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The Rise Of The Social And The Change In The Political: A Consideration Of Arendt, Habermas, And Foucault

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DEDICATION

This project is dedicated to my wife Emily without whose support it would not have been possible.
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# TABLE OF CONTENTS

Dedication.............................................................................................................................................. iii

Acknowledgements.................................................................................................................................. iii

List of Figures........................................................................................................................................... viii

Chapter 1 Introduction .......................................................................................................................... 1

Chapter 2 Hannah Arendt ..................................................................................................................... 7

  2.1 Introduction..................................................................................................................................... 7

  2.2 The Pre-Social World of Greek Distinctions ................................................................................. 8

    The Private, Animal Laborans, and Homo Faber ............................................................................. 9

    The Private Realm............................................................................................................................ 9

    *Animal Laborans* ............................................................................................................................. 12

    *Homo Faber* ................................................................................................................................... 15

  2.3 Arendtian Politics........................................................................................................................... 21

    *Zoon Politikon* and the Public Realm .......................................................................................... 21

    The Miracle of Politics..................................................................................................................... 25

    Freedom ........................................................................................................................................... 32

  2.4 The Origins of the Social .............................................................................................................. 39

    The Philosophical Leveling .............................................................................................................. 39

    Hobbesian Man............................................................................................................................... 44

    Imperialism ....................................................................................................................................... 48

    Totalitarianism ............................................................................................................................... 50

    The Social Question......................................................................................................................... 53

  2.5 Contemporary Politics and the Rise of the Social ..................................................................... 57
LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1: Schema of Social Realms ................................................................. 97
Figure 2: Crises Points of Origin ................................................................. 133
Figure 3: Types of Action ......................................................................... 143
Figure 4: Social Interactions .................................................................. 156
Figure 5: Functions of Action Oriented Toward Mutual Understanding .......... 170
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION

Several political theorists have described a change in the nature of the concept of the political. In particular, subjects, modes of action, and ways of thinking which were once beyond the scope of the political realm have become a part of it. The presence of these elements within the political has broadened our contemporary understanding of the concept. As a result, the idea of the political has been stretched beyond its initial meaning, and those considerations which are classically political have languished from inattentiveness as they have been displaced by other content. Theorists who have expressed concerns about the demise of the political have not necessarily agreed upon the causal mechanism responsible for this change, or the character of the change itself. What they have agreed upon is that the conception of politics has changed and that this change impoverishes not just modern politics, but modern life as a whole. Within this work I examine the notions that the political and the social are, or at least once were even if only theoretically, distinct entities and that the social has become a component of the political.

The political realm has come to include modes of action and thought once foreign to that realm. The content of politics has also been altered. Two of the most important aspects of this change to the political realm have been the inclusion of the principles of economics and the use of force, as modes of conduct, ways of thinking, and as subjects. There is theoretically, or historically, a political point of view or mode of thought and action distinct from an approach to life based upon economic principles. That political way of life has been replaced by the economic approach emphasizing calculation, instrumental rationality, and the promotion of self-benefiting action. The political mode of thought and action was also distinct from realms of life that permitted the use of force as a means or the obsession over the use of force as a primary issue under consideration. The changes that took place brought force’s raw power, coercion, and
manipulation into politics displacing the use of persuasive speech as the primary means of conducting affairs. The outcomes of these developments drastically altered not only politics, but also life as a whole.

The scope of the problem I examine is vast. The political realm could no longer be understood as a space of freedom. Politics would no longer viewed as a noble human endeavor. The space and activity of politics became a space and activity associated with necessity rather than freedom. Necessity must always be addressed and is most efficiently answered by the employment of economic principles or the use of force than by free individuals engaging in persuasive political discourse. The decline of the political realm as a space of action among free and equal citizens precluded the possibility of persuading others to accept the force of the better argument. Given the prominence of politics in determining the course of collective human undertakings control over the most important decisions of the day has been lost.

Further obfuscating this already complex matter is the fact that the changes that have occurred in the political realm and humanity’s alienation from its collective actions have gone relatively unnoticed, save for academic treatises. The contemporary situation has even become self-reinforcing, as self-disciplining behavior has become entrenched at the individual and societal levels. Behavior has replaced action in the political realm and this has been widely accepted as the norm. The current understanding of politics emerged long ago and contemporarily remains largely unquestioned aside from a sense of malaise associated with politics. This inspires in many an aversion to the political realm and a preference instead for the perceived safety and freedom of a life removed from politics. Freedom is no longer conceived politically, but largely viewed as something that cannot be associated with political life.
I accomplish my task of investigating this phenomenon by examining the works of three prominent, although very different thinkers: Hannah Arendt, Jürgen Habermas, and Michel Foucault. My choice of thinkers was deliberate. Each of the three represents a different theoretical approach applied to similar problems. The choice of Arendt may be somewhat obvious, as it was she who coined the titular phrase “the rise of the social.” Her approach was informed by her connection to German Existenzphilosophie and a profound interest in the nature of politics in classical Greece. Arendt provided what was undoubtedly the most famous account of the issue in *The Human Condition* (Arendt, 1958), though the theme was present in much of her work. Arendt claimed that the political and the social had once been distinct areas of life, but the “rise of the social” changed the relationship and occluded the political.

My choice to consider the works of the great critical theorist Jürgen Habermas may be somewhat less obvious. However, his early work *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere* (Habermas, 1962) is particularly pertinent. In that work Habermas described, in great detail, the formation of the bourgeois public sphere and how, separate from social interests, it was similar to a political realm in that individuals could debate as equals. However, social interests were unleashed and the bourgeois public sphere’s existence came to an end, being replaced by a mixed realm where private, social interests rather than shared reason dictated debate. I also examine Habermas’s more mature thought which may be read as an effort to theoretically recover the ideal form of public sphere typical of the era described in his *Structural Transformation*.

If my choice of Arendt is obvious and my choice of Habermas less so, then my decision to utilize the work of Michel Foucault may initially seem out of turn. However, the French sociologist can be read as adopting different approaches than Arendt or Habermas while arriving
at interconnected conclusions. For Foucault, the political, through the state, had enveloped the social in order to gain greater control over individuals. Thus, the political realm came to entail things that were previously not located within it. Enforcement mechanisms have also moved beyond the state making the newly dominant modes of thought and action more pervasive. Though these theorists described different processes, there is a common connecting thread: the idea that the concept of the political has changed, and correspondingly that the relationship between the political and nonpolitical realms of life have changed.

My purpose is to examine the work of each of these theorists who take markedly different approaches to make the case that regardless of the perspective taken or the theoretical orientation adopted the conclusion is similar, namely, that politics has changed. Beyond this basic notion of change, considering the work of these three reveals a core common to each of their understandings of the change that occurred in the political realm. Thinking through Arendt, Habermas, and Foucault individually will allow me to draw out the crucial components of each account. This reveals the common elements within a broader construction of the account of the rise of the social and the critical change to politics. Having identified the changes that have occurred and the difficulties they cause potential remedies can be considered and assessed.

Having provided a brief introduction to the topic and my rationale for the structure I have chosen I proceed as follows in the remainder of this work. Chapter 2 considers the work of Hannah Arendt. My account of Arendt begins with her analysis of classical Greece, where she argued that the *polis* was distinct from the all that existed outside of it. With this distinction in mind a portrait of Arendtian politics, as an idealized form of political interaction, is presented. I then examine Arendt’s conception of the social as well as its rise. I include Arendt’s thoughts on the relationship between politics and philosophy, the role of Hobbes’s thought, the importance of
imperialism and totalitarianism, as well as the social question, which doomed the French revolution. I then turn to Arendt’s thoughts on contemporary politics and the problematized relationship between the political and the social.

