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Trust, Credibility And Authenticity: Race And Its Effect On Audience Perceptions Of News Information From Traditional And Alternative Sources

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TRUST, CREDIBILITY AND AUTHENTICITY: RACE AND ITS EFFECT ON AUDIENCE PERCEPTIONS OF NEWS INFORMATION FROM TRADITIONAL AND ALTERNATIVE SOURCES

by

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Approved by:

_______________________________
Advisor Date
DEDICATION

الحمد لله

Al-ḥamdu lillāh

I dedicate this dissertation to my husband, Syed Rashid Ali

and our children, Talal and Tazim, for their love, encouragement and support.
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Writing this dissertation was one of the most significant academic challenges I have ever faced. But due to the support and encouragement from the following people, this former television reporter was able to successfully move from the broadcast world to a wonderful academic career. As I have told countless students, colleagues and friends: I went from one really awesome career to another really awesome career.

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# TABLE OF CONTENTS

Dedication ......................................................................................................................... ii

Acknowledgments ........................................................................................................... iii

List of Tables .................................................................................................................... vii

List of Figures .................................................................................................................. viii

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION ................................................................................. 1

CHAPTER 2: MEDIA FRAMING ............................................................................. 20

Framing race, culture and audience perceptions ......................................................... 20

Framing of race and ethnicity: An examination of Orientalism ................................. 23

Framing of race and ethnicity in the newsroom ......................................................... 27

Framing conflict, immigration and culture ............................................................... 30

Relationship of traditional media and citizen journalism ............................................. 36

Trust, credibility and authenticity in online spaces ....................................................... 38

Framing and audience perceptions of trust, credibility and authenticity .................... 40

CHAPTER 3: SECURITIZATION ............................................................................. 45

What is securitization and how does it work with media frames? ................................. 45

Securitization and “the Other” .................................................................................. 46

Culture threatened by the “Others” ........................................................................... 53

Securitizing the U.S. economy .................................................................................... 59

Securitizing war and conflict ....................................................................................... 61

Securitizing images and traditional/social media discourse ..................................... 66

HYPOTHESES .............................................................................................................. 72

CHAPTER 4: METHODOLOGY ............................................................................. 77

Trust scales .................................................................................................................... 85
LIST OF TABLES

Table 1 ........................................................................................................................................... 78
Table 2 ........................................................................................................................................... 83
Table 3 ........................................................................................................................................... 97
LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1 ........................................................................................................ 107
Figure 2 ........................................................................................................ 107
Figure 3 ........................................................................................................ 109
Figure 4 ........................................................................................................ 109
CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

In recent years, the relationship between traditional and social media has resulted in debates that examine how audiences perceive information coming from Internet sources – in particular, how audiences perceive trust, credibility and authenticity. At the same time, both American audiences and American journalism have grown more culturally diverse – not necessarily in direct proportion to each other, but in ways that suggest that audiences interpret news from traditional and social media sources differently. This dissertation examines perceptions of news information from multiple channels, presenters of different ethnicities and modality due to the drastically changed ways in which the American public, politicians and the media talk about “security.”

This dissertation brings together all these elements in a controlled experiment that addresses important theoretical approaches from communication and international relations in the news media environment. This introduction sets out the general approach to those theories by defining them through prior research and tying them into audience perceptions of race and news information. However to accomplish this, it has to start with a 19th century concept that still flavors much of the political discussion about the U.S. and its place in a diverse and chaotic world. This chapter will briefly turn to discussing exceptionalism and its role in the way Americans view race.

In that context, this project examines how groups that are deemed to be culturally different or foreign are placed under a symbolic quarantine by American exceptionalism. This notion stems from the perception that American ideals and values are superior to those of foreign nations. The concept of exceptionalism “emphasizes the United States—and earlier the colonies—separation from the rest of the world and development of unprecedented forms of society and politics,” (Chaplin, 2003, p. 1432). Newer forms of exceptionalism can also come into play when dealing
with individuals from “othered” geographic regions such as the Middle East, South Asia and Latin America.

One definition of “othering” is the way the West views the East through the lens of moral and technological superiority, thereby creating a sense of ongoing tension between the two (Said, 1978). Said used the term “other” to specifically refer to Arabs, the Middle East and Islam, naming this particular form of “othering” Orientalism. Said used the term Orient to refer to the East, while defining the Occident as the West. Orientalism from European nations like Germany and France share the perception with American Orientalism that they possess “a kind of intellectual authority over the Orient within Western culture,” (Said, 1978, p. 19). Therefore, “othering” people in geographic and cultural spaces allowed Europe or Western nations’ culture to gain strength and a specific identity by setting themselves against the perceived inferiority of the East (1978).

Nayak and Malone (2009) argue that the myth of Orientalism arises out of this belief that America and Europe are the “monolithic, hermetically sealed ‘West’ that posits itself against the rest of the world” (2009, p. 255). This Orientalism focuses on the physical and cultural space between the Occident and Orient, but scholars have noted that Orientalism also exists within the context of the United States (2009). 9/11 has changed the way the public thinks and talks about people from the Middle East and South Asia (Hagopian, 2004). Immigration from countries like Mexico have led to claims that the Anglo-Saxon way of life is being threatened (Nayak & Malone, 2009). This fear of losing a “way of life” echoes the rhetoric of the Reagan administration during the Cold War and continues to be used by politicians and the mass media (2009). This furthers the divide between America and the “others.”

In the context of the current research, “othering” is not just relegated to the East/West divide, but rather looks at the more nuanced institutional biases that exist within the news media.
Traditional news media routinely use racial stereotyping, which becomes more evident in the context of disaster and crisis coverage (Gitlin, 2003). As Gitlin writes, “simply by doing their jobs, journalists tend to serve the political and economic elite definitions of reality” (2003, p. 12). Journalists, editors, managers and media owners develop their ideas of social reality through routines that have been developed as early as childhood and further reinforced by their careers through training, assignments, rewards and promotions (Gitlin, 2003). These routines, when used regularly create a framework that is passed onto audiences and continues to depict “the other” in a stereotypical fashion. This framework, referred to as media framing, is a “process of culling a few elements of perceived reality and assembling a narrative that highlights connections among them to promote a particular interpretation,” (Entman, 2007).

Framing is the repetitive use of words, metaphors, symbols, phrases and the types of stories used that create a specific social reality (Entman, 1991, 1993; Gitlin, 2003). Developed frames can highlight how and what audiences perceive as problems and moral dilemmas (Entman, 1993; 2004). Frames have been used as mechanism to define cultural differences on a range of issues pertaining to Muslims and Islam (Kumar, 2010). However, “othering” is not just relegated to Islam and Muslims, but also to other ethnicities.

The growing multiculturalism in U.S. society has led to heated debate regarding racial identity (Gandy, 1998). Equality, by definition, means there is no underlying difference between races and cultures; however, adherents to multiculturalism argue that “Whites, Blacks, Asians, and Native Americans are different at a deeper, cultural level, and that the preservation of these cultural differences is a legitimate choice” (Gandy, 1998, pg. 73). But the framing of race and ethnicity has been controlled actively in the political sphere, which has led to the use of identifying markers (such as race, language and religion) as the focus of attack by adversaries of multiculturalism.
(Gandy, 1998). Hall (1998) argues that for cultural framing of an issue to be successful, it requires dominance over all other frames such that it silences all other competing frames. This allows the specific frame “to win a kind of credibility, legitimacy or taken-for-grantedness for itself” (1998, p. 1050). The addition of an actor, like a politician or the media, has an amplifying effect that can turn racial/cultural stereotypes into threats to a country’s dominant culture. This combination of frames and the amplifying effects of a perceived threat can influence audiences’ perception of an “othered” group’s identity. This threat can be physical or cultural and has raised questions about how politicians and, in turn, the mass media, define “security threats” and is referred to as securitization.

Securitization was introduced by the Copenhagen School (Buzan, 1983) and is housed within international relations. The Copenhagen School is an academic school of thought that suggests that “the enunciation of security itself creates a new social order wherein ‘normal politics’ is bracketed” (Balzacq, 2005, p. 171). Originally, securitization was defined through the prism of military and state security (Williams, 2003); however, the concept has expanded to include issues, such as immigration, language and culture as an imminent threat to the dominant culture of the state. The media play a crucial role in the perception and management of information regarding a distant and poorly defined enemy, especially during times of conflict (Hess and Kalb, 2003). This research examines security through the lens of juxtaposition of the dominant culture to immigrating cultures (such as Middle Eastern, South Asian and Latin). The current research finds the media is an important intermediary for politicians to convey their messages of imminent threats at the global and state levels.

Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde’s (1998) definition of securitization consists of three elements: 1) the securitizing actor or agency that makes the securitizing move (for this research
the media plays the crucial role as a platform for the actor), 2) the referent object, (in the context of this dissertation is the dominant culture) and 3) a target audience that accepts the issue as a security threat (Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde, 1998). In order for a threat to be successfully securitized, it must be accepted as an existential threat by the audience. In this regard, race and culture can be securitized by repetitive use of frame; in particular, issues surrounding racial and cultural identity have been highlighted during times of conflict and strife, such as war or economic downturn. Thus, in the context of the current research, securitized situations would require a perceived threat of an outside cultural influence with the media (traditional or social) as an intermediary. The perceived threat could be based on language, religion and ethnicity and an actual physical threat.

Rather than the prevailing black-white paradigm that has dominated U.S. racial discourse, this research looks at the phenomenon of “browning.” Discussions regarding “browning” and “browned” bodies took place prior to the attacks of 9/11 and focus on two areas: 1) the growing number of immigrants and minorities and 2) the wider acceptance of multiculturalism within U.S. society (Lugo-Lugo and Bloodsworth-Lugo 2009). This “browning of America” has been viewed with contempt because it disrupts the longstanding black-white binary that has pervaded U.S. rhetoric on race (Sundstrom, 2008). Post-9/11 growing “brownness” has created a sense of insecurity within the mainstream such as anti-immigration sentiment (Lugo-Lugo and Bloodsworth-Lugo, 2009).

This dissertation follows previous research in race and identity which defines “Brown” as a body that is perceived as a threat to the American government and the social values of the country, deemed as being un-American. And finally Brown individuals are placed under strict containment; that is, they are socially quarantined and allowed to be scrutinized by the government
and the public (2009). Conversations post-9/11 have divided “browned” groups as threats or as “model minorities.” Puar and Rai (2004) find that South Asians, in contrast to Middle Easterners, often had the label of “model minority” attached to their identities.

Much of this identity came in the form of “economic exceptionalism, upward class mobility, and educational excellence” (Puar and Rai, 2004, p. 11). However, 9/11 tarnished the image of the South Asian “model minority” due to physical and geographic association with Osama bin Laden and other terrorists (2004). Muslims, along with Sikhs, are identified as “others” due to wearing turbans and hijabs. Hindus, on the other hand, although “brown” do not face the same level of surveillance (2004). This research looks to define “Brown” and “browned bodies” as those from the Orient, while “White” is viewed as the Occident.

Previous research defines White as it contrasts with Black Americans, who have been historically defined as the “other” (Warren and Twine, 1997). Whiteness comes with privileges such as being seen as neutral and normal (McIntosh, 1989). Many of these perceptions are considered to be unearned privileges to being viewed as White. Perhaps most importantly, the perception of Whiteness is deemed as American (1989). Brown and White are not defined based on physical skin color, but rather the focus is on other elements that define an individual along these racial lines.

The attacks of September 11, 2001, turned to this new “browned” racial discourse that focused on Muslim nations and their citizens being viewed as a threat. Since the attacks on 9/11, terrorism has been associated with Brown “others” and it became so salient that the “war on terrorism” became a global fight against “otherness.” In 2008 when the U.S. was under the most severe recession since the Great Depression of the 1930s (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, February 2012), interest surrounding terrorism and government policies fell in importance in the
public forum in favor of the economy and jobs. According to Pew Research (Pew Research, 2012), terrorism had fallen to third place; behind the economy and unemployment, in 2012 due to the recession. Since President Barack Obama’s election in 2008, the American public’s concerns have been closer to home, with 81 percent saying Obama should be more focused on domestic issues than foreign policy (Pew Research, 2012). The president, other politicians and the mass media can set the agenda for the most important issues facing the country. The salience of certain topics presented by the mass media is referred to as Agenda-Setting Theory.

According to McCombs and Shaw (1972), by simply emphasizing stories on a particular issue, the mass media plays an integral role in agenda setting. Their study on audiences and political information found that people’s perception of important news stories came directly from the mass media. Major campaign issues in 2012 were focused on unemployment and the economy and as a result audiences of traditional media found those issues to be the most important (Neuman, Guggenheim, Jang and Bae, 2013).

Yet despite the shift in public priorities, securitizing factors continue to remain a prevalent part in the way political actors widen their agendas by throwing a security net over specific referent objects like national security, immigration, the economy, and other societal sectors. For example, honoring Muslim holidays in schools like Eid-ul-Fitr or Eid-ul-Adha could be conflated with the larger idea of political violence from the Middle East and South Asia. American exceptionalism can only exist if American values and ideals remain the standard. As a result, Muslim holidays, foreign languages and political ideologies cannot share the same stage with American holidays, American English and American political ideals.

Issues like immigration and economic downturn can place “othered” groups in a contemptuous space that has those groups being perceived as burdens on already strained economy
with American taxpayers taking on the brunt of the financial responsibility (Ana, 1999). But even when they are being “good” immigrants, like getting H-1B visas to legally work in the United States and not straining the economy, they are still perceived as taking opportunities away from Americans (1999). The H-1B visa allows American companies to hire foreign workers on a temporary basis in certain technical fields related to technology and medicine (U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, n.d.). Despite the process being legal, issues of allowing “others” into America for employment has further lengthened the divide between “us” versus “them.”

Media coverage surrounding the “war on terror” and immigration continues to distinguish “good guys” from “bad guys.” After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States projected the image of the lone world superpower that was the cultural and technological top of the pyramid. The attacks of September 2001 changed that. America’s sense of invincibility was shattered and as a result, in an effort to recreate the muscular propaganda war of the 1940s, George W. Bush initially used language that evoked images of the old West (Jansen, 2002, p.178). This post 9/11 world was a black and white land where there were clearly defined good and bad guys, oversimplifying the complexities of war (p. 178). Prior to 9/11 countries like Iran and Iraq had been perceived as enemy nations along with their citizens.

Part of creating this good versus bad field involved putting the war in terms of language that attempted to make America the heroic figure. Frames, in part, rely on the repetitive use of key words and phrases (Gitlin, 2003), thus language framed in specific ways, such as de-emphasizing victims and government actions, can create social hierarchies that extend out to the rest of the world (Entman, 2007). After the end of the Cold War, Washington faced a “threat deficit” and despite potential replacements as foreign enemies to focus U.S. foreign and military policy, like Japan and China (as economic competitors), none came as close as the Soviet Union (Buzan,
The U.S. struggled against Communism for over 40 years and had created a global shared framing that positioned it as the leader of the Western world (Buzan, 2006).

The terror attacks provided a new global threat that could be a unifying force to maintain U.S. leadership over the Western world (Buzan, 2006). Organizations like the Taliban and al-Qaida had become a new branch of “manly men” (Jansen, 2002, p. 55) that were a formidable enemy, not only through the attacks, but also by defying the hierarchical social order that had dominated Western ideologies since the fall of the Soviet Union (2002).

The Cold War discourse helped to condition the American public to seek enemies (Mehan, 1997). This is reflected below the level of interstate conflict in the framing of such issues as immigration, especially in more conservative states. As an example, Arizona passed the Arizona State Senate Bill 1070 in 2010, requiring police to check the citizen status of anyone who was suspected of being an illegal immigrant (Valentino, Brader and Jardina, 2013). In the same year Arizona House Bill 2281 passed and as a result all ethnic studies curricula had to be eliminated from public schools (2013). The growth in the number of non-English-speaking immigrants in the United States has made language a central issue in current political debates over immigration and even multiculturalism (Newman, Hartman and Taber 2012). Framing issues surrounding immigration, and subsequently race and identity, can shape the way the public perceived groups and individuals. In the context of conflict, certain groups can be framed as the “enemy” while other groups can be viewed as “allies.”

Entman defines framing as “select[ing] some aspects of a perceived reality and make[ing] them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem, definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation,” (1993, p. 52). Media framing scholars argue that culture is a stock “of commonly invoked frames” (p. 53).
The news media make framing judgments, which are manifested through emphasizing certain elements and de-emphasizing others (Entman, 1991, 1993; Fahmy, 2004). A combination of these can create specific themes within the text that then reinforce those judgments. The viewing public makes its judgments based on a collection of thematically driven clusters of information and this creates their version of a social reality. The mass media set the frames the public use to interpret new events (Tuchman, 1978).

Scheufele (1999) also places framing within the context of political communication and says that frames can be presented as two concepts: media and individual. Media frames take complex issues and make them in discernable news bites for audiences to consume (Gitlin, 2003). Further, media frames allow journalists to classify and identify news and quickly package it (1999). Entman (1993) suggests that individual frames are organized by the viewing audience based on previous stored mental judgments about the concepts within the news text. In terms of international news coverage of non-Western nations, the viewing public is flooded with a constant barrage of images, keywords/phrases, which in turn create social realities about distant places, making them appear exotic, backwards and threatening (Moeller, 1999; Fahmy, 2004).

This over-simplification of complex issues creates a specific social reality for American audiences when it comes to international coverage of crisis and disaster (e.g., Ali, James and Vultee, 2013). Journalism makes its subjects into archetypes (Batteau, 1990). Thus, audiences are shown images of starving children as representations of African nations (Ali et al, 2013), cowering women in blue burkas as the image of the Middle East (Fahmy, 2004), conflict and bombings as the image of Asian countries (Norris, 1995), while being fed a constant diet of American troops’ achievements and heroism (Kellner, 2004; Lee, Maslog and Kim, 2006).

Journalistic routines are heightened by the inherent characteristics of broadcast news
media frames) and the characteristics of audience (individual frames). According to the Pew Research Center (2012) news consumption from television remains the number one source for young people, despite the rapid increase of information gathering from digital sources. Scholars have also noted that the audiences for print and broadcast news have different characteristics. Print readers are generally more educated and members of a specific party (Neuman, Just and Crigler, 1992), because they tend to be more involved in the political process and are more media literate (Valentino, Beckman and Buhr, 2001).

Heavy television news consumers might be more vulnerable to media frames because this group of news consumers may solely rely on this medium for their news (Valentino, Beckman and Buhr, 2001). Thus the visuals of television news may have a stronger effect because of the characteristics of the audience, not the medium itself (2001). Both print and broadcast may use the same frames, but television news coverage has a different impact on heavy users based on the characteristics of that group (2001).

Research on portrayals of race in broadcast find that “othered” groups are blamed for problem behavior and how that behavior negatively effects the dominant group (Romer, Jamieson and De Coteau, 1998). Examining prime-time news coverage of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, Iyengar & Simon (1993) found that viewers who reported higher rates of television exposure were more inclined to support a military response to crisis and disaster than a diplomatic one. That type of television exposure helps to perpetuate the ethnic blame discourse, which frames “behavior by ethnic others as intergroup conflict and accentuates the harmful effects of the behavior for the in group” (Romer, Jamieson and De Coteau, 1998, p. 286). Romer, Jamieson and De Coteau’s (1998) study on Philadelphia television stations found that White actors were predominantly presented as victims of crime, while non-White actors were visualized as perpetrators. Despite country
citizenship, individuals deemed other by the media can be viewed as a threat within their own nations.

This distorted image of the “Other” also comes into play during times of disaster and crisis (Fahmy, Kelly and Kim, 2007). Thus, rather than speaking about the benefits of immigration, such as new taxpayers and the infusion of new workers, the focus shifts to the dangers from immigrants (Ana, 1999; Maira, 2004). This debate has also opened up new sources of information in the online world, which has become significantly more important for contemporary media consumers. Although the prevailing idea is that the Internet opens spaces for dialogue and understanding, the interactive nature of the medium complicates race in ways that are still tied to hegemonic norms from American exceptionalism (Daniels, 2013).

The television culture from the 1960s through the ‘80s laid the groundwork for the beginnings of the Internet in the ‘90s (Batteau, 2010). Unlike its media predecessors (print and radio), the power of television images arguably has replaced previous oral and literate cultures (2010). This is important to politics because favorable coverage from traditional media can raise the status of political candidates in the same way unfavorable coverage can lower the level of political power and status (Wolfsfeld, 1997). The introduction of the Internet, especially interactive sites like YouTube (a video sharing site), provided media consumers alternative sources for information, while combining the visuality of television with choice and control over content (Gaskin and Jerit, 2012). Perhaps the most important feature of the Internet is that it allows users the ability to create their own content, as well as disseminate information that they deem important (2012). Interactivity with traditional media and within online spaces has allowed once passive consumers to now be an active part of the news gathering and dissemination system.

The fast pace, connectivity and ability for users to create their own content have added new
elements to politics in the public sphere. Social media sites like YouTube, Facebook and Twitter allow users to produce and capture news stories that have meaning to them with mobile technology, creating an incessant new flow of information in which political figures’ reputations can be enhanced or destroyed (Gurevitch, Coleman and Blumler, 2009). From Senator Trent Lott’s disparaging remarks about the civil rights movement at what he thought was a private meeting, to Senator George Allen’s mockery of an Indian staffer working for his opponent at a campaign rally, political figures have found themselves in a very different sort of spotlight (2009). Barack Obama’s 2008 grassroots Facebook campaign further cemented the Internet’s, in particular social media’s, political power (Gurevitch et al, 2009; Batteau, 2010).

The ubiquitous nature of social media in modern society has opened the doors to connectivity and information; however, these concepts themselves have little meaning without context (Batteau, 2010). This context and connectivity can be engaging by uniting individuals with groups with common goals and agendas or it can be alienating in that users become disconnected with the offline world. (2010). Anderson (1991) refers to this concept as an imaginary community. These “communities” can consist of millions of people who have never met, but share common characteristics such as ethnicity, language, or political agendas. In many cases they are also united by a specific medium such as Facebook or a blog (1983). Batteau (2010) suggests that the distinguishing characteristic of modern technology is its ability to be repurposed for new uses.

The online world has been viewed as a public space that allows for open and egalitarian discussions (Ali and Fahmy, 2013). Perhaps the most recent and widely known example is Egypt and its “Facebook Revolution,” which was part of a much larger phenomenon with activists from Libya, Yemen, and Tunisia also using social media as a forum to express their frustrations and outrage regarding their governments (Ali and Fahmy, 2013). This new space has emerged as an
alternative to the commercial area that traditional media occupies. However, in recent years, the line between alternative and traditional media has begun to blur. The Middle East protests have exemplified how information from social media has been used to enhance traditional media coverage (Ali and Fahmy, 2013).

Technological advances in information dissemination such as social media sites have given citizen journalists new opportunities to become active participants in the newsgathering and information dissemination to engage audiences. Much of this user-generated content (UGC, such as podcasts, videos on YouTube, Facebook pages) is produced during times of crisis, including wartime and political strife. One major question that remains unanswered, and that this study hopes to demystify, is how audiences respond to information about conflict and other crises from traditional media sources as compared to UGC coming from social media. In recent years demonstrations across the Middle East have shown the world that countries with authoritarian regimes, where media is restricted if not owned by the government. In these countries, UGC plays a larger role in dissemination of what many citizens consider to be more authentic news, or information coming from sources that are first-person accounts (Domingo and Heinonen, 2008; Wardle and Williams, 2010).

This study examines audience perception of news from traditional and social media sources, while examining at the same time how the ethnicity/race of the presenter changes that perception, especially in regards to the type of story being presented (securitized or not securitized). Broadly, does the audience trust a source like traditional media more or less than social media? According to the Pew Research Center (State of the News Media, 2012), news from television remains the top source for a majority of Americans; however, that is changing as digital technologies become more available. Are those sources considered credible and authentic? Do the
perceptions of credibility and authenticity change depending upon who is presenting the information? In addition, when information and images are framed in specific ways, how does that change the way a viewer responds to the material? Specifically, if the information presented is securitized, how does the audience respond to that type of framing amplification? Thus the following research examines audience attitude and perceptions towards news from traditional media as compared to social media sources when dealing with the hot button issue of terrorism and U.S. policy using race and story type as moderating variables. The study hopes to clarify and perhaps unlock issues that surround media framing, as well as audience attitudes towards the “anchor” that is delivering news who then may be perceived as being a threat.

Although many studies have used the theory of framing (visual and textual), little research has extended into the realm of social media and audience perception during perceived crisis. This study is an attempt to fill the gaps in the media literature regarding framing and securitization using modality (news from television or social media), story type (securitized or not securitized), and race (White or Brown) as independent variables. Entman (1993) defines framing as “select[ing] some aspects of a perceived reality and mak[ing] them more salient in a communicating text” (p. 52). Using that definition, securitization works as another element of framing because it highlights an existential threat of an issue and makes the normal routines of politics less salient (Buzan, Waever, & de Wilde, 1998; p. 5). Buzan et al (1998) conceptualize securitization thus:

“Threats and vulnerabilities can arise in many different areas, military and nonmilitary, but to count as security issues they have to meet strictly defined criteria that distinguish them from the normal run of the merely political. They have to be staged as existential threats to a referent object by a securitizing actor who thereby generates endorsement of emergency measures beyond rules that would thereby bind.” (p. 5).

Buzan et al’s (1998) definition focused on existential threats and does not include the media as a securitizing actor; however, this study hopes to expand on the theory of securitization by
comparing traditional and social media sources. Previous research has examined issues of security from traditional media sources (O’Reilly, 2008; Vultee, 2009). The contribution the current research makes is an examination into how frames and securitization work within the context of social media. As previously discussed, online spaces such as YouTube and Facebook also provide news information to a newer generation of media consumers. In addition to looking at news information sources (traditional and social), this study also includes the broader terms of race: White and Brown. Thus this study derives its conceptual framework from several major disciplines, including communication and journalism studies, new media and social media, anthropology, and risk and crisis research.

This study will look at the way race/ethnicity is framed in the context of the current American political landscape. First looking at how the audience perceives news coming from an “anchor,” traditional and social, when the “anchor” looks like “the other.” Arguably, since 9/11, fault lines have shifted from White Americans versus “Others” or even from the black/white paradigm in the media to a grayer area. Especially given the racial tensions in response to the Obama presidency. America has now divided along the lines between Muslim versus non-Muslim, American/foreigner, and even citizen/non-citizen (Maira, 2004).

Certain elements like food, language and clothing are considered ways for people of different ethnic backgrounds to preserve their cultures while assimilating into Western societies (Poole, 2002). But these aspects of culture can also be perceived as a threat to the dominant culture, thereby indefinitely excluding othered groups (2002). The media (print and broadcast) have been scrutinized for their portrayal of Islam and Muslims with the religion becoming synonymous with terrorism and fanaticism (Said, 1997). Media outlets, in particular Fox News Channel, use a distinct set of frames that create an atmosphere where the audience and the American public are
constantly under threat (Vultee, 2009). Examples of “othering” occur within traditional media, especially post-9/11.

