each party joining or remaining in a coalition. Parties’ electoral seats, cabinet ministries, budget allocation, and other political resources represent the rational benefit-cost basis

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for calculating coalition formation and duration (Riker, 1962; Dodd, 1976, 84; Strom, 1984; Laver and Shepsle 1990, 96).

William Riker’s influential theory of formation was based on the assumption that coalitions form as the outcome of zero-sum games calculations, especially by coalition leaders. He describes such a theoretical model as follow:

In n-person, zero-sum games, where side-payments are permitted, where players are rational, and where they have perfect information, only minimum winning coalitions occur... In social situations similar to n-person, zero-sum games with side-payments, participants create coalitions just as large as they believe will ensure winning and no larger (Riker, 1962, p. 32).

In other words it is considered irrational in this formulation to pay more for a cabinet alliance than is required to win in parliament, with costs considered in allocating benefits to coalition partners. Therefore rational leaders supposedly tend not to include more partners than minimally necessary for victory.

The second view of coalition formation is associated with the Ideological-Interest model. This tradition primarily draws on the concept that parties reflect the political, economic, or social interest of particular classes, groups, or cleavages in society (Lipset and Rokhan, 1967; Axlerod, 1970; de Swaan 1973; Lipjhart, 1977; Warwick, 1979; Baron, 1993; Dunleavy, 2001). From this perspective, parties’ decisions to join, defend, or abort a coalition are closely linked with the momentum of social conflict and political change. The significance of a cleavage or a class in political life determines coalition behavior. Thus, cleavages and classes of similar interests tend to push their respective
parties to politically bond in order to confront parties representing antagonistic programs. (Axlerod, 1970) Calculating interests involves numerous sets of quantitative and qualitative variables. However, most ideological-interest coalition researchers have attempted to find policy variables as indicators of parties' coalition cohesion. (Budge 1978, 90, 94; Baron 1993)

The core assumption of both these traditions considers the party as the main unitary actor in the political system. It is either the party's electoral rationality or ideological position that largely determines its political alignment. Coalitions emerge as the final outcomes of the various partisan electoral configurations or ideological associations. "Most policy-driven coalition theories," suggest Budge and Laver, "of course, operate on the basis that both the coalition that forms and its polity are in some predictable form the objectives of parties within the system." (Budge, 1993, p.499). Or as Sartori puts it, "parties make for a 'system,' then, only when they are parts (in the plural); and a party system is precisely the system of interactions resulting from inter-party competition" (Sartori, 1976, p.44).

Serious reconsideration of both theoretical paradigms has been made through the years. This was most evident in S.M. Lipset and S. Rokkan's effort to revise the theories. In their famous study "Party Systems and Voter Alignments" (1967), Lipset and Rokkan advance the thesis that the western Democratic Party system of the 1960s resembled the same cleavage structure of the 1920s. Lipset and Rokkan established the view that both national and industrial revolutions of the 19th Century continued to shape the ideological
struggle of the 20th Century. Their study suggested the “freezing hypothesis” in which the same ideological considerations continued to determine partisan conflict throughout the post WW II era. The Lipset and Rokhan analysis implied that the party continues to act as an ideological agent for its respective social cleavage, and this role has not changed. In other words, Lipset and Rokhan’s asserted that ideology remains the prominent vehicle of coalition politics and, in their view, it remained premature to support Riker’s theory of party politics based strictly on rational opportunity.

Several studies have challenged the Lipset and Rokkan findings. Most notable is the literature questioning the fundamental structure of the party system and its rationality. Lipset and Rokkan’s critics revived the view, proposed by Otto Kirchheimer, which suggested that the western political party system was in a process of transformation (Kirchheimer, 1966). Kirchheimer considered that parties in western democracies were moving further away from ideological traditions and were adopting opportunistic electoral strategies. He found evidence for this claim in the rise of what he called the “catch-all party” where winning votes becomes the essence of party strategy in the political process.

Several other authors found support for this view, such as Mogens Pedersen who suggested that electoral volatility in several countries is a proof of ideological detachment. Pedersen concluded that ideological detachment and electoral volatility are the consequence of the parties’ declining ideological commitment. Parties no longer commit to ideological programs and voters no longer identify with particular parties.
Kirchheimer and Pedersen’s theses implied that a party’s ideology can no longer be taken as a determinant of a party’s behaviors and coalition strategies. Their model suggests that a greater consideration must be given to electoral opportunistic factors and that the Rational-Efficient model is best suited for coalition analysis.

However, the Rational-Efficient model also failed to provide a fully satisfactory account of parties’ coalition behaviors. Riker’s minimum winning coalition theme, for example, could not explain many collective formations and "deformations". Early studies by Michael Taylor and Michael Laver of twelve European countries between 1945 and 1971, as well as Abram De Swaan’s study of eight European democracies and Israel between 1918 and 1972 found Riker’s theory of minimum winning formation to be contradicted in most cases (De Swaan, 1973, Taylor and Laver, 1972). Also, Lipjhart opposed Kirchheimer’s thesis on the basis that “parties’ policy preferences cannot be ignored. This means that parties are not pure power maximizers” (Lipjhart, 1984, p.53). In Israel, for instance, religious parties in the past defected from a minimum winning coalition in protest to the Prime Minister’s attending a symbolic ceremony on the Sabbath. The consequence was a prioritization of ideological principles or symbolic politics despite the significant loss to the religious parties of cabinet seats and political power in the government. And contrary to Riker’s model many coalitions exceeded the minimum winning number of seats. At least seventeen Israeli governments exceeded the
minimum winning coalition conditions out of a total of twenty-eight governments. In fact, contrary to Riker's rational-efficient model, Lipjhart found that many oversized or "grand" coalitions are often formed. Grand coalitions, according to Lipjhart, are usually formed in plural societies as to accommodate the diverse societal cleavages (Lipjhart, 1984). Yet, both Lipjhart, and later, Ronald Inglehart admitted to the weakening ideological commitments in favor of "value based politics" that required less comprehensive ideological identification (Lipjhart, 1984; Inglehart, 1987).

Bridging Rational and Ideological Paradigms in a Unified Structural Model

Attempts to bridge both ideological and rational explanations to parties' coalition behaviors have been made throughout the years. Most notable was the early work presented by De Swaan in 1973 in which both ideological and size variables were combined in analyzing coalition formation. De Swaan examined coalition governments in nine democratic countries, including Israel, between the period of 1918 and 1970. He investigated 108 coalition formations while considering major factors contributing to their establishment. De Swaan focused on whether the coalitions confine to the size principle as proposed by Riker or to the policy-closeness position as suggested by Axelrod. De Swaan predicted that coalitions form as minimum winning. However, he hypothesized that minimum winning requirement is conditioned by ideological closeness among partner parties. His study suggested that the minimum winning conditions can be violated in favor of ideological closeness between partners. De Swaan implemented

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9 See chapter 3 "Methodologies and Measures" for Israeli governments' share of seats in the Knesset (Table 3.2) A minimum winning coalition is a government with the minimum number of seats necessary for a Knesset majority.
COAL as a statistical analysis method in order to reveal the impact of both ideological and size variables. De Swaan's findings denied the Riker principle's exclusive explanatory power in coalition formation. As he concluded, "all theories that ignore the actors' policy positions and only take their weight into account fail to produce significant result..." (De Swaan, 1973, p. 150). At the same time, he found that "policy distant theory...produces results that are significant at a level of 3.7%: not entirely sufficient to accept, yet too good to reject the theory" (De Swaan, 1973, p. 153).

De Swaan suggested that a 'close coalition proposition' was the best explanatory synthesis of coalition formation. A close coalition, according to De Swan, is the coalition that prioritizes common policy objectives between partners while attempting to achieve the minimum size formation. De Swaan considered such a proposition to represent a theoretical improvement for its ability to incorporate both minimum-winning variables as well as closed coalition version of policy distance. Nonetheless, De Swaan's model implied greater weight to policy distance variables; his final conclusion states that "parliamentary majority coalitions tend to be closed among the policy scale and, in times of normalcy, of minimal range" (De Swaan, 1973, p. 159).

Mark Franklin and Thomas T. Mackie also attempted to reassess the importance of size and ideology in the formation of governing coalitions (Franklin and Mackie, 1984). In their assessment of past coalition research theories they found fault with previously implemented methodologies. Particularly they considered that the assumption, universe, and statistical analyses implemented by past researchers have been
responsible for generating contradictory results. Thus, and in an effort to reveal aspects of reconciliation between the various theories, Franklin and Mackie attempted to replicate past studies while joining the common universe of data that existed between the previous research studies. Additional weighting variables were given to different countries with varying numbers of coalition formations and party strengths. Both ideological and size variables were recoded as to maintain uniform coded variables across the various studies. Finally, a multiple regression analysis was conducted as to assess the best explanatory variables for coalition formation.

In their assessment of previous research, Franklin and Mackie suggested that most studies that proposed ideological closeness as the essence of coalition formation have adopted erroneous assumptions. This was particularly the case because in studying ideological or Minimum Connected Winning theories (MCW), researchers deleted from their analysis single party coalitions and gave others disproportional weights relative to their respective electoral strengths or made subjective sampling selections. When Franklin and Mackie corrected these problems they found that “ideological connectedness, as operationalized by MCW, has no special edge except when restrictive assumptions are made about what to count as a political party, when a particular weighting strategy is employed, or when the universe of countries is restricted” (Franklin & Mackie, 1984, p. 683). Through their improved data and coding techniques the analysis yielded the proposition that the additive combination of both ideology and size provided better explanation to coalition formation. Contrary to De Swaan they found size to be a more significant explanatory variable in coalition formation. Nonetheless,
Franklin and Mackie considered that the choice of country was the most significant determinant of how either ideology or size was to be considered. They claimed to have discovered, “that in some countries either ideology or size proves to be much more powerful than in others,” and they proposed that “if we could discover what it is about these countries that make them different, this might provide us with powerful additional variables with which to attack the problem of predicting coalition formations” (Franklin & Mackie, 1984, p. 688).

Reacting to parties’ changing ideological commitments, more recent research has attempted to replace the theme of party ideological proximity with parties’ policy programs. (Budge; 1993, 94) These research programs have come to be closely associated with the ‘Manifesto Project’ that aims at revealing from parties’ platform policy indicators that, along with size considerations, policy positions orient coalition outlooks. Among recent work linking size and policy considerations to coalition behavior has been that of Carol Mershon (1996, 2001) and Itai Sened (1996). Both Mershon and Sened associated policy and electoral strength to parties’ coalition behaviors. Also, Martin Lanny and Randolph Stevenson provide an empirical approach that bridges and evaluates both size and policy variables while taking into consideration institutional variations (Martin & Stevenson, 2001).

**The Stability (Duration) Structural Models of Coalitions**

Mershon has advanced an approach with the aim of revealing the causes behind what she describes as the situational coexistence of government instability and stability in
postwar Italy until 1992. Mershon noted that most Italian cabinets lasted less than two years in power, yet the leading parties in the various governments remained the same. This situation prompted Mershon to ask the question of “how can governments break up at such low cost and with so little effect on alternation?” Mershon’s inquiry led her to suggest the following proposition:

I argue that the costs of making, breaking, and maintaining coalitions depend on political institutions and on the array of parties and voters in policy space. Institutional and spatial conditions structure politicians’ opportunities and attempts to lower costs. Under some conditions ... coalitions are cheap, and politicians can easily make coalitions even cheaper. (Mershon, 1996, p. 534).

Mershon’s measurement of coalitions’ costs and benefits were measured as both office and electoral costs. Office costs were measured as the parties’ proportional share of cabinet relative to their share of Parliament. The cost of coalition formation and maintenance can be high when parties’ percentage shares of cabinet were shown to be lower than that of Parliament. Electoral costs and benefits of breaking coalitions, on the other hand, were measured as “mean changes of parties’ share of the vote between pairs of consecutive elections...” (Mershon, 1996, p. 539). Mershon also considered policy-based costs associated with coalitions’ formation, breaking and maintaining. She suggested that policy payoffs, indexed by participation in government, indicate policy influence being gained or lost by parties.

After measuring the costs associated with the existence of Italian coalitions Mershon revealed evidence supporting her proposition. She found that Italy’s coalitions are costly to sustain, yet their formation and dissolution cause little damage. This
conclusion was manifest in short-lived cabinets that at the same time closely resembled incumbent governments. Mershon finally claimed to have found evidence that "particular spatial and institutional conditions in Italy curbed the costs of assembling and dismantling coalitions and encouraged strategies that lowered costs further" (Mershon, 1996, p. 549).

Similar to Mershon, Itai Sened proposed a theoretical model that "synthesizes the office and policy approaches to coalition formation..." (Sened, 1996, p. 351). Sened's strategy was based on measuring the payoffs a party gets when joining a coalition. According to Sened, these payoffs were "the distance between the government's position and the party's ideal point in the policy-space and the share of the office-related payoffs the party receives as a member of the government in office" (Sened, 1996, p. 352). And Sened hypothesized that coalition agreements are often reached as the trade between "office-related side payments for policy compromises and vise versa" (Sened, 1996, p. 352). Sened's model suggested the existence of a "structurally stable core (SSC)" where a stable coalition is often formed after equilibrium between policy and office side payments is reached.

Sened demonstrated his model by taking the formation of Israeli coalitions after 1992 election as evidence. First, Sened used parties' manifestos and official publications about the parties' positions on different issues. He established policy space scales based on two most salient issues in Israeli politics as revealed by Arian and Shamir's public opinion surveys: religion and security. After conducting factor analysis of ruling
coalitions’ parties’ positions he constructed two Likert scales and plotted the core position of parties on a policy space. Likewise, the position of the government was plotted after coding Prime Minister’s presentations of the governments’ speeches. The parties’ share of the Knesset was integrated into the plot. His comparison to different time periods revealed that between 1948 and 1973 Labor captured an SSC position resulting in a stable government. This situation was changed between 1977-1988 having an empty SSC and resulting in unstable government. But following the election of 1992, the Labor party was able to recapture the SSC position.

**Synthetic Structural and Event Models of Coalition Behavior: Competing Perspectives**

The ideological (policy) and rational (size) debates suggest that the party’s coalition behavior is neither purely ideological nor purely rational. The Mershon and Sened studies suggest that a synthesis of both factors, perhaps conceptualized in policy space, shapes party political behavior in coalitions. However, Mershon and Sened share the same core assumptions as previous research. Particularly, they also adopt the view that a party’s rationality or policy position is the sole basis for coalition behavior. Mershon suggested that parties needed to be treated as unitary actors (Mershon, 1996, 539). Similar to previous research, contemporary work attempts to solve the theoretical difficulties of predicting coalition behavior while relying on factors exclusively associated with party characteristics.
Since Kirchheimer it has become evident that the party is not a solitary agent, but directly influenced by the changing political environment (see also Lipjhart, 1984 and Ingelhart, 1987). The consequence is that parties become more submerged in unlikely alliances where neither ideological nor rational interpretations are exclusively or even jointly able to explain the phenomenon. Alliances between ideological opposites, such as religious and left parties in Israel often generated strong and lasting coalitions. Other coalitions in Israel have conformed to the minimum-winning model, while still others tend toward the maximum winning model while having extended survival rates (Table 3.2).

Generally, the structural models in both ideological and rational versions have continued to generate varying and often conflicting results. Theories aiming to predict coalition formation have struggled to assert determining variables such as size or policy. Furthermore, this debate has yielded different visions of which formation leads to a stable or enduring partnership. Anomalies, such as Israeli coalition behaviors, continue to challenge the structuralists’ core assumptions. This matter was a reason for the rise of a competing model with primary objective of explaining coalitions’ duration using alternative explanatory variables.

Browne, Frenderis, and Gleiber (1984, 86,88) suggest that structural theories fail to account for important variables that determine coalition behaviors. They propose that the structure of the political system is subject to continuous pressure by randomly

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10 This is best explained by Webber’s “elective affinity” concept that he used in explaining the submergence of capitalist rationalism and Protestant ethics in the rise of modern capitalism.
occurring events that, subsequently, determine the behaviors of the coalitions. In their analysis of government durability they proposed a "...mathematical model of governmental dissolution in which duration is solely a function of the appearance of random events which trigger governmental collapse" (Frendreis, Gleiber, and Browne 1986, p.624) and found that "...stochastic elements are important, if not dominant, in determining the downfall of cabinet governments" (Browne, Frendreis, and Gleiber, 1986, p. 644).

The Browne, Frenderis, and Gleiber studies suggested that regardless of how efficient or well structured the coalition; events will continue to exert tremendous pressure on the partners leading to its coalitional aging and eventually death. Unforeseen wars, flow of refugees, economic crises, scandals, etc... are events that guarantee the destruction of the best-structured coalition.

Critics of the "Event" model, however, point to the "unrealism" of ruling out structural variables (Warwick, 1992). Warwick suggested that while events may have significant impact on government stability, structural variables hold important determinant power when events are controlled for (Warwick, 92, p. 875). He protested the totality of the event model since "...to expunge causal factors from the analysis totally – to treat durations as purely a function of random outside events – seems even more unrealistic. If British governments normally remain in power longer than their Italian counterparts...is surely due in part to systematic differences between the two...
not simply because British governments face fewer or less difficult events” (Warwick, 1992, p. 875).

The "event" theories marked a turning point in the study of coalition behaviors. As Warwick observed, however, their totality was problematic, and unifying them appeared urgent. Robertson along Warwick and various authors took on this task. In linking event to structure, Warwick established causality between economic indicators and government stability (Warwick, 1992). Similarly, Robertson suggested that the economy is an important determinant of structural behaviors (Robertson, 1983; 1984). Robertson examined the effect of rising prices and the loss of jobs on seventy-seven coalitions in six European democracies (Robertson, 1983). His study establishes a linkage between the structure and the outside economic environment, and suggests that “the tenure of undersized and minimum winning coalitions is substantially and significantly shortened by unemployment, while oversized coalitions are free from the effects of either inflation or unemployment” (Robertson, 1983, p. 932). Not only did Robertson measure the impact of the economy on government stability, but also attempted to examine such impact on its formation (Robertson, 1986). He proposed that economic pressure contributes to the formation of oversized coalition, while the absence of economic pressure fosters the formation of MWCs (Robertson, 1986, p. 533).

Finally, King established a unified statistical model that combined both "event" and "structural" models in analyzing the durability of coalitions (King, Alt, Burns, and Laver 1990). King's model combines recognition of stochastic element in cabinets'
dissolution while establishing systematic predictable factors for governments’ durability. The model permits the use of standard statistical methods in integrating both types of data (event and structural).

In its turn, the unified model presents some problems in the literature. These problems are associated with the questions of which event(s) should be considered most critical in determining coalition behaviors? Are there patterns to these events in their impacts on structural behaviors or is each event unique in its implication(s) as a historian may suggest? Despite various efforts to address these questions (Laver, Shepsle, 1998), they continued to require more rigorous analytical solutions. Laver and Shepsle argued that the different government formations (in game-theoretical model) provide ground for variation in impacts of “exogenous” shocks. They further suggest that the impact of these shocks may weigh on the durability of the government (Laver, Shepsle, 1998, 1999). David Baron extended the research so as to account for various shocks, namely government incomes and resources, on government formation, reformations, and terminations (Baron, 1998). Last, but not least, was the work provided by Diermeir and Stevenson in which they found support to the increasing hazard rate over government life hypothesis (Diermeir and Stevenson, 1999).

Bernard Grofman and Peter Roozendaal present us with the most up-to-date attempt to account and weight for both structural and event variables (Grofman, Roozendaal, 1997). Roozendaal also suggests that the impact of both structural and event variables on government durability can be summed in five categories: structural;
characteristics of party strength in the legislature; attributes of the government; overall ideological structure of party competition; institutional features of the political process; event: factors external to the legislature and government. (Roozendaal, 1997).

In the following section an attempt is made to develop a theoretical model that synthesizes the structural (in both its ideological and size components) with the event model (both external and internal events). The combined theoretical model will examine a wide range of variables that account for structural restraints on parties' behaviors; thus avoiding to take parties as unitary free players, an assumption typical of most research. Two structural restraining variables will be introduced: coalition ideological parameter, coalition competition. As for event, the model will set the distinctions between important event variables that impact coalition behaviors differently (internal vs. external events). In addition, the synthesized model will provide a complete analysis of coalition behaviors using time-dependent variables, thus allowing examination of coalition formation, duration, and aging. Finally, the model will provide a first step analysis toward integrating comprehensive comparative coalition data from other countries to those of Israel.

**Unifying the Structural and Event Models**

**The Size and Ideological Parameters of Coalition Systems**

Theory needs to sum up the various historical cases within a comprehensive analytical framework. The objective of the theory is to be able to identify and sort out the various causal patterns associated with particular historic outcomes. Thus, it accounts for the differences in the various historic outcomes. (George, 1969)
Strom, Budge, and Laver point to an important fallacy in most coalition literature: taking for granted the political party as a unitary free player in the political system (Strom, Budge, Laver, 1994; also Laver and Garry, 2000). The question that needs to be addressed is not only to what extent parties act ideologically, pragmatically or rationally within a coalition but also the extent to which their actions are determined by the nature of the existing coalition itself. While elaborate research has attempted to answer the first question, in this study we suggest that coalition analysis should also consider the characteristics and processes of the coalition itself, such as its size, underlying ideology, strength of competing or challenger coalition(s), and the surrounding foreign and domestic events. It is from this perspective that parties’ coalition behaviors are often derived.

The theoretical suggestion made here is that parties’ ideological closeness in coalitions should be analyzed under evolving coalition rules. While subject to ideological or policy restraints, parties are willing to make rational calculations in order to form and maintain coalitions. These calculations often violate ideological purity or size principles and deviate from inter-party ideological proximity under the pretext of political necessity. This violation usually takes place while forming a coalition between a dominant party and “volatile” parties, i.e., parties that can potentially defect to an ideologically opposite coalition (Baron, 1991). Mutual political needs force ideological concessions. As a consequence, new ideological parameters are established within which all partners in a coalition can be contained. Theoretically these ideological parameters are set outside every party’s ideological core, yet they satisfy the best possible
coalition outcome and the closest feasible ideological perspective relative to the dominant party (Baron, 1991; Sened, 1996).

Thus, coalition theory must discover ideological parameters for potential coalitions that account not only for ideological proximity but also for ideological differences among coalitions' constituents, and also account for political circumstances that cause conditions of unlikely ideological bedfellows. These ideological parameters are thought to rank among the primary determinants of parties' behaviors in an alliance. The ideal coalition is one that can set the most common ideological denominators among the parties and establish a tight ideological or policy program, thus making parties' participation in the coalition consistent with their principles and more feasible to defend and maintain. A realistic coalition under urgent electoral or political pressure, however, stretches its parameters to accommodate opposing points of view of the various parties. Thus, parties' participation in the coalition can become more costly and difficult to maintain and defend.

This study suggests that there must be an interactive relationship between pragmatic rationality and ideological parameters. (Sened, 1996; Mershon, 1996, 2001). The proposition is that within a coalition a direct relationship exists between ideological parameters and rational-efficiency that influences party behavior. The ideal model suggests that narrower ideological parameters result in the best rational outcomes that can be produced through a small sized or "minimum winning" coalition (Riker, 1962). The
pragmatic/realistic model, on the other hand, proposes that larger ideological parameters may become necessary to accommodate a larger coalition.

The ideal model can be applied during periods of relatively low political pressure, or whenever a coalition can be established without serious challenges from opposition parties to form an alternative ruling alliance (predominant-coalition system) (Sartori, 67; Elazar & Sandler, 90). The realistic model, on the other hand, can best be applied under conditions of political pressure or to situations where the threat of the opposition forming an alternative coalition is real (competitive-coalition system) (Sartori, 67; Elazar & Sandler, 90). The consequence is that parties' behaviors within a coalition-system are determined by taking into consideration the competitiveness aspect of the coalition and its surrounding political environment.

It was Arend Lipjhart who provided a similar rationale for the formation of coalition-systems. Lijphart argued that nations that are politically homogenous tend to produce a Westminster model for coalition formation. This coalition model, according to Lipjhart, is characterized by its maximum efficiency and minimum winning formation. Societies that are heterogeneous or plural, on the other hand, favor a consensus coalition system characterized by the formation of grand sized alliances (Lijphart, 1984). Lipjhart's models are applied in this study to the 'plurality of the parliamentary coalitions' rather than to society per se. Whenever a plurality of possible coalition formations is present, or competitiveness is high, we consider the consensus or even preemptive (i.e., keep partners away from the competition) as the realistic model.
Otherwise, the Westminster or the 'ideal' tight and minimum winning model is most applicable.

In the formation process, and before the establishment of the coalition, the weaknesses of parties' ideological commitments make coalitions easier to establish. Ideological constraints or parameters generate defined possibilities of various coalition configurations. Potential coalitions can be determined relative to each country's political spectrum, such as having left-religious, right-religious, left-right, or left-right-religious potential alliances, with each having a corresponding ideological parameter. Thus when forming coalitions, ideological parameters are likely to be stretched whenever the size of the coalition is enlarged or diversified. A party's rational calculus in joining or abstaining largely depends on such a structural combination.

If the seats controlled by the parties allow for potentially more than one winning coalition configuration (realistic or competitive model), then competition can be fierce between dominant parties to win volatile parties or parties that can be swayed to switch coalition ranks. Under high competition, ideological parameters are thus stretched to accommodate for diversity and larger size coalitions. In contrast, the absence of potential winning competing coalition configurations relieves dominant parties of attracting ideologically distant or opposite partners, making ideological concessions unnecessary while predictably reducing the number of partners (Table 2.1). The presence or absence of potential winning competing coalition is determined based on the relative size of the
dominant parties and their respective capacities to form winning majorities in alliance with other partners. Hypothetically, as long as no party controls a majority of the seats in Parliament more than one winning coalition is possible to form. Yet, whenever the size of the dominant party approaches that of majority seats the potential for competitors to form winning coalitions decline (See chapter 3 for definitions and measures).

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<tr>
<th>Competitiveness</th>
<th>Coalition Size</th>
<th>Ideological Parameter</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>Large</td>
<td>Wide</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Small</td>
<td>Tight</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The same rationale that governs coalition formation determines parties’ behavior within a coalition after its inception. In this study, we are further interested in parties’ behaviors contributing to coalition’s duration. Therefore, among our objectives is to reveal factors leading to or preventing party’s defection from a coalition.

Combining both rational and ideological perspectives, this study implies that parties’ behaviors within a coalition depend on the cost associated with participation. In the best possible outcomes, if both size and ideological costs for participation in a coalition are low, then probability of parties’ defection is also very low. If the ideological cost of alliance is low but accommodation is made in limiting the size of the coalition, then the overall cost is endurable and parties’ probability of defection is low or

moderate. By the same token, if the size of the coalition is large but accommodation is made in limiting ideological parameters, the cost of participation is also endurable and the probability of defection low or moderate. Otherwise, defection possibility can increase and coalition stability is threatened. The confirmation of this rationalism is a further demonstration that the nature of the coalition (size, ideology, and competitiveness) can to a large extent determine party behavior. Of course, factors such as available and competitive alternative coalitions and dominant parties will also affect these calculations.

**Accounting for Effects of “Competition” in Coalition Behaviors**

It has been previously suggested that the presence or absence of potentially alternative coalition configurations reshape both ideological parameters and coalition size. The increased potential of challenging coalitions theoretically increases the risk of defection by centrist and minor parties. Coalition competition forces ideological moderation in order to accommodate the various members within the alliance that includes potential defectors. The result is a large accommodating coalition with ideologically stretched parameters. These considerations also thereby are likely to affect the duration of the government. The coalition leader tries to minimize the risk of defections as a consequence of having ideologically unaccommodating parameters, thereby seeking to preclude unstable short duration governments. This effort to accommodate more partners, however, can run into difficulties as the partners themselves seek to exact greater “side payments” or concessions for staying in the coalition. Thus, the probability of being able to satisfy everyone would appear to go down with time.
In contrast, the situation is reversed when the presence potential challenging coalitions are reduced. While dominant parties still require the support of center and volatile parties to form ruling coalitions, the threat of their defection is not serious. Dominant party's ability to substitute small sized parties without fearing a total overthrow makes ideological tightness feasible if not a requirement for partnership. Furthermore, since the dominant party is not in an immediate threat from a challenger, the party is not pressured to enlarge the coalition partnership or to make serious policy or ideological concessions. Under these circumstances, smaller size and tighter ideological parameters theoretically extend coalition duration.

This discussion implies that coalition duration is largely determined by the cost parties are willing to pay while considering the size and ideological parameter of the coalition and the alternatives they perceive in rival potential coalitions (these might be perceived as opportunity costs). The absence of potential challenging coalitions makes the existing coalition more cost effective. It could be concluded from such a model, therefore, that under conditions of coalition competition and high cost the difficulty of maintaining accommodating alliances grows and government duration becomes shorter than under circumstances where competition is absent and partners can be shed without fear of lost power. The presence of a potential challenging coalition that could attract the centrist and volatile parties, and the high or increasingly unacceptable price for maintaining the current coalition, destabilizes it and shortens its life span. In contrast, the
absence of a coalition challenge reduces the cost associated with maintaining the coalition and would appear to maximize its duration.\textsuperscript{12}

According to Mershon, however, the cost calculations must take into consideration not only maintaining the coalition but also the cost associated with its termination (Mershon, 1996, 2001). Mershon suggested that there are cheap coalitions and more expensive ones. Cheap coalitions can be discarded and easily replaced by the dominant party, while others are indispensable. Mershon's model provides significant implications for coalition duration. Applying her model to the cases where coalition competition is high suggests that a higher cost must be paid for dismantling coalitions than under conditions of low competition, since the dominant party would risk losing governance to the challenging alliance.\textsuperscript{13} This risk forces the dominant party to make the most concessions possible in order to maintain and perpetuate its ruling alliance. In contrast, the absence of coalition competition makes alliances relatively cheap and replaceable. The dominant party grows intolerant and easily willing to dismantle and form alternative coalitions. Thus as a rival hypothesis, and contrary to the view of Grofman and Roozendaal, it might be expected that coalition competition contributes to longer coalition duration.

Furthermore, applying Lipjhart and later Mershon's thesis suggests that the existence of political pressure (coalition competition) forces ongoing coalitions to take

\textsuperscript{12} Grofman and Van Roozendaal, "Toward a Theoretical Explanation of Premature Cabinet Termination", hypothesized that the greater number of feasible alternative coalitions, the less durable, on average, will be the present coalition. European Journal of Political Research, 26, 1994, pp. 155-70.
extreme measures to guarantee their duration. That is, coalitions are more likely to form accommodating the largest possible partnership. Therefore, it is expected that under the condition of competition coalitions are likely to form having wide ideological parameters and large size partnership. It is also likely that coalitions with larger size and wider ideological parameter will be formed often jeopardizing their durability. On the other hand, the absence of coalition competition reduces the ideological and political cost of ousting coalition partners, since every smaller partner is replaceable. Smaller participants would have to abide by the narrowness of the coalition’s ideological parameters and platform or risk a forced withdrawal from the coalition. Therefore, under these circumstances – the absence of coalition competition – it is expected that coalitions would be formed having narrow ideological parameters and small-sized partnership. It is expected that the absence of coalition competition would in general reduce the durability of the coalitions. Yet, the tighter is the ideology and the smaller is the coalition (the more efficient) the more durable it is expected to be (Figure 2.1). ¹⁴

Accounting for “events” in Coalition’s Behaviors

Thus far we have considered the structural impact on coalition behaviors. What remains is the “event” variable that has been widely seen as important factor shaping the coalition system and duration in particular (Freireis, Gleiber, and Browne, 1984, 86, 88; King, 1990, Warwick 1992).

¹³ See chapter 3 “Methodologies and Measures” for a further discussion of how leaders of dominant parties in Israel are named to form governments.
¹⁴ Through a multiple linear regression analysis the association of every independent variable with the dependent variable can be calculated, while controlling for other variables.
As has been noted in literature review, the unified model, while resolving major anomalies in the structural theories, introduces new challenges to coalition theories. These challenges are related to the issue of “weighting” events as they impact the structure. The question is whether a general theory is possible to establish, factor, and predict “event” impact on coalition structure whenever it occurs. While efforts have been made to meet challenges, particularly in the later work of Laver and Shepsly (1998) and through their debate with Warwick, major obstacles remain.15

Whether event or structure is a more significant factor in the process of coalition formation and maintenance is disputable. Lupia and Strom (1995) analyzed the various structural ‘legislative and electoral’ constraints as well as event ‘exogenous shock’ variables on coalition termination. They found evidence that decision to terminate the coalition “result from the party leaders’ rational responses to the constraints of legislative and electoral institutions and the anticipated feelings of the electorate” (Lupia and Strom, 1995, p. 648). Lupia and Strom thus undermined the ‘event’ in favor of ‘structural’ variables and electoral politics. Diermeier and Stevenson’s work, on the other hand, is a further effort to resolve the anomaly between both the structure and event models (1999). Their study reaffirms earlier hypotheses that events become more hazardous as the life of a government is prolonged (1999). Thus, they establish distinctions between earlier and later weight of events on structural formation and termination. They conclude that

coalitions are more capable structurally in handling the challenges of earlier events in their life, but less so as they age.

This study adopts Diermeier and Stevenson's hypotheses; however, it suggests that a major issue remains unresolved. While accounting for government aging, the question is which events matter most in structural formation, duration, and aging? Research is still in its early stage in accounting for various 'event' variables. Nevertheless 'event' variables appear to deepen the divisions in structural frameworks, but the impact of external conflicts on coalition durability can vary across time and between political systems, such as in Britain as opposed to Germany, Japan, or Israel. Likewise if we consider domestic discontent with government conduct or the outbreak of political scandals, their impact may vary considerably in the coalition systems from one country to another.

When it comes to religious issues, for example, Israeli and Lebanese governments are sometimes extremely sensitive and the implications of religious related action can immediately determine the fate of a particular coalition at a particular moment. At least five Israeli coalition governments collapsed as a direct consequence of disputes between partners over religious issues, policies, and events.\textsuperscript{16} In France the coalition system is generally less sensitive to changes in 'religious events' compared to the flow of immigration into the country, another event variable that presents a major distinction in impact on coalition behavior. Israel, Canada, and Australia have either consistently or at

\textsuperscript{16} See Table 3.1 under 'End Reason' of coalition. Information was compiled from Keesing Contemporary Archives.
times striven to attract immigrants, and the inflow may prove stabilizing to coalitions, while the same event(s) may emerge as troubling for coalitions in France, Japan or Germany where immigration has been a more divisive political issue. Thus, what was presented by Lijphart as a 'structural model' of coalition systems may prove insufficient in light of politically charged policies or events.\(^{17}\)

This line of reasoning suggests that it is premature for 'event' research to conduct a general analysis before making the necessary distinction between the various 'events' driven coalition systems. But how is it possible that a theoretical distinction be advanced in this domain? In this study we propose that first a "country" analysis effort is required before a general clustering of coalition systems is made. In other words, research must focus on gathering event-structure variation data in separate democracies as a step toward system categorization and conclusively a general coalition theory. The case study appears as a starting point for event theory building.\(^{18}\)

The theoretical contribution of this study, therefore, is to provide an examination of whether a distinction exists between 'internal-domestic events' and 'external-foreign events' and their interactive influence on the structural behaviors of coalitions in one specific democracy. Recognizing Israel's unique geo-cultural situation and tradition, using Israel as a case study and implementing comparative analysis between the various

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\(^{17}\) Lijphart distinguished between two structural coalition models. One is typical of nations that are politically homogenous (Westminster model) and the second is established by societies that are heterogeneous or plural (Consensual model) (Lijphart, 1984). Each of these models provides distinct coalition formations.

Israeli cabinets we identify 'internal and external-event' variables' impact on coalition behavior.

Early theorization was made by J. Robertson in order to account for internal-events' impact on coalition formation (Robertson, 1986). Robertson's study suggested that minimum-sized coalitions are usually formed under conditions free from economic "event pressure." In his analysis, event pressure refers to the situation of economic stress resulting in the increase of inflation and unemployment. Such a pressure is considered polarizing because it instigates greater divisions between the socio-political strata within the country. Oversized coalitions, on the other hand, are likely to form under conditions of domestic economic pressure. In other words, Robertson's study theorizes that 'domestic pressures' press coalition toward consensualism and therefore larger size structural formation. The Robertson thesis has ideological-structural implications, suggesting that 'domestic pressures' force coalition toward consensualism and therefore wider-ideological agendas. Furthermore, according to our earlier logic, maintaining the coalition under condition of domestic pressures appears pressing though potentially relatively difficult and costly; 'Domestic pressures' push coalitions toward consensualism and therefore stability and durability, though with lower overall durability than when such pressures do not exist.

The question remains whether external-events have similar impact on coalition formation and duration. Can a hypothesis be established that 'external pressures', such as external conflict (-) and foreign aid (+), press coalition toward consensualism and
therefore larger size structural formation and wider ideological agendas? Furthermore, can it be maintained that 'external pressures' push coalition toward consensualism and therefore stability and durability that could have otherwise been greatly undermined? To answer these questions we develop and examine a synthetic structural-event model of coalition formation and duration.

A Synthetic Structural-Event Model of Coalition Formation and Duration

A. Coalition Formation Model: Predicting Size and Ideological Parameter

Coalition competition determines conditions of cabinet formation. Parties' rationality in forming alliances is mostly based on the calculation of relative party strength in parliament or system competitiveness. Equally important are the political conditions of the country both externally and internally. Parties must weigh domestic and foreign political pressures to establish the consequences of particular formation. These conditions (independent variables) as they relate to the dependent variable and particularly to duration are shown in Figure 2.5.

Hypothesis 1: High coalition competition presses toward wide-ideological parameter and large-sized cabinets (Figure 2.1).

This research predicts that coalition competition can be captured in the relative power index of dominant party to form winning coalitions. The increase in the power index of a dominant party to form winning coalitions indicates a decrease in the ability of rival coalitions to form. Thus, whenever the dominant party's power index increases
competition decreases.\textsuperscript{19} Ideological parameter is defined as the ideological distance between dominant party and the coalition’s policy objectives (See Chapter 3 for definition and measure). Coalition size is defined as the number of seats partner parties control in the Knesset.

Again the logic of Hypothesis 1 flows from our discussion of ‘cost analysis’ thesis advanced by Mershon (1996, 2001). The high cost to the dominant party of defection under competition requires the formation of accommodating grand and ideologically wide coalitions. Alternatively the decline of coalition competition provides the dominant party with a different strategy and more options for alliance formation. Thus, dominant parties afford the formation of efficient alliance keeping both policies and side-payments to a minimum. Therefore, as coalition competition declines, it is preferable for a dominant party with the absence of a challenger to form a minimum winning tight durable ruling alliance. (Figure 2.1).

\textit{Hypothesis 2: Domestic and Foreign Events’ pressure generates domestic pressure on coalitions toward consensualism and therefore large formation and wide ideological parameter} (Figure 2.1).

\textsuperscript{19} See Chapter 3 “Methodologies and Measures” for further discussion, definition, and measures.
Figure 2.1: Coalition Formation Linear Synthetic Model

Events' pressures considered are either domestic or external. Domestic events which put pressure on the political system are: economic; such as decline in GDP annual rate, increase in annual strikers and strikes, and increase in annual unemployment rate; or social, such as increase in annual immigration rate. External events are captured in terms of annual increase in the severity of external conflict and in the decline of foreign aid receipts or prospects (Figure 2.2).

The logic of these hypotheses flows from our previous discussion, which suggested that 'event pressure' creates conditions of consensualism and therefore expanded or grand alliances. For example, external conflicts often unify loyal and opposition groups against foreign threat. Internal ideological differences become less significant relative to the gain of having more unity in coalitions of grand size. The null hypotheses, however, may indicate that 'event pressure' intensifies the divergence in policy positions, thus excreting pressure toward smaller and narrower alliances as it becomes more difficult and ultimately infeasible to bridge the ideological or policy preference gaps in forming governments.
Figure 2.2: Internal and External Event Pressure Impact on Structural Formation

Internal Event Pressure

- Annual change increase in % GDP (-)
- Annual % of Unemployment (+)
- Annual % of # of strikers per strike (+)
- Annual % of immigrants per population (+)

External Event Pressure

- Annual Severity of External Conflict (+)
- Annual Foreign Aid (-)

---

Internal Event Pressure

- Annual change increase in % GDP (-)
- Annual % of Unemployment (+)
- Annual % of # of strikers per strike (+)
- Annual % of immigrants per population (+)

External Event Pressure

- Annual Severity of External Conflict (+)
- Annual Foreign Aid (-)

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B. Coalition Duration Model

Coalition’s durability appears fundamentally to be a function of two primary factors: a. event and b. structure. In other words, a coalition would last longer in power if it was most efficiently formed around a small sized and ideologically similar core (reducing defection) while taking into consideration both systematic and event factors at hand. As has been discussed in the literature there has been increasing interest in this theoretical area, particularly after the introduction of event variables (Lupia and Strom, 1995; Laver, Shepsle, 1998, 1999; Baron, 1998; Diermeir and Stevenson, 1999; Martin and Stevenson, 2001; Grofman and Roozentaal, 1997; Roozentaal 1998; Sened 1996; Mershon 1996, 2001).

In order to determine both event and structural variables we need to control for the ‘aging theme’ as advocated by Laver and Shepsle (1998) as well as by Diermeir and Stevenson (1999). It is suggested that ‘coalitions are more capable structurally to the challenges of earlier events in their life, but less so as they age’ (Laver & Shepsle 98; Diermeir & Stevenson 99). Controlling for ‘aging’ is possible by examining and comparing first year events and structural impacts on duration and those in later years after formation. Again the rational argument proposed that coalitions that are efficiently formed would be more durable than those that violate efficiency formation as proposed in previous discussion (Warwick, 1992).
Hypothesis 3: Increase in events’ pressure yields short coalition durations (Figure 2.2).

Yet the impact of increasing event pressure is most significant in shortening the duration of coalitions as they age. Again events considered are external and domestic and their impact on coalition duration is demonstrated in Figure 2.3.

Figure 2.3: Internal and External Event Pressure Impact on Coalition Duration

Internal Event Pressure
- Annual change increase in % GDP (+)
- Annual % of Unemployment (-)
- Annual % of # of strikers per strike (-)
- Annual % of immigrants per population (-)

External Event Pressure
- Annual Severity of External Conflict (-)
- Annual Foreign Aid (+)

The null hypothesis will confirm that event pressure presses toward greater consensualism and therefore longer duration. For example, external war or conflict may provide reasons for the various political groups to set ideological differences aside and align together against foreign threats. Such a situation may prolong government life rather than shortening it.

Coalition competition also is an important structural variable to consider in durational analysis. As has been advanced by Mershon’s argument we examine the thesis

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that coalitions are more valuable to dominant parties to maintain or costly to lose at higher levels of competition. Contrary to Grofman and Roozendaal (1997), under competition dominant parties will make significant concessions and efforts to maintain the coalition and not risk losing power in favor of a rival alliance. Alternatively, when competition declines the risk of dismantling and forming a coalition is reduced, so is the expected duration of the ruling alliance.

Hypothesis 4: *Increase in coalition competition contributes to long coalition durations* (Figure 2.4).

Alternatively, the null hypothesis would suggest that increase in competition increase the incentives for partners to break away for greater rewards by joining alternative coalition and therefore shorten duration.

In addition to competition, coalition’s size and ideological parameter are significant structural variables that impact durability. Adopting the efficiency model suggests that the best formation is the least costly in term of policy concessions or size of side-payments. Efficiency implies that minimum-tight coalition is the most lasting coalition while maximum-wide coalition is the least durable.

Hypothesis 5: *Wide ideological parameter shortens coalition duration* (Figure 2.4).

Hypothesis 6: *Large size coalition shortens coalition its respective duration* (Figure 2.4).
Figure 2.4: Coalition Formation and Duration: Linear Synthetic Model

Summary: A Structural-Event Synthetic Model of Coalition Formation and Duration

In sum, coalition literature has struggled to construct theoretical models predicting coalition behaviors and outcomes. Most significant were two competing paradigms rationalizing coalition formation and duration: the ideological policy-interest and the rational-efficiency models. The first expressed the party as a representative of a particular group of people struggling to achieve policy or philosophical objectives. Within this framework coalitions tend to form between ideologically close parties with similar objectives and policy intentions. The second view presented the party as an electoral opportunist agency which aims to achieve maximum gains in the electoral process and through the ruling coalition. From this perspective, coalitions form in order
to achieve the maximum possible collective benefit that no single party can accomplish alone. Excessive or unnecessary payments diminish these returns.