In Chapter 3 I turn to the works of Jürgen Habermas whose idealized conception of politics was typical not of ancient Greece but of the bourgeois public sphere. I chronicle Habermas’s description of the creation, functioning, and decline of genuine politics. I discuss the pathologies of modernity that Habermas identifies as symptoms of the rise of the social and the alteration of the political realm. The colonization of the lifeworld emerges as an important metaphor for the manner in which the contents and modes of action in the public sphere have given way to their non-public counterparts. Manipulative and strategic communication replaced true political communication under these conditions. I understand Habermas’s theory of communicative action as offering the prospect of recovering an idealized form of politics and offsetting the pathologies associated with the rise of the social.

I consider the work of Michel Foucault in Chapter 4. I wish to make an important caveat from the outset. More so than with Arendt or Habermas, my account of Foucault considers Foucauldian thought inclusive of a variety of scholars who adopted Foucault’s frequently novel but often underdeveloped concepts. Specifically, I examine the Foucauldian concepts of panopticism, biopolitics, and governmentality. I provide an understanding of each these concepts that links them to the idea of the rise of the social and the alteration of the political in a manner consistent with the accounts of Arendt and Habermas.

Chapter 5 serves as a conclusion; there I indicate some parallels between the works of Arendt, Habermas, and Foucault. I present the core common to the three thinkers, namely, that nonpolitical concerns have become incorporated into the political realm and altered politics.
Considering the three important thinkers in unison makes a stronger case for the idea that politics has changed in its content and mode of conduct and thought. I translate some of the theoretical points made into practical examples from contemporary political life. Finally, I briefly consider some potential remedies that may be capable of offsetting the negative components of the changes that have occurred to the concept of the political.
CHAPTER 2 HANNAH ARENDT

2.1 Introduction

Among the theorists considered, it was Hannah Arendt who provided the best-known account of the social and its relationship to the political. Though Arendt’s work on the topic has not consistently been well received, it was nonetheless an important, albeit controversial, component of her thought. Despite the fact that Arendt’s thought did not neatly coincide with either Habermas’s or Foucault’s, there are some similarities and areas of overlap. When considered together, these prominent theorists coalesce around certain themes. Together they tell a tale of a new understanding of the political, one that is markedly different from prior understandings of that sphere of life: namely, that politics now includes content and ways of thinking and doing which were previously excluded. This conception of contemporary politics not only altered what politics, or the political, refers to, but by extension the way individuals live both their private and public lives.

Arendt’s thought conveyed two different conceptions of the political and politics. The first was the political as she claimed it classically existed, prior to the rise of the social: I refer to this as Arendtian politics. This was an elevated notion of the political; it was a noble politics, which Arendt viewed as “the highest level of human affairs.” Alternatively, the rise of the social resulted in a baser form of the political. Arendt described this politics, contemporary politics, as though it “was no more than a battlefield of partial, conflicting interests, where nothing counted but pleasure and profit, partisanship, and the lust for domination” (Arendt, 1954a). Arendt articulated these high and low, noble and base alternative conceptions of the political in several works placing them in stark contrast to one another (Arendt, 1954a, 2005). The difference between these contrasting meanings of the political was the effect of the rise of the social. This
phenomenon changed the very meaning of the political. Arendt constructed her account of this change over the course of her career.

My analysis of Arendt proceeds as follows. Initially, I present Arendt’s depiction of the Greek world, as the distinctions inherent in that description permit Arendtian politics, which I then discuss. Next, I outline the creation of the social, including the relationship between philosophy and politics, the thought of Thomas Hobbes, and the world’s experiences with imperialism and totalitarianism. The discussion includes the social question, which in Arendt’s view doomed the French Revolution. The next step in my analysis is an examination of the rise of the social, and its several component parts. The rise of the social brought content and modes of thought that were once confined to the nonpolitical realms of life into politics. My examination of the rise of the social also describes what Arendt believed politics had become, having deviated from the idealized Arendtian politics. Finally, I touch upon some problems with Arendt’s analysis and her notion of the “double face” of certain issues.

2.2 The Pre-Social World of Greek Distinctions

The logical starting point for the task at hand is Arendt’s *The Human Condition* (1958). Many regard this work as Arendt’s magnum opus, and unsurprisingly it has received no shortage of scholarly attention. Indeed, it seems that anyone undertaking work on Arendt has had to contend with *The Human Condition*, a complex work. It is also, undoubtedly, the most famous and complete articulation of Arendt’s thought on the rise of the social. The starting point for this investigation will be Arendt’s well known, albeit idealized, account of the Classical world. This seems the most appropriate starting point, as it is the beginning of Arendt’s theoretical timeline of the social and its rise. Within this work, Arendt provided an account not just of the rise of the social, but of what she envisioned the world, and the political, to be prior to that rise. An
understanding of how Arendt viewed the political prior to the corrupting influence of the social will provide a stark contrast to the alterations caused by the rise of the social.

The Human Condition was exemplary of the method closely associated with Arendt. She began by considering the Greek city-state, and paid heed to the etymology of the concepts with which her work was concerned. In Arendt’s view, Classical Greek society was one characterized by a number of distinctions. The first characteristic distinction separated the public and the private realms of life. The second set of distinctions was between the three components of the vita activa, and to some degree, corresponded with the distinction between the public and private realms. There was yet another pertinent distinction present in Arendt’s account of the Classical world; this was between the bios politikos – or the vita activa – and the bios theoretikos. These distinctions were crucial, as they constituted Arendt’s understanding of the political prior to the rise of the social. In Arendt’s view, many of the ails of modernity can be traced to the erosion of these distinctions, which permitted the rise of the social. The rise of the social described the phenomena of the nonpolitical aspects of life entering the political realm. This being the case, any understanding contemporary politics from the Arendtian perspective requires understanding the nonpolitical categories since the erosion of these distinctions permitted what was previously nonpolitical to enter into politics.

The Private, Animal Laborans, and Homo Faber

The Private Realm

Arendt’s first distinction was between the public polis and the private oikos. The private oikos was pre-political and so a pre-public realm in several ways. The oikos was pre-political in that it was, necessarily, first in human development. As Arendt wrote, “man is a ‘social’ before he is a ‘political animal’” (Arendt, 1958, p. 32). In this sense, the private, familial man is more
primitive than the public, political man. After all, other animals may lead private lives, but would be incapable of creating and living in a public world, in Arendt’s sense. In this way, the oikos was a requisite, but more primitive, animalistic portion of life.

The oikos, as private life, is prior to the public in that it provided for all of the necessities of life, which allowed men to enter into the public sphere unconcerned with the basic necessities of life. It was the place of biological and physical necessities. The oikos was the realm of life concerned with food and shelter, for example. It was the location of biological necessities like reproduction, parenting, and familial relations. All of these are necessary for life, but merely precursors that make a public realm possible.

The oikos, being a pre-political realm, was directed by relationships based purely upon the power of one member, the head of the household, over all other members. That single individual used “prepolitical force” with which he “ruled over the family and its slaves” (Arendt, 1958, p. 32). This method of conducting the affairs of a group or a collective of individuals would appear similar to a contemporary political order based purely on raw power. It would be the tyranny of one over many. Arendt, however, believed that in antiquity it was not viewed as political at all: “the whole concept of rule and being ruled, of government and power in the sense in which we understand them as well as the regulated order attending them, was felt to be prepolitical and to belong in the private rather than the public sphere” (1958, p. 32). The oikos was an example of what contemporaries would consider a political mode of conducting affairs, which was not considered so in Arendt’s Greece. The tyranny of the head of the household was permitted because while within the household he was not among equals. The superior head of the household need not concern himself with the opinions or desires of those who were his inferiors. Despotism and force could rule anywhere outside of the political realm; Arendt believed that
Thucydides’s famous observation was accurate. In all areas of life outside of politics, “the strong did what they could and the weak suffered what they must” (Arendt, 1963c, p. 12).