During an interview with author Deepak Chopra, Bill O’Reilly, host of the O’Reilly Factor on Fox News, said: “I believe there is a Muslim problem in the world. I think we should acknowledge it and try to solve it” (Edwards, 2010). Since the attacks on 9/11, Islam and its followers are vilified in the news media, particularly in American media outlets like Fox News. The menacing specter of Islam, as created by Fox News (Vultee, 2009) uses the most common theme of “us” versus “them” which continues to pit a modern and virtuous West against a menacing and backwards East (Said, 1978; p. 7).

All this “othering” takes place against a background in which groups, especially Muslims, are marginalized. Like many demographic minorities, Muslims move and can reside in any number of Western nations and be any race or ethnicity. According to a study conducted by the Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life (2011), by 2030, the world’s Muslim population is expected to increase by 35 percent to nearly 2.2 billion. Within the United States, it is expected to grow to 1.7 percent (of the total U.S. population) up from 0.8 percent in 2010 (The Future of the Global Muslim Population, 2011). A majority of these immigrants and their children will be from South Asia, the Middle East, and Africa (Grossman, 2011).

Those trends (both demographic and technological) underscore the importance of framing research that looks beyond the black/white racial binary that has pervaded American political and legal discourse. According to Perea (1997) the black/white racial paradigm was so widely accepted that other racial groups, such as Latinos, Asians and Native Americans were often marginalized or ignored. This binary was also strengthened by popular culture, textbooks, and other forms of media such that those researching race were often forced to write about ‘others’ within this paradigm.
(1997). However, in recent years the conversation on race has shifted this black/white binary to include other racialized groups. Although racially, politically and anthropologically simplistic (1997), the category of Brown has also been added to the conversation.

This study focuses on race, security, American exceptionalism and social media, by combining all of these elements. It examines audience perceptions of video news reports as a way of integrating that array of contemporary concerns. This study is focused on how media sources (traditional and social) are perceived as trustworthy, credible and even authentic to audiences and how that changes when the presenter is Brown or White. Broadly, the study will ask: Do audience members have more trust in information coming from traditional media versus social media? Will news from social media be perceived as more authentic? In the context of America’s current political atmosphere, does that trust change when an audience member is viewing information that is securitized or not securitized? And finally, does the trust in the information change when the ‘anchor’ looks ‘American’ (White) or more like “the Other” (Brown)?

The study hopes to make scholarly contributions to framing and securitization theories in the context of crisis, as well as how individuals perceived as Brown are viewed by audiences in the current socio-political climate of America. In addition, adding the element of information disseminated through social media will expand the growing research on new media and journalism. Expected findings hope to clarify the differences in audience perceptions of trust, credibility and authenticity in information from traditional and social media sources. Thus, the research will examine how people approach securitized information from two modalities (traditional and social media) and whether what type of information combined with the race/ethnicity of the presenter will elicit stronger reactions for trust, credibility, and authenticity.

This dissertation is divided into six chapters. After the introduction, chapter 2 will discuss
the major literature within framing while also acknowledging the effect social media has had on traditional media sources. All of this is in the context of how audiences interpret trust, credibility and authenticity. Chapter 3 delves in securitization and how its amplifying effects on frames regarding race, immigration and terrorism have created an existential threat on culture and the American way of life. This chapter also further discusses American exceptionalism and the role it plays in discussions about American politics. The methodology chapter will discuss in detail how the experiment was designed and how it will test the hypotheses and research questions. In addition, the methodology will define the terms trust, credibility and authenticity in the context of traditional and social media. The results chapter will show the tests used to answer hypotheses and research questions, which will be discussed in the final chapter in detail. The discussion chapter will also place this research in the wider context of framing, securitization and race in a new media environment.
CHAPTER 2
FRAMING

Framing race, culture and audience perceptions

This chapter begins with defining framing by placing it in the context of race and ethnicity, particularly focusing on the way people from foreign nations are depicted in U.S. media. Here the discussion will use Said’s (1978) concept of “othering” and how that notion has evolved post-9/11. Literature will also be examined on race in the newsroom and how journalists as media consumers are subject to their own biases. Further, immigration post-9/11 has changed the way race and ethnicity is discussed in the media and the public. This chapter elaborates on the “browning” of America through immigration, but also the demonization of Islam, which in turn has resulted in younger generations embracing their religious and cultural heritages. And finally, chapter 2 examines the relationship between traditional and social media and the effects it has on audiences’ perceptions of trust, credibility and authenticity in the traditional and new media environment.

Frames are one of the ways the media contribute to the creation of social realities. By choosing certain images, phrases, or words, media accounts help shape individual perceptions (Entman, 1993). The media frame issues through “persistent patterns of cognition, interpretation, and presentation, of selection, emphasis, and exclusion, by which symbol-handlers routinely organize discourse, whether verbal or visual” (Gitlin, 2003, p. 7). Entman (1993) defines framing as “select[ing] some aspects of a perceived reality and mak[ing] them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or recommendation” (p. 52).

Visuals such as graphics, photographs and broadcast images can also be used to emphasize and de-emphasize victims and certain agencies (Entman, 1991, 1993). In addition, news frames
can be constructed using graphics, keywords, concepts, and visual images that are emphasized in the news narrative (Entman, 1991, 1993; Gitlin, 2003; Scheufele, 1999). Messaris and Abraham (2001) suggest that visuals are uncontested by audiences because they appear to be more closely related to reality. Visuals that accompany text can lead audiences to perceive complex issues simplistically resulting in a loss of context (Domke, Perlmutter and Spratt, 2002). Coupled with pre-existing attitudes and stereotypes, specific news construction can lead to a country and its citizens being perceived as an “enemy,” while other countries and their citizens are depicted as American allies. Research in framing also looks at the portrayal of victims, finds that frames can emphasize the one nation’s citizens as victims, while another can be virtually non-existent in news coverage (Iyengar, 1991, 1993). “Television news has a significant impact on public opinion,” (Iyengar, 1993, p. 381). A majority of television news is focused on “episodic” themes or issues within the context of specific instances and events, such as a murder or a car accident (1993). As a result audiences “induce attributions of responsibility to individual victims or perpetrators rather than to broad societal forces,” (Iyengar, 119, p. 16).

In addition, emphasis or de-emphasis on human life in the midst of a crisis, whether through man-made or natural causes, also have been framed in ways that continue to maintain the hegemonic norms of U.S. news narratives and routines in regards to race and people in foreign nations. Entman’s (1991) comparison of imagery and language used to describe the downing of a Korean airliner by a Soviet fighter plane versus the U.S. downing of an Iranian airliner, showed a marked difference in the news coverage surrounding two similar events. Although both events were analogous, the Soviet downing was depicted as a moral outrage through the use of graphics and language (i.e. a bull’s eye placed over the image of a Korean airliner on the cover of Newsweek and “Shoot to Kill” on the cover of Time Magazine, p. 12), while the U.S. downing of an Iran
Narratives only consist of words, graphics and images and the repetitive use of them are where news frames are constructed (Entman, 1991, 1993). Frames are a system of “selection, emphasis, and presentation composed of little tacit theories about what exists, what happens, and what matters,” (Gitlin, 2003; pg. 6). In this regard, audiences, over time, see the world as depicted, rather than the reality (2003).

Media frames also organize the world for traditional journalists and other news producers (i.e., citizen journalists). Frames allow journalists (traditional and citizen) to process large amounts of complex information, quickly and routinely (Entman, 1993; Scheufele, 1999; Gitlin, 2003). Thus, frames “exist at two levels: as mentally stored principals for information processing and as characteristics of the news text” (Entman, 1991, pg. 7). In order for the framing devices to be successful, a majority of the public needs to accept it as a “common sense interpretation of events” (Entman, 1991, p. 6). Framing also happens in the context of race and “othering.”

Research in race and media suggests that citizens of nations who look like the “other” will be framed differently than those of nations that look like “us” (Said, 1978, 1997; Fahmy, 2004). The media is a window into the international arena and coupled with news organizations’ news philosophies and routines can provide a specific construction of reality regarding foreign countries, cultures, and religions. This also includes the way citizens of “enemy” and ally nations are portrayed (Entman, 2004). Visuals provide a simple entry point into turning a complex issue into digestible bites for audiences to consume. The current research focuses on the broadcast images of traditional and social media news presenters (specifically the race of the presenter) as a framing device. Visual framing “involves the selective prioritization of some images to promote a specific interpretation of events conducted either consciously or subconsciously. It is therefore instructive.
to reflect on how media apply visual framing to contribute to our understanding of the world we see in the news” (Ying & Fahmy, 2013, p.195).

Audiences are more inclined to accept images of people and places because they are perceived to be closely related to reality (Messaris and Abraham, 2001). Viewers are willing to overlook the oversimplification of a complex issue or human being (Sharkey, 1993; Taylor, 2000). International news tends to focus on episodic coverage, stories that are onetime events, rather than part of an ongoing situation (Moeller, 2002; Fahmy, 2004). Visuals that accompany this type of news also tend to lean towards this episodic orientation, but also add information and understanding by providing details that words cannot (Friend, Challenger and McAdams, 2004; Ali et al, 2013). Thus stories about Africa focus on intense poverty and famine, while stories on the Middle East focus on conflict and terrorism (Moeller, 2002; Fahmy, 2004).

By emphasizing isolated events, media frames can also “other” citizens of foreign nations. American audiences are inundated with “othered” images of the Middle East, South/East Asia and Mexico with the West being visualized a place of moral, cultural and technological superiority (Said, 1978). The current research also examines the ways in which “othered” nations and their people are perceived by audiences in the United States. Orientalism, as discussed in the next section, is a concept that defines the perceived differences between America and “Others” and how that translates to visual media depictions of race in foreign nations.

**Framing of race and ethnicity: An examination of Orientalism**

Edward Said (1978) defined Orientalism as the way the “Occident” views the “Orient” by dehumanizing, ignoring, and denuding the culture of entire groups of people. As a result, the West is able to maintain its perceived superiority over the East. Previous studies have found that the Western media often over-simplify complex issues by not placing stories and images (print and
broadcast) in the broader spectrum of international coverage (Moeller, 1999, 2002; Taylor, 2000; Gitlin, 2002; Fahmy, 2004). As a result, Western audiences have a skewed perception of what people look like on the other side of the world. The news media, in particular television news, use video clips to represent complex issues in a form that simplifies the story to make it understandable, but does not demand that viewers go beyond stereotypical images (Taylor, 2000). For example, using images of Muslim people and the Middle East “along with repeated pictures of Osama bin Laden, Saddam Hussein, and other religious of nationalist leaders, to provide some tangible image of a largely invisible (and inexplicable) enemy (Griffin, 2004, p. 393) stereotypes Islam and its followers as a “threat” (Said, 1978, 1997).

Despite previous beliefs, the press does not use horrific images for the sake of shocking the public (Taylor, 2000). Western media tend to stay on the side of restraint when it comes to highlighting dead bodies and suffering (2000). American press agencies tend to focus more on the “human interest” stories because there is a perception by the mainstream news media that this is how you show audiences the rest of the world (2000). Images of mass death bring far-away stories closer to home, but they also oversimplify the issue taking it out of context for audiences (Moeller, 1999; Taylor, 2000). Frames are part of this oversimplification process and are the organizing principles or storylines that provide meaning to complex events and spaces (Gamson and Modigliani, 1987). Reporters, as well as editors, managers, and news organization owners, are inundated with the same media that audiences consume, thus the visuals produced are based on the social reality that has been part of news narratives and routines.

Western media continue to portray international events and conflicts through a limited scope of themes that continue to reinforce the stereotype that the developing world is war-torn and violent (Galtung and Ruge, 1965; McQuail, 2000; Riffe, Aust, Jones, Shoemaker and Sundar,
Developing nations get news coverage if they are in the midst of natural disasters or conflicts and war (2007). Thus, news stories from the Middle East are focused on conflict and war (Fahmy, 2004) and coverage from Africa is dominated by extreme poverty and famine (Fair, 1993). The audience sees a part of the larger story.

Framing theory and visuals can only provide information inherent to the image and do not provide a narrative of the context of the creation of the image for analysis. Complex cultural and religious nuances lose their meanings when oversimplified within the mainstream media’s news narratives (Moeller, 1999). For example, during the post-9/11 invasion of Afghanistan, broadcast television images in 2001 showed U.S. troops invading Afghanistan to free the women from the pitfalls of the burka (headscarf and long coat). “The American public has identified the “veil,” whether a hijab (a covering of the hair) or burqa (a covering of the head including the face), with Islamic militancy, extremism, jihadism, and oppression of women,” (Haddad, 2007, p. 255). Yet despite the burka becoming a symbol of oppression for US audiences, Muslim women continued to wear it even after the U.S. invasion, which suggests that the nature of religion, culture, and life in a traditional society is far more complex than just what simple images can provide (Fahmy, 2004).

International affairs are complex, but many reporters are not trained to understand local culture (Gitlin, 2003). Therefore, foreign coverage privileges easy-to-understand explanations of foreign events (2003). Rather than showing conflicts as political confrontations, they are reduced to predictable and intermittent events of senseless violence deserving little international attention, or as acts of oppression that deserve full humanitarian intervention (Moeller, 1999). News coverage of disasters and crises is no different (Moeller, 1999; Fahmy, 2004). International coverage dealing with distinct racial groups with similar conflict histories can also be framed to create a certain
social reality.

Myers, Klak, and Koehl (1996) compared news coverage of Rwanda and Kosovo and found that despite being similar in military tactics, external imperialism and underdevelopment, both countries were cast in two different frameworks. The findings suggest that although both conflicts are similar, the Western press continues to distort the situation in Rwanda and “force it to fit a frame.” Their research found that the press tends to “other” Africa, which contributes to negative impressions of Africa and Africans to the West (1996). “Othering” citizens of foreign nations can oversimplify complex issues and continues to distort how audiences in the West view “others” (Said, 1978).

This oversimplification also takes complex issues out of their political and societal contexts (Moeller, 1999), giving the viewing audience only a fraction of the story. Situations involving war, death, famine, and disease have been turned into easy-to-digest clips for Western audiences. As a result of viewing simplified “distant suffering”, thus the emaciated African baby becomes the image of Africa (Moeller, 1999), while citizens of the Middle East are depicted as “threats” (Griffin, 2004). Research in mainstream media has also found that during conflict, television reports, newspaper and news magazine stories tend to reinforce similar images and depictions of race (2004).

The mainstream news media have been criticized for their representations of race and ethnic groups as being inaccurate and reflecting institutional, individual and cultural biases toward minorities (Gandy, 1998). According to Gandy (1998), “the media are charged with continuing to rely upon racist stereotypes, emphasizing negative aspects of behavior, and suggesting deficiencies in morality and intelligence that stigmatize and entire population” (p. 159). Network news depictions of Islam and Muslims have also been cited as setting a contradictory set of frames
following the 9/11 attacks, such as “disapproving representations of Islam, alongside stories that highlighted Islam as an integral part of American life,” (Ibrahim, 2010, p. 112).

Disparities in race can have a major impact in the way the public views minorities in the U.S. (Fahmy, Kelly, and Kim, 2007; Kahle, Yu, and Whiteside, 2007; Gans, 2004), citizens of developing nations, as well as countries in political turmoil as is most evident by America’s relationship with South Asian and Middle Eastern countries during the war on terror. The lack of ethnic minorities on television; whether in news or entertainment, has also been cited by critics of American media as furthering the reinforcement of negative stereotypes in the newsroom (Nishikawa, Towner, Clawson and Waltenburg, 2009).

**Framing of race and ethnicity in the newsroom**

Media Matters for America, a media watchdog group, found that although most U.S. minority ethnic groups, such as African Americans and Latinos, were underrepresented in the major cable news networks, groups that were completely shut out were Asians and Middle Easterners (2008). According to a Radio and Television Digital News Association (RTDNA) 2011 report on women and minorities in the newsroom, “in the last 21 years, the minority population in the U.S. has risen 9.5 percent; but the minority workforce in TV news is up 2.7 percent” (RTDNA, 2011, p. 1). The least represented group in the news workforce was once again Asian Americans. The lack of representation of minorities in U.S. broadcasting had been a persistent concern. Research suggests that ethnic minority audiences felt their group’s portrayals on television were negative (Halloran, 1998). Research on audiences found that trust levels for television news were higher in which “real images” were shown (Mullan, 1997) and that news content recall was also higher for racial and ethnic groups who were represented in the coverage (Fujioka, 2005).

Further research on people of Asian background in the UK (Halloran, 1998) found that
participants said that they were influenced by television and much of this influence was considered negative. Many ethnic minorities felt that a significant number of whites held these negative beliefs about them (1998). News judgment is heavily subjective, especially on issues surrounding race, cultural diversity, gender and economic class (Gist, 1990). News reporters, anchors and correspondents are not exempt from their own biases and cultural backgrounds, which inevitably make their way into what news is produced and aired (Gans, 1980, 1983, Tuchman, 1972, Whyte, 1943).

The preceding is important because media frames shape and alter audiences’ interpretations about the world (Entman, 2007). Certain issues, images, ideas are made salient thorough the use of frames and as a result the audience is encouraged think, feel and decide in a certain way (Entman, 2007; Gross & D’Ambrosio, 2004; Iyengar & Simon, 1993; Kim, Scheufele & Shanahan, 2002; Price, Tewksbury, & Powers, 1997). The “media may be helping to distribute political power to particular groups, causes, or individuals,” (Entman, 2007, p. 166). Journalists are not exempt from frames and as a result the media’s decision biases are created within individual journalists and the organizations they represent as part of their news routines and norms (2007). Some of this distribution of power comes from the people journalists choose to interview as “experts.”

The news media relies on a “framework of interpretation offered by public officials, security experts and military commentators, with news functioning ultimately to reinforce support for political leaders and the security policies they implement” (Norris, Kern, & Just, 2003, p. 1). Steele (1995) finds that journalists’ selection of experts and has a “profound effect[s] on both the content and quality of television news coverage” (p. 807). Interviewees chosen by journalist for their technical expertise, analysis and predictions may frame news on war and conflict in a specific light, especially because these experts are not required to place events in a broader historical
context (1995). Experts are also chosen because they represent “political perspectives that are not acknowledged by the news organizations that solicit their views,” (1995, p. 807). Ethnicities of journalists are also an important factor on the way news is framed. News practices like “expertise” also influence less direct forms of framing – not just how groups are represented in news coverage but how they are represented among those who make news decisions.

Studies on race and ethnicity in local television news coverage find that Latinos, Asian Americans, and Native Americans are virtually non-existent as reporters, anchors, coverage, and as sources (Poindexter, Smith, and Heider, 2003; Owens, 2007). African Americans were present as anchors and reporters, but when it came to subjects of news, blacks were often associated with committing a crime (Poindexter, Smith, and Heider, 2003). The lack of ethnic minorities from local news coverage frames certain groups (Asian American, Latin Americans, and Native Americans) as not needing a voice because there are so few of them. Not being represented in the mainstream media or being shown as villains or in a negative context (stories about crime, conflict, drugs, gangs, and poverty), journalists may imply that minorities are either not important, untrustworthy and/or trouble causing (Gist, 1990; Nishikwa et al, 2009). Minority audiences are dissatisfied with mainstream media coverage and often consider themselves marginalized by mainstream news (Gandy, 1997; Riffe, Sneed, & Van Ommeren, 1990). This may be the case with groups that identify as South Asian, Middle Eastern, Latin and African American. These groups, through mainstream media practices, such as the use of “experts,” feel the burden of being “othered.” Like their audiences, journalists, regardless of race and ethnicity, are pummeled with the same media messages and as a result what makes it to air and how it is constructed is just as important as who represents the newsrooms.

Journalistic norms and practices have helped to “other” members of foreign nations long
before September 11, 2001. That pattern has been found to hold among minority journalists as well. Nishikwa et al (2009) found that minority journalists accept widespread mainstream news norms and, in fact promote the mainstream voice. These journalists eschew advocacy positions within the media, believing them to be unprofessional (2009). Thus ethnic media tend to be held in disregard because that forum is viewed as community advocacy as opposed to objective journalism (2009). The research also suggests that minority reporters shy away from topics like pro-immigration rallies to avoid being branded advocates and opening themselves to criticism (2009).

“Othering” didn’t begin with 9/11, but it took on some of its most salient characteristics since then. The end of the Cold War helped to open cognitive restraints, which created the conditions for the media to have a greater influence (Entman, 2004). Audiences cannot escape frames because they come, in part, from prior beliefs with the media making certain elements more salient through repetition of key words, images and phrases (Entman, 1991, 1993, 2004). In the weeks following the 9/11 attacks, President George W. Bush defined terrorism as a global threat, urging what were deemed civilized nations to band together against the “axis of evil” or Iran, Iraq, and North Korea (2004). The creation of these civilized versus uncivilized divides reinforced the Cold-War era concept of good guys and bad guys. Nations that did not subscribe to American standards of democracy or were viewed as others were seen as the bad guys (Entman, 2004).

Framing conflict, immigration and culture

Ten years after 9/11 the frames used by the media continue to impact how audiences respond to nations deemed as U.S. allies and enemies. In the days and weeks following the attacks, former President George W. Bush spoke in terms of a criminal attack against those who supported freedom and of war crimes committed by the Taliban and Osama bin Laden. Edy and Meirick
(2007) suggest that when audiences are confronted with competing frames, war and crime, viewers simply cobble components together and create their own versions of social realities.

Media frames have a strong impact on the way audiences treat U.S. citizens who look like the “other” in the post-9/11 environment. These have been through certain policy changes, such as stricter immigration laws, to even profiling individuals based on race and ethnicity. Maira (2004) argues that imperialist power is at work post-9/11 in regards to the way South Asian Muslims have been framed in the Western media, as well as by U.S. policies towards immigrants. However, unlike imperialist power during colonial times, this neo-imperialism does not require physical land or even the direct ability to govern.

Many scholars discuss South Asian identity in the context of 9/11, but very little of the research goes further to say that perhaps the terrorist attacks may have shaped a new South Asian identity, especially among the youth. Despite certain fears regarding citizen status and surveillance, many Muslim youth are actively speaking out against terrorism and questioning how the United States responded to 9/11 (Maira, 2004). Many second-generation South Asians are seeking their own identities. These identities are a mix of what the first generation brought with them from their home countries while assimilating into American culture and the second generation traversing through old and new cultures creating a new identity. The current study is focused on ethnic populations that were born in the United States. These groups of people do not have the same issues when it comes to assimilation, yet may be perceived as “others.”

Although many second-generation South Asians were not “pushed” into their cultural identities, they were still curious to learn more about the traditions of their parents (Maira, 2004). So although these individuals are “integrated” into American society by virtue of being second generation, they still have a desire to maintain and reaffirm their identities as South Asia Muslims.
Perhaps mainstream media’s demonizing of Islam may have caused a shift for second-generation youth to find ways to dispel anti-Muslim-ness by gaining a stronger hold on religion and ethnic pride, as opposed to “browning it down.”

Since the attacks, the concept of being “Brown” comes with mixed feelings. “Brown” was associated with two components: increased immigration, especially from Latin countries and the United States embracing multiculturalism (Lugo-Lugo and Bloodsworth-Lugo, 2009). But in the context of a post-9/11 world, the concept of “Brown” has been framed as a threat, capitalizing on U.S. anxieties about public and national safety (2009). Lugo-Lugo and Bloodsworth-Lugo (2009) refer to this as the “browning of terror” (p. 115). When the media, such as Fox News commentator Mark Williams, made a comment suggesting that President Obama was a “domestic insurgent,” (p.115), he and others were framing the President to their viewing audiences as not only unpatriotic, but also un-American. “Not like us” theme developed by Vultee (2012) suggests that Obama is seen “as a foreigner, non-Christian, and a Muslim. Indirectly he is seen as the mirror opposite of traditional values of courage, honesty, modesty, and respect,” (p. 58). The Obama as an “other” discourse does not just belong to journalists. Fox News audiences also share that sentiment on the network’s website and take advantage of the interactivity available to them through the site to support comments made by the reporters (2012).

As a result, it is important to consider the post-9/11 audience when conducting framing research about Islam. Framing, on one hand, refers to the way journalists shape news content whether it is because of their own personal experiences or due to news organizations’ routines and narratives. But it also depends on the audience who adopts the frame by seeing the world in a similar way as the journalist (McQuail, 2005). Why Afghan women continued to wear the burka even after being “liberated” by the U.S. suggests that complex issues like cultural and religious
traditions cannot be merely quantified and that just photographs are not enough to relate the experiences of these women (Fahmy, 2004).

Ibrahim (2010) argues that non-biased coverage of Islam is a myth. In the weeks following September 11th, visuals from television news coverage depicted anti-American and pro-bin Laden demonstrations throughout Pakistan. These images created a social reality for American audiences that suggested to them that not only was Pakistan against the U.S. foreign policy, but also military action in Afghanistan. Showing images of incensed Pakistanis juxtaposed with images of groups of Muslims kneeling for prayer clearly framed Muslims and Pakistanis as the “bad guys” in the media (2010). It also turned Muslims into a monolithic group and negated the actual diversity among its millions of followers (2010). In recent years, the idea of Muslim American identity has been circulating in public discourse namely focused on the homegrown terrorist; however, when “othering” individuals, current research finds that foreignness and immigration status plays a key role in highlighting cultural differences in the media.

Chuang (2012) highlights two shootings perpetuated by East Asians. Jiverly Wong, a Vietnamese immigrant, opened fire at a New York immigrant center on April 3, 2009, killing thirteen people and critically injuring four others. This was considered the nation’s worst mass shooting since the Virginia Polytechnic Institute shooting on April 16, 2007, where Seung-Hui Cho shot and killed 32 people in Blacksburg, Virginia, then killed himself (2012). What makes these incidences analogous is the way the media portrayed these individuals. Both individuals were Asian and born outside the U.S. with Cho registered as a permanent resident and Wong a naturalized U.S. citizen since 1995 (2012). Media depictions in both cases focused on the foreignness of these individuals, even conflating ethnic for foreign (2012).
The news media have maintained a foreigner identity for Asian Americans because of perceived cultural differences. Gandy (1998) finds that the same foreigner-constructed identities do not apply to European-descended immigrants like Italians, Irish or German, because these groups have been able to assimilate into the White mainstream. However, non-Europeans like Asians and Middle Easterners continue to be placed in the ethnic categories because they are perceived as being considerably different, physically and culturally, than whites (1998). This perceived difference also is a factor in the way groups like South Asians Middle Easterners are depicted by the media.

Since 9/11, media scholars have been focusing on Muslim identity. As was the case with Cho and Wong, Pakistani American Faisal Shahzad, who in 2010 attempted to bomb Times Square, represents a homegrown terrorist who was physically and culturally foreign (Chuang and Roemer, 2013). On May 3, 2010, Shahzad, a naturalized citizen from Pakistan, attempted to detonate a car bomb in New York’s Times Square (2013). Although unsuccessful, the idea that a potential terrorist could come so close to another American landmark generated intense media coverage with Shahzad’s Pakistani American and Muslim identities being the focus of news coverage (2013).