Both competing paradigms are found somewhat lacking. The ideological-interest model has been considerably weakened due to the prospect of "catch-all-party" phenomena. Literature, particularly after the post-War II era, points toward weakening party identification and broadening voters' volatility in many countries. Parties have become less doctrinaire and more vaguely positioned in order to attract voters. On the other hand, rational-efficient model literature failed to explain seemingly irrational patterns in coalition formations around the world. The occasional lack of minimum winning coalitions in various ruling governments provides serious opposition to this model.

In this study, it is suggested that the problem with the literature can be found in party analysis. Each approach builds on the party's rationality basis for coalition formulation and maintenance. Alternatively, for purposes of explaining seeming anomalies in existing theory, this study attempts to analyze the coalition on its own terms. First, the parties in the coalitions are not treated as pure unitary rational or ideological agents. Rather, the parties are studied within the context of an overall ideological and rational coalition system, tending toward or away from compromise. It is proposed that not only does the party shape the framework of the coalition, but also the nature of the

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coalition itself, the exogenous events in the environment, and the level of inter-party electoral competition determine parties’ behaviors. The size and ideological parameters of the coalition also dictate its duration, i.e., determine the extent to which parties are willing to stretch their compromises and not defect.

Second, this study implies that the impact of compromises on coalition duration varies with respect to political pressure of various sorts, arising from party competition and from emerging internal or external politically charged events. In other words, coalition compromises under conditions of coalition competition impact duration differently than under conditions of reduced or absent competition, since the costs and risks associated with compromise vary relative to the presence of coalition competition. Contrary to a hegemonic situation (predominant coalition-system), under competition the relative and perceived cost of coalition compromise is reduced relative to the gains.

It is hypothesized that under a predominant coalition system, the condition where one dominant party is capable of leading the formation of a ruling alliance, minimum-tight ideological parameters contribute to durable coalitions. Under a competitive coalition system, the condition where at least one rival dominant party is capable of forming a competing coalition consensual-wide ideological parameters and large-sized cabinets are often formed, thus undermining durability.

Coalition competition increases the pressure for political concession by dominant party as to accommodate partners both ideologically and through forming larger
alliances. By the same reasoning, coalition competition makes it more difficult and risky for a dominant party to dismantle a coalition. Breaking a coalition may boost the chance of the opposition to form a ruling alliance. Therefore, it is theoretically suggested that coalition competition, while widening coalitions, also contributes to longer duration.\textsuperscript{21}

In addition to coalition competition, political events determine formation and effect duration. Two distinct event variables are proposed: external and internal pressures. Both are suggested to press the coalition to be formed on an accommodative basis, i.e., larger by size and wider by ideology. The impacts of these events increase progressively as they emerge after coalition formation. The more the coalition ages in power the more these events can become factors in shortening its duration. As has been argued in the literature, events will continue to accumulate "shocks" against the coalition making them with time less sustainable and more divisive. From this hypothesis another hypothetical conclusion could be drawn suggesting that more efficient coalitions shall be more resistant over time to events changes. Thus we would expect that the longest lasting coalitions to be the smallest in size.

This synthetic model of coalition behavior can best be applied to democratic systems where coalition formations are necessary for ruling alliances. Distinctions must be made, however, as to whether the party system is predominant or competitive. Another important discrimination must be made as to categorize the system being domestically or externally event-sensitive. The model could then be applied to each

\textsuperscript{21} See Chapter 3 for further discussion definition and measure for coalition competition.
situation differently (this distinction shall be made more evident in the following chapter). This research study aims at examining this theoretical model within the context of the Israeli party system, since we can apply both propositions to Israeli coalition behaviors. The Israeli party system always dependent to some extent on coalitions was predominant before 1969 and since has become multi-polar or competitive.

Israel's case represents a challenge for coalition theories in multi-party democracies for two other important reasons. First, Israel's coalition politics synthesize both Eastern and Western cultural and political traditions. The political loyalty to religious authority by many Israeli parties, for example, reflects something of Eastern cultural-political practices, while the dominance of Labor and bourgeois secular politics mirror Western practice. Second, Israeli politics, while sharing essential characteristics of the Western democratic model, also maintains exceptional characteristics. Such characteristics pertain to Israel's foreign policy that uniquely shapes parties' ideology and coalition behaviors and to the tendency to exclude certain parties, most notably among Arab parties, from coalitions or cabinet participation. Israel foreign policy is peculiar for having an unresolved national component that continues to be expressed in the unsettled Palestinian-Israeli and Arab-Israeli national claims.

In the case of Israel we examine hypotheses 1 to 6 within two historic periods (pre-1969 vs. post-1969) that set different political formulations to the Israel's coalition structure and events. Israel's ideological landscape has been divided on Left-Right and Hawkish-Dovish ideological spectra. After 1967 the 'external' (Hawkish-Dovish)
dimension began to greatly impact the 'internal' (Left-Right) dimension of party ideology (Issac, 76; Perlemutter, 85; Arian; 98). Among the direct effects has been the fragmentation of the Israeli Left in favor of rival Right and Religious parties. During the Seventh Knesset of 1969, the Israeli political party and coalition systems transformed from a Labor-dominant toward a competitive formation.

Two approaches are proposed in chapter 3, “Methodologies and Measures,” in order to examine the underlying hypotheses of coalition formation and duration: quantitative and qualitative. We implement a quantitative analysis to examine the linear relationships that have been established in the theoretical model. However, the shortcoming of having a small sample size of Israeli coalitions (N=28) and the dramatic transformation of Israel after 1969 compels us to implement an additional qualitative comparative approach for verification, possible theoretical refinement, and alternative measures.
CHAPTER 3
METHODOLOGIES AND MEASUREMENTS

This chapter examines two methodological approaches to evaluate the theory presented in chapter 2. The first is a quantitative method using multiple linear regression analysis. The second is a qualitative method using comparative case study analysis. The purpose of having two methodologies methods is related to the small number of cases being examined in this research. Such a shortcoming makes a quantitative examination difficult to verify. An inductive qualitative approach, on the other hand, allows rigorous examination of cases studied and provides further verification and/or refinement to theoretical assumptions. This chapter discusses the unit of analysis, independent, and dependent variables implemented in both methods. It defines operational variables and measures employed in the quantitative analysis. It further discusses the qualitative method, its various phases, the criteria of case selections and systematic case evaluation and comparison.

Unit of Analysis:

This study provides an analysis of party behaviors based on the systematic characteristics of the coalition system. It establishes the universe in which parties operate. Hence, parties’ behaviors become significantly a function of coalitions’ structures and the events shaping them. Therefore, ruling coalitions are recognized as the unit of analysis while parties are considered players within those units.
After a general election the president of the country names the head of the party that received most votes in the election to establish a government. The President also names the party leader to form a government if a previous government collapses. In the event that the party leader fails to form a coalition, the President can name the head of the second dominant party to form it. In case neither is successful the President may call a new national election.

Each coalition government represents the joining of various Israeli parties that agree to govern the country while commanding a majority of seats in the Knesset. During formation process, the dominant party engages in negotiations with other smaller parties to convince them to join the coalition. In its package are offers that usually combine policy proposals, ministerial seat incentives, as well as budgetary allocation for each ministry. Israeli religious parties, for example, has conditioned their participation in the coalition to their control over Ministry of Religious Affairs. Beside the carrots the dominant party may demonstrate sticks that threaten non participating smaller parties in diverting funds and isolating supporters. A successful coalition building leads to a cabinet agreement which primarily provides a general policy proposal and a distribution of ministerial seats along with respective budget allocation.

The coalition must then be presented to the entire Knesset to receive a vote of confidence. It is essential that the coalition commands the majority of the Knesset's seats.

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22 This process has been relatively changed with the introduction of the second ballots in 1996 where the public began to cast their votes directly to the Prime Minister. The president was obliged to name the prime minister elect to form the government. However, the second ballot system was abandoned in the 2003 election. This was institutionalized following an increasing concern in the Knesset that the Second Ballot has caused greater fragmentation to the electoral system contrary to what was intended.
to win and retain confidence. A new government is said to be officially formed when it receives the confidence of the majority of Knesset’s members or MKs’ votes.\textsuperscript{24}

Many events can disturb the coalition’s life after formation. The least is abstention of some coalition members from voting when a no-confidence vote is presented against the government. On some occasions coalition members may resign either individually or by entire parties. Most threatening occasions occur when one or many parties Pullout from the coalition reducing its command of the Knesset to a minority stand. Changes in political circumstances can also lead the Prime Minister to dissolve the cabinet and/or Knesset and call for either a new election or a new government. Terminating the government may take only a small party withdrawing or a prime minister demanding its dissolution. A government’s life is officially over and the coalition is considered dead when a new government is inaugurated.

Various studies suggest different ways to define a ruling coalition among political parties. Strict definitions suggest that a ruling coalition is established each time an individual cabinet member leaves or enters the alliance (Budge, 1990). Loose definitions, on the other hand, establish that a ruling coalition remains the same when dominant parties or the Prime Minister are not changed (Mershon, 1996). Both definitions have advantages and disadvantages. Strict definitions provide a larger N-size to analyze but too many basically identical cases, particularly in policy domain. On the


\textsuperscript{24} Israeli Knesset: www.knesset.gov.il, 2003. Knesset consists of 120 MKs. The government can be dissolved when a vote of no-confidence receive a majority of votes.
other hand, loose definitions diminish the number of cases to analyze while providing essential policy differences to consider.

According to the strict definition of a coalition there could be over 60 Israeli ruling alliances between 1949 and 1999, marked by ministers' resignation and/or appointments in addition to government inaugurations by the Knesset. The loose definition, on the other hand, suggests that Israel witnessed only eleven Prime Ministers, and therefore eleven coalition governments.

This study adopts the definition officially established by Israel, listing twenty-eight Israeli ruling coalitions between 1949 and 1999 (Table 3.1). Each of these coalitions was inaugurated in the Knesset. Inauguration entails the presentation of the coalition's policy guidelines along with members of the new cabinet. The Knesset's confidence vote to the coalition establishes the formation of the new government (see Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs: http://www.mfa.gov.il).

In determining the life duration of a ruling coalition authors have disagreed over the issue of government termination (Gorman and Rosendale, 1997). Again, strict and loose definitions are relevant to this issue. Lose definition considers the resignation of a Minister as a termination while strict definition suggests only the change of the entire cabinet along with the Prime Minister as condition for a dissolution (Budge 1990 vs. Mershon 1996). Additional complications are introduced such as the consideration of care-taker government and the changes that occur within it, the death of the Prime
Minister, the establishment of an emergency government, etc... For the purpose of our analysis the termination date of the coalition is considered to be that day when a new ruling coalition is inaugurated by the Knesset (Table 3.1).

Table 3.1: Characteristics of Israeli Governments 1949-1999

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gov</th>
<th>Begins</th>
<th>Ends</th>
<th>Prime Minister</th>
<th>Begins</th>
<th>Ends</th>
<th>Reason</th>
<th>Days</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>3/10/1949</td>
<td>10/29/1950</td>
<td>Ben-Gurion</td>
<td>Election 1</td>
<td>Religious issues/Economic problems</td>
<td>599</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>10/30/1950</td>
<td>10/6/1951</td>
<td>Ben-Gurion</td>
<td>Religious issues</td>
<td>342</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>10/7/1951</td>
<td>12/22/1952</td>
<td>Ben-Gurion</td>
<td>Religious issues</td>
<td>442</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>12/23/1952</td>
<td>1/6/1954</td>
<td>Ben-Gurion</td>
<td>Resignation of PM</td>
<td>380</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>1/7/1954</td>
<td>6/28/1955</td>
<td>Shared</td>
<td>Resignation of General Zionists</td>
<td>538</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>6/29/1955</td>
<td>11/1/1955</td>
<td>Shared</td>
<td>Care taker election</td>
<td>126</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>11/2/1955</td>
<td>1/5/1958</td>
<td>Ben-Gurion</td>
<td>Election 3</td>
<td>Dispute with Ahдут Avoda over German weapons</td>
<td>796</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>1/6/1958</td>
<td>12/5/1959</td>
<td>Ben-Gurion</td>
<td>Religious issues</td>
<td>709</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>12/6/1959</td>
<td>11/1/1961</td>
<td>Ben-Gurion</td>
<td>Levon Affairs</td>
<td>688</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>6/24/1963</td>
<td>12/21/1964</td>
<td>Eshkol</td>
<td>Levon Affairs/Labor split</td>
<td>547</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>12/22/1964</td>
<td>1/9/1966</td>
<td>Eshkol</td>
<td>Electoral Opportunity</td>
<td>383</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>1/10/1966</td>
<td>3/16/1969</td>
<td>Eshkol</td>
<td>Death of PM</td>
<td>1162</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>10/10/1983</td>
<td>9/12/1984</td>
<td>Shamir</td>
<td>Weakness of Government</td>
<td>338</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>9/13/1984</td>
<td>10/19/1986</td>
<td>Peres</td>
<td>Agreement</td>
<td>768</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>10/20/1986</td>
<td>12/21/1988</td>
<td>Shamir</td>
<td>Election</td>
<td>794</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>6/18/1996</td>
<td>7/6/1999</td>
<td>Netanyahu</td>
<td>Election/Peace question</td>
<td>1113</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>7/7/1999</td>
<td>3/7/2001</td>
<td>Barak</td>
<td>Election 15</td>
<td>Peace question</td>
<td>609</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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Dependent Variables:

Three dependent variables are analyzed in two stages. In the first stage, coalition formation analysis is performed in which the dependent variables considered are coalition size and coalition ideological parameter. Coalition size is simply the number of Knesset seats controlled by the coalition upon inauguration. For our qualitative analysis, the size of the coalition can be considered either large or small. A small coalition is the coalition that is established by the minimum number of seats necessary for a Knesset majority. Another word for a small coalition is minimum winning coalition or MWC. An Israeli MWC requires the least possible number of parties in control of the least possible majority seats. When additional parties join the coalition, making their presence unnecessary for the control of a minimum winning requirements (excessive), the coalition can no longer be regarded as MWC. Therefore, we consider a MWC to be the ruling alliance with the minimum required parties to achieve simple majority. In contrast to MWC, a large coalition (LWC) is that which exceeds the minimum winning requirement with more parties than needed included in the alliance. Eleven Israeli governments were established as minimum winning coalitions while seventeen were larger than minimum formations (Table 3.2).

26 Based on events as covered by Keesing's Contemporary Archives 1949-1999.
Table 3.2: Size and Ideological Parameters of the Israeli Governments 1949-1999.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Government</th>
<th>SEATS</th>
<th>SIZE</th>
<th>Coalition Ideology</th>
<th>Ideological Closeness</th>
<th>Ideological Parameter</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>LWC</td>
<td>L-C-R</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>W</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>LWC</td>
<td>L-C-R</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>W</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>MWC</td>
<td>L-R</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>LWC</td>
<td>L-C</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>W</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>LWC</td>
<td>L-C</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>W</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>MWC</td>
<td>L-R</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>LWC</td>
<td>L-C</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>W</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>LWC</td>
<td>L-C</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>W</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>LWC</td>
<td>L-C-R</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>W</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>LWC</td>
<td>L-R</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>W</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>LWC</td>
<td>L-R</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>W</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>LWC</td>
<td>L-R</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>W</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>LWC</td>
<td>L-R</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>W</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>LWC</td>
<td>L-R</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>W</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>LWC</td>
<td>L-R</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>W</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>MWC</td>
<td>L-R</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>MWC</td>
<td>L-R</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>MWC</td>
<td>RT-C-R</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>MWC</td>
<td>RT-C-R</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>MWC</td>
<td>RT-C-R</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>LWC</td>
<td>L-RT-R</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>W</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>LWC</td>
<td>RT-L-R</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>W</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>LWC</td>
<td>RT-L-R</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>W</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>MWC</td>
<td>RT-R</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>MWC</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>MWC</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>MWC</td>
<td>RT-R</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>LWC</td>
<td>L-C-R</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>W</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Coalition ideological parameter, on the other hand, represents the ideological distance between the dominant party policy position and that of the coalition as a whole after formation. In our quantitative approach we content code dominant parties' manifestos and government's policy guidelines in order to determine the distance

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27 An Israeli MWC requires the least possible number of parties in control of the least possible majority seats. When additional parties join the coalition making their presence unnecessary for the control of a minimum winning requirements the coalition is no longer regarded as MWC.

28 Governments' composition of parties ideologically identified as Left (L) Right (Rt) Center (C) or Religious (R). This classification is provided by Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs (www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp7MFAHfyd0).

29 Ideological Closeness Index of coalition is developed by Ian Budge where 1 indicates very close while 6 very wide.
between them as being the ideological parameter (see below for measurement and definition).^{30}

In the qualitative section ideological parameters are said to be tight or wide. Israeli coalitions are formed by a partnership of parties that are categorized as left, center, right, or religious. The Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs provides ideological categorization of Israeli parties and ruling coalitions since 1949. Budge provides an ideological closeness index of Israeli parties within each government. We consider ideological parameter of the coalition to be tight (T) whenever Budge's ideological closeness index scores less than 3; otherwise the coalition is said to be wide (W) (Table 3.2).

In the second stage the durational analysis is conducted in which the dependent variable considered is the number of days the coalition lasts in power. As has been discussed, the count begins in the day the government is inaugurated and runs until the day it is replaced by an alternate. In the qualitative case study we examine the shortest vs. the longest-lived Israeli coalitions in order to compare explanatory variables (see below for further examination of case selection criteria).

**Independent Variables:**

In order to explain cabinet formations two types of independent or explanatory variables are considered. The first are structural, i.e., variables that are measurable through the institutional structure of the government. In this case it is the dominant party's power index which is obtained by measuring the power of the dominant party to form a winning coalition while considering the various possible partnerships. Party power index is established after every national election.

Whenever the dominant party's control of the Knesset increases we assume that coalition competition decreases. The power growth of the dominant party decreases the opportunity for rival coalitions to be formed. We used Banzhaf's power index (see Banzhaf Power Index in Appendix B) that calculates the power of the dominant party to form winning coalitions within the Knesset (See below for measures). To confirm the validity of our measure we also established a "feasibility" of coalition formation table showing the ideological coalitions that were potentially possible along party ideology (Table 3.3). This was done by listing all Israeli political parties that have won Knesset's entries since 1949 (Table 3.10). Then, we grouped the parties as left, religious, right, or anti-system parties as established by *International Almanac of International History* as well as Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs. For each ideological category we added the number of seats each camp could have "feasibly" controlled in the Knesset, not including anti-system parties, as listed in Table 3.3. (See below for further discussion)

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31 Banzhaf power index provides a % power of each party's ability to form a winning majority among a population of parties based on the number of seats each party controls. The formula for calculating the power is provided in the Appendix.
projected ‘feasible’ alliances which add the religious parties to either the left or the right camps.

Table 3.3: Knesset Seats by Ideologically Feasible Coalitions and Dominant Party

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Power Index 1949-1999$^{32}$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/25/49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7/30/51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7/26/55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11/3/59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8/15/61</td>
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<td>10/28/65</td>
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<tr>
<td>10/28/69</td>
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<tr>
<td>12/31/73</td>
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<td>5/17/77</td>
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<td>6/30/81</td>
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<td>6/23/84</td>
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<td>11/1/88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6/23/92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5/29/96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5/20/99</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* A “feasible” winning coalition with more than 60 seats (50%) of the Knesset.
** Anti-System parties consist of non-Zionist parties primarily communist and Arab parties.

Both measures reflect similar conclusions suggesting that the larger a “feasible” coalition, the greater is the power of the dominant party to form a winning coalition and, therefore, the lower coalition competition.$^{33}$ Table 3.3 shows that ‘feasible’ winning alliances control of Knesset’s seats grow as the power of the dominant party to form winning coalitions increase. Competition increase as indicated by the ability of both the

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$^{32}$ We categorized Israeli parties as left, right, or religious based on the description provided by International Almanac of International History, 2nd Edition, 1982.

$^{33}$ The only exception of this pattern occurred in 1969 election. In 1969 election almost all left oriented parties joined the Alignment (56 seats) forming a grand labor alliance. No left-oriented “system party” was left outside this grand coalition bloc. Therefore when Benzahaf power index calculation is made without taking into consideration potential ideological partners it scores high. However, if ideological consideration was to be made, the Alignment could have only added 2 additional seats to a left alliance short of a ruling majority.

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right and the left to form winning coalitions while the power of the dominant party declines particularly since 1977 Knesset election.

For the qualitative case study analysis coalition competition is said to be low when dominant party's power index to form a winning coalition scores above 80 or when an ideological alliance is capable of controlling a majority of the seats. As indicated in table 3.3 alliances of left-parties were practically capable of forming governments throughout pre-1969 without needing the support of outside ideological camps. These situations indicate low-level of ideological competition within the Knesset before 1969 election. Additional indications of low competition are often observed in the low occurrence of defection from parties' ranks. At low competition, defection from parties and by parties from alliances is hardly rewarding because it does not impact the overall balance of power within the Knesset. In contrast, coalition competition is said to be high when dominant party's power index to form a winning coalition scores low, i.e., below 80 or when an ideological alliance is not capable of controlling a majority of seats in the Knesset. At high competition defection from party ranks or by parties from coalitions can be rewarding due to the increasing values of defectors in tilting the balance of power in favor of one Knesset's pole rather than another.

The second set of variables considered in analysis of coalition formation are event pressures, i.e., variables that vary on yearly bases relative to internal and external political developments [See below for further illustration of variables and measures].
These variables account for a variety of "internal" and "external" political events that present pressure on structural variation during alliance formation (see chapter 2).

Event variables are considered in the 1st stage analysis, i.e., the formation analysis based on developments a year prior to government's inauguration. What are the impacts of prior events on the formational structure of the government? This study considers the following variables as a source for explaining size and ideological formations of governments: annual severity of external conflict, annual foreign aid, annual percentage change in Gross Domestic Product, annual percentage of immigrants relative to population, annual percentage of unemployment, annual percentage of strikers per strikes. [See Appendix C: Data Structure]. In the quantitative study various "event pressures" are also included: United Nations resolutions, inflation rate, and economic growth.

In the 2nd stage durational analysis event pressure variables are combined with formative variables, i.e., coalition size and ideology parameter, as to determine their combined impact on the durability of the government (Figure 2.4). In order to assess the variation of structural vs. event variables on the duration of governments as they age we examine the model in stages. First we examine duration based on first year events following government formation. Second, we examine duration based on events that proceeded government termination. This makes our structural independent variables act as control variables for comparison. The contrast will establish the different significance of structural vs. event variables on duration as coalition ages in power.
Finally we examine our hypotheses based on pre-1969 vs. post-1969 Israeli coalitions. Our rationale for this comparison is provided in Chapter 1 and 2 where we establish grounds for introducing such a controlled comparison design.

**Measuring Ruling Coalitions’ Ideologies:**

Definition: Coalition ideology is defined in this study as the combined ideological policies taken by a coalition on domestic-liberal and external-peace positions (C) as expressed in the *Principle Guidelines of the Government*.

Upon its formation every Israeli government is required to present a policy statement to the Knesset entitled “The Principle Guidelines of the Government” (PGG). This statement represents an actual agreement drafted by a coalition of political parties who have agreed either to support or to share the new cabinet. In his inauguration speech in 1999 Mr. Barak defined the PGG as follow: “the guidelines constitute the identity card of the government, the principles of its policy and its declaration of intent.” By agreeing to the PGG, it becomes binding for the parties in the coalition to support every government policy that is inspired by the PGG. Violation to these policy principles can invite immediate fragmentation in the coalition and may lead to the collapse of the government. This makes the PGG a major source that underlines the government’s political program and coalition’s ideology.

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34 Speech by Prime Minister Ehud Barak during the Presentation of the 28th Government to the Knesset Jerusalem, July 6, 1999.
In this study, a content coding is conducted for government guidelines using Ian Budge’s approach to coding party platforms. For governments that adopted previous governments’ PGG, the speech of Prime Minister’s speech upon introducing the government are coded and added to the previous PGG. Budge coded party platforms as they emerge in newspapers or publications of their respective parties. The coding was aimed to reveal the saliency of policy issues that were emphasized and prioritized by political parties throughout electoral campaigns. Budge’s coding scheme provided seven general policy domains: External Relations, Freedom and Democracy, Government, Economy, Welfare and Quality of Life, Fabric of Society, and Social Groups. Each domain was divided into various defined categories for the total sum of 54 sub-domains [See Appendix A for definitions]. We made adjustments to the sub-domains as they relate to the particular circumstances of Israeli politics. For example, we replaced Budge’s sub-domain “favorable mention of European community” with what we thought a category related to Israel’s case as “favorable mention of Jewish community”. Furthermore, we inserted the following significant Israeli sub-policies: (609) immigration and settlement, (610) support of religious laws (611) same as (610) but negative, and (612) Jerusalem.

36 Dataset CMPr3 (Author A Volkens), Comparative Manifestos Project, Science Center Berlin, Research Unit Institutions and Social Change (Director H-D Klingemann) in cooperation with the Manifesto Research Group (Chairman I Budge). The dataset is also referred to as SN3437- Comparative Manifestos Project: Programmatic Profiles of Political Parties in Twenty Countries, 1945-1988. Description of the data and method of order is available online at http://www.data-archive.ac.uk/findingData/snDescription.asp?sn=3437.
37 Inter coder reliability test was made by having two university students content-coding the same five PGG texts that were randomly selected. My content coding agreed with that of the students over 90% of the times.
Because Israeli politics is highly partisan, both cabinet and the Knesset tend to be driven by the same ruling coalition agenda (Asher, 1998). For this reason, the PGG represents not only the program of the cabinet, but it sets the scope of the legislative agenda in the Knesset. For example, when the Likud-led coalition began to rule Israel in 1977 its PGG prioritized the support of religious institutions among other objectives. This was also reflected in its legislative activities in the Knesset. The legislative agenda was highly religious and the religious institutions received its highest financial support from the government through out this period.\textsuperscript{38}

Since the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948, twenty-eight coalition governments have adopted twenty-two PGGs. Most PGGs were authored by newly emerging coalitions reflecting the new political policy direction of the government. Coalitions that underwent minor changes in their formation or policy programs, particularly during the life of the same Knesset, occasionally adopted the same program of the previous coalition. This makes the formation of new PGG an indicator of major changes in the policy objectives of the emerging coalitions and, therefore, of the government's programs (Table 3.4).

\textsuperscript{38} In 1976/77 Under the Labor government Ministry of Religious Affairs received annual budget of only 208.2 millions. Since 1977 Likud government, the ministry’s budget continued to be annually doubling until it reached 1615 millions in 1980/81. See Statistical Abstract of Israel, Central Bureau of Statistics under Government Expenditure.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gov</th>
<th>Document Date</th>
<th>Document Title</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>10/7/1951</td>
<td>Basic Outlines of the Policy of the Government</td>
<td>Israel Government Yearbook, Israel Office of Information, 1951</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>1/7/1958</td>
<td>Ben Gurion's Statement to the Knesset</td>
<td>Israel Knesset Archive, 1955</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>8/24/1963</td>
<td>Statement to the Knesset by P.M. Eshkol</td>
<td>Israel Knesset Archive, 1959</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>10/22/1964</td>
<td>Statement to the Knesset by P.M. Eshkol</td>
<td>Israel Knesset Archive, 1959</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>1/12/1966</td>
<td>Basic Principles of the New Government's Programme</td>
<td>Israel Knesset Archive, 1966</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>6/3/1974</td>
<td>Address in the Knesset by P.M. Rabin</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1974</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>10/20/1986</td>
<td>Statement in the Knesset by P.M. Designate Shamir</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1986</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

39 Previous was adopted with no adjustment as presented by Gurion on Nov.1, 1950, See Keening Contemporary Archives, December 2-9, 1950, p.1131a.  
40 Previous was adopted with no adjustment as presented by Share. See Sharett's speech on January 25, 1954 to the Knesset. Israel Government Yearbook, 1949.  
41 A caretaker government was formed with no new guidelines. See Keening: July 9-16, 1955, p. 14308a  
42 Previous was adopted with adjustment as presented by Gurion. See Keening's Contemporary Archives, Jan. 25-Feb1, 1958, p. 15990  
43 Previous was adopted with adjustment as presented by Gurion. See Israel Knesset Archive, 1961, Translated.  
44 Previous was adopted with adjustment as presented by Eshkol. See Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Volume 1-2: http://www.mfa.gov.il/mja/go.asp?MFAH00d4d0  
45 Previous was adopted with adjustment as presented by Eshkol. See Statement to the Knesset by P.M Eshkol in Hebrew 1964, p. 675. Also see Keening Contemporary Archive, online http://keesings.gov.pi.net/keesing/country3055.htm. Volume 11/January 1965/Israel  
46 Previous was adopted with adjustment as presented by Mrs. Meir. See Major Knesset Debates, 1948-1981, Netanel Lorch, University Press of America, pp. 1650-1653  
47 Previous was adopted with adjustment as presented by Mrs. Meir. See online Volume 1-2: http://www.mfa.gov.il/mja/go.asp?MFAH00d4d0. Also available in Hebrew, Israel Knesset Archive, 1974  
48 See online Volume 1-3: http://www.mfa.gov.il/mja/go.asp?MFAH00e1g0. Also available in Hebrew, Israel Knesset Archive, 1974.  
49 See Israel Foreign Policy, 1977  
50 See The Jerusalem Post, Thursday, August 6, 1981.  
51 Translated to English from Hebrew.  
52 Previous was adopted without adjustment. See Israel Foreign Policy, 1984.  
53 Previous was adopted with adjustment as presented by Shamir. See Israel Foreign Policy, pp. 515-521.  
54 See Israel Foreign Policy, 1988. p. 1-4  
55 See the Jerusalem Post, Tuesday, June 12, 1990.  
56 Same as 1995 Peres's Guidelines. Translated from Hebrew to English.
A rectangular data matrix was established where each Israeli ruling coalition was content-coded according to its respective coalition guideline. The data matrix was established where the unit of analysis was the coalition (case) entered in the rows while the sub-policy domains were entered in the columns (variables). Sentences in the document were coded according to each sub-policy domain. We then counted the sentences as they fell in their respective sub-policy category. Then, we calculated for each government the mean percentage of each sub-policy out of all sub-policies. These mean scores were entered in the database as proportional sub-policy factors. The sums of these sub-policies were then calculated as to determine the factor of each of the seven major domain policies (See Appendix A).

A new variable was added as an indicator of coalition’s “liberalism”. This variable subtracted conservative sub-policies from liberal sub-policies. We implement Patterson’s definition of “liberal” policies being those which propose active role for government in area of economic security and a lesser role in area upholding traditional values, whereas conservative policies seek the contrary (Patterson, 2002, p. 172). We also established a similar variable as a peace policy indicator. This variable subtracted all “security” from those of “peace” oriented sub-policies. Our operational definitions of

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

⁵⁸ The Jerusalem Post, Tuesday, June 18, 1996.
⁵⁹ See http://www.laborisrael.org/government.htm

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security sub-policies are the sentences that stress defense, security, strength, and anti-terrorism in contrast to peace oriented policies that emphasize conflict settlement, negotiation, concession, cooperation, and mutual recognition. Each of these sub-policies is numbered as shown in the formulas below (definitions are provided by Budge in the Content Coding Appendix A).

\[ LC (X) = 201 + 202 + 301 - 302 + 401 + 504 - 505 + 506 - 507 - 601 + 602 - 603 + 604 - 605 + 606 + 607 + 608 - 610 + 611 - 612 + 701 + 702 + 703 - 704 + 705 + 706 \]

\[ PC (Y) = 101 - 102 + 103 - 104 + 105 + 106 \]

LC is the coalition liberal (X) ideological position (Figure 3.2).

PC is the coalition peace (Y) ideological position (Figure 3.2).

Then \( C(LC, PC) \) or coalition ideology is the government’s joint position on the liberal-peace dimensional space.

---

60 See Content Coding Appendix on the general coding frame and definitions.
Table 3.5: Sub-Policies Codes Considered in Liberalism Score Calculation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>201</td>
<td>Freedom and Domestic Human Rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>202</td>
<td>Democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>301</td>
<td>Decentralization: Positive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>302</td>
<td>Decentralization: Negative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>401</td>
<td>Enterprise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>504</td>
<td>Social Services Expansion: Positive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>505</td>
<td>Social Services Expansion: Negative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>506</td>
<td>Education Pro-Expansion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>507</td>
<td>Education Anti-Expansion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>601</td>
<td>Defense of National Way of Life: Positive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>602</td>
<td>Defense of National Way of Life: Negative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>603</td>
<td>Traditional Morality: Positive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>604</td>
<td>Traditional morality: Negative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>605</td>
<td>Law and Order</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>606</td>
<td>National Effort of Social Harmony</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>607</td>
<td>Communalism, Pluralism, Pillarization: positive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>608</td>
<td>Communalism, Pluralism, Pillarization: negative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>610</td>
<td>Support of Religious Laws: Positive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>611</td>
<td>Support of Religious Laws: Negative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>612</td>
<td>Jerusalem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>701</td>
<td>Labor Groups: Positive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>702</td>
<td>Labor Groups: Negative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>703</td>
<td>Agriculture and Farmers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>704</td>
<td>Other Economic Groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>705</td>
<td>Underprivileged Minority Groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>706</td>
<td>Non-economic DemoFigureic Groups</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.6: Sub-Policies Codes Considered in ‘Peace’ Score Calculation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>101</td>
<td>Foreign Special Relationships: Positive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>102</td>
<td>Foreign Special Relationships: Negative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>103</td>
<td>Decolonization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>104</td>
<td>Military and Security: Positive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>105</td>
<td>Demilitarization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>106</td>
<td>Peace</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Based on our above calculations, each ruling coalition’s ideology was plotted on a Liberalism-Peace dimensional space (Figure 3.1). This plot illustrates the distributions of the Israeli governments on the Peace-Liberal ideological scale. Among the most peace oriented Israeli governments was the 16th coalition scoring 46.58 (Table 3.8). This government was initially a national unity headed by Golda Meir, but soon became a left-
leaning coalition. The government position was the establishment of peace with Arab states and the end of hostility. The government adopted the Rogers Plan (the peace initiative of the U.S. Secretary of State) which proposed the formula 'land for peace.' Yet, it was among the shortest lived government in Israel’s coalition history. Among the most liberal governments were the first two established in Israel. Both of these governments were Labor dominated and headed by David Ben Gurion. These governments strongly leaned toward early social idealism (Table 3.8).

Figure 3.1: Government's Ideology 1949-1999

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Measuring Dominant Party Ideology in Ruling Coalitions

Definition: Dominant party ideology is defined in this study as the ideological policies taken by a dominant party in a ruling coalition on domestic-liberal and external-peace positions (P) as expressed in the party's election platform.

We implement Budge’s party platform data in order to determine parties’ ideology. Budge’s ideological closeness approach suggests that parties’ emphases on policies determine their corresponding ideologies. As has been previously discussed, Budge coded party platforms as they emerge in newspapers or in publications. The coding was aimed to reveal the saliency of policy issues that were emphasized and prioritized by political parties throughout electoral campaigns. Budge’s coding scheme provided the same seven general policy domains in twenty democracies examined including Israel. Each domain was divided into various defined categories for the total sum of 54 sub-domains [See Content Coding Appendix A for definitions].

Note that our content coding method for PGG is the same as that used by Budge with respect to party platforms. However, while we inserted new sub-policy categories specific to Israel in our PGG coding (108, 609, 610, 611, and 612) Budge did not have them in his party platform data. This is because Budge aimed at providing general policy categories common to most democracies. These added categories, however, do not present discrepancies between both data sets when calculating ideological position in Israel in either the PGG or party platform. Our aim is not to merge the data sets but rather to calculate ideological positions of governments and parties. The ideological position formula we implement accounts for all possible sub-policies that contribute to either peace or liberalism positions. Budge’s party platform data, while not specifically including the sub-policy categories we added, incorporate them in other categories that our formula accounts for as well. For example, our formula subtracts traditional morality (604) in measuring liberalism (LC or LP). In Budge’s coding scheme religious laws (610) -- a category that we established -- is incorporated under traditional morality (604). Thus, when we calculate ideological liberalism (LC or LP) the same result will be found whether we subtract 604 that incorporate 610 in Budge’s data or we subtract 604 and 610 that are separately established in our content coding. The only reason we present these additional categories is to establish a database particular to Israel that accounts for its peculiarities in future studies.
Budge’s dataset ends in 1988. We updated Budge’s data as follows: Dominant parties in coalitions publish their respective policy platforms in various journals, magazines, and newspapers. *Israel Government Yearbook* has consistently published major Israeli parties’ platforms. The intention of this study is to conduct a content analysis of the dominant Israeli parties within the ruling coalitions and to later calculate coalition’s ideological parameter. Using the same content coding approach implemented by Budge, we coded dominant parties’ platforms from 1988 until 1999 (Table 3.7). These documents are very typical of those implemented by Budge’s study.

### Table 3.7: Dominant Party Platforms 1992-1999

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Election</th>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Document</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>Labor</td>
<td>Party Guide for the Perplexed Voter</td>
<td><em>Jerusalem Post</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>Likud</td>
<td>Party Guide for the Perplexed Voter</td>
<td><em>Jerusalem Post</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Labor</td>
<td>Platform for Elections to the 14th Knesset</td>
<td><em>Ministry of Foreign Affairs</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Likud</td>
<td>1996 Likud Party Platform</td>
<td><em>Ministry of Foreign Affairs</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Labor</td>
<td>1999 Electoral Platform</td>
<td><em>Jerusalem Post</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Likud</td>
<td>The Only Peace That Will Hold</td>
<td><em>Jerusalem Post</em></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A data matrix was established where the unit of analysis was the party (case) entered in the rows while the sub-policy domains were entered in the columns (variables).

All sentences in the document were coded according to each sub-policy domain. We

---

62 Inter coder reliability test was made by having two university students content-coding the same five PGG texts that were randomly selected. My content coding agreed with that of the students over 85% of the times.

63 Description of the documents, data, and method used by Budge is available online at [http://www.data-archive.ac.uk/findingData/snDescription.asp?sn=3437](http://www.data-archive.ac.uk/findingData/snDescription.asp?sn=3437).

64 Jerusalem Post Supplement – Election 1992

65 *ibid.* This document, however, was not used in our analysis because the Likud didn’t form a government.


67 The Jewish Student Online Research Center (JSOURCE) later became the Jewish Virtual Library. “1996 Likud Party Platform” [http://www.us-israel.org/jsource/Politics/likud.html](http://www.us-israel.org/jsource/Politics/likud.html). This was an official translation from the Likud Party platform, chapter 1.

68 Jerusalem Post, “1999 Electoral Platforms” 1999 Election Supplement. We also coded and added the Jerusalem Post’s interview with Barak “Netanyahu is living the Truman Show” (1999 Election Supplement).

69 We coded but didn’t add this document in our analysis because Likud was not part of the Government. This document was an election interview with Netanyahu conducted by Jerusalem Post “The Only Peace that will Hold is a Peace we can Defend” (1999 Election Supplement).
counted the sentences as they fell in their respective sub-policy category. Then, we calculated, for each party, the mean percentage of each sub-policy out of all sub-policies. These mean scores were entered in the database as proportional sub-policy factors. For example, a party platform with ten sentences emphasizing "need for strong military" out of a total of 100 sentences receives .1 or 10% factor for the sub-policy category of "military and security: positive" (104).

Sub-policies are grouped into seven general domain policies. One of these general domain policies, for example, is 'external relations' which include 'military and security: positive" in addition to others sub-policies such as 'decolonization' (see Content Coding Appendix A).

'Liberalism' is a variable we calculate based on our sub-policy scores. This variable subtracts conservative sub-policies from liberal sub-policies. We established a similar variable as a peace policy indicator. This variable subtracts all security from those of peace oriented sub-policies in the same manner we conducted our calculation of the coalition ideology.

\[
LP (X) = 201 + 202 + 301 - 302 - 401 + 504 - 505 + 506 - 507 - 601 + 602 - 603 + 604 - 605 + 606 + 607 - 608 - 610 + 611 - 612 + 701 - 702 + 703 - 704 + 705 + 706 \]

\[
PP (Y) = 101 - 102 + 103 - 104 + 105 + 106.
\]

LP is the party liberal (X) ideological position (Figure 3.2).
PP is the party peace (Y) ideological position (Figure 3.2).

Then P(LP, PP) or party ideology is the party’s joint position on the liberal-peace dimensional space.

Based on our above calculations, each dominant party ideology was plotted on a Liberalism-Peace dimensional space (Figure 3.2).

Figure 3.2: Dominant Party Ideology 1949-1999

Figure 3.2 shows each dominant party’s ideological position based on the content coding of its election platform. For example, among the most ‘dovish’ Israeli dominant parties ever to emerge was Mapai under Ben Gurion during the 7th government in 1955.

---

70 See Content Coding Appendix on the general coding frame.
The party's platform consistently proposed the achievement of peace with Arabs. The party scored over 30 on the 'peace' scale (Table 3.8). The dominant party under the 20th and 19th governments, on the other hand, was the most conservative. The Likud was the dominant party under Begin then Shamir respectively scoring -57 on the liberal scale (Table 3.8).71

**Measuring Coalition Ideological Parameters**

Definition: A coalition ideological parameter (I) is defined as the distance between the ruling coalition's ideology (C) and that of the dominant party (P).

\[ IL(X) = CL - PL \]

IL is the liberal (X) ideological parameter of each coalition.

\[ IP(Y) = CP - PP \]

IP is the peace (Y) ideological parameter of each coalition.

Then, the overall coalition ideological parameter or I (IL, IP) is IL + IP and it is calculated as the distance between two points: \( d = \sqrt{(x_2-x_1)^2 + (y_2-y_1)^2} \) or I as the distance between P and C: \( I = \sqrt{(PP-CP)^2 + (PL-CL)^2} \) (Figure 3.3). Each Israeli government has an ideological parameter being the distance between its PGG and the dominant party platform.

---

71 Although Labor's platform, throughout the various governments and particularly that of Ben Gurion, emphasized the achievement of peace, events often contradicted rhetoric. The 7th government, for example, was supposed to be among the most 'dovish', yet it was confronted with major military conflict against Arab countries, particularly in the Sinai Campaign. Similar situations were faced by the Likud governments which were supposed to have stood for 'hawkish' agenda. During both 19th and 20th Likud
Figure 3.3: Theoretical Illustration of Ideological Parameter

![Diagram showing the theoretical illustration of ideological parameter with axes for Left and Right, and positions for Dovish and Hawkish.]

Table 3.8: Content Scores of Governments and Dominant Parties' Ideologies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Government</th>
<th>CP</th>
<th>CL</th>
<th>PP</th>
<th>PL</th>
<th>I</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>1.82</td>
<td>9.62</td>
<td>9.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>1.92</td>
<td>9.62</td>
<td>9.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>-3.85</td>
<td>12.31</td>
<td>11.36</td>
<td>-4.55</td>
<td>22.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>-0.87</td>
<td>15.65</td>
<td>11.36</td>
<td>-4.55</td>
<td>23.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>-0.87</td>
<td>15.65</td>
<td>11.36</td>
<td>-4.55</td>
<td>23.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>-0.87</td>
<td>15.65</td>
<td>11.36</td>
<td>-4.55</td>
<td>23.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6.13</td>
<td>31.76</td>
<td>-2.35</td>
<td>32.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5.86</td>
<td>31.76</td>
<td>-2.35</td>
<td>32.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>5.71</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>-2.69</td>
<td>4.30</td>
<td>10.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>5.71</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7.78</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>5.07</td>
<td>9.68</td>
<td>7.78</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>5.49</td>
<td>8.86</td>
<td>7.78</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>8.18</td>
<td>9.55</td>
<td>22.22</td>
<td>2.22</td>
<td>15.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>6.89</td>
<td>0.82</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>6.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>7.17</td>
<td>10.75</td>
<td>0.82</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>12.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>46.58</td>
<td>2.74</td>
<td>2.13</td>
<td>-2.13</td>
<td>44.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>12.24</td>
<td>18.33</td>
<td>2.13</td>
<td>-2.13</td>
<td>21.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>18.75</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>29.09</td>
<td>-16.36</td>
<td>19.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-62.32</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-57.14</td>
<td>5.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>6.82</td>
<td>2.27</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-57.14</td>
<td>59.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>8.82</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-0.97</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>9.84</td>
<td>-1.64</td>
<td>-0.97</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>4.94</td>
<td>-3.70</td>
<td>1.03</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>5.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>5.13</td>
<td>-3.85</td>
<td>1.03</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>5.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>8.05</td>
<td>14.09</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>12.68</td>
<td>8.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>-1.39</td>
<td>3.47</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>12.68</td>
<td>9.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>1.27</td>
<td>2.55</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7.69</td>
<td>5.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>1.70</td>
<td>8.94</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3.70</td>
<td>5.50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

governments' major peace steps were taken to end the state of war with Egypt as concluded in the Camp David peace agreement.
Figure 3.4 illustrates the pattern of Israeli governments policy position distance from that of dominant parties. The Figure shows that later Israeli governments were more coherent with their dominant parties than predecessors. The 20th government, for example, had an I value of 59.80 scoring very high (Table 3.8). Indeed this government was very ideologically incoherent, with the Likud greatly differing from the PGG. The 20th government was a national unity government with a range of partners that included left, right, and religious parties. Such a range of wide ideological coalition makes the PGG a representative to the least common policy denominator among all partners. This also makes the dominant party further apart from the PGG.