Since the oikos was ruled by power and domination, it was a realm of life totally lacking freedom. Obviously, the inferiors within the oikos could not experience freedom; the slaves, children, and wives lived lives of total domination. The head of the household’s relationship to freedom is far less obvious. The head of the oikos, solely as a member of the oikos, albeit as the dominant member, was just as much a stranger to freedom as all those he ruled over. The private was a realm characterized by a deprivation of freedom, which affected all within it equally. To be solely private meant to be deprived of what made human life quintessentially human: “the privation of privacy lies in the absence of others; as far as they are concerned, private man does not appear, and therefore it is as though he did not exist. Whatever he does remains without significance and consequence to others, and what matters to him is without interest to other people” (Arendt, 1958, p. 58). The oikos was private, privacy meant isolation, and “to be isolated is to be deprived of the capacity to act,” which was the only source of freedom (Arendt, 1958, p. 188). Action could only occur and have meaning in the presence of equals. “Everybody outside the polis – slaves and barbarians – was aneu logou, deprived, of course, not of the faculty of speech, but a way of life in which speech and only speech made sense and where the central concern of all citizens was to talk to each other” (Arendt, 1958, p. 27). This went for all members of the oikos, the only respite for the head of household was his additional, external role in the public realm.

This description of the private realm would sound odd to most contemporary ears. Today we view the private realm as a place of welcoming safety, a place that relieves the pressure applied by others. Rather than believing that the public realm provides freedom, many feel that it
has the opposite effect. Contemporaries feel restrained in public, forced to conform to societal standards. Many even play roles that they have not chosen for themselves, but rather have been defined for them. Individuals in these scenarios can only be who they truly are in private, and so only experience what they believe to be freedom in that realm far away from the prying eyes of publicity. This freedom is based upon the right to privacy, protecting individuals’ private lives from governmental interference. This understanding of freedom could only be a modern one, a result of the rise of the social.

Arendt’s description of the oikos is not meant to imply that the private realm was totally without reason, or that it served no function whatsoever. It functioned quite well in meeting the basic biological and physical needs. Its members were sheltered, fed, and clothed. Children were produced and raised to continue the society. The oikos was quite capable of satisfying both necessity and biology, although certainly in an inequitable manner. The different members of the household certainly would have had their needs met to differing degrees based upon their status, and the situations of subservient members would certainly have varied across households. This was, after all, a system based upon patriarchy and slavery. The oikos did, however, operate on the basis of its own type of logic, the logic embedded in the types of activities that took place therein. An account of these activities requires an understanding of the second distinction that characterized Arendt’s account of classical Greece.

Animal Laborans

An understanding of the second crucial distinction, the component parts of the vita activa, is required to provide a full account of the private realm, and thus, to bring it into contrast with the public realm, the polis. Arendt described the vita activa as consisting of three distinct component parts, or modes of life. Arendt theorized three ideal types of individuals within the
vita activa. These were labor, undertaken by the animal laborans, work, undertaken by homo faber, and action, of which only the zoon politikon was capable. Animal laborans and homo faber were associated with the private realm while zoon politikon was associated with the public realm, and more specifically, politics within it. The first two components, animal laborans and homo faber, were temporally prior and hierarchically inferior to the zoon politikon whose existence they made possible.

The first component of the vita activa was labor, which was associated with, and performed by animal laborans. Animal laborans was biologically human, but was not capable of the sort of humanity Arendt associated with zoon politikon, as explained below. “The animal laborans is indeed only one, at best the highest, of the animal species which populate the earth” (Arendt, 1958, p. 84). These laborers were concerned with nothing more than the continual satisfaction and creation of necessity. They are above other animals, but unlike the other forms of human life, they always remain tied to nature. “The animal laborans, which with its body and the help of tame animals nourishes life, may be the lord and master of all living creatures, but he still remains the servant of nature and the earth” (Arendt, 1958, p. 139).

For these beings, life and its mere continuation was the highest good and the creation of an abundance of basic necessities their modus operandi (Arendt, 1958, pp. 126, 208). Acknowledging Marx, Arendt wrote: “the productivity of labor power produces objects only incidentally and is primarily concerned with the means of its own reproduction; since its power is not exhausted when its own reproduction has been secured, it can be used for the reproduction of more than one life process, but it never ‘produces’ anything but life” (Arendt, 1958, p. 88). A form of Malthusian trap, labor provides for the necessities of life, but nothing more. As labor becomes more efficient, more life can be created and sustained, however, if this limited cycle
continues endlessly, nothing higher than mere necessities would ever be produced. “This cycle needs to be sustained through consumption, and the activity which provides the means of consumption is laboring” (Arendt, 1958, p. 99). All products of labor are “fed into the human life process almost immediately” (Arendt, 1958, p. 99). More necessities are produced, and thus, the number of lives supported would increase, although the circumstances of those lives would never move beyond the state of animal laborans.

In Arendt’s account of antiquity, there was a distinction between types of activity. Those undertaken out of necessity were of strictly private concern and took place solely within the confines of the oikos (Arendt, 1958, p. 85). Those activities were neither seen nor heard, and this was the fate of animal laborans whose outputs were the mere labors of their bodies, which was capable of nothing beyond meeting the necessities of life. “To labor meant to be enslaved by necessity, and this enslavement was inherent in the conditions of human life” (Arendt, 1958, pp. 83-84). Arendt argued that the slaves of antiquity, were not primarily kept as a source of cheap labor, as they were in later ages, but represented an “attempt to exclude labor from the conditions of man’s life” (1958, p. 84). This exclusion, of not just labor, but also work, freed citizens’ lives of necessary and slavish activities which must occur in private to enable a political life of public concern.

This then was the mentalité, and the mode of being and doing most associated with the oikos. As long as humans are as they are, they feel the constraint of necessity. The private realm existed as a place where this necessity could be satisfied. Animal laborans, as those totally confined to the darkness of the private sphere, were singularly concerned with nothing more than the continual satisfaction of unceasing necessity. This was, at its core, a narrowly concerned
continuation of itself. It was blind production for the purposes of the continuation of life. Arendt wrote:

There is no lasting happiness outside the prescribed cycle of painful exhaustion and pleasurable regeneration, and whatever throws this cycle out of balance —poverty and misery where exhaustion is followed by wretchedness instead of regeneration, or great riches and an entirely effortless life where boredom takes the place of exhaustion and where the mills of necessity, of consumption and digestion, grind an impotent human body mercilessly and barrenly to death—ruins the elemental happiness that comes from being alive (1958, p. 109).

There was nothing satisfying outside the fulfillment of necessity and the continuation of the life process. For animal laborans, laboring was the pursuit of happiness, which corresponded to the pursuit of life (Arendt, 1958, p. 109). The satisfactions equated with life processes or physical needs were best pursued in the private realm where such interests could be singularly pursued, as opposed to the public realm where other matters could be raised.

**Homo Faber**

The second category within the *vita activa* was *homo faber*. Echoing Locke, Arendt wrote that *homo faber* worked with their hands, rather than merely laboring with their bodies, as was the case with animal laborans (1958, p. 136). *Homo faber* produced durable outputs, which would outlast him, rather than being continually consumed out of necessity, as were the products of animal laborans. *Homo faber* was the “fabricator of the world” whose ideals were “permanence, stability, and durability” (Arendt, 1958, p. 126). Rather than being immediately consumed in an endless cycle of life, *homo faber’s* products could exist for significantly longer. While the *animal laborans* remained subject to nature, *homo faber* mastered it and nature was subjected to him. An “element of violation and violence is present in all fabrication, and *homo faber*, the creator of the human artifice, has always been a destroyer of nature” (Arendt, 1958, p. 139). Rather than being of nature, “*homo faber* conducts himself as lord and master of the whole earth” (Arendt, 1958, p. 139).
The final object produced justified the violence *homo faber* committed against nature. “The end justifies the violence done to nature to win the material, as the wood justifies killing the tree and the table justifies destroying the wood” (Arendt, 1958, p. 153). *Homo faber* was entirely motivated by a means/ends mindset. All things produced were done so with an eye to their usefulness. Taking an example from an end of carpentry, a chair “can show its usefulness only by again becoming a means, either as a thing whose durability permits its use as a means for comfortable living or as a means of exchange” (Arendt, 1958, p. 153). If a potential output of production could not find a use, then it would simply not be produced in the first place.