Although American Muslims are not defined by race or nationality, they share a religious identity (Chuang and Roemer, 2013). The events of 9/11 have narrowed debates into Orientalistic modes of discussion (Kumar, 2010). Orientalist thinking allows them to maintain that image in that they are complex, dynamic and adaptive, while the Orient, particularly Islamic nations are in constant states of conflict, backwards, barbaric and in need of Western intervention to pull them into the modern world (Said, 1997; Kumar, 2010). Political leaders and popular members of the mainstream media connected the actions of extremists to an entire religious following (2010).
Many issues surrounding race and cultural differences are focused on individuals that are not perceived as being American enough or those who fail to achieve the American Dream (Chuang, 2012; Chuang and Roemer, 2013). That is, they do not learn the language or fail to assimilate into the mainstream. De Vreese, Boomgaarden and Semetko (2011) found that negative framing by the media and political elites yielded stronger effects in participants, in particular as cultural threats. In areas where the Turkish population was high, the European Christian culture was threatened by the growing population of Muslims throughout Europe (2011). In the U.S, increased immigration resulting in demographic changes has been unnerving to those who believe that Anglo-American culture should remain dominant and foremost (Ana, 1999).

The portrayal of immigration, as the following chapter suggests, has been a frequent topic of securitization studies because of that sort of perceived threat. Ana (1999) suggests metaphors used by the media surrounding the 1994 political debate over California’s anti-immigration referendum Proposition 187 say that the language that the media uses can contribute to “demeaning and dehumanizing the immigrant worker” (pg. 217). Further, the techniques the political elite and the media use to frame issues have the ability to influence whether audiences apply existing racial stereotypes in a politically meaningful manner (Domke, McCoy & Torres, 1999). Audiences, through the interpretation of certain frames, may perceive immigration as an issue that may have a negative consequence for their lives. Thus the framing of immigration can lead to audience’s perceiving an individual’s identity as foreign and culturally different regardless of their citizenship.

Such studies have usually been rooted in legacy media, but discussion on identity also comes from the online world. The glut of websites, social media, and blogs are dedicated to connecting people to other like-minded individuals. Online spaces also provide audiences with alternative sources for news information, which in turn have expanded concepts surrounding trust,
credibility and authenticity. Social media connected activists in the Middle East with the rest of the world, allowing people in the West (Muslim and non-Muslim) to take part in a dialogue about government corruption and other issues surrounding the unrest in the Arab world (Ali and Fahmy, 2013). Although no strangers to the online world, journalists and media organizations from around the globe became transfixed with Facebook pages, Twitter feeds, and YouTube videos; relying on these sites for breaking news in the international arena.

**Relationship of traditional media and citizen journalism**

Many news organizations are opening their websites to readers thorough the creation of a shared space that has constantly changing content generated by a large collective of individuals (Singer and Ashman, 2009). It is this shared space that has called into question issues regarding the credibility and newsworthiness of the participatory content, as well as who is responsible for the content itself (2009). Traditional media journalists are wary of the public’s contribution to the news (2009).

Although journalists may appreciate the public’s ability to voice their opinions, “many felt some of those voices were not worth listening to” (Singer and Ashman, 2009, p. 18). Some of the contention lies in the reporters’ skepticism regarding the public’s opinion on what is newsworthy and whether that information should trespass onto the journalist’s professional news judgment. Singer and Ashman (2009) found that despite the growing amount of user-generated content, traditional media members are cautious of the contributing public and tend to pick and choose comments that fit within the normative framework created by the institution.

Domingo and Heinonen’s (2008) typology examines the relationship between citizens and traditional journalists through an analysis of blogs. Independent bloggers, or those who are not affiliated with news organizations, do not pretend to be journalists; however, much of the work
they do approaches that arena. Blogs may be challenging the very definition of journalism and may be causing a paradigm shift by changing the understanding of what journalism is with the proliferation of the Internet (2008). In addition, bloggers are pushing against the norm of the journalist as the trained observer. Bloggers are generally involved in the stories they are reporting on, thus giving first-hand accounts as they happen (2008). Despite research that suggests user generated content (UGC) is changing traditional journalism norms, other scholars find that news media’s hegemonic norms remain intact (Hermida and Thurman, 2008).

Hermida and Thurman (2008) found that gatekeeping practices in news organizations want to use a lot of UGC but only select those comments that “fit their brand” (p. 350). In other words, information that deviated from the story or did not meet the standards of audience expectations — as deemed by editors — was filtered out. Similar to text, TV stations are also large consumers of UGC, especially in the form of videos and photographs. Television news, as part of the elite media, filter UGC based on gatekeeping processes that they deem valuable to their audiences.

Williams et al (2011) found that editors and managers at television stations use UGC as just another source for news stories. Their findings suggest that reporters have not changed the way they work; rather the material provided by citizen journalists continue to remain embedded within the institution’s framework, maintaining the status quo for traditional media. Their study revealed that long-established reporting practices, “such as ensuring accuracy, authenticity, and impartiality” (p. 93), remain paramount when using UGC. Thus, although news organizations have embraced materials provided by citizens, they have done so with restraint. The videos and photos citizen journalists provide are pushed through a filtering process of journalists, editors, and managers, who then select only those pieces that fit within the news organizations traditional structures (Williams et al, 2011).
Information from social media has sparked debates on issues surrounding trust, credibility, and authenticity of the information (Georg and Jackob, 2010; Lee and Sundar, 2012; Marwick and Boyd, 2011). Traditional media is also using UGC as a way to combat viewer disengagement from their news stations and draw in larger and more diverse audiences (Harrison, 2010). News organizations use UGC that fits within the routines and narratives of their organization but also as a way to connect to their audiences to the happenings in other parts of the country and world as a part of public service (2010).

**Trust, credibility and authenticity in online spaces**

Live broadcast television has allowed viewers from across the globe to witness major news events instantaneously, but unlike traditional media, social media has allowed citizens to engage and add to the discussion. A recent incarnation is the “Arab Spring.” Demonstrators in Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia credited social media like Twitter, Facebook, YouTube, and blogging sites as important components to overthrowing authoritarian regimes (Nguyen, 2009, Parvaz, 2011, Ali and Fahmy, 2013). These sites allowed protesters to post videos, images, and start discussions, thereby not just viewing the materials, but also becoming an active part of the dialogue and protests (2013).

In addition, social media allowed activists from other countries the opportunity to aid other revolutions. For example, online organizers in Egypt and Tunisia exchanged their experiences via Facebook, including information like using vinegar and onions to stave off the effects of tear gas (Kirkpatrick & Sanger, 2011). In other words, social media proved that it had the ability to create collaboration among a pan-Arab youth movement, giving “birth to a new force in the Arab world” (2011, p. 1).

Although social media have been praised for their ability to unite people as a tool for
activists, they still need a traditional media source to get widespread attention. As Singer (2005) found, citizen generated materials, such as blogs, are being used by traditional media organizations to enhance their own coverage. Thus the user-generated content is being forced to fit the narratives and traditional routines practices by traditional media. These routines are part of the gatekeeping process, which is the selection process used by editors, news directors, and managers (the gatekeepers) to choose stories and/or visuals that follow the organizations’ routines and narratives (White, 1950). Thus the social media information that fall in line with traditional media are the ones that get picked up to be presented via traditional news platforms to a wider audience.

Citizen journalists provide an alternative source of information outside of traditional media, which in turn, are electronically disseminated to a larger audience via traditional media sources (Berenger, 2006). One reason for this growing dissemination has been the need for many news organizations to tighten their budgets. Many news organizations simply cannot afford to send reporters to cover international events. This need suggests that the reliance on citizen journalists will continue to grow (2006).

Many traditional news organizations have an independent new media staff whose main focus is to write news for the web and disseminate it to wider audiences (Pavlik, 2011). The speed and access of information on the web has allowed social and new media news producers to bring information to audiences at a rapid rate. However, new media staffs are not necessarily trained journalists. They do not have strong journalism credentials or follow the practices of traditional media producers (2011). But research suggests that due to the growing distrust in traditional media, social and new media have become alternative sources for news information (Johnson and Kaye, 2004). And that underscores the importance of exploring their trustworthiness, credibility and authenticity.
Framing and audience perceptions of trust, credibility and authenticity

Coming from authoritarian regimes, news from social media sites is considered a source of trusted information simply because most of the traditional sources are government owned (Wall, 2009; Ali and Fahmy, 2013). For many activists, especially the youth, the Internet was a resource where like-minded people could gather to exchange ideas amongst themselves, as well as organizations from other public spheres. In addition, news from social media provided alternative information (Olsson, 2008). Because authoritarian governments continue to exercise control over the information being distributed that they deem “objectionable” including pornographic materials and political dissidents’ messages (Ghareeb, 2000), news from citizen journalists is viewed by many as being as credible source.

Choi, Watt, and Lynch (2006) examined how American news audiences perceived the Internet as a source of credible information during the 2003 Iraq War. They found that credibility was not merely a characteristic of the message itself; rather it was a perception by the viewing audience. Audiences respond less to news organizations and their personalities than they do to the specific content (Gunther, 1992). Thus when consuming news content concerning an issue as salient as the Iraq War, participants who were more involved with the issue tended to judge media credibility differently than those who were merely casual consumers. Compared to groups that were supporters of the war and neutral parties, those participants that were opponents of the U.S. attack on Iraq viewed the Internet as a credible source of news (2006). Opponents of the war used the Internet as an alternative source of information that accorded with their political attitudes towards the war that they were not able to find in traditional media sources.

Similarly, Abdulla, Garrison, Salwen, Driscoll, & Casey (2002) found that online news credibility was based on trustworthiness, timeliness, and viewer biases. Their comparison of
newspapers, television, and online news found that even though people perceived all three similarly in terms of credibility, such as dimension of currency, timeliness, and up-to-date information, but there were some fundamental differences.

News audiences perceived newspapers to be up-to-date, while television news was seen as current, up-to-date, as well as timely. Online news furthered that by also being current (Abdulla et al., 2002). In terms of credibility, viewers felt that in order for newspapers to be credible they must be “balanced in story-telling, complete in providing information, objective and fair, accurate, and unbiased.” In addition, honesty in presentation, believability, and trust in the source were also seen as major factors in credibility. Television news credibility is constructed around providing information that is fair and balanced (Flanagin and Metzger, 2000; Abdulla et al, 2002) the information and source must be trustworthy, accurate, objective, complete, unbiased, honest, and finally believable (Flanagin and Metzger, 2000; Austin and Dong, 1994). Finally, viewers believe that online news credibility is based on trustworthiness (Flanagin and Metzger, 2000). Thus for an online source to be credible it must be trustworthy, fair, honest, balanced, accurate, and believable (Abdulla et al, 2002). Their study also revealed that many viewers are not convinced that the Internet is a source for unbiased and objective information. These viewers found that the relative ease of putting information on the Web, as opposed to the work it takes to put together a television broadcast or newspaper, made this medium less credible.

Traditional media producers and online news observers have also noted their concerns over credibility, believability, ethical lapses, newsgathering techniques, and news presentation of Internet sources of news and information (Lasica, 2001; Arant & Anderson, 2000). Similarly, Flanagin and Metzger (2000) find that while traditional media goes through a process of gathering and verifying information, online news does not necessarily follow that convention. Internet sites
do not always use such measures. Thus, the central problem lies in the lack of editorial and gatekeeping rules that the traditional media use. Finally authenticity comes to the forefront when discussing UGC and online news. Like trust and credibility, authenticity can be based on the source of the information. But unlike trust and credibility, authenticity relies on online news producer’s real self (Marwick and Boyd, 2010).

Grazian (2003) suggests that authenticity is a social construct that requires something to be inauthentic. There is not a universal authenticity; rather it is a construct that varies according to community (Marwick and Boyd, 2011). Authenticity requires the producer use rawer tone that might too conversational for traditional media outlets (Matheson, 2004). When it comes to online news, audiences valued diverse topics, the personal character and the authenticity of the stories published (Deuze, Bruns, and Neuberger, 2007). Individuals producing news that comes from a real person is considered authentic because it is perceived as being without bias (2007).

In the news media, discourse concerning state and national security is often constructed through the use of frames. This collection of words, images, and graphics put together create a specific social reality for audiences. Cultural differences and foreign identities can force individuals into “othered” categories, despite citizenship. The introduction of information dissemination through social media forums has also changed the way journalists gather the news and audiences consume it. Thus it is important to focus research on ways to elucidate questions regarding news consumption and audience response to presenters of other ethnicities in online spaces, as well as traditional media and how audiences perceive trust, credibility and authenticity of news sources and the presenters.

The news media use framing devices like words, metaphors and images to make certain ideas and issues more salient (Entman, 1991, 1993), but the amplifying effects of securitization
can intensify the social and cultural significance of certain frames (Vultee, 2009). The next chapter examines the theory of securitization in the context of culture and race and how certain issues presented by the news media or politicians as a threat to security can alter audiences’ perception of the content.

If framing creates a media atmosphere in which certain words, images, phrases, and metaphors are made salient through news routines and narratives that in turn become a part of how audiences interpret information (Entman, 1991,1993; Gitlin, 1980), then securitization is a loudspeaker that amplifies the social and cultural conditions that surround particular frames (Vultee, 2009). Chapter 3 focuses on the theory of securitization and how exceptionalism coupled with framing can create an atmosphere where American culture has become securitized. The chapter focuses on the ways in which multiculturalism, due to increased immigration especially from South Asian, Middle Eastern and Latin American countries, has led to a racially charged space post-9/11.

This chapter will begin with a brief discussion on how securitization works with media frames to exaggerate racial and ethnic stereotypes that have the potential of being perceived as an existential threat. Further, as mentioned in Chapter 2, a discussion on individuals and groups perceived as “Brown” or “Others” have become the new cultural threat due to growing multiculturalism in the United States. The chapter will also discuss the ways in which war and conflict, in particular, the ways 9/11 has highlighted America’s vulnerabilities through the prism of its perceived cultural, economic and technological superiority. This will lead into a discussion about American Orientalism and American Exceptionalism and the creation of a new American culture that is attempting to create a divide between the “East” and the “West.” The chapter will
conclude with an examination of how securitized images work within the context of traditional and social media discourse.
CHAPTER 3

SEURITIZATION

What is securitization and how does it work with media frames?

This dissertation expands on Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde’s (1998) definition of securitization, which assembles three basic elements in a “securitizing move”: a securitizing actor, a referent object and a target audience. If the actor makes a claim that something valuable (referent object) is under an existential threat that requires extraordinary measures and the audience accepts this claim, then the securitizing move is successful. Further, the audience needs to continue to accept that the referent object is something of value that requires constant protection (1998). As discussed earlier, this research uses the media as a securitizing actor, the target audience as the American public and the referent object as the dominant culture. In addition, the element of “Brown” bodies, specifically using race as a signifier of cultural difference or “othering,” adds the visual representation of ethnicity. This study takes a more nuanced approach to securitization by suggesting that the fear of cultural takeover by “Others” is the threat that has been securitized by the media for the American public. Research in security has focused on national and physical safety; however, this research elaborates on Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde’s (1998) assumptions on how the ability to maintain and pass along a treasured culture can be securitized. The growing multiculturalism in America, which scholars refer to as “browning” of America, also expands the discussion on securitization of culture in that it poses a threat to the dominant culture.

Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde (1998) define a securitized situation as one that poses an existential threat to a cherished referent object, calling for extraordinary measures beyond the normal, everyday politics. Threats can be political, cultural or physical. An issue can become securitized when a securitizing actor, such as a politician, the media, or a community leader
supports emergency measures beyond regular laws and norms to extinguish the threat and the audience accepts the frame (p. 5).

Securitization is rooted in international relations and as a result is linked to the physical security of the state. However, scholars have recognized that securitization is more than physical threats and can entail societal issues, as well as the environment, the economy and the political arena (Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde, 1998). This dissertation is focused on the societal sector and the securitization of a dominant culture. Culture and its preservation can also be linked to the wider arc of a physical threat. That is, the acceptance of another culture could lead to a perceived takeover physically. This literature review re-examines securitization theory regarding threats to American culture via US foreign policy, immigration, and the ever looming threat of “the other” to the American way of life. The research brings to light how contemporary media frames continue to highlight the social and cultural conditions in which securitization factors are amplified. Because of the growth of online news consumption, the review will also expand the literature regarding news information that is disseminated through alternative sources.

**Securitization and “the Other”**

During the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terror attacks, President George W. Bush used language that fueled an “us” versus “them” atmosphere, which in turn created a nation of hyper-patriots (Gershkoff and Kushner, 2003). Thus, when the United States went to war on Iraq on March 19, 2003, nearly 70 percent of Americans supported the action, although there was no direct correlation between Osama bin Laden and Saddam Hussein (2003). This support was high among Democrats and Republicans, men and women (2003). Fear of the “Other” is not limited to post 9/11, but can find its history in US political discourse.

The “global war on terrorism” can trace its roots back to the Cold War. The “war on terror”
and the Cold War were similar in that both were staged as defense of the West against “Others” who sought to destroy western ideologies (Buzan, 2006). However, a significant difference is that the Cold War was a highly formalized affair based on nation rivalries, while the “war on terror” was far smaller in comparison (Tirman, 2006). Al Qaeda is not a country, but rather a terror organization whose ideology is a “cry against alleged Western mistreatment” (2006, p. 2). Despite the fact that very little terrorism poses a threat to the US, it continues to be successfully cast as an “extraordinary threat” by political actors and the media. This suggests that the “threat” is more ideological and that there is not a clear definition of what a security threat actually is (Sjostedt, 2007). Even with the vague conceptualization of securitization, the use of constant televisuals of foreign-looking people, have become a powerful tool for securitizing which has been tied increasingly with political communication (Williams, 2003).

Images of women in burkas and of bearded men began to symbolize something that was “un-American” and different. Lugo-Lugo and Bloodsworth-Lugo (2009) argue that the process of “browning” specific groups places those members of society in a social quarantine. In the context of securitization, the “browned” body becomes one that is: “1) perceived as a threat to both the US government and the social fabric of the country, 2) rendered as being in opposition to the post-September 11, 2001 notion of Americanness, and 3) placed under strict rhetorical, legal, or physical containment” (2009; p. 112).

Discussion regarding the “browning” of America started well before the September 11, 2001 attacks. This was in part due to an increase of immigration, in particular from Latin America. The growing number of immigrants and minorities led to an embracing of multicultural ideals by American society (Lugo-Lugo and Bloodsworth-Lugo 2009). The United States is eventually expected to become a country of majority-minorities by 2043 (2009). By 2060 the Hispanic
The population is expected to nearly double with nearly one in three US residents of Hispanic origin. By 2050, the Asian populations (East and South) are expected to increase by 79 percent (Ortman and Guarneri, 2009).

Certainly physical appearance is a major factor in the “browning” of a group; however, it is just one issue. Names like Ali, Abdullah, Hussein, and Mohammed have also been “browned.” For many people, these types of names may evoke images of terrorism, but they most often create a sense that there is a lack of patriotism (Lugo-Lugo and Bloodsworth-Lugo, 2009). Individuals with these or similar “brown” sounding names (i.e. Hispanic) can be construed as being “un-American” and potential enemies of the state.

During the 2008 presidential campaign, Barack Obama’s middle name, Hussein, was injected into discourse by conservative commentators eager to invoke images of the Muslim “Other,” in general, and of Saddam Hussein in particular (Lugo-Lugo et al, 2009). In the context of a campaign in which the absence of an American flag pin in Obama’s lapel became a controversy for political rivals and some press accounts (2009), his name was another way of questioning his patriotism (2009). Additionally, the added issues of his name being mistaken for Osama by members of the media, such as Glenn Beck’s 2007 misstep on “Good Morning America,” where he switched Obama with Osama (Stelter, 2007) and The Detroit News running the headline “Clinton, Osama meet to Discuss Unity” (Associated Press, 2008) added to the “browning” of Obama. Even politicians were not above making these errors with the President’s name, such as in 2008 when former Attorney General John Ashcroft referred to Obama as Osama to a group of students at Skidmore College (ABCNews.com, 2008). The “othering” of Obama’s name is an example of one of many factors used to “Brown” individuals and groups, making them into foreign entities (Lugo-Lugo et al, 2009). In the process of being ‘browned’ through his name
and his perceived lack of patriotism, Obama’s identity was also tied to Islam, a religion that has been demonized by politicians and the media as the ideology of the “enemy.”

Buzan (2006) suggests that securitizing ethnic groups and turning them into the “enemy” is not a new phenomenon. It is merely an evolved version “from the pre-9/11 European pattern, where the main effort went into securitizing a threat package linking immigration, organized crime and drugs—thereby depicting immigrants as the root problem” (p. 1105). Actors, such as politicians and policymakers, can target “Others” through issues, such as Muslims via terrorism and Mexicans via illegal immigration, and thus prevent themselves from being labeled racists; rather they are perceived as patriots focused on the security of the country. This is not particularly unusual. “Others” have been and continue to be the scapegoats for domestic problems (lack of jobs blamed on immigrants) and in some more extreme cases blamed for global calamities (Muslims and a perceived rise in global terrorist attacks). National leaders have used the process of securitizing “Others” as a tool to foster nationalism and identity, as well as gain public support for elections or waging a costly war (Bigo, 2002; Massey, 1995).

Months following the Pearl Harbor attacks, President Roosevelt signed an executive order in 1942 that essentially sent nearly 120,000 Japanese Americans to internment camps as a way to “protect” American citizens (Nagata, 1990). However, the attacks did not signal the beginning of the negative racial stereotypes of Japanese as “subhuman, untrustworthy, and inferior to Caucasian Americans” (p. 134); rather, these preexisting ways of thinking became exaggerated after Pearl Harbor (1990). In addition, the “Other” has also been used as a distraction from internal societal failings such as classism, high inflation, and poor economic performance, to name a few. Thus, the “Other” is not just a person or a group, but rather a political construction (Said, 1978). Conservatives in America and other Western nations, like Canada, also claim that immigration
policies in the US are detrimental to American identity as a nation founded by White Europeans (Russo, 2008). This stems from increased immigration from South Asia and Africa, with conservatives suggesting that these groups may not be able to “assimilate” as well as their European counterparts (Russo, 2008). Individuals and groups who physically look like their European predecessors have been perceived as being better equipped to assimilate into the dominant American culture, while people who physically look like “Others” have been expected to have a more difficult time assimilating. As a result, government policies, (heightened visa controls, new border security measures and the storage of personal information about legal immigrants to the US) have been enacted to tie immigration to terrorism, specifically from South Asia and the Middle East or geographic areas where Islam is the dominant religion practiced.

The combination of a perception that Islam is synonymous with terrorism (despite the West’s long history of encounters with non-Muslim terrorism) and fears of uncontrolled immigration may be creating a sense of cultural imbalance. National identity and stability is created by the development of traditions, such as systems of justice and rights (Ibrahim, 2005). However, immigrants bring different cultures and traditions and are perceived to imbalance the nation through the addition of their cultural practices (2005). An imbalance is perceived when the dominant cultural group believes their way of life is being eroded or supplanted with the addition of new cultures and ways of life that immigration tends to bring with it.

Immigration has been framed in relation to terrorism, unemployment and crime (Bigo, 2002), but in the mid-19th century it was also focused on the expansion and economic growth of the US (Hipsman and Meissner, 2013). Because of industrialization and the Irish potato famine, immigration began around 1880 with nearly “28 million immigrants entering the United States” (Massey, 1995, p. 633). A majority of these immigrants were from Northern and Western Europe,
eventually leading to immigrants coming from Eastern and Western Europe as industrialization worked its way across the United States (1995). Immigration shifted to Asian populations, namely from China, when gold was discovered in California in 1848 (Wright, 1940).

“At first, the Chinese were welcomed in California. Their labor was needed, and they were willing to do work to which the Anglo-Saxon would not stoop—women’s work, and menial labor of all kinds” (Wright, 1940, p. 329). Early characterizations of Chinese immigrants suggested they were “hardworking exotics” (Freedman, 2005; p. 83), while their European counterparts, particularly the Irish, were viewed as “potential convicts” (2005; p. 83). However, Europeans were still the majority and as a result, “the United States became less black, more white, and more firmly European in culture and outlook” (Wright, 1940, p. 633). But like any other non-European immigrants, these groups brought their own set of customs and cultures, which were perceived by Europeans as a disruption of their culture and a potential imbalance to the nation (Ibrahim, 2005).

As the mining boom began to near its end, hostility towards Chinese immigrants rose. Thus Congress passed the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, halting immigration from China for ten years (Hipsman and Meissner, 2013). This was part of a larger immigration policy that would limit immigration in general, with specified portion focused on Chinese immigrants. In 1917, Congress passed another immigration act that barred immigrants from Asian countries and the Middle East (2013). Further, in 1924 the US enacted policies favoring immigrants from northern and western Europe, placing stricter quotas on those from Asian countries (2013). Although immigration has always been regulated, the events of 9/11 had lasting implications that led to more robust immigration policies, as well as the dissolution of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (2013). In its place was the creation of the Department of Homeland Security and its three branches: Customs and Border Protection, Immigration and Customs Enforcement and U.S.
Citizenship and Immigration Services (2013). Yet, despite these measures, immigration in the US has had a steady growth since 2007 (Pew Research, 2013).

According to the Pew Research Hispanic Trends Project (2013), the US is home to over 40 million immigrants, including 11 million unauthorized individuals. This group represents 13 percent of the population, just under the 15 percent during the immigration wave from 1890 to 1920 (2013). One major difference is that the earlier group was dominated by immigration from European countries, while the immigrant populations from the latter group were mainly from Latin and Asian countries (2013). The growth of “Brown” groups and their cultural differences have been perceived as threats to a nation’s existing way of life. As Ibrahim (2005) suggests that “cultural differences threaten the existing way of life” (p. 166) and as such, “the defining feature of new racism is that cultural pluralism will lead to inter-ethnic conflict which will dissolve the unity of the state” (p. 166). Muslim populations are growing steadily globally and in the United States.

According to projections by the Pew Research Center, the global Muslim population is expected to increase by 35% in the next 20 years, rising from 1.6 billion in 2010 to nearly 2.2 billion by 2030 (DeSilver, 2013). Islam is the second fastest growing religion in the world behind Christianity (2013). In the United States, due to immigration and conversion, followers of Islam have risen to 2.6 million in 2010 from one million in 2000 (Al Arabiya News, May 2, 2012). In 2009, a majority of Muslim immigrants were from Pakistan and Bangladesh and those countries are expected to remain the top countries of origin for Muslim immigrants to the United States in 2030 (Pewforum.org, 2011).

Much of the issues surrounding this “invasion,” especially from predominantly Muslim countries, is the potential of an attack on a nation’s/person’s/group’s majority identity. The
securitization of cultural differences; however, can be traced back to the 16th century with the rise of European power (Buzan, 2010). Said (1978) suggests this fear of cultural differences, in many ways, is about perceiving the East as an uncontrollable danger. While the “Occident” places itself in a position of superiority, the “Orient” or “Other” is “devalued, feared, reviled,” (Nayak and Malone, 2009, p. 256). In the case of a nation-state, identity is based on what makes a country unique and special. In other words, what makes America and Americans, America and Americans? This identity is tied into pre-independence ideas of cultural superiority and an exaggerated global dominance the US has held since World War II.