---

72 This study will aim to reveal reason for such variation. Supports are found in the analysis chapter to the claim that increase in structural competitiveness and decline in economic pressure bring about efficient formations (tight rank and small formations).
Figure 3.4 also shows that the most ideologically coherent government was the 27th government headed by Netanyahu and scoring 5.3 on the ideological parameter scale (Table 3.8). This reflects the small number of partner parties with very close ideological positions; making the PGG with most ideological common denominator and placing it very close to the Likud's principle policy positions.

**Measuring Coalition Size**

Definition: Ruling coalition's size is the original number of Knesset's seats controlled by coalition partner parties.

Consideration of coalition's size could be the number of parties within the coalition. However, such a variation has not been considered in our quantitative analysis for two reasons. First, there are not many significant variations in the number of parties throughout the coalitions. Almost all coalitions consisted of 4 or 5 parties. Second, and more importantly, such a consideration is well accounted for in the number of seats the coalition as a whole controls. Most significant to our analysis is to examine the size of the coalition in terms of the number of seats it controls which indicate the extent to which the coalition maintain control over the Knesset as a whole.

Ian Budge's "Handbook of Democratic Government: Party Government in 20 Democracies (1945-1990)" provides detailed information about every ruling coalition that was formed in Israel from 1945 to 1990. The information provided by Budge
includes the number of parties participating in the coalition, the number of Knesset seats
they control, the cabinet ministry(ies) each party controls, in addition to other
information.\footnote{Budge, Ian; Jaap Woldendorp and Hans Keman "Handbook of Democratic Government: Party Government in 20
Democracies (1945-1990)", Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1993.} We updated Budge’s data on seats controlled by each government from
1990 to 1999 using *Keesing’s Contemporary Archive* (Table 3.9).

**Table 3.9: Israeli Coalition Governments Knesset’s Total Seats 1949-1999**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CABINET SEATS</th>
<th>SIZE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 73 LWC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 73 LWC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 65 MWC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 87 LWC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 87 LWC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 63 MWC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 80 LWC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 80 LWC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 86 LWC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 66 LWC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 66 LWC</td>
<td></td>
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<td>12 66 LWC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 73 LWC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 104 LWC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 102 LWC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 68 LWC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 61 MWC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 68 LWC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 57 MWC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 60 MWC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 96 LWC</td>
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<td>22 96 LWC</td>
<td></td>
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<td>23 90 LWC</td>
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<td>24 56 MWC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 62 MWC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 58 MWC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 62 MWC</td>
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<tr>
<td>28 68 LWC</td>
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</table>
Measuring the Competitiveness of the Coalition System

Definition: Coalition competition is defined as an increasing opportunity for rival ruling coalitions to be established by dominant parties.

Opportunity of rival coalitions to be established is determined in this study by the relative power of the dominant party to form a winning coalition compared to the rest of parties in the Knesset. The greater is the power of the dominant party to form a coalition the lesser is the competition. The ability of the dominant party to form a coalition is measured by Banzhaf's power index that calculates the power of each party to form a winning coalition relative to other parties. "The standardized Banzhaf index can be interpreted to give an answer to the question: what is voter's relative share among all pivotal positions?" The voter here is the party's sum of votes that are under its control in the Knesset.

Table 3.10 provides a description of all Israeli parties' share the various Israeli Knessets (1 to 15) from 1949-1999, and shows two dominant blocs that have dominated Israeli Knesset. The Right bloc was originally that of Herut, then became Gahal and today is organized under the Likud. The Left bloc was primarily organized under Mapai then was re-established under the Alignment then under Labor and by the 15th Knesset was renamed as One Israel. Both of these blocs have controlled large shares of the Knesset and presented themselves as the main rival factions in Israel. Table 3.10 is

74 See Banzhaf Power Index calculation and discussion in the Appendix.
implemented in this study in order to calculate the Banzhaf’s power index of each party in the Knesset and ultimately the dominant parties.

Table 3.10: Distribution of Knesset Seats by Parties by Knesset 1949-1999

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<th>Political Parties</th>
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</table>

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Progressive Party 5 4 5 6
Rafi 10
Rakah 3 3 4
Ratz 3 1 1 3 5
Religious Torah Front/United Torah Front 6 6 5
Sephardim and Edot Mizrah/Shas 4 2 4 6 6 10 17
Shlomzion 2
Shituf Ve’ahvah* 2 2 2 2
State List 3
Tami 3 1
Tehiya/Tsomet 3 5 3
Telem 2
The Third Way 4
Tsomet 2 8
United Religious Front /NRP 16 11 12 12 11 12 10 12 6 4 5 6 9 5
United Torah Judaism 5
Shinui 2 3 2 6
WIZO 1
Yahad 3
Yahadut Hatorah 4 4
Yemenite Association 1 1
Yisrael Be’aliyah 7 6

Table 3.11 illustrates the changes in the ruling dominant party power index. Since 1969, the power index of the ruling dominant party has substantially declined (Figure 3.5).\textsuperscript{76} This indicates a considerable increase in the competitiveness of the coalition system – also referred to in literature as “fragmentation”.

\textsuperscript{76} 1969 election data, however, may be misleading in our power index consideration. The power index calculation indicates an overwhelming power gain by the Labor bloc (56 seats and scored .99 on the power index). Nonetheless, if we take into account the ideological orientations of possible partners its power to form a winning coalition may greatly decline. See feasible coalitions in Table 3.11.
Table 3.11: Power Index of the Ruling Dominant Party in the Knesset 1949-1999

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Knesset</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Power index of Dominant Party</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1949</td>
<td>0.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>1951</td>
<td>0.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>1955</td>
<td>0.84</td>
</tr>
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<td>1959</td>
<td>0.93</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>1961</td>
<td>0.83</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>1965</td>
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<td>7</td>
<td>1969</td>
<td>0.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>1973</td>
<td>0.81</td>
</tr>
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<td>9</td>
<td>1977</td>
<td>0.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>1981</td>
<td>0.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>1984</td>
<td>0.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>1988</td>
<td>0.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>0.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>0.55</td>
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<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>0.58</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 3.5: Power Index of Dominant Party 1949-1999

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77 For formula see Benzhaf Power Index Appendix
Note that the Banzhaf power index calculates the power of the party relative to the coalition's members based solely on the number of seats. Although this is a very strong measure of party's power, ideological consideration may also prove significant in the determination of party's power to form coalitions and therefore in the relative competitiveness or flexibility of the system as a whole.

Ideological consideration can be accounted for by looking at ideologically feasible competing coalitions. In addition to three dominant Zionist ideological camps, left, right, and religious, various other camps have also been formed most notably the ethnic camp of Sephardic Jews under Shas and Russian Jews under Israel Ba'aliah. While these camps have gained greater significance over the years they continued to play the ideological partner of major traditional Zionist camps. Shas remains strongly associated with the religious camp while Israel Ba'aliah with the center-right camp. As for the Arab parties -- which are not associated with Labor -- and the communists, they have been considered as anti-Zionist and categorized in most literature as 'anti-system parties'. In fact no Israeli ruling coalition has ever formed in partnership with either the communists or the Arab parties.

We divided Israeli feasible coalitions among parties into the most likely ideological grouping scenarios: left, right, religious, left-religious, and right-religious coalitions.\textsuperscript{78} We ruled out left-right and left-right-religious formations because they were not ideologically feasible to form in our considerations. Such formations usually occur not

\textsuperscript{78} We categorized Israeli parties as left, right, or religious based on the description provided by International Almanac of International History, 2nd Edition, 1982.
on ideological basis (not ideologically feasible) but rather on the consideration of other factors such as having a national unity government in war or for strictly electoral opportunistic non-ideological purposes. Our objective is to simulate the most ideologically likely and opportunistically least likely formations. The result is shown in table 3.3. This is being done in order to compare such a result to that of Banzhaf’s power index that measures dominant party’s power to form coalitions on a non-ideological basis. Our ideological measure of feasible ideological coalitions in addition to that of Banzhaf’s dominant party power index should provide a compatible result to the measurement of ‘competitiveness’. For example, we should expect that the larger the seats an ideological feasible coalition is capable to control, the higher is the power index of the dominant party, and therefore the lower is the competitiveness of the system.

Both ideological feasible coalitions and Banzhaf’s measures reflect similar conclusions, which suggest that the greater the seats an ideological coalition is capable of controlling the greater is the power of the dominant party. As Table 3.3 shows, from 1949 until 1965 a ruling left alliance was always feasible strictly on ideological basis. For the same period Mapai was the dominant party scoring above 83 on Banzhaf’s power index. Contradictory results emerge only in 1969 where dominant party power index scored high (99%) but feasible winning coalition scored low seats relative to previous years (78 on the left-religious ideologically feasible coalition). This result is due to the simplification of power calculation after 1969 with the absence of smaller left-parties outside the grand left-alliance that was formed under the Alignment Bloc.79

79 In 1969 election almost all left oriented parties joined the Alignment (56 seats) forming a grand labor alliance. No left-oriented “system party” was left outside this grand coalition block. Therefore when Banzhaf power index...
Since 1969 the Labor-left parties were no longer in clear command of the Knesset. For the first time the Labor alliance needed the essential support of either the Religious or the Right parties in order to form a government. Banzhaf’s power index similarly shows that the post-1969 era represents a period where the dominant party’s power to form ruling coalitions has been significantly reduced (Figure 3.6). For this reason, we consider the 1969 Israeli Knesset to have introduced for the first time into Israel a strong competitive coalition system.

Measuring Coalition Duration

Definition: Coalition duration is the number of days a ruling coalition lasts in power from the time it is inaugurated by the Knesset to the time a new government is likewise established.

The coalitions’ duration was measured by the duration of each government using Ian Budge’s “Handbook of Democratic Government”. Figure 3.6 shows the pattern of duration for 28 governments. The main observation to be made is that the duration of Israeli governments in post-1969 period and since the 13th government has come to calculation is made without taking into consideration potential ideological partners it scores high. However, if ideological consideration was to be made, the Alignment could have only added 2 additional seats to a left alliance short of a ruling majority.

fluctuate between very long and very short lived ruling coalitions. On average, governments of post-1969 lived longer than their predecessors.\footnote{Explaining this pattern is provided in Chapter 3, where proper government’s structural formation, reflecting external pressure, and the decline in economic pressure during the office term of the government are found to explain long duration governments. These attributes characterize post-1969 governments more so than governments formed before 1969.}

**Figure 3.6: Government Duration in Days 1949-2000**

Measuring Event Pressure Variables

Event pressure variables are the non-structural variables that indicate political, social, or economic changes that impact the country as a whole.
In this study we consider six event pressure variables that are significant to Israeli politics. Two variables are measures of external political pressures: severity of external conflict and foreign aid. Severity of external conflict generally refers to the conflict with the Arab states and the Palestinians. It is measured based on annual events that take into consideration: number of Israeli casualties and fatalities, frequency of annual disputes reported to the U.N., border skirmishes and attacks. Our measurement is established based on the information provided by Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and published online. The MFA's information provides data reflecting the views and political concerns of Israelis as events shape their politics. Furthermore, J. David Singer provides data from 1948 to 1992 documenting annual number of casualties in conflicts and indexing annual fatality rate where 1 refers to low and 6 a very high rate.

We established a similar scale to Singer as to measure the severity of conflict. The severity of conflict variable provides a scale of 1 to 6 where 1 indicates a very low severity of conflict while 6 indicates a high severity (Table 3.12). This variable differs from Singer's index by incorporating two additional sources of external pressures: U.N. resolutions and border skirmishes and attacks. The UN resolutions are those adopted by both the General Assembly and Security Council. A list of UN resolutions related to Israel is provided online by the Jewish Virtual Library (http://www.us-israel.org/jsource). We coded these as either 0 for resolution that carry no annual condemnation or criticism to Israel, 1 for some condemnation, and 2 severe condemnations. As of border skirmishes and attacks, we thought that Singer undermined some conflicts that did not

---

resemble a major war. Therefore, we coded a new variable “Skirmishes/Attacks” taken into considerations Singer’s coding while relying on the annual skirmishes/attacks incidents as reported by Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Skirmishes/Attack is indexed from 1 to 4 with 1 representing low and 4 representing high level of skirmishes/attacks. Severity variable adds both Skirmishes/Attack and condemning UN resolutions for a maximum index score of 6 (Table 3.12).

Table 3.12: External Conflicts and their Severity 1949-1999

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Casualty</th>
<th>Fatality</th>
<th>Skirmishes/Attacks</th>
<th>(-) U.N Resolution</th>
<th>Severity</th>
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<td>1949</td>
<td>War of Independence</td>
<td>6373</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td>1950</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>Syrian incursions / Suez canal blockade</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>Syrian border skirmishes</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>Water issue with Jordan/Syrian border skirmishes</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>Egypt interfere with ships</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>Kinneret Incident with Syria/ Gaza incident with Egypt</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>Sinai campaign</td>
<td>6231</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>Post Sinai campaign</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>Skirmishes on the Syrian and Jordan borders</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>Egypt blockade of Suez</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>Israeli goods are seized in Suez</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>Syrian-Egyptian union is dissolved/ Conflict on Syrian border</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>Conflict on Syrian border</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>Conflict on Syrian border</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>Divergence of Jordan water/arm race/establishment of PLO</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>Border conflict</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>Border conflict</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>Six days war</td>
<td>776</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>War of attrition</td>
<td>324</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>War of attrition</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>War of attrition</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>Arab boycott/ War of attrition</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>Lebanese Syrian border skirmishes/ Munich attack</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

85 As reported by Singer.
86 As reported by Singer as an index of 1 to 6 where 1 represents low fatality rate while 6 high fatality rate.
87 Although no casualties were reported by Singer, tension ran high with Egypt under Nasser. Border penetrations and attacks were common. U.N. criticism to Israel for violating the Armistice Agreement was severe. International Isolation of Israel was mounting.

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Fatalities</th>
<th>Injuries</th>
<th>Casualties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>Yom Kippur War</td>
<td>2688</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>Syrian border skirmishes/ Ma'alot attack.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>Borders conflict with Lebanon/Savoy Hotel incident 7 Israelis killed/talk with Egypt suspended/bomb in Jerusalem 14 killed</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>El-Al attack in Istanbul, border skirmishes with Lebanon</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>Borders conflict with Lebanon</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>Terrorist attack in Haifa kills 37/Invasion of Lebanon</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>Borders conflict with Lebanon</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>Borders conflict with Lebanon/conflict in territories</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>Borders conflict with Lebanon/Bombing Iraqi nuclear site/assassination of Sadat</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Foreign aid, on the other hand, is the measure of total annual money received by the government in millions. Total aid is simply the sum of U.S. and European aid that includes both military and economic aid excluding any loans or loans guarantees (Table 3.13). Foreign aid is considered a potential external pressure due to the ability of aiding nations to implement financial assistance in pressing the recipient government to pursue a particular policy course. U.S. aid to Israel, for example, has been often associated with Israel settlement policies. President George H.W. Bush conditioned increased U.S. aid to Israel, on the other hand, is the measure of total annual money received by the government in millions. Total aid is simply the sum of U.S. and European aid that includes both military and economic aid excluding any loans or loans guarantees (Table 3.13). Foreign aid is considered a potential external pressure due to the ability of aiding nations to implement financial assistance in pressing the recipient government to pursue a particular policy course. U.S. aid to Israel, for example, has been often associated with Israel settlement policies. President George H.W. Bush conditioned increased U.S. aid to

---

Israel on halting settlement activities in the Occupied Territories in 1991. Other times, U.S. assistance to Israel has been increased following peace agreements in reward for such a policy as was the case in 1993.89

Table 3.13: Foreign Aid to Israel in Millions of U.S. Dollars 1949-199990

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>U.S. Aid</th>
<th>European Aid</th>
<th>Total Aid91</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1949</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>295.7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>295.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>249.6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>249.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>250.7</td>
<td>26.9</td>
<td>277.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>174.9</td>
<td>62.3</td>
<td>237.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>163.1</td>
<td>82.5</td>
<td>245.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>126.7</td>
<td>142.2</td>
<td>268.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>185.4</td>
<td>200.9</td>
<td>386.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>1022.3</td>
<td>1172.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>163.8</td>
<td>285.7</td>
<td>449.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>139.5</td>
<td>333.3</td>
<td>472.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>396.7</td>
<td>636.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>217.6</td>
<td>404.5</td>
<td>622.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>103.3</td>
<td>401.6</td>
<td>504.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>167.7</td>
<td>307.9</td>
<td>475.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>338.1</td>
<td>400.4</td>
<td>738.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>33.8</td>
<td>718.5</td>
<td>752.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>191.4</td>
<td>689.4</td>
<td>880.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>287.6</td>
<td>585.9</td>
<td>873.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>159.3</td>
<td>612.9</td>
<td>772.2</td>
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<td>1971</td>
<td>1285.7</td>
<td>534.7</td>
<td>1820.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>838.3</td>
<td>656.3</td>
<td>1494.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>818.9</td>
<td>576.8</td>
<td>1395.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>4516.3</td>
<td>628.9</td>
<td>5145.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>1064.2</td>
<td>531.7</td>
<td>1595.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>3476.3</td>
<td>593.3</td>
<td>4069.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>2583.4</td>
<td>571.4</td>
<td>3154.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>2476.5</td>
<td>560.2</td>
<td>3036.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>6102.7</td>
<td>543.8</td>
<td>6646.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>2075.8</td>
<td>498.4</td>
<td>2574.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


89 Our hypothesis is that increase in foreign aid constitute a decline in external pressure and therefore contribute to smaller formations and durable coalitions.

90 Figures are adjusted to 1995 inflation index.

91 Including German reparations.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>GDP Change</th>
<th>Unemployment</th>
<th>Strikers Struck</th>
<th>Immigrants %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>2294.3</td>
<td>441.9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>2206</td>
<td>61.1</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>2393.1</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>2631.6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>3376.7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>3663.5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>3040.2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>3043.4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>3045.6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>3434.9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>3712.3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>3100</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>5103.4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>5097.2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>5102.4</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>5144</td>
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<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>5132.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>3080</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>3010</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The other set of socio-economic event pressure variables provide important statistical insights into the country’s internal stress. These variables are: change in annual GDP, annual unemployment rate, annual percentage of strikers per strike, and annual percentage of immigrants per population. This set of data is obtained from *Statistical Abstract of Israel* for the period of 1949-1999 (Table 3.14).\(^2\)

---

106

Table 3.14; Statistical Data 1949-1999
Y ear
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
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1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999

GDP
0
10,155
11,202
10,880
10,436
12,172
13,352
13,922
14,352
14,867
16,259
16,883
18,099
19,051
20,249
21,380
22,328
21,980
21,774
24,304
26,658
27,835
30,009
32,905
33,364
33,990
34,434
34,227
34,166
34,823
35,585
36,005
37,048
36,876
37,129
37,185
38,159
38,913
40,645
41,340
41,148
42,412
42,314
43,727
44,156
46,073
47,765
49,096
49,464
49,471
49,359

GPDRATE

0.09
-0.03
-0.04
0.14
0.09
0.04
0.03
0.03
0.09
0.04
0.07
0.05
0.06
0.05
0.04
-0.02
-0.01
0.10
0.09
0.04
0.07
0.09
0.01
0.02
0.01
-0.01
0
0.02
0.02
0.01
0.03
0
0.01
0
0.03
0.02
0.04
0.02
0
0.03
0
0.03
0.01
0.04
0.04
0.03
0.01
0
0

Immigration
239,954
170,563
175,279
24,610
11,575
18,491
37,528
56,330
72,634
27,290
23,988
24,692
47,735
61,533
64,489
55,036
31,115
15,957
14,469
20,703
38,111
36,750
41,930
55,888
54,886
31,981
20,028
19,754
21,429
26,394
37,222
20,428
12,599
13,723
16,906
19,981
10,642
9,505
12,965
13,034
24,050
199,516
176,100
77,057
76,805
79,844
76,361
70,605
65,962
57,700
77,921

Population
1,174,000
1,370,000
1,578,000
1,630,000
1,669,000
1,718,000
1,789,000
1,872,000
1,976,000

Percimmig
0.20
0.12
0.11
0.02
0.01
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04

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2,332,000
2,430,000
2,526,000
2,598,000
2,657,000

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0.01

2,776,000
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3,121,000
3,225,000
3,338,000
3,422,000
3,493,000
3,575,000
3,653,000
3,738,000
3,836,000
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0
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0
0
0
0
0.01
0.04

Strikes
53
72
76
94
84
82
87
74
59
48
51
135
125
144
126
136
288
286
142
100
114
163
169
168
96
71
117
123
126
85
117
84
90
112
93
149
131
142
174
156
120
117

0.03
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.01

77
114
73
75
71
75
69

0.01
0.01

53
66

Strikers
5189
9100
9715
14010
8804
12123
9861
11452
3692
6050
5873
14420
26184
37588
86475
47168
90210
85953
25058
42146
44496
114941
88265
87309
122348
27141
114091
114970
194297
224354
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38776
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124215
434335
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232583

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Avgstrik
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105
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7.1
6.1
6.4
8.9
9.6
10.6
11.2
10
7.8
6.3
6.7
7.7
8.6
8.9


Data Analysis:

After compiling the data into twenty eight cases representing the entire Israeli array of coalition governments a multiple regression analysis was conducted in two stages.

In the first phase we regressed independent variables on size and then on ideological parameter of the coalition as dependent variables. This is conducted in order to measure the significance of the multiple regression models in accounting for size and ideological parameter of the coalition. In a further examination of our model we measured its significance before and after 1969. We call this stage coalition formation analysis.

In the second phase we regressed independent variables, along with size and ideology, on duration as the dependent variable. This was done in two steps: first we regressed the model using first year events data as to determine first year events in the life of government in days; second we regressed the last year events data as to determine last year events in the life of government in days. We further examined our model in pre and post-69 using the same steps in analysis.

It is important to keep in mind that regression analysis provides a linear-based measure of association rather than an affirmation of causation. The major pitfalls of our least squares multiple regression is that our measurement of association is based on
relatively small number of cases (N=28) with seven independent variables in the formation analysis and nine independent variables in the durational analysis. This represents a major shortcoming for any generalization that can be made in regard to regression results. Multicollinearity represents another problem for the analysis. Such a problem is associated with the integration of correlated explanatory variables. Although, our independent variables may have no significant correlation among each other, such an association may slightly remain present.

Comparative Case Study Methodology

The shortcomings of having a small number of cases to investigate quantitatively (N=28) make us search for an additional methodology for theoretical confirmation. A suitable investigative approach is the one that can, as Alexander George reasons, “convert ‘lessons of history’ into a comprehensive theory that encompasses the complexity of the phenomenon or activity in question” (George, 1979, p. 43).

We adopt George’s analytical approach known as “the method of structured focused comparison” (George, 1979). It is based on the strategy of grouping historic phenomena that occur repeatedly throughout history as classes of similar events to be studied and compared. It allows the development of scientific generalizations and general laws that are specific to each class. This is achieved through establishing correlation between independent and dependent variables in each case and describing the relationship in general terms as to be considered as one of a class of such events. Alexander suggests that this is possible through an inductive analytical approach whereby
categories are established to describe the variance in each variable through different cases.

The structured focused comparison approach has various weaknesses and advantages. The main weakness is that generalization would remain limited to the small population investigated unless similar conditions can be shown to exist for a comparative group. Also, no formal statistical methods and probability calculations are employed. Among the advantages of this approach is the ability to systematically deal with a relatively small number of cases. Also it provides the researcher with the capacity to select cases based on a variety of outcomes, not just quantified data. Furthermore it allows the identification of the conditions and context under which each distinctive type of causal pattern occurs rather than attempting to address the question of how often each occurs or is expected to occur. As George suggested a "... controlled comparison is useful for developing a differentiated theory comprised of conditional generalizations rather than frequency distributions" (George, 1979, p. 60).

George's approach requires important prerequisites. First there must be a capacity to employ "disciplined-configurative" mode of analysis which "describes and analyzes the case in terms of theoretically relevant general variables" (George, 1979, p. 51). Furthermore, the structure of the research must be able to define the "class" of events which the theory seeks to explain. And finally, this approach should be capable of applying a selective and focused technique in all the case treatments.
Application of Structured Focused Comparison to Israeli Coalition Study

Three phases are essential in this research design and implementation: design, case studies, and theoretical implications (Figure 3.7). Each phase must achieve various tasks and answer essential questions as follow:

Phase I: Design

- **Research question, Literature review, and initial theorization**
  a. What is phenomenon or behavior to be explained?
  b. What are the relevant theories (variables)?
  c. Which theory (ies) are most relevant and may require refinement or elaboration.

- **Model of investigation**
  a. What is the dependent variable?
  b. What are the independent and intervening variables?
  c. What are the control variables which will allow comparison?

- **Case study selection**
  a. Select appropriate representative cases from the universe.

- **Plausible Theory**
  a. Generalize the causal relations between independent and dependent variables. In other words, establish a set of hypotheses that are the essence of a plausible theory.

- **Establish criteria for case evaluation**
  a. Ask the same questions that examine plausible theory hypotheses for each case or class of cases in the controlled comparison.

Phase II: The Case Studies

a. Apply analysis for each case or set of cases.

b. Develop a historic explanation (casual imputation) for the outcome in each case as they relate to the independent variables.

c. Examine alternative or null hypotheses.

Phase III: Drawing the theoretical implications of the case studies

a. What are the results: answer to the questions and confirmation to the hypotheses.

b. Assess, refine, and/or elaborate initial theory.
I. Pre-Research requisites:

Applying George's focused case comparison approach presupposes the ability to establish a "disciplined-configurative" mode of analysis. Our objective is to explain two phenomena that are relevant to most coalition theoretical research, i.e., coalitions' formation and duration. As has been elaborated in chapter 2 we have proposed various theoretically relevant variables responsible for coalition behaviors. These include structural variables such as coalition competitiveness, coalition size, and coalition ideological parameters as well as event variables, such as internal and external pressures. These variables are thought to discriminate between the formation and duration of various Israeli coalition governments and they meet the first prerequisite of George's method by constituting a 'pre-theory' model for analysis.

The second prerequisite establishes the need for the researcher to define and examine the "class" of events which the theory seeks to explain. In this study, the aim is to reveal the variables responsible for particular coalition formation; namely the coalition size and ideological parameter. Why is a particular "class" of governments established with a particular size and ideology? And consequently how is this structural formation, while taking political developments at hand, attributed to a short-lived or a long-lived "class" of governments? By being able to define the "class" (short-lived governments vs. long-
lived governments) which the theory seeks to distinguish the second prerequisite of the research approach is fulfilled.

The final prerequisite presupposes that the researcher must be able to apply a selective and focused technique in case treatment to see whether the predictions are correct. In this study we meet this by establishing a selective criteria to study "the shortest" and "the longest" governments. This prerequisite is further satisfied in comparing both groups by asking the same set of questions. Such a comparison provide a mean to evaluate independent variables responsible for different government durations.

II. Design

a. Theoretical Relevance

In Chapter 2 we reviewed major theoretical research in the domain of coalition theory. We examined the structural paradigm and its sects. We also reviewed the event paradigm which originally emerged as a challenge to the structural views. However, we have come to realize that contemporary efforts have aimed to bridge and synthesize both approaches. We examined some of the gaps evident in these synthetic views and we proposed alternative solutions and measures. Most importantly we advanced the view that coalition behaviors are significant to be analyzed as a determinant to party behaviors, rather than the contrary. Parties’ decisions to abort a coalition, for example, are often calculated relative to the policy objectives and the side-payments the coalition offers. And in order to examine the coalition on its own terms we establish variables that are essential for such an analysis. Namely, we formulate two new structural variables:
coalition ideological parameter and coalition competitiveness (see chapter 3 for definition and measures).

As we further examined the literature we recognized another inadequacy in synthetic coalition literature. We find that theories continue to debate whether to take the structure or the event as a more determinant factor in coalition durability. Further investigation leads us to question which events matter the most and at what particular time in the life of a coalition government? We propose to examine this by analyzing the different impacts “external” and “internal” event pressures have on coalition formation and coalition duration as the ruling alliance ages. We consider the theory composed in chapter 2 as a tentative theory in need of investigation towards either confirmation or further revisions.

b. Unit of Analysis, c. Dependent Variables, and d. Independent and Control variables

Unit of analysis and variables are examined and defined at the beginning of the chapter.

e. Case study selection

As has been discussed, our goal is to understand the underlying structural and event factors responsible for government's formation and duration. Therefore, our case selection criteria for comparison take both extremes of government duration as a base of analysis. We select the shortest vs. the longest lived coalitions to be the object of our
investigation. Our selection criteria, however, does not include caretaker governments, since their shortcoming and termination (election) is inevitable regardless of any consideration.93

The shortest lived pre-1969 governments were the second and twelfth coalition governments. The second government lasted only 342 days while the twelfth government lasted 383 days (Table 3.15). In post 1969 the shortest duration governments were the sixteenth (90 days) and twenty-sixth governments (206 days). In contrast the longest lived governments were the seventh (796 days) and thirteenth (1162 days) in pre-1969 and eighteenth (1507 days) and twenty-fifth (1194 days) governments in post-1969 (Table 3.16). These governments will serve as our cases for analysis and comparison. In depth description and case analysis of each of these governments will be provided in chapter 4.

Table 3.15: Shortest Lived Israeli Ruling Coalitions in Pre vs. Post 1969 (in days)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Knesset</th>
<th>Government</th>
<th>Begins</th>
<th>Ends</th>
<th>Prime Minister</th>
<th>Duration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10/30/1950</td>
<td>10/6/1951</td>
<td>Ben-Gurion</td>
<td>342</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12/22/1964</td>
<td>1/9/1966</td>
<td>Eshkol</td>
<td>383</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.16: Longest Lived Israeli Ruling Coalitions in Pre vs. Post 1969 (in days)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Knesset</th>
<th>Government</th>
<th>Begins</th>
<th>Ends</th>
<th>Prime Minister</th>
<th>Duration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>11/2/1955</td>
<td>1/5/1958</td>
<td>Ben-Gurion</td>
<td>796</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1/10/1966</td>
<td>3/16/1969</td>
<td>Eshkol</td>
<td>1162</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

93 Only one Israeli government is officially considered as a caretaker, i.e., the Sixth Israeli government inaugurated in 6/25/1955 under Shared and lived 126 days until an election was held.
f. Plausible Theory

We turn our theory that was established in chapter 2 and diagramed in Figure 3.1 into a plausible theory to be inductively analyzed and possibly refined and revised. Restated, our theory suggests two relevant stages crucial for understanding coalition stability: formation and duration. In the formation process structural variables such as competition as well as event pressure variables are thought to determine the size and ideological parameter of the coalition. Increasing competition and event pressures press coalitions toward consensual formations where size and ideological parameters are enlarged and widened. In the duration process, structured variables serve in prolonging government life to the extent coalitions are most efficiently formed in the first place, i.e., the coalition formed smaller in size and tighter in ideological parameter is thought to last the longest. Another structural variable that impacts duration is competitiveness. Coalition systems that are more competitive would tend to be maintained more significantly than non-competitive systems. Event pressure variables are also important to durability; the greater the pressure the shorter the duration of the government.

g. Criteria for Case Evaluation

As suggested by George the principal strategy of this research is to implement the same questions to be investigated in each case and ‘class’ of cases under study, allowing a final controlled comparison evaluation. Questions for each case are formulated to address three distinct phenomena. First we need to understand the pre-formation conditions. Toward that that purpose we design our questions to evaluate the impact of both structural and event pressure variables on the formative size and ideological
parameter of the coalition. Second the questions are designed to examine the impact of early formation and event pressure variables on duration. Lastly, the questions aim to reveal the impact of the later event pressures to examine the ongoing changes of events’ pressure on government’s durability. In other words, the questions will measure whether the government duration was linked to aging or its ability to reduce event pressures (Table 3.17).

This design will allow us to set the stage for comparative analysis first between short-lived and long-lived coalitions and then between pre-1969 and post-1969 coalition systems if necessary. This is done in order to answer the fundamental research questions as to whether systematic or events’ pressure determines coalition formation and duration, which is more significant in determining formation and duration, and whether event pressure gain momentum in coalition termination as they age (Table 3.17).

Table 3.17: Question for the Comparative Case Study of Israeli Coalitions\textsuperscript{94}

| Structure: How and why is the coalition structurally formed? (Size, Ideology, and Competitiveness) |
| Economics as Event Pressure: Is the country facing economic growth or decline before formation, after formation, and at termination? |
| Immigration as Event Pressure: Is the country facing immigration increase or decline before formation, after formation, and at termination? |
| External Developments as Event Pressure: Is the country facing external pressure before formation, after formation, and at termination? |

\textsuperscript{94} Details about measuring and analyzing these questions have been discussed in the previous sections regarding qualitative variables' definitions and measures.
CHAPTER 4
QUANTITATIVE DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS

In this chapter a quantitative approach is conducted to analyze Israeli coalition formation and duration. The data were analyzed as to reveal the relationship between coalition size, ideological parameter, and duration, with structural and event pressures. The data were plotted to reveal trends of every variable throughout the years since Israel was founded. A multivariate linear regression (OLS) and a robust regression analysis were conducted to show the significance of the models developed in chapter 2. While the models were not found significant, partly in light of small population of cases, certain key variables did emerge, as trend analysis also showed that the dominant party power index has consistently declined, foreign aid increased, and numbers of strikers per strike increased over the years. These changes in trends became apparent since 1969. Thus, the need for a qualitative comparative approach emerges in order to examine our models in light of each separate historic period while analyzing a small number of cases.

Data Analysis:

The purpose of this chapter is to implement multiple linear regression analysis in order to establish the existing relationship between coalition formations and duration variables with event pressure and structural electoral factors. After compiling the data for twenty-eight cases representing all Israeli coalition governments established between 1949 and 1999, a multiple regression analysis was conducted in two stages. In the first stage we regressed the independent variables on the size and then on the ideological
parameter of the coalitions as the dependent variables. This is done in order to measure the significance of our theoretical models (Chapter 2) in accounting for coalition formation tendencies. We call this stage coalition formation analysis.

In the second stage, 'duration' or the number of days the coalition spent in office became the dependent variable. We regressed independent variables, which included the number of seats (size) and ideological parameter (ideology) of the coalition, on duration. This was done in two steps: first we regressed the model using first year events data so as to determine first year event pressures on the life of government in days; secondly we regressed the last year event pressures data as to determine last year events' effect on the life and demise of government. Potential differences between first year and last year's independent variables on cabinets' duration should provide indication as to which variables impact the process of aging. We call this stage coalition duration analysis.

It is important to note that regression analysis provides a measure of association rather than an affirmation of causation. The major pitfalls of our bivariate and multiple regression analyses were that our measurement of association was based on a relatively small number of cases (N=28) with seven independent variables in the formation analysis and nine independent variables in the durational analysis. With such a small N and such a large number of independent variables a lack in the degrees of freedom will be present. Some cases were dismissed during statistical analysis due to the lack of unemployment data during early years of government formations. This further contributed to the decreasing size of our already small number of cases and represented another shortfall for
any generalization we could have made in regard to the regression results. As one remedy for this, the weakly associated independent unemployment variable was dropped from the analyses in efforts to identify the largest associations.95

In addition, the analysis assumes linear relations among the variables, a situation that might not pertain especially in looking at duration since variables might have more impact on mid-range than long or short coalitions. Some variables associated with the annual number of immigration per population and average number of strikers per strike also revealed skewed distributions. This was corrected by implementing logarithmic scales for these data. In order to further remedy such problem we implemented the robust regression technique in STATA. The major advantage of 'robust regression' in our data analysis over OLS is its ability to lessen the influence of outliers while analyzing a small number of cases (Hamilton, 1992; p. 185).96 Both OLS and Robust regression analyses were implemented, as to compare results. However, we favored the robust regression results due to the better capacity of this approach in handling small N size. Nonetheless and regardless of the statistical application used it remained difficult to assert any quantitative generalization.

**Examining the Findings**

We examined our data in two ways. First, we observed the historic trends in each variable throughout the various years prior to government formation. Trend analysis

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95 Although coefficients may be unbiased they are likely to have large standard errors and lack the important property of robustness—that is, their size and even the signs of the coefficients may change with small changes in specification (deleting or adding one independent variable) or small changes in the sample (adding or deleting a single case).
provided directional projection for variables over time. Secondly, we conducted bivariate and a multiple regression analyses for our models in order to examine their significance based on the data prior to government formation, first year of government formation, and by the last year before government termination.

A. Trends:

The dependent variables this study attempt to explain are: coalition size, coalition ideological parameter, and coalition duration. Although no significant trend emerged out of these variables some trend variation can be observed. For example, duration of governments slightly increased over the years and duration in post-69 governments became more extreme, fluctuating from very short to very long duration cabinets (Figure 4.1). This suggests a shift in the formative requirements and/or event pressure on post-69 coalitions, an issue that we will further examine. In Chapters 5 and 6 we analyze the changes in coalition politics and conclude that after 1969 coalitions needed to cope with increasing competition and the change associated with external and economic pressures. Such a change required durable coalitions to form small and tight at low level of external pressure and large and wide at high external pressure.

Coalitions’ size slightly decreased over the years, again fluctuating more after 1969 (Figure 4.2). Coalitions appear to have shifted from mainly large sized formations (65-90 seats) in the pre-1969 period to either very large or very small post-1969 coalitions (less than 65 or more than 90 seats). Most largely formed coalitions, particularly before 1969, responded to high level of economic pressure as well as low level of competition, a conclusion that we will discuss in Chapter 7. However, in the post-1969 period formation became increasingly sensitive to external pressure, large formations during situations of external tension and small formations during times of low external pressure. Such formations, we will further suggest, have contributed to lasting coalitional alliances.
Coalitions' ideological parameters do not appear to have changed much over the years. Ideological perspective of the dominant party remained close to that of coalitions partners and became more consistently closer in recent years. This illustrates that ideological closeness was necessary between the dominant party and coalition members for any government to be formed. By the sixteenth and twentieth ruling coalitions (1974 and 1983), wide ideological differences between the dominant party and its partners led to very short-lived governments (Figure 4.3). Increase in competition seems to have necessitated tight formation contrary to our proposition. Domestic and foreign pressures in post-1969 period appear to have had a polarizing impact on coalitions; thus

97 The sixteenth government was headed by Meir and lasted only 90 days while the twentieth government was headed by Shamir and lasted 338 days.
necessitating close rank among alliances. This is another result supporting our null hypotheses.

Figure 4.3: Israeli Governments' Ideological Parameters, 1949-1999


Three of the independent variables examined in the model appeared to have significantly changed through time, and 1969 emerged as a watershed in each category. First is the government's ruling dominant party power index, representing the party's

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98 Ideological parameter of each coalition government was obtained by content coding the policy statement of each government entitled "The Principle Policy Guidelines of the Government". The Policy Program of the dominant party in each government was also content coded. The difference between the government position and that of the dominant party represents a policy space difference that we label as ideological parameter. For further measures and discussion see Chapter 3.

99 We consider a "significant" trend emerging over time when $R^2$ in a scatterplot that places consecutive governments on the y-axis, sores higher than .50 (suggesting steep linear change in relationship over the time). See Scatterplot Appendix D: Regression by Government. Other variables appear to have a positive or a negative trend over the years, however, the "significances" of such trends were considered low due their respective low $R^2$ score.

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ability to form coalitions relative to other parties. A consistent decline in this index is evident after 1969 indicating a shift in the Israeli political system toward fragmentation and competitiveness (Figure 4.4). This fragmentation emerged after a series of setbacks for Mapai and the labor parties starting with the Lavon affair. This episode divided the leadership of Mapai and fostered the situation of splinter movements among its ranks. Further fragmentation emerged after the 1967 War, paving the way for territorial and settler movements that further divided traditional ideological camps over the future of the Occupied Territories (Isaac, 1984).

Other aspects of fragmentation have been observed in the decline of ideological parties in favor of ethnic politics. This pattern emerged strongly in Israel following the arrival of the Soviet Jews in the 1990s and the rise of Israeli Ba’aliah. In the same period, Sephardic discontent with traditional ideological parties found its way in the formation and growth of Shas. The propositions made in this study predicted that such an increase in fragmentation and competition would yield larger-accommodating and more durable governments (See Figure 2.4 for illustration).

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100 In July 1954 Egypt was plagued by series of bombs directed against American and British interests in Cairo. Islamist groups were the suspect of responsibility. It was later discovered, however, that these bombs were the work of Israeli intelligence, orchestrated by Colonel Benyamin Givli and aimed at widening the wedge between the government of Egypt and both the U.S. and British administrations. Defense Minister Pinhas Lavon, Givli’s boss, was accused of having link to this plot. Investigation to this affair raked the Labor bloc into bitter internal dispute and continued to the early 1970s. This scandal came...
Figure 4.4: Dominant Party Power Index 1949-1999


to be known as the Lavon Affair (See David Hirst, "The Gun and the Olive Branch" (Futura Publications: 1977, 1984).

Four post-1969 governments emerged amid a noticeable rise in the dominant party power index: the 14th and 15th governments (.99%) as well as the 25th and 26th cabinets (74.3%). The 14th and 15th governments were formed following the election of the 7th Knesset where almost all left oriented parties joined the Alignment (36 seats) forming a grand labor alliance. No left-oriented “system party” was left outside this grand coalition bloc to make alliance with. Therefore when Benzhaf power index calculation was made regardless of ideological consideration, the Alignment power index to form a winning coalition scored high. However, if ideological consideration was to be made, the Alignment could have only added 2 additional seats to a left alliance short of a ruling majority. Likewise, both 25th and 26th governments were formed during the 13th Knesset and led by the Labor Party who controlled 44 seats (34.7%). The numeric power gain of Labor in the 13th Knesset indicated an increased in its capacity to form a winning coalition. However, a closer look into aspects that stretched beyond the electoral strength in the distribution of seats among the 13th Knesset’s parties may reveal otherwise. Particularly if we examine the various ideological orientations of the parties we will find that ideological partners to a Labor-led coalition were very limited. Only Meretz (12 seats) emerged as an ideologically close partner to Labor. Taking ideological consideration in coalition formation, the power index of Labor in both 25th and 26th governments would have been undermined. In fact both 25th and 26th
The second trend change is found for foreign aid (Figure 4.5). Foreign assistance to Israel in early statehood was based primarily on German reparations, which amounted between 60 and 80-million U.S. dollars annually.\textsuperscript{102} Subsequently, aid to Israel has grown tremendously, particularly with U.S. assistance after the Camp David Accords. Post-1969, military and economic aid to Israel came to exceed two billion U.S. dollars annually.\textsuperscript{103} This represented a great improvement over the pre-69 period where annual aid amounted to less than one-billion U.S. dollars (Figure 4.5).

**Figure 4.5: Foreign Aid to Israel in Millions of Dollars 1949-1999\textsuperscript{104}**


\textsuperscript{103} In constant dollars.

\textsuperscript{104} Figures are adjusted to 1995 inflation index.
The increase of U.S. aid to Israel (and Egypt) signaled Washington’s growing role in Middle Eastern affairs, particularly after the 1967 Six Day War and the 1973 Yom Kippur War. A U.S. – Israeli strategic alliance was further solidified following the U.S. sponsored Camp David Accords that eliminated Egypt as a major Arab threat against Israel.

After Camp David, U.S. assistance remained very crucial for Israel’s military and economic wellbeing. As posited in the model, foreign assistance can reduce external pressure, thus relaxing conditions for consensus and helping prolong government duration. Thus in light of this trend we would expect smaller-based coalitions and governments of longer duration after 1969.

A third major change is evident in the number of strikers per strike in Israel, an indicator of potential social disruption which could threaten governments’ longevity. Major strikes became frequent through time reflecting Israel’s industrial development and consequently greater labor disputes. Again post-69 Israel witnessed greater intensity in labor strikes reflected in larger number of strikers per strikes than that in the pre-1969 period (Figure 4.6). This might have reflected or contributed to Likud’s growing political power, and the attendant policy changes that might have threatened trade unions and Labor Party status.
According to our theoretical propositions, increase in labor strife should have been a factor in the establishment of large or accommodating coalitions. Furthermore, the increase in such a pressure is expected to have led to shorter duration coalition governments after 1969.