Judgments about the utility of ends were determinative in all aspects of the production process, not just the decision regarding what to fabricate. Such judgments were applied universally: “tools are designed and implements invented, and the same end product organizes the work process itself, decides about the needed specialists, the measure of cooperation, the number of assistants, etc. During the work process, everything is judged in terms of suitability and usefulness for the desired end, and for nothing else” (Arendt, 1958, p. 153). *Homo faber* as a distinct category within the *vita activa* were defined by this mode of thinking. Just as *animal laborans* were characterized by their unending laboring to fulfill necessity, *homo faber* was characterized by unrelenting obsession with usefulness. The durability of the work as well as the means/ends nature of *homo faber* differentiated that category from *animal laborans*. Whereas *animal laborans* was concerned solely with the life process and the production of more labor power, *homo faber* viewed additional labor as useful only in that it could be used to pursue a “higher end,” namely objects of use or valuable in exchange (Arendt, 1958, p. 162).

The unrelenting nature of the means/ends mode of thinking was problematic. “The trouble with the utility standard inherent in the very activity of fabrication is that the relationship
between means and ends on which it relies is very much like a chain whose every end can serve again as a means in some other context” (Arendt, 1958, pp. 153-154). No matter how useful one of *homo faber’s* fabrications proved to be, no end ever proved satisfactory. There was never truly an end, merely another means to some end, more utility need always be found. *Homo faber* was unable to grasp the distinction between usefulness and meaningfulness, always and only acting “in order to” and never “for the sake of” (Arendt, 1958, p. 154).

*Homo faber* worked in isolation with rarely more than a few assistants; fabrication occurred in the small-scale shops of the craftsman, rather than the large-scale factories that arose after industrialization. This type of work was a private affair, contained almost entirely within households, as was the labor of *animal laborans*. Unlike *animal laborans*, however, *homo faber* was not an entirely private being, completely shut into the isolation of the oikos. *Homo faber* was capable of emerging from his isolation, as when he appeared “as a merchant and trader and establishes the exchange market in this capacity” (Arendt, 1958, p. 163). The exchange market was a public realm of sorts. However, this sort of publicity was based entirely upon a desire for a greater range of end options for the objects of fabrication. “Historically, the last public realm, the last meeting place which is at least connected with the activity of *homo faber*, is the exchange market on which his products are displayed” (Arendt, 1958, p. 162). That is, objects of fabrication could find more, or higher ends, if they could become objects of exchange by taking on value in addition to usefulness. The exchange market did not allow for the expression of humanity or free interaction. “However, the people who meet on the exchange market are primarily not persons but producers of products, and what they show there is never themselves, not even their skills and qualities . . . but their products” (Arendt, 1958, p. 209). Thus, in this public realm, inhabited more by commodities than by humans, the values placed upon the objects
of fabrication were determinative of the values of their makers. This placed even more importance upon the ends, which must be found for the objects of fabrication.

Furthermore, value in exchange came only from the opinion of others, as potential partners in exchange. As Arendt put it, “[t]his value consists solely in the esteem of the public realm where the things appear as commodities, and it is neither labor, nor work, nor capital, nor profit, nor material, which bestows such value upon an object, but only and exclusively the public realm where it appears to be esteemed, demanded, or neglected” (1958, p. 164). Borrowing from Locke, Arendt noted that this value existed independent of intrinsic worth and had everything to do with “marketable value” (1958, p. 164). In this way, value of a fabricated object was entirely and arbitrarily determined based upon the collective perception of a community of fabricators who comprised the exchange market. Since homo faber was connected to a public solely through the objects of fabrication, the worth of the individual could be seen to correspond to the value communally assigned to those fabrications. Thus, an individual was little more than what he produced.

Animal laborans and homo faber, despite their differences, did share some characteristics of great import. The first such characteristic was their outcome based orientation toward action. As previously mentioned, each was motivated by generally known outcomes. Specifically, animal laborans was motivated by necessity and the continuation of life processes, while homo faber was motivated by an unending cycle of means and ends. This may be seen as a form of rationality, in that it is goal directed. As Benhabib noted, even though Arendt never used the terminology of Max Weber, his formal and instrumental rationality may loosely fit (Benhabib, 2000, p. 26; Weber, 1964, pp. 115-118, 181-309, 324-341). There were, of course, no formal, institutionalized guidelines to be followed. However, the behaviors of both animal laborans and
homo faber were predictable and goal orientated, so, in a way, uniform. Additionally, homo faber organized fabrication based upon concerns about the efficiency of achieving ends of value. These conditions inherent in their behavior made it somewhat uniform, in that deviations were unlikely. Their activity was behavior in these senses, a sort of pre-institutional, informal instrumentality, where future behavior could be reliably predicted.

Furthermore, the behavior of animal laborans and homo faber adhered to a form of rationality in that it was limited and directed purely by necessity. The effort of animal laborans was necessary in the most basic sense. As previously explained, animal laborans ensured the continuation of the life processes. There were enough necessities produced that others, not engaged in the laboring process, could consume them. Thus, animal laborans labored solely out of necessity and the entirety of the products of the labor was necessary. Similarly, the fabrication of homo faber was necessary, although in a less basic sense. As discussed above, fabrication and mastery over nature was necessary for the creation of a common world. For these reasons, both the labor of animal laborans and the work of homo faber were necessary if there was to be a human world at all; it was necessary if any human relations or activity, beyond mere necessity, beyond labor and work, were to be possible.

Animal laborans and homo faber were also similar in their orientation towards the political and those who engaged in it, the yet to be discussed zoon politikon. Animal laborans and homo faber were devoted to their own aims which produced, in their eyes real, tangible results and:

Both, therefore, are, strictly speaking, unpoltical, and will incline to denounce action and speech as idleness, idle busbybody-ness and idle talk, and generally will judge public activities in terms of their usefulness to supposedly higher ends – to make the world more useful and more beautiful in the case of homo faber, to make life easier and longer in the case of the animal laborans (Arendt, 1958, p. 208).

As will become apparent in the proceeding discussion, the action of zoon politikon was not
oriented toward any specific end, but was important due to its primary byproduct, freedom. This hostility to the political might make sense to contemporaries. After all, if there is a specific end in mind, be it the production of necessities and continuation of life, or the fabrication of goods, deliberation or debate of the political sort would not be the most efficient means of achieving them. Indeed, politics is often considered the least efficient process for attaining any predetermined end, and is in fact, often focused upon what end should be pursued, prior to any concern about pursuing it. The tyranny of the oikos, and the rationality of both animal laborans and homo faber would be far more efficient than any conception of politics.