**Culture threatened by the “Others”**

As mentioned earlier, securitization scholars such as Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde (1998) suggest the securitization process requires three elements: an actor, a referent object and a target audience. The actor makes the claim that the referent object is under an existential threat requiring emergency measures and the target’s accepting this claim makes it successful (1998). The threat can be physical, political or cultural and be amplified and created by securitizing actors like the media or a politician. This dissertation; however, focuses on the securitization of culture. Markers like race and religion help to define those groups that are different, thus certain immigrants can be perceived as threatening because they represent a group that is culturally different than the European-based “American” culture and identity, while other groups of immigrants are perceived as “model minorities.”

Societies are organized by identity (Buzan et al, 1998). Specific members belong to communities and as a result identify with those politically constructed groups. Societal insecurity exists when the development of a potential situation threatens the group’s survival as a community (1998). A nation’s identity and its culture can be threatened by issues such as immigration, war,
even the environment when the referent object is culture or “the American way of life” (Ibrahim, 2005; Vultee, 2009; Buzan, 2010). While war and conflict certainly constitute an existential threat, “the roots of conflicts are increasingly related to culture and identity,” (Laustsen and Waever, 2000, p. 705). When there is a shared understanding by the public and its policymakers that extraordinary measures need to be taken to protect what makes America intrinsically American, the elements giving a nation its uniqueness, are in peril. Thus, immigration becomes more about English-only laws in states that border Mexico, rather than improving laws and policies; political actors can turn Sharia law into a constitutional issue suggesting that creeping Sharia law might mean that “we” can no longer enforce the constitution “we” want (and want to pass along to our offspring).

In recent years, the debate about foreign laws taking root in the American legal system have been focused on Sharia law or the moral code that followers of Islam may abide by. It is defined as “the body of Islamic religious law applicable to police, banking, contracts, and social issues” (Black’s Law Dictionary, 2011). Because Sharia covers such a “wide array of societal and economic interactions, it fails to capture the distinctions made among various Islamic countries and sects” (Rosato, 2014; pg. 660). As a result, there is not a single definition of Sharia and it is open to interpretation that may allow it to be used in conjunction with state law (2014). Further, “Sharia does not represent a rigid, inflexible, and monolithic legal system,” (Rehman, 2007, p. 838), thus Sharia law is adaptable to “changing social and political norms and values” (p 838). Yet several states in recent years have moved to ban Sharia usage in state courts. Although most have been unsuccessful, Oklahoma succeeded in 2010 by passing the “Save Our State” amendment by a 70 percent voter approval (Rosato, 2014).

Despite the lack of evidence to support the Sharia “threat,” proponents across the state and
nation were able to successfully securitize Sharia. Politicians argued that Sharia Law was related to radical Islam and as a result posed a threat to the United States (Rosato, 2014). The threat perceived was not because “Islamophobes in Western countries claim that they will eventually be forced to adhere to Sharia,” (2014, p. 661); rather, the emphasis was placed on whether Sharia would be injected into the American legal system and how that would change U.S. law (2014). Thus, proponents in Oklahoma argued that U.S. courts would only uphold American law and not allow any foreign legal system to enter into the courts. However, Sharia law was never a threat, physical or cultural. Sharia law falls in many ways within the societal sector of securitization. Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde (1998) introduce multiple sectors of securitization including military, which can affect how people perceive “threats.”

The military sector focuses on states and would-be states as referent objects for military security. The protection of the physical territory of the state becomes a matter of military security. Within the realm of environmental security are two agendas: scientific and political. What is imperative for environmental securitization to be successful is for the states, major political actors and local communities to accept the presented scientific agenda (1998). Economic securitization deals the quality of economic units and the insecurity of market relations. The political security agenda is about non-military threats to state sovereignty. Political security issues can be divided into two categories: nonmilitary threats to political units that are not states and defense of system level referents like international law and society. However, this research is concerned with the societal security agenda because it has traditionally been tied to national security. National identity is the crux of the societal sector, which is why it is the focus of the current research. Cultural differences can threaten national identity and thus can be securitized. Part of national identity is tied to the concept of American exceptionalism, which suggests that American culture and its way
of life is unique and something to be protected. While the state represents physical and geographic borders, the nation represents something more metaphorical. It is based within the realm of culture and identity. Within the metaphorical space of national culture is where the concept of American exceptionalism takes root.

American exceptionalism refers to the concept that America is somehow unique due to its political, cultural and even religious heritage (Lipset, 1996). In one of his first trips overseas in 2009, during a news conference, President Barack Obama was asked about his belief in American exceptionalism and he responded, “I believe in American exceptionalism, just as I suspect that the Brits believe in British exceptionalism and the Greeks believe in Greek exceptionalism” (Tumulty, 2013). This suggests that the US is no more unique or superior than any other dominant nation and that exceptionalism is not exclusively an American concept. Yet, growing multiculturalism has also led to discussions about race and identity (Gandy, 1998) and the fear that what makes America uniquely American might not exist.

Obama’s comment enraged the right wing in the same way that the “Ground Zero Mosque” did because it redefined American exceptionalism by emphasizing every nation’s form of exceptionalism. Similarly, the “Ground Zero Mosque” emphasized that American was not a country of White Christians and despite right wing opposition mosques would exist in the same spaces as churches. America is a multicultural nation that is not particularly unique compared to other nations. Thus, immigration can be securitized because the shared need to take extraordinary measures to protect America is more than just about the physical borders. A broader more ambiguous sense of identity, culture, and language, which produces the fear of losing the very uniqueness of what it is to be American, might be put at risk (Vultee, 2010).

When certain topics like immigration or Sharia Law are brought into the public forum,
those conversations lead to issues surrounding the fear of losing American identity and culture and an inherent change in the perceived dominant society. Historically, America has attempted to be a monocentric culture, in that society has a core which absorbs all other cultures “into its particular rules, norms and institutions” (Buzan, 2010; pg. 3). As a result, cultures, races, and even religions that do not “fit” within the core are deemed “others.” The global growth of Islam has also resulted in more misunderstandings about the religion and cultures associated with it, leading to “confusion, misinformation, contempt, and sometimes fear and even hatred,” (Adnan, 1989). However, Islam and Muslims are not the only “othered” groups. Increased immigration has opened doors to citizens from Latin America (Lugo-Lugo and Bloodsworth-Lugo, 2009), Middle Eastern and South Asian countries (Maira, 2004) and has created this divide between White (Caucasian, ethnically European) and Brown (others).

Lugo-Lugo and Bloodsworth-Lugo’s (2009) concept of the “browned body” suggest that groups deemed “brown” are perceived as threats to America and its government. This threatens not only the state as it presents a threat to the perceived American culture and identity. Further, post-9/11, “browned” groups have been viewed as not only being un-American, but in direct resistance to American ideals and values (2009). Much of this articulation is happening in the public space with political actors and elites feeding the media with the information eventually making its way to the audience (Entman, 2003). President George W. Bush’s “war on terror” frame dominated the news (2003) and as a result created a distinct differences between the “East” and “West” (Nayak and Malone, 2009).

Nayak and Malone (2009) suggest that American exceptionalism is “rooted in American political thought about the development and articulation of the American nation in contradistinction to Europe,” (p. 254). An example would be the use of international law. While
Europe views “international law as the primary tool of diplomacy, the United States has defended its sovereign right to put forth a national security strategy without consulting with others” (p. 261). In the national context, the United States has a tendency to rely on its European roots as the “dominant position in American life” (Massey, 1995, p. 632), However, due to the large influx of immigrants to major urban areas like Los Angeles and Miami, people of European decent are expected to become the minority in the future (1995). It is this fear of cultural displacement that has resulted in rules about English being spoken in classrooms instead of Spanish and the continued nationalization of American and Christian holidays.

Buzan et al (1998) outline the three most common issues surrounding threats to societal security: migration, horizontal competition, and vertical competition. Migration suggests that the dominant group in society believes it is being overrun or diluted due to an influx of migration from another group. As a result of this dilution the community will be changed (1998). Horizontal competition occurs when the original group is still living in the region while their ways are changing as the newer group moves in their cultural and linguistic influence (1998).

In this regard, a newer identity is created that merges the original identity with the newer cultural influences. It is during this transition period that divides are seen within societies. Thus society does not refer to state population, but as Buzan et al (1998) suggest, it is based on communities with which individuals identify. The original group in the area may hold onto their culture by deeming the newer cultures as a threat.

Vertical competition says that the original group will stop seeing themselves as unique due to integration projects or secessionist/regionalist projects which pull different groups together, either widening or narrowing their identities (1998). For example, certain cities such as San Antonio, Texas (53% Latin or Hispanic), have majority-minority populations resulting in
integration where both groups (White or Hispanic) can identify as either (CNBC.com, 2011).

The securitizing society can react to the perceived threat through laws in their community and state through the political or military systems (Buzan et al, 1998). In many cases, the space between societal and political merges because situations originally deemed simple cultural nuances (Arabic restaurants in Dearborn, Michigan) can become politically charged (immigration from the U.S/Mexican border and the fear of homegrown terrorism).

Securitizing the U.S. economy

Since colonial times, America has been perceived by the international community as an exceptional place where anything was possible (Goldberg, 2010) and unlike Britain, France, Germany, and Japan, the American industrialization machine did not have to seek colonies as markets or for raw materials (2010). “The relative US decline was an inevitable result of the exaggerated position of global dominance it held in 1944,” (Buzan et al, 1998; p. 97). Globalization has changed the United States in the last 30 years resulting in an identity crisis and a feeling of national insecurity (Goldberg, 2010). Certain immigration policies also ensured a large, cheap labor force.

The massive global economy that once had allowed the United States to become an economic leader was beginning to disintegrate due in part to the lure of cheap overseas labor. “The United States’ continental market has been taken over, in a semi-nonfriendly way, by the international marketplace” (Goldberg, 2010). The US dominant position was challenged by Europe and Japan as these regions began to recover after World War II and also by newly decolonized countries that were moving towards modernization (Buzan et al, 1998). However, like the previous three decades, American economic polices favored countries from Europe, which were perceived as “potential equals” (Beeson and Higgott, 2005, p. 1179) while Asian countries were viewed as
“alien” and “inferior” (p. 1179). For the first time, America was feeling the challenge of having to compete in a new market that had sizable opponents many of whom were perceived as “Others.”

Some of the largest issues that led America to this perceived sense of insecurity are trade deficits, the county’s dependence on foreign oil, and the pressure on the US currency (Buzan et al, 1998). This process made the conditions ripe for securitization mainly because the United States was entering an unfamiliar territory of economic interdependence that made the country economically weaker (1998). Economic success in Europe and Asia also prompted this national insecurity. There was evidence that the Bush administration (2001-2009) had been in the process of securitizing the global economy in U.S. policy (Higgott, 2004); however, 9/11 cemented this ideology. Globalization was not only seen in neo-liberal economic terms, but also through the lens of national security (2004). As John Ikenberry notes:-

“The pre-eminence of American power today is unprecedented in modern history. No other great power has enjoyed such formidable advantages in military, economic, technological, cultural or political capabilities. We live in a one superpower world and there is no serious competitor in sight” (Ikenberry, 2002, p. 1).

Prior to 9/11, the Bush Administration began adopting policies and procedures that were extraordinary to the norms for foreign economic policy (Higgott, 2004). Recent changes in these policies included the unilateralist attitudes towards economic reform instruments like the World Trade Organization, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank following the Asian financial crisis (Higgott, 2004). Other aspects of this dissent included walking away from the Kyoto Protocol (2004). Post 9/11 resulted in a renewed sense of American exceptionalism.

Unilateral economic moves were not unique to the post-9/11 period. After World War II, the US used its dominance to create and set in place global economic management systems that were mainly beneficial to its national interests (Higgott, 2004). These interests were threatened following the attacks of September 11, 2001, and the rhetorical claims made by the Bush
administration and the media made globalization into a securitized issue, namely because of the country’s dependence on foreign oil from countries perceived as the “other.”

After the Cold War, the country was facing a deficit in national security threats (Buzan, 2006). Washington sought a replacement that could match the Soviet Union as an enemy for military and foreign policy; however, countries like Japan, China and various “rogue states” (Buzan, 2006; p. 1101) did not provide an adequate “common cause and a shared framing that underpinned US leadership of the West.” (2006, p. 1101). Claims made by the Bush Administration following the 9/11 attacks gave the US a long term global war on terror that allowed it to reassert itself as the dominant leader in global security (Buzan, 2006). In a series of claims, the attacks also helped to frame US interests in foreign policy as universal ideals. (2006).

Securitizing war and conflict

The media has always had an amplifying effect on politics, but the 9/11 attacks brought into light the vulnerabilities of America in terms of its perceived cultural, economic, and technological superiority. As a result, securitization becomes a particularly relevant form of framing, in that it highlights certain elements that make an issue a threat that requires extraordinary measures beyond normal routines and politics. Thus if the function of framing is “to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text” (Entman, 1993, p. 52), then securitization is a frame that emphasizes those aspects of reality (Vultee, 2007).

Much of framing’s impact comes from the shortcuts it offers to people who, facing a flood of mediated information, act as “cognitive misers” (Pachur & Hartwig, 2006), by using systematic shortcuts to cut through the information quagmire. Unlike agenda setting, which says the media doesn’t tell audiences “what to think” but “what to think about” (McCombs and Shaw 1972); framing tells audiences how hard to think about what they are being told to think about (Vultee,
Pan and Kosicki (1993) suggest that news texts should be “viewed as a system of organized signifying elements that both indicate the advocacy of certain ideas and provide devices to encourage certain kinds of audience processing of the texts” (p. 56).

Cognitive cues like securitization work with frames to provide pinpoint cues to audiences that allow them to quickly make judgments based on easy-to-digest bits of information. In the context of the war on terror, securitized cues play a specific role in US political and journalistic discourse (Vultee, 2011) by giving audiences and journalists immediate “good” and “bad guys.”

The war on terror, like Pearl Harbor, created the classic conditions in which securitization can operate as a frame. Not only can securitizing actors argue, and gain assent for, using extraordinary measures to protect the country from future attacks, but there is comparatively little resistance when securitizing actors propose to hunt down, separate and vilify those who have been deemed the villains – or, for these purposes, those who look or talk or worship like the villains. Gandy (1998) refers to this new breed of politics as the “culture wars” and suggests that opponents (politicians and the media) use negative stereotypes to frame race and ethnicity to make identifying markers for attacks. Audiences see these stereotypes and accept them as reality. As a result, media portrayals of terrorists tend to rely on broadcast footage of “Brown” men in faraway places like the Middle East or South Asia.

Images of “Brown” people combined with language identifying this group as “inferior” allowed the US to maintain its cultural superiority globally. However, the 9/11 attacks forced the US to redefine itself in the global world order. On September 11, 2001, President George W. Bush announced: "Freedom itself was attacked this morning by a faceless coward, and freedom will be defended” (CNN, 2001). Freedom was a part of America’s identity and it had been attacked and as a result it was imperative to protect freedom, as well as punish the “faceless cowards” that had
attacked it. According to Buzan and Wæver (1998), national identity has a stronger pull than national sovereignty because it is at the core of U.S. identity and defines whether “we” are still “us” (Buzan et al, 1998; Vultee, 2011).

Within the realm of international relations, the state is considered the only legitimate referent object for military security (Buzan et al, 1998). The state is comprised of a ruling elite, but it is an imperfect model in that it does not incorporate all the elements of civil society found at the national level (1998). Therefore, the door opens to other referent objects, such as language, the “American way of life” and religion.

Prior to 9/11, the growth of Islam was seen as a potential threat to the Western world; however, since post-attacks, the perception of Islam has become synonymous with terrorism (Adnan, 1989; Ibrahim, 2010). Islam itself did not attack the state physically or its identity; however, its followers represented something that was foreign and culturally different (what makes America, America) and as a result there continues to be a fear that the country cannot survive if its identity becomes altered (Vultee, 2011). As with immigration and campaigns to prevent Spanish from being used in the American public sphere, this fear of the loss of identity results in actors claiming Sharia law will void the U.S. Constitution and campaigning for bills that will prevent this takeover. In many ways Sharia law has been securitized as a specific threat because it threatens the dominant American way of life in that it is the “enemy’s” law and way of life and the “possibility of radical Muslims infiltrating the US government and establishing a Taliban-style theocracy” (Sullivan, 2011). Despite the lack of evidence, politicians, like former House Speaker Newt Gingrich and Alabama State Senator Gerald Allen, both calling for a federal law that would deter the use of Sharia law in U.S. courts (2010). The fear that American culture and “way of life,” or what makes America unique, could inherently be altered by the introduction of a “foreign” legal
and moral code is how Sharia Law is securitized. Buzan (2010) says that the only uniqueness that the U.S. may actually have is its desire to “impose its values on others for their own benefit” (p. 7), but other states have also followed a similar path, suggesting that the US is perhaps not more or less unique than any other dominant culture or power.

Outside of language and culture, certain ethnic groups may be targeted as “enemies” after major events, like Middle Easterners and South Asians in the years after 9/11. Further, once the actor made a securitizing move, claiming that a referent object was under threat, the actor needed a target audiences’ support (Buzan et al, 1998). Dissent of any sort, especially following the days after the attacks, would have warranted negative public outcries. O’Reilly (2008) refers to this as hyper-patriotism. This hyper-patriotism made the atmosphere ripe for the Bush administration to create ties to Iraq and the “war on terror.” Members of the Bush administration contended Saddam Hussein had active ties to al-Qaeda, which in turn led to a hunt for the infamous weapons of mass destruction; however, both assertions were unfounded and as a result the administration lost a majority of international support for war (2008). Due to high levels of patriotism after 9/11, the administration was able to successfully securitize the Iraq War in the United States using the media (2008).

Another way to capture target audiences is to get media and political elites discussing those topics. Although dissent is not stopped by discussions, it has a better chance of reaching traditional news outlets and target audiences if it comes from conversations already happening among the elites (Entman, 2004). The cascading activation model, according to Entman (2004), is how specific frames about war, public policy, and economy start at the top level of a government system (for example, the White House) and move onto other elites such as Congress and experts, then to the media, and finally to the public. But before these frames make it to the media and eventually
the public, there must be agreement among top-level political elites (Bennett, 1990). The relationship between government and the mass media has not always been so antagonistic.

The intent of the mass media is to act as a balance to counter the potential unchecked power of government (Bennett, 1990). “A strong, adversarial press must be ready to raise its own and other grass-roots voices against government officials who would exclude those voices from deliberations about the national interest” (1990, p. 104). However, due to budget cuts and the growing need to fill “news holes,” journalists rely on government officials to supply a steady stream of information (1990). Bennett (1990) suggest that news professionals “index” a variety of “voices and viewpoints in both news and editorials according to the range of views expressed in mainstream government debate about a given topic” (p. 106). In this way the government controls the information that mass media covers as it eventually makes its way to the audience. The interpretations of the topics then come back from the lowest level (public) eventually making it to the higher levels (Entman, 2004). Thus, once the political elite were in agreement and had the media on their side, the decision to invade Iraq was largely supported by the American public.

“Winning the moral support of the American public and the formal support of a Senate vote went hand-in-hand, and arguably influenced each other in supporting the war” (O’ Reilly, 2008, g. 67). The rhetoric the Bush administration used also helped to narrow the gap between citizen and state, keeping the security issues of the politically elite in line with American citizens (2008). Speeches with metaphors suggesting a “good” versus “evil” (2008) with the U.S. as the “good guys” and Iraq as the “bad guys” helped to further American exceptionalism and the need to protect “our way of life.” Securitizing an issue allows an actor to describe an issue as a security threat without having to go into significant details. Thus the decision to invade Iraq was supported by the American public despite international dissent because of the hyper-patriotic atmosphere
post-9/11.

The language used by Bush, combined with the highly emotional state of the country and the “national feeling and fostering of hyper-patriotism, driven through the mainstream media which played upon the 9/11 attacks and created an audience far more susceptible to securitization rhetoric” (O’Reilly, 2008; p. 67). In addition, for securitization to be successful, the target audience needs to be appropriate and relevant. The audience needs to be a group that the threat would be a viable threat to (2008). In the case of the Iraq War, support from the international community was not required; rather it was sufficient to convince Congress and the public.

US identity also plays a major role in international relations, especially in terms of how U.S. foreign policy can treat one country benevolently, while the “Other” is considered a threat (Hayes, 2009). In order to securitize an issue successfully, actors must use the language of security by appealing “to certain norms and identities in order to communicate the idea of a threat and that the object threatened is valuable” (2009, p. 982). The Copenhagen School says the language used by actors can position whether a situation is deemed a threat (Wæver, 1995). Political leaders use language that helps create a democratic identity and as such nations that share similar democratic identifying markers are considered allies. Nations deemed allies versus enemies by US political leaders are created as a mechanism of self-preservation. Nations that are dissimilar to America can fall into the “othered” category and that prejudice can trickle down to the media and further to the public.

*Securitizing images and traditional/social media discourse*

Both theories of framing and securitization contend that phrases, metaphors, and images are a required component to understanding political outcomes. On their basic levels, the theories posit that through the use of many types of discursive practices, the actor can construct existential
threats (Watson, 2011). Securitizing actors like political leaders can endorse the need for emergency actions beyond the normal routines (Buzan et al, 1998). Using this definition, the media is also a securitizing actor, in that it was used as a facilitating agency to seek public support for the military actions in Afghanistan, Iraq, and the U.S. “war on terror.” For this project, the increasing relevance of social media in news consumption is an important factor in how audiences interpret news information.

Because of the role the media plays, this research specifically looks at audience attitudes towards news information that is securitized or nonsecuritized. It suggests that when audiences are presented with visual cues that play on stereotypes and themes that have already been made salient in the news media, those ideas will not have to fight opposing ideas because stereotypes readily used in mainstream media have already primed audiences, thus making securitizing moves more likely to succeed. When issues surrounding immigration or terrorism are presented in the news media, audiences, in many cases have negative attitudes towards the information. The process of securitization is open to the securitizing actor. The “actor” can securitize any issue so long as he/she can make any effective claims about the threat, which in turn needs an appropriate audience to accept such claims (Williams, 2003). Part of the securitizing actor’s job is to also define the boundaries of “friends” versus “enemies.” Schmitt (1985, as cited in Williams 2003) suggests that “enemies” are not necessarily defined as economic competitors or even morally evil, but rather as ‘others’ whose very nature makes them an existential threat so that in extreme cases, conflict is considered a norm. When a group or community has been “othered” by securitizing actors like politicians and the media, it opens the door for the public to view these groups as alien and a danger to them. Thus, political actors in conjunction with the news media can form a very powerful securitizing union.
One of the most powerful forms of communication media is television. Without words, televised images can help to define who the “enemies” versus “friends” are in relation to any nation. Thus, similar topics like war and conflict, where there tend to be grayer moral areas, can be constructed in ways that suggest those who are most similar to us are the “good guys” while those deemed unusual or strange are depicted as “bad guys.” Television images have become the privileged lens through which moral relations are mediated and filtered to the modern world (Ignatieff, 1998). In reality, conflicts are not composed of “good guys” and “bad guys.” Frames can eliminate gray areas in conflict by diverting audience attention to support those portrayed as our allies, while instilling hatred and fear to those deemed “villains.” Still, the degree to which fundamentally rhetorical arguments like securitization work with televised images remains unexplored. According to Buzan et al (1998), a successful argument is a combination of the language used, as well as the public value of the actor(s) that authorize that speech. However, this definition does not include the added power of televisual images and immediacy of broadcast news. Although words are powerful, images have the ability to communicate beyond just the verbal and have become an essential form of communication (Moeller, 1999). Images, especially moving images, can convey emotion and add clarity and depth that words alone may not be able to (1999). Images can penetrate the consciousness of the public, calling to question issues surrounding domestic and international conflict.

Securitization scholars also recognize the importance of non-linguistic forms of communication, such as images, to help aid in the move towards a more multi-layered understanding of security theory (Watson, 2011; Möller, 2007; McDonald, 2008). Broadcast images used in conjunction with television linguistic tools have created a social reality that allows the actor to make the successful securitizing move (Williams, 2003). The constant barrage of
television images that depict nefarious-looking “Others” in faraway desert countries shooting targets with rifles or lines of immigrants from Mexico waiting for daily employment juxtaposed with a well placed voiceover have created an electronic media environment ripe with “threats” to America and Americans.

Images cannot function without the appropriate linguistic tools to make an issue securitized. Vuori (2010) suggests that images and symbols can facilitate, or impede, securitization moves. They require some sort of anchorage to have the full effect. Certain words, such as terrorism, automatically bring to mind danger and fear (2010). These types of words have already been institutionalized as securitized (2010). However, some written text is open to interpretation and may be more difficult to securitize, therefore the employment of images can help to convey the emotion and clarity that words alone are not able to. It is also important to recognize that images require a member of the media to give them meaning and provide a solid context to the audience (2010). Without previous securitization, it would be difficult for images to convey that act of securitization alone. Images, therefore, perform a facilitating act between the speech act and securitization.

The attacks of 9/11 provided a contemporary example of how broadcast images were used to create an atmosphere open to securitizing forces (verbal and non-verbal). The use of raw footage on television of the planes crashing into the towers followed by the ash-covered faces of survivors and emergency personnel made it easier for actors like the media and politicians to justify the use of extraordinary means to stop the threat. The constant images also made it easier for the American public to see the justification behind using those means (Shapiro, 2004; Williams, 2003). Television images also created hypernationalism. “Media sources, and in particular the major television news networks, strived to show how patriotic they were, how proud they were to be American and most
importantly how just was the cause for war,” (O’Reilly, 2008; p. 71). In this hyper-patriotic world amid visuals and words, where does social media fit?

Cultural theorist Paul Virilio says cyberspace provides a newer perspective compared to traditional media (n.d.). Walsh and Barbara (2006) suggest that cyberspace has allowed the “war on terror” to take place in a number of geographic fronts. The Internet, specifically social media, has allowed many groups to engage with the political process in unprecedented ways, using imagery as a way to create and sustain fear or unite populations for a cause.

In the Western world, Walsh et al (2006) say that despite citizens’ enjoying unparalleled opportunities to engage and express their political opinions while gaining diverse information, they have inadvertently weakened their ability to make real political changes. Social media provides a political vent where citizens can express themselves, while the state continues to pursue its own agendas. However, these techniques are entrenched in the broader realm of more traditional mass media for which the state mobilizes public opinion and support (Walsh et al, 2006).

In recent years, social media has been used as a tool for engagement and mobilization. The most recent examples are the protests across the Middle East, in which youth activists utilized social media platforms like Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube to engage with their governments and each other (Ali and Fahmy, 2013). Many bloggers focused their energies on dislocating the hegemonic norms of racial superiority and transforming the contemporary social order. According to Domingo and Heinonen (2008), bloggers are challenging the definition of journalism by removing the concept of the “trained observer.” Despite traditional media’s dominance in viewership (Olmstead, Jurkowitz, Mitchell and Enda, 2013), news from social media is gaining trust from younger consumers (Huang, 2009). According to Huang (2009), younger viewers consume news to monitor the world around them and prefer Internet sources for their shorter, more
concise writing styles, as well as the multimedia visual presentations. Further, younger consumers also “like to control what news to access and how to access it. For some, they do not just want to be passive news receivers; they also want to contribute content via participatory media, such as blogging and podcast” (Huang, 2009, p. 117).