No significant trend was evident in other independent variables, suggesting a relative political and economic stability in the country.\textsuperscript{106} Severity of external conflicts variable, for example, shows that since its establishment Israel continued to exist in an environment of conflict and confrontation. Coexistence between Israel and the

\textsuperscript{105} R\textsuperscript{2} value was improved from .55 to .81 when we plotted the log value of the number of strikers per strike.

\textsuperscript{106} Scatterplots for the rest of the variables revealed very low values of R.
Palestinians often entailed violence. Israel's military engagements with the surrounding Arab countries saw outbreaks of wars or collective violence approximately every five to ten years (Figure 4.7). It must be recognized, however, that the Arab states' collective military and security threat against Israel has tremendously declined over the years, particularly after 1967 and 1973 Wars. The signing of the various peace agreements between Israel, Egypt, Jordan, and the Palestinian Authority as well as the beginning path of normalization between Israel and most Arab States contributed to an increasing expectation of peace and security. Yet, despite security gains, Israel's sensitivity to external and then internal pressure after 1969 grew tremendously. As we will later reveal in Chapter 6, foreign or security policy became a source of greater polarization and division among Israelis, leading in one instance to the assassination of a Prime Minister (Rabin).

Thus, we find that the severity of conflict remained relatively high throughout the history of Israeli coalitions, yet its impact on coalition formation and duration became more prominent in later governments, as we will show in both our multiple regression analysis and throughout our qualitative case study Chapters 5 and 6. We will further demonstrate that larger coalitions, forming amid high level of external conflict, lasted longer than smaller coalitions.
Other variables showed slight trends over the years. Noticeable increase in Israel’s GDP occurred over the years and by the 1990s exceeded that of its neighboring countries combined. Thus Israel had the capabilities to take an economic leadership position in the region, and to support its military establishment, but lacked the political legitimacy to reach regional leadership potential. This fact had political implications for Israeli governments, and for the origin of desired peace accords as well. Annual changes in GDP slightly declined over the years, again suggesting relative economic stability. In

107 See Chapter 3 for severity of external conflict definition and scale.
the post-69 period, annual average changes in GDP declined to less than + or - 4% while scoring above + or - 4% before 1969 (Figure 4.8).

These patterns suggest that, in accordance with our theoretical propositions, the decline in economic pressure over the years has potentially contributed to smaller and more durable coalition formations.

**Figure 4.8: Annual Change in Israeli GDP 1949-1999**


Israel's e annual unemployment rate slightly increased across time. Israel's development into a major economic industrial country and a world mini-economic power helped establish a relatively large labor force and demand. In earlier years, most labor was agriculturally oriented around the Kibbutz and similar collectivities. With
industrialization, labor dislocation emerged with more people moving to industrial centers and reporting employment status.\textsuperscript{108} (Figure 4.9). This trend of increased annual unemployment is matched by the increasing rate of annual strikers per strike (Figure 4.6). Both variables reflect certain economic dislocation as a direct consequence of growing industrialization in the country. The predicted impact of such dislocation on the formation and maintenance of governments would be increasing pressures leading to larger but less durable governments.

Figure 4.9: Annual Unemployment Rate by Israeli Governments 1949-1999


\textsuperscript{108} Also a growing number of poor can be recorded, which is another problem associated with growing industrialization. In 1998, for example, the number of poor reached 18\% of the population during high industrial growth. (see Jewish Virtual Libray: http://www.israeltour.org/jsource/vitaltoc.html)
The last trend variable is annual number of immigrants per population. Despite significant immigration from the USSR and Ethiopia, the annual per capita figure slightly declined over the years (Figure 4.10). This was measured in order to record the pressure immigrants might have exerted on the country as a whole relative to its entire population. The size of the population becomes relevant in this regard. There could be a tremendous drop in Israeli immigrants in the future particularly after the pool of Russian immigrants has been drained.109

Figure 4.10: Annual Immigration and Immigration per Population Rate by Israeli Governments 1949-1999


¹09 See the distribution of the Jewish population around the world in the Jewish Virtual Library: http://www.israeltour.org/jsource/vitaltoc.html. Also see projected population change in Statistical Abstract of Israel.
Approximate number of immigrants during governments' time in power is also demonstrated in figure 4.10 with no apparent trend. Immigration pressure appears to have been periodically renewed throughout the history of Israeli governments. Both governments formed before and after 1969 encountered periodical change in immigration, although none so great as in the wave of Russian immigration of the early 1990s. This fluctuation, it will be later revealed in our regression and qualitative analyses, has been partially responsible for the variant impacting pressure on the formation of coalition and duration of the coalition. Immigration pressure, it will be

10 The number of immigrants per government was not a straightforward measure, since every government may begin in the middle of the year and terminate in the same year or in the middle of the following year. The number of immigrants is calculated annually. Therefore, we approximated the number of immigrants per government by calculating the proportion of government stay in power in a particular year and multiplying that proportion by the total number of immigrants for the same year. Then we added all annual proportions of immigrants that responded to the total annual proportions of government’s time in office. This is done in order to obtain an approximation to the total number of immigrants who entered the country while the government was serving office.
revealed, has been partially responsible over the downsizing of cabinet formation and the shortening of the coalition duration.

B. Examining the Models

The models proposed in Chapter 2 suggested that there are two important components to coalition formation that need to be explained: the size and the ideological parameter of the governing alliance.111 Explanatory variables selected in the models were mainly of two types. The first are of structural nature and measure the competitiveness of each Knesset as reflected in the power of the dominant party to form winning alliances. The second set of independent variables indicates external and internal political pressures exerted on coalition after formation and at termination (Chapter 2, Figure 2.2). It was originally hypothesized that competitiveness as well as political pressures press political parties to form large alliances and wide accommodating policy programs (Figure 2.1).

Our trend analysis points in various directions:

➢ First, we observed a stochastic decline in dominant party power index, suggesting higher competition, and expecting larger and durable formations.
➢ The observed increase in foreign assistance undermines external pressure and, thus, we expected small coalition formations of long durations.
➢ Increase in the number of strikers per strike presented expectation for larger but less durable formations.

111 Definition and measures of both size and ideological parameter is discussed in details in chapter 3.
Therefore, because various factors may have different impact on governments' formation and duration, the trend of both formation and duration variables alone cannot show patterns corresponding to the combined impact of independent variables, seen in Figures 4.4, 4.5, and 4.6. The only quantitative way to reveal the various directional impacts of each independent variable in shaping the formation and the duration of the governments is to conduct bivariate correlation as well as a multivariate regression analysis.

Based on the formation data, and after plotting the variables against the coalition's ideological parameter and then the number of coalition seats (size), our bivariate analysis did not produce any statistically significant result. Duration analysis, on the other hand, had one significant correlate, i.e., severity of external conflict a year prior to government termination. In a two-tailed test it showed significant correlation with durable governments of .49 at the .01 level. This suggested that with N=28 the increase in the severity of external conflict a year prior to government termination was associated with prolonging governments.

Our OLS model produced reasonably significant results in predicting coalition's size but not ideological parameter. The model predicted the number of coalition's seats (44% of variance) at a significance level of .06, and ideological parameter (35% of variance) only at a significance level of .17 as seen in Tables 4.1 and 4.3). In either case, the model failed to explain at least 50% of the variance in the dependent variables.
In terms of individual predictor variables, in OLS regression only one independent variable in each analysis showed significance relationship with our dependent variables. A unit-increase in the level of external severity of conflict was nearly significantly associated at a .063 level with a 6.61 increase in ideological parameter scores while holding other variables constant (Table 4.1). This result supported our proposition that external pressure undermines or suppresses the policy differences between political parties resulting in a broader government policy program.

By the same token, for OLS analysis of coalition size (Table 4.3), only the annual percent of immigrants per population appeared to have a significant and negative impact on number of coalition seats in formative decision making. Indeed this was a highly significant association, and the entire model was quite significant as well, though not especially strong in accounting for overall variance in coalition size.

These findings were partly upheld and partly contradicted in robust regression analysis (Tables 4.2 and 4.4). Robust analysis did not support the significance of external conflict for coalition ideological parameters. Instead robust regression showed, in the only significant relationship, that a unit-increase in the log of annual number of strikers per strike is strongly associated at a .01 level with a 6.29 decrease in ideological parameter while all other variables were held constant (Table 4.2). This finding supports the null hypothesis 2, indicating contrary to Robertson (1984), that internal ‘event pressure’ intensifies the divergence in policy positions, thus exerting pressure toward smaller and narrower alliances as it becomes more difficult and ultimately

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112 See Bivariate Analysis Appendix.
infeasible to bridge the ideological or policy preference gaps in forming governments (Chapter 2, Figure 2.2).

The robust overall model for the number of seats did not reach significance. However, as with OLS, the annual percent of immigrants per population appeared to have a significant (negative) coefficient, while the rest of the variables were held constant (Tables 4.3 and 4.4). Both in the OLS and Robust analysis showed similar significance levels, with the robust analysis suggesting that a percentage increase in the log of annual immigrants per population is associated with 8.86 decrease in the number of coalition seats with all other variables held constant (Table 4.4). This finding supports the null hypothesis 2 that immigrant pressure flares partisan differences and instigates alliances to form smaller and closer ranks (Chapter 2, Figure 2.2).
### Table 4.1

**OLS Regression Analysis of Ideological Parameter (n= 26)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variable</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>Sb</th>
<th>t</th>
<th>sig (2-tail)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dominant Party Power Index</td>
<td>-0.23</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>-0.68</td>
<td>0.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Severity of Conflict</td>
<td>6.62</td>
<td>3.36</td>
<td>1.97</td>
<td>0.06**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Aid</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>-0.06</td>
<td>0.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP change year to year</td>
<td>-125.67</td>
<td>75.62</td>
<td>-1.66</td>
<td>0.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log of Number of Immigrants as Percent of Population</td>
<td>1.40</td>
<td>3.08</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td>0.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log of Number of Strikers Per Strike</td>
<td>-6.74</td>
<td>4.07</td>
<td>-1.65</td>
<td>0.12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ R^2 = .35 \]

*Correlation is significant at the 0.1 level (2-tailed).
**Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
***Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).*

---

### Table 4.2

**Robust Regression Analysis of Ideological Parameter (n= 26)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variable</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>Sb</th>
<th>t</th>
<th>sig (2-tail)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dominant Party Power Index</td>
<td>-0.11</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>-0.61</td>
<td>0.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Severity of Conflict</td>
<td>0.99</td>
<td>1.76</td>
<td>0.56</td>
<td>0.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Aid</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.43</td>
<td>0.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP change year to year</td>
<td>-65.50</td>
<td>39.72</td>
<td>-1.65</td>
<td>0.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log of Number of Immigrants as Percent of Population</td>
<td>1.09</td>
<td>1.62</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>0.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log of Number of Strikers Per Strike</td>
<td>-6.29</td>
<td>2.14</td>
<td>-2.94</td>
<td>0.01***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>60.09</td>
<td>22.60</td>
<td>2.66</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ F(6,19) = 4.33 \] \[ Prob= 0.01 \]

*Correlation is significant at the 0.1 level (2-tailed).
**Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
***Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).*

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113 28 cases were examined. However, the lack of official statistic data on GNP in early years is responsible for lowering the analysis to 26 cases.

114 Prob>F (6,19) = 0.01 indicates that the F test, which is a test for the overall linear relationship between the independent variables and the dependent variable with F(6,19) means six degrees of freedom in the numerator (that's the number of independent variables that we have), 19 degrees of freedom in the denominator (that's n-k-1 or 26-6-1=19), a significant probability for a linear relationship exists (4.33) between the x's and the y.
Table 4.3
OLS Regression Analysis of Number of Coalition’s Seats (n= 26)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variable</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>sb</th>
<th>t</th>
<th>sig (2-tail)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dominant Party Power Index</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>1.60</td>
<td>0.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Severity of Conflict</td>
<td>2.32</td>
<td>3.44</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>0.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Aid</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>-0.62</td>
<td>0.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP change year to year</td>
<td>-16.62</td>
<td>77.54</td>
<td>-0.21</td>
<td>0.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log of Number of Immigrants as Percent of Population</td>
<td>-9.18</td>
<td>3.16</td>
<td>-2.91</td>
<td>0.01***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log of Number of Strikers Per Strike</td>
<td>-0.70</td>
<td>4.18</td>
<td>-0.17</td>
<td>0.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R² = 0.44</td>
<td></td>
<td>12.73</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.06*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Correlation is significant at the 0.1 level (2-tailed).
**Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
***Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Table 4.4
Robust Regression Analysis of Number of Seats(n= 26)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variable</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>sb</th>
<th>t</th>
<th>sig (2-tail)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dominant Party Power Index</td>
<td>0.53</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>1.36</td>
<td>0.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Severity of Conflict</td>
<td>2.40</td>
<td>3.93</td>
<td>0.61</td>
<td>0.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Aid</td>
<td>-0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>-0.51</td>
<td>0.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP change year to year</td>
<td>-11.50</td>
<td>88.49</td>
<td>-0.13</td>
<td>0.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log of Number of Immigrants as Percent of Population</td>
<td>-8.86</td>
<td>3.60</td>
<td>-2.46</td>
<td>0.02**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log of Number of Strikers Per Strike</td>
<td>-1.10</td>
<td>4.77</td>
<td>-0.23</td>
<td>0.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>36.65</td>
<td>50.35</td>
<td>0.73</td>
<td>0.48</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

F(6,19) = 1.87 Prob= 0.14**

*Correlation is significant at the 0.1 level (2-tailed).
**Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
***Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Our theoretical formation models were based on various hypothetical propositions drawn from the coalition literary traditions (Chapter 2). The first hypothesis predicted

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115 Weak linear relationship between the xs and the y.
large and ideologically wide coalitions corresponding to high coalition competition. We found no quantitative evidence for such an assertion as party competition increased after 1969, and thus we were not able to confirm or reject Mershon's thesis (1996, 2001). This posed a new dilemma for our models, particularly in analyzing whether competitiveness had distinct impact on formation before and after 1969. In order to examine such a proposition, we must divide our population into two sets of coalitions consisting of governments formed before and after 1969. This will leave us with 13 governments for the first set and 15 for the second. Due to such a small population size comparative case study analysis will be necessary to examine such a proposition, an approach we will explore in the following chapter.

The second aspect of our coalition formation models proposed that coalitions are formed larger and ideologically wider when confronted with mounting domestic and external pressures (hypothesis 2, Chapter 2). This proposition was partially contradicted by our robust regression analysis where the increase in the number of strikers per strike was found to be significantly associated with tight ideological parameters (rejecting Robertson; 1984, 1986). The null hypothesis was further asserted in both our OLS and robust regressions where increased immigration pressure was significantly associated with smaller-sized coalitions. Our hypothesis was only confirmed in OLS analysis with regard to increasing external pressure having positive effect on the ideological parameter of the coalition. Coalitions' policy positions, our OLS model suggested, became accommodating to various ideological perspectives as external conflict pressure on the country mounts. Overall, however, in dealing with ideology, the robust model was quite
significant, though modestly powerful, and featured the effects of strikes in narrowing coalition parameters.

Predicting coalition size in our formation model indicated some validity for the combined propositions (including null hypotheses). The size model appeared nearly significant, though at a modest level of variance explained ($R^2=44\%$) in OLS but not the robust regression analysis. Once again, trend analysis revealed shifts in important characteristics of Israeli polity, which necessitate careful examination of coalition behaviors while taking historic transformations into account. As our annual number of strikers per strike and unemployment trends revealed, a dramatic increase began to take shape following 1969 (Figure 4.3). This necessitates a qualitative comparative analysis of our formation model for the periods before and after 1969.

As for the duration model proposed in Chapter 2, it was suggested that explaining ruling coalitions' duration involves two sets of independent explanatory variables. The first set involves systematic structural variables entailing parliamentary competitiveness, coalition size, and coalition ideological parameter. It was hypothesized that 'efficient formation,' i.e., smaller size and tighter ideological parameter; contribute to extended duration (Chapter 2, hypotheses 5 and 6). It was also proposed that party system competitiveness prolongs duration (Chapter 2, hypothesis 4). The second set of independent variables includes event pressure indicators (Chapter 2, Figure 2.3). It was argued that pressure upon formation or increasing change in pressure before termination shortens the durability of the coalition (Chapter 2, hypothesis 3).
An OLS analysis of data obtained the first year after government formation accounted for a modest 22% of variance in duration (Table 4.5) and with a generally insignificant confidence level. Dealing with individual predictors, and implementing OLS, no significant correlation was found between the examined independent variables and coalition duration.

However, when we use robust regression analysis the overall model appears as highly significant, and the dominant party power index emerges as a significant predictor of duration. Robust regression shows that a percentage increase in the power index of the dominant party was associated with 33.21 days increase in the duration of the government (Table 4.6). This implies that the years of lower party competition saw longer duration coalitions. This finding contradicts hypothesis 4, which claimed that coalition longevity was associated with higher level of competition. This result also supported Grofman and Roozentaal's (1997) thesis against Mershon’s (1996) view. Neither the size nor the ideological parameter appeared to be significantly relevant to duration analysis (Hypotheses 5 and 6, Chapter 2). Nonetheless, as has been previously discussed, we still must further examine such hypotheses in light of important institutional and historic developments as revealed by our trend analysis, which showed a dramatic increase in competition as well as changes in coalitions’ size and ideological parameters following 1969 national election (Figure 4.1, 4.5, 4.6).
Robust Regression also reveals the significance of outside aid in prolonging governments; *each one million U.S. dollars increase in foreign aid is associated with a 0.21 day increase in the duration of the coalition* (Table 4.6). This finding supports hypothesis 3 which proposed that government longevity is associated with the decline in event pressures or increased resources. In this case, increase of foreign assistance indicates a decrease in external pressures (perhaps signaling favorable international circumstances), and therefore tended to prolong the duration of the ruling coalition.\(^{116}\) This finding supports the logic of Browne's proposition (1984, 86, 88) where duration is viewed as a function of declining event pressure. Nonetheless, acceptance of such a proposition also requires a qualitative comparative examination to the shifting impact of the dramatic increase in foreign aid on duration after 1969 (Figure 4.2).

\(^{116}\) Of course increasing aid opens the way for subsequently increased foreign pressure on Israel as the aid donor can conceivably move to withdraw the aid if Israel did not cooperate.
### Table 4.5

**OLS Regression Analysis of Government’s Days Based on One Year After Formation Data (n= 27)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variable</th>
<th>b</th>
<th>sb</th>
<th>T</th>
<th>sig (2-tail)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dominant Party Power Index</td>
<td>11.17</td>
<td>11.70</td>
<td>-0.66</td>
<td>0.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Severity of Conflict</td>
<td>25.17</td>
<td>101.24</td>
<td>0.96</td>
<td>0.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Aid</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP change year to year</td>
<td>-2802.12</td>
<td>2347.55</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>0.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log of Number of Immigrants as Percent of Population</td>
<td>16.65</td>
<td>126.65</td>
<td>-1.19</td>
<td>0.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Coalition Seats</td>
<td>2.44</td>
<td>7.35</td>
<td>0.89</td>
<td>0.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideological Parameter</td>
<td>-6.12</td>
<td>6.91</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>0.74</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$R^2 = .22$

*Correlation is significant at the 0.1 level (2-tailed).
**Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
***Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

### Table 4.6

**Robust Regression Analysis of Government’s Days Based on One Year After Formation Data (n= 27)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variable</th>
<th>b</th>
<th>sb</th>
<th>T</th>
<th>sig (2-tail)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dominant Party Power Index</td>
<td>33.21</td>
<td>8.72</td>
<td>3.81</td>
<td>0.00***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Severity of Conflict</td>
<td>94.10</td>
<td>75.51</td>
<td>1.25</td>
<td>0.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Aid</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>0.00***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP change year to year</td>
<td>-1245.08</td>
<td>1751.01</td>
<td>0.71</td>
<td>0.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log of Number of Immigrants as Percent of Population</td>
<td>40.77</td>
<td>94.47</td>
<td>0.43</td>
<td>0.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Coalition Seats</td>
<td>3.32</td>
<td>5.48</td>
<td>0.61</td>
<td>0.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideological Parameter</td>
<td>-3.30</td>
<td>5.15</td>
<td>-0.64</td>
<td>0.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-3565.44</td>
<td>1152.91</td>
<td>-3.09</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$F(8,18) = 4.28$  Prob= 0.005

*Correlation is significant at the 0.1 level (2-tailed).
**Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
***Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Neither the OLS nor the robust regression models revealed significant association between events pressures a year prior to government termination and the coalition

[117] Strong linear relationship exiting between the xs and the y.
duration (Table 4.7 and 4.8). Furthermore no significant correlation was evident between individual predictors and the dependent variable. Unlike some of the trend or bivariate correlation analyses, these results suggested that the last year events (e.g., external conflict) did not significantly impact the duration of the coalitions. In both analyses we found no strong evidence to support the ‘aging proposition’ stated in hypothesis 3 which predicted that the increase in pressures during a coalition’s office term contributed to its downfall (Browne, 1982, 84,86). Only in our previous bivariate analysis did we find indication supporting such a proposition where the deterioration of external conflict at government’s end year was found to be associated with longer duration coalitions.\textsuperscript{118} It appeared logical to conclude that as the coalition ages in power external shocks became significantly associated with its downfall, but we find no clear evidence of this in the regression analyses (though conflicts were the closest to significance in the regression models). Still, however, we need to qualitatively examine such a proposition in order to compare corresponding impacts on coalitions’ duration before and after 1969.

\textsuperscript{118} Deterioration in external conflict can include, as explained in Chapter 3, increase in casualties and/or the level of hostility with surrounding countries and/or U.N condemnation to international practices. See table
### Table 4.7

**OLS Regression Analysis of Government's Days Based on the Year of Termination Data (n= 27)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variable</th>
<th>b</th>
<th>sb</th>
<th>T</th>
<th>sig (2-tail)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dominant Party Power Index</td>
<td>7.09</td>
<td>8.75</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td>0.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Severity of Conflict</td>
<td>177.30</td>
<td>115.66</td>
<td>1.53</td>
<td>0.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Aid</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td>0.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP change year to year</td>
<td>-1066.79</td>
<td>1329.38</td>
<td>-0.80</td>
<td>0.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log of Number of Immigrants as Percent of Population</td>
<td>-52.55</td>
<td>92.09</td>
<td>-0.57</td>
<td>0.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Coalition Seats</td>
<td>-2.83</td>
<td>6.03</td>
<td>-0.47</td>
<td>0.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideological Parameter</td>
<td>-5.90</td>
<td>6.28</td>
<td>-0.94</td>
<td>0.36</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ R^2 = 0.36 \]

*Correlation is significant at the 0.1 level (2-tailed).
**Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
***Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

---

### Table 4.8

**Robust Regression Analysis of Government's Days Based on the Year of Termination Data (n= 27)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variable</th>
<th>b</th>
<th>sb</th>
<th>t</th>
<th>sig (2-tail)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dominant Party Power Index</td>
<td>7.75</td>
<td>9.66</td>
<td>0.80</td>
<td>0.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Severity of Conflict</td>
<td>193.65</td>
<td>128.69</td>
<td>1.50</td>
<td>0.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Aid</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP change year to year</td>
<td>-0.75</td>
<td>1536.22</td>
<td>-0.34</td>
<td>0.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log of Number of Immigrants as Percent of Population</td>
<td>-110.10</td>
<td>115.13</td>
<td>-0.96</td>
<td>0.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Coalition Seats</td>
<td>-3.69</td>
<td>6.73</td>
<td>0.59</td>
<td>0.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideological Parameter</td>
<td>-8.07</td>
<td>7.12</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>0.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-992.84</td>
<td>1381.49</td>
<td>-0.72</td>
<td>0.48</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ F(8,17) = 1.22 \quad \text{Prob}= 0.35^{119} \]

*Correlation is significant at the 0.1 level (2-tailed).
**Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
***Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

---

3.12.

119  Weak linear relationship existing between the xs and the y.
Discussion

Some event variables appeared to significantly correlate with formation and duration analyses. Certain event pressure variables, such as labor disputes, appeared to have association with both formation and durational analyses. Labor disputes appeared to have driven a wedge between parties and increased the pressure for ideologically tighter formations. Also associated with such unexpectedly smaller coalitions was immigration pressure. External event pressure involved in conflicts, on the other hand, might have undermined policy differences and ideologically united distant parties. The structural variables did not reveal significant correlation with either dependent variable, suggesting perhaps greater impact of event pressure variables on formation analysis.

Durational analysis provided additional support to the significance of event variables in coalition behaviors. In our case, annual increase in foreign assistance positively impacted the duration of coalitions. Structural variables also appeared relevant to duration outcome. Increase in coalition competition emerged as negatively impacting the duration of the coalitions. No significant results were found that other structural or event variables significantly impacted coalition duration.

Furthermore, no significant evidence was found to support the aging thesis. Some evidences hinted that certain external shocks might have been associated with the downfall of ‘older’ or long-duration governments. Yet, dismissing systematic variables
as well as other event pressure variables is premature before we have thoroughly reviewed cases in the following chapter.

Trend analysis suggested that differences exist in coalition behaviors before and after 1969. The trend plots showed increase in both foreign aid, unemployment, and the number of strikers per strikes over the years. Such increases were significantly sharpened after 1969, along with declining party power dominance scores. Other variables showed similar differences between the two periods, but in a less dramatic trend. These patterns suggested that Israel became further dependent on foreign aid particularly from the U.S., and therefore that its coalition behaviors conceivably became more linked with U.S. foreign policy. In addition, Israeli coalition behaviors became increasingly "industrial-labor" oriented reflecting the industrial growth of the country and the rise of "industrial politics" and the globalized, if somewhat more stable economy. Most importantly, however, to coalition behavior was the notable decline in dominant party's power and, thus, the fragmentation of the coalition system toward a more competitive arrangement particularly seen after 1969. Immigration continued to be a significant aspect of coalition formation as well. The flow of immigration has contributed to increasing fragmentation in the Israeli system, polling partisanship toward greater ethnic divisions and, therefore, tighter alliances.

Other potentially important observations in our trend analysis suggested that, with the exception of wartime, the over-sized coalitions, which were the traditional formation before 1969, became less of a strategy for post-69 formations. Instead, small or minimum
winning coalitions became more frequent. Furthermore, though almost all coalitions' ideological parameters were relatively tight, this became more pronounced post-69.

This difference in variable patterns before and after 1969 presents new challenges to the proposed models. Perhaps it is the case that our models can be applied to one period more significantly than another. The only way to examine such a proposition is to further divide the population of governing Israeli coalitions into two sets for case study analysis.

In the following chapter a qualitative examination is, therefore, made. While a number of the factors cited in this chapter, such as strikes and immigration, are peculiarly relevant to Israeli politics, we will remember the overall categories of variables as structural or event based, so that general findings can be developed about the potency of these categories in predicting coalition size, ideology and duration in other countries as well.
CHAPTER 5

QUALITATIVE DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS:
SHORT DURATION COALITION GOVERNMENTS

In this chapter a qualitative approach is conducted to analyze Israeli coalition formation and duration. The shortest-lived Israeli governments were selected in order to examine the most evident variables associated with governments’ early breakups and terminations. The sample examined includes four Israeli cabinets evenly divided between pre and post-1969 periods. This selection has been followed in order to provide comparative evidence to whether a transformation in coalition behaviors has occurred following 1969 general election in Israel. Explanatory variables examined include economic, immigration, and external pressures as well as the structural competitiveness of the Knesset upon the formation of the coalition government. Changes in pressure variables as well as the structural competitiveness of the Knesset, the coalition’s size, and the coalition’s ideological parameter are further examined in a second stage analysis in order to reveal factors determining the short duration of the governments.

The results of our examination to the four shortest lived Israeli governing coalitions reveal that economic pressure is directly associated with coalition formation. Coalitions are often formed on consensual basis (large-wide) when faced by high economic pressure while formed competitive (small-tight) when confronted by low economic pressure. In contrast to post-1969 period, economic pressure appeared to have been higher during early years of statehood formation. Such a condition was reflected in
the different impact of competitiveness on the formation of coalition governments. Early coalitions were often formed consensual (large-wide) under conditions of low competition in contrast to competitive formation (small-tight) that emerged throughout the post-1969 era. Increase economic pressure during the lifespan of the government were evident in all short duration governments examined.

Overview

As seen in the quantitative results, Israel’s political history can be divided primarily into two distinct periods: the pre-1969 and the post-1969 eras (Arian, 1998). The earlier period was marked by the task of state political, economic and social formation. The second period, in contrast, was a period of consolidation, expansion, industrialization, and conquest (Perlmutter, 1985). The two periods in Israeli history resemble human growth from youth to adulthood. The early epoch was fraught with uncertainties concerning the state of the economy, population demography, security, and the structure of government, posing great challenges to Israel's very existence. When looking back to the early period Mosh Felber saw Israel’s history as "a story of recurring dangers and crisis threatening to destroy it." (Felber, 1999). Two decades after its establishment, Israel emerged strong and mature. It was able to meet the challenges on many fronts achieving dramatic economic progress, meeting the need of a newly founded immigrant-based society, fielding the strongest military in the Middle East while achieving peace with major surrounding countries, and rooting a strong tradition of democratic government.
From the beginning the greatest task facing the nation was that of governing. How could the Zionist parties with all their ideological and constituent differences align together and lead a durable government under tremendous foreign and domestic pressures? This challenge to the nation was answered by the ability of the different Zionist tendencies and factions to form stable and durable alliances while allowing voices of dissent to assemble and be heard. Charismatic leadership (example, David Ben Gurion) and dramatic events led to stretch coalitions that were inclusive of the various Israeli political spectra. National governments were often formed to confront war and threats against the State in 1948, 1955, 1967, 1982, and in 2000. Israeli democratic tradition was further expressed in its capacity to enhance the environment of political pluralism and toleration while reacting to changing environments. Political parties were divided among ideological groups forming and breaking alliances in response to changing political circumstances. In sum, Israeli democratic tradition was demonstrated in alliances' formation and duration, which responded to changing political and social conditions that have confronted the nation.

The question that we aim to examine is how have the changing challenges to Israel impacted its political cabinet structure and process (formation and duration)? We examine this question while observing a shift in the political discourse of Israeli coalition politics from a pre to a post-1969 era. In the quantitative section of this study we noted that the making of coalitions in Israel after 1969 became subjugated to a more fragmented and competitive Knesset. We also observed that coalition politics in this period became less oriented to immediate external military threat. The U.S. political, economic, and
military support to Israel following 1967 Six Day War and the 1973 Yum Kippur War increased many folds, thus adding to Israel's regional security and potential for arms supplies (with some interruption in 1973). We also found that economic development in this period entailed rapid industrial growth, including an arms industry, leading to growing activities by labor for better living and working standards. While a major immigrant infusion took place first from Ethiopia and then Russia, this period also was known for a decline in the number of immigrants relative to the entire Israeli population.

The prospect of the case studies is to examine how these challenges shaped political alliances in both composition and dissolution for each period of time. For that purpose we discuss these challenges and their prospective consequences on coalitions' formation and duration by comparing four shortest-lived to four longest-lived Israeli coalition governments. We further study the differences between both groups for the period before and after 1969. The coalition sample that we research is divided into two shortest-lived and two longest-lived coalitions for each period of time (Table 3.15 and Table 3.16).

In correspondence to the predictive models, the challenges (event pressures) examined in this study are related to: the economy, immigration, and external pressure. Each is briefly described for every government to answer the question proposed in Chapter 3, i.e., how each developed prior to formation, after formation, and at termination. Then we discuss for each government the structural dimension in order to answer how each coalition formed by size and ideological parameter while considering
system (Knesset) competitiveness and details of political competition and decision-making. Finally, we attempt to make association between the event pressures (economy, immigration, external pressure) along with structural variable (competitiveness) with coalition formation (size and ideological parameter). We compare the relationship by two levels: pre-post 1969 level and shortest-longest government duration level. Then, we examine the impact of changing event pressure on government duration in order to test for the aging thesis.

The 2nd Israeli Government, 1950-51

The 1st Israeli government collapsed as a direct consequence of economic shortfalls. The introduction of austerity policy in March 1949 with aims of decreasing price and wage levels led to black marketeering and profiteering (Lann, 1996). The collapse of the 1st government occurred after Prime Minister Ben Gurion attempted to reshape the government in order to wage a long-range assault on black marketers. On October 3rd Mr. Ben Gurion announced that he had assumed all powers vested in the government in order to equip himself with the necessary authority to wage a campaign against black marketers. In a broadcast aired on the 3rd of October Mr. Ben Gurion warned merchants to surrender hidden stocks and declared severe punishment against violators. Ministers of the Religious Bloc withdrew from the coalition government in protest against the Prime Minister’s new vested power.120 As a consequence the 1st coalition government collapsed and Mr. Ben Gurion resigned on October 15, 1950.

120 Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, p. 11131, December 2-9, 1950.
Mr. Ben Gurion, the head of the major dominant Mapai party in the Knesset, was asked by President Weizmann to form a new government on October 15, 1950. Mr. Ben Gurion proposed the formation of a caretaker minority administration pending election. His request, however, was rejected by the Knesset due primarily to the opposition of the Religious Bloc to join such an administration. Finally on October 25 a settlement was reached between Mapai and the Religious Bloc to form a coalition government until January 1953, when general elections were due to be held. The 2nd government was born on October 30th after it received the confidence of the Knesset. The 2nd government resembled the first with the same partner parties. The only important revision, which indicated partial concessions by the Religious Bloc in favor of Mr. Ben Gurion, was the establishment of the Trade and Industry Ministry under Mr. Jaacov Geeri who was named by Ben Gurion.121

Economy:

On November 1, 1950 Mr. Ben Gurion addressed the Knesset declaring that economic controls and rationing would continue to be the aim of government policy together with measures to raise the standard of living. The new government received a vote of confidence by 69 votes to 42, with two abstentions.122 Prime Minister Gurion’s statement came amid mounting economic crisis facing the country.

121 Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, p. 11131, December 2-9, 1950.
But the major economic difficulty faced Israel following independence was inflation. The annual inflation rate was in double digits increasing to 66% in 1952. In 1950 unemployment was approximately at 7% and rising with increasing waves of incoming immigrants. Most of the workforce worked in agricultural settlements compared to only 3% today. Number of strikes and strikers increased for this period from an average of 98 strikers per strike in 1949 to 126 in 1950 and 128 in 1951. In 1951 and despite limited economic growth inflation rose by 20% from the previous year (Lann, 1996).

When the second government formed, Mr. Ben Gurion declared his aims for an economic reform to boost exports and reduce imports, increase financial and technical aid as well as provide larger allocation of raw materials to exporters, form mixed committees of workers and employers to supervise productivity, encourage foreign investment, and lift duties on capital imports. Ben Gurion's efforts, however, did not succeed in reducing inflation. In fact, from 1950, the year the government formed, until 1951, the year it dissolved, inflation remained the major unresolved economic problem confronting the nation. And, despite government's strategies to ease price pressures, economic circumstances proved to be overwhelming contributing to the 2nd government's early fall. Although the pattern was not as clear-cut quantitatively across all cases, this case tends to confirm our hypothesis proposed in Chapter 2 that economic pressure undermines the longevity of governmental terms. Furthermore, as will be shown in this section, the 2nd government was formed large. This also supports the hypothesis which

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suggested that economic pressure helps establish a large sized and ideologically diverse coalition.

Immigration:

In addition to the economic burden and the high rate of inflation that confronted early Israeli governments, immigration added another aspect of economic and social burden on the country in general and on the government in particular. From independence in 1948 through 1951 a mass immigration of some 687,000 people poured in. Presenting the government to the Knesset in November 1950 Mr. Ben Gurion declared that his administration regarded immigration as integral to national security. He further announced that a total of 510,000 immigrants had entered Israel since the foundation of the state in May 1948. This large number of immigrants exerted great challenge for the newly emerging state. By 1951 the country had doubled its Jewish population. The number of immigrants arriving in 1950 alone reached 12% of population, totaling 170,563 immigrants. Immigrants arriving in 1951 rose to 175,279 (Felber, 1997). The immigrants included survivors of the Holocaust, large numbers of Bulgarian, Polish and Romanian Jews, and nearly all of the Jewish communities of Libya, Yemen, and Iraq.

Immigration represented a multifaceted problem to the newly emerging state. Most of the immigrants were not young or educated. Rather, they were refugees from the

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125 Keesing's Contemporary Archives, p.11131, December 2-9, 1950.
127 Central Bureau of Statistics, JAFI, Jerusalem Post (December 29, 2002)
Nazi death camps in Europe. At that time, Israel did not even have the capacity to feed or house the newcomers (Felber, 1999). In addition to the economic burden, immigration represented a cultural and integration challenge to Israel. Survivors spoke many languages and held traditions that varied along with their national origins. They brought diverse political and religious convictions that often clashed with early settlers. Incorporating all these aspects into the process of nation building represented the greatest challenge of immigration.

Religious versus secular education for the country in general and for the new immigrants in particular proved to be among the major divisive policy issues for early Israeli coalitions. Such a division fostered polarization among Israel political parties and contributed to the downfall of both the 1st and the 2nd Israeli coalition governments. The dissolution of the 2nd government occurred following the Minister of Education’s plan for allowing the Histadrut (the trade union movement) to supervise the religious education of child immigrants in work camps. Mr. Ben Gurion argued that parents should determine for their children the type of education they should receive (religious or secular) after they move from reception camps to work camps. The Religious Bloc rejected Gurion’s proposition on the ground that religious education should be compulsory for all immigrant children in work camps. The opposition of the Religious Bloc to secular education along with its rejection to government’s economic policy led to the collapse of the ruling alliance and consequently to the resignation of Prime Minister

Gurion.\textsuperscript{130} Thus, in addition to economic pressure that faced the 2\textsuperscript{nd} Israeli government, immigration pressure was an additional factor that played a role in its early downfall. Economic as well as immigration pressure also appear to have been associated with the government's rather ideologically broad formation as predicted by our model described in Chapter 2.

**External Pressure:**

The 2\textsuperscript{nd} Israeli government declared in its policy guidelines its commitments to peace and international law. It announced that Israel foreign policy would be formed on the basis of "loyalty to the principles of the United Nations Charter...striving towards a Jewish-Arab covenant within the framework of United Nations Organization...support of every measure to strengthen peace, ensure the rights of man and the equality of peoples the world over, and strengthen the authority and competence of the United Nations Organization."\textsuperscript{131}

These declarations of principle were announced the first year after independence that followed two bloody years of war with Arab armies. Israel not only won the War of Independence but also gained international support recognizing its legitimate foundation. Although tension with Arab states remained high, 1950 was the first year of peace for Israel.

\textsuperscript{130} *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, p. 11348, March 17-24, 1951.

Under these circumstances the 2nd Israeli government was established. A year after it was formed, a relative low escalation of external tension had emerged. Among the most notable escalations were border skirmishes erupting on the Syrian borders and the assassination of King Abdullah of Jordan in the Al Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem.\textsuperscript{132} Despite these escalations, favorable international developments helped maintain Israel’s sense of national security. In 1950 and 1951 the United Nations did not pass any resolution criticizing or condemning Israel. On the contrary, the Security Council passed three important resolutions supporting ceasefire (Resolution 92, 93) and free passage in the Suez Canal (Resolution 95).\textsuperscript{133}

External circumstances of the 2nd Israeli government, therefore, do not appear to have been factors in its duration, since the coalition collapsed early while low external pressures were present. Furthermore, external pressures do not seem to have been a reason for large government formation. Contrary, to our hypothetical expectations the 2nd government formed large and fell early while external pressures were low.

Coalition Structure:

A. Size:

In October 1950 the 2nd Israeli government was established under high economic and immigration pressures. As our model proposed, economic and immigration pressure were aspects forcing the government to form on a national consensual basis, where

parties from opposing ideological camps unite together in order to confront threats to nationhood. The government was formed as an alliance of various left, center, and religious parties controlling the following seats: Mapai 46, United Religious Front (URF) 16, Progressive Party 5, Sephardim and Edot Mizrah 4, and the Arab List 2 (Table 5.1). This government was a model of the early governments that dissolved due to differences about religious education, and in this case also about the Prime Minister's demand for the cancellation of Supply and Rationing Ministry.

The coalition formed with three "excessive" parties (Progressive, Sephardim, and Arab) having 11 seats more than the necessary minimum winning majority seats of 62 which Mapai and URF alone controlled. This situation suggested that the coalition was formed on consensual basis due, perhaps to the high immigration and economic pressures that the country was facing. Consensual formations are often prompted by national or international pressures where, for example, deteriorated economic conditions require sacrifice of the various social cleavages or principles in order to safeguard the economy and the entire nation from total collapse. Under such circumstances, larger (consensual) alignments appear necessarily to maintain national harmony and overcome threatening events.

Both economic and immigration pressure seem to have been aspects of the large formation of the 2nd government, as proposed by our theoretical model. Furthermore, the

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135 Exceptions rarely occur when neither of the two dominant parties in the Knesset is capable of capturing the necessary vote to form a winning ruling coalition. In such a situation, as it occurred following the 1983
2nd government’s short duration also confirms our proposition that large coalition formations (inefficient) reduce cabinet’s durability, especially in the face of continued environmental pressures.

B. Ideological Parameter

The principal guidelines of the 2nd government established a wide range of ideological positions ranging from religious to secular and from favorable private economic policy to workers rights and control. It declared that the State shall observe the Sabbath and Jewish Holy Days. Among its objectives was the encouragement of private capital while providing an economic nationalization plan. It spelled the right of free enterprise; at the same time stressing labor’s rights of minimum wage, collective bargaining, and strike.136

The government was ideologically established between left, center, and religious parties that controlled 73 seats.137 Budge coded this coalition 3 on the ideological closeness scale. In Budge’s scale a coalition would score 1 for being ideologically very tight and score 6 for being ideologically very wide. The ideological variety of this coalition was evident in having various parties of different ideological backgrounds. Along Budge’s characterization of the 2nd government, we confirm that the ruling coalition was established with somewhat wide ideological parameters. Such parameters coincide with its over minimum size, as expected.

C. Competitiveness

Mapai, with 46 seats (38%), was the dominant party of the First Knesset. Although it did not control the majority of seats in the Knesset (61) it was realistically impossible for any coalition to have been established without its leadership. A rival coalition to a Mapai-led alliance was virtually impossible. Any rival coalition that excluded Mapai would have to have included religious, right, and left parties while being led by Mapam (a far left-secular party), the second largest party in the Knesset (19 seats); such an alliance was practically impossible.

Another indicator of low competitiveness in the 1st Knesset and leading to the 2nd was the maintenance of parties’ ranks throughout the Knesset life. Only four seats were lost by defections before the election to the 2nd Israeli Knesset (Table 5.1). As has been discussed in previous chapters, high party competition encourages defection from party ranks as potentially highly rewarding.

The 2nd government was terminated after the Knesset rejected an education bill proposed by the Minister of Education and Culture regarding the registration of children in schools. Religious partner parties opposed the legislation and as a consequence the government collapsed on October 1951, lasting only 342 days. Thus contrary to what was proposed by our model, coalition competition for this government does not appear to

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137 Ideological categorization of parties and government is established according to Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs “The Governments of Israel”. www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp?MPAH0hyd0.
have been a factor in its duration or demise. Furthermore, low competition, contrary to our theoretical expectation, did not lead to an especially small sized cabinet formation.