Despite their belief that the political activity of the public realm was superfluous, both animal laborans and homo faber had a need for that space. Arendt wrote, “for without a space of appearance and without trusting in action and speech as a mode of being together, neither the reality of one’s self, of one’s own identity, nor the reality of the surrounding world can be established beyond doubt” (1958, p. 208). Arendt quoted Dante’s De Monarchia, “[t]hus, nothing acts [unless by acting] it makes patent its latent self” (1958, p. 175).¹ This is a starting point for Arendt’s theory of action (Markell, 2006, p. 10). More fundamentally, it has a far more basic impact upon the lives of animal laborans and homo faber, as individuals who do not truly undertake action, but rather, labor and work respectively. Individuals must actualize and articulate themselves in some way that can be viewed by others, only through this expression. Humans, and the world, must be experienced by the senses of others in order to be considered real. Moreover, those isolated in privacy did not exist as humans in the same way. The world

¹ The epigraphs to The Human Condition’s chapter on action have received some scholarly attention. Markell provided an exegesis of Dante’s passage and its relationship to Arendt’s thought (1992, p. 22). Gottlieb noted both the importance of Arendt’s use of Dante, and the significance of the choices Arendt made in translating the passage (2006). Additionally, Thiele argued that a proper understanding of Arendt required a consideration of not just the epigraph from Dante, but also the preceding one from Isak Dinesen (2003, Ch. 4).
must also be experienced and affirmed by common sensory perception in order to be affirmed (Arendt, 1958, pp. 208-209).

2.3 Arendtian Politics

Arendt’s conception of what was classically, properly, and purely political was as enigmatic as any component of her work. It was somewhat difficult to even narrow down a proper term for the concept being discussed; Arendt herself never coined a phrase for this notion of proper politics. I have settled upon Arendtian politics for several reasons. First, it was a category unique to Arendt’s thought; no other theorist articulated a concept of politics with precisely the same spirit. Second, using terms that assign the politics to any particular epoch or physical location would be problematic, because such politics were never so confined, and because Arendt’s account was idealized and not a completely accurate historical depiction.

Here, I provide an account of Arendtian politics in order to understand what they were, as well as to permit an understanding of what Arendtian politics were not. This will provide a contrast to what contemporary politics are, what politics have become with the rise of the social. Contemporary politics, taking place after the rise of the social, in the broadest possible terms, prohibits politics in the Arendtian sense. Thus, contemporary politics are an entirely new category, far removed from what Arendt understood as the politics of past ages. The Arendtian politics described here were the highest level of human affairs (Arendt, 1954a, 2005). They were humans overcoming their base nature, being solely concerned with necessity and utility, and engaging in something nobler.

Zoon Politikon and the Public Realm

The final category within Arendt’s tripartite distinction of the vita activa was zoon politikon. A description of the zoon politikon will also provide a description of the political
realm, the *polis*, because the activity undertaken by the *zoon politikon* constituted the *polis*. Put another way, *zoon politikon* lived a *bios politikos*. Action defined the political realm just as the labor of *animal laborans* and the work of *homo faber* characterized the private realm, the *oikos*, as a place where necessities were met, means/ends rationality prevailed, and isolation and a lack of freedom were pervasive. Additionally, the political realm was far different than the private realm, in that violence and force were not permitted. Arendt’s concept of politics described here was certainly idealized. Contained within it are several categories from Arendt’s distinctions. The *bios politikos* was the political life, lived in the company of equals, where affairs were conducted politically, which was distinct from the not yet discussed *bios theoretikos*, lived internally. Additionally, *zoon politikon* represents the third category within Arendt’s *vita activa*, and was distinct from *animal laborans* and *homo faber*.

Arendt drew upon Aristotle’s definition of *bios politikos*, which among all the potentialities of humans, consisted only of *praxis*, action, and *lexis*, speech (Arendt, 1958, p. 25). Given this understanding, these two capacities were given the highest significance among all human capabilities. Action and speech were viewed as equal to one another, and both were considered superior to another important, albeit less so, human capacity: thought (Arendt, 1958, pp. 25-26). Therefore, the *bios politikos* was not just superior to the other components of the *vita activa*, but to the *bios theoretikos* as well.

Arendtian politics, which she believed existed in ancient Greece, were conducted through words, and “more fundamentally that finding the right words at the right moment, quite apart from the information or communication they convey, is action” (Arendt, 1958, p. 26). Arendt further explained the meaning of “great words” as words that “reply to striking blows,” to quote the final line of Sophocles’s Antigone (1958, p. 25). Action then was made possible as a
component part of speech. This was consistent with Aristotle’s definition of political man as “zoon logon ekhon (‘a living being capable of speech’)” (Arendt, 1958, p. 27). Hence, Arendt’s description of anyone existing outside of politics as being aneu logou, without speech, meaning outside of a context where speech was of primary importance, and determinative of action (Arendt, 1958, p. 27).

Essentially, the violence and force that was capable of ruling in the private realm could not do so in public. This was because while the starkest imaginable inequalities existed in the private realm the public realm was inhabited solely by equals. Free and equal individuals inhabited the public “where to be free meant both not to be a subject to the necessity of life or to the command of another and not to be in command oneself. It meant neither to rule or be ruled” (Arendt, 1958, p. 32). None could command another, and so their only resort was persuasion. This formulation would strike modern men as quite odd. Contemporarily, the political realm is often understood as a realm where, at least in practice, some rule over others, a place where raw power is frequently exerted, and coercion is the norm. In Arendt’s account the oddity of this notion to contemporaries was the result of the change in our understanding of the political, brought about by the rise of the social.

Individuals constituting zoon politikon, however, were not identical to one another and the political realm was a realm of plurality. Plurality was absolutely necessary for speech and action to occur and hence for the political to come into being. The two crucial aspects of plurality were “equality and distinction” (Arendt, 1958, p. 175). If citizens were not equal, then they would not be capable of understanding one another. In using the term equality Arendt had a specific meaning in mind, the Greek isonomy, which she understood as meaning not equal
conditions, but rather a condition that made men equal.² Isonomy represented a unique form of government, characterized as a condition of “no-rule,” different from a democracy, characterized as the rule of the majority (Arendt, 1963c, pp. 30-31). Any division of individuals into a hierarchy of rule brought with it inequality and threatened the universal humanity that isonomy signified. As Gottsegen observed, “[w]here there are rulers and ruled, or any formal divisions within the citizen body which might potentially dichotomize along such lines, it is Arendt’s concern that those in a position to rule will, first, come to monopolize the right of initiating action, and the will come to dominate the field of action as well” (1994, p. 57). This condition of artificial and restricted equality was present only within the public sphere and a necessary condition for Arendtian politics. It was only there that men, potentially, had the ability to perform equally well. Isonomy ceased to exist once one ventured outside of the political realm. In other aspects of life people would be unequal, due to their unequal potentialities to excel (Arendt, 1963c, p. 283; 1966, p. 301; 2003, pp. 45-46).

The other requirement for plurality, and thus Arendtian politics, was distinction. If individuals were not distinct from one another, this too would preclude the possibility of action and Arendtian politics. After all, if all were of like mind, deeds and speech would be wholly unnecessary. “Signs and sounds to communicate immediate, identical needs and wants would be enough” (Arendt, 1958, p. 176). For Arendt, reality was resultant of the recognition received from others, and therefore, was dependent upon the presence of others and variety among individuals (Arendt, 1958, p. 57). The public realm was a place of relation and differentiation. Just as a negation of the isonomy requirement would threaten the possibility of Arendtian politics, so to would the absence of an appropriate degree of distinction. Such a threat could be

² Arendt uses both isonomy and isonomie to represent this concept.
the result of isolation or loneliness, signifying a total lack of distinction (Arendt, 1966, pp. 474-479). After all, isolation from the recognition of equals was precisely the sort of deprivation experienced in the darkness of the household. Alternatively, a threat to distinction could arise with the formation of hostile factions, where individuals form groups around their lack of distinction, while remaining distinct from and hostile toward other such groupings (Arendt, 1958, pp. 180, 203).

Furthermore, in Arendt’s distinction between the private and public realms, running along the lines of the divisions within the vita activa, there was a difference in the content appropriately found within each realm of life. As mentioned, those activities undertaken out of necessity were of strictly private concern and took place solely within the confines of the oikos (Arendt, 1958, p. 85). Those activities were neither seen nor heard. The head of the oikos freed himself from such concerns, by subjugating others to perform necessitous activities, and was thereby able to focus on public matters. Activities worthy of public-ness stood in contrast to necessitous, private activities. Such public activities were worthy of being seen, heard, recognized and remembered (Arendt, 1958, p. 85). Arendt wrote that the distinction could be drawn by asking, with reference to Cicero, “is the greater amount of time and effort spent in private or in public? Is the occupation motivated by cura private negotii or cura rei publicae, care for private or for public business?” (1958, p. 85).