Despite the growth of social media, it continues to remain on the fringes of news trustworthiness and credibility. However, in regards to authenticity, social media may take on a stronger presence. In the Middle East protests, traditional media, most of which are owned by governments, were not considered a trustworthy or even credible source (Ali and Fahmy, 2013). Those media systems were considered mouthpieces of the government, hence the reliance on social media platforms. However, no studies to date look at audience attitudes towards information coming from social media sources from the Western world. This study hopes to add to the literature regarding how Americans view securitized information coming from both traditional and social media spaces. It also looks at how the amplifying effects of securitization work in conjunction with media frames to make cultural and societal differences more salient.

The next chapter will lay out the hypotheses and research questions which ask how audiences perceive trust, credibility and authenticity in regards to race and modality. This section will lead into the methodology for this dissertation. The current study is an experiment that utilizes broadcast images of traditional and social media anchors and podcasters, respectively, presenting securitized and nonsecuritized information. The methods will lay the foundation of how race and security work in a traditional and new media environment.
HYPOTHESES AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS

*Hypotheses and research question on trust, credibility and authenticity of PRESENTERS’ RACE*

**Hypothesis 1a:** The White (Anglo-European descent) anchor presenting the *securitized* story will be perceived as more trustworthy than the Brown (other/South Asian/Middle Eastern) anchor presenting the same story.

**Hypothesis 1b:** The White anchor presenting the *nonsecuritized* story will be perceived as more trustworthy than the Brown anchor presenting the same story.

**Hypothesis 2a:** The White anchor presenting the *securitized* story will be perceived as more credible than the Brown anchor presenting the same story.

**Hypothesis 2b:** The White anchor presenting the *nonsecuritized* story will be perceived as more credible than the Brown anchor presenting the same story.

**Research Question 1:** Will audiences perceive the Brown news presenter presenting either securitized/not securitized news as being the more authentic voice than the White news presenter presenting the same stories?

*Hypothesis on trust, credibility and authenticity of MODALITY (traditional and social media)*

**Hypothesis 3:** Stories from traditional media (broadcast TV) will be perceived as more trustworthy than stories from podcasts (social media).

**Hypothesis 4:** Stories from traditional media (broadcast TV) will be perceived as more credible than stories from podcasts.
Research question 2: Will audiences perceive news information from podcasts as more authentic than traditional media?

MEDIA USE (traditional and social) on trust, credibility and authenticity on PRESENTERS’ RACE and STORY TYPE

Research question 3: What is the effect of participants media use (traditional or social) on trust of presenter?

Research question 4: What is the effect of media (traditional and social) usage of participant on credibility of presenter?

Research question 5: What is the effect of media (traditional and new) usage of participant on authenticity of presenter?

Participants’ POLITICAL LEANINGS and PERCEIVED POLITICS OF THE MEDIA

Research question 6a: What is the effect of participants’ political leanings on trust of the presenter?

Research question 6b: What is the effect of the perceived politics of the media on participant trust of the presenter?

Research question 7a: What is the effect of participants’ political leanings on credibility of the presenter?

Research question 7b: What is the effect of the perceived politics of the media on participant credibility of the presenter?
Research question 8a: What is the effect of political leanings of the participant on the authenticity of presenter?

Research question 8b: What is the effect of the perceived politics of the media of the participant on authenticity of presenter?

Participants’ POLITICAL LEANINGS and PERCEIVED POLITICS OF THE MEDIA and STORY TYPE

Research question 9a: What is the effect of participants’ political leanings on trust of story type?

Research question 9b: What is the effect of the perceived politics of the media on trust of story type?

Research question 10a: What is the effect of political leanings of the participants’ on credibility of story type?

Research question 10b: What is the effect of the perceived politics of the media on credibility of story type?

Research question 11a: What is the effect of political leanings of the participants’ on authenticity of story type?

Research question 11b: What is the effect of the perceived politics of the media on authenticity of story type?

We cannot ignore the possibility that that participant characteristics, like age, gender and ethnic backgrounds, can play a role in how these participants perceive trust, credibility and
authenticity of presenters and story types. Therefore I propose the following research questions based on age, gender and participants’ ethnic backgrounds.

**AGE of PARTICIPANT on Trust, Credibility and Authenticity on presenter and story type**

**Research question 12:** What is the effect of age of participant on trust of presenter and story type?

**Research question 13:** What is the effect of age of participant on credibility of presenter and story type?

**Research question 14:** What is the effect of age of participant on authenticity of presenter and story type?

**Research question 15:** What is the effect of age of participant on perceptions of trust, credibility and authenticity of the modality?

Further, the study looks at how participant gender and ethnicity can also play a factor in trust, credibility, and authenticity and how these audiences perceive story type, race of anchor, and modality of the source.

**GENDER and perceptions of trust, credibility and authenticity of presenter, story type and modality**

**Hypothesis 5:** Women will perceive both presenters as more trustworthy compared to men.

**Hypothesis 6:** Women will perceive both presenters as more credibility compared to men.

**Research question 16:** Will male or female participants find the Brown presenter more/less authentic than the White presenter?

**PARTICIPANT RACE and perceptions of trust, credibility and authenticity**
Hypothesis 7: Participants who self-identify as South Asian and Middle Eastern will perceive the Brown anchor more trustworthy than participants who self-identify as Caucasian.

Hypothesis 8: Participants who self-identify as South Asian and Middle Eastern will perceive the Brown anchor more credible than participants who self-identify as Caucasian.

Research question 17: Which ethnic group of participants will perceive the Brown anchor more authentic than the White anchor?
CHAPTER 4

METHODOLOGY

Participants and procedure

Undergraduate students from Wayne State University were recruited from the Communication Department’s participant pool. The participant pool draws primarily on the introductory public speaking course, a campus wide requirement, but also uses other communication courses in which extra credit is offered. The experiment was presented on desktop computers with flat-screen monitors, using the MediaLab data collection program (Jarvis, 2010). 171 participants were recruited, but that number was dropped to 165 due to a technical error with one of the computers. Course credit for participants was recorded in a separate management system.

College students can provide valuable information about psychological processes within the context of basic research. In addition, students are appropriate for basic research because it focuses on relative effects (Kardes, 1996). Relative effects can be determined using carefully controlled studies and well-developed measures that provide useful information about the moderating variables and mediating process that explain behavior (Baron & Kenny, 1986). Student samples are not required to be representative of the population in experimental studies for several reasons: experiments can randomly assign conditions, as was done in this study, and multivariate effects (such as the effect of a news story on attitudes) are different from univariate effects (the attitudes themselves), thus the theory can be tested using this sample (Basil, Brown and Bocarnea, 2002).

The sample of 165 participants used for this study includes the following ethnicities as compared to the current ethnic populations in the United States (see chart below):
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Student sample</th>
<th>Percentage (out of 165)</th>
<th>U.S. ethnicity</th>
<th>Percentage (out of total population, 308.7 million, approximately; United States Census, 2010)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic or Latino</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>Hispanic or Latino</td>
<td>12.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Native American or Alaskan Native</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
<td>Native American or Alaskan Native</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Asian/American</td>
<td>5.5%</td>
<td>East Asian/American</td>
<td>4.8%* (combined with South Asian/American)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Native Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander</td>
<td>.6%</td>
<td>Native Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White or Caucasian</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>White or Caucasian</td>
<td>75.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Asian/American</td>
<td>11.5%</td>
<td>South Asian/American</td>
<td>4.8%* (combined with East Asian/American)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle Eastern/ Middle Eastern American</td>
<td>14.5%</td>
<td>Middle Eastern/ Middle Eastern American</td>
<td>.42% (year 2000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black/African American</td>
<td>23.6%</td>
<td>Black/African American</td>
<td>12.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multi or Biracial</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>Multi or Biracial</td>
<td>2.4%</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Table 1
The average age of the participants was 22.5 years old. Out of the 165 participants, 70 identified as male, while 95 identified as female.

**Experimental design**

The current study is a 2 (ethnicity of the presenter) x 2 (medium modality) x 2 (story type) mixed design. The independent variables, race of presenter, story type, and medium modality. Race of presenter and story type were within-subjects variables, while modality was a between-subjects variable. Ethnicity of presenter is operationalized as South Asian/Middle Eastern (Brown) and Caucasian (White). Medium modality is operationalized as traditional media and podcast. The final story type is operationalized as securitized and not securitized. Demographic factors and participants’ attitude toward media and government are between-subject factors.

**Stimulus material**

Scholars have stressed the necessity of creating television news stimuli that are seen as realistic despite being used in an artificial setting (Brosuis, Donsbach, & Birk, 1996). Thus the stimuli were created keeping in mind real life newsroom settings (lighting, anchor desk, camera footage). Thus, the researcher (a former television reporter and anchor) recruited journalism students specifically interested in careers in broadcast television reporting as talent.

In order to test the hypothesis/research questions, one Caucasian (Anglo-European descent) anchor and one “other” (South Asian/Middle Eastern) student were recruited to play the respective parts. The presenters were female. According to Coleman and Wu (2006) during the 9/11 attacks both male and female anchors had the same rate of success or failure at concealing their nonverbal expressions while reporting on the attacks. Coupled with the fact that approximately 65% of bachelor’s degrees in journalism were awarded to women in 2003, more than double from the 30% awarded in 1970 (Becker, Vlad, Huh, & Mace, 2003), suggests that
audiences are often going to see female newscasters. The current research hopes to fill in the gap in the literature regarding news reported by “anchors” within the context of social media, as there is far less theoretical research on the subject.

Playing the role of the social media podcaster were two journalism students recruited by the researcher from Wayne State and Oakland University. The student presenters were given copies of their footage to be used for resume tapes/demo reels, as well as a Target gift card. All the presenters were women. One anchor and one podcaster were chosen from Oakland University and the other anchor and podcaster were chosen from Wayne State University.

In the effort to minimize any external factors that may influence participants, the presenters were of similar body types. In addition, all anchors/podcasters wore the same clothing and had similar hair and makeup styles during the news story tapings. The presenters were asked to keep their makeup neutral and hair pulled back. All presenters chosen for this study were native English speakers with Midwest accents.

Stories were based on current news stories in traditional media in 2011. Story topics included: NATO attacks on Pakistan, drone attacks, CIA agent shooting, Iraqi refugees, Lowes pulling its advertisements from a Muslim reality show, gunman in Los Angeles, Sharia law and the Ground Zero mosque. Each story was written in securitized and nonsecuritized versions, and each of those was prepared for presentation in traditional broadcast style and in the less formal style of podcasts, creating a total of 32 versions. All stories were reviewed by another professional multimedia journalist.

To address validity and reliability issues, this project used the de Vreese (2004) study on the enlargement of the European Union as a guide. Thus the decision to produce news stories, rather than select stories as a representation of the framing issue was made. Creating news story
stimuli ensures that the researcher has full control over the material, such as the variation of the manipulation, and can exclude any unintended variations (2004). Also, this avoids the potential of participants’ having seen the stories before (2004).

Before beginning the experiment, participants were asked a series of demographic questions. Participants were asked to indicate all ethnicities to which they might belong, their age, gender and media consumption. Those questions specifically dealing with the participants’ political affiliation, and trust in media (traditional and social), used Vultee’s (2007) media distance scales.

Participants were randomly assigned to one of eight conditions. Each of the eight conditions had eight stories, about 35 to 60 seconds in length. Thus, participants watched about four to six minutes of video. The participants were divided into two smaller groups. One group viewed all traditional media stories, while the other group viewed all of the podcasts. After each video, participants answered a series of questions based on scales for the dependent variables (trust, credibility, and authenticity—see Appendix B for questions). Including demographic questions, video viewing, and experiment questions; the experiment time was about 25 to 30 minutes.

The conditions with stories are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Condition 1</th>
<th>Brown</th>
<th>Television</th>
<th>Securitized/Nonsecuritized</th>
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<td>NATO Attacks</td>
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<td>Iraqi refugees</td>
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<td>Lowes’ ads</td>
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<td>Gunman</td>
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<td>Sharia Law</td>
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<td>Ground Zero Mosque</td>
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<tr>
<td>Condition 2</td>
<td>White</td>
<td>Television</td>
<td>Securitized/Nonsecuritized</td>
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<td>Ground Zero Mosque</td>
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<tr>
<th>Condition 3</th>
<th>Brown</th>
<th>Television</th>
<th>Securitized/Nonsecuritized</th>
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<td>NATO Attacks</td>
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<td>Sharia Law</td>
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<td>Ground Zero Mosque</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Condition 4</th>
<th>White</th>
<th>Television</th>
<th>Securitized/Nonsecuritized</th>
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<td>NATO Attacks</td>
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<td>Ground Zero Mosque</td>
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Condition 5</th>
<th>Brown</th>
<th>Podcast</th>
<th>Securitized/Nonsecuritized</th>
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<td>NATO Attacks</td>
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<td>Raymond Davis</td>
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<tr>
<td>Condition 6</td>
<td>White</td>
<td>Podcast</td>
<td>Securitized/Nonsecuritized</td>
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<tr>
<th>Condition 7</th>
<th>Brown</th>
<th>Podcast</th>
<th>Securitized/Nonsecuritized</th>
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<td>Ground Zero Mosque</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Condition 8</th>
<th>White</th>
<th>Podcast</th>
<th>Securitized/Nonsecuritized</th>
</tr>
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<td></td>
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<td>NATO Attacks</td>
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Table 2
Current research suggests that social media users are divided similarly to women in television news. The numbers of male/female users of social media is approximately even; in particular sites such as Facebook, MySpace, Flicker, and Linkedin indicate that women are using these sites just as often as men (Graham, 2005). Thus the use of female podcasters is also appropriate for this study.

Scholars have criticized experiments for having low external validity, such as having a created artificial viewing environment. However, experiments are considered superior to other methods when investigating the effects of key independent variables (Kinder and Palfrey, 1993). In the case of framing studies done on television news, there are several shortcomings to the potential design and external validity to these experiments in general (de Vreese, 2004). First, researchers are not able to fully manipulate the independent variable. Second, there is a potential for low external validity because the experiment may not be generalizable to a larger population or different population. To avoid that potential pitfall, it is imperative to create stimuli that keep in mind journalistic practices (2004).

**Measurement**

The study has three independent variables, race of anchor (Anglo-European descent vs. ‘the other’ South Asian-looking), story frame type (securitized and not securitized), and modality of the information source (traditional media versus social media). In addition the study has four dependent variables: trust (in presenter/information/modality), credibility (in presenter/information/modality), and authenticity (in presenter/information/modality) and story type (securitized and nonsecuritized).
Although trust is generally measured using credibility scales, this study argues that trust and credibility are distinct from one another (Kohring and Matthes, 2007). A credible source may not necessarily be a trusted source while a trusted source may not be perceived as being credible. Relying on previous research, trust and credibility were measured using different scales. Authenticity, on the other hand, is not widely discussed in the literature; thus ad hoc scales were developed that address dependent variables using scales that address issues of believability and truthfulness.

**Trust scales**

Tsfati and Cappella (2003) define trust as relationship over time between two sides: a trustor and a trustee. In other words one side must place the trust, while the other side is being trusted. Trust allows people to deal with the risk of a complex open future, in that it enables them to give up control to another. The trustor, whether through action or information, now becomes the link to the trustee’s future, helping to reduce the complexity of not knowing (Luhmann, 1979). This is how trust replaces knowledge. But it must be noted that the actual act of trusting is “a state midway between knowing and not knowing” (Simmel, 1964 in Kohring and Matthes, 2007). Thus the trustee does not know if his/her trust is warranted (2007).

Fukuyama (1995) defines trust, in the general sense, as honest and cooperative behavior that is based on commonly shared norms of professional standards. Thus, the media trust scales must also take into consideration audience assessments of media fairness and objectivity, as well as accuracy and credibility. Tsfati and Cappella (2003) found that trust was also gained through consumption patterns. Essentially, individuals who trust the mainstream media tend to get their information and news from these traditional sources; however, those who have higher levels of mistrust of mainstream media focus their attention to alternative sources, such as the Internet. Their
study also found that even though skeptics and non-skeptics do not differ significantly in the amount of news exposure, skeptics tended to view higher amounts of non-mainstream news.

Bennett, Staci & Flickinger (2001) also found that trust was tied with how “fair” the viewing audience thinks the press is being when covering public affairs. Their data suggest that audiences that are more conservative with a tendency to be misanthropic tended to not trust the press to cover politics fairly. In addition, those who disapproved of Congress and the president were likely not to trust in media fairness (2001). This project also asked participants to indicate their trust in the government, their voting tendencies, as well as how closely they see their politics aligned with the media’s politics (Vultee, 2007).

Although there are multiple definitions of trust, this study uses Kohring’s (2004). Kohring (2004) defines a trust situation as: “Social Actor A selectively connects his or her own action with a certain action of Social Actor B under the condition of a perceived risk. The risk refers to the fact that A’s action becomes impossible when B does not fulfill the trust expectation toward him or her. For the Trustee A, this risk has not become legitimately tolerable because of factual criteria” (p. 130). For this study Social Actor A is the media presenter (social or traditional media), while Social Actor B is the audience.

In a modern society, information is widely disseminated through media channels, traditional or new. In particular, the protests in the Middle East have shown that social media is a major tool for youth activists who used sites like Facebook and YouTube to show the international audience the corruption of their governments. However, consumers, because of lack of time and resources (Huang, 2009), are also taking on the risk of giving media (traditional or new) the responsibility of selecting what news and information viewers will see (Kohring and Matthes, 2007). By selecting information that is to be disseminated to their audiences, the media create a
social reality, especially in regards to the way American’s see people in non-Western nations.

In addition, story (Entman, 1991; 1993; 2004; Scheufele, 1999) and image selection (Messaris & Abraham, 2001) are also framing techniques. By selecting certain stories, the media creates a very specific social reality of the world, which the viewer trusts is a true representation. Thus, when developing scales, selectivity of the information is also crucial to understanding how audiences perceive news about certain topics (e.g. terrorism, Ground Zero Mosque, etc).

Trust also extends into the online forums when audiences are selecting what information to consume. Georg and Jackob (2010) found that people with access to online information sources may feel less dependent on the media. In fact, many may also be less confident in mainstream media and thereby less susceptible to media effects. In the world of computer mediated communication, Caruso (2008) says that trust is a difficult concept to approach because of the lack of certainty regarding the identity of the communicator. However, the addition of visuals works do catalyze trust (2008).

This study also uses visuals, but those visuals are not necessarily devised to create trust. Rather the focus is on how audiences perceive information coming from a source that is Caucasian or South Asian/Middle Eastern. The use of visuals allows the researcher to determine how audiences will interpret trust from these particular anchors or podcasters. Thus Kohring’s (2004) definition of trust is a key element in this study as it focuses the relationship the audience has with the information provider (i.e. anchor or podcaster). In determining trust in media three items were measured: trust in the information (i.e. newsworthiness of topic, factual accuracy, accuracy of depiction), trust in the presenter (journalistic assessment), and trust in the medium after each video. The first two items used a version of Kohring and Matthes’s (2007) multidimensional scale; for the trust in medium, a simplified version of Nah and Chung’s (2012) scales were used as they
answer questions related to how audiences trust information from non-traditional sources such as social media versus a professional journalist.

Nah and Chung’s (2012) scales look at the use and trust of both professional and citizen journalism as associated with social capital, such as social trust and media credibility. Their scales were based on perceived journalistic roles of both traditional and citizen journalists and were measured with 15 items regarding five different roles: disseminator, interpreter, adversary, mobilize (calling audiences to action), and civic roles (based on scales developed by Weaver et al, 2007, also see Cassidy, 2007, see appendix for questions). Some of the 15 items were not used in this study as not all items answer the questions being examined. Participants answered questions based on a series of 5-point Likert scales (1-very important, 2-important, 3-neutral/don’t know, 4-not important, 5-not important at all). In addition to questions like: “People shouldn't believe everything they see on the Internet”; “I wouldn't believe this until I hear it on TV;,” were asked because they directly pertained to whether audiences trust the medium (Vultee, Ali, Stover, &Vultee, in press; Vultee, 2011).

Kohring and Matthes (2007) have differentiated the term trust from credibility. Mass communication research in media trust derives its theoretical lineage from sociology, in that these theories specifically refer to the selectivity of social actors, namely the mass media (Tsfati and Cappella, 2003). Thus these theories offer a relevant multidimensional scale for trust in media. In addition, like Kohring and Matthes (2007), this study is focused on trust in journalism, which is referred to as “trust in media.” It does not refer to other forms of media such as advertisement and entertainment.

**Credibility scales**

Credibility is a trait attributed to communicators by the audience (Infante, Rancer, &
In credibility research multiple reference objects were used, such as in the Yale experiments that Hovland and Weiss (1951) conducted. In some studies the reference object being studied for credibility was sometimes the media sources as channels and in others, authors of the message. Like the present study, Kiousis (2001) also divided credibility into two categories: source and medium credibility.

Source credibility involves examining how different communicator characteristics (i.e. race of anchor/podcaster) can influence how audiences process the messages (Addington, 1971; Markham, 1968; Mulac & Sherman, 1975; O’Keefe, 1990). The way audiences interpret messages based on the ‘presenter’ is particularly important when the message is in regards to risk and crisis communication. Although this study does not deal with an immediate crisis such as a food recall or the spread of a highly infectious disease, it does deal with threats to the American way of life. Newhagen and Nass’s (1987) media analysis found that television credibility was based on individual on-air personalities (i.e. news anchors, station brand). Thus the credibility of the information presenter is very important. As in previous studies, the presenter/communicator is defined as the individual presenting the information.

Medium credibility is focused on the modality that the information is disseminated from, rather than the presenter (Abel & Wirth, 1977; Gantz, 1981; Newhagen, 1997). In this study the two modalities compared were a traditional news broadcast and a podcast (for example: YouTube or a blog). Medium credibility has been studied far more extensively, especially during the age of information overload. Schweiger (2000) suggests that credibility can also influence the journalistic and commercial success of a given medium. Thus credibility is an important heuristic for viewers at the time of content selection (2000). Johnson and Kaye (1998) also focused on credibility in
online news media and online candidate literature and found that online news was perceived to be more credible than traditional print and broadcast news media.

The openness of the Internet makes it different from other technologies such as television when it comes to information retrieval, especially in key ways like credibility. The open accessibility of the medium is designed specifically to not be controlled by any one person or entity. This feature allows anyone to be an author at any time (Flanagin & Metzger, 2000). Coupled with traditional media reports following the use of social media during the uprisings in the Middle East, the Internet has also become a haven for activists in the United States and abroad.

Flanagin and Metzger (2000) found that audiences perceived information from online sources and more traditional sources like radio and television to be of equal credibility. Their study found that overall respondents reported Internet information to be as credible as information obtained from television, radio, and magazines, but not as credible as newspaper information. This study suggests that certain types of information sources (i.e. newspapers) are still considered more credible than newer (broadcast and Internet) information sources.

One of the most widely used credibility scales in media studies is Gaziano and McGrath’s (1986) 12-item scale (Sundar, 1998; Johnson and Kaye, 1998). Gaziano also noted that their credibility scales were derived by their predecessors Hovland and Weiss (1951) and have been successfully used by Meyer (1988), as well as many others.

Gaziano and McGrath’s (1986) factor analysis found that media credibility comprised 12 items: the news is fair, unbiased, tells the whole story, is accurate, respectful of people's privacy, watches out after people's interests, is concerned about the community's well-being, there is a separation of fact and opinion, can be trusted, is concerned about the public interest, factual, and has well-trained reporters. However, since trust is addressed in the previous scale, it will not be
addressed to determine credibility. Thus, the current study will use 11 of Gaziano and McGrath’s scales. Further, most literature on trust in media deals with mainstream sources (Gaziano and McGrath are about credibility in newspaper and television); however, the current research also delves into alternative spaces for information like social media.

Georg and Jackob (2010) also found that those skeptical of the media actively search for alternative sources for their news, as well as those who felt that they were not dependent on the media for information. Therefore the Gaziano and McGrath (1986) News Credibility Scale can be used for news coming from alternative sources like social media and podcasts. Abdulla, Garrison, Salwen, Driscoll, and Casey (2002) also used the Gaziano and McGrath (1986) credibility scales for newspapers, television, and Internet news. Thus, credibility will be measured using 11 of Gaziano and McGrath’s (1986) 12-item Likert-type news credibility scale. Participants will answer questions based on a series of 5-point Likert scales (e.g. 1-very important, 2-important, 3-neutral/don’t know, 4-not important, 5-not important at all).

**Authenticity scales**

Defining authenticity is more complex because it is largely thought of as being an emotional and political issue for native populations, especially those seeking sovereignty and their “own voice” (Linnekin, 1991). A contemporary example is the current and ongoing revolutions throughout the Middle East. Many of these activists have credited social media for providing a free forum to express their opinions, as well as allowing many in the Western world to hear the uncut, authentic voices of these people.

However, traditional media producers have voiced their concerns over believability, ethical lapses, newsgathering techniques, and news presentation of Internet sources of news and information (Lasica, 2001; Arant & Anderson, 2000; Williams, Wardle and Wahl-Jorgensen,
2011). Similarly, Flanagin and Metzger (2000) also argue that while traditional news sources go through a check and balance system, many Internet sites do not. The Internet is an open, free space where anyone with access to a computer can post information regardless of whether it is credible. It is up to the viewing public to discern its trustworthiness. However, despite the misgiving from traditional media producers, many people use the Internet as a source of news and information, especially those who have higher levels of mistrust of mainstream news media (Flanagin and Metzger, 2000). Although the concept of authenticity is deeply tied with the credibility, there is a difference. Authenticity speaks to the “realness” of the information. According to Dylko and McCluskey (2012) because much of the UGC created is in an unfinished form, this “projects authenticity and invites future participation by the users, which often guarantees refinement” (p. 257).

Information coming from wikis, blogs, Facebook, and other social media sites is generally written or posted by everyday people or those who are not tied to government or professional organizations such as traditional media agencies. Lasica (2003) says that the typical blogger is an amateur with no editorial oversight and no professional training as a journalist, and generally works outside the mainstream news media’s rules and standards. However, many bloggers see this as an asset and say that mainstream media is an elitist club that forces information to fit within its organizations routines and narratives, putting economic survival over its societal responsibility as a free press (2003).

Case in point, during the recent uprisings in the Middle East, social media took on a new role as being the authentic voice of the people (Ali & Fahmy, 2011). Many news organizations in the Middle East are government owned and therefore are seen as an extension of that government, including being corrupt. Supporters of citizen journalism argue that because citizen journalists are
living their stories, they are better equipped to give first-hand accounts (Liu et al, 2009). Essentially the source becomes the storyteller, thereby lending a more authentic voice to the report and giving first-hand accounts as they happen. Further, Hall (2009) suggests that authenticity perceptions would be associated with the sense that one has gained valid insights about the world. When the citizens of these countries sensed they were no longer able to get the information they needed, they turned to social media sources like Facebook and YouTube.