Table 5.1: Political Parties’ Distribution of Seats at the First Knesset

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political Parties</th>
<th>First Knesset</th>
<th>Before Next Knesset Election</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mapai</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mapam</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Religious Front</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Herut Movement</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Zionists</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Progressive Party</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maki</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sephardim and Edot Mizrah</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arab Parties</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fighters List</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WIZO</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemenite Association</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ari Jabotinski</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hillel Kook</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The 12th Israeli Government, 1964-66

The 12th government was established under Levi Eshkol, formed on 22 of December 1964 after the 11th government resigned a week before, owing to a domestic controversy within Mapai on the ‘Lavon Affair’. The controversy within Mapai began by Mr. Dayan, a leading figure within the party and the Minister of Agriculture, who resigned his post in November 4, 1964. The Israeli press reported that Mr. Dayan’s resignation was primarily due to his deepening differences with the Prime Minister on Mapai’s continued cooperation with Ahdut Avoda, as well as his reported demand for the abolition of farm subsidies and other disagreements. However, the dispute within the Mapai leadership reached its climax on November 7th when supporters of Mr. Pinhas Lavon decided to split with Mapai after Mr. Eshkol hesitated to nominate the former in
the parliamentary and trade union elections. Worse, the dispute within Mapai led to the resignations of Mr. Ben Gurion from the party’s central committee on November 15th, after he had taken a hard position against any role of Mr. Lavon in the party and demanded a new inquiry into his affairs.139

In December 14, 1964 Mr. Eshkol resigned from the Premiership after being unable to establish a unified position among the party’s leadership in regard to the Levon’s issue. Mapai’s central committee, however, reinstated Mr. Levon as the party leader on December 17 and the Levon’s question was left to Mapai’s ministers to resolve. President Shazar asked Mr. Eshkol on Dec. 20 to form a new government, and on Dec. 22 Mr. Eshkol announced his new administration, which was identical with its predecessor except for the appointment of Mr. Akiva Govrin, previously Minister without Portfolio, as Minister of Tourism, a new post. Mr. Eshkol told the Knesset that his new government would continue to act on the basis of the same principles and coalition agreements that were in force during the previous administration. The new cabinet received Knesset’s vote of confidence and decided in its first meeting not to institute a new inquiry into the Lavon affair.140

139 “Defection of Lavon Group from Mapai. - Mr. Ben-Gurion’s Resignation from Mapai Central Committee. - Resignation of Eshkol Cabinet. - New Coalition Government formed by Mr. Eshkol.” 139 Keesings Contemporay Archive, January 1965 - Israel.
Economy:

The 12th government's economic policy was an extension of previous governments' programs of the 5th Knesset whose aims were to stabilize the economy.\textsuperscript{141} The means were proposed to stabilize prices and set a single exchange rate.\textsuperscript{142} In its guiding principles, the 12th government promised a wide range of economic incentives to local industry and foreign capital amid higher productivity and imports. The government guidelines further emphasized the role of technology toward efficient productivity. The final aim of government's economic policy was expressed as: "the speeding up of progress toward the achievement of economic independence and a vigorous effort to obtain Jewish and international capital from abroad for the development of the country."\textsuperscript{143}

In 1964, the year before the inauguration of the 12th government, the economy (GDP) scored a relative rate increase of .05. Despite noticeable economic progress over previous years, economic pressure remained, however, during the government's formative period. Economic "crises" emerged prior to the formation of the government following the economic regulation of 1962, which led to the devaluation of the Lira, the cancellation of subsidies, and the increase in prices and taxes (Lann, 1996). GDP growth rate also declined from .05 in 1964 to .04 in 1965, the government's first year in office. Although there was also a decrease in average strikers per strike in 1965, the number of

\textsuperscript{140} "Defection of Lavon Group from Mapai. - Mr. Ben-Gurion's Resignation from Mapai Central Committee. - Resignation of Eshkol Cabinet. - New Coalition Government formed by Mr. Eshkol." Keesings Contemporary Archive, January 1965 - Israel.

\textsuperscript{141} Levi Eshkol, "Statement to the Knesset" Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 24 June 1963.

\textsuperscript{142} Israeli Knesset, "The Main Events and Issues During the Fifth Knesset": www.knesset.gov.il/history/eng/eng_hist5.htm, 2003.

\textsuperscript{143} Israeli Knesset Archives, "Basic Principles of Government Program" December 17, 1959.
strikers increased, and unemployment increased slightly from 3.3% in 1964 to 3.6% in 1965. At the time of the government’s termination in 1965 economic pressure had increased with inflation reaching 7% after it had been reduced to 4.4% in the previous year (Lann, 1996).

The 12th government operated in similar economic circumstances as those faced by the 2nd government. Indeed most governments of Israel’s first two decades formed under conditions of high inflation and economic instability, though the GDP growth rate was relatively stable. A decline in the economic situation was evident during the life of both the 2nd and 12th governments, yet no dramatic economic deterioration occurred before their formation, during their tenure, or as they were terminated. The GDP growth rate indicated low decline during the terms of both governments. Yet both governments’ failure to resolve the problem of inflation and to instigate economic growth may have contributed to their respective short duration in power. As predicted by our model, both governments were formed relatively large in response to high economic pressure. The gradual but continued deterioration of economic conditions seems to have been associated with short duration, as expected.

Immigration:

For the 12th government the ingathering of the Jews remained among the government’s prime objectives, though the rates of arrival slowed. The guiding policy principles of the 12th government spelled out these aims by declaring its effort for “... bringing to Israel ... Jews from countries where they are in distress, and the
encouragement of immigration from other countries." Yet, the number of immigrants coming in the 60s dropped tremendously relative to early years. By 1964 immigration hardly exceeded 2% relative to the population. The total number of immigrants entering the country in 1964, before the 12th government formed, was 55,036. The number dropped in 1965 to 31,115 and to only 15,957 in 1966. Thus immigration tides had begun to recede.

For the 12th government immigration and settlement problems were much more manageable relative to early years of statehood. While the number of immigrants entering the country during the formation of the 12th government still remained significant and required allocation of resources for settlements, in contrast to the 2nd government, immigration did not exert much political pressure. Theoretically the decline of the number of immigrants while the 12th government was in power should have contributed to a decrease in events’ pressures and, in turn, to longer government duration. It did not. Thus, while immigration pressure might still have contributed to a relatively large sized cabinet coalition, it did not extend the endurance of the government.

External pressure:

Prime Minister Eshkol prioritized the task of strengthening the security of Israel, to repulse Arab hopes of defeating Israel, and consequently convince enemies that the only solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict was through negotiation. In his remarks to the Knesset upon introducing the 11th government, whose policy principles were adopted by the 12th government, he declared, “in a sincere desire for peace in the world and in our

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own area, and in order to preserve it, the Government will give first priority to the strengthening of security. It will endeavor to acquire and develop the most modern equipment required of the security of the State and its people..."145

In 1964 defense Budget constituted 49% of Mr. Eshkol’s 11th government expenditures and 44% of his 12th government’s spending.146 1964; as reflected in this decline the year before the 12th government inaugurated saw low external tension. Although the PLO was formed following the Arab Summit in January, it was kept under firm Egyptian control and no serious confrontations occurred. No United Nations resolutions were passed and foreign aid to Israel was high. As of 1965, the government’s first year in office, the situation remained calm with little noticeable escalation. A few shooting incidents on the Syrian borders occurred and the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) raided various West Bank areas. Arab positions toward Israel gradually hardened with Syria declaring that the only solution to the Palestine problem was the elimination of Israel.

The Arab summit conference in Casablanca intended to divert Jordan River headwaters. Also during the year two United Nation Resolutions (2002, 2052) criticized Israel for not acting on its resolution 194 in regard to Palestinian Refugees. West Germany also suspended its arms sales to Israel; thus 1965 presented increasing challenges to Israel in terms of its foreign relations though the inter-Arab “cold war”

tended to divide Israel’s adversaries, while forcing some of them toward more anti-Israeli militancy.\(^{147}\)

The 12\(^{th}\) Israeli government was formed amid low external pressure throughout 1964. There was no immediate threat or a major military confrontation with Arab countries. Hostilities remained confined and Israeli casualties in the minor skirmishes did not exceed a dozen. External pressure would not have been a reason for wide coalition formation. On the contrary, such a low pressure should have freed coalition making from such a burden, while providing the dominant party with greater maneuvering room to form close alliances. This situation does not comply with our theoretical expectations that low external pressure yields small-sized cabinets. Perhaps other variables were prominent in determining the large coalition formation, as we will discuss later. However, by the time the government terminated in January 1966 external pressure was escalating as evident throughout 1965. This deterioration constituted additional stress on the ruling coalition and accelerated its downfall as projected by our hypotheses.

**Coalition Structure:**

**A. Size**

12\(^{th}\) Government was the third government formed within the 5\(^{th}\) Knesset, controlling 66 seats and supported by outside votes that included the minority lists

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(Kimah Ufituah and Shituf Ve’ahvah). The 12th government was actually the extension of the 10th government formed in the 2nd of November 1961. It included the same partners as that of the 10th and 11th coalitions: Mapai 42, National Religious Party 12, Ahдут Ha’avodah 8, Po’alei Agudat Yisrael 4 and the minority lists 4 (Table 5.2). This coalition was not a minimalist since it included extra parties (Po’alei Agudat Yisrael and Ahдут Ha’avodah) in addition to outside supporters (the minority list associated with Mapai).

Two variables appeared to have been prominent factors in determining coalition size: economic and immigration pressures. As suggested by our model, both factors were associated with large coalition formation. The cabinet’s large size along with economic as well as external pressures, also were associated with the short duration of the 12th government, as projected by our model.

B. Ideological Parameter

The cabinet again emerged as an alliance between the left and religious parties. The National Religious Party took three government ministries while Mapai and Ahдут Ha’avodah controlled 13. Ideologically the coalition was inclusive of religious and leftist policy orientations. The guidelines reaffirmed religious authority in major aspects of Jewish society. At the same time, the proposed policies affirmed the leftist orientation by maintaining government’s major role in economic affairs, providing national health care and social welfare, confirming labor rights and the leading role of the Histadrut in

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148 Minority lists were associated with labor, often supporting labor-led governments in the Knesset, but not officially part of the ruling coalition.
Budge considered the coalition to rank as 3 on the ideological closeness index. This suggests that the coalition, as in the second government, was somewhat wide in its ideological parameter. Both the size and the ideological parameter of the government reflected its consensual orientation as a necessary formation required to confront extreme economic and immigration pressure exerted on the country as a whole.

C. Competitiveness

Mapai (42) was the dominant party in the 5th Knesset making any realistic coalition impossible without its full leadership (Table 5.2). A rival coalition would have had to have been led by either Herut (17) or the General Zionists (17). Such a Right-led alliance of both Herut and the General Zionists could have established a minimum winning status if it were able to attract, in addition to the National Religious Party (12) and Agudat Yisrael (4), 10 additional seats from at least two far left-parties. It was highly unlikely, if not impossible, for either Mapam or Ahdut Ha’avodah to have accepted an alliance with the Right-parties. This made rivalry and competition with Mapai virtually absent.

Indication of increasing competition, however, was noticeable throughout this Knesset. By the time the government was terminated and a new election was called a split in Mapai occurred leading to the formation of Rafi (Table 5.2). Also, a merger into Gahal (27) occurred between the Right parties of General Zionists and the Herut Movement. Opponents to the merger established the Independent Liberals (7).

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Israeli parties were undergoing more of the periodic splits and metamorphoses that came to characterize the political system over the years.

The coalition collapsed in January 1966, after a dispute between Prime Minister Eshkol and Ben Gurion over Mapai’s leadership leading to an early election. The dispute within Mapai continued to divide the party between minority support to Mr. Gurion and majority support to Mr. Eshkol. The differences within the party remained unresolved throughout government’s term, which centered on whether the government’s re-investigate the Lavon affair or whether Mapai allow an electoral merge with Ahdut Avoda. Mr. Ben Gurion’s faction demanded investigation in the Lavon affair and opposed the merger with Ahdut Avoda. The dispute led eventually to Mr. Ben Gurion’s defeat and his formation of Rafi confronted by a Mapai-Ahdut Avoda electoral bloc. An early election was called for on November 2nd, 1965 and the 12th government was terminated on the 12th of January 1966 after serving 383 days in office.150

Economic and immigration pressure faced by Israel seemed to have been associated with Mapai’s effort to form large alliances as well as wide policy oriented coalition. Despite the rifts within Mapai, its virtual dominance over the Knesset appeared to have given the party a leading role in forming large alliances. Yet, the deterioration of both economic conditions and rising external pressure during the coalition’s reign as well as having large size cabinet and low competitive Knesset seemed to have fueled inter-

150 “Cabinet Changes. - Electoral Agreement between Mapai and Ahdut Avoda. - Continuing Dispute between Mr. Eshkol and Mr. Ben-Gurion. - Mr. Eshkol’s London Visit. - Peace Appeal to Arab States.” Keesing’s Record of World Events, July. 1965, Israel.
party dispute and fostered the conditions for government's early termination. These associations support our hypothetical propositions.

### Table 5.2: Political Parties’ Distribution of Seats at the Fifth Knesset

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political Parties</th>
<th>5th Knesset</th>
<th>Before next Election</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mapai</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Zionists</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Herut Movement</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Religious Front /NRP</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mapam</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ahdut Ha'avodah</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maki</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agudat Yisrael</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kidmah Ufituah</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Po'alei Agudat Yisrael/Morasha</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shituf Ve'ahvah</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gahal</td>
<td>27</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rafi</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent Liberals</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


**The 16th Israeli Government, 1974**

The 16th government, third in our chronology of short duration cabinets, was formed in March 1974 and lasted only until June of the same year (90 days). This was by record the shortest-lived Israeli cabinet. Following the 1973 Israeli election, President Katzir asked Mrs. Golda Meir, the head of the largest emerging party (Mapai), to form the government. However, Mrs. Meir mission was proven difficult rocked by the National Religious Party’s (NRP) opposition to join a government that did not strictly adhere to the *halacha*.¹⁵¹ Negotiation with the NRP to join a coalition government broke

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¹⁵¹ *Halacha* is the religious coda under which, to be recognized as a Jew, an individual must either have a Jewish mother or have been converted to the Jewish faith by an Orthodox rabbi.

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down on February 1974 and Mrs. Meir’s attempts to establish a minority government without the participation of the NRP was rejected by Mapai. Finally, on March 6 Mrs. Meir succeeded to form an alliance with the NRP who accepted a compromise position that the whole question of the halacha be shelved for 12 months or two years while a Government commission draft new proposals aimed at a settlement of the “who is a Jew” controversy. The new governing coalition received a vote of confidence in the Knesset on March 10, 1974 and the new coalition consisted of Labor, the Independent Liberals, and the NRP.

Economy:

The 16th government was the second administration headed by Prime Minister Golda Meir and adopted the same principle guidelines of its two preceding cabinets. The government was formed following Yum Kippur War; thus security and peace were at the top of its agenda. Yet, economic issues also remained relevant. The government established in its principles and objectives of “guaranteeing the constant, steady growth of the economy” and controlling inflation by revising fiscal and monetary policies.

Before the formation of the 16th government, the country was facing a low GDP growth of .01, increase in average strikers per strike from 519.70 the previous year to 1274.46, and a decline in unemployment from 2.8 to 2.6. Severe inflationary problems emerged with 1973’s extreme oil price increase causing “stagflation” (or both recession

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152 "New Coalition Government formed by Mrs. Meir after Prolonged Ministerial Crisis” Keesing’s Record of World Events. April 1974, Israel.
and inflation). Inflation reached 20% and defense budget rose significantly (Lann, 1996). By the 1974 the situation worsened despite the declared aim of the government. Stagflation led to another devaluation of the Lira, which reached six to the U.S. dollar. The government cancelled subsidies on basic goods and the inflation rate doubled to 40% (Lann, 1996). The government's economic achievement was notable only in the lowest level of unemployment in comparison to the 60s and 50s.

The 16th government appeared typical of the pre-1969 short-duration governments, which underlined economic deterioration from the time of their formation to a worsening situation at termination. Despite these similarities it is important to note the differences between the economic wellbeing of Israel throughout the 70s in contrast to earlier periods. In comparison to the 60s and 50s Israel's 1970s economy was not faced with comparable difficulties. Israel had been transformed into an industrial state and most laborers became industrial rather than agricultural. Foreign aid in 1970s amounted to $29 billions in contrast to $6.5 billions in the 60s in total. GNP rose from $2.5 billions in the 60s to $6.8 billions in the 70s. Israel also tripled its exports in the 70s (Table 5.3). Therefore, in comparative analysis, we consider the 16th government to have experienced a lower level of economic pressure upon formation than governments of earlier periods. Yet the economic conditions again worsened by the time the government was terminated.

It appeared that economic deterioration during government's term in office acted as an important determinant of its early termination, as our duration hypotheses proposed.
The formation of a tight 16th government in association with relatively low levels of economic pressure agrees with our propositions that low economic pressure help the dominant party form tight alliances.

**Immigration:**

Following the 1967 War Israel's immigration policy focused on boosting efforts to increase and maximize the recruitment of Jews from abroad. In its basic principles the government declared its top priorities were "the ingathering of the dispersions of the Jewish people in its homeland; stepping up immigration from all countries and from all strata of the people; encouragement of immigration from the affluent countries; stimulation of pioneering immigration." Acting on this policy Israel attracted 54,886 immigrants in 1973 or about 2% of its Jewish population. However, the number of immigrants began to decline the following year, with 31,981 immigrants arriving increasing the Jewish population by 1%. Immigrants coming to Israel in the years after the Six-Day War were predominantly from the West. They were mostly idealist Zionists who came with the mission to defend the State. Furthermore, they hardly represented the economic or domestic burden as that of earlier Alyiah. These immigrants were coming to Israel without active government planning in contrast to earlier mass migrations.

However, the nature of settlement activities after 1967, in contrast to that of pre-1967, became more polarizing. The reason can be highlighted by the deepening division.

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in Israel over settlement expansion into the newly Occupied Territories. The establishment of Gush Emunim, a movement calling for such expansion, was confronted with an opposite ‘peace’ camp calling for a halt to settlement activities. Settlement expansion was no longer nationally consensual. A less prominent division between earlier immigrants and newer immigrants began to emerge in competition for jobs and other resources as well as cultural and religious identities. These divisions led to the rise of territorial movements within the traditional Zionist parties, further splitting the Knesset and polarizing Israel’s political landscape.

Our examination of the 16th government, therefore, reveals that its coalition was formed amid moderate but gradually increasing immigration policy pressure. However, overall immigration does not appear to have been a major factor in the determination of either the formation or the duration of the 16th government, at least not to the extent of earlier governments. Other variables, as we will discuss, appear to have had a more prominent role in such determination.

External Pressure

The year 1973, before the 16th government formed, was a rocky one for Israel in term of external threats. Following the prolonged and sometimes tense “War of Attrition” along the Suez Canal after 1971, in October 1973 Egyptian forces crossed the Canal and the Yom Kippur War began. Syrian forces also attacked in the North opening a second front against Israel. On the 17th of October Arab oil producing states began a halt to oil production in protest of U.S support to Israel, and the Nixon administration temporarily delayed resupply of arms to Israel in hopes of promoting peace talks. Arms
resupply from Washington soon resumed after Israel took major losses against Egyptian forces and Prime Minister Meir pleaded for U.S. support.\textsuperscript{157} This Arab-Israeli conflict extended to major powers, with a Soviet threat of direct intervention and with the U.S. order of worldwide alert in response.\textsuperscript{158} In the same year, the UN General Assembly passed three resolutions criticizing Israel in regard to both the refugee question and the Palestinian civilian population under occupation (3089, 3090, 3092).\textsuperscript{159}

Amid these developments, and with growing domestic pressure to investigate the decision-making that seemed to have allowed a surprise Egyptian attack initially to succeed, the 16\textsuperscript{th} government declared in its basic principles its intention to achieve a permanent peace with each neighboring state and the utilization of all peace possibilities and prospects expressed in the Geneva Conference.\textsuperscript{160} Indeed, with greater mutual respect between Egyptian and Israeli forces, several achievements were made in the peace process. The year 1974 began following the Geneva Peace Conference on the Middle East; Israel-Egypt and Israel-Syria separation of forces agreements were signed, and Arab States lifted oil embargo on the U.S. Israel's foreign aid, primarily U.S. aid, increased from $1395.7 million in 1973 to $5145.2 million in 1974. U.S. military aid to Israel increased by 800\%.\textsuperscript{161} Thus, while the 16\textsuperscript{th} government was formed following a year of intense external pressures, it was terminated while severe external tensions had been contained. External pressure did not appear to have been a major determinant of

\textsuperscript{157} Dorf, Matthew “Remebering the Yom Kippur War: Decision to resupply arms solidify U.S.-Israel ties” \textit{Jewish Telegraph Agency}, San Francisco: September 25, 1998.


government formation or duration, as our model has predicted. Since, the coalition government was established as a tight alliance while facing high level of external pressure, contrary to what we would have predicted. Furthermore, the coalition was terminated early despite a decline in external pressure amid separation of forces and peace negotiation. Such an early termination contradicted our expectation, suggesting perhaps other relevant environmental variables that may have been associated more significantly with its termination. Inter-party disputes and/or failure in government’s performance may have been important reasons contributing for the coalition’s early breakup.

Coalition Structure:

A. Size

The 16th government was established following the election of the 8th Knesset in December 1973. The government was formed in March 1974 and commanded 65 Knesset Seats. Coalition members included the Alignment163, National Religious Party 10, and Liberals 4 (Table 5.3). Two seats were lost by the Alignment following election, thus establishing a government of minimum-winning proportions. Every party became indispensable for the government to maintain its majority over the Knesset. Any withdrawal of any partner party would have led to a lost majority, and consequently to a government collapse.

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162 While Mrs. Meir Meir resigned following the Agranat Commission, which faulted the government for failing to predict the Egyptian surprise attack, her decision is often attributed to inter-party power struggle particularly between Mapai, Rafi, and Ahдут Avoda factions of the Labor Bloc.
Compared to early statehood governments, and despite high inflation rate, the 16th government was established amid great economic prosperity. Economic achievements appear to have been associated with tight political formation, relieving the dominant party from sharing power with an extended list of parties.

B. Ideological Parameter

The government was formed as a left-religious alliance. It expressed its ideological policy guideline as an extension to that of the 14th government established under Eshkol. The guidelines of the government enforced its leading and dominant role in major economic planning, education, and social spheres. It emphasized the leading role of labor and civil rights. At the same time, it preserved the authority of religious institutions in various aspects of Israeli society. Its foreign policy advocated the importance of establishing a permanent peace with neighboring states. It aimed at establishing a strategic alliance with the United States and advocated the freedom of Russian Jews to immigrate to Israel. It called for a peace treaty with Jordan in which a Palestinian-Jordanian federation may be realized.164

Budge scaled the ideological closeness of the parties in the coalition at 2. Thus, ideological parameter was somewhat tighter than the previous governments we have examined. This is particularly reasonable to accept since partnership in the coalition was very small and the dominant party had no reason to compromise policies with such

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163 The Alignment (Maarakh) represented the merger of Mapai, Ahdut HaAvodah, and Rafi. Following 1969 election, Mapam also joined. The Alignment lasted until 1984 representing Labor-left parties.
limited number of coalition members.\textsuperscript{165} Our model predicts the ideological tightness of this coalition concord with the minimal size formation.

C. Competitiveness

Although the Labor Alignment was a very dominant bloc with 51 seats, it lost 2 seats following election; its coalition partners were limited, and its ability to form alternative formations was reduced (Table 5.3). Rakah (4) and Ratz (3) were considered anti-system (left and anti-Zionist) parties and not acceptable in any ruling coalition. This left the United Torah Front (5), the Kidmah Ufituah (2), Moked (1), and the Arab Parties (1) parties without any leverage in shaping the Alignment-NRP alliance. It was essential, therefore, that the NRP remain part of the Alignment-led government in order for a minimum winning majority to be maintained. Without the NRP the Alignment would have had to establish a coalition with the Liberals (4), United Torah Front (5), Kidmah Ufituah (2), and Arab Parties (1) and/or Moked (1). Such an alliance would have held the government hostage to the will of the very small parties (Kidmah Ufituah (2), the Arab Parties (1), or Moked(1)), and could have been the true nightmare of the Alignment making an early election a better alternative.

Rivalry between dominant parties increased amid the relative electoral gain achieved by the Likud (39) in the 8th Knesset. Likud’s gain in the election was achieved following the failure of the Meir government to effectively respond to the attacks of Arab armies in the Yom Kippur War. In addition, the increasing dispute within the rank of the

\textsuperscript{165} The government clearly advocated the peace process which posed its program relatively in contradiction with the opposition of the rightwing Likud Bloc.
left parties on the future of the Occupied Territories strengthened the Likud’s electoral position, which was able to attract more “territorialists.” Likud’s potential to form a winning coalition increased, particularly after it won another additional seat to its rank following the election and after a wedge began to emerge between the Labor parties and the Religious bloc, the latter began to lean against territorial concession while establishing biblical rights to Judea and Samaria. For the first time a serious challenge to the Labor’s traditional power dominance emerged. The Likud was potentially capable of forming a rival winning alliance consisting of Likud (40), NRP (10), United Torah Front (5), the Independent Liberals (4), and any other small party. The rising challenge of Likud to Labor’s traditional monopoly over power introduced to the Knesset a serious sense of competitiveness. This situation became evident in the increase of defection and realignments throughout the life of the 8th Knesset (Table 5.3). At least nine Knesset seats switched party ranks.

The coalition was terminated following the resignation of the Prime Minister Meir on the eve of the publication of the ‘Agranat Commission’. This report examined reasons responsible for late-responsiveness of the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) following the Yom Kippur War. Meir considered herself partially responsible and resigned as a consequence. The government had lasted only 90 days.

For the 16th government, and as predicted by our model, the declined economic pressure along with the increased competitiveness were reflected in the formation of a minimum winning coalition with tight ideological parameter. The reason for its short
term, as our model would have predicted, appears to have been associated with being formed with limited number of partners operating in a competitive Knesset.

Table 5.3: Political Parties' Distribution of Seats at the Eighth Knesset

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political Parties</th>
<th>8th Knesset</th>
<th>Before Next Election</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alignment</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Likud</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Religious Party</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Torah Front</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rakah</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent Liberals</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ratz</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kidmah Ufituah</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moked</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arab Parties</td>
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<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Arab List</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social-Democratic Faction</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Agudat Yisrael</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Po'alei Agudat Yisrael</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mordechai Ben Porath</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The 26th Israeli Government, 1995-1996

The 26th Israeli Government, another short-lived government, was established under painful circumstances. The late Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin was assassinated on November 4, 1995 by a Jewish extremist while addressing a peace rally in Tel Aviv. Deputy Prime Minister Shimon Peres became the Prime Minister. The new government under Prime Minister Peres promised to continue Rabin's path of peace while accelerating the country's economic developments. Opposition Likud's leader Benyamin Netanyahu accepted Peres succession, and on November 6, Peres ruled out
early general election until its scheduled date on November 1996. On November 21, 1995 the leaders of the outgoing coalition that included Labor, Meretz, and the Yiud faction signed a new agreement. The new coalition was officially inaugurated by the Knesset on November 22.

Economy

Among the new government’s economic objectives were: “the continuation of the momentum of growth and development; the broadening of the international and regional economic relations; the prevention of unemployment...”

In contrast to the 16th government, the 26th was established amid remarkable period of economic prosperity. In 1995 the GDP marked a 0.04% growth, average strikers per strike declined from 1413.96 to 1067.49, so did unemployment from 7.8 to 6.3%. Between 1991 and 1996 investment in Israel averaged a 13.5% increase per year. In 1995 foreign direct investment totaled $2 billions. Exports also increased by 8.6%; tourism doubled in comparison to 1990 reaching 2,214,000. The inflation rate, however, soared to 14.7%.

In 1996, the year the government was terminated, inflation was 13.7%. This decline, however, confronted an increase in number of strikers per strike, a rise in unemployment rate, and a decline in growth.\textsuperscript{170}

In contrast to the previous epoch, remarkable economic growth was achieved in the 1990s. Israel reached an economic growth that allowed its standard of living to equalize that of most industrially advanced nations. Its GNP increased to $98.5 billions with a population of less than 6 million. Exports, particularly in military industry, rose tremendously, reaching $22.5 billions, or about a third of the GNP. Foreign aid to Israel also increased reaching a total of $42 billions in the 90s compared to about $30 billions in the 70s.\textsuperscript{171} Thus the 25\textsuperscript{th} government was formed in a situation of economic prosperity.

Following formation, economic pressure remained low as indicated in growth. When the government terminated the economic situation remained healthy though with some notable deterioration. Both the 16\textsuperscript{th} and the 26\textsuperscript{th} governments were established with relatively low economic pressure. As a consequence, and in line with party competition, both were formed as tight alliances, as our model would have predicted. They performed under situations of economic health, though notable deterioration can be observed at their dissolution. Economic deterioration, while both governments were in office, appears to have been a factor for their short durations, as proposed by our hypotheses.

Immigration

The 26th government was formed while facing the biggest wave of mass immigration in Israeli history. Within a six-year period (1990-1996) 737,000 Soviet immigrants arrived to Israel. This influx was similar to that of early statehood, 1948-1951 when 688,000 immigrants arrived (Table 5.4).\textsuperscript{172} It was estimated that the new immigrants increased Israel’s Jewish population by 10\% between the years 1990-1996,\textsuperscript{173} and to an extent eased fears of rising Arab birth rate. In 1995, 76,361 immigrants arrived and in 1996, 70,605 (Table 5.4).

These new immigrants constituted an immense political and economic pressure on the government. The impact was felt with the rabbinic authority questioning the authenticity the new immigrants' Jewishness. The new immigrants' distinctiveness was manifested in their establishment of an independent secular political party “Israel Ba’aliya” rather than necessarily merging with traditional Israeli parties. Other segments of the émigrés chose the path of the Likud, joining the Right in reaction to the hated Soviet communist experience. The Soviet immigrants further contributed to the fragmentation of Israeli electoral system pushing ethnic politics in Israel to challenge the ideological tradition of party politics. Such a fragmentation appears to have been closely associated with short duration coalitions as projected by our theoretical model.

Table 5.4: Immigration to Israel During Short Durational Israeli Governments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Government</th>
<th>Pre-Year</th>
<th>First Year</th>
<th>Last Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>170563 (1950)</td>
<td>170563 (1950)</td>
<td>175279 (1951)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>55036 (1964)</td>
<td>31115 (1965)</td>
<td>31115 (1965)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


External Pressure

The year of 1995 was a year of peace negotiations and achievements. Despite the Palestinian Intifadah and various suicide attacks against Israel, Prime Minister Rabin continued the path of negotiation with the Palestinians and the Syrians throughout the year until his assassination. Israel and the Palestinians signed the Taba Interim Agreement. The U.S. Congress approved a bill calling for the transfer of the U.S. embassy to Jerusalem. Israel reestablished its normal relations with several countries and began a diplomatic offensive to achieve economic and political relations with the Arab countries. Israelis seemed to envision a new technological leadership role in the Middle East in collaboration with neighboring Arab states once the Palestinian issue was settled. At the same time, the UN General Assembly passed various resolutions that criticized Israel in regard to Palestinian rights under occupation, settlements, and nuclear programs. However, the General Assembly applauded the achievement of peace

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174 The Taba Interim Agreement or Oslo II Agreement was signed on 26 September 1995. It divided the West Bank and Gaza into 3 geographic areas A, B, and C. Both A and B areas consisted of approximately 29% of the Occupied Territories and included about 90% of Palestinian population. The agreement established the transfer of both areas A and B to Palestinian Authority while. See [http://www.dac.neu.edu/polisci/d.sullivan/peacequest/documents/osloprocess.html](http://www.dac.neu.edu/polisci/d.sullivan/peacequest/documents/osloprocess.html).

Foreign aid to Israel stood at $5 billions in 1995, almost all from Washington.

Throughout 1996, the last year of the government, Israel witnessed dramatic developments. The rate of suicide bombing rose dramatically.\textsuperscript{177} Prime Minister Peres delayed redeployment in Hebron. Israel launched operation “Grapes of Wrath” in Lebanon against Hizbullah.\textsuperscript{178} The UN General Assembly passed 30 resolutions mostly criticizing Israel.\textsuperscript{179} Foreign aid remained around $5 billions (Table 5.6). Thus, external pressure had again worsened.

Despite the assassination of Prime Minister Rabin, the 26\textsuperscript{th} Government was established in relatively favorable external conditions of low pressure. In association with low external pressure, and in accordance with our theoretical expectations, the 26\textsuperscript{th} government was formed tight. However, the deterioration of external circumstances during the cabinet’s office term appears to have been a factor, along with the economic decline, in its early termination, as expected.

\textsuperscript{177} In February and March 1996, 59 Israelis were killed as direct consequence of four suicide bombings. http://www.aish.com/Israel/articles/Suicide_Bombings.asp
Coalition Structure:

A. Size

The 26th Government was headed by Shimon Peres and formed under the 13th Knesset. It included 44 Labor seats, 12 for Meretz, and Yi'ud originally had 2. The government controlled 58 seats with outside support of 5 Arab Knesset Ministers (Table 5.5). This coalition was practically the extension of the 25th government that was headed by Prime Minister Rabin and commanded not even a minimum required majority seats in the Knesset. Nevertheless, the outside support of 5 Arab Knesset members, inspired by the prospect of peace negotiation between Israel and the Palestinians, helped the government survive motions of no-confidence. Yet, government’s peace negotiation with the Palestinians and its proclamation for Palestinians’ statehood rights in part of the West-Bank in Gaza was responsible for its isolation from most Zionist parties in the Knesset. Labor’s traditional ruling allies, particularly the religious parties, were critical of government’s course and preferred to remain in the opposition along with the Right.

The small size of the coalition, according to our model, emerges in association with low external and economic pressures. Despite the small size of the coalition, that was expected to contribute to long duration, the deterioration of both economic and external conditions while the cabinet was serving office appear to have been associated with early termination.
B. Ideological Parameter

The 26th government was among the most ideologically tight coalitions that were formed in Israel. The coalition was an alliance of left parties supported by an outside bloc of Arab Knesset premiers. Traditionally, nationalist Arab parties in the Knesset aligned themselves with the Communists and the anti-Zionist (anti-system) parties. However, their support to the Labor ruling coalition was due to the government’s declared aim of settling the Arab-Israeli conflict. This coalition was among the very few Israeli governments that were formed without the participation of religious parties. Although the coalition was left-oriented, its economic and social policies were moderate. Government supervision over economic affairs was deemphasized in favor of private entrepreneurs. Rather than establishing economic independence, that was a typical objective of early left-leaning Israeli governments, the 26th government demanded liberalization and global integration. The Basic Policy Guidelines explained that “the government will continue the implementation of reform in the capital market, including the reduction of Government intervention in this market; the development of a risk-capital market; and the supervised opening of the Israeli capital market to international fluctuations.”

Scoring coalitions on the ideological closeness index, Budge did not include governments formed after 1991. However, we can readily consider the 26th government as ideologically very tight, scoring 1 in closeness. Both Meretz and Labor were Left

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180 These Arab Knesset members were not part of the ruling government coalition, yet they provided essential support to the government by voting in its favor whenever a confidence vote was placed on the Knesset’s floor.
parties committed to the peace process and to a similar economic and social liberalization programs. We consider the 26th government, with primacy to peace initiative, to have been very tight in ideological parameter. The ideological parameter of the coalition synchronizes its size, as expected: tight ideological parameter corresponds to small coalition size.

C. Competitiveness

The 26th government was under continuous threat of losing the confidence of the majority in the Knesset. It was practically held hostage to a few outside Arab votes. This situation indicated that coalition competition in the Knesset was very high and evident in Labor's rivalry with the Likud. Competition was elevated with the increased partnership options for the opposition to form a ruling alliance and to command a majority in the Knesset (Table 5.5). It was hypothetically possible for the Likud to form a right-center-religious winning coalition. A Likud-led coalition could have included: Likud (32), Tsomet (8), United Religious Party (6), Shas (6), Yahadut Hatorah (4), Moledet (3), and Gesher (2). Another less likely scenario -- due to religious-secular pressure between Meretz and religious parties-- could have been an alliance between the Likud (32) and Meretz (12) that attracts Tsomet (8) and either United Religious Party (6) and/or Shas (6). Yet the Likud was not given the opportunity by the President to form a government since it ranked second to Labor in term of number of Knesset seats that it controlled (Table 5.5). For the Likud to be named by the President to form a government would

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have been possible if Labor, with most seats, had failed to form a coalition (see previous discussion in Chapter 3 about procedure in coalition formation).

Evidently, the distribution of Knesset seats increased the number of potential ruling alliances, which made it very difficult for any dominant party to assure its firm grip on power. This situation inflamed coalition competition throughout the 13th Knesset leading to defections and realignments among several MKs. Most notable was the split from Labor by the Third Way (Derch Hashishit). The Third Way was led by Avigdor Kahalani, a hero of the Yom Kippur War, and was formed in opposition to the concessions made in the peace talks by Rabin and Peres governments. In total, parties in the Knesset lost over 13 seats to new or rival parties and factions.

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Table 5.5: Political Parties’ Distribution of Seats at the Thirteenth Knesset

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political Parties</th>
<th>13th Knesset</th>
<th>Before Next Election</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Labor</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Likud</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meretz</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tsomet</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Religious Party</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shas</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yahadut Hatorah</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moledet</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hadash</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arab Democratic Party</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agudat Yisrael</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Degel Hatorah</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Third Way</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gesher</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>He'atid</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yi'ud</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ymin Yisrael</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yossef Aztran</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ephraim Gur</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nav Arad</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yossef Ba-Gad</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The 26th government collapsed after increasing defections that occurred among the rank of the Labor. Most notable was the loss to two MKs who formed the Third Way (Table 5.6) leaving Labor totally dependent on Arab votes. This situation led Prime Minister Peres to call for early election in hope that Labor will bring a sweeping victory. The cabinet was terminated in June 17, 1996 surviving only 206 days.

Our model correctly predicts the tight formation of the 26th government, particularly with circumstances of low economic and external pressure. However,
competition appears to have had the opposite effect to our hypothetical expectations. In this coalition, competition emerged as the prime responsible factor for tight formation. Considering the high level of competition between the Labor and the Likud blocs, were each was practically capable of forming a winning alliance, our model would have predicted that such competitive pressure would have led to the dominant parties extending partnership to smaller parties while making policy concessions. Such a strategy, our model suggested would have been necessary for the dominant party to maintain power.

**Summary of Results**

**Economic Pressure**

All four short duration governments examined confirmed our theoretical expectations that economic pressures and alliance formation are directly related. In other words, governments established under circumstances of high economic pressures were widely formed (consensual formation: Gov. 2 and 12). In contrast, governments were established tight while economic pressures were at low (Gov. 16 and 26). Coalitions established after 1969 (Gov. 16 and 26) appear to have been formed amid low level of economic pressure, contrary to prior governments (Gov. 2 and 12). This difference in economic circumstances between the pre-1969 and post-1969 eras may underline the decline in national economic pressures in the later period. As predicted by our model, pre-1969 governments' economic pressure was high leading to large sized and ideologically wide parameter-based coalitions (Table 5.6).
Table 5.6: Economic Pressure Events, Structural Formation, and Duration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Government</th>
<th>Economy</th>
<th>Formation*</th>
<th>Economic Pressure Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Short Duration Governments</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>l-w</td>
<td>Elevated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>l-w</td>
<td>Elevated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>low</td>
<td>s-t</td>
<td>Elevated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>low</td>
<td>s-t</td>
<td>Elevated</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* s-t: small-tight, l-w: large-wide.

Economic pressures, after government formation, are found not to have a direct association with duration. Short duration governments examined experienced both high economic pressure (Gov. 2, 12) and low economic pressure (Gov. 16, 26). Change in economic pressure, however, is found to be significant to durational analysis. In all cases of short duration coalition governments studied, deterioration in economic condition is found to be inversely related to duration. In other words, an increase in economic pressure during the lifespan of the government, as expressed in economic deterioration from the year the government assumes office to the time it dissolves, was found to be associated with shorter duration governments (Gov. 2, 12, 16, and 26).

In all governments examined evidence to the “aging thesis” was found. This was most apparent where economic deterioration led to coalitions fast downfall (Gov. 2, 12, 16, and 26). This suggested that governments established under situations of economic hardship were unable to last long in power while economic pressure continued to shock them (Table 5.6).
Immigration

In our methodology chapter we considered a high immigration pressure to occur when number of immigrants exceeded 40,000 a year; otherwise it was considered low. In our examination of the shortest lived Israeli governments immigration pressure was not found to have an association with coalition formation. Coalitions were formed large (consensually) with high annual immigration (Gov. 2, 12) and formed tight (non-consensual) with high annual immigration (Gov. 16, 26). This suggests no consistent association pattern between immigration pressure and formation. However, immigration pressure must be considered within the relative impact of other variables (later examined) since immigration had clearly some effect on coalition formations (Gov. 2 and 12).

As for duration, an inverse association was seen between coalition annual immigration and government longevity. Governments confronted with high immigration pressure upon their formation tended to have difficulty maintaining power. All of the short duration sample governments were formed after large waves of immigrants poured into the country (Table 5.13: Gov. 2, 12, 16, and 26).

There were no consistent patterns to show that changes in immigration pressure during government's life impacted durability. Nor was there evidence to suggest that immigration shocks led to 'aging' and termination. This result suggested that although the immigration pressure variable was found to be inversely associated with duration, it remained a weak determinant of government durability; since, in two examined situations
short duration governments had immigration pressure decreasing rather than increasing (Gov. 12 and 16) and remaining the same in two other cases (Gov. 2 and 26).

### Table 5.7: Immigration Pressure Events, Structural Formation, and Duration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Government</th>
<th>Immigration</th>
<th>Formation*</th>
<th>Immigration Changes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Short Duration Governments</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>l-w</td>
<td>Same</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>l-w</td>
<td>Reduced</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>s-t</td>
<td>Reduced</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>s-t</td>
<td>Same</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* s-t: small-tight, l-w: large-wide.

**External Pressure**

External pressure was found to have a low direct association with coalition formation in the sampled cases (Table 5.8). Three cases were found to have an inverse association (Gov. 2, 12, and 16) and only one government’s formation was directly associated with external pressure (Gov. 26). In other words, support to the hypothesis that projected low external pressure to lead to tight coalition formation is contradicted in two examined short duration coalitions (Gov. 2, 12). Support to the hypothesis that projected high external pressure to lead to wide coalition formation is also contradicted in one examined short duration government (Gov. 16). Thus, suggesting perhaps other relevant variables in the respective circumstances of short duration governments to have had determined their formations, an issue that we will further explore.

In relation to duration no clear association can be made with external pressure. Three governments of short durations were established at low level of external pressure (Gov. 2, 12, and 26) and only one case (Gov. 16) supports the proposition that high
external pressure undermine the duration of the coalition. In two cases (Gov. 12, 26) elevated external pressure (positive change) is found to be associated with short duration.

It is interesting to suggest, following our analysis, that coalitions not rationally formed, i.e., small-tight when external pressure was high (Gov. 16) and large-wide when external pressure was low (Gov. 2,12), shortly dissolve. This finding, and its implication, will be further explored in the Chapter 7.

Table 5.8: External Pressure Events, Structural Formation, and Duration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Government</th>
<th>External Pressure</th>
<th>Formation*</th>
<th>External Pressure Changes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>low</td>
<td>l-w</td>
<td>Same</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>low</td>
<td>l-w</td>
<td>Elevated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>s-t</td>
<td>Reduced</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>low</td>
<td>s-t</td>
<td>Elevated</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* s-t: small-tight, l-w: large-wide.

Coalition Structure

Our examination of four short duration Israeli governments produced the same result which suggest that competitiveness of the electoral system determined to a large extent the formation of the coalition. Two coalition governments (Gov. 2,12) were formed at low level of competition. Another two coalition governments (Gov. 16, 26) were established small by size and tight by ideological parameter under condition of high coalition competition. The result also indicated that the size and ideological parameter variables were directly related. Whenever the size of the coalition increased beyond minimum winning requirement we expect that coalition’s ideological parameter to be a wider, more accommodating, and of consensual policy space.
These results additionally demonstrated that formation was significantly different between coalitions formed in the pre-1969 than the post-1969 era. The early period demonstrated a large degree of political consensus leading to larger structural formations, while the later period provided less ground for national consensus leading to tighter formations. Another important observation can be made from our analysis that no apparent difference existed between the durability of coalitions that varied in structural formations. Consensual (l-w) and competitive (s-t) formations produced different government duration with no apparent pattern (See table 5.9). No support was found to our hypothetical proposition that efficient formation (small-tight) leads to longer duration contrary to large-tight formation. This conclusion suggests that structural variables may need to be examined in light of other event pressure variables in the process of determining government’s duration, an issue which we will undertake in the following chapter.

Table 5.9: Structural Formation of Israeli Governments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Government Short Duration</th>
<th>Size</th>
<th>Ideology</th>
<th>Competition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>large</td>
<td>wide</td>
<td>low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>large</td>
<td>wide</td>
<td>low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>small</td>
<td>tight</td>
<td>high</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>small</td>
<td>tight</td>
<td>high</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

How does our result compare with long duration governments? In the following chapter we will examine four long duration governments. We will apply the same procedure we have undertaken in studying short duration governments as to reveal comparative differences and similarities in coalition formation and duration.
CHAPTER 6
QUALITATIVE DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS:
LONG DURATION COALITION GOVERNMENTS

In this chapter a qualitative approach is conducted to analyze Israeli coalition formation and duration. The longest-lived Israeli governments were selected in order to examine the most evident variables associated with governments' longevity. The sample examined includes four Israeli cabinets evenly divided between pre and post-1969 periods. This selection provides evidence of whether variables associated with coalitions of long duration changed or remained the same following 1969 general election in Israel. Explanatory variables examined include economics, immigration, and external pressure and structural competitiveness of the Knesset upon the formation of the coalition government. Changes in pressure variables as well as the structural competitiveness of the Knesset, the coalition's size, and the coalition ideological parameter are further examined in a second stage analysis in order to reveal factors determining the long durability of the governments.