The Miracle of Politics

Arendtian political action was, in a word, miraculous. To engage in Arendtian politics, then, was to work miracles. Arendt did not intend to intone any religious meaning, but rather understood a miracle as a novel beginning. The importance of beginnings and natality in Arendt’s work has been noted. Canovan wrote that Arendt was “preeminently the theorist of
beginnings” (1998, p. vii). Kohn observed that the centrality of beginning in human affairs was Arendt’s “deepest conviction, stated over and over throughout her works” (2000, p. 114). Of miracles Arendt wrote, “every new beginning is by nature a miracle when seen and experienced from the standpoint of the processes it necessarily interrupts” (2005). Furthermore, something “new always happens against the overwhelming odds of statistical laws and their probability, which for all practical, everyday purposes amounts to certainty” and so would always seem miraculous (Arendt, 1958, p. 178). Such a miracle was on par with the beginning of human life and the world’s coming into being. Arendt articulated this position:

Man himself evidently has a most amazing and mysterious talent for working miracles. The normal, hackneyed word our language provides for this talent is “action.” Action is unique in that it sets in motion processes that in their automatism look very much like natural processes, and action also marks the start of something, begins something new, seizes the initiative, or, in Kantian terms, forges its own chain. The miracle of freedom is inherent in this ability to make a beginning which itself is inherent in the fact that every human being, simply by being born into a world that was there before him and will be there after him, is himself a new beginning (2005, p. 113).

Political action, then, was the ability to work a miracle, and this was freedom from the existing state of the world and ongoing chains of events. This understanding of political action, as miracle working was far more than a mere choice between predetermined or externally imposed alternatives, instead it was the creation of a new chain of events. It was, in this way, an abandoning of the forgone conclusions of future occurrence. Arendt indicated that there were three such types of action: “the experience of action as starting a new enterprise in pre-polis Greece, the experience of foundation in Rome, and the Christian experience of acting and forgiving as linked” (Arendt, 2005, p. 60).

Arendt’s use of “miracle” did not entail spiritual or prophetic implications. She emphasized the possibility of starting something anew, of bringing novel creation into being, of undertaking unprecedented action. To perform a miracle was to embark upon the unforeseen
path. The possibility of performing political miracles took on different connotations in different historical eras. Miraculous ability, then, came in three forms, of which only one was confined to the Greek world, while the other two were added by later traditions. The first mode of political action as miracle was the original, Greek, ability to create anew. In the Greek world beginnings were emphasized and this could be seen in Achilles as the heroic “doer of great deeds and speaker of great words” (Arendt, 1958, p. 25). The Greek *archein* means both “to begin” and “to lead” (Arendt, 1958, pp. 177, 189, 224; 2005, pp. 46, 114, 126). The notion of man, as a beginning, was recognized by Augustine, though Arendt believed that he had done little with this realization (Arendt, 2005, p. 59). This was integrally tied to the notion of political action as rebirth, the re-creation of the self. One was, in essence, born anew upon engaging in political action.

This rebirth required the presence of others, since action had no meaning if none observed it. It was, in essence, the entire point of the *polis*. Achilles’s actions had been seen, because so many of his equals, other kings of Greece, had been present; however, with Achilles dead, Troy razed, and the kings dispersed those actions would have been lost had they not been immortalized by Homer nearly a century later. To remedy the danger of action losing its meaning, and perhaps the dependence upon poets, the Greeks institutionalized the public space, the *agora*, which Achilles had found in the military camp and on the battle field, this was the *polis* (Arendt, 2005, p. 123). Since there was the potential for action to be made political through poetry or history it may, at times, take on a narrative-like quality. As Benhabib put it “[n]arrative action is ubiquitous, for it is the stuff out of which all human social life . . . is constituted” (2000, pp. 107-113).
The similarity to narrative, and the requirement of the presence of others, gave political action a revelatory quality, “men show who they are, reveal actively their unique personal identities and thus make their appearance in the human world” (Arendt, 1958, p. 179). This led some to see Arendt’s concept of political action as associated with theatricality, to varying degrees. For example, Kateb saw a political actor as a sort of performer who was both self-expressive, and self-surprising, who changed himself as well as the world around him (Kateb, 1983, p. 10). Alternatively, Kateb thought that the political actor could be seen as obsessively wearing a mask, purposefully revealing less of himself, and more of what he wanted his fellow citizens to see (Kateb, 1983, pp. 10-11). Similarly, Villa emphasized the aesthetic nature of Arendt’s political action, thus linking her to Nietzsche (Villa, 1992, Ch. 3; 1996; 1999, Ch. 6). This aesthetic propensity permitted the transcendence of the divided psychology of the self, thereby resulting in the unity of the individual (Villa, 1996, p. 91).³ On this view, living aesthetically also provided an escape from Silenus’s pessimistic view of life.⁴

Such views could be supported. However, viewing Arendt’s political action in this way may be somewhat “misleading,” to use Villa’s own admission, since she opposed the conflation politics and art, that many, including Nietzsche had wanted to accomplish (Villa, 1996, p. 108). Furthermore, emphasizing this sort of performance, with its necessarily individualistic nature, ignored a significant component of Arendt’s notion of political action, namely, the collective, deliberative component emphasizing persuasive words between equals (Arendt, 1963c, 1968, 1970, 1990).

³ Resolving the divided self would offer a superior alternative to the philosophers’ turning inward since in Arendt’s view that could not lead to the unity of the individual since human plurality began within the mind (Arendt, 1958, 1990, 2005).

⁴ Silenus was quoted in both Arendt and Nietzsche, “[N]ot to be born prevails over all meaning uttered in words; by far the second-best for life, once it has appeared, is to go as swiftly as possible whence it came” (Arendt, 1963c, p. 281; Nietzsche, 2000, p. 42). Interestingly, Kateb frames Arendt’s entire project as an answer to Silenus’s statement (Kateb, 1983).
Owing a debt to Burke, Arendt described political action as “acting together in concert” (Arendt, 1968, p. 143). These two components of action, the individual and the collective, have been termed the expressive and the communicative by d’Entreves, or alternatively, the agonistic and the associational by Benhabib (Benhabib, 1992, 2000; d’Entreves, 1994). Alternatively, d’Entreves expressed the view that, depending upon which component was emphasized, interpreters would arrive at different understandings of Arendt’s political action, viewing it either as individual performance or collective deliberation (1994, p. 85). In emphasizing the individual performance aspect an interpreter neglects the aspect of collectivity and deliberation, and vice versa. Habermas, in particular, emphasized the deliberative nature of Arendt’s concept of politics (1962). By contrast, Sennett focused on the aspect of theatricality (1974). Villa, correctly, argued that viewing these components as in tension with one another arose from a contemporary inability to grasp the long forgotten spirit of a bygone age. To emphasize one aspect over the other is to do Arendt a disservice, since she “is not promoting hero worship, nor is she yearning for the days of communal self-representation” (Villa, 1999, p. 154). Neither individuality, nor collectivity should be stressed at the expense of the other, because they were intended to exist harmoniously in Arendtian politics.