Domingo et al. (2008) argue that blogs are challenging the very definition of journalism because bloggers are pushing against the norm of the journalist as the “trained observer.” bloggers are generally involved in the stories they are reporting on (2008) thus giving first-hand accounts as they happen. In addition, these first-hand accounts may lend themselves to giving audiences an authentic voice. Previous research (Jacobson, 1969) suggests that authenticity is often synonymous with believability and trustworthiness.

Authenticity matters for many reasons. It has direct ties to the concepts of credibility and trust in that sources of information that are considered “inauthentic” generally are also considered sources that are not credible and untrustworthy. Authenticity is also a key concept in research about social media networks. When discussing social media networks such as Facebook and MySpace; Marwick and boyd (2010) presume that “authenticity” is tied in with truthfulness. This truth is generally seen as being accurate information about oneself such as age, sexuality, hometown, and likes and dislikes. It then stands to reason that information that is coming from a source, whether it is informal like a blog or podcast or a traditional forum like a local news affiliate, needs to have elements of truthfulness. But for something to be interpreted as truthful it also needs to be seen as believable. The addition of truth is how authenticity is different than trust and credibility.
Jacobson’s (1969) study looked at the believability of the media. Although the study does not ask questions pertaining to new media, the scales derived from it answer questions about authenticity in regards to both traditional and social media. Jacobson’s analysis compared both the source of the message (television, radio, and newspapers), as well as the person from whom the information was originating (Weiss, 1959; Sargent, 1965). He found that television news was perceived to be the most believable of the three mediums. Jacobson (1969) equated authenticity to believability and thus created authenticity scales comprised of: trustworthy-untrustworthy, accurate-inaccurate, expert-ignorant, and open minded-close minded.

A more contemporary look at Jacobson’s (1969) study was Austin and Dong (1994), who examined the extent to which message content contributed independently and in combination with institutional level source reputation to predict what was believable and truthful about specific news stories. Their factor analysis found that a reality emerged comprised of judgments about source truthfulness and message accuracy, source expertise and message representativeness, and finally source bias and personal perspective. These concepts were developed by Austin (1990) who referred to them as “apparent reality assessments” (ARA) and defined as the degree to which an individual believes media portrayals of issues or people reflect reality, which provides a way to test believability judgments based on message content and context.

Austin and Dong’s (1994) scales dealt with information from newspaper; however, the questions that they ask are also relevant to information from television and online sources and can easily be used. Thus this study uses Austin and Dong’s (1994) media believability scales with a few variations. Austin et. al (1994) also considered whether believability was influenced by the sources the reporters used. Because this study does not include sources and is just focused on the anchor and/or podcaster, that particular factor will not be considered.
As mentioned previously, the literature on authenticity suggests that for something to be perceived as authentic it must have elements of truthfulness and believability. This study purports that audiences will perceive authenticity in anchors and the modality of the information if these sources are truthful and believable. Thus, authenticity will be measured using two sub-scales: authenticity of modality and authenticity of the anchor. Participants will answer questions based on a series of 5-point Likert scales (1-very important, 2-important, 3-neutral/don’t know, 4-not important, 5-not important at all).

**Statistical analyses**

SPSS was used to run statistical analyses for this study. The statistical measure was a repeated Anova. The repeated Anova allows the researcher to use a smaller number of subjects in a shorter amount of time. One question this study asks is: Does the race of the presenter (anchor or podcaster) affect audience perception of trust, credibility, and authenticity after controlling for story type (high securitized or low securitized)? Because multiple measures were used, a repeated Anova was the appropriate statistical test. A Cronbach’s Alpha was used to measure the reliability of the trust, credibility, authenticity and securitization scales. Cronbach’s Alpha is used to measure reliability when multiple Likert questions are used to create a scale (Tavakol and Dennick, 2011). For trust, Cronbah’s Alpha measured at .8, credibility measured at .89, authenticity measured at .85 and securitization scales measured at .89. Acceptable values of alpha range from .70 to .95 (Tavakol and Dennick, 2011).
CHAPTER 5

RESULTS

Demographics

The main part of the study enrolled 171 participants. That number was reduced to 165 due to technical issues with one of the work stations. Of the 165 enrollees, about 42.4% were male (n=70) and 57.6% were female (n=95). Participants’ ages ranged from 16 to 63 (M= 22.47, SD= 7.68). About 37% (n=61) participants identified themselves as White or Caucasian, 23.6% (n=39) as Black or African American, 14.5% (n=24) as Middle Eastern or Middle Eastern American, and 11.5% (n=19) as South Asian or South Asian American. Other ethnicities included Hispanic or Latino, 3% (n=5), American Indian or Alaska Native, 1.2% (n=2), Native Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander, .6% (n=1), and multi or biracial, 3% (n=5).

Most participants reported using the Internet almost every day (68.5%, n=113), 20.6% (n=34) used the Internet/social media sites three to five days a week, 6.7% (n=11) one to two days a week, 1.8% (n=3) less than once a week, and 2.4% (n=4) reported having never used the Internet/social media sites. Participants’ radio use is broken down as follows: 20.6 % (n=34) used radio almost every day, 20% (n=33) used it three to five days a week, 24.8% (n=41) used it one to two days a week, 22.4% (n=37) used it less than once a week, and 12.1% (n=20) reported never using radio/radio websites. Television use is as follows: 18.8% (n=31) reported using almost every day, 25.5% (n=42) three to five days a week, 30.3% (n=50) use television one to two days a week, 20.6% (n=34) used it less than once a week, and 4.8% (n=8) never use television.

Turning to print media use (and their accompanying websites), 12.7% (n=21) participants use newspapers or their websites almost every day, 15.2% (n=25) use it three to five days a week, 26.7% (n=44) use newspapers one to two days a week, and 37.6% (n=62) are less than once a week, and 7.9% (n=13) never read newspapers. Finally magazines (and their websites) use was
reported as follows, 5.5% (n= 9) almost daily, 9.7% (n=16) use it three to five days a week, 23.6% (n=39) use it one to two days a week, 32.7% (n=54) use magazines and their websites less than once a week, and 28.5% (n=47) never use magazines.

The following table shows participants’ new media usage:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>New Media Usage</th>
<th>Almost every day</th>
<th>3 to 5 days a week</th>
<th>1 to 2 days a week</th>
<th>Less than once a week</th>
<th>Never</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Social Networking Site (i.e. Facebook and Twitter)</td>
<td>66.7% (n=110)</td>
<td>12.1% (n=20)</td>
<td>11.5% (n=19)</td>
<td>3.6% (n=6)</td>
<td>6.1% (n=10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Instant Messaging or IM-ing</td>
<td>18.8% (n=31)</td>
<td>7.3% (n=12)</td>
<td>12.1% (n=20)</td>
<td>15.8% (n=26)</td>
<td>46.1% (n=76)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Video Chat Sites (i.e. Skype and Facetime)</td>
<td>7.9% (n=13)</td>
<td>4.2% (n=7)</td>
<td>26.1% (n=43)</td>
<td>30.9% (n=51)</td>
<td>30.9% (n=51)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blogging</td>
<td>1.8% (n=3)</td>
<td>6.1% (n=10)</td>
<td>4.2% (n=7)</td>
<td>15.8% (n=26)</td>
<td>72.1% (n=119)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3

A majority of participants were heavy social media site users and non-bloggers.

Participants were asked about their political affiliation and how they view the media’s political leanings. Liberal participants were the majority with 47.3% (n= 78), while those who saw themselves as neutral or conservation were 26.7% (n= 44) and 26.1% (n=43), respectively. Participants who saw themselves as left of the media were the largest group with 44.2% (n= 73). Those who saw themselves as being right of the media were 33.3% (n= 55). Finally, participants who viewed themselves as having the same political leanings as the media were 22.4% (n= 37).

Scale items were developed using multiple theories as mentioned in the methodology. The
Likert scales followed a basic 1 to 5 scale, with lower numbers indicating more trust, credibility and authenticity, while higher numbers indicate less of each. For example, trust 1 questions asks: “I trust what the presenter is telling me” and is measured on a Likert scale as, 5-strongly agree, 4-agree, 3-agree, 4-don’t know neutral and 1-disagree.

**Perceptions of trust, credibility and authenticity of presenter race**

Hypothesis 1a and 1b look at how the race of the news presenter (TV and podcaster) affects how audiences perceive trust. Hypothesis 1a and 1b predict the White news presenter presenting the securitized and nonsecuritized stories will be perceived as more trustworthy than the Brown news presenter presenting the same set of stories (securitized and nonsecuritized). There was not a significant interaction effect between ethnicity and story type, (p= .3). There was not a significant main effect of ethnicity, (p = .62). Thus, hypothesis 1a and 1b did not find support.

Hypothesis 2a and 2b look at how race of the news presenter (TV and podcaster) affects how audiences perceive credibility. Hypothesis 2a and 2b predict the White news presenter presenting the securitized and nonsecuritized stories will be perceived as more credible than the Brown news presenter presenting the same set of stories. There was not a significant interaction effect between ethnicity and story type, (p= .57). There was not a significant main effect for ethnicity (p = .215). Thus, hypothesis 2a and 2b did not find support.

Research Question 1 asks if audiences perceive a difference in authenticity based on ethnicity of the news presenter. There was not a significant interaction effect between ethnicity and story type, (p= .27). There was not a significant main effect of ethnicity (p= .25). Thus, there was no statistically significant difference between races of the presenters and perceptions of authenticity.
Perceptions of trust, credibility and authenticity of Modality (traditional and social media)

Hypothesis 3 focuses on modality and predicts that stories from traditional media (anchors) will be perceived as more trustworthy compared to stories from social media sources (podcasters) by looking at the interaction between modality (traditional versus social media) and story type (securitized versus nonsecuritized). There was a significant interaction effect between story type and modality, such that securitized television stories (2.62) were trusted more than securitized podcast stories (3.04). Nonsecuritized television stories (2.58) were trusted more than nonsecuritized podcast stories (2.84), (F (1,163) 4.311, p = .039, η^2_p = .026). Thus, hypothesis 3 found support.

Hypothesis 4 focuses on modality and predicts that stories from traditional media (anchors) will be perceived as more credible than stories from social media (podcasters). There was a significant interaction between story type and modality, (F (1, 163) 10.580, p < .001, η^2_p = .061). Securitized television stories (3.1) were perceived as more credible than securitized podcast stories (3.4). Nonsecuritized television stories (3.04) were perceived as more credible than nonsecuritized podcast stories (3.2). Thus, hypothesis 4 found support.

Research question 2 asks if audiences will perceive authenticity in news information from social media differently than from traditional media. There was a significant interaction between story type and modality, (F (1, 163) 19.069, p < .001, η^2_p = .105). Like trust and credibility, securitized television stories (2.6) were perceived as more authentic than securitized podcast stories (3.02). Nonsecuritized television stories (2.54) were perceived as more authentic than nonsecuritized podcast stories (2.8). Specifically, White (2.621) securitized anchors were perceived as more authentic than White (3.037) securitized podcasters. Similarly, Brown (2.534) securitized anchors were perceived as more authentic than Brown (3.002) securitized podcasters.
MEDIA USAGE (traditional and social) on trust, credibility and authenticity on PRESENTERS’ RACE

Research question 3 asks how participant use of traditional and social media affects trust of presenter. Overall, there was not a significant interaction effect between ethnicity of traditional anchor and media usage of participant, (p = .56). There was not a significant interaction effect between story type, ethnicity of anchor and media usage, (p = .98). There was not a main effect of ethnicity (anchor) for traditional media usage, (p = .67). For social media usage, there was not a significant interaction effect between ethnicity of podcaster and media usage of participant, (p = .93). There was not a significant interaction effect between story type, ethnicity of anchor and media usage, (p = .4). There was not a main effect of ethnicity (podcaster) for new media usage (p = .57). Thus, the media usage of the participant did not influence trust of the traditional media anchor or social media podcaster (White and Brown).

Research question 4 asks how participants’ traditional media use affects their perception of anchor credibility. There was a not a significant interaction effect between ethnicity of anchor and amount of traditional media usage, (p = .3). There was not a significant interaction effect between story type, ethnicity of anchor and media usage, (p = .75). Main effects for ethnicity were statistically insignificant (p = .3). For social media usage, there was not a significant interaction effect between ethnicity of podcaster and media usage of participant, (p = .93). There was not a significant interaction effect between story type, ethnicity of anchor and media usage, (p = .4). Main effects for ethnicity were also statistically insignificant, (p = .57). Thus, the media usage of the participant did not influence credibility of the traditional media anchor or social media podcaster (White and Brown).

Research question 5 asks what effect media usage has on participants regarding
authenticity of anchor. For traditional media usage, there was not a significant interaction effect with traditional media usage and the ethnicity of anchor/podcaster, \((p = .91)\). There was not a significant interaction effect between traditional media usage, ethnicity of the anchor and story type, \((p = .98)\). There was not a statistically significant main effect for ethnicity, \((p = .24)\). For social media usage there was not a significant interaction effect with social media usage and podcaster ethnicity, \((p = .69)\). There was not a significant interaction effect between podcaster ethnicity, social media usage and story type, \((p = .69)\). There was not a significant main effect with ethnicity of anchor, \((p = .21)\). Thus, media usage did not have a statistical effect on participants’ perception of presenter authenticity.

**Participants’ POLITICAL LEANINGS and PERCEIVED POLITICS OF THE MEDIA**

Question 6a asks what effect the political leanings and perceived politics of the media of participant have on trust of presenter. There was not a significant interaction effect between participant politics and presenter ethnicity, \((p = .91)\). There was not a significant interaction between participants’ politics, presenter ethnicity and story type \((p = .52)\). There also was not a significant main effect ethnicity, \((p = .7)\). Participants’ political leanings did not make a statistically significant difference in trust of either the White or Brown anchor/podcaster.

Research question 6b looks at media distance or how participants’ perception of where the media’s politics are in comparison to their own (left of the media, same as the media, right of the media) affects trust in the presenter. There was not a significant interaction effect between ethnicity and media politics, \((p = .831)\). There was not a significant main effect for audience perceived media’s politics and trust, \((p = .608)\). Participants’ perceived media politics did not have an effect on trust of the presenter. Thus, participants’ politics and perception of the media’s politics had no statistically significant effect on trust of the presenter.
Research question 7a asks how political leanings of the participant, as well as perceived politics of the media, affect the credibility of the presenter. There was not a significant interaction effect between presenter ethnicity and participant political leanings, (p = .85). There also was not significant interaction effect between presenter’s ethnicity, story type and participants’ politics (p = .33). There was not a main effect of presenter ethnicity, (p = .3).

For research question 7b, (the perceived politics of the media), there was not a significant interaction effect between media politics and ethnicity of presenter, (p = .1). There was not a statistically significant main effect of media’s perceived politics and credibility of the presenter ethnicity, (p = .49). Thus, participants’ politics and perception of the media’s politics did not affect credibility of the presenter.

Research question 8a asks what effect participants’ political leanings and perceived politics of the media have on authenticity of anchor. There was not a significant interaction effect with presenter ethnicity and participants’ political leanings, (p = .59). There was not a significant main effect of ethnicity of the presenter, (p = .34).

For research question 8b, there was not a significant interaction effect between the news presenters’ ethnicities and media’s politics, (p = .33). There was not a significant main effect with presenter ethnicity, (p = .22). Thus, participants’ politics and perception of the media’s politics did not affect perceptions of authenticity of the presenter.

Participants’ POLITICAL LEANINGS and PERCEIVED POLITICS OF THE MEDIA and STORY TYPE

Research question 9a asks how participant trust is affected by their own political leanings and their perception of the media’s political leanings. There was a significant interaction effect for story type and participants’ political leanings, (F (1, 162) 3.192, p = .044, $\eta^2_p = .038$) and a
significant main effect for story type, (F (1, 162) 5.665, p = .018, $\eta^2_p = .034$). Liberal leaning participants perceived the nonsecuritized stories (2.63) as more trustworthy than securitized (2.84) stories. Politically neutral participants perceived the nonsecuritized stories (2.77) more trustworthy than the securitized (2.85) stories. But conservative participants perceived the nonsecuritized (2.79) stories as more trustworthy than their securitized (2.78) counterparts; however, this last difference was not statistically significant.

Research question 9b looks at how participants’ perception of the media’s politics (that is, are the media liberal-leaning, neutral or conservative-leaning) affects participants’ trust of story type. There was not a significant interaction effect with media’s perceived politics and story type, (p = .44).

Research question 10a asks how participants’ perception of credibility is affected by their own political leanings and their perception of the media’s political leanings. For participants personal politics, there was not a significant interaction effect between story type and participant political leanings, (p = .3). For research question 10b, perception of media politics, there was not a significant interaction effect between media’s politics and story type, (p = .81).

Research question 11a asks how participants’ perception of authenticity is affected by their own political leanings. There was not a significant interaction effect between story type and participant political leanings, (p = .12). For research question 11b, there was not a significant interaction effect between media politics and story type, (p = .27).

**AGE of PARTICIPANT on Trust, Credibility and Authenticity on presenter, story type and modality**

Research question 12 deals with how age of the participant affects trust of the news presenter and finds there was not a significant interaction effect between age of participant and
ethnicity of news presenter, (p = .28). There was not a significant interaction effect between story type and age of participant, (p = .3) and ethnicity of news presenter, story type and age of participant, (p = .39). There was not a main effect of age, (p > .05). Thus participant age was not a statistically significant factor for news presenter and story type trustworthiness.

Research 13 asks what effect age of participant has on credibility of presenter and story type. There was not a significant interaction effect between age of participant and ethnicity of presenter, (p = .33). There was not a significant interaction effect between age and story type, (p = .97). Thus, age of the participant did not have a statistically significant effect on perceptions of credibility for the presenter and story type.

Research question 14 asks what effect age of participant has on authenticity of presenter and story type. There was not a significant interaction effect between age of participant and presenter ethnicity, (p = .08). There was not a significant interaction between age of participant and story type, (p = .83). There was not a significant interaction between age of participant, presenter ethnicity and story type, (p = .7). There was not a main effect for presenter ethnicity, (p = .88).

Research question 15 asks what effect age of participant has on perceptions of trust for modality (traditional and social) and finds that there was not a significant interaction between presenter ethnicity, story type and modality, (p=.41). As for credibility, there was not a significant interaction effect between news presenter ethnicity, story type, and modality, (p = .23). Finally for authenticity, there was not a significant interaction effect between news presenter ethnicity, story type, and modality, (p = .72). Thus, age was not a factor for determining trust, credibility and authenticity for modality.
**GENDER and perceptions of trust, credibility and authenticity of presenter, story type and modality**

The next set of hypotheses and research questions look at how participant gender affects trust, credibility and authenticity of news presenter, story type and modality. Hypothesis 5 predicts women will perceive both news presenters (White and Brown) as more trustworthy compared to men. There was not a significant interaction of ethnicity of presenter and participant gender, (p = .87). There was not a significant interaction effect with story type and participant gender, (p = .69). There was not a significant main effect for ethnicity of presenter, (p = .6). The results find that gender was not a factor in trust of the anchor/podcaster (White and Brown). Thus, hypothesis 5 was not supported.

Hypothesis 6 predicted that women will perceive both news presenters (White and Brown) as more credible than men. There was not a significant interaction effect with presenter ethnicity and participant gender, (p = .45). There was not a significant interaction effect with story type and participant gender, (p = .7). There was not a significant main effect for ethnicity of presenter, (p = .27). Thus gender was not a statistically significant factor in perceived credibility of anchor/podcaster. Hypothesis 6 was not supported.

Research question 16 asks if male or female participants will find the Brown presenter more or less authentic than the White presenter. Like trust and credibility, there was not a significant interaction with anchor/podcaster ethnicity and gender of participant, (p = .61). There was not a significant interaction effect with story type and participant gender, (p = .6). There was not a significant main effect for anchor/podcaster ethnicity, (p = .23). Thus gender was not a factor in perceived authenticity of the presenter.

The final set of hypotheses and research questions look at how participant ethnicity plays
a role in anchor/podcaster trust, credibility and authenticity. Participant ethnic categories were collapsed into three main categories, White (n= 61), South Asian/Middle Eastern (n= 43) and Other (n= 61). Hypothesis 7 predicts that participants who identify as South Asian and Middle Eastern will perceive the Brown anchor more trustworthy than participants who self-identify as Caucasian. There was a significant interaction effect with story type and participant ethnicity, (F (1, 162) 4.393, p = .014, $\eta^2_p = .014$).

There was a significant interaction effect with ethnicity of presenter, story type and participant ethnicity, (F (1, 162) 4.016, p = .020, $\eta^2_p = .020$). Middle Eastern/ South Asian participants trusted the White news presenter (3.081) less than the Brown news presenter (2.857) presenting the same stories. But Middle Eastern/ South Asian participants trusted the Brown news presenter (2.721) presenting the nonsecuritized stories less than the White news presenter (2.612) presenting the same stories. There was not a significant interaction with presenter ethnicity and participant ethnicity, (p = .24). There was not a significant main effect with presenter ethnicity, (p = .52). Thus, hypothesis 7 was partially supported. Middle Eastern/South Asian participants trusted the White securitized news presenter, but also trusted the Brown not securitized news presenter.

Hypothesis 8 predicts participants who identify as South Asian and Middle Eastern will perceive the Brown anchor more credible than participants who identify as Caucasian. There was a significant interaction effect with presenter ethnicity, story type and participant ethnicity, (F (1, 162) 4.884, p = .009, $\eta^2_p = .057$). Middle Eastern/South Asian participants perceived the White securitized news presenter (3.449) as less credible than the White nonsecuritized news presenter (3.112). Middle Eastern/South Asian participants also perceived the Brown securitized news presenter (3.256) as less credible than the Brown nonsecuritized news presenter (3.128).
There was a significant main effect with story type, $(F (1, 162) 27.664, \ p = .000, \ \eta^2_p = .146)$, such that White securitized news presenter (3.269) was perceived as less credible than the White nonsecuritized news presenter (3.128). Also the Brown nonsecuritized news presenter (3.226) was
perceived as less credible than the Brown nonsecuritized news presenter (3.112). There was not a significant main effect with anchor/podcaster ethnicity, (F (1, 162) = 2.201, p > .05). There was also not a significant interaction effect with anchor/podcaster ethnicity and participant ethnicity, (F (1, 162) = 1.562, p > .05). Interaction effect with story type and participant ethnicity approached statistical significance, (F (1, 162) 2.969, p = .054, $\eta^2_p$ = .035).

Research question 17 asks which ethnic group of participants perceived the Brown anchor as more authentic than the White anchor. There was a significant interaction effect with anchor/podcaster ethnicity and participant ethnicity, (F (1, 162) 3.104, p = .048, $\eta^2_p$ = .037). Middle Eastern/South Asian participants perceived the Brown securitized news presenter (2.826) as less authentic than White (2.765) and other participants (2.727). Middle Eastern/South Asian participants also perceived the Brown nonsecuritized news presenter (2.713) as less authentic than White (2.699) and other participants (2.593).

There was a significant interaction effect with story type and participant ethnicity, (F (1, 162) 3.216, p = .043, $\eta^2_p$ = .038), such that the Middle Eastern/ South Asian participants perceived the White securitized news presenter (3.078) as the least authentic. There was a significant interaction effect with anchor/podcaster ethnicity, story type and participant ethnicity, (F (1, 162) 3.908, p = .022, $\eta^2_p$ = .046).
Participants who identify as White (2.839) found the White securitized news presenters more authentic than participants who identify as South Asian/Middle Eastern (3.078). Participants
who identify as White (2.773) found the White nonsecuritized news presenters less authentic than participants who identify as a South Asian/Middle Eastern (2.678). Participants who identify as White (2.765) found the Brown securitized news presenters more authentic than participants who identify as a South Asian/Middle Eastern (2.826). And finally, participants who identify as White (2.699) found the Brown nonsecuritized news presenters more authentic than participants who identify as a South Asian/Middle Eastern (2.713).

Further, there was a significant main effect for story type, (F (1, 162) 21.501, p <.001, $\eta^2_p = .117$). The White securitized news presenter (2.827) was perceived as less authentic than the White news presenter (2.671) presenting the nonsecuritized stories. The Brown securitized news presenter (2.767) was perceived as less authentic than the Brown news presenter (2.664) presenting the nonsecuritized stories. There was not a significant main effect of presenter ethnicity, (F (1, 162) 1.966, p = .163, $\eta^2_p = .012$).

This study compares story type (securitized versus nonsecuritized), ethnicity of the presenter (White versus Brown) and modality (traditional versus social media). Overall, participants trusted traditional media, but news from social media was perceived as more authentic. Credibility was a mixed bag, in that some social media conditions elicited more credibility than traditional media. Manipulating broadcast news stories (traditional and podcast) with securitizing elements in conjunction with the race of the presenter, shows some interesting results. Securitized stories elicited more trust and credibility when the presenter was White, while nonsecuritized stories tended show similar results for Brown presenters. The next chapter will discuss what these findings mean in the context of securitizing frames, race, traditional and alternative news sources.
CHAPTER 6
DISCUSSION/CONCLUSIONS

According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC, 2014) there have been four cases of Ebola in the United States, resulting in one fatality. Yet, during the 2014 Midterm election campaign, several prominent candidates for House and Senate “ran 734 ads citing the threat of Ebola” from October 21 to the 25th (Judis, 2014). Politicians like North Carolina Republican Thom Tillis, who successfully won a seat in the Senate, included the fear of Ebola as a major campaign strategy. Other politicians, like Republican Senator Mitch McConnell, used the threat of ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and Syria) as part of his ad campaigns. What do Ebola and ISIS have in common? Both were used as convenient pretexts for immigration policies. Linking Ebola and ISIS to border immigration allowed political actors to manufacture a threat fostering fear in the American public, which arguably allowed these candidates to win the elections.

Despite the fact that there have been no incidences involving Ebola infected Mexican immigrants and ISIS is mainly contained in Iraq and Syria, Republican politicians continue to insist that these issues are threats that the American public needs to be protected from (Talbot, 2014). And they are successful in maintaining the implausibility of those fears. The media as an intermediary relays those fears through news coverage to a largely misinformed public in spite of the increased interest in both Ebola and ISIS.

The Pew Research Center (Motel, 2014) finds that Ebola remains among the top followed stories since 2010, only to be surpassed by the Boston Marathon Bombing, the elementary school shooting in Newtown, Hurricane Sandy and the 2012 Presidential election (2014). According to a Pew Research Center (2014) poll, a majority of Americans support the U.S. military campaign against ISIS. Highest support comes from Republicans (68%) who also believe that the U.S.
to do more to stop the threat of ISIS (2014).

Concerns surrounding Ebola, ISIS and immigration have opened the door to questions about security and existential threats from those deemed “others.” Conversations about security took a pointed turn following 9/11 when American exceptionalism and Orientalism joined to create a newer version of America and a perceived American culture. This dissertation examines how already prevalent frames about race can be amplified by effects of securitization which will be presented with some tentative conclusions about those findings.