Our comparative analysis to longest vs. shortest duration governments provides support to the hypotheses on economic pressure and system competitiveness as determinants of coalitions' structural formation. Furthermore, analysis shows that changes in economics, immigration and external pressures are inversely related to cabinet duration. Proper structuring of government formation that responds to changing external pressure is found to relate positively to government duration.
The 7th Israeli Government, 1955-57

The outgoing 6th Israeli coalition government was headed by Prime Minister Sharett and collapsed following the Dr. Israel Kastner's scandal.184 The coalition's disagreement over the Kastner's trial erupted after the government, with "unnecessary haste," appealed the case to the Supreme Court. In protest to the government position, The General Zionists, the second largest coalition partner in the government, abstained from voting in a no-confidence vote brought by the opposition. Mapai considered the position taken by the General Zionists as a breach in the coalition covenant and a violation to the principle of collective Cabinet responsibility. This situation rendered the four General Zionist Ministers as resigned and Mr. Sharett submitted the resignation of his government to President Ben-Zvi on June 29.185

On July 26 a general election was held which brought back Mapai once again as the largest dominant party to the Third Knesset (Table 6.1). Taking on the responsibility of forming a ruling coalition, Mapai decided to form a large alliance consisting of various political parties, particularly that of the left. Among the possible motivations to form such an alliance could have been the increasing foreign threat, represented by the Soviet-Egyptian alliance as well as other considerations such as overcoming the Kastner's case controversy. Yet, Mapai decided to punish the General Zionists for violating previous coalition's unity and excluded them from the new Cabinet. On November 2nd 1955 the 7th government was inaugurated in the Knesset under the premiership of Mr. Ben Gurion.

184 Dr. Israel Kastner was high civil servant, a member of Mapai, and a former leader of the Hungarian Jewish community. On June 22 the Jerusalem District Court, after 18 months of deliberation, found Dr. Kastner guilty for alleged collaboration with the Nazis. The court found evidence which supported the
The new Mapai-led alliance included all left-Zionist parties as well as the centrist-leaning Progressive party and the Hapoel Hamizrachi of the National Religious Party. The entry of the left-Zionist parties into the coalition government was motivated by the return of Mr. Ben Gurion to the leadership of Mapai as well as their large acquired shares of the government's ministries. Mr. Ben Gurion's return came after his inter-party struggle with Mr. Sharett, which led to the resignation of the later form the party's leadership.

The coalition only collapsed after a partner party, Ahudat Ha'avodah, leaked in its newspaper details about the secret arms agreement Mr. Ben Gurion was trying to conclude with Western Germany. Ben Gurion considered the leak a breach in the coalition agreement and demanded that Ahudat Ha'avoda pull out of the government. After the latter refused, Mr. Ben Gurion dissolved the government in January 1958. The government lasted 796 days in power and was among the longest lasting coalitions.

Economy

Economic tasks were among this government's priorities. In its policy guidelines the government declared its intention to achieve full employment, raise the standard of living, attract private capital, balance the budget, and most importantly hold inflation in check.

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185 See Keesing's Contemporary Archives, July 9-16, 1955, p. 14308.
186 Ahdut Avoda acquired ministries of Interior and Transport, Mapam received the ministries of Development as well as Health. See Keesing's Contemporary Archives, November 5-12, 1955, p. 14520.
For the 7th Government economic conditions were difficult upon formation. Inflation was in double digits and economic growth declined from 30% in 1951 to 14% in 1955; unemployment was 7.2%.\textsuperscript{188} In 1956, the first practical year of the government, emphasis on industrial developments led to the beginning growth of the economy.\textsuperscript{189} By 1957, the last year for the government in power, and despite the violent strike of “Ata” textile factory workers,\textsuperscript{190} unemployment was reduced to 7% and economic growth was exceeding 9%.\textsuperscript{191} The average annual strikers per strike was also reduced to 63 compared to 155 in the previous year.\textsuperscript{192}

The 7th government achieved many of its intended economic policies. Reducing unemployment and controlling inflation in addition to attaining economic growth which marked important economic progress for the government. This government was a predictable case in our theoretical model where high economic pressure contributed to larger coalition formations. At the same time, the improvement of economic circumstances, throughout the life of the government, played an important determinant factor, as expected in our model, in prolonging its duration.

\textbf{Immigration}

Like many others, the 7th Israeli government established immigration as a major policy objective. However, the government’s task was concentrated on immigrants’ integration and absorption. It was urgent to mobilize “all internal potentialities and

special resources... to absorb the masses of immigrants in work and settlement, to house them and integrate them in Israel.”

The massive immigration that followed independence represented a major challenge to the country’s absorptive ability. An estimate of 825,000 new Jewish immigrants entered the country between 1948 and 1957. By December 1957 it is estimated that the Jewish population had increased from a total of 650,000 to 1,770,000 due primarily to this immigration.

By the mid-50s European immigration into Israel was declining and the Zionist effort was turning to North Africa. In 1955, during the first year term of the government only 37,528 immigrants came. In the second year immigration increased to 56,330, and the figure continued to reflect the success of the government in attracting more immigrants by raising the number in 1957 to 72,634 immigrants. The 7th government was established at the end of 1955 while the country was experiencing a dramatic drop in the number of immigrants relative to earlier years. Yet, in the last year of the 7th government, immigration from North Africa was once again on the rise.

According to our model, immigration does not appear to have been a factor in the initial formation of the coalition. The coalition was formed large, yet immigration pressure was low. However, initial low immigration pressure may have been a factor that contributed to longer duration government.

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External Pressure

Many urgent tasks confronted the 7th government, particularly that of external relations. Upon its formation the government’s foreign policy objective was centered on strengthening Israeli military preparedness while observing the Armistice Agreements between Israel and its neighbors.\textsuperscript{195} Related to such matters were the “feda’eyeen” attacks from Gaza and Israel’s formation of demilitarized zones.

In 1955, when the 7th government was born, external threat to Israel was mounting. The Egyptian-Czechoslovak arms deal was announced while Egypt and Syria signed a mutual defense treaty. Raids from Gaza intensified and the IDF responded with attacks on the Egyptian military installations. Eventually the Sinai War broke out in 1956 against Egypt with Israel fighting alongside France and Britain. Israeli forces conquered the Sinai Desert. The Soviet Union threatened to intervene in the conflict. In the same year the Security Council and the General Assembly criticized Israel for violating the General Armistice Agreement (UN General Assembly-UNGA and UN Security Council – UNSC).

By 1957, the government’s last year in office, the Suez crisis was over and external pressure on Israel was greatly reduced. The IDF withdrew to armistice lines. Serious clashes on Israel-Syrian borders continued; however, they were limited skirmishes which did not represent a major threat to the country. U.N peacekeeping forces began to patrol the Sinai and continued in Lebanon.

\textsuperscript{195} Basic Principles of Government Program, Israel Knesset Archives, November 3\textsuperscript{rd}, 1955.
Thus, the 7th government was preceded by high intensity of external pressure. This pressure was further exaggerated after it was formed. By the time it was dissolved, external pressure had been greatly reduced. In the case of the 7th government external pressure appears to have been a factor in the formation of larger sized coalition as our model has predicted. Furthermore, the breakout of the war with Egypt appears as an additional factor contributing to the proliferation of the government. The eventual reduction in external pressure appears to contradict the 'aging thesis' which predicted collapse of coalitions at shocks.

Coalition Structure

A. Size

The large 7th government was established under the 3rd Knesset in November 1955. The government controlled 80 Knesset seats. Its partners consisted of Mapai 40, National Religious Party 11, Mapam 9, Ahдут Ah’avadah 10, The Progressive Party 5, and the minority list 5 (Table 6.1). This government was a large coalition consisting of many excess parties. Beside Mapai every party in the coalition was potentially replaceable.

Surrounding threats, immigration and integration, and economic difficulties were among the pressures leading the various Israeli parties to establish and maintain a large national alliance that pulled together the various ideological groupings in Israel. As predicted by our model, events’ pressure can be associated with large coalition
formations as demonstrated by the 7th government. The coalition's long duration can be associated with 'proper' coalition formations responding to pressures. Furthermore, as our hypotheses projected, the decline of certain pressures might be also associated with government longevity.

B. Ideology

The coalition was ideologically left-center and although basically secular, included religious partnership. Whether in economic or social welfare policies the government was instructed to take on a dominant role in planning and management. The guidelines expressed the need for the government to provide housing, national health care, and jobs for all Israeli citizens. At the same time, the guidelines were founded mostly on national building and integration of the immigrants. Thus, it emerged as a consensus document expressing the national aspirations of most Zionist parties.196

Budge coded ideological closeness among partners as level 3, indexing the 7th government ideologically as somewhat wide. This is further supported by the fact that a large number of cabinet partners held diverse policy agendas, yet joined together under a general wide governmental policy umbrella.

Both size and ideology appeared to have been stretched to accommodate a range of partners. As our model predicted, among the factors that emerged to have been responsible for this wide formation include immigration, economic and external pressures. The 7th government also confirms our hypothetical expectations that reduction
or resolution to economic and external pressure contributes to longer duration. Large size and wide ideological formation, however, which responded to pressures, seem to have gone along with longer duration in this case, contrary to our expectations.

C. Competitiveness

This was another government formed during the ‘Mapai dominance era’ where challenges to party rule were virtually non-existent. Virtually no alliances were practical without Mapai (Table 6.1). Mapai controlled 40 Knesset seats along with four Arab seats associated with Labor. Only 45 seats were left to religious and right wing parties. A Herut-led coalition could only have been formed if it captured all right and religious seats (45) in addition to at least two other left-wing parties --Ahdut Ha’avoda (10) and Mapam (9). Such an alliance would have been unrealisitc at that time between such ideological antagonists. This situation left Mapai with the real power leverage to form and break coalitions.

We consider coalition competition to have been very low. The implication of low competition could be observed in the strong party discipline during the Third Knesset. Party discipline was best captured in the absence of factional defections or re-alignments occurring in the Knesset (Table 6.1).

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197 Aspects of external pressure may have been elevated as for example the problem of Palestinian refugees, which drew negative international condemnation while Israel refused their return. Yet, other aspects of external pressure, particularly in term of severity of external conflict that reflects the number of casualties.
Table 6.1 Political Parties’ Distribution of Seats at the Third Knesset

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political Parties</th>
<th>3rd Knesset</th>
<th>Before Next Election</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mapai</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Herut Movement</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Zionists</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Religious Party</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ahdut Ha’avadah</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mapam</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maki</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Torah Front</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Progressive Party</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arab Parties</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kidinah Va’avadah</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hakla’ut Ufituah</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Contrary to our proposed model, low competition was not associated with narrow cabinet formation in the 7th government. Low competition also was not associated with short duration as our model predicted. Quite the contrary, this seems to confirm the null hypothesis which proposes that low competition widens coalitions and prolongs their duration.

The 13th Israeli Government 1966-1969

The second longest durable cabinet in the pre-1969 period was the 13th government. It was inaugurated in January 1966 following a national election. The government was formed by Prime Minister Levi Eshkol and lasted 1162 days in power. The formation of the new coalition government followed a bitter inter-party struggle over Mapai’s leadership. The outgoing 12th coalition government had collapsed in January 1966 owing to the dispute between Prime Minister Eshkol and Ben Gurion over the Lavon case and Mapai’s electoral merger with Ahdut Avoda. The dispute led eventually

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skirmishes, and attacks have declined. It is in our assessment, that despite the refugee problem, the overall external situation for the government had been improved by the last year the coalition’s term.
to Mr. Ben Gurion's exit from the party and his formation of Rafi. Levi Eshkol claimed Mapai's leadership and reestablished electoral alignment with Ahdut Avoda. On November 2nd, 1965 the Mapai-Ahdut Avoda electoral alignment (Alignment) captured 45 Knesset seat while Rafi won 10 seats.

On November 28, following the national election and after consulting with party leaders, President Shazar asked Mr. Eshkol to form a new government. Coalition negotiation was complicated by the religious parties' demands for an agreement calling for a new legislation providing stiff penalties for transgressions of the Sabbath. A compromise agreement was reached on January 6, 1966 whereby strict Sabbath observance was adopted as public policy by the coalition with exception under "special circumstances" to be determine by a committee composed by the Prime Minister and the Minister of Labour and Religious Affairs. The new coalition excluded Rafi while including, in addition to the Alignment the National Religious Party, Mapam, the Independent Liberal, Po'alei Agudat Yisreal and the minority lists. The coalition was inaugurated by the Knesset on January 12. The coalition controlled 73 Knesset seats, having 12 extra seats than the needed minimum majority of 61. On June 5, 1967 (the day

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198 A Left wing labor Zionist party. Following the Six Day War many of its members, including the party's spiritual leader Yitzhak Tabenkin, supported the idea of Greater Israel; however, another leader, Yigal Allon, advocated the return of some of the administered territories which would not endanger Israel's security.


200 Rafi (Israel Labor List) was established by David Ben-Gurion for the 1965 elections as a protest against Mapai's action in the Lavon Affair. Rafi gained ten seats in the next elections. Shimon Peres served as its secretary general and was instrumental in bringing Rafi and Mapai together to form the Labor Party in 1968.
of the outbreak of the Six Day War), the coalition government was further expanded to include Gahal and Rafi. The government ceased to exist when Eshkol passed away on 26 February, 1969.\textsuperscript{202}

**Economy**

The 13\textsuperscript{th} government’s guiding principles emphasized the coalition’s initial leftist orientation by providing the government with major tasks in planning and economic development. This was seen as a means to control inflation while providing full employment, increase capital production, expand product export, import foreign capital, and achieve economic independence.\textsuperscript{203}

The government was formed in 1966 while the country faced economic recession. The impact of the 1962 government economic policy of devaluation and tax increase presented major challenges for the new government. A year prior to its formation, inflation had been doubled from 4.4\% in 1964 to 7\% in 1965. The situation even worsened after the government was established. In 1966, the year following government’s formation, economic pressure was rising. Israel faced a bigger recession forcing the closure of factories, cutting government spending, canceling subsidies, reducing local demand, and resulting in heavy unemployment. Inflation was at 8\% and the growth rate was less than 1\%.\textsuperscript{204}

\textsuperscript{201} "New Coalition Government formed by Mr. Eshkol. - Mr. Eban succeeds Mrs. Meir as Foreign Minister" Keesing’s Record of World Events, February 1966, Israel.

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The economic situation, however, dramatically changed following the 1967 War. In 1968, the government's last year in office, major economic difficulties were resolved, economic growth increased to 12%, inflation fell to 4%, and unemployment was greatly reduced to 6.1 compared to 10.5 in 1966.205

Both pre-969 long duration governments (7th and 13th) were thus formed under daunting economic difficulties. Inflation and unemployment presented major challenges to both. From the time they were formed until they terminated, major achievements in reducing economic pressure can be noted in term of controlling for inflation, reducing unemployment, and providing economic growth.

Governments formed before 1969 were established under tremendous economic pressure. Such situations prompted larger formations as evident in governments 2, 12, 7 and 13. Duration of these coalitions appear to have been associated with the decline in economic pressure. To the extent economic pressure declines, governments last longer in power. Both results confirm our hypothetical expectations. Furthermore high economic pressure (Gov. 2, 12, 7, and 13) appear to be associated with large coalition formation while low economic pressure can yield tighter formations (Gov. 16, 25, and 26).

Immigration

Immigration to Israel remained a central task for the 13th government, "...the ingathering of the exiles of the Jewish people in its Homeland; speeding up aliya from all

countries and all classes, encouragement of aliyah from the countries of prosperity, stimulation of pioneering aliyah.\textsuperscript{206} And Israel was prepared by the mid-60s more than earlier years to absorb new waves of immigration. There were 448 new settlements and 25 new towns partially occupied. Agriculture and industry were thriving. Immigrants were taken directly to apartments rather than transit camps.\textsuperscript{207}

The task of attracting more Jewish immigrants into Israel, however, became more difficult. First, there was no immediate threat to Jews around the world typical to the experience of WWII. Second, many Jewish communities found in the west, particularly in the U.S., enjoyed a permanent and thriving home. This reality was reflected in the decline of immigration to Israel during the 60s. The number of immigrants dropped from 31,115 in 1965, to 15,957 in 1966, and to 20,703 in 1968. Low immigration pressure does not appear to have been associated in the formation of the 13\textsuperscript{th} government. Immigration issue began to lose significance in the political dynamics of coalition behaviors.

In July 28, 1969 at a ceremony in Jerusalem, which was attended by Mrs. Meir, Mr. Aryeh Pincus, chairman of the Jewish Agency asserted the declining immigration to Israel. The information given by Mr. Pincus was supplemented by statistics that was later issued by the Jewish Agency. Mr. Pincus pointed out to the problem of attracting Algerian Jews whose attachment to the French culture undermined Israel's attraction. He

\textsuperscript{205} Ibid.
also explained that the remaining number of potential Jewish immigrants from the "lands of distress" outside the Soviet Union amounted to less than 250,000. These factors were significant, in his assessment, to the decline of immigrations by the end of the 60s. Evidently, this situation undermined the importance of immigration in national political mobilization that characterized the early years of State formation.

**External Pressure**

The basic principles of the 13th government established the task of advancing peace in the region and strengthening defense as a primary objective of the government along with the aim of ingathering. "Foreign policy," the basic principles advanced, "will be designed to safeguard the full independence, sovereignty, welfare and security of the State, the integration of its territory and boundaries, its internal freedom, the welfare of its citizens, and the enhancement of Israel’s status in the family of nations." For that purpose, the statement stressed, the government was to pursue avenues that can lead to peace negotiation with Israel’s neighbors.

In 1965, the year before the government assumed office, external pressures remained low, though with noticeable escalation in tension compared to 1964. In 1966, however, pressure between Israel and its neighbors was on the rise after a U.S. sale of jet

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208 “Immigration since Independence” Keesing's Record of World Events, August 1969.


210 This policy went along the position taken by Mr. Eshkol who repeatedly expressed Israel’s intention for peace negotiation. His position was best captured in his speech on May 17, 1965 at the opening of the last term in the life of the 5th Knesset, Mr. Eshkol made a statement on international affairs in which he appealed for talks between Israel and the Arab countries to bring about a peaceful settlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute.
fighters to Tel Aviv. The American administration's justification for the transaction was that the planes were needed to maintain the arms balance in the face of large Soviet arms shipments to the United Arab Republic and Syria and, to a lesser extent, to Iraq. Serious clashes between Israel and Syria broke out following a military coup in Damascus. Egypt and Syria signed mutual defense treaty with a joint command.\footnote{Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs.} The UN Security Council passed resolution 228 holding Israel responsible for violating the General Armistice Agreement by its military action in Southern Hebron against Jordan (UNSC). The following year the Six Day War broke out with Israel defeating Arab armies and conquering new territories including the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

By 1968, the year the government dissolved, tension with the Arab countries remained high. The Jordan border became a stage for Palestinian attacks on Israeli settlements and military posts. Nasser's heated rhetoric against Israel continued and fighting along the Suez Canal erupted. Israeli aircrafts attacked Iraqi artillery units in Jordan and raided Beirut airport destroying thirteen airliners. Palestinians attacked an Israeli airliner in Athens. The U.S. announced sale of Phantom jets to Israel.\footnote{Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs.} The UN General Assembly's resolution 2443 criticized Israel for its treatment of civilian populations under occupation. The UN Security Council in its resolutions 248 and 256 condemned Israeli military action against Jordan as violation of UN Charter and cease-fire resolutions. The Security Council passed a similar resolution (262) with respect to Israel's attack on Lebanon.
External pressure appeared evident prior to the formation of the 13th government. This pressure was further escalated after formation, peaking in the war, and remained relatively high at the time of termination. It should be noted, however, that with the exception of persistent dispute over free passage in the Suez Canal and compared to the 1967 war, severity of external pressure at the time of termination in 1968 slightly decreased with no major military threat against Israel evident. Initial external pressure appeared to have had contributed to the establishment of a large sized coalition as our model predicted. Furthermore, the persistent of external pressure throughout the term of the 13th government appeared to have been associated with its longer duration. As the case of the 7th government demonstrated, the large size of the coalition may evidently become relevant to duration at times of severe external pressure. Coalitions formed large when pressures are high (war and severe conflict) may be associated with long coalition duration.

Coalition Structure

A. Size

The 13th Government was formed as the first government under the 6th Knesset. It was originally established as a coalition with partners controlling 73 seats. With the outbreak of the Six Day War the coalition was enlarged to include most parties in the Knesset including the right wing parties. Original partners included the Alignment with 45 seats, Mapam 8, NRP 11, Liberals 5, Po'alei Agudat 2, and Kidmah Ufituah 2 (Table 6.2). On June 5, 1967 Gahal and Rafi joined the government extending its control to a
109 Knesset seats. Both economic and external pressures were associated with the reason of forming a larger than minimum winning coalition, as our model had predicted. The coalition was initially formed with 12 extra seats and three additional parties than necessary to have a minimum winning coalition. External pressure, however, became the sole reason for extending the size of the coalition to become a grand alliance of all Zionist parties. This occurred in June 1967 on the eve of the Six Day War where the government was further extended to include all Zionist parties in the Knesset.

The formation of a large government was associated with high economic and external pressure that surrounded the 13th Cabinet. The slight declined of these pressures may have helped prolonging government's duration, as projected by our model. However, the large size of the government did not appear as a factor for short duration, as we would have expected. It appears that the formation of large coalitions during situations of high external pressures can contribute to longer government's duration.

B. Ideology

The alliance initially represented a coalition between left and religious parties that controlled 73 seats. When the Six Days War broke out the alliance was extended to include Rightist parties. Ideologically the coalition was formed wide but with the war it turned into a national alliance reflecting the entire spectrum of the Knesset. Thus, the ideological parameter was originally wide but stretched even wider after the right parties joined the government. Budge indexes the ideological closeness of the initial coalition partners as 3. However, it could be argued that with the war, and after the coalition was
extended to Gahal, that closeness was increased to level 5. Whatever the case we consider the coalition to have been formed as ideologically somewhat wide and it became even wider on June 5, 1967.

**Competitiveness**

Coalition competition increased noticeably throughout the 6th Knesset. Although the dominance of the Alignment remained indisputable with 45 Knesset seats, Gahal became a significant political force in Israel (26 seats). Gahal (*Gush Herut-Liberalism*) was a right-wing party formed in 1965 as a merger of two right-wing groups: Herut and a splinter group of the Liberal party. Still, the level of competition remained low, preventing any coalition from being formed without the participation of the Alignment (Table 6.2). A rival coalition to that of the Alignment would had to have been led by the right-wing Gahal (26) in alliance with the NRP (11), Rafi (10), Liberals (5), Agudat Yisrael (4). But such a coalition would have required five more Knesset seats which would have been potentially impossible to get out of either MAPAM (8) or other extreme left-wing parties such as Rakah (3) or Hadash (1). Such a highly unlikely scenario helped maintained the dominance of the Labor alliance and undermined any serious challenge to the rulership.

Throughout the 6th Knesset the electoral position of the Alignment even improved with Rafi rejoining labor ranks, thus making the Left the indisputable ruler of the Knesset (Table 6.2). In addition, the successful conclusion of the Six Days War

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213 The American Cooperative Enterprise. [www.us-israel.org/isource/Politics/Gahal.html](http://www.us-israel.org/isource/Politics/Gahal.html), 2003
brought to the Alignment great electoral and political rewards.\textsuperscript{214} Israel emerged as indisputable military power in the region proving itself capable of defeating several Arab armies at the same time. Conquest of new territories containing vast labor and natural resources also proved indispensable for Israel's growing industry. The strategic military significance of the new conquest elevated Israel's military edge to a higher level and attracted great powers to seek alliances and strategic positioning in the region. The government was terminated following the death of Prime Minister Eshkol on February 26, 1969. Prime Minister Golda Meir headed the following 14\textsuperscript{th} Government.\textsuperscript{215}

According to our predictive model, the case of the 13\textsuperscript{th} government confirms two important aspects of coalition formation. Both economic and external pressures seem to be highly associated with large formation. Again, our null hypothesis is confirmed with regard to competition where it seems that low competition contributed to large formation and long duration. The presence of high levels of external and/or economic pressures, low competition, and a large coalition formation appear to have been associated with long government's duration.

\textsuperscript{214} Although the Labor emerged electorally powerful, the capture of the new territories with Arab majority opened new sources of divisions and splits into the rank of the left parties (territorialists vs. peace advocates) and eventually helped strengthen the position of the Right Likud bloc.

Table 6.2: Political Parties’ Distribution of Seats at the Sixth Knesset

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political Parties</th>
<th>6th Knesset</th>
<th>Before Next Election</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alignment</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gahal</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Religious Party</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rafi</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mapam</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberals</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agudat Yisrael</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rakah</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kidmah Ufituah*</td>
<td>2*</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Po’alei Agudat Yisrael/Morasha</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shituf Ve’ahvah*</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ha’olam Hazeh-Koah Hadash</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maki</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hamerkaz Hahofshi</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ahvah Aravit</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Druze Faction</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The 18th Israeli Government, 1977-81

The 18th government was among the post-1969 longest-lived Israeli alliances. It also came clearly after the rise of electoral competition had become firmly established in the early 1970s. Prime Minister Menachem Begin formed the government in June 1977 and it lasted until August 1981, the sum of 1507 days. The outgoing 17th government of Mr. Rabin had witnessed a series of internal party disputes and divisions marked by the split of Mr. Arieh Eiav from the Labor party and his merger with Civil Rights Movement to form a new “super-dove” Yaad party, which continued under the leadership of Mrs. Shulamit Aloni. Further cracks in the Rabin’s 17th government emerged amid a power struggle with the National Religious Party. The latter abstained from voting in a no-confidence vote against the government following a dispute over the Prime Minister’s non-observance of the Sabbath. This prompted Mr. Rabin on December 1976 to invoke a
1962 law that permitted the Prime Minister to dismiss cabinet ministers of parliamentary factions that voted against the government or abstained on issues of confidence. Mr. Rabin's dismissal of the NRP from the coalition provoked the Independent Liberal party to quit the coalition, thus reducing the government command of Knesset seats to 53. Mr. Rabin was forced to resign his government and the Knesset decided for an early election.\textsuperscript{216}

Prior to the national election, which brought victory to the Likud, the Labor Alignment was undergoing leadership power struggle. It began first with the narrow election of Mr. Rabin as the party leader against Mr. Peres in February 1977 (1,445 votes against 1,404). A scandal concerning Rabin soon emerged following the publication of a report by the daily \textit{Ha'aretz} on March 15 revealing secret U.S. bank accounts held by Mr. And Mrs. Rabin. In April Mr. Rabin resigned his post as the party leader and Prime Minister. On April 11 he was ordered by the Finance Ministry to pay a fine of £115,000 and on April 17 Mrs Rabin was found guilty of contravening currency regulations by the Tel Aviv district court and sentenced to a fine of £1, 250,000 or 12 months imprisonment.\textsuperscript{217}

Against this background of Labor internal turmoil the general election was held on May 17 leading to the victory for the right wing Likud bloc. The new election enabled the \textit{Likud} leader, Mr Menahem Begin, to form a centre-right coalition Cabinet on June 19, thus ending an era of labor dominance over every established government since the

\textsuperscript{216} "Resignation of Rabin Government" Keesing's Record of World Event, March 1977, Israel.
foundation of the state in 1948. Following the election the Likud began negotiations primarily with primary three parties, the Democratic Movement for Change (DMC) and the two main religious parties (i.e. the NRP and Agudat Israel), with a view to forming a centre-right coalition. Negotiation with the dovish DMC proved difficult particularly because of Likud’s initial hawkish position on the question of peace and the Occupied Territories. Negotiation was further complicated by the fact that Likud’s leader Menachem Begin insisted in having Mr. Dayan as Foreign Minister, an issue that proved unacceptable to the DMC. Thus, DMC’s initial position was to oppose joining the Likud government. Religious parties, on the other hand, accepted the Likud invitation on the ground that great religious concession would be provided. The coalition agreement asserted religious parties’ demand promising a sweeping reform in favor of applying halacha to the Law of Return in addition to a greater role of religious authorities in civil affairs.\footnote{218} On June 1977, a narrow Right-Religious coalition was established and inaugurated by the Knesset. On October 20\textsuperscript{th} the DMC also decided to join Begin’s coalition. The DMC, however, underwent various divisions and splits that forced it to withdraw from the Likud led coalition in 1978 and 1980.\footnote{219}

**Economy**

The principle guidelines of the 18\textsuperscript{th} government were the shortest and most summarized versions that have been written by any Israeli coalition. With regard to economic objectives, the guidelines emphasized the need to achieve “restraint of

\footnote{217} “Developments preceding Elections - Resignation of Mr Rabin as Labour Party Leader - Succession of Mr Peres - Financial Scandals” Keesing’s Record of World Event, September 1977, Israel.
inflation, stabilization of the currency, and assurance of a decent standard of living for all residents of the state."^220

The government assumed office in 1977 while another devaluation of the lira had taken place, growing to 10 to the U.S. dollar. Inflation was high, reaching 39.1%.^221 Inflation continued high, doubling annually and reaching 56.8% in 1978. By 1980, economic pressures were tremendous. The inflation rate was 131% and the shekel replaced the lira as Israel's official currency. In 1981 Yoram Aridor became the Finance Minister and his policy to lower taxes on imported goods led to another jump in the inflation rate, reaching 120%. In February 1981 the Tel Aviv bourse collapsed with a 15% drop in total stocks' values.^222 Economic growth rates of the national product also declined an average of 3.6% after mid-70s and 3% in the 80s.^223

Although the 70s represented a period of major economic achievements in contrast to the 60s, no sign of economic health was evident throughout the life of the 18th government. The government insisted that the reason was a global recession. However, the Labor opposition stressed that since the Likud-led coalition assumed power in 1977, consumer prices had risen 1,200%, unemployment increased sharply, and industrial

^218 "Formation of Begin Cabinet - Controversy over Nomination of Mr Dayan as Foreign Minister - Portfolios left Open for Democratic Movement for Change" Keesing’s Record of World Event, September 1977, Israel.
^219 "Cabinet Changes" Keesing’s Record of World Event, December 1980, Israel.
^221 Statistical Abstract of Israel: www.cbs.gov.il
production stagnated. Economic deteriorations were evident from the time the coalition assumed office until it was dissolved. Economic distress ran contrary to the government’s declared objectives that were stated in the Basic Guidelines, where controlling inflation and achieving higher productivity were the aims.

Contrary to our expectation, however, economic pressure did not lead to the formation of a large initial coalition. The 18th government was formed tight while encountering such pressures. Furthermore, economic pressure and deterioration were not found to have been associated with short governmental duration. Despite economic difficulties, the 18th government was among the longest-lived Israeli coalitions. We must look elsewhere for the explanation.

Immigration

The Basic Guidelines of the 18th Government announced that, “the Government will make the encouragement of aliyah a chief national task.” Furthermore, the government established in its aims a “constant campaign for the return to Zion of all who yearn for her in the Soviet Union, and for the rescue of the Jewries of Syria and the Arab states.”

As has been previously discussed, post-1967 immigration issues gained greater polarizing impact than in the pre-1967 period. Particularly the question of the location of immigrants’ settlements gained unprecedented attention. Whether settlements to

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225 This was unusual for post-1969 governments to prioritize aliyah above other national priorities.
accommodate immigrants should be built in the newly Occupied Territories or within Israel’s “green line” borders became a polarizing issue to the various Israeli parties. Statements such as “the Government will plan, establish and encourage urban and rural settlement on the soil of the homeland” became disputable. While the right-wing and most religious blocs considered the Territories part of the ‘homeland,’ the left-wing and center parties disputed such a claim.

Nonetheless, experience in immigration absorption and settlement by successive Israeli governments helped the 18th government avoid major obstacles in the process of integrating the new arrivals, primarily from the Soviet Union. Problems associated with housing and cultural integration encountered by the Yemenites in the 50s and the North Africans in the 1960s, for example, were avoided in the assimilation of Ethiopians and Russians in the 80s and 90s. Still immigration continued to decline throughout the duration of 18th government’s. In 1977 the year before the government was formed only 21,429 immigrants arrived. This number slightly increased the first year following government formation and reached 26,394 in 1978. By the time the Likud-led coalition terminated in 1981 the number of immigrants had declined to 12,599. Low immigration pressure, upon formation, appears not to have a significant association with coalition formation or duration through out the life span of this government.

228 In the early 1970s, the Soviet Union permitted significant number of Jews to emigrate to Israel. At the end of the decade, a quarter of a million Jews had left the Soviet Union; 140,000 immigrated to Israel.
External Pressure

Prior to the formation of the 18th government foreign policy pressure was low. Despite a few skirmishes on the Lebanese border, external tensions were hardly observed. United Nation resolutions continued to be negatively worded against Israel in relation to the Arab population in the Occupied Territories (UNGA). However, no serious resolution ever emerged from the Security Council. In 1978 serious efforts were made to end the Arab-Israeli conflict beginning with the first peace agreement between Israel and an Arab state (Egypt). This stunning success may have contributed to extending the government longevity.

The 18th Israeli government was the first to be led by the Right. Despite Likud's hawkish principles regarding the Occupied Territories, the achievement of peace with Egypt was difficult to ignore. The coalition government emphasized in its Basic Guidelines the objective of achieving peace, declaring that "the government will place the aspiration for peace at the forefront of its concerns, and will strive actively and constantly to achieve permanent peace in the region." In fact, this ‘hawkish’ government dedicated most of its guiding principles toward the objective of achieving peace with its Arab states while avoiding direct discussion of a Palestinian State or national rights for self-determination. The Camp David Accords substituted "autonomy" for the discussion of a Palestinian State; a solution that was ultimately rejected by the

230 Basic Guidelines of the Government, Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 20 June 1977. Although common to all Israeli governments to declare their intention to achieve peace, the emphasis varied by the subsequent administrations. The emphasis can be measured by the number of statements dedicated to this issue relative to other priorities.
Palestinians. The objectives of the 18th government appeared to aim at achieving peace with the Arab states while delaying negotiation or comprehensive solution to the Palestinian issue. The latter would have required constant pressure from Egypt and the U.S., which was not to be.

The Camp David Accords between Israel and Egypt were concluded in 1978 and the state of war between them was terminated. However, serious clashes occurred with the PLO on the Lebanese border and the PLO attacked a bus in Haifa leaving 37 dead. The IDF retaliated against the PLO by invading South Lebanon and establishing the "Security Zone." Thus, by 1981, and prior to the fall of the 18th government, serious external tensions were present. On the Lebanese borders Katyusha rocket attacks increased. Israeli warplanes attacked various targets in Southern Lebanon. Worse, Israeli air attacks shot down two Syrian helicopters in Lebanon and Syria retaliated by introducing surface to air missiles into the Bekka Valley. The most serious escalation, however, was the raid carried out by Israeli Air Force into Iraq, which led to the destruction of the Ossiraq nuclear reactor in Baghdad. Many tensions between Israel, Europe and the U.S. emerged in the aftermath, leading to the suspension of U.S. arms transfers to Israel. American aid to Israel also temporarily declined. Several U.N resolutions emerged from the General Assembly condemning Israel’s attack on Iraqi nuclear installations (36/27) and demanding a freeze on nuclear weapons including those of Israel (36/87, 36/98 UNGA). The Security Council also condemned Israel’s action against Iraq in resolution 487 and against Lebanon in resolutions 488, 490, and 498 (UNSC).
The 18th government was established following a situation of low external pressure. Following formation, external pressure was dramatically reduced with the signing of the Camp David Accords. By the time the government terminated external pressure had been notably elevated. Our model predicts that low external pressure leads to tight cabinet formation, as in the case of the 18th government. Furthermore, our duration hypothesis is confirmed where relatively low external pressure is projected to have prolonged government durability.

Coalition Structure

A. Size

The 18th Government lasted throughout the 9th Knesset. It was the longest-lived Israeli government ever and the first under with the Labor parties as the opposition group. While the Likud became the dominant bloc in the Knesset, it operated under fierce competition from its ideological rivals. Likud’s initial coalition controlled a narrow 61 Knesset seats and consisted of Likud 43, NRP 12, Agudat 4, Sshlomzion 2, and Moshe Dayan 1 (Table 6.3). Four months after its formation the Democratic Movement for Change (DMC), with 15 seats joined the government, increasing the coalition’s size to a more comfortable 76 seats. The DMC was composed of several left-leaning secularist parties including Shinui which was led by Yigal Yadin in 1976.231 The DMC soon dissolved in 1979, due to Shinui’s opposition to join the Likud’s government, thus reducing the size of the government once again to a minimum-winning stand. Thus, with

the exception of a brief period of time the 18th government was a minimum winning coalition.

The case of the 18th government confirms some of our hypothetical propositions while it contradicts others. The establishment of a tight coalition amid low external and immigration pressures supports our hypotheses. However, high economic pressure seems to contradict the prediction of large formation. Furthermore, high economic pressure did not seem to be associated with shorter duration. This could have been compensated by peace accords and lower immigration pressure along with efficient or tight formation, which with fewer partners to please helped the government live longer.

B. Ideology

Ideologically, the coalition was a right-center-religious alliance. Budge coded the coalition as ideologically very tight, scoring 1 on his scale. Ideological tightness of the coalition stems from the very close agreements between the parties over the main policy issues facing the government. Coalition members were united in the support of settlement activities, including extended activities in the Territories. The government expressed this unifying goal during Mr. Begin’s address to the Knesset where he stated, “the government will plan, establish and encourage rural and urban settlement on the soil of the homeland.” Although vague about whether “homeland” included Territories, it asserted that settlements must be expanded into the Territories. In a further demonstration of unity among the ruling parties the guideline rejected the demand of Arab countries to any condition for peace negotiations that included the returning of the
Territories or a comprehensive agreement. Mr. Begin declared, "the government will invite each and every one of Israel's neighbors ... to conduct direct negotiations... without preconditions on the part of either side and without formulae prepared by outside elements."

Table 6.3: Political Parties' Distribution of Seats at the Ninth Knesset

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political Parties</th>
<th>9th Knesset</th>
<th>Before Next Election</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Likud</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alignment</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Party for Change</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Religious Party</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hadash</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agudat Yisrael</td>
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<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shlomzion</td>
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<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mahanay Shehi</td>
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<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ratz</td>
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<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Po'alei Agudat Yisrael</td>
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<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flato Sharon</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberals</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arab Parties</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shinui</td>
<td>5</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telem</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tehiya</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ahva</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ihud</td>
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<tr>
<td>Yisrael Ahat</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ya'aad</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State List</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shivyon Beyisrael</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yossef Tamir</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yigael Yadin</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Binyamin Halevy</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shmuel Tamir</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


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233 There is no reference in Camp David to a Palestinian State or the unconditional return of the Territories to Arabs. In reference to the Palestinians, Camp David spells out the right of the West Bank and Gaza's inhabitants for autonomy (or self-rule) under Israeli-Egyptian-Jordanian supervision. The future of the Territories is kept for future negotiation determined after the conclusion of various peace settlements with Arab states. See “The Camp David Accords” the U.S. Department of State’s Office of International Information Programs (usinfo.state.gov/regional/nea/summit/cdavid.htm), September 17, 1978

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Throughout its stay in power, all government parties supported the signing of the Camp David Accords (a major reason for the DMC to join the government), settlements in the Territories, and the conduct of war in Lebanon. With the exception of the DMC, strong agreements between coalition members were evident in the support of the religious institutions as well. The Likud considered the clauses in the coalition agreement not necessarily to undermine secularist principles but having to do more with the cultural Jewishness of the state. The coalition emerged ideologically tight, reflecting its original small size.

C. Competitiveness

The coalition operated within a very competitive Knesset session and period. Both Right and Left parties were potentially capable of forming a winning majority in alliance with the Religious parties (Table 6.3). The left Alignment (32) hypothetically could have formed a winning majority in alliance with Democratic Movement for Change (15), National Religious Party (10), and Agudat (4). The plausibility of this formation could have become real if either religious party, in addition to the DMC, defected from the ruling coalition. The fragmentation of the Knesset, through defections and realignments among parties and MKs, evidenced the high competitiveness of the period. Before the Knesset’s dissolution there were 20 parliamentary groups and four non-affiliated MKs (Table 6.3). In fact, defection, alignments, and realignments finally led

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to the loss of government's commanding majority over the Knesset forcing an early election.237

Supporting our null hypothesis high competition in the 9th Knesset led to the formation of a tight coalition government. Yet, such a high level of competition was associated with a long-duration government as our hypothesis would have predicted.

**The 25th Israeli Government, 1992-95**

The 25th government was another extremely durable coalition one; lasting 1194 days from the time it was formed on July 1992. It was preceded by a Likud-led cabined that was dissolved due to internal coalition divisions. The dispute within the outgoing Likud coalition was sparked by autonomy negotiation with the Palestinians in Washington. On January 19, 1992 two nationalist right-wing coalition members (Moledet and Tahiya parties) quit the coalition to protest a perceived territorial concession in favor of the Palestinians, which was thought by the renegade parties to endanger Jewish settlers in the Occupied Territories. The departure of the two parties from the coalition reduced Prime Minister Itzhak Shamir's command over the Knesset to a minority position and forced him to call for an early national election.238

Israeli parties convened their national conventions in preparation for election set to be held on June 23, 1992. Evidence of a split within the Likud emerged following the

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defeat of Mr. Levi's list in favor of Mr. Shamir. In protest, Mr. Levi, who represented a large Sephardi following within the party, resigned his post as a Foreign Minister in Shamir's cabinet. The national election brought the Labor party back to a dominant position in the Knesset with 44 seats against 32 for the Likud. Labor promised a swift move in the negotiation process with the Palestinians with the aim to end the Arab-Israeli conflict.

On June 28 President Chaim Herzog formally asked Rabin to form a government within 21 days. Two religious parties, United Tora Judaism and the NRP, were pressing Labor to enter into a coalition with them to the exclusion of Meretz (a secularist party). Shas also offered to participate in a coalition, which would include Meretz, provided that an accommodation could be reached between Labor and the other two religious parties. On July 13th, Mr. Rabin was able to assemble a coalition that included Meretz and Shas providing the first with the Ministry of Education and the latter with Ministries of Interior and Defense. This tight coalition was able to receive the confidence of the Knesset only with the support of the Arab non-coalition parties who were inspired by Mr. Rabin's peace policy.

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238 "Departure of Tehiya and Moledet from coalition Budget security issues Foreign affairs" Keesings Record of World Events, January 1992, Israel.
239 "Announcement of Levi's resignation" Keesings Record of World Events, March 1992, Israel.
240 Is a Sephardic-religious party equivalent to Agudat Israel (Shomrei Torah Sephardim-Sephardi Torah Guardians).
241 "Likud general election defeat" Keesing's Record of World Events, June 1992, Israel.
Economy

Among the new government's top priorities was the establishment of a peace-oriented economy. This economy was envisioned as to eliminate unemployment, open the prospect of high-tech producing industry, and privatize the public sector. There were hopes of market development in the Middle East.

In contrast to the '70s and '80s, the '90s was a decade of economic miracles for Israel. The 25th government was established as a 'peace coalition' following the Madrid Peace Conference, the end of the first Palestinian Intifadah, and the conclusion of the Gulf War I. By 1992 the peace economy was in the making, resulting in the high rate of foreign investment, tourism, and export. Defense expenditure declined tremendously relieving the economy from a major burden. Between 1984 and 1994 defense expenditure fell by over 70%; as proportion of the GNP the relative decrease approached 300%. Inflation was also declining by 11.2%. A year later the peace economy was proceeding at a growing pace. The last year of the government witnessed an annual GDP growth rate of 4%, a decline in the average strikers per strike form 1414 in 1994 to 1067 in 1995, and a decline in the unemployment rate from 7.8 to 6.3% for the same years. Investment in Israel rose on average of 13.5 % a year after 1991 and foreign direct investment totaled $2 billion in 1995. Exports also doubled reaching an 8.6% increase, tourism doubled

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244 Sherman, Martin "Trends in Israel's Defense Budget" in Arieh Stav, "Israel at the Cross Roads" (Israel: Ariel Center for Policy Research) 1997.
245 Statistical Abstract of Israel: www.cbs.gov.il

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in comparison to 1990 reaching 2,214,000. The inflation rate was relatively under control at 14.7%.

Contrary to the 18th Likud-led government of 1977, the 26th government experienced a period of economic growth and prosperity from the time it was established until the time it was terminated. The termination of the government came as Prime Minister Rabin was assassinated. The case of 25th government fits our hypothetical predictions where low economic pressure seemed to have contributed to a tight coalition formation. Furthermore, the association between low economic pressures and government's long duration in office provides further support to our proposition.