Arendt’s second type of miraculous political action was the Roman notion of honoring and defending a founding. This has received little attention in the scholarly commentaries on Arendt. This absence of commentary may be due to the fact that this subject stepped out of the Hellenic world that Arendt was so famous for analyzing. The emphasis on founding was uniquely Roman, however, it grew from seeds sown by the Greeks. While the Greeks honored Achilles as the doer of great deeds, as a great initiator of enterprise, the Romans identified with Hector. Hector went to his death, not for his own immortality, as Achilles had, but as a sacrifice
for his home, the city of Troy. This reverence for home, and Rome’s connection to Hector and
Troy through Virgil’s *Aeneid*, and the suffering and difficulty in creating Rome led to the belief
in the sacredness of founding. It “made it a holy duty to preserve whatever had been handed
down from the ancestors” (Arendt, 2005, p. 49). The political genius of Rome was located in
both founding and the related concept of legislation (Arendt, 1958, p. 195).

Thus, in the Roman experience “political action consists in the foundation and
preservation of a *civitas*” (Arendt, 2005, p. 47). Rome’s initial founding took the form of a peace
treaty, the great innovation of Rome, which represented a negotiated agreement between the
wayfarer Aeneas and the natives (Arendt, 2005, p. 183). The Roman’s political feats were the
creation of new and expanded political arenas by incorporating one-time enemies into a political
realm, making friends of enemies, creating equals out of unequals (Arendt, 2005, p. 178). This
was miraculous in that it broke a chain of hostile events, warfare and unpolitical conflict, and
created an expanded political realm. Even if the treaty was, effectually, a mandate, the end result
was the same, a larger political sphere. This was contrary to the Greek view, in which
negotiation was a continuation of war by the means of “cunning and deception” (Arendt, 2005, p.
165).

The Roman approach emphasized law, *lex*, which was seen as a contract between parties,
be they domestic citizens or foreigners incorporated into the ever-expanding political realm. The
creation of law, as a contract required proposals and counterproposals, and thus speech was as
important to the Roman as it had been to the Greek (Arendt, 2005, p. 179). The Romans also saw
a role for a legislator in politics, as opposed to the Greek practice of employing an external
lawgiver. Legislation and peace treaty came together as one in Rome’s Twelve Tables, which
was, in essence, “a contract between two warring factions, the patricians and the plebes, that
required the approval of the entire populace” (Arendt, 2005, p. 179). In essence, for Rome, politics was honoring Rome’s founding by expanding upon it through agreement, which in theory was based upon deliberative speech between various parties whose relationships had previously been nonpolitical.

Forgiveness was the third and final miraculous action, albeit the furthest removed from politics. Forgiving, like the two previous forms of miracles, forged a new chain of events. Due to the high degree of uncertainty in human affairs all the consequences of actions can never be foreseen. There are ripples that continue endlessly and the actor could be forever tied to them as their initiator. As Arendt put it, “[w]ithout being forgiven, released from the consequences of what we have done, our capacity to act would, as it were, be confined to one single deed from which we could never recover; we would remain the victims of its consequences forever” (Arendt, 1958, p. 237). Arendt believed that forgiveness as a remedy to this problem, as a way to break the chain of previous events and forge a new chain, was discovered by Jesus. The source of the discovery should not limit its scope of application. Arendt correctly wrote that “[t]he fact that he made this discovery in a religious context and articulated it in religious language is no reason to take it any less seriously in a strictly secular sense” (Arendt, 1958, p. 238).

Forgiving was miraculous in the respect that it did “the seemingly impossible . . . to make a new beginning where beginnings seemed to have become no longer possible” (Arendt, 2005, p. 58). Forgiveness contained what no other, albeit miraculous, action could: fresh starts where action had already been undertaken. It “guarantees the continuity of the capacity for action,” ensuring that individuals were not forever locked into a single chain of events (Arendt, 2005, p. 59). Therefore, it ensured that subsequent political action is not forever clouded, or precluded, or

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5 In Arendt’s view forgiveness was a Judeo-Christian innovation, Griswold disputed this, arguing that forgiveness was present in Pagan Greece and Rome (Griswold, 2007).
not free due to action previously undertaken. Put another way, forgiveness combats the irreversibility of human affairs (Arendt, 1958, pp. 236-243). Time and causality, after all, move only in one direction. Additionally, to forgive was to act “anew and unexpectedly, unconditioned by the act which provoked it” (Arendt, 1958, p. 237). Without forgiving an action would spawn mere behavior, as predetermined retaliatory processes ensued (Schaap, 2005; Young-Bruehl, 2006). In short, forgiving created the possibility of free action, a hallmark of Arendtian politics.

**Freedom**

Since “[t]he raison d’être of politics is freedom and its field of experience is action” and action was the human ability to work miracles in concert with others, the question of what precisely freedom was remains (Arendt, 1954a, p. 146). Policy outcomes were far less important than the freedom created, experienced, and shared by citizens coming together as political actors. Arendt wrote of the outcomes of politics: “[O]f the actual content of political life – of the joy and the gratification that arise out of being in company with our peers, out of acting together and appearing in public, out of inserting ourselves into the world by word and deed, thus acquiring new and sustaining our personal identity and beginning something entirely new” (1954a, p. 263). Therefore, the result of, and the reason for political action were far different from both labor and work, which had definitive and defined outcomes, pursued in the most instrumentally rational and efficient manner possible. For this reason, politics, and zoon politikon, ran afoul of the opinions of animal laborans and homo faber who, as previously mentioned viewed politics as superfluous and denounced them (Arendt, 1958, p. 208).

Unsurprisingly, Arendt referred to the Greeks as the first people to experience freedom, as if they discovered it in their way of life. Arendt’s notion of freedom could be understood as freedom of movement. “Freedom originally meant nothing more than being able to go where one
please”, but this indicated something far more than mere freedom to move about (Arendt, 2005, p. 121). This freedom of movement entailed several notions, being free from the household, free from fear, and freedom of the mind. At the most basic level, being free to move about meant that no one could restrain the individual with the capacity for movement, that none ruled over him. Additionally, one capable of movement was free from the burdens of necessity and he need not worry about the maintenance of his house (Arendt, 2005, p. 121). In these ways free individuals were free in that they were not subject to anyone else’s rule. In the Greek system this meant that they must be the heads of the their households and once they emerged into the public sphere they were amongst equals, and had no superiors in any realm.

The equality required for the political realm to function required that men be free from the necessities of life. This made the functioning of the private realm crucial. Only once the necessities of life were removed from consideration could an individual meet with other citizens as a free and equal member of the polis. Only then could he engage in politics, and be capable of free action. Restrictive necessities were provided for by the private oikos, and only those whose necessities were met could stand on equal footing with other citizens. Without animal laborans laboring to meet human needs in the background of the oikos, citizens could not be free from necessity, and thus, could not be free and equal in the political realm. The system was built upon the slavery and exclusion of many so that a few citizens could be free and equal within the political realm.

Due to the equality of those in the political realm, the despotic mode of rule, the uncommanded commander of the private sphere was not possible in the political, the two were “mutually exclusive” (Arendt, 1958, p. 28). While engaged in politics none could influence others with violence, nor could they simply issue commands. As an interesting example of the
extreme prohibition of force and violence, Arendt noted the Athenian practice of persuading the condemned to consume hemlock, as was the case with Socrates. “[T]hus sparing the Athenian citizen under all circumstances the indignity of physical violation” (Arendt, 1963c, p. 12). This view can only be described as idealistic. While in the literal sense this practice may have been free of physical violence between citizens, it was certainly not lacking in coercion, or even force. How many of the convicted would have voluntarily decided to drink the hemlock had they not experienced some coercion to do so, or been deprived of any alternative?

Freedom of movement also meant freedom from fear, because moving into the political realm required courage, one of the earliest political virtues (Arendt, 2005, pp. 122-123). Entering the political realm required daring, it was a risk to the individual’s life. The household was secure, all needs were met there, and the head of household ruled as a despot. Arendt wrote that the Greeks had a word for the fear of leaving the security of the household, *philopsychia* (Arendt, 2005, p. 122). The opposite of this, the political man, was heroic because he was willing to leave the security of his despotism. As Odysseus was willing to risk his life for knowledge, by listening to the Sirens’ song, which none had heard and survived, citizens risked themselves to experience politics and freedom.