Watson (2011) suggests that securitization is a subfield of framing because “security” itself is a “master frame” (p. 2) that operates by creating a social reality through the use of language and images. Political actors and the media play on racial stereotypes and create problems and threats through discursive practices (Gamson, Croteau, Hoyne and Sasson, 1992). Images, especially broadcast images, have the ability to direct audiences to think about topics in certain ways (de Vreese, 2004). Coupled with the ubiquitous nature of the online news sources, audiences today are inundated with a variety of ways to get the news. This dissertation adds to the body of research regarding framing, securitization and race with the hopes of illuminating how different audiences perceive news information from multiple sources and presenters.

This dissertation focuses on how securitization has a framing function with the news media as an important intermediary between political actors and the public. In particular, broadcast news can provide a multi-layered look at how audiences perceive information from on-air personalities. In recent years, the growth of social media has provided consumers an alternative place to get their news in the form of blogs, podcasts and tweets (Allan and Thorsen, 2009). This research also looks at the function of race in audience perceptions of trust, credibility and authenticity on news content, as well as the presenter. This dissertation examines perceptions of race, particular kinds of news
and where people get that news. Audience perception, for this study, was measured using scales for trust (Kohring and Matthes, 2007; Nah and Chung, 2012), scales for credibility (Gaziano and McGrath, 1986) and scales for authenticity (Austin and Dong, 1994). And Vultee’s (2007) securitization scales were used to measure perceptions regarding story type (securitized and nonsecuritized).

Essentially the chapter asks: When security is “switched” on, do audiences trust the information? Is the information credible? And when that same information is presented in a social media context, is the information perceived as authentic? In addition, how do audiences perceive the individuals that give them the news? What kind of difference does it make to audiences if the presenter is White or Brown? And how does modality (traditional versus social media) affect the way news information is perceived by audiences? This chapter hopes to answer these questions while examining the role of security within the context of media framing.

**Race and trust, credibility and authenticity: Audience perceptions of presenters’ race**

Although race of the presenter did not play a part in how audiences perceive trust, credibility and authenticity, previously studies have found that race matters. But the results suggest otherwise. Part of this could be due to the growing multiculturalism within audiences, as well as diversity within the field of journalism. Gunther (1992) found that audiences’ attributes play a larger role in trust in media, rather than media attributes themselves. Involvement in social groups plays a larger role in how audiences trust news, especially if the group membership is based on a common ethnicity (1992). Although audiences are open to a large variety of content for the purposes of information seeking and observation, much of what is consumed is highly scrutinized due to “personal predilections” (1992, p. 163).

This is somewhat contradictory to past research which suggests that individual and groups
deemed as “others” will generally be viewed as less credible (Melican and Dixon, 2008; Entman and Rojecki; 2000); however, much of the prior research is focused on the stereotypes of Blacks and rarely includes discussion of “Browned” people. Vidal-Ortiz (2008) suggests that political-economic issues have allowed certain ethnic groups like Blacks and Latinos to be visualized in mainstream media as acceptable “others.” But Middle Easterners and South Asians (once viewed as model minorities prior to 9/11), “are continuously reracialized as terrorists and deficient citizens regardless of their political or religious belief systems” (2008; p. 1039). But in the context of crisis information, prior research in credibility and race has found that the presenters’ race does not necessarily affect their audiences’ perception of credibility in terms of the type of news presented (Andsager & Mastin, 2003; Mohammed, 2012). Race of the presenter may only be a minor factor when it comes to trusting and finding information credible as audiences may perceive the information itself to be more cognitively valuable.

Further, the introduction of brown faces in high profile journalism positions, as well as entertainment may also suggest why certain races do not elicit changes in audience perceptions of trust and credibility. Major news contributors like Sanjay Gupta (CNN senior medical correspondent), Ali Velshi (CNN host of Your Money) and Fareed Zakaria (CNN host of Fareed Zakaria GPS/Global Public Square) may show audiences that Brown news presenters are at the same level as their White counterparts in the newsrooms in terms of expertise and training. Further, growing multiculturalism has also permeated entertainment, such as Aziz Ansari (comedian, Parks and Recreation), Mindy Kaling (The Office and The Mindy Kaling Project), Kal Penn (Harold and Kumar) and Kunal Nayyar (The Big Bang Theory). It is important to note that while television news is growing more diverse, it is not necessarily at the same rate of audience diversity. However, the growing popularity of these figures may suggest why race did not make a significant difference
in trust and credibility of the presenter.

In a growing multimedia environment, examining the perception of authenticity is valuable. Marwick and boyd (2010) say that there in not an “absolute sense of authenticity” (p. 119), but rather how consumers of media perceive authenticity in the presenter. Authenticity could be viewed as a person tweeting without any expectations from the viewer or the concept of the “real person.” Grazian (2003) says that authenticity is socially constructed by society and as a result does not have a clear cut definition.

Kiousis (2001) and others (Addington, 1971; Markham, 1968; Mulac & Sherman, 1975; O’Keefe, 1990) have found that the presenters’ characteristics can influence news audiences’ perception of information. However, this study found that race of the presenter was not a significant factor for audience perceptions of trust, credibility and authenticity.

**Story type and perceptions of trust, credibility and authenticity**

The current results suggest when securitized information is presented by an “other” audiences align the information with the source. Thus, if the information is about Islamic militants, a presenter who looks like that “other” might elicit more trust, credibility and authenticity. Again, “turning on” the security switch suggests that audiences may equate importance to certain topics dealing with security. Aligning ISIS and Ebola with immigration suggests to the viewing public that terrorism and disease come from immigrants and this continues to reinforce negative stereotypes about “othered” people. This creates larger issues surrounding inequality and access to social institutions and policy formation.

Like trust and credibility, race did not affect audience perception of authenticity, but story type did. Securitized stories in both Brown and White conditions, as well as, traditional and podcast conditions were viewed as more authentic. Like in trust and credibility, when security was “turned
“on” audiences perceived those stories as more authentic. Breten (2011) suggests that regardless of genre, television bombards its audiences with stories about dangers and risks especially in regards to terrorism and the “war on terror.” As a result viewers are hypersensitive to the potential threat and regardless of the lack of focus and direction, these audiences may perceive this information as more authentic than nonsecuritized information.

**Audience perceptions of modality (television and social media)**

Audience attitudes towards trusting a particular modality was measured and the results showed that television was trusted more than social media overall. In spite of the growth of alternative news, Tsfati and Cappella (2003) found that even when alternative news sources were available, television was still trusted more. Part of this might stem from the fact that despite growing audience skepticism of traditional media, most of these people are exposed to television news on a regular basis (2003). Papathanassopoulos, Coen, Curran, Aalberg, Rowe, Jones, Rojas and Tiffen (2013) also found that despite the growing acceptance and use of online news sources, television news viewing was still at the top of the news consumption hierarchy with print and Internet tied at second place. Ahlers (2005) also found that the growth of online news consumption has not necessarily impacted traditional media negatively. Many users multitask media by continuing to use traditional media in conjunction with online sources (2005).

Similarly, traditional media stories were also perceived to be more credible than their social media counterparts. This is consistent with previous research which suggests that traditional media is generally perceived as the more credible source when compared to online (Kiousis, 2001). Johnson and Kaye (2004) suggest that the more a particular medium is used the more credible it is perceived by the users. Despite the fact that a majority (66.7 %) of the participants for this study identified as heavy social media users, many of these participants also were regular users of
television. Despite the growth if Internet news audiences, television remains the most widely used medium in the United States (Pew Research Center, 2011).

Finally, authenticity of modality found that traditional media was perceived as more authentic. Previous research suggests that authenticity is tied to “truthfulness” and as a result when a presenter is “truthful” about their appearance and likes and dislikes audiences may perceive that as being authentic (Marwick and boyd, 2010). In addition, the growth of alternative news sources has resulted in a growing distrust of traditional media (Kiousis, 2001). Part of this growing distrust may be due to how closely related to reality media portrayals of issues and peoples are (Austin, 1990). The stylized nature of traditional media through high quality camera use and production routines may make the information coming from that channel appear more authentic then an everyday person presenting the same information in context of a podcast.

Further, audiences tend to seek the most convenient ways to get information despite having alternative information sources, like the Internet (Georg & Jackob, 2010). Television does not require the same level of literacy that the Internet requires. By its very nature, television is a more passive and prolific source of information. Younger generations may prefer the mobility of the Internet via mobile technology, but by and large television currently remains the most used medium in the United States. Those numbers will change in the future as younger people continue to turn to the Internet as a primary source of news information.

Participants’ political leanings, perceived politics of the media and story type

There was a significant interaction effect between story type and participant’s personal politics. Liberal, politically neutral and conservative leaning participants trusted securitized stories more than nonsecuritized stories within traditional media conditions. The podcast conditions had a different result with liberal and politically neutral participants trusting the nonsecuritized stories
more than the securitized stories. However, conservative participants trusted the information in the securitized stories more than the nonsecuritized. Overall, stories from traditional media were trusted more than their podcast counterparts.

Media texts may be interpreted differently by audiences based on their political views (Giner-Sorolla & Chaiken, 1994; Vollone, Ross & Lepper, 1985); however, the results of this study show that when security is “turned on,” higher levels of trust were perceived. Similarly in the podcast conditions, conservative audiences trusted the securitized stories more than the nonsecuritized stories, which is interesting because podcasts, in general, were trusted less than traditional media. Morris (2007) suggests that the introduction of online news sources has led to “fragmented media,” where audiences seek alternative sources to augment their own political views. Even though many conservatives criticize the media for being too liberal (Morris, 2007), the results of this study find that perceived politics of the media only made a difference with the stories were securitized.

According to Feldman (2007), while younger people are focusing on social media as a legitimate source of news, many of these audiences are also turning to *The Daily Show with John Stewart* for news about politics. This suggests that total abandonment of traditional media is not necessarily occurring, rather these audiences are not getting all of their political information from traditional news services and relying (in some cases) on alternative television political programs.

**Age of participant on trust, credibility and authenticity on presenter and story type**

Participants’ age was not a significant factor in audience perception of trust, credibility and authenticity of the presenter in the traditional and podcast conditions. That finding is consistent with prior research which suggests that demographic variable, like age, may not play a significant role in trust of the presenter (Yang, 2007; Georg and Edmund, 2010). These studies found that
media usage (amount used and type of media) played a much larger role in how audiences trusted the presenters.

These findings were not unexpected as the current questions regarding age were not focused on the age of the presenter, but rather on the age of the participant. The average age of the participants was nearly 23, with almost 70 percent as heavy social media users. The presenters used for this study were also in their early to mid-20s. Since participants were not given a wide variety in presenter age and all presenters were female, this suggests that audiences did not focus on the presenters’ attributes, but rather at the information being presented. Similarly, Weibel, Wissmath and Groner (2008) found that age of the presenters did not necessarily affect the newscasters’ perceived credibility.

Age of the participant did not affect trust, credibility and authenticity of the modality. Although the results were not significant, future research in the area might include more detail in media preferences for younger and older media consumers. In addition, the average age in the participant pool was nearly 23 years old and largely social media users. According to Pew Research Internet Project (2014) 74 percent of people online use social media (numbers from January 2014), thus trust in modality may be an ever changing space for the average user. In addition, certain types of information may evoke different reactions in audiences regardless of age and modality. Younger audiences tend to be more heavily represented in studies comparing television and Internet usage, and this study had an overall young population.

Previous research suggests that audience demographics variables do affect their perception of medium credibility (Westley & Severin, 1964; Abel & Wirth, 1977; Gunther, 1992; Mulder, 1981); however, these studies were focused on traditional media. The addition of social media has provided audiences more options for seeking information, and despite the majority of
heavy social media users, age did not show a significant effect for modality and credibility.

Conventional wisdom suggests that as the Internet continues to become ubiquitous, more and more people will turn to it for information, including news. But as in the case of trust and credibility, authenticity did not produce significant results in regards to age and media usage despite the fact that the majority of users claimed to be heavy social media users and the average age of the participants was just under 23. This suggests that authenticity may be perceived in different ways than trust and credibility. Story type produced a significant main effect in that nonsecuritized stories were perceived as more authentic than securitized stories. Thus, when security was turned on audiences found nonsecuritized stories more authentic. One explanation for this result might be that participants did not judge the securitized stories as believable while nonsecuritized stories may have been perceived closer to reality. Austin and Dong (1994) found that stories judged believable were because they were more closely perceived as reality while information deemed sensational is deemed unbelievable. The participants for this study may have perceived the securitize stories as sensational and nonsecuritized stories as more aligned with reality.

**Gender and perceptions of trust, credibility and authenticity of presenter, story type and modality**

Gender did not produce any significant results for trust, credibility and perceived authenticity for audience perception of presenters, regardless of the presenter’s ethnicity. Several audience demographic characteristics like age, gender and education have been identified as correlates of trust and credibility (Choi, Watt & Lynch, 2006; Gunther, 1992; Becker, Cobbey & Sobowale, 1978; Westley & Severin, 1964). In contrast, Grabe and Kamhawi (2006) found that when presented with negative, positive and ambiguous news information, men tended to focus and recall the negative news, while women leaned more towards the positive news. News information
that has securitizing elements could certainly be viewed as negative news, yet the current results did not show a difference in gender.

This suggests that securitization may not necessarily connote “negative” for audiences. For some viewers (perhaps regardless of gender), certain racial markers, like religion, skin color and even the immigration status of a group of individuals might symbolize a threat. Thus, all immigrants will take American jobs, Muslims are terrorists, the spread of Ebola and ISIS poses a threat to the U.S. Racial markers allow viewers to make decisions about news information efficiently, which does not always translate to negative. This area requires future exploration looking at how gender works within the context of securitized news from both traditional and social media.

**Participant race and perceptions of trust, credibility and authenticity**

The current study divided the participant pool into three categories: White (n=61), South Asian/Middle Eastern (n=43) and Other (n=61). The reason was to identify those groups that have been deemed “Brown” and “White” and see if they perceived trust, credibility and authenticity with presenters that looked like them. The study hypothesized that participants who self-identify as South Asian and Middle Eastern will perceive the Brown anchor as more trustworthy than participants who self-identify as Caucasian. The results found that there was a significant interaction effect between ethnicity of presenter, story type and participant ethnicity.

White securitized presenters were trusted most by the Other category, followed by White and South Asian/Middle Eastern participants. White nonsecuritized presenters were trusted most by South Asian/Middle Eastern, followed by Other and White participants. South Asian/Middle Eastern participants essentially trusted White presenters presenting nonsecuritized news more than securitized news. Research in audience attributes suggests that trust in media is based on
individuals’ relationship with the content (Gunther, 1992). Trust may decrease for certain audiences if the news information is perceived as controversial (Roberts and Leifer, 1975). In terms of race, Johnson (1984) found that Black audiences assessed Black reporters positively in appearance and believability, overall these audiences felt White reporters were just “better performers,” (p. 367). When security was turned on Brown securitized presenters were trusted by Other, White and South Asian/Middle Eastern participants. And finally Brown nonsecuritized presenters were trusted by Other, South Asian/Middle Eastern and White. Despite the growing numbers of South Asian and Middle Eastern on-air personalities, non-White audiences may continue to perceive White presenters as more trustworthy than Brown because Whites are more commonly seen on-air.

The combination effect of the White presenter with security turned on resulted in less perceived trust from South Asian/Middle Eastern audiences than Other and White audiences. This suggests that this ethnic group of participants may trust the White presenter to be professional, they may not trust the information being presented by this presenter. Little research extends into how the ethnicity of the participant plays a role in trust of the news presenter. Giles (2002) suggests that viewing audiences generally align themselves with television personalities they have developed a parasocial relationship with. Horton & Wohl (1956) defined parasocial relationships as the perception of an actual social relationship with a media personality. In the case of this study, the results were inconsistent with prior research and require more exploration.

Further the study hypothesized that participants who self-identified as South Asian and Middle Eastern would perceive the Brown anchor as more credible than participants who self-identify as Caucasian. Overall, participants who were categorized as Other found the presenters in all the conditions more credible than their South Asian/Middle Eastern and White counterparts.
White securitized presenters were perceived as more credible by White participants compared to South Asian/Middle Eastern. White presenters presenting nonsecuritized stories were perceived as more credible by South Asian/Middle Eastern than White participants. Brown securitized and nonsecuritized presenters were perceived as more credible by South Asian/Middle Eastern than White participants. Johnson’s (1984) exploratory study on black audiences’ perception of Black newscasters versus White newscasters found Black participants’ perceived the White newscaster more credible. Like the Johnson (1984) study, the participants for the current research many not be an accurate representative sample. Further, the audiences are exposed to White news presenters more often (Johnson, 1984; Poindexter, Smith & Heider, 2003) and as a results may perceive them as more credible.

The final research question asks which ethnic group of participants perceived authenticity in the presenters. To date this is the only research on authenticity, race of presenter and securitization and as such it is exploratory. Like credibility, Other participants found the presenters in all conditions to be the authentic. Broken down between the other two categories, White participants perceived the White securitized presenter as more authentic than South Asian/Middle Eastern participants. White nonsecuritized presenter was perceived as more authentic by the South Asian/Middle Eastern participants than the White presenter. Thus, securitizing a story appears to make a difference in authenticity if the presenter is White, but not if the presenter is Brown. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, when security is turned people pay more attention. Certainly media, entertainment and news, manage the ways race and identity are constructed on television and even online (Gandy, 2001). But identifying markers in audience can illuminate the types of viewing choices. Gandy (2001) suggests that people who are “favorably oriented toward people of their own race would tend to prefer content that enables such as interaction, even if it is indirect,”
These results show the White audiences perceive White presenters presenting securitized news more authentic than Brown presenters. However, the same does not translate to Brown audiences and Brown presenters.

As with trust and credibility, these audience members perceived the White presenter presenting nonsecuritized stories as more authentic than the Brown presenter. Further, the Brown securitized presenter was perceived as more authentic by the White participants as compared to the South Asian/Middle Eastern participants. And finally the Brown nonsecuritized presenter was perceived as more authentic by the White participant as compared to the South Asian/Middle Eastern participants. Meaning that in both cases, White participants were more likely than South Asian/Middle Eastern participants to see the Brown presenter as more authentic than the white presenter. Again, because this area is exploratory, further research is required to determine how story type, modality and presenters’ race correlate with the race of the participants.

**Implications for the field of journalism**

During the mid-October 2014 elections, Americans regarded Ebola and ISIS has major threats to the United States despite there being little evidence to support these claims. ISIS is a terrorist organization, but its attacks are generally isolated in Iraq and Syria. As for Ebola, there have only been four cases in the United States with only one fatality. Yet Republican candidates were able to successfully weave these unfounded assertions into their campaigns and win political seats, specifically using ISIS and Ebola to create restrictive immigration policies. One reason for their success may lie with the origins of where these so-called threats come from.

Post-9/11, Americans feared new terrorists’ attacks. Not only were the attackers of Middle Eastern decent, they also came through regular immigration channels (international student visas). This resulted in renewed U.S. policies that restricted immigration, while increasing surveillance
of immigrant populations (Rodriguez, 2008). These measures, rather than alleviating tensions about security, exacerbated racial divides and re-racialized American society. These policies redefined groups as “good guys” and “bad guys” and as a result certain minority populations were targeted as potential threats to American society. Because ISIS is defined as a threat from the Middle East, politicians were able to successfully equate it with national security post-9/11.

Similarly, Ebola stories stoked public fear and an increase in news coverage that was akin to the early days of immigration when epidemics were blamed on immigrants such as tuberculosis from Jews and cholera from the Irish (Judis, 2014). Fears surrounding Ebola may be linked to its origins from Africa. Like similar “othered” geographic spaces, Africa and the ensuing Ebola coverage, evoked unfounded fears of the “Other” by the American public. As Judis (2014) says, “These fears are grounded in Americans’ own peculiar nativism, which contrasts the purity of the New World with the evil of the Old” (n.p.). The renewed sense of American exceptionalism coupled with media stories and political actors focusing on “threats” created a successful securitizing atmosphere.

These results of this dissertation brought to light some important aspects of the construction of news information, in particular looking at perceived threats to American culture and audience perceptions of trust, credibility and authenticity. Further, news from social media adds another layer to the different kinds of news and where people get it. Past studies have found that trust and credibility in traditional media sources is eroding due to alternative media sources, while authenticity in social media is an underdeveloped area of research. Audiences, with more choices in the new media environment, are turning to online sources for news; however, most people continue to use the Internet a supplement to traditional media (Gaskins and Jerit, 2012). When audiences use social media, authenticity is a principal element when it comes to presenters
(Marwick & boyd, 2010). Social media has made an impact in the ways audiences consumes news. The “Arab Spring” is a prime example of how social media, especially in countries with government-owned media, appealed to people during times of political strife (Hamdy & Gomaa, 2012). Traditional media in Egypt was a mouthpiece for the government, while social media sites like YouTube and Twitter allowed the Egyptian public to post videos and news information about the injustices being committed by their own government (2012). Unlike network news broadcasts, which are packaged and distributed, social media allows audiences to engage with the information (Hermida, Fletcher, Korrell & Logan, 2012). Journalists, as well as academics, are debating the relationship between traditional and social media sources, while acknowledging the diversity within American journalism and audiences.

Growing multiculturalism in America has led to what scholars call the “browning of America,” (Lugo-Lugo and Bloodsworth-Lugo 2009). In some ways this “browning” has resulted in a perceived “existential threat” to America and the American way of life in terms of dominating cultures, religions and even languages. Examples like Sharia Law and even the “Ground Zero Mosque” represent more than a potential physical menace, they can also be perceived as a more nuanced cultural threat. Sharia law is perceived as the law of the “enemy” and could potentially dismantle the U.S. Constitution, and the “Ground Zero Mosque” is being built on hallowed ground and is perceived as an affront to the victims of the 9/11 attacks. Part of this fear is due to American exceptionalism or that idea that American values and perceived culture is the standard. For example, immigration can be securitized because it opens the door to “othered” groups that bring other languages, religions and cultures to America which are not necessarily negative so long as they do not usurp the “American way of life.” Essentially, the immigrating populations would fundamentally change what makes America American. But how does securitization fit within the
context of media framing?

Frames rely on stereotypes that are already prevalent within all cultures (Entman, 1993). Audiences are inundated with images of people and faraway places that become representations of the way the world looks. Frames allow editors, managers and journalists to take complex issues and simplify them for their audiences (Entman, 1993; Gitlin, 2003; Scheufele, 1999). Frames are created through the repetitive use of words, phrases, metaphors and images (Entman, 1991, 1993). Securitization provides an amplifying effect that exaggerate the social and cultural importance of these frames (Vultee, 2009). This dissertation adds to the body of literature regarding framing and securitization. The results suggest that when security is “turned on” audiences perceived higher rates of trust, credibility and authenticity. As a result it is imperative to recognize that the media has an important role when talking about topics like terrorism, immigration and even health. Specifically, race and culture can be framed and securitized and this can be significant in newsrooms for consumers and news producers.

Journalism is a public service ideally based on the concept of democracy and inclusion; however, American journalism has been criticized for its depictions of race, trivializing culture and essentially maintaining the status quo (Glasser, Awad and Kim, 2009). The Civil Rights Movement of the 1960s created more opportunities for minorities in the newsrooms, but not in direct proportion to minority population growth. As a result, mainstream news media has been criticized for not covering issues that reflect minority populations and for biased news coverage regarding issues about race and culture. Shaw (1990) noted that lack of diversity in the news media has played a significant role in perpetuating stereotypes about ethnic minorities.

The results of this study may illuminate the hiring decisions made by news owners and managers. Making stronger efforts to hire people of color as reporters and anchors may aid in
negating racial and ethnic stereotypes prevalent in the media. What is particularly of interest for news producers is being aware of the types and ways they write news stories, especially understanding the ways in which audiences trust, find credible and authentic, news information when the security switch is turned on. And finally it is important to address how audiences, who are becoming more diverse and media literate, consume news in multiple formats. As online news becomes more prolific and ubiquitous, it is important to understand how traditional media outlets are changing and evolving in this new media environment. Journalists and other news producers need to explore the ways in which stereotypes are formed and used within their news coverage to better understand the ways to dispel them.

In addition, as the field of journalism becomes more diverse, there is a growing need to address how audiences perceive information from ethnic news presenters in traditional media. This dissertation research also hopes to add to the body of literature that examines race post 9/11 in terms of trust, credibility and authenticity. This could have implications for news producers and writers as they package news. Also social media is becoming a larger part of traditional media newscasts (Hermida, Fletcher, Korell & Logan, 2012), as such newsmakers need to pay attention to what citizens are bringing to the newsroom and the impact it has on diverse audiences.

**Limitations and future research**

This dissertation study had several limitations. The questions about trust and credibility were limited in scope and for future research should be made more elaborate to test for differences between the two. Much of the research surrounding trust and credibility tends to these terms interchangeably, thus further explanation of these terms should be used in future research. While authenticity is an exploratory area, the scales should also be broadened to gain a better understanding of its role in news from traditional and new media. The large amount of insignificant
results, also suggests that a more thorough definition of trust, credibility and authenticity is required to understand how audiences perceive these elements in news.

The stories created for the study were also limited in subjects. This dissertation was mainly focused on terrorism and immigration, but future studies could add other topics like economics, health issues and climate change. In addition, the presenters hired for the study were students and while that is more commonplace in social media settings to see more casual presentations, in traditional media their lack of television news training may have been more apparent to participants.

Grabe and Kamhawi (2006) suggest that participant demographics play an important role in news perception. This dissertation used participant demographics as correlates, but the findings were inconclusive. Women interpret news differently than men, but the results of this dissertation did not find those differences to be significant. This suggests that perhaps the ways men and women interpret securitized news is different than news that is perceived as negative. When the security switch is turned on, men and women may interpret that information in more similar ways than previously thought. Further, the lack of significant results for participant age and securitization may reflect that younger and older audiences also see securitized information similarly. Despite what society thinks about younger people media use and perceptions of security, the current results say that there are no major differences.

But securitization made a difference in the way certain audiences viewed the information in terms of trust, credibility and authenticity. This dissertation was interested in looking at the ways “othered” participants like South Asians and Middle Easterners perceived news information differently than other ethnic groups like White and Black. Conventional wisdom has always suggested that ethnic groups will most often align themselves with people who physically resemble
them, but the results proved that it is not always the case. In many ways this result reflects current newsroom demographics which showcase growing multiculturalism in the newsrooms, but not necessarily at the same rate as represented in current US populations. Because White anchors and reporters dominate American newsroom, many viewers may interpret this as the norm and may not perceive a person of color in the same regard for trust, credibility and authenticity merely due to the lack of visibility on-air.

Issues of race are important factors to consider when considering news information in the new media environment. Trust, credibility and even authenticity are interpreted by different audiences in different ways, especially when the information presented may be perceived as a threat to the “American way of life.” Culture is an ever evolving and highly interpretive space, but during times of conflict it becomes coveted and cherished. Thus, it is important to recognize that threatening a dominant culture may be perceived as a threat to national identity.
APPENDIX A

BROADCAST SCRIPTS

(Manipulated portions are highlighted)

NATO ATTACKS ON PAKISTAN TRADITIONAL MEDIA SCRIPTS

[SECURITIZED] ANCHOR: Pakistan's military insists that the NATO strike last month that killed more than two dozen Pakistani soldiers near the Afghan border was deliberate.