Immigration

Formed by Prime Minister Rabin, the 26th government faced the biggest wave of mass immigration in Israeli history. Over quarter of a million immigrants entered the country while the 26th government was in office. Yet, the government's immigration and settlement policy experienced a significant change. The government made it clear that settlement activities needed to be shifted from the Territories toward the 1948 Green Lines. In its policy statements this orientation was expressed under “Changes in the Order of National Priorities” which stated that “the map of developing areas and cities will be made as to prioritize the settlements on the Green Lines and the developing areas furthest from the center of the country; other than the eras of Judea, Samaria, and the Gaza Strip that are close to the center of the country.” The coalition

was formed in 1992 with 77,057 Soviet immigrants entering the country. Immigration pressure held steady throughout the government life. In 1993, 76,805 immigrants arrived and 76,361 in 1995 when Prime Minister Rabin was assassinated (Table 6.4).

The settlement policy signaled a shift toward accommodating Palestinian and international demands as conditions for regional peace. At the same time, it inflamed the settlement movements against the regarded concession policy of Prime Minister Rabin, and eventually led to his assassination. Thus, in a sense immigration and settlement policy was a factor that ended the government.

Immigration pressure did not lead to a large coalition as our formation model predicted. Nor did such a pressure lead to early termination. Contrary to our prediction, here immigration pressures were associated with tight formation and long duration. Despite the large number of immigrants, it seems that such a factor for coalition politics was not as stressful as earlier years. The modern capacities of the country to accommodate a large wave of immigrants seemed to have rendered such a factor to a secondary relevance in coalition formation if not duration.

Table 6.4: Immigration to Israel during Long Durational Israeli Governments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Government</th>
<th>Pre-Formation</th>
<th>First Year</th>
<th>Last Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>37,528 (1955)</td>
<td>56,330 (1956)</td>
<td>72,634 (1957)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>31,115 (1965)</td>
<td>15,957 (1968)</td>
<td>20,103 (1968)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Statistical Abstract of Israel
External Pressure

Prior to the formation of the 25th government the Iraq War was successfully concluded and new efforts to settle the Arab-Israeli conflict were underway. In October 1991 the Madrid Conference was accomplished and bilateral talks between Israel and its neighbors began. The 25th government was the first Israeli government to recognize the Palestinian political right for independence. It asserted in its policy guidelines intentions to negotiate with the Palestinians an interim plan "for the establishment of the independent Palestinian authority in Judea and Samaria" while refraining "from actions and policies that will slow the process of negotiation."249

With its commitment to peace, the government survived amid a climate of low external pressure. In 1992, when the government was formed, U.S. aid to Israel increased. No changes in U.N resolutions wording occurred in criticizing Israel over its treatment of population under occupation or in demanding a nuclear free zone in the Middle East (UNGA). Beside the dispute over the deportation of Palestinian activists to the Lebanese border and minor skirmishes with Hizbullah, 1992 was a year of peace negotiations and agreements. The following year witnessed a relative escalation of attacks against Israel, primarily in the Gaza Strip where Palestinian groups opposed to the peace talks killed several Israelis through attacks. The Lebanese border caught fire at various times, most seriously in the "Operation of Accountability" which involved an assault on Hizbullah bases in Southern Lebanon. However, major peace achievements concluded in 1993; most notable was the Oslo Agreement which for the first time brought

249 Principle Guidelines of the Government of Israel, Israel Knesset Archive, 1992. Note that the principle of "independence" remained vague throughout the various declarations of the 25th government. The

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mutual recognition between the Israeli and the Palestinian leadership. In addition to Oslo, Israel concluded a peace settlement with Jordan and began a path of normality with the Arab countries. U.S. aid to Israel increased to $5 billions with additional loans and loan guarantees, a two billion U.S. dollars increase from the previous year.

The 25th government was terminated following the assassination of Prime Minister Rabin. Despite this fact, and as has been previously discussed, 1995 was a year of peace negotiations and achievements. External threats against the state were greatly reduced.

The 25th Israeli government was essentially a peace government. It was established following a situation of low external pressure. Major peace agreements and achievements followed its formation leading to the decline in external pressure. The case of the 25th government supports the hypothetical claims which suggest that low external pressure provides the dominant party with greater maneuvering capacity to form tight coalitions. Furthermore, this case agrees with the proposition that low and declining external pressures tend to prolong duration.

\footnote{\textit{extent} of independence remained a subject of negotiation. A Palestinian State as well as its authority, territorial extension, capital, and refugees' return were issues to be later defined and agreed upon.}

\footnote{The death of a Prime Minister does not constitute a necessary termination of government. The dominant party can elect a new leader or appoint the vice in the position of the Prime Minister with the Knesset's approval. However, because leaders' personalities and charisma are important characteristics in Israeli party tradition, it is often the case that a new government will be called forth to be inaugurated by the Knesset.}
Coalition Structure

A. Size

The 25th Government was formed as the first government of the 13th Knesset. The coalition was established as a minimal winning coalition controlling 62 Knesset seats. It originally consisted of Labor with 44 seats, Meretz 12, and Shas 6. On September 1993 Shas defected and on January 9, 1995 Yi’ud joined with 1 seat. Shas defection came following a Sept. 8 Israel’s Supreme Court ruling that demanded the ousting of Shas leader Der’i and his Shas colleague, Deputy Religious Affairs Minister Raphael Pinhasi, from the Cabinet because of accusations of corruption against them. Shas’ ministers in the cabinet resigned the coalition in protest. The government maintained the support of 5 MKs from the Arab parties (Table 5.5). With the defection of Shas, however, the coalition became even less than minimalistic. The only reason for its continuation in power was the outside support of primarily Arab parties. The peace process proved very controversial.

B. Ideology

The central policies of the 25th government focused on achieving peace. Government guidelines envisioned a Middle East of economic, cultural, and scientific cooperation. Regional cooperation was seen as the essence of peace. The growth of high tech industry was a major reason driving the government to invest in the path of regional cooperation and a greater economic role. The impact of globalization on politics, in its momentum to liberate economies from national boundaries toward international integration, appears to have been a factor in Israel’s push toward ending the Arab-Israeli
conflict. Acting on these principles the 25th government signed peace agreements with both Jordan and the Palestinian Authority.

Budge data did not include governments formed after 1991. However, we can readily consider the 25th government as ideologically very tight, perhaps scoring 1 or 2 on Budge ideological closeness index. Both Meretz and Labor were left parties committed to the peace process. Shas was the ethnic-religious party of Sephardim whose ideological impact on the coalition was limited to issues related to religious education. Its impact was further diminished by its withdrawal from the coalition one day after the Oslo agreement was signed in September 1993.\textsuperscript{252} Shas' withdrawal added further ideological cohesion to the ruling left-coalition. We consider the 25th government to have been very tight in ideological parameter responding to its limited and small partnership.

C. Competitiveness

The 25th government operated under very competitive circumstances in the 13th Knesset. Rivalry between the Labor and the Likud was evident in giving either the potential leverage to form a ruling alliance (Table 5.5, see also previous discussion of the 13th Knesset). Labor was named to form the coalition because it had the largest number of Knesset seats. Had the Labor party failed the task of forming the coalition, the President would have named the second largest party (the Likud in this case) to form the coalition.


\textsuperscript{252} Shas did not oppose nor support the Oslo Agreement and chose to remain outside the government, yet it restrained from joining the opposition or voting against the government. See Behar Moshe, "The Peace Process and Israeli Domestic Politics in the 1990s" Socialism and Democracy, No. 32, Summer/Fall 2002.
government. Thus, the 25th government was clearly formed under the condition of high competition.

This government was dissolved following the assassination of Prime Minister Rabin. Mr. Peres assumed the formation of a new government which maintained the same alliance. The case of the 25th government supports the hypothetical claim that increasing competition leads to longer duration governments. However, this case the null perception, which suggests that increase competition can be associated with wide formation. This may indicates that other factors, particularly low economic and external pressures, weigh more in determining the tight formation of such a government.

**Qualitative Case Comparative Analysis**

**Economic Pressure**

Seven out of eight governments studied in chapter 5 and 6 confirmed our theoretical expectations that economic pressures lead to consensual coalition formations. In the pre-1969 period, economic pressures in all the four government cases examined had a direct relationship with formation (Gov. 2,12, 7, and 13) compared to three governments in post-1969 (Gov 16, 26, and 25). In other words, governments established under circumstances of high economic pressures were widely formed (consensual formation: Gov. 2, 12, 7, and 13). In contrast, governments were established tight while economic pressures were lower (Gov. 16, 26, and 25). Coalitions established after 1969 (Gov. 16, 26, and 25) appear to have been formed amid generally low level of economic pressure, contrary to prior governments (Gov. 2, 12, 7, and 13). As predicted by our model, higher pre-1969 governments' economic pressure apparently led to large sized
and ideologically wide parameter-based coalitions (Table 6.5). For governments examined in this study after 1969, with the exception of the 18th Government, economic pressure was low leading to small-sized and ideologically tight parameter based coalitions (Table 6.5).

*Change* in economic pressure is found to be significant to durational analysis. In seven out of eight cases studied, change in economic pressure is found to be inversely related to duration. In other words, an increase in economic pressure during the lifespan of the government, as expressed in economic deterioration from the year the government assumes office to the time it dissolves, was found to be associated with shorter duration governments (Gov. 2, 12, 16, and 26). In contrast, a decline in economic pressure during the lifespan of the government, as expressed in economic improvement from the year the government is formed to the year it terminates, tended to prolong durability (Gov. 7, 13, and 25: Table 6.5). Only in the 18th government we noted its long duration despite rising economic pressure.
Table 6.5: Economic Pressure Events, Structural Formation, and Duration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Government Short Duration Governments</th>
<th>Economy</th>
<th>Formation*</th>
<th>Economic Pressure Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>l-w</td>
<td>Elevated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>l-w</td>
<td>Elevated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>low</td>
<td>s-t</td>
<td>Elevated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>low</td>
<td>s-t</td>
<td>Elevated</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Government Long Duration Governments</th>
<th>Economy</th>
<th>Formation*</th>
<th>Economic Pressure Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>l-w</td>
<td>Reduced</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>l-w</td>
<td>Reduced</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>s-t</td>
<td>Elevated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>low</td>
<td>s-t</td>
<td>Reduced</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*s-t: small-tight, l-w: large-wide.

In five of the government cases studied evidence to the “aging thesis” was found. This was most apparent in the short duration governments where economic deterioration led to their fast downfall (Gov. 2, 12, 16, and 26). This suggested that governments established under situations of economic hardship were unable to last long in power while economic pressure continued to shock them (Table 6.5). In contrast, long-duration governments often experienced improved economic conditions while in office. This was found to be the case for most examined durable governments (Gov. 7, 13, and 25) that operated under circumstances of improved economic circumstances (Table 6.5).

**Immigration**

In our methodology chapter we considered a high immigration pressure to occur when number of immigrants exceeded 40,000 a year; otherwise it was considered low. In our examination of eight Israeli governments immigration pressure was not found to have clear association with coalition formation. Coalitions were formed large (consensually) with under condition of initial high annual immigration pressure (Gov. 2, 12) and with initial low annual immigrations (Gov. 7, 13). Coalitions were formed tight (non-
consensual) with initial high annual immigration (Gov. 16, 25, 26) and consensual with low annual immigration (Gov. 18). Hence there may be some residual effect of such pressure in tightening coalition ideology (3 of 4 cases), but further analysis would be necessary to confirm this overall pattern (see table 6.8). However, immigration pressure must be considered within the relative impact of other variables (later examined) since immigration had clearly some effect on coalition formations (Gov. 2 and 12).

As for duration, an inverse association was seen between coalition annual immigration and government longevity. Governments confronted with high immigration pressure upon their formation tended to have difficulty maintaining power. All of the sample governments of short duration were formed after large waves of immigrants poured into the country (Table 6.6: Gov. 2, 12, 16, and 26). In contrast, three of the long duration governments studied (Gov. 7, 13, and 18) were formed after low number of immigrants entered the country (Table 6.6).

There were no consistent patterns to show that changes in immigration pressure during government’s life impacted durability. Nor was there evidence to suggest that immigration shocks led to ‘aging’ and termination. This result suggested that although the immigration pressure variable was found to be inversely associated with duration, it remained a weak determinant of government durability, since, in two examined situations short duration governments had immigration pressure decreasing rather than increasing (Gov. 12 and 16) and remaining the same in two other cases (Gov. 2 and 26). Furthermore, we witnessed government of long duration having an increase in
immigration pressure during their reign (Gov. 7 and 13) rather than having a decrease in immigration as predicted (Table 6.6).

Table 6.6: Immigration Pressure Events, Structural Formation, and Duration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Government</th>
<th>Immigration</th>
<th>Formation*</th>
<th>Immigration Changes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Short Duration Governments</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>l-w</td>
<td>Same</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>l-w</td>
<td>Reduced</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>s-t</td>
<td>Reduced</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>s-t</td>
<td>Same</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Long Duration Governments</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>low</td>
<td>l-w</td>
<td>Elevated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>low</td>
<td>l-w</td>
<td>Elevated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>low</td>
<td>s-t</td>
<td>Reduced</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>s-t</td>
<td>Same</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*s-t: small-tight, l-w: large-wide.

External Pressure

External foreign policy pressure was found to have a low direct association with coalition formation in the sampled cases (Table 6.7). Five studied cases established a direct association between external pressure and formation as predicted (Gov. 26, 7, 13, 18, and 25) while three cases were found to have an inverse association (Gov. 2, 12, and 16). In other words, evidences for the hypothesis that projected high external pressure leading to large coalition formation are found in two cases (Gov. 7 and 13). Support for the hypothesis is also found in tight governments formed during low external pressure (Gov. 26, 18, and 25). The other governments examined contradicted our hypothesis, suggesting perhaps other relevant variables in their respective circumstances to have determined their formations, an issue that we will further explore.
In relation to duration no clear association can be made with external pressure. Three governments of short duration were established at low levels of external pressure (Gov. 2, 12, and 26) while two long duration governments were established at high pressure (Gov. 7 and 13). This result tended to refute the proposition that external pressure has an inverse relationship with duration. Only three cases support such a proposition (Gov. 16, 18 and 25).

*Change* in external pressure, however, showed better association with duration. Five cases examined conformed to the inverse relationship between changes in external pressure and duration (Gov. 12, 26, 7, 13, and 25). Decline in external pressure, during government’s term, contributed to longevity as predicted (Gov. 13 and 25). In contrast, negative change (accumulative shocks) led to short duration (Gov. 12 and 26). Two cases contradicted this proposition (Gov. 16 and 18) suggesting that such an association was weak (Table 6.7).

It is difficult to infer from our studied cases a strong conclusion in regard to the ‘aging thesis’. In four cases evidence may support that external shocks were factors in termination (Gov. 2, 12, 26, and 18). However, in four other cases the result provided a contradictory conclusion (Gov. 16, 7, 13, and 25).

It is interesting to suggest, following our analysis, that coalitions rationally formed, i.e., large-wide when external pressure was high and small-tight when external pressure was low, last longer in power (Gov. 7, 13, 18, and 25). Alternatively, those
alliances that are not rationally established, in reaction to external pressure, with the exception of one case (Gov. 26), shortly dissolve (Gov. 2, 12, and 16). This finding, and its implication, will be further explored in the Chapter 7.

Table 6.7: External Pressure Events, Structural Formation, and Duration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Government</th>
<th>External Pressure</th>
<th>Formation*</th>
<th>External Pressure Changes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Short Duration Governments</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>low</td>
<td>l-w</td>
<td>Same</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>low</td>
<td>l-w</td>
<td>Elevated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>s-t</td>
<td>Reduced</td>
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<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>low</td>
<td>s-t</td>
<td>Elevated</td>
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<tr>
<td>Long Duration Governments</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>l-w</td>
<td>Reduced</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>l-w</td>
<td>Reduced</td>
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<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>low</td>
<td>s-t</td>
<td>Elevated</td>
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<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>low</td>
<td>s-t</td>
<td>Reduced</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* s-t: small-tight, l-w: large-wide.

Coalition Structure

The answer to the question “how the coalition structurally formed? (Size, Ideology, and Competitiveness)?” is shown in our case study. Our examination of eight Israeli governments produced the same answer, i.e., competitiveness of the electoral system determined to a large extent the formation of the coalition. Four coalition governments (2, 12, 7, and 13) were formed at low level of competition. These coalitions were formed large by size and wide by ideological parameter. Another four coalition governments (16, 26, 18, and 25) were established small by size and tight by ideological parameter under condition of high coalition competition. The result also indicated that the size and ideological parameter variables were directly related. Whenever the size of the coalition increased beyond minimum winning requirement we expect that ideological parameter becomes wider, more accommodating, and consensual in policy space.
These results additionally demonstrated that formation was significantly different between coalitions formed in the pre-1969 than the post-1969 era. The early period demonstrated a large degree of political consensus leading to larger structural formations, while the later period provided less ground for national consensus leading to tighter formations. Another important observation from our analysis is that no apparent difference existed between the durability of coalitions that varied in structural formations (short: 2, 12, 16, and 26 vs. long: 7, 13, 18, and 25). Consensual and competitive formations produced different government duration with no apparent pattern (See table 6.8). No support was found for our hypothetical proposition that efficient formation (small-tight) leads to longer duration contrary to large-tight formation. In other words, in our examination of eight Israeli governments we found no evident relationship between structural variables and government durability. This conclusion suggests that structural variables may need to be examined in light of other event pressure variables in the process of determining governments' duration, an issue which we will undertake in the following chapter.

Table 6.7: Structural Formation of Israeli Governments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Government Short Duration</th>
<th>Size</th>
<th>Ideology</th>
<th>Competition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>large</td>
<td>wide</td>
<td>low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>large</td>
<td>wide</td>
<td>low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>small</td>
<td>tight</td>
<td>high</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>small</td>
<td>tight</td>
<td>high</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government Long Duration</td>
<td>Size</td>
<td>Ideology</td>
<td>Competition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>large</td>
<td>wide</td>
<td>low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>large</td>
<td>wide</td>
<td>low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>small</td>
<td>tight</td>
<td>high</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>small</td>
<td>tight</td>
<td>high</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Qualitative vs. Quantitative Comparative Summary of Results

Quantitative as well as qualitative analyses were conducted in order to examine our theoretical model proposed in Chapter 2. Various hypotheses were advanced suggesting that coalition formation, in both size and ideology can be determined based on the level of parliamentary competition as well as events’ pressure. It was suggested that increase in coalition competition leads to coalitions of larger size and wider ideological parameter. Furthermore, the model predicted that increased economic, external, and immigration pressures contribute to larger, consensual or accommodating coalition formations. Duration of the coalition was generally predicted to be determined by both structural systematic as well as event pressure variables. Higher competition and tighter coalition formations were thought to help prolong government’s life, while increasing events’ pressures undermined its durability.

The results of our analyses were mixed, suggesting the need for theoretical refinement. Our quantitative result suggested that some economic pressure variables were significantly associated negatively with both formation and durational analyses. Labor disputes appeared to have driven a wedge between parties and increased their polarization into ideologically tighter camps. Associated with such a pressure was immigration pressure, which was also found to drive alliances into smaller formations. Internal event pressures, so it seemed, fragment alliances into smaller and ideologically tighter formations. Contrary to our theoretical expectation, quantitative results supported the null hypotheses, which suggested domestic events’ pressure to be associated with greater polarization and, therefore, tight formations (non-consensual). External pressure,
on the other hand, appeared to undermine policy differences and unite ideologically distant parties, supporting our hypothetical expectations.

Contrary to our quantitative result, our qualitative analysis supports the proposition that event pressure forces accommodation (larger-sized wider-ideology) formations, particularly in the economic domain. This result appeared qualitatively very significant for the pre-1969 period. All governments sampled for this period of low party competition provided association between high economic pressure and large coalition formations (Table 6.8). In fact, our qualitative analysis of Israeli coalitions revealed a permanent economic pressure throughout the pre-1969 period at the time where most coalitions formed large. Yet, our qualitative examination revealed that this association was weakened in post-1969 period due, perhaps, to the increasing competition between parties for government control and the decline in governments' economic priorities. Israel's industrial growth in post-1969 period, as we have discussed, may have further contributed to the growth of labor force, and consequently to the increase in the number of reported labor disputes. Such a post-1969 development may have been responsible for a greater weight in the negative quantitative association existing between coalition formation and economic pressure.253 Thus, we adopt the conclusion that confirms the strong qualitative evidence of positive association existing between economic pressure and the size-ideological structure of coalitions through pre-1969 period. This association, we further believe, has been reversed to a negative association through post-1969 Israeli coalitions, as our quantitative analysis asserted.
Table 6.8: Table of Qualitative Formative Structural and Event Pressure Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Government Before 1969</th>
<th>Size*</th>
<th>Ideology*</th>
<th>Competition</th>
<th>Economy</th>
<th>Immigration</th>
<th>External</th>
<th>Duration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>large</td>
<td>wide</td>
<td>low</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>low</td>
<td>Short</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>large</td>
<td>wide</td>
<td>low</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>low</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>Long</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>large</td>
<td>wide</td>
<td>low</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>low</td>
<td>Short</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>large</td>
<td>wide</td>
<td>low</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>low</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>Long</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>After 1969</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>small</td>
<td>tight</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>low</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>Short</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>small</td>
<td>tight</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>low</td>
<td>low</td>
<td>Long</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>small</td>
<td>tight</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>low</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>low</td>
<td>Short</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>small</td>
<td>tight</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>low</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>low</td>
<td>Long</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Dependent Variable.

In regard to immigration pressure, our qualitative analysis supported our quantitative findings particularly for the post-1969 period. Both revealed a negative association between immigration pressure and coalition size-ideological formation. As for the prior period of time, we were unable to make a strong qualitative confirmation to the whether an association existed between immigration pressure and coalition formation (Table 6.8).

Both our qualitative and quantitative analyses provide evidence for the proposition that external conflict undermines partisan differences and necessitate the establishment of accommodating governments. With the exception of ‘war cabinets’, most Israeli governments were established relatively larger in pre-1969 than in post-1969. This pattern leads us to believe that a positive association existed between external pressure and coalition accommodation in the earlier period. At the same time, our qualitative analysis revealed that in the post-1969 period external pressure did not

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253 In our quantitative analysis 13 governments formed before 1969 and 15 governments formed after 1969 were included in the analysis. This situation may have led to a bias in favor of 1969 coalition formation pattern, since there were more governments formed during this period.
broaden government formation (Table 6.8). On the contrary, lower external pressure
during post-1969, with the exception of wartime and severe external threat, was
associated with increasing polarization among political parties and small coalition
formations (Example, 18\textsuperscript{th} government). The fact of increasing party competition may
have conditioned the impact of external events in this period. This leads us to conclude
that external pressure was positively associated with the structural formation of pre-1969
governments (asserting our quantitative result) and negatively associated with post-1969
governments (asserting our qualitative result).

Relevant to formation analysis, coalition competition also appeared highly
significant. This significance was marked by the shift to a post-1969 competitive Israeli
Knesset, a comparative difference that the quantitative analysis could have not accounted
for with a pre-post sample of coalitions. Our qualitative result suggested that coalitions
before 1969 were consistently formed large while having low level of competition (Table
6.8). The situation changed after 1969 with coalitions consistently forming tight while
experiencing high level of competition.

Quantitative durational analysis provided additional support to event variables
having significant impact on coalitions' behaviors. As we expected, annual increase in
foreign assistance positively impacted the duration of coalitions. Structural variables also
appeared relevant to duration analysis. However, contrary to our expectation, increase in
coalition competition was quantitatively found to impact negatively the duration of the
coalitions.
Our qualitative duration analysis supports aspects of our theoretical expectations, particularly that increase in event pressures during the coalition's life span (economic, immigration, external) undermine the durability of the government. The significant quantitative positive association found between foreign aid and government duration also supports this assertion. Structural variables also appeared relevant to duration analysis. However, based on the case studies of eight Israeli coalition governments examined we were enable to asserts qualitatively our quantitative finding which suggested that high in Knesset competition contributes to shorter duration governments (Table 6.8).\textsuperscript{254} We affirm the quantitative conclusion because of the larger number of cases examined. No apparent qualitative difference was noted in the duration of coalitions through the periods before and after 1969.

With respect to other structural variables, our qualitative analysis further supported the proposition, that large coalition structure corresponding to particular external pressure is positively associated with government duration. This was qualitatively found with respect to coalitions forming large when faced with severe external threat (Table 6.7). Our quantitative analysis was unable to account for such phenomena due to rarely occurring cases of large national alliances forming in response to severe external threat (only 7 national governments out of 28 governments).

\textsuperscript{254} One reason for this discrepancy can be in our sample selection of governments of extreme duration cases in the qualitative analysis. This may have biased our qualitative analysis in favor of variables of severe implication on duration and undermined other explanatory variables. For example, severe external pressure such as war may have become the dominant factor in prolonging governments (7 and 13) and undermined other factors that may prove significant under normal circumstances.
Evidence on the aging thesis was also found in the qualitative analysis, which associated short duration governments with economic and foreign policy deterioration. Our quantitative bivariate analysis supported such perception by revealing significant bivariate association between severity of external shocks and aging governments. The qualitative results also suggested that the duration of the coalition can be associated with both structural as well as event pressure variables. Deteriorations in economic and external circumstances while the government is in office accumulate shocks that undermine durability. The structural formation of the coalition becomes significantly important at time of external pressure. Larger coalitions appear to cope more durably with external threat than tight formations (supporting Warwick, 1992).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Government</th>
<th>Formation</th>
<th>Competition</th>
<th>Economic Changes</th>
<th>Immigration Changes</th>
<th>External Changes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Short Duration</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>l-w</td>
<td>low</td>
<td>Elevated</td>
<td>Same</td>
<td>Same</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>l-w</td>
<td>low</td>
<td>Elevated</td>
<td>Declined</td>
<td>Elevated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>s-t</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>Elevated</td>
<td>Declined</td>
<td>Declined</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>s-t</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>Elevated</td>
<td>Same</td>
<td>Elevated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Long Duration</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>l-w</td>
<td>low</td>
<td>Declined</td>
<td>Elevated</td>
<td>Declined</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>l-w</td>
<td>low</td>
<td>Declined</td>
<td>Elevated</td>
<td>Declined</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>s-t</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>Elevated</td>
<td>Declined</td>
<td>Elevated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>s-t</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>Declined</td>
<td>Same</td>
<td>Declined</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the following chapter we revisit the literary discussions and explain the contribution of our findings to coalition theories as well as proposed refinement of our initial theorization. Further Interpretation to the significance of these results within the evolution of Israeli coalitions are elaborated. The Shortcomings and limitations of our study are evaluated and prospective research is proposed.
CHAPTER 7
ISRAELI GOVERNMENTS 1949-1999: FORMATION AND DURATION

CONCLUSION

This chapter summarizes the findings of our quantitative and qualitative data analyses. It discusses the findings in light of our proposed hypotheses. The findings support our null hypotheses that high coalition competition presses toward tighter ideological parameters and smaller-sized cabinets, resulting in short duration coalitions, particularly for the period that followed the 1969 Israeli Knesset election. Economic and external pressures, which were responsible for the formation of large coalitions before 1969, had the reverse impact afterward, leading to the formation of many contemporary minimum-winning coalitions. Immigration pressure through the post-1969 period also appears to have contributed to political polarization and smaller coalition formations. Supports for our duration hypothesis were found in the significant negative association existing between the rise of domestic and external pressures and government duration. While competition was found to contradict long-duration proposition, large-sized and wide-ideological coalitions were found to have conditional impact, contributing to government longevity in situations of external threat. Supports to the ‘aging’ thesis demonstrated negative associations between economic as well as external ‘shocks’ and government duration.

Our comparative examination of Israeli coalitions revealed a significant behavioral shift following 1969’s Knesset election. Increasing parliamentary fragmentation and coalition competition mark the transformation. Throughout the ‘post-
national' period, with the exception of grand alliances forming to repel external threat, coalitions have gown more competitive and less tolerant to policy differences, forming narrow agendas and smaller sized cabinets in response to domestic and external pressures. This transformation appears to instigate shorter duration governments, and consequently, instable polity.

The limitations of our proposition are due to the small number of cases studies and to the cultural and political peculiarities of the country examined. The contribution to the general coalition theory, however, shows that coalitions need to be examined in light of important historic-national transformations. Theoretical models must take into consideration the country's level of national fragmentation arising as a consequence of global transformation to reveal proper conclusions about coalition behaviors. Future studies can analyze countries of similar ethnic-cultural-political attributes, clustering them into levels of national fragmentation while taken global developments into consideration. The significance of such a proposition lies in forecasting the formation of durable and stable post-national governments.

The Political Relevancy of Event Pressure Variables

It is important to note that this study focuses on variables widely debated in theoretical literatures, and that these variables are relevant to Israel's political and cultural peculiarities. Many other variables remain relevant and may often prove to have explanatory significance in the determination of coalition formation and duration. Prospective research may undertake the examination of other explanations, such as the
impact of leadership charisma and personality in the formation of alliances. Leadership personality may also prove significant in the management of conflict among coalition partners, and thus help prolong duration of the coalition. Personal rivalry within the parties, as well as religious preferences and beliefs, may fuel disagreements and undermine the inclusiveness and/or duration of the coalition. Scandals and unexpected political developments may reshape coalition formation and undermine duration. This study does not claim to have discovered "the ultimate theory" of coalition formation and duration. Instead, this research represents a modest attempt to shed light on issues that seem to have reemerged, sometimes presenting a persistent pattern and at other times showing significant association with Israeli coalition formation and duration.

This study also attempts to reveal the significant level of association that may exist between the independent event variables and the dependent coalition behaviors. It is important, therefore, to note that association does not necessarily imply causation, but simply establishes the frequent occurrence of a particular set of events with a particular set of behaviors. Moreover, two reasons underlie the choice of studying particular independent variables rather than others. The first has often been established by previous research works that determine the importance and relevancy of particular independent variables in shaping a specific institution. The second is the examiner's own intuition and research work. Both reasons were present in this study for selecting economic, external policy, and immigration event pressure variables. The political relevancy of these events and their significance in alliance behaviors may become further apparent when one follows the daily political developments in the country. In this section we
follow the issues debated in the 13th Knesset election campaigns leading to the formation of the cabinet as covered by the daily Jerusalem Post. This is done in order to demonstrate that Israeli political party behaviors are often driven by the pressure variables which we claim to be significant in coalition politics.

The 13th Knesset election was a landmark in Israel political history. It revealed the fundamental issues that divide Israeli political parties and continue to shape their political alliances. Both the Likud and the Labor parties advanced fundamentally opposite programs and visions for peace, security, immigration, and economic policies. The following political debate that proceeded to the formation of the 25th government illustrates our point.

Foreign Policy Debate

Prime Minister and Likud leader Yitzhak Shamir, pronounced that, “Labor’s politicians are being driven out of their minds when they see the peace process pressing and the expansion of Israel’s international ties.” He was reacting to a statement by Labor campaign media chief Haim Ramon which undermined the peace effort being made in Washington by the current administration. In Ramon’s assessment, “It is quite obvious the negotiations have reached a dead end and the Likud is treading water. But the [impending] hasty return home of the Israeli delegation, despite the request of the Arab delegation, demonstrates the lack of any real desire to talk.”255 The accusations between the Labor and Likud parties was preceded by a heated campaign in which each portrayed

255 Jerusalem Post, May 1, 1992, p. 2.
the other as an obstacle to peace and security. One ad posted by the Likud associated Labor Leader Yitzhak Rabin with the PLO’s Yasser Arafat.256

Underlining the disagreement over the peace process, Likud rejected concessions that could have yielded a Palestinian state, while the Labor party and the “peace camp” appeared willing to consider such a possibility. “A few more years of Likud rule, and no one will talk again about the possibility of a Palestinian state. That will be a totally unrealistic idea… There will no longer be the possibility of founding [a Palestinian state] in Judea, Samaria, and Gaza, where hundreds of thousands of Jews will be living… the notion of territorial compromise will fade away like a bad dream,” said Shamir during a Likud election campaign while Labor supporters demonstrated outside the hall.257 Meretz championed the opposite Zionist vision of peace. Author Amos Oz spoke at a Meretz campaign and announced that he would vote for Meretz “because its positions represent the most responsible Zionist options. [It is time] to give Palestine to the Palestinians and receive Israel in return at long last.”258

The electoral rhetoric continued to heat up between the competing parties. On June 1st, 1992, Likud represented the Labor platform as an ad, putting the country up for sale by promising wide territorial concessions to the Palestinians if they won the election. A statement by the Likud party described the Labor declaration as having “put Eretz Yisrael on an end-of-season sale when it published a defeatist platform which advocates

256 Jerusalem Post, May 1, 1992, p. 2.
far reaching territorial concessions." Labor had declared in its electoral platform that "a peace process must be based on territorial compromise, in accordance with U.N Security Council Resolution 242 and 338, while ruling out a return to the 1967 lines." 

Immigration Policy Debate

During this period of time Israel received one of the largest waves of immigrants who arrived primarily from the Soviet Union. The immigration and absorption policy of the Shamir government was fundamentally linked with its vision of territorial expansion in the West Bank. This policy was opposed by the Bush administration and drove a wedge between the U.S. and Israel, leading to a freeze on loans to Israel that were formerly guaranteed by Washington. Immigration declined in 1992, but its massive burden was still felt in Israeli society. The pressure was manifested in the debate between the Likud government and the opposition and became a significantly divisive issue in the election campaign.

Reacting to the growing burden immigrants were placing on hospitals, Labor Histadrut spokesman David Tagar demanded that the government allocate funds to allow the building of facilities, the purchase of equipment, and the hiring of staff for an additional 1,000 hospital beds. Health Ministry spokesman Hagai Elias countered by saying that arrangements were being made to accommodate the serious crowding and overburdened staffs. In an editorial, Rabin accused the Shamir government of having done nothing for the immigrants. He described their situation upon arriving in

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259 Jerusalem Post, June 1, 1992.
Israel as having “no food to eat and no jobs to go to,” and he placed the blame on the administration as being a “good-for-nothing government [that] stands helplessly as the new immigrants lose what is most important to any human being — their dignity.”

Rebuffing Rabin’s accusation at a meeting of the Likud ministers, Sharon described the current wave of immigrants as “spoiled”, yet he blamed the Labor party for the slowdown in Russian immigration by disseminating false information among the immigrants.

240,000 of the country’s 3.4 million eligible voters were recent immigrants from the Soviet Union. A survey conducted by Tatzpit Research Institute found up to 190,000 were expected to turn up at the polls, with enough electoral strength to determine at least eight Knesset seats. Most Russian immigrants leaned to Labor because of a general feeling that the Likud government was falling short of providing basic support for the newcomers. The Tehiya party began to emerge as an ethnic political group.

Economic Policy Debate

The political division between Israeli political parties maintained the Left-Right positions in which each camp proposed opposite economic visions. Labor drew its support from the Histadrut and leaned toward advancing the interest of the Israeli labor unions. The Likud, on the other hand, pressed toward programs supporting economic liberalization and a free market economy. Meretz stood closer to Labor in its support of

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261 Jerusalem Post, May 12, 1992, p. 2.
262 Jerusalem Post, June 1, 1992, p. 12.
a welfare state with a mixed economy. Tsomet was closer to the Right and established the need for privatizing the public sector as a means of attracting foreign investment.

The debate between the Shamir Right wing government and the Left opposition continued, with each blaming the other for the country’s economic problems. The electoral platform of Likud finally spelled out the position of the party as aiming to “shape a free economy with the government merely providing the outlines of economic, monetary and fiscal policy, while cutting down state involvement. All government companies will be sold off; likewise all shares in state hands.” (footnote?) This position was countered by that of Labor, which expressed a more cautious, Histadrut-oriented free market economy. In its Platform it declared that “the private, governmental and Histadrut sectors should all coexist in a mixed, competitive economy; conducted without any discrimination along business principles, offering equal opportunity for all.”

Coalition Formation

Rabin declared, following Labor’s victory in the 13th Knesset, that his “strategy will be to change policy, to change the order of national priorities, to change the way the government functions and hopefully to change the electoral system...We will be shifting all government financing from what I call the political settlements to unemployment and other social and economic problems,” he said; “we will freeze all the incentives and all the benefits that are given at the expense of the Israeli taxpayers to the political settlements.” He went on to state that economic and political pressures had been responsible for the decline in immigration: “the sharp reduction in the number of
immigrants from Russia is related mainly to the economic problems, which are influenced by the political climate in Israel.”

Labor pursued formation of a broad coalition while initially ignoring negotiating with the NRP, who supported the Likud, particularly in relation to settlements and immigration. Labor Knesset faction leader Haim Ramon opened the door for a broad coalition that would exclude Likud and NRP but negotiate with Tsomet, Meretz, Shas, and United Torah Jerusalem.

Tsomet leader Rafael Eitan, who won 8 seats in the Knesset, declared that Tsomet “will not deviate from its principles,” and rejected Rabin’s definition of “political settlements” which he believed could undermine settlements in the Territories. He further opposed the government policy guidelines as set forth by Labor. Meretz, from the Left, also rejected the guidelines since “it makes no mention of substantive and basic issues such as UN resolution 242, a settlement freeze, full autonomy and [Palestinian] election in the territories.” To avoid a split with Meretz, Rabin offered the party the Education Ministry. Giving the ministry to a secular party meant a breach with religious groups. United Torah Jerusalem criticized this offer and broke away from the negotiation. Shas, on the other hand, decided to join after its Council of Sages gave party leader Aryeh Deri the go-ahead to enter the coalition based on the promise that the

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267 Jerusalem Post, June 28, 1992, p. 2. Tsomet is a right nationalist party with strong ties to settlers. Meretz is a dovish social-democratic party. Shas is an Orthodox-Sephardic party. United Torah Jerusalem is a religious party. NRP is a religious party with strong ties to settlers.
269 Jerusalem Post, July 2, 1992, p. 2.
party would receive the Interior Ministry and two deputy ministers. Shas' position was also dependent upon Rabin temporarily holding the religious affairs portfolio.

Meretz finally joined the coalition on the condition of preserving its position regarding the Palestinian question and the inclusion of another principle in the government guidelines, in which the PLO would be recognized as a partner in peace negotiations. On July 10, the new coalition was formed and was among the narrowest of labor-led alliances. The partners were Labor, Meretz, and Shas. Tsomet and Likud's opposition to the Labor coalition's economic, immigration-settlement, and foreign policy principles were among the major reasons for their exclusion. Thus, the consequence of economic, immigration, and foreign policy pressures were felt in the political debate leading to the formation of a tight coalition.

Findings and Discussion:

a. Coalition Formation

Several hypotheses were initially advanced in this study in order to examine coalitions' behaviors in both formation and duration. The first hypothesis suggested that "high coalition competition presses toward wider-ideological parameter and larger-sized cabinets" (Figure 2.1). Our trend analysis of twenty-eight Israeli governments revealed a consistent increase in coalition competition over time, particularly following the 1969 Israeli Knesset election. This trend was evident through the decline in the dominant party's power index over the years indicating greater fragmentation and, therefore,

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270 Jerusalem Post, July 9, 1992, p. 2.
competition within the consecutive Israeli Knessets (Figure 4.1). Nonetheless, our analysis of coalitions’ size and ideological parameters did not reveal a similar inverse pattern as to confirm our hypothesis (Figure 4.5 and Figure 4.6). On the contrary, our case studies of eight Israeli governments suggested that the null hypothesis was correct. This conclusion agrees with Mershon (1996, 2001) in the sense that the cost of coalition membership increases with competition. The result of the qualitative analysis supports the trend analysis in showing that smaller coalitions established after 1969 encountered higher levels of coalition competition than larger government formed before 1969 (Table 6.8). Our conclusion supports the null proposition that high coalition competition presses toward tighter ideological parameters and smaller-sized cabinets.

The rationality of this conclusion is based on two foundations. First, that greater coalition competition is the consequence of the declined power of the dominant party. This situation instigates a multi-polar parliamentary system, rather than a monopole, with each pole hardly capturing the minimum-required seat for a majority coalition. The second rationale can be made in the required efficiency (small-tight) for a coalition under multi-polarity to maintain rank and discourage splinter parties from defection to an opposite pole. Efficient formation provides maximum benefits among smaller numbers of coalition partners in terms of government resources and portfolios, and hence reduces defection opportunities (Mershon, 1996, 2001). This conclusion leads us back to confirm Riker’s classical proposition that minimum winning formation is the rational aim of coalitions (Riker, 1962). However, our conclusion presupposes conditional structural variables represented by the level of parliamentary competition. Riker’s classical thesis,
our study proposes, is confirmed to the extent to which parliamentary competition over
government formation is elevated. Likewise, Riker’s thesis is contradicted whenever
parliamentary competition declines (confirming Liphart; 1977, 1984).

The other aspect of coalition formation analysis is the impact of domestic and
foreign event pressures on the ways coalitions formed. It was initially hypothesized that
"events’ pressure moves a coalition toward consensualism and therefore a larger
formation and wider ideological parameters." The trend analysis revealed that two
pressure variables have consistently increased over the years: foreign aid and annual
number of strikers per strike (Figure 4.2 and Figure 4.3). It was expected that while
increase in foreign aid reduced external pressure, the annual number of strikers per strike
increased domestic pressure on government formation. In our quantitative analysis, we
found that the increase in the number of strikers per strike was correlated with the
decrease in the ideological parameter, contrary to our expectation (Table 4.2).
Furthermore, the quantitative analysis revealed that increased immigration pressure is
associated with smaller sized cabinets (Table 4.4). Both of these findings supported our
null hypothesis in suggesting that "events’ pressures polarize coalitions toward tighter
formations."

Our case analysis, which combined the various internal and external pressure
variables, provided a result contrary to our quantitative analysis, revealing that the
combined internal and external pressures were often associated with the formation of
large coalitions with wide ideological parameters. Such a relationship was found to be
particularly strong before 1969, where economic pressures positively impacted the size of the coalition (confirming Robertson, 1986). Immigration pressure appeared to be negatively associated with coalition formation, particularly in the post-1969 era. Modern Israeli immigration policy seems to have been creating a greater wedge between Israeli political parties. This is the case particularly when we recognize the various polarizing religious, ethnic, and settlements aspects associated with Jewish immigration. Likewise when we considered the external policy domain we found that external pressure, which was positively associated with the structural formation of pre-1969 governments (asserting our quantitative result), appeared to have been negatively associated with the post-1969 governments (asserting our qualitative result). Thus, based on our analyses of Israeli coalitions we conclude that our hypothesis was largely confirmed in regard to pre-1969 coalition formations (Figure 7.1), but strongly contradicted in the post-1969 period (Figure 7.2). After 1969, coalitions appear to have emerged less accommodative to minor pressures, producing an exclusive formation pattern that supported our null hypothesis. Our hypothesis is confirmed for governments formed before 1969 while our null hypothesis is confirmed for the period thereafter, with formation becoming negatively sensitive to additional pressure variables.

Emerging as a newly formed state and isolated by hostile borders, economic development became by far the most important task for Israeli governments. It was the economy that threatened the fundamental foundation of Israel as a nation. Despite the various international treaties that guaranteed the protection of Israeli borders, such as the Armistice Agreements, the U.N. charter, European and U.S. assistance, Israel remained
hostage to Arab threats of its annihilation. Accommodating massive waves of immigrants, establishing a national economy, and achieving national security were crucial tasks forcing political parties to seek unity and coalition accommodation. Thus, the rationale for the tremendous economic, social, and external pressures that existed before 1969, and their significant positive association with the structural orientation of the Israeli coalitions, can be observed from this perspective. Early Israeli governments were established large, accommodating a wide range of parties representing the national spectrum of Israeli society (confirming Robertson, 1984, 86; Lipjhart, 1977, 84).