Pakistani military officials at the briefing contended that NATO forces knew they were firing at Pakistani troops throughout the attack and even apologized as they kept firing...evidence they say supports their assertions the attack was deliberate.

The Pakistani officials at the briefing argued that well-established operating procedures and an intricate system for operational information sharing were deliberately ignored, which led to the tragic incident.

[NONSECURITIZED] ANCHOR: Pakistan's military insists that the NATO strike last month that killed more than two dozen Pakistani soldiers near the Afghan border was deliberate.

U.S. officials have said it was a regrettable case of mistaken identity and miscommunication when NATO attacked the area in support of a nearby U.S.-Afghan joint patrol that believed it was under fire from the Taliban.

The Pakistani officials at the briefing argued that well-established operating procedures and an intricate system for operational information sharing were deliberately ignored, which led to the tragic incident.

NATO ATTACKS ON PAKISTAN SCRIPTS PODCAST/SOCIAL MEDIA

[SECURITIZED] PODCASTER: Last month a NATO airstrike in Pakistan killed 24 Pakistani soldiers...and Pakistani officials are saying it was deliberate. Not only are we killing innocent civilians with drone bombs, but now were killing their soldiers who are trying to help us combat terrorism. There’s even evidence that suggests that NATO forces were apologizing to the Pakistani soldiers as they were firing on them.

Within hours of the attack Pakistan had closed the border crossing for supplies bound for NATO forces in Afghanistan... it’s a move that’s been used in the past as a protest.

[NONSECURITIZED] PODCASTER: Last month a NATO airstrike in Pakistan killed 24 Pakistani soldiers...and Pakistani officials are saying it was deliberate. According to U.S. officials...it was a major case of mistaken identity and miscommunication from both parties. NATO soldiers truly believed they were under attack by the Taliban and fought back. Although the deaths are a tragedy...I think we all need to keep in mind that these Pakistani men were soldiers. It’s a hazard of the job.

Within hours of the attack Pakistan had closed the border crossing for supplies bound for NATO forces in Afghanistan... it’s a move that’s been used in the past as a protest.
Several missiles fired from an American drone aircraft on Thursday struck a meeting of local people in northwest Pakistan who had gathered with Taliban mediators to settle a dispute over a mine. Pakistani intelligence says the attack killed 26 of 32 people present, some of them Taliban fighters, but the majority were elders and local people, including several children. The locals were not attached to the militants.

**Waziristan is one of the hardest hit areas in Pakistan and is also a major hub for extremism. But according to one local: quote “Muslim blood has become a business. If they really were killing extremists, the deaths from drone strikes would be lessening the insurgency, which it isn't.” End quote.** The United States has been using drones attacks in Pakistan since 2004.

About four missiles fired from one or more drones hit the meeting of two tribes and Taliban mediators who had gathered on open ground at a market in Datta Khel, in North Waziristan.

**But American officials on Thursday sharply disputed Pakistan’s account of the strikes and the civilian deaths, contending that all the people killed were insurgents. According to one American official...quote: “These people weren’t gathering for a bake sale. They were terrorists.” End quote.**

About four missiles fired from one or more drones hit the meeting of two tribes and Taliban mediators who had gathered on open ground at a market in Datta Khel, in North Waziristan.

**America has been using drones as a weapon of choice since 2004 especially in the Pakistan/Afghanistan border areas. Despite the fact that Pakistani officials are saying we are killing innocent civilians...we are in fact targeting and killing key members of Al-Qaida and the Taliban.**

**Take for instance the latest bombing in Waziristan....a major hub for extremism. As one American official put it...quote “These people weren't gathering for a bake sale. They were terrorists.” End quote.**

**The two tribes were gathering to discuss local business matters with members of the Taliban.**

**Waziristan is one of the hardest hit areas in Pakistan and is also a major hub for extremism. But according to one local: quote “Muslim blood has become a business. If they really were killing extremists, the deaths from drone strikes would be lessening the insurgency, which it isn't.” End quote.** The two tribes were gathering to discuss local business matters with members of the Taliban.
RAYMOND DAVIS SHOOTING SCRIPTS TRADITIONAL MEDIA

[SECURITIZED] ANCHOR: More trouble for U.S./Pakistan relations…this time resulting in the deaths of two Pakistani citizens by an American.

The U.S. says the American, 36-year-old Raymond Allen Davis, shot the Pakistanis on January 27th because they were trying to rob him in the eastern city of Lahore. Pakistani police officials say one of the men was carrying a gun. Washington insists his detention is illegal under international agreements covering diplomats because he is a U.S. Embassy staffer.

The disclosure compounds an already combustible standoff between the United States and Pakistan at a time of growing distrust between the two countries and complicates the U.S. efforts on the war on terror.

[NONSECURITIZED] ANCHOR: More trouble for U.S./Pakistan relations…this time resulting in the deaths of two Pakistani citizens by an American.

Investigators have determined that CIA contractor Raymond Davis who killed two Pakistani youths… was not acting in self-defense. Lahore City police Chief Aslam Tareen told a news conference that one of the boys was killed while running away. On Friday, Pakistani police officials recommended Davis face a murder charge in a case that has further strained relations between the counterterrorism allies.

The disclosure compounds an already combustible standoff between the United States and Pakistan at a time of growing distrust between the two countries and complicates the U.S. efforts on the war on terror.

RAYMOND DAVIS SHOOTING SCRIPTS PODCAST/SOCIAL MEDIA

[SECURITIZED] PODCASTER: Two Pakistanis were killed by Raymond Davis…he’s a CIA contractor who was stationed in the city of Lahore. So Davis shot the men when they were trying to rob him according to U.S. officials. Later on…Pakistani police found out that one of the men Davis shot actually had a gun. Pakistan has no right to detain Davis…it was self-defense and he had the right to defend himself.

Of course this only makes the situation between Pakistan and the U.S. more difficult because there is major distrust between both countries. On one hand both countries are trying to combat terrorism and on the other they have to rely on each other and that requires trust.

[NONSECURITIZED] PODCASTER: Two Pakistanis were killed by Raymond Davis…he’s a CIA contractor who was stationed in the city of Lahore.

Crime scene investigators from both sides…U.S. and Pakistan agree that Davis was in fact…NOT acting in self-defense. I mean he shot of one of the innocent men in the back. Pakistani police officials are recommending that Davis face a murder charge…which makes perfect sense. He killed two innocent people…well technically three if you count the wife that committed suicide after she found out her husband had been shot dead.
Of course this only makes the situation between Pakistan and the U.S. more difficult because there is major distrust between both countries. On one hand both countries are trying to combat terrorism and on the other they have to rely on each other and that requires trust.

**IRAQI REFUGEES TRADITIONAL MEDIA SCRIPTS**

[SECURITIZED] **ANCHOR:** Iraqi refugees across the United States — some of whom, have risked violence, kidnapping and death threats for assisting U.S. forces — now face a dire economy and joblessness in their adopted land.

Tens of thousands have fled Michigan's troubled economy in recent years, yet Iraqi refugees continue to move to the state. Family ties and cultural support from the region's large Middle Eastern community is appealing to many of the refugees.

But what Detroit boasts in Middle Eastern culture, it lacks in economic opportunities. According to the Department of Treasury…Michigan’s unemployment is at 10.6 this year, while the national average is at 8.6.

**Critics say that the Obama Administration lifting restrictions on Iraqi refugee settlement has put an undue amount of stress on the most economically depressed state in America. Southeast Michigan currently has 15,000 Iraqi refugees, many of whom are still unemployed.**

[NONSECURITIZED] **ANCHOR:** Iraqi refugees across the United States — some of whom, have risked violence, kidnapping and death threats for assisting U.S. forces — now face a dire economy and joblessness in their adopted land.

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But what Detroit boasts in Middle Eastern culture, it lacks in economic opportunities. According to the Department of Treasury…Michigan’s unemployment is at 10.6 this year, while the national average is at 8.6.

**Though Dearborn retains its Lebanese flavor, the area’s Muslim community includes many immigrants from India, Pakistan, Yemen and elsewhere, along with a growing Eastern European contingent and many African-Americans.**

**IRAQI REFUGEES SCRIPTS PODCAST/SOCIAL MEDIA**

[SECURITIZED] **PODCASTER:** We won the war in Iraq and have opened the doors to nearly 15,000 Iraqi refugees…many of whom helped us during the Iraq war. Some risked death and violence to help bring down one of the worst regimes in human history. But these same people are now facing the harsh realities of joblessness here in Michigan.

The fundamental problem is that employment is the backbone of the U.S. resettlement program. Refugees are expected to find work when they arrive in the U.S. and to move as quickly as possible toward self-sufficiency…except that was a system tailored to an economy with plentiful jobs. But jobs have dried up and the system is now collapsing.
But the bigger question is…if we really “Won” the war in Iraq, why do we continue to let thousands of Iraqi refugees—many of them MUSLIM—into the United States, especially in economically depressed areas like Michigan, where there aren’t enough jobs and unemployment is nearly 11%?

[NONSECURITIZED] PODCASTER: We won the war in Iraq and have opened the doors to nearly 15,000 Iraqi refugees…many of whom helped us during the Iraq war. Some risked death and violence to help bring down one of the worst regimes in human history. But these same people are now facing the harsh realities of joblessness here in Michigan.

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But we have to remember that we live in one of the greatest countries in the world and despite the economic situation…refugees are willing to accept what we consider low pay. One of the things I love about living in Detroit is the fact that we have large, thriving ethnic and religious groups from all around the world. Keep them coming. The Big Three will pull through as our regional economy continues to diversify.

LOWE’S ADS SCRIPTS TRADITIONAL MEDIA

[SECURITIZED]ANCHOR: Lowe's is planning to stick by its decision to pull its ads from a reality TV show about American Muslims... despite the growing opposition the home improvement chain is facing over the move.

Lowe's stopped running commercials during "All-American Muslim" after a conservative group known as the Florida Family Association e-mailed advertisers to ask them to stop advertising on the show.

The group said the program, which follows the lives of Muslim families living in the Metro Detroit area, was "propaganda that riskily hides the Islamic agenda's clear and present danger to American liberties and traditional values."

"All-American Muslim" premiered last month and chronicles the lives of five families who live in and near Dearborn, Michigan, a Detroit suburb with a large Muslim and Arab-American population. The show airs on Mondays on TLC and portrays Muslim families living in the United States.

[NONSECURITIZED]ANCHOR: Lowe's is planning to stick by its decision to pull its ads from a reality TV show about American Muslims... despite the growing opposition the home improvement chain is facing over the move.

Lowe's stopped running commercials during "All-American Muslim" after a conservative group known as the Florida Family Association e-mailed advertisers to ask them to stop advertising on the show.
Calling the retail giant's decision "un-American" and "naked religious bigotry"…Senator Ted Lieu says quote: "The show is about what it's like to be a Muslim in America, and it touches on the discrimination they sometimes face. And that kind of discrimination is exactly what's happening here with Lowe's."

"All-American Muslim" premiered last month and chronicles the lives of five families who live in and near Dearborn, Michigan, a Detroit suburb with a large Muslim and Arab-American population. The show airs on Mondays on TLC and portrays Muslim families living in the United States.

LOWES’S ADS SCRIPTS PODCAST/SOCIAL MEDIA

[SECURITIZED] PODCASTER: Lowe’s has made the big decision to pull its ads from this new TLC show called “American Muslim”.

Lowe's stopped running commercials during the show after a conservative group known as the Florida Family Association e-mailed advertisers to ask them to stop advertising on the show.

In think it’s safe to say that this show is just a ploy to trick God-fearing Americans into falling for propaganda that’s hiding the obvious Muslim agenda to disrupt our American civil liberties and traditional values.

[NONSECURITIZED] PODCASTER: Lowe’s has made the big decision to pull its ads from this new TLC show called “American Muslim”.

Lowe's stopped running commercials during the show after a conservative group known as the Florida Family Association e-mailed advertisers to ask them to stop advertising on the show.

As far as I’m concerned…Lowe’s pulling their ads from the show is absolutely un-American and clear bigoted move to squelch the voices of a minority population. The show is about what it's like to be a Muslim in America, including the discrimination they sometimes face. And that kind of discrimination is exactly what's happening here with Lowe's.

GUNMAN SCRIPTS TRADITIONAL MEDIA

[SECURITIZED]ANCHOR: A lone gunman, shooting randomly at cars in Hollywood with no apparent motive, was killed on Vine Street by Los Angeles police officers Friday morning.

The young man was spotted in a white tank top…walking up the street yelling “Allah- u-Akbar” and firing a handgun in the air. He then turned to firing at passing motorists who seemed to be picked at random, including a man in a Mercedes who was shot in the jaw. That man is currently in critical condition.

The gunman was eventually shot by a detective and an off-duty officer who may have been working on a movie set nearby.

Police so far…have found no motive in the shooting.
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The gunman was eventually shot by a detective and an off-duty officer who may have been working on a movie set nearby.

Police so far...have found no motive in the shooting.

GUNMAN SCRIPTS PODCAST/SOCIAL MEDIA

PODCASTER: This crazy guy...who apparently didn’t have a motive...was shooting randomly at cars in Hollywood. He was killed by LA Police Friday morning.

Witnesses spotted the guy walking up the street yelling “Allah-u-Akbar” and firing a handgun in the air. He then turned to firing at passing cars...even shooting a guy driving a Mercedes in the jaw. The driver is still in critical condition.

The gunman was eventually shot by a detective and an off-duty officer who may have been working on a movie set nearby.

[SECURITIZED] PODCASTER: This crazy guy...who apparently didn’t have a motive...was shooting randomly at cars in Hollywood. He was killed by LA Police Friday morning.

Witnesses spotted the guy walking up the street yelling “I’m going to die and I want to die” and firing a handgun in the air. He then turned to firing at passing cars...even shooting a guy driving a Mercedes in the jaw. The driver is still in critical condition.

The gunman was eventually shot by a detective and an off-duty officer who may have been working on a movie set nearby.

SHARIA LAW SCRIPTS TRADITIONAL MEDIA

ANCHOR: Murfreesboro, Tennessee is the epicenter of a legal battle dealing with Sharia Law. State lawmakers have introduced legislation that would make it a felony to practice the religious law of Islam. And a Senate candidate in Nevada warns that cities like Dearborn are already under Sharia law – quote – “We're talking about a militant terrorist situation, which I believe isn't a widespread thing, but it is enough that we need to address” end quote.

If passed...individuals or groups practicing Sharia law could be punished with 15 years behind bars. Tennessee isn't the first state to consider anti-Sharia legislation. Oklahoma passed a similar
bill last year. In March…Missouri House Speaker Steve Tilley said he would support a bill that "maintains that U.S. law will take precedence in U.S. courts.

[NONSECURITIZED] ANCHOR: Murfreesboro, Tennessee is the epicenter of a legal battle dealing with Sharia Law. State lawmakers have introduced legislation that would make it a felony to practice the religious law of Islam. If passed…individuals or groups practicing Sharia law could be punished with 15 years behind bars. Many Muslims consider Sharia law to outline basic tenets of living a moral life...including how to give to the poor, repay debt, and ensuring the rights of women and children. Some US courts already settle arguments in religious communities by referring to religious rules.

Tennessee isn't the first state to consider anti-Sharia law legislation. Oklahoma passed a similar bill last year. In March…Missouri House Speaker Steve Tilley said he would support a bill that "maintains that U.S. law will take precedence in U.S. courts.

SHARIA LAW SCRIPTS PODCAST/SOCIAL MEDIA

[SECURITIZED] PODCASTER: So there’s this town in Tennessee…Murfreesboro…which has become like the major epicenter of the Sharia Law debate. I’m gonna to have to say…we live in America…so why are we wasting taxpayer dollars debating a law that has no business being here in the U.S. in the first place.

Tennessee lawmakers have introduced legislation that would make it a felony to practice the religious law of Islam...even saying that if passed…individuals or groups practicing Sharia law could be punished with 15 years behind bars.

This isn’t something that’s unique to Tennessee. Oklahoma passed a similar bill last year and in March Missouri House Speaker Steve Tilley said he would support a bill that “maintains that U.S. law will take precedence in U.S. courts”.

[NONSECURITIZED] PODCASTER: So there’s this town in Tennessee… Murfreesboro… which has become like the major epicenter of the Sharia Law debate. I’m gonna to have to say…we live in America…which is not a country of just white Christians. It’s a country that has embraced people from all religions and from every country in the world.

Tennessee lawmakers have introduced legislation that would make it a felony to practice the religious law of Islam…even saying that if passed…individuals or groups practicing Sharia law could be punished with 15 years behind bars.

This isn’t something that’s unique to Tennessee. Oklahoma passed a similar bill last year and in March Missouri House Speaker Steve Tilley said he would support a bill that “maintains that U.S. law will take precedence in U.S. courts”.

GROUND ZERO MOSQUE TRADITIONAL MEDIA SCRIPTS

[SECURITIZED] ANCHOR: America's Republicans are up-in-arms about a proposed building that is barely even a blueprint yet, because it will put a new mosque within walking distance of New York's Ground Zero. Former mayor Rudy Giuliani, who led the city through the 9/11 attacks that destroyed the World Trade Center in 2001...has referred to the plans to build the mosque as a “desecration of hallowed ground”. Critics charge that having a mosque so close to where nearly 3,000 innocent people lost their lives is insensitive and an insult to the
victims' families. The mosque would be part of a 13-story Islamic center originally named Cordoba House, after the Spanish city conquered by Muslim invaders.

[NONSECURITIZED] ANCHOR: America's Republicans are up-in-arms about a proposed building that is barely even a blueprint yet, because it will put a new mosque within walking distance of New York's Ground Zero. Mayor Michael Bloomberg says if people want to build a house of worship they have a right to do it. He further goes on to say "This country is not built around state religion or only religions or clergy people we agree with. It's built around freedom." The mosque would be just one part of an Islamic community center originally named Cordoba House, after the Spanish city conquered by Muslim invaders and enriched by their heritage.

GROUND ZERO MOSQUE PODCAST/SOCIAL MEDIA SCRIPTS

[SECURITIZED] PODCASTER: It hasn’t even been built yet and Republicans are already up in arms over a proposed mosque being built near ground zero. Muslim community members have purchased an abandoned and private building a few blocks away that used to be the Burlington Coat Factory. Frankly…it’s a disgrace that President Obama supports the idea of this mosque. I mean…how can you build a mosque where 3,000 people died because of Islamic terrorists? Sure Muslims have the freedom and the right to build a mosque near Ground Zero. But we also as Americans have the right to free speech and to picket in front of the mosque for as long as it stands.

[NONSECURITIZED] PODCASTER: It hasn’t even been built yet and Republicans are already up in arms over a proposed mosque being built near ground zero. Muslim community members have purchased an abandoned and private building a few blocks away that used to be the Burlington Coat Factory. Despite the fact that it’s being called a mosque…it’s actually a large proposed community center, open to the public and set to house, among other things, a basketball court. Yes there will be a prayer space inside it as well, but you don't call a hospital a church because it happens to have a chapel inside it, do you? Naysayers may have the right to picket in front of the proposed community center…but peaceful Muslims have the right to build a place for a multi-faith dialogue.
APPENDIX B

SURVEY QUESTIONS

*Trust*

1.) I trust what the presenter is telling me. (trust 1)
   - strongly agree
   - agree
   - don’t know/neutral
   - disagree
   - strongly disagree

2.) The story is providing me an adequate interpretation of complex issue. (trust 2)
   - strongly agree
   - agree
   - don’t know/neutral
   - disagree
   - strongly disagree

3.) I trust this information. (trust 3)
   - strongly agree
   - agree
   - don’t know/neutral
   - disagree
   - strongly disagree

*Credibility*

1.) The presenter is a credible source of information. (cred 1)
   - strongly agree
   - agree
   - don’t know/neutral
   - disagree
   - strongly disagree

2.) The information is fair. (cred 2)
   - strongly agree
   - agree
   - don’t know/neutral
   - disagree
   - strongly disagree
3.) Only news from radio, newspaper, and television is credible. (cred 3)  
   -strongly agree  
   -agree  
   -don’t know/neutral  
   -disagree  
   -strongly disagree

**Authenticity**

1.) I believe what the presenter is saying. (auth 1)  
   -strongly agree  
   -agree  
   -don’t know/neutral  
   -disagree  
   -strongly disagree

2.) I believe this information. (auth 2)  
   -strongly agree  
   -agree  
   -don’t know/neutral  
   -disagree  
   -strongly disagree

3.) Television news is believable. (auth 3-Conditions 1-4)  
   -strongly agree  
   -agree  
   -don’t know/neutral  
   -disagree  
   -strongly disagree

4.) News from social media is believable. (auth 3- Conditions 5-8)  
   -strongly agree  
   -agree  
   -don’t know/neutral  
   -disagree  
   -strongly disagree

**Securitization**

1.) The story represents a threat to our way of life. (sec 1)  
   -strongly agree
2.) The government needs to take extraordinary measures to deal with this situation. (sec 2)
   -strongly agree
   -agree
   -don’t know/neutral
   -disagree
   -strongly disagree

3.) The information from this story makes me feel worried. (sec 3)
   -strongly agree
   -agree
   -don’t know/neutral
   -disagree
   -strongly disagree

4.) Americans need more information about this story. (sec 4)
   -strongly agree
   -agree
   -don’t know/neutral
   -disagree
   -strongly disagree

5.) This story makes me feel personally threatened. (sec 5)
   -strongly agree
   -agree
   -don’t know/neutral
   -disagree
   -strongly disagree

6.) The development in this story is a threat to our country. (sec 6)
   -strongly agree
   -agree
   -don’t know/neutral
   -disagree
   -strongly disagree
Political leanings questions

1.) How would you describe your own politics? (pol 1)
   - Very liberal
   - Liberal
   - Neither liberal nor conservative
   - Conservative
   - Very conservative

2.) How closely do you follow international news (for example: The Middle East)? (pol 2)
   - Very closely
   - Closely
   - Somewhat closely
   - Not closely
   - Never

3.) How much do you trust the news media to look after your interests? (pol 3)
   - All of the time
   - Most of the time
   - Occasionally
   - Hardly ever
   - Never

4.) How would you describe the politics of the news media? (pol 4)
   - Very liberal
   - Liberal
   - Neither liberal nor conservative
   - Conservative
   - Very conservative

5.) Do you think the country is better or worse off than it was before the terrorist acts of September 11, 2001? (pol 5)
   - Much better
   - Better
   - Neutral/don’t know
   - Worse
   - Much worse

6.) Do you think the country is safer or less safe than it was after the terrorist acts of September 11, 2001? (pol 6)
   - Safer
   - Somewhat safer
   - Somewhat less safer
7.) How good a job would you say the President is doing? (pol 7)
- Good job
- Somewhat good job
- Neutral/ don’t know
- Somewhat bad job
- Bad job

8.) The good a job would you say Congress is doing? (pol 8)
- Good job
- Somewhat good job
- Neutral/ don’t know
- Somewhat bad job
- Bad job

9.) How much do you trust the government to look out for you interests? (pol 9)
- All of the time
- Most of the time
- Occasionally
- Hardly
- Never

**Media Usage Questions**

1.) Newspapers and/or newspaper websites (media 1)
- Never
- Less than once a week
- 1-2 days a week
- 3-5 days a week
- Almost everyday

2.) Television and/or television websites (media 2)
- Never
- Less than once a week
- 1-2 days a week
- 3-5 days a week
- Almost everyday

3.) Radio and/or radio websites (media 3)
- Never
- Less than once a week
- 1-2 days a week
- 3-5 days a week
- Almost everyday

4.) Magazines and/or magazine websites (media 4)
   - Never
   - Less than once a week
   - 1-2 days a week
   - 3-5 days a week
   - Almost everyday

5.) Internet and/or social media websites (for example: Yahoo, MSN, Facebook, Twitter)
   (media 5)
   - Never
   - Less than once a week
   - 1-2 days a week
   - 3-5 days a week
   - Almost everyday

Social Media Engagement Questions

1.) Blogging (social 1)
   - Never
   - Less than once a week
   - 1-2 days a week
   - 3-5 days a week
   - Almost everyday

2.) Social Networking Sites (for example: Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, MySpace, Google+) (social 2)
   - Never
   - Less than once a week
   - 1-2 days a week
   - 3-5 days a week
   - Almost everyday

3.) Instant Messaging (or IM-ing) (social 3)
   - Never
   - Less than once a week
   - 1-2 days a week
   - 3-5 days a week
   - Almost everyday
4.) Video Chat (for example: Skype, Facetime) (social 4)
   - Never
   - Less than once a week
   - 1-2 days a week
   - 3-5 days a week
   - Almost everyday
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ABSTRACT

TRUST, CREDIBILITY AND AUTHENTICITY: RACE AND ITS EFFECT ON AUDIENCE PERCEPTIONS OF NEWS INFORMATION FROM TRADITIONAL AND ALTERNATIVE SOURCES

by

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Major: Communication

Degree: Doctor of Philosophy

The purpose of this study is to investigate audience perceptions of trust, credibility and authenticity in news information coming from traditional and social media sources, especially focused on how securitization amplifies the effects of news frames regarding race and culture. Research in race and media suggests that citizens of nations who look like the “other” will be framed differently than those of nations that look like “us.” The study examines the effects of securitization and how exceptionalism coupled with framing can create an atmosphere where American culture has become securitized, in particular the ways in which multiculturalism due to increased immigration, especially from South Asian, Middle Eastern and Latin American countries, has led to a racially charged space post-9/11. The study employed an experiment comparing traditional and social media to determine the ways in which audiences perceive news information and found that story type (securitized and nonsecuritized) played an important role in how audiences perceived trust, credibility and authenticity in the information, the presenter and the modality. Overall, securitized stories were trusted and perceived more credible than nonsecuritized stories. Race played a larger role in the way audiences perceived the presenter, with
the Brown presenters generally being perceived as more authentic than their White counterparts. Audiences also perceived traditional media more trustworthy and credible compared to social media. But news from social media was perceived as more authentic than traditional media. Further, this dissertation focused on how securitization has a framing function with the news media as an important intermediary between political actors and the public. Broadcast news can provide a multilayered look at how audiences perceive information from on-air personalities. But in recent years, the growth of social media has provided consumers an alternative place to get their news, such as video blogs and/or podcasts. Thus, this study examines perceptions of news information from multiple channels, presenters of different ethnicities and modality due to the drastically changed ways in which the American public, politicians and the media talk about “security.”
AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL STATEMENT

Sadaf R. Ali is an Assistant Professor of Electronic Media & Film at Eastern Michigan University. She received her Bachelors of Arts in English at the University of Illinois at Chicago and a Masters of Arts from Columbia College-Chicago in Broadcast Journalism. She worked as a television reporter for local and ethnic news stations until 2008 when she began her doctorate studies at Wayne State University in Detroit, MI. Her research interests include broadcast journalism, social media, media framing and securitization.