The post-1969 period witnessed tremendous economic, social, and security leaps. Israel emerged as an economic and military regional superpower, thus undermining prior national alliances. Post-1969 coalitions grew more competitive and less tolerant to minor internal and external circumstances, hence forming smaller and ideologically tighter. In response to pressures, and with the exception of national governments established to repel severe external threats, we observed that coalition governments formed after 1969 to have been narrowly established (contrary to Robertson, 1984 or Lipjhart 1977, 84). Thus we conclude that our hypothesis that stated “events’ pressure presses coalition toward consensualism and therefore larger formation and wider ideological parameter” is confirmed for the period before 1969 era (Figure 7.1) while the null hypothesis is confirmed for the latter, suggesting that “events’ pressure polarizes coalition toward fragmentation and therefore smaller formation and tighter ideological parameter” (Figure 7.2).
Figure 7.1: General Israeli Coalition Formation Model Before 1969

Economic Pressure $\rightarrow$ Structural Size-Ideological Formation $\rightarrow$ Structural Competition

$\rightarrow$ External Pressure

Figure 7.2: General Israeli Coalition Formation Model After 1969

Immigration Event Pressure

Economic Event Pressure $\rightarrow$ Structural Size-Ideological Formation $\rightarrow$ Structural Competition

$\rightarrow$ External Event Pressure

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b. Coalition Duration

The third proposed hypothesis aimed at examining the relationship between domestic and external pressures and the durability of coalitions. The hypothesis suggested, “increase in events' pressure yields shorter coalition durations” (Figure 2.4). Furthermore, the hypothesis sets the stage for the examination of the aging thesis, which claimed that “the impact of increasing event pressure becomes more significant in shortening the duration of coalitions as they age.” In the qualitative comparative case study the changes in economic pressure during the life of the coalition emerged as a dominant variable impacting duration. It was found that economic deterioration during the life of the coalition, or increase in economic pressure, shortens the durability of the coalition (Table 6.9). Again, this was a further assertion regarding Roberston’s thesis about the significance of economic indicators in determining governments’ duration (Robertson 1983, 84). Furthermore, it was qualitatively revealed that elevated economic pressure contributes to the accumulation of “shocks” that help bring quick endings to coalitions. This qualitative conclusion confirmed Diermeier and Stevenson’s as well as Browne’s theses that accumulative shocks undermine the duration of the government (Browne, 1984, 86, 88; Diermeier and Stevenson, 1999). Our qualitative study attributes to “economic shocks” the most important determinant of coalition dissolution and confirms our hypothesis

This finding reasserted the significance of economic pressure having the most determinant role in Israeli coalition politics. The confirmation of our hypotheses
establishes a priority to economic consideration in Israeli coalition formation and duration analyses. Economic pressures have determined, to a large extent, the dimensional structure of coalition formation. And more significantly, economic pressures have determined the prospect of coalitions’ durability (Warwick, 1992).

Another significant domestic pressure variable found in our qualitative analysis to have an association with coalition duration was immigration pressure. High immigration pressure was another factor, in addition to the economy, which was found responsible for short Israeli coalition durations (Table 6.8). This finding was a further assertion of economic pressure having a dominant impact on coalition behaviors. While immigration pressure is not strictly of an economic nature, it comprises major economic functions. Housing, education, job training, integration, settlement, and employment of the new immigrants can largely be associated with economic costs; thus adding to economic pressure and consequently shorter duration governments.

External pressure was another important dimension of Israeli coalition politics. In our qualitative analysis we found association between duration analysis and external pressure variables. In accordance with hypothesis 3 the case study revealed that, during a government’s term in office, the accumulation of external pressure was a factor responsible for additional shocks contributing to early termination (Table 6.9). Most successful Israeli governments that endured for extended stays in power functioned under situations of declined external pressures, contrary to short duration governments. Further assertion of this conclusion was provided by our robust regression where we found that
increase in foreign assistance helped to reduce external pressure and contribute to longer duration coalitions.

Indeed, Israeli foreign policy emerged unique among the nations. The historic opposition of the Arab states to recognize Israel’s right to exist as a Jewish nation, confronted with the opposition of Israel to the creation of an independent Arab Palestinian State, was a major source of tension and external pressure exerted on Israeli coalition politics. The different positions of Israeli parties in regard to external issues, largely those related to peace with the Arabs and particularly the issue of a Palestinian State in the Occupied Territories since 1967, constituted major dilemmas in maintaining alliances. Our findings suggest that, during coalitions’ terms in office, reduction in tensions due to external issues contributed to lasting alliances.

In the final analysis we concluded that our hypothesis was largely confirmed both quantitatively and qualitatively in asserting that “increase in events’ pressure yields shorter coalition durations.” Furthermore, our analysis confirmed the ‘aging thesis’ which proposed that “the impact of increasing event pressure becomes more significant in shortening the duration of coalitions as they age.” Our qualitative analysis to economic shocks revealed confirmation to the ‘aging thesis’ as Roberston proposed. Deterioration in economic or external conditions during a government’s time is associated with short duration government (Table 6.9). Similarly, our bivariate quantitative analysis revealed significant assertion of the association existing between
external conflict and the duration of the government, suggesting that the termination of long-durable (old) government is associated with external conflicts.

In addition to the 'events' impact on durational analysis, structural associations were also considered in this study. The association of coalition competition with duration was proposed in hypothesis 4 which suggested, "increase in coalition competition contributes to longer coalition durations." The null association was found significant in our quantitative analyses. The quantitative robust regression analysis showed that the increase in competition was associated with shorter duration governments (confirming Grofman, Roozentaal's (1997) and rejecting Mershon (1996, 2001)). We were not able to either assert or reject this proposition in our qualitative analysis. We accept the quantitative result due to the larger number of coalitions involved in the analysis, which our qualitative analysis lacked. Thus, we assert the null hypothesis, which stated that "increase in coalition competition contributes to shorter coalition durations."273

The relationship linking coalition size and ideological structure with duration was proposed in hypotheses 5 and 6 respectively, that "widening ideological parameter shortens coalition duration" and "enlarging the size of the coalition shortens coalition duration." In our qualitative study we found that ideological and size formations that properly responded to external pressure yielded durable coalitions. In other words, the association of durational analysis to the structural formation of the coalition was found

272 In our sample of coalitions studied we found that in situations of high competition two coalitions were of short duration while two were of long duration. In situations of low competition, on the other hand, two coalitions were of short duration while the other two where of long duration (see Table 6.8).
273 See previous discussion about the rationality of this null hypothesis which was elaborated in chapter 2.
relevant when such a formation corresponded to external pressure. Whenever the structural formation of the coalition was contradictory to external pressure, as proposed in hypothesis 2, coalition duration shortened (Table 6.8). This conclusion asserts Warwick's claim against Browne that the structure, not only the event, is responsible for the ability of a government to endure shocks (Warwick, 1994). Yet, this study found some structural formations may prove to insulate coalitions from shocking events more effectively than others. This study suggested that durational analysis could be relevant to coalition formations when coalitions are efficiently structured in reaction to external pressure. Thus, we find that our hypothesis is conditionally confirmed and the increase in a coalition's size and ideological parameter can be positively associated with duration whenever such an increase corresponds to external pressure.274

In addition to revealing the importance of parliamentary structure, the above findings assert the importance of foreign policy issues in determining the prospective duration of Israeli alliances. In order to manage their fragilities, alliances need to take a critical approach to external issues. Grand alliances help establish long duration coalitions when faced by severe external threats, such as war. In contrast, narrowly formed alliances were short-lived when confronted with typical external circumstances. The presence of coalition competition or its absence may further contribute to duration. This is a further illustration that Browne's thesis needed to consider structural variables that may undermine the impact of 'shocks' in durational analysis as proposed by

274 Our quantitative analysis does not include a conditional external conflict analysis. Such a statistical design goes beyond our empirical design and the limitation imposed by our small number of cases.

This study suggested that not all event pressures have equally and consistently impacted coalition formations, and not all formations properly responded to pressures yielding long duration governments. Perhaps radical historic transformations may have altered aspects of coalition behaviors. Following 1969, it can be observed that the Israeli coalition system has transformed into a competitive structure, thus changing important expectations of coalitions' formations and duration. The impact of economic pressure on formation, for example, was reversed and additional relevant variables emerged. Coalitions that formed large as a consequence of economic pressures before 1969, formed small in response to lower pressure afterward. This study found that proper coalition formations, properly structured in reaction to external pressure, as well as consideration of the existing level of parliamentary competition, provided the best guarantee of lasting governments. Coalitions that formed large in reaction to mounting external pressure during low level of parliamentary competition were among the best-survived cabinets. Coalitions formed small while having low levels of external conflict and parliamentary competition had a better chance to last in power. Since 1969, and with the increasing level of competition, coalitions grew more polarized in their formation and their alliances became more sensitive to event pressure (see Duration Model, Figure 7.3).
Our findings supported the view that claimed Israeli coalition politics prior to 1969 to have been differently structured than afterwards. The early period of Israel's history reflected national consensus faced by national building tasks. Security, economic pressure, and immigration absorptions were among the major challenges that enforced political unity among the various sectors of Israeli society (Issac, 1976; Lann, 1996; Felber, 1997; Arian, 1998). This was translated in the democratic society through parliamentary coalition building politics. Many Israeli governments in the pre-1969 period were formed larger by size and more receptive to various ideological partnerships, amid low level of coalition competition. Coalition behaviors throughout this period

In this study we found that these challenges acted as event pressures leading governments in pre-1969 to be based on large alliances with wide ideological spectrums. Economic pressure emerged as having the most imprints on coalition formations. Permanent economic pressures in this period led to the establishment of grand alliances (confirming Robertson, 1984). The fate of these alliances, upon formation, was determined by economic and external political developments. Economic deterioration often meant early coalition breakup and dissolution contrary to situations of economic progress. Large coalitions responded more effectively to external pressures and proved capable of lasting in power, overcoming internal disputes and divisions; while tight coalitions faced with typical circumstances shortly collapsed (confirming Warwick, 1994). Low coalition competition further contributed to longevity of coalitions through this early period (confirming Grofman and Roozendaal, 1997).

The dominance of Mapai throughout the pre-1969 Knesset undermined the ability of challenging coalitions to be formed. Mapai’s dominance provided the party with the luxury to form larger alliances and share government resources with minor ideologically odd parties without fearing a “coalition coup d’État” (confirming Mershon, 1996, 2001). Mapai’s coalition governments often included, in addition to religious blocs, rightist parties such as General Zionists, the Liberals, and even Gahal. Mapai’s unchallengeable

275 Lipjhart (1977, 1984) claimed that pluralistic nations consisting of various ethnic groups tend to form consensual political ruling alliances contrary to situations in homogeneous countries.
power contributed further to the formation of lasting and consensual national
governments that were capable of confronting primarily economic challenges, foreign

Post-1969 achievements were evident in various national spheres, most notably in
economic development. Post-1969 Israel became industrially oriented, achieving a
dramatic increase in GNP, exports, growth, and foreign investment. Security threats were
to a large extent contained by Israel’s military edge and a series of peace agreements.
After 1969 Israel became more susceptible to ‘normal’ democratic factional politics
within an increasingly complex society. This study showed that the decline in economic
and external stress combined with the increase in competition among rival dominant
parties were politically reflected in lesser structural need for consensual coalition
formation (Figure 7.4). The increase of competitiveness among Israel’s dominant parties
was marked by a substantial decline in the Labor party’s dominance over the Knesset
(Figure 7.5). Coalition politics in post-1969 Israel were contradictory to Lijphart’s
views, which emphasized consensualism in pluralistic societies (Lijphart, 1977, 1984).
Both the decline in economic and external stress and the increase in structural
competitiveness of the Knesset contributed to the formation of many minimum-winning
coalitions in this period (Riker, 1963). Grand alliances, in the same period, were formed
as a consequence of external threat rather than economic pressure. For example, the
national government that was maintained by Prime Minister Meir following the 1967
War, Shamir and Peres following the 1982 War, or Sharon following the 2000 Palestinian
Intefadah.
Figure 7.4 provides another illustration of the declined emphases of economic objectives by Israeli governments. Israeli government policy guidelines expressed the various policy objectives of each coalition upon formation. These policies included a variety of tasks set forth by each cabinet, ranging from strengthening security, achieving peace, fostering immigration, to pursuing particular economic plan (Chapter 3 provides a detailed discussion of Governments’ Policy Guidelines). After these guidelines were content-coded the percentages of statements stressing economic policies by each government were plotted in Figure 7.4. The trend demonstrates that earlier governments preoccupied themselves with emphasizing economic policies more than later cabinets. Early Israeli governments dedicated 20% to 40% of their policy guidelines to economic plans while more recent government guidelines fell below 20%. This Figure provides additional indications to support that economic pressure was a more significant factor in earlier Israeli coalitions than in later ones.
Figure 7.4: Economic Policy Priority in Government's Guidelines (1949-1999)

![Graph showing economic policy priority over time](image)


Figure 7.5 provides further demonstration for the combined impact of both economic pressure (% of statements emphasized by each government’s policy guidelines) and Knesset competitiveness (as indicated in the % of dominant party power index) on the structural formation of the government (the number of Knesset seats controlled by a coalition’s parties). The Figure reflects a synchronized trend between three variables:

276 From March, 1974 until August, 1981 (16th –19th governments) policy priorities focused on issues such as peace, government corruption, support of religious institutions. Economic questions were not of immediate concern. Overshadowing economic concerns were post-1973 peace plans with Egypt and the rise of the Likud to government following the 1977 national election. The 21st government was that of...
increase in economic pressure and increase in dominant party power index (decrease in competitiveness) is reflected in a similar trend in coalition size.

Figure 7.5: Economic Policy Guidelines, Dominant Party Power Index, and Coalition Size by Government (1949-1999)²⁷⁷

Source: Government Policy Guidelines (1949-1999), Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs

²⁷⁷ From March, 1974 until August, 1981 (16th – 19th governments) policy priorities focused on issues such as peace, government corruption, support of religious institutions. Economic questions were not of immediate concern. Overshadowing economic concerns were post-1973 peace plans with Egypt and the rise of the Likud to government following the 1977 national election. The 21st government was that of national unity formed in September 1984 and was primarily occupied with the War in Lebanon and the Palestinian Intifadah.
Economic performance, this study showed, was one of the primary determinants of government duration (Robertson, 1983, 1984). This agrees with our findings above, showing that the economy has played a central role in Israeli democratic politics. Economic pressure was relevant to structural formation. Furthermore, this study revealed that the extent to which economic pressures were resolved determined the capacity of the government to last in power. In the pre-1969 period resolution of economic pressure increased the durability of governments in power. However, post-1969, additional factors relevant to government duration were primarily external and immigration pressure, combined with increased competition.

Among the additional factors found relevant to duration analysis, particularly after 1969, was government foreign policy performance. After 1967 Israel was no longer in a position of merely defending its right to exist as a nation, but it had to increasingly justify its occupation of newly captured territories populated by a Palestinian majority. Despite military supremacy and enhanced national security, the subsequent Israeli governments had to shield themselves from international condemnation for “illegal occupation” and work more skillfully in the diplomatic arena. In this study we have shown the relevancy of increased foreign aid in prolonging the duration of the government. We have further demonstrated that governments which existed amid low external pressure lasted longer in power (Gov. 7, 13, and 25). The 25th government of Prime Minister Rabin was a case in point. The government was able to survive various no-confidence votes while not commanding a majority of seats in the Knesset. Yet, its various achievements in reducing external pressure, particularly signing the peace
agreements with both Jordan and the Palestinian Authority, helped prolong its longevity with the support of external votes.\textsuperscript{278}

Figure 7.6: Foreign Policy Priority in Government’s Guidelines (1949-1999)\textsuperscript{279}

![Graph showing the emphasis on foreign policy issues over time.](image)


Figure 7.6 demonstrates a steady increase in Israeli governments’ emphasis on foreign policy issues. Foreign policies were emphasized by later Israeli governments in reaction to growing issues in this domain.

\textsuperscript{278} Two sources of outside support helped the government defeat no-confidence votes. The Arab MKs voted with the government while Shas’ MKs refrained from voting with the opposition.

\textsuperscript{279} 16\textsuperscript{th} Labor-led government was that of P.M. Golda Meir of 1974. It emerged after the October, 1973 war and was overwhelmingly concerned with the question of peace in the Middle East. It was also among the shortest lived governments of Israel, lasting only 90 days.

19\textsuperscript{th} government was a Likud-led government overwhelmingly concerned with religious affairs.

21\textsuperscript{st} and 22\textsuperscript{nd} governments were national unity governments arising after 1982 war in Lebanon and continuing though the Palestinian Intefadah.
In addition to resolution of external pressure, the duration of Israeli governments emerged as a function of structural formation. This study demonstrated that governments rationally formed in reaction to external pressure lasted longer in power. In other words, coalitions formed on a larger basis when external pressure was high or on a smaller basis when external pressure was low were the ‘rational’ and durable governments. Competition also emerged as relevant to duration. The increase in coalition competition after 1969 has exerted additional pressure, undermining the durability of the government.

Israel is a country of immigrants. Massive immigration to Israel exerted great pressure on the country’s institutions, particularly in the early period of nationhood. Housing, welfare, jobs, education, religion and cultural integration for the new immigrants were among the few imperative tasks faced by governments. After 1969, government immigration policy became more controversial, fueling religious, ethnic, and settlement disputes. These represented additional pressure on governments leading them to terminate relatively quickly whenever immigration pressure was high.

Our above discussion demonstrates that event and structure variables are relevant to both the formation and the duration of governments. In the case of Israel, coalition competitiveness (structure), economic and immigration pressures (internal events), and foreign policy pressure (external events) are found to be the primary determinants of coalition systematic formation. Furthermore, government duration was also found to be determined by structured formations and event variables. In eight Israeli governments we found that increases in internal and external pressures, along with ‘irrational’ structural
formations responding to external pressure, undermined the duration of the government. The relative increase in competition was also found among the structural variables that have undermined the durability of the government.

Figure 7.7 combines both foreign and economic policies emphasized by the various Israeli coalitions within their respective policy guidelines. The trend shows a decline in economic emphasis in favor of external policy. This suggests that pressure exerted on Israeli coalition politics has been of increasingly external orientation. Thus, if trends continue along the same path, we should expect future Israeli coalitions to take foreign policy, an arising determinant of coalition unity and stability, as a more essential factor in coalition building.
Significance of Findings to Coalitions' Formations and Duration Theories

The study finds that there are no contradictions between policy-based and structural or size-based research. Coalitions' ideological parameters increase with coalition size. More participants in the coalitions mean more ideological concessions. This suggests that minimum winning coalitions are among the most ideologically tight structures, contrary to grand coalitions. Parties strive for minimum formations (confirming Riker, 1962) but are often confronted with events' pressures to stretch beyond the boundaries of "efficiency" (confirming Robertson, 1986 Lipjhart, 1977, 1984). These pressures shape formations and consequently determine coalition duration. The first important aspect of coalition formations is the parliamentary structural context.
This structural component is best captured by the degree of competitiveness within the system. A competitive system, with many potential winning coalitions, acts just like a competitive economic system in producing "efficient" formations or enterprises (confirming Mershon; 1996, 2001). Whenever competitiveness is reduced, other variables become relevant in determining formations. Most significant to formation analysis are the economic and security well-being of the country. Severe economic and external pressure on the country forces greater formative accommodation (confirming Robertson, 1986). When confronted with severe economic pressures, coalitions often formed large as to maintain national unity in confronting domestic threats (confirming Lipjhart; 1977, 1984 and rejecting Riker, 1962). Yet, increasing coalition competition fuels rivalry between dominant parties and coalitions grow less tolerant to event pressures, thus forming among a smaller number of partners (confirming Mershon; 1996, 2001 and Riker, 1962 and rejecting Robertson, 1986 and Lipjhart; 1977, 1984).

Following formation, maintaining a coalition, i.e., prolonging its life, becomes the second significant aspect of coalition politics. Reduced event pressures help the government repels reasons for early termination and prolong its stay in power. Most importantly in this regard are the changes in economic and external pressures as well as immigration pressure, their elevation providing mounting reasons for early termination (confirming Browne, 1984, 1986, 1988). The second aspect of duration is competition. The durability of a coalition is enhanced whenever the chances of a competing coalition to control a winning majority in the Knesset are reduced (confirming Grofman and Roozentaal, 1997 and rejecting Mershon, 1996, 2001). The third aspect of duration is the
structural formation of a government that responded to external pressure. Larger formation responding to external pressure prolongs government duration. Also, small formation responding to low external pressure has a similar impact (confirming Warwick, 1994).

Thus, the theoretical contribution of this study is to provide new avenues in which both structural and event pressures are combined in analyzing coalition formation and duration behaviors. This has been achieved by taking the coalition as the unit of analysis while making the distinction between important historic eras to which our model can be separately applied. Our study demonstrates that the application of theoretical models must carefully consider national historic transformations. Coalition formation theories may provide contradictory results when applied to countries undergoing varying levels of economic and global transformation. As the case of Israeli coalitions demonstrated, nations undergoing early nation building prioritize consensus and unity in alliance formations in order to confront common tasks. However, the situation is often changed after the same nation matures economically and internationally and begins to globalize. Post-nationalism boosts political fragmentation and competition, and undermines, as a consequence, consensual coalition behaviors. The immediate consequence is greater ethnic and ideological polarization that can potentially undermine the stability (duration) of national alliances.

Our theoretical finding synthesizes both the Rational-Efficient model, initially advanced by Riker (1962), later elaborated and revised by Dodd (1976, 84), Strom
(1984), Laver and Shepsle (1990, 96), and the Ideological-Interest model, suggested by Lipset and Rokhan, (1967), Axlerod (1970), de Swaan (1973); Lipjhart (1977), Warwick (1979), Baron (1993) and Dunleavy (2001). Evidence of Lipjhart's "consensual theory" in pluralist societies is demonstrated in the cases of Israeli governments being established in reaction to economic and external pressures, particularly before 1969. Evidence suggests that ideological cleavages are overcome during early periods of nation building. Riker's view about minimum winning coalition formation, on the other hand, is found to be plausible in post-national periods where political circumstances approach 'normalcy' and/or 'complexity', i.e., society is no longer confronted with threats to its fundamental foundations. This situation became evident in Israeli polity after 1969, where political parties further factionalized into a multi-polar Knesset.

The differences in Israeli coalition behaviors through two distinct periods of time, before and after 1969, invite additional considerations and conditions to political analysis. Lipset and Rokhan's "freezing hypothesis", that established the 20th century ideological struggle to have been shaped by the same tenets of the industrial and national revolution of the 19th century, must be viewed in a different light. Our analysis of Israeli politics, which distinguishes between two political periods, before and after 1969, demonstrates rapid national development indicated by a shift in the priorities of coalition building. Economic progress, and perhaps globalization, appears to have liberated national politics, particularly that of multi-ethnic and pluralistic societies, from the tradition of national consensualism toward greater ethno-political fragmentations, and therefore, political competition. Morgan Pederson was correct to characterize modern
political alignments as being in a state of ideological detachment and electoral volatility (Pederson, 1990), yet, examining the impact of globalization on national politics can perhaps further enrich the explanation of the realignment phenomenon.

The liberation of politics from the strict tasks of nation building toward a process of global integration seems to constitute the essence of a new coalition synthesis. While this study did not undertake fully the examination of the global transformation impact on national politics, it provided greater support for such a paradigmatic perception. The decline in ideological commitment in favor of greater ethno-political fragmentation constitutes an important aspect of this process (contradicting Lipjhart, 1977, 1984). Such a process, this study demonstrates, is manifested in shifting pressures and increasing fragmentation among parties making coalition building hardly consensual and, thus, giving greater thrust to the formation of minimum winning coalitions (reasserting Riker, 1962).

The conclusions established in this study are constrained by the small size of examined coalitions. Quantitative examination included only 28 cases while qualitative case study focused on only eight governments. Other limitations to our proposition stem from the country we studied whose unique political and cultural attributes may have undermined our theoretical assertions in regard to other countries. Despite the reliability limitation imposed on our theoretical assertions, the generalization made in this study provides partial support to various theoretical traditions and provides ground for the examination of a synthetically oriented theory. Thus, we consider the generalization
made to constitute a base that can stimulate research that takes into consideration our results, which we view as necessary for the advancement of a comprehensive coalition theory.

The Transformation of Politics from Nationalism toward Globalism

Franklin and Mackie question: "what it is about these countries that make them different?" (Franklin & Mackie, 1984, p. 688). The answer to this question, they suggest, "might provide us with powerful additional variables with which to attack the problem of predicting coalition formations." (Franklin & Mackie, 1984, p. 688). The answer to such a question must be examined in light of the impact of global transformations on countries like Israel, a subject that can be further elaborated by future research. As we have established in this study, study of a country needs to look at the time period that signals a shift from national to global politics. Toward such a thesis we must look at countries' ethnic fabrics and evaluate their internal tendencies toward global integration and national fragmentation, as well as their coalition and parliamentary political formations.

The question can be further extended as to whether we can establish an association between coalition duration and global integration. Browne, Frenderis, and Gleiber's studies (1984, 1986,1988) provided extensive emphasis on environmental developments as primary factors determining the lifespans of coalitions. Events, they claimed, place accumulative pressure on coalition partners to split. Unforeseen wars, flow of refugees, economic crises, scandals, etc... are events that invite increasing differences and divisions within ruling alliances. This theme seems to suggest that global
events invite greater challenges to traditional alliances and their durability. Globalization
entails far-reaching events with dramatic impacts that include cultural, political,
economic, and environmental transformations. Should we then expect that alliances
formed in modern times will be of shorter duration (less stable) as a consequence of
dramatic global transformation shocks?

Shorter government durations and increased instabilities could perhaps be
rational conclusions to the rapid global transformations that are storming nations.
However, our study suggests that the structural situation might often counteract the
impact of events on coalition duration. This confirms Warwick's views that structural
variables hold important determinant power when events are controlled (Warwick, 1992,
p. 875). In our study we have found evidence to support Warwick's thesis that properly
structured coalitions— in reaction to external pressures events – are more resistant to
environmental pressure, and therefore, are often more durable.

Coalition formation and duration, this study established, is a permanent process
conditioned by institutional limitations as well as environmental political developments.
Considerations of the time period as well as the country and its social fabric are serious
factors that need to be integrated within the analysis of coalition theories. The world is
rapidly changing toward global integration with radical consequences on national
politics. It is no longer valid to examine coalition politics today by the same standards
that governed countries in previous decades and it is difficult to impose the previous
standards on modern coalition behaviors. The solution to this dilemma may lay in
categorizing democratic systems according to their respective levels of national
development or global integration, i.e., by the extent to which countries have achieved
social cohesiveness and economic development within the international arena. Leaders
and policy makers can then foresee the shape and the prospect of durable coalitions. A
comparative analysis of several countries may prove useful in this regard. Applying our
model to future research might be achieved by grouping proportional representative
democratic countries according to their respective level of existing fragmentation and
ethnic plurality, economic development, and security pressure. Each country will, thus,
be included in two samples where each is distinguished by its level of national
transformation. Turkey, Pakistan, India, Italy, South Africa as well as many South
American countries, such as Brazil and Argentina, are suitable candidates for such a
comparative examination. These countries have encountered dramatic national
transformations as evident in economic growth while their coalition politics have
confronted mounting global transformation pressure. Prospective research can determine
the historic periods in which global impact has marked the political transformation in
these countries. All coalition governments will then be grouped into two samples of pre
vs. post global transformation sets. Examination of their formation and duration can then
be separately examined and compared in light of the hypotheses proposed in this study.

Lipjhart was right to suggest that pluralistic societies tend to produce consensual
political formations. However, in this study we found Lijphart’s thesis to be conditioned
by the time framework and the global circumstances nations encounter. Lipjhart’s views
can be asserted during periods of national revival, where multi-ethnic cleavages in
pluralist societies unite in the process of State building. However, we must recognize that globalization has greatly undermined the national paradigm in favor of an ethnic synthesis (Gurr, 1994, 1997, 2000). Globalization today is reinventing nationalism in favor of world integration and altering ethnic identities and ideological politics toward greater fragmentation. The most fundamental imprint of globalization on national politics can be seen through the “liberation” of the “ethnic interest” from geopolitical limitations, or from the border space of the Nation State. Never before have we seen pluralistic nations, subjugated to the force of globalization, so divided and polarized (Crawford, 1998). The Kurds in Iraq, as well as the Tajiks in Afghanistan, appear to have a more in common interest with the Americans than with their fellow national ethnics. If we were to examine political loyalty of the other contemporary Iraqi ethnicities of Turkmen, Assyrians, Chaledeans, Arab-Christians we will hardly find a common momentum for traditional national unity. What politically matters for ethnicities today is having a State capable of nurturing their respective ‘ethnic interests’ rather than having the contrary. With globalization, ethnic groups appear to be growing less trustful of the national ‘melting pot’ paradigm, and emerging more assertive of their distinct political-ethnic identities. Thus, while consensual politics may be needed for governing, such a requirement continues to be undermined and reinvented by the process of globalization, where ethnic groups are increasingly finding supports and alliances being extended beyond their national ethnic counterparts. The post-national state’s role appears to emerge as less concerned with regulating and unifying national economy and culture, but more concerned with the management and distribution of resources among the various ethnicities.280

280 The role of post-civil war governments in Lebanon, for example, was predominantly submerged in the
The impact of globalization on Israel is apparent in the increasing rise of ethnic politics and the undermining of national or ideological currents. The increasing influence of groups such as Shas, Israel Ba'aliah, and the Arab parties along with the growing tendency of larger parties to adopt ethnic perspectives (Ashkenazim vs. Sephardim) are evidence of such a pattern.\(^{281}\) The most important consequence of globalization is the deterioration of national unity in favor of greater political fragmentation and competing ‘identities’ (Crawford, 1998). Such a situation has been responsible, as this study has demonstrated, for contemporary coalition competition and less consensual Israeli politics. As we move to the 21\(^{st}\) Century, global and domestic events continue to reshape modern Israeli politics. It is evident that the new century of globalization will exert greater pressure on Israel’s pluralist society and its structure of government, and determine the prospect and shape of its post-modern national unity.

\(^{281}\) In the 2003 Israeli election, Shinui emerged as a large party with 15 seats in the Knesset. Shinui is widely viewed as a secular-Ashkenazi party in opposition to Shas, a religious-Sephardic party.
APPENDIX A

IAN'S BUDGE'S DEFINITIONS OF POLICY DOMAINS AND SUBDOMAINS

Domain 1 External Relations

102 Foreign Special Relationships: Positive

Favorable mentions of other countries where these are either specially dependent on or are especially involved with the relevant country. For example, former colonies; in the West German case, East Germany; in the Swedish case, the rest of Scandinavia; the need for cooperation with and aid to such countries; their importance to the economy and defense programs of the relevant country.

102 Foreign Special Relationships: Negative

As 101, but negative.

103 Decolonization

Favorable mentions of decolonization, need for relevant country to leave colonies; greater self government, and independence; need to train natives for this; need to give special aid to make up for colonial past. This also includes negative references to Soviet Imperialism in Eastern Europe, especially in the United States.

104 Military and Security: Positive

Need for strong military presence overseas, for re-armament and self-defense, need to keep to military treaty obligations, need to secure adequate manpower in military.

105 Demilitarization

As 104, but negative.

106 Peace

Declaration of belief in Peace and peaceful means of solving crises; need for international disarmament and desirability of relevant country joining in negotiations with hostile countries.

107 Internationalism: Positive

Support for UN, need for international cooperation, need for aid to developing countries, need for world planning of resources, need for international courts support for any international aim or world state.

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108 Jewish Community: Positive

Favorable mentions of Jewish Community in general and in Diaspora in particular.

109 Internationalism: Negative

As 107, but negative

110 Internationalism Negative EEC and Europe

As 108, but negative.

Domain 2 Freedom and Democracy

201 Freedom and Domestic Human Rights

Favorable mentions of importance of personal freedom, civil rights; freedom of choice in education; freedom from bureaucratic control, freedom of speech; freedom from coercion in industrial and political sphere; individualism.

202 Democracy

Favorable mention of democracy as method or goal in national and other organizations; support for worker participation; for involvement of all citizens in decision making, as well as generalized support for symbols of democracy.

203 Constitutionalism: Positive

Support for specified aspects of a formal constitution, use of constitutionalism as an argument for policy as well as generalized approval for 'constitutional' way of doing things.

204 Constitutionalism: Negative

As 203, but negative.

Domain 3 Government

301 Decentralization: Positive

Support for devolution, regional administration of politics or economy, support for keeping up local and regional customs and symbols, deference to local expertise in planning, etc.

We replaced Budge's sub-domain "favorable mention of European community" with what we thought a category related greater to Israel's case as "favorable mention of Jewish community".
302 Decentralization: Negative

As 301, but negative.

303 Government Efficiency

Need for efficiency in government (e.g. merit system in civil service), economy in government, cutting down civil service; improving governmental procedures; general appeal to make process of government and administration cheaper and more effective.

304 Government Corruption

Need to eliminate corruption in government, and associated abuse, e.g. regulation of campaign expenses; need to check pandering to selfish interests.

305 Government Effectiveness and Authority

This includes references to government stability, especially in Italy.

Domain 4 Economy

401 Enterprise

Favorable mention of private property rights; personal enterprise and initiative; need for the economy of unhampered individual enterprises; favorable mention of free enterprise capitalism; superiority of individual enterprise over state, and over state buying or management systems.

402 Incentives

Need for financial and other incentives and for opportunities for the young, etc; encouragement to small businesses and one-man shops; need for wage and tax policies designed to induce enterprise; Home ownership.

403 Regulation of Capitalism

Need for regulations designed to make private enterprise work better; actions against monopolies and trusts and in defense of consumer and small businessmen; anti-profiteering.

404 Economic Planning

Favorable mention of central planning of consultative or indicative nature; need for this and for government department to create national plan; need to plan imports and exports.
405 Corporatism (Applicable to the Netherlands and Canada only)

Favorable mentions of the need for the involvement of employers and Trades Union organizations in overall economic planning and direction through the medium of 'tri-partite' bodies such as the SER in the Netherlands.

406 Protectionism: Positive

Favorable mention of extension or maintenance of tariffs, to protect internal markets; or other domestic economic protectionism.

407 Protectionism: Negative

As 406, but negative.

408 Economic Goals

Central statements of intent to pursue any economic goals that are policy non-specific.

409 Keynesian Demand Management

Adjusting government expenditure to prevailing levels of employment and inflation.

410 Productivity

Need to encourage or facilitate greater production, need to take measures to aid this, appeal for greater production, and importance of productivity to the economy; increase foreign trade; special aid to specific sectors of the economy; growth; active manpower policy; aid to agriculture, tourism and industry.

411 Technology and Infrastructure

Importance of modernizing industrial administration, importance of science and technological developments in industry; need for training and government sponsored research; need for overhaul of capital equipment, and methods of communications and transport (including Merchant Marine); development of Nuclear Energy.

412 Controlled Economy

General need for direct government control of economy; control over prices, wages, rents, etc. This covers neither Nationalization nor Indicative planning.

413 Nationalization
Government ownership and control, partial or complete, including government ownership of land.

414 Economic Orthodoxy and Efficiency

Need for traditional economic orthodoxy, e.g. balanced budget, retrenchment in crisis, low taxation, thrift and savings; support for traditional economic institutions such as the Stock Market and banking system; support for strong currency internationally.

Domain 5: Welfare and Quality of Life

501 Environmental Protection

Preservation of countryside, forests, etc; general preservation of natural resources against selfish interests; proper use of national parks; soil banks, etc.

502 Art, Span Leisure, and Media

Favorable mention of leisure activities, need to spend money on museums, art galleries, etc; need to encourage worthwhile leisure activities, and to provide cultural and leisure facilities: to encourage development of the media etc.

503 Social Justice

Need for fair treatment of all men; for special protection for exploited; fair treatment in tax system; need for equality of opportunity; need for fair distribution of resources and removal of class barriers; end of discrimination.

504 Social Services Expansion: Positive

Favorable mention of need to maintain or expand any basic service or welfare scheme; support for free basic social services such as public health, or housing. This excludes education

505 Social Services Expansion: Negative

As 304. but negative.

506 Education Pro-Expansion

The need to expand and/or improve education provision at all levels. But not Technical training which is coded under 411.

507 Education Anti-Expansion
As 301, but negative.

**Domain 6 Fabric of Society**

601 Defense of National Way of Life: Positive

Favorable mentions of importance of defense against subversion, necessary suspension of some freedoms in order to defend this; support of national ideas, traditions and institutions.

602 Defense of National Way of Life: Negative
As 601, but negative.

603 Traditional Morality: Positive

Favorable mention of e.g. prohibition, censorship, suppression of immorality and unseemly behavior; maintenance and stability of family.

604 Traditional morality: Negative
As 603, but negative.

605 Law and Order

Enforcement of all laws; actions against organized crime; putting down urban violence; support and resources for police; tougher attitudes in courts, etc.

606 National Effort of Social Harmony

Appeal for national effort and solidarity; need for nation to see itself as united; appeal for public spiritedness; decrying anti-social attitudes in a time of crisis support for public interest; national interest; bipartisanship.

607 Communalism, Pluralism, Pillarization

Preservation of autonomy of religious, ethnic, linguistic heritages within the country. Preservation and/or expansion of schools with a specific religious orientation.

608
As 607, but negative.

609 Immigration and Settlement: Positive\(^{284}\)

\(^{284}\) We inserted this category, due to its significance in Israeli policy domain.
Fostering immigration and settlements, support immigrants settle the land of Israel.

610 Support of Religious Laws: Positive

Support of religious institutions and establishments by the government politically and financially, given the religious authorities greater role in public life.

611 Support of Religious Laws: Negative

As 610 but negative.

612 Jerusalem

Insistence that Jerusalem will remain the eternal capital of Israel. Facilitating Jerusalem for all sorts of religious worship.

Domain 7 Social Groups

701 Labor Groups

Favorable references to Labor, working class, unemployed, poor; support for Labor Unions, free collective bargaining, good treatment of manual and other employees.

702 Labor Groups: Negative

As 701, but negative.

703 Agriculture and Farmers

Support for agriculture; farmers; any policy aimed specifically at benefiting these.

704 Other Economic Groups

Favorable references to any Economically-defined group not covered by 701 or 703. For example, employers, self-employed, middle-class and professional groups in general.

705 Underprivileged Minority Groups

Favorable references to underprivileged minorities which are defined neither in economic nor in demographic terms, e.g. the handicapped, homosexuals, etc.

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285 We inserted this category, due to its significance in Israeli policy domain.
286 We inserted this category, due to its significance in Israeli policy domain.
287 We inserted this category, due to its significance in Israeli policy domain.
706 Non-economic Demographic Groups

Favorable mentions of or need for, assistance to Women, Old People, Young People, linguistic groups and national minorities; special interest groups of all kinds.
The standardized Banzhaf index, normalized Banzhaf index or just Banzhaf index was introduced two decades after Shapley-Shubik index by lawyer John F. Banzhaf in 1965 (Banzhaf 1965). The index calculates voter 𝑖’s swings like the Shapley-Shubik index. While the latter one analyzes all possible voter permutations the former index considers each distinct coalition only once thus concentrating on voter combinations. The standardized Banzhaf index value for voter 𝑖 is obtained by dividing the sum of 𝑖’s swings (regarding all possible \(2^n\) combinations) by the sum of all voters’ all swings hence giving 𝑖’s proportion of all swings. Formally voter 𝑖’s standardized Banzhaf index is calculated as

\[
\bar{\beta}_i = \frac{\sum_{S \subseteq N} [v(S) - v(S \setminus \{i\})]}{\sum_{j \in N} \sum_{S \subseteq N} [v(S) - v(S \setminus \{j\})]}.
\]

The standardized Banzhaf index can be interpreted to give an answer to the question: what is voter 𝑖’s relative share among all pivotal positions (swings)?

**Example:**
Consider a three voter weighted voting game where voter a has 50 votes, b 49 votes and c one vote with a quota of 51, i.e. \([51; 50, 49, 1]\). In order to find the pivotal positions for each voter we have to analyse all the possible voter combinations. There are always \(2^n\) (\(n\) being the number of voters) of them, so in this case we have \(2^3=8\) possible combinations which are:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Combination</th>
<th>Weight</th>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Critical voters</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>losing</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ab</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>winning</td>
<td>a,b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ac</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>winning</td>
<td>a,c</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>abc</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>winning</td>
<td>a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>losing</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bc</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>losing</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>losing</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(\emptyset)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>losing</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

First the winning coalitions which meet the vote threshold have to be found: these are ab, ac and abc. The critical voters (swings) are found within the winning coalitions by withdrawing a voter and checking whether the remaining coalition is winning. Clearly in coalition ab both voters are critical, thus both have a swing. In the grand coalition abc.
only a is critical since b or c could be removed (not both at the same time of course) and the coalition would still remain winning. There are altogether five swings, a has three of them, b and c one swing. Thus, the Banzhaf index scores are

\[ a = \frac{3}{5}, b = \frac{1}{5}, c = \frac{1}{5} \]

References:
There are three structures to the data. The first entails the data collected based on governments being the unit of analysis. This primarily includes data gathered about each of the twenty eight governments -- their duration in power, size, ideology, etc. The second set of data is based on fifteen Knesset general election results. From those fifteen Knesset elections we establish and calculate the dominant party power index. The dominant party’s power index remains the same throughout the Knesset’s terms. This power index, which is a measure of the ability of the dominant party to form alliances, remains the same regardless of cabinet changes during the same Knesset. The third dataset consists of annual figures relating to external and domestic political indicators from 1949 to 1999.

We collapse the data based on the government being the unit of analysis, since it is the ruling coalition is the objective of this study. This was done as follow: First, we entered the size, ideology, and duration data simply in accordance with the original formulation of the government. Second, we entered the power index of the dominant party data based on party’s relative position in the Knesset. Whenever more than one government was established within the same Knesset we duplicated the same dominant party’s power index for the different governments unless a different dominant party led the new government.
The third annual dataset was then integrated into the government data in three data blocks. The first block consists of the annual data figures for the year before government formation if the government’s formation occurred in at least mid-year; otherwise the data are entered for the year of formation. This is done to examine prior events’ impact on coalition formation in term of both size and ideological parameters. The second block of data is entered for the first year after formation provided that the government has been formed prior to mid-year; otherwise the same year is considered. This is to establish the impact of first year events as well as dominant party power index, coalition’s size and ideology of government on its stability or durability. The third block of data is entered for the last year of government or the year before termination; the same year is considered when coalition ends after mid-year. This is established in order to determine whether a pattern exist that impact government’s termination (Table 3.17).

**Data Structure**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Annual Data Selection</th>
<th>The year before formation</th>
<th>First year after formation</th>
<th>The year before termination</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Month of Government</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st to 5th</td>
<td>Last Year</td>
<td>Same Year</td>
<td>Last Year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6th to 12th</td>
<td>Same Year</td>
<td>Following Year</td>
<td>Same Year</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


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ABSTRACT

ISRAELI COALITION GOVERNMENTS: FORMATION AND DURATION
(1949-1999)

by

IMAD SALAMEY

DECEMBER, 2003

Advisor: Dr. Fred Pearson
Major: Political Science
Degree: Doctor of Philosophy

This doctoral dissertation identifies key aspects that have contributed to the formation and duration of Israeli coalition governments. Most importantly, it differentiates between two historical periods that have shaped Israeli coalition politics. Prior to the 1967 Arab-Israeli War and the election of the 7th Israeli Knesset in 1969, Israeli political parties formed consensual and inclusive coalitions in response to economic, immigration, and external pressures. Low levels of party competition and the dominance of Mapai in the Israeli Knessets further contributed to the formation of large alliances. Post-1969, following the gradual decline of Labor's electoral dominance, Israeli parties became further polarized and more competitive. External, economic, and immigration pressures, in addition to increased party competition, undermined consensual coalition formations. These factors were also relevant to the durability of alliances. Deteriorating economic, immigration, and external conditions as well as increased party competition have contributed to the shortfall of coalitions.
Imad Salamey was born in Lebanon in 1967 and grew up in Beirut, where he witnessed the outbreak of the Civil War in 1975 and the Israeli invasions of Lebanon in 1978 and 1982. In 1983 he emigrated to the United States and attended Fordson High School. Salamey graduated from the University of Michigan-Dearborn in 1990, with a major in Electrical and Computer Engineering with a minor in Political Science. He served as president of the International Student Association for two years and coordinated activities that advocated cultural diversity. He received his U.S. citizenship in 1992.

Salamey began his graduate studies at Wayne State University - Department of Political Science in 1992. While pursuing his graduate degree, he was awarded a graduate assistantship at the Center for Urban Studies where he managed several programs that surveyed and interviewed local ethnic leaders in the Detroit metro era. He also managed the National League of Cities study which surveyed 300 city mayors and officials across the United States. The study revealed major urban issues and concerns confronted by local administrations. Salamey was hired by the Center for Urban Studies in 1996 as an Application Specialist, and administered various survey research projects in several capacities including survey design, data collection, data processing, and reporting.

In 1994 Salamey was hired by the Detroit Board of Education in the Department of Bilingual Education. He taught social studies classes in American Government, History, and Economics, and acted as liaison between the school and bilingual parents to assist in the integration of bilingual students within the school environment.

In 2000 Salamey began his dissertation work on Israeli coalition politics. The Department of Political Science awarded him a Teaching Assistantship at Wayne State University where he taught introduction to American Government and a graduate level course in Middle Eastern politics. In 2002 he was hired as a lecturer at the University of Michigan – Dearborn to teach introduction to American Government and Comparative Politics.

Salamey has written many political articles and essays that have appeared in various Arabic and English newspapers and magazines. His writings have focused on the Arab-Israeli peace process and its prospects. As an advocate for peace, Salamey chose to write his dissertation on Israeli coalition formation and duration in order to reveal factors that can enhance the chances for successful Arab-Israeli conflict resolution. He has spoken at various community events and appeared on local TV and radio talk shows, and has attended conferences worldwide and traveled to ten different countries in Europe, North America, and the Middle East. Salamey is fluent in Arabic and has elementary knowledge in French and Hebrew.