Finally, freedom of movement also meant the freedom of the movement of the mind, which sounds quite odd, but was crucial to Arendtian politics. This freedom came from Homer who, as the educator of Hellas, endowed the Greeks with this movement by recounting history from both sides, that of the Trojans as well as the Greeks, that of Hector as well as Achilles (Arendt, 2005, p. 167). Just as history, the political realm was common to all within it, and this meant that there were many ways to view any particular subject. To truly understand a subject one must have the “ability to see the same thing first from two opposing sides and then from all
sides . . .” (Arendt, 2005, p. 167). This ability to see an issue from a multitude of perspectives was, by definition, to see it politically and permitted true understanding. This was not just an individual momentarily setting their interests aside, nor was it totally abandoning them. Persuading fellow citizens through speech meant that individuals were not strictly bound to their own mental or physical standpoint (Arendt, 2005, p. 168). Therefore, this freedom of movement of the mind was required for Arendtian politics to be possible. Indeed, for something to be political meant it was understood in this way, form many viewpoints.

The result of this freedom of movement and many-sided understanding was *phronēsis*, or political reason. It was a collective understanding, characterized as reasoned and agreed upon common sense, common in the sense of politically common to all (Arendt, 1954a, p. 221). *Phronēsis* also possessed an added dimension of knowledge derived from experience rather than from theory. Once political action had occurred, and *phronēsis* had been achieved there would, presumably, necessarily be an additional step, implementation. There seems little point in free and equal men doing great deeds, speaking great words, coming to agreement and then stopping. However, this was precisely where Arendt’s process stopped, or at least where her interest wavered. She merely alluded to the implementation stage without expounding upon it (Arendt, 1954a, p. 166; 1958, pp. 189, 222). This would likely be considered administration in her mind and outside of the political realm.

Arendt wrote that, “[a]ction, to be free must be free from motive on one side, from its intended goal as a predictable effect on the other” (Arendt, 1954a, p. 151). In order to be free, and thus political, action needed to be able to transcend motives and goals (Arendt, 1954a, p. 151). Action must be depersonalized in that it must be “neither under the guidance of the intellect nor under the dictate of the will” (Arendt, 1954a, p. 152). Political action, then, must not
merely be the product of the forceful will, the calculating intellect, or, of course, the needs of the body.

Arendt employed the concept of “acting from a principle” (Arendt, 1954a, p. 151). A principle came from outside of the actor; it was an idea both generalizable in nature and universally valid. A principle only came into being when an individual acted in accordance with it, the “appearance of freedom, like the manifestation of principles, coincides with the performing act” (Arendt, 1954a, pp. 152-153). Arendt provided a few examples of principles, some dark like fear, distrust, hatred, but primarily her examples were nobler, like honor, glory, love, equality, distinction, and excellence (Arendt, 1954a, p. 152). A principle was a peculiar thing, it inspired and provided impetus for a political actor; however, without that individual’s action the principle remained an ephemeral, nascent thing, which only came into being through action. By way of example, Arendt wrote that a political actor did not pursue honor, rather he did all things honorably. Put another way, all of his deeds were honorable ones (1954a, p. 241). Remaining with the example of honor, an actor lived his life honorably, and did honorable deeds, and in so doing brought honor into being. He was both motivated by and the creator of this principle. He was willing to sacrifice his own private interests to live in accordance with his principle and to sacrifice, depersonalize himself to bring it into being. This line of thinking led Arendt to characterize the process as self-forgetting (1963c, p. 285).

If political action was characterized by its simultaneous loyalty to, and creation of a principle, it could equally be characterized by its lack of functional, external goal seeking, since the “[t]he raison d’être of politics is freedom” (Arendt, 1954a, p. 146). The subject of Arendtian politics could be seen as not specifically directed toward achieving any particular ends. This led some to view such politics as totally empty of content. For example, Kateb used the metaphor of
politics as a game to describe the totally self-contained nature of the political (1983). However, Kateb reduced the content of this game of Arendtian politics to contemporary power politics. He wrote that “even when politics was not a class war” it was “a wargame, a conditioning for war” (Kateb, 1983, p. 22). This reduction was not consistent with Arendtian politics. Arendt explicitly expressed the view that warfare was not properly political, that it was, at best, an issue peripheral to politics, and that the fact that it had come to be conflated with politics was a result of the rise of the social, as discussed below (Arendt, 1963a, 2005).

Moreover, though freedom from necessity was important to Arendtian politics, that freedom was in no way the purpose of politics. Such freedom from necessity was actually the meaning of politics, rather than the outcome. Put another way “politics and freedom are identical, and wherever this kind of freedom does not exist, there is no political space in the true sense” (Arendt, 2005, p. 129). In the presence of the demands of necessity, Arendtian politics would simply not have existed; there would be no political realm, no polis, and no freedom. If freedom was required for politics to come into existence, how then could freedom be created? Not politically, since freedom was needed for the political to exist. In the Greek world the creation of laws, and the conducting of foreign policy were the “means” of protecting a political realm, but were not tantamount to politics. “They are phenomena peripheral to politics and therefore not politics itself” (Arendt, 2005, p. 129).

The polis itself was not the definition of the political; rather it was one mode of organizing what embodied the political. It was a specific form of human communal life wherein “men in their freedom can interact with one another without compulsion, force, and rule over one

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Kateb was not alone in this regard. In an early review of The Human Condition Auden (1959) expressed a similar view. More recently, Breen (2007) offered an interpretation of Arendtian politics that included some aspects of violence and power.
another as equals, commanding and obeying one another only in emergencies – that is, in times of war – but otherwise managing all their affairs by speaking with and persuading one another” (Arendt, 2005, pp. 129-130). As such, the polis has become representative of the political, not just to Arendt, but to many others as well. Life in the polis was distinct from all other forms of communal life that had been experienced, the family for example, in that within the polis, unlike other communities, there was freedom. Freedom was not acquired by virtue of political means, but rather “being free and living in the polis were, in a certain sense, one and the same” (Arendt, 2005, pp. 45, 117). Again, Arendt expressed the view that freedom was not an end pursued by politics, but was identical to political life. Freedom could be understood “negatively as not being ruled or ruling, and positively as a space which can be created only by men” (Arendt, 2005, p. 116).

Politics and freedom were inextricably bound together, as well as being separated from and opposed to both the necessities of life and the means of achieving any unchanging, specific goals. It was clear from Arendt’s work that politics of this pure and idealized type did not exist in all places or at all times. Arendtian politics may have existed for little more than fleeting moments in the history of human civilization, though fleeting these historical moments were crucial. These moments, such as the time in which the Greek polis existed, “set the standard,” by which to determine “those epochs denied a full experience of political reality” (Arendt, 2005, pp. 116-117). Though these moments of Arendtian politics may be nearly impossible to imitate, the concepts inherent within them became criteria by which to judge the politics that occur in all other places and times. Since freedom and this form of the political were inseparable, judging politics entailed judging the extent to which freedom was realized. Whenever the politics of the age resembled those of the great historical moments the political realm embodied a form of
politics close enough to the Arendtian standard that it was capable of action, miracles, and freedom. Whenever the politics of the age were too far afield from the great moments, Arendtian politics do not exist and neither do freedom, the possibility of action, or miracles. By Arendt’s account the contemporary age was one characterized by impure politics and hence a lack of freedom. Contemporary politics had strayed from their classical, Arendtian precursor as a result of the rise of the social, and all of the changes entailed within that concept.

2.4 The Origins of the Social

Prior to a discussion of the social’s effects on the world, and Arendtian politics, it is important to understand just where the social came from. Put another way, how was the social unleashed upon politics, in the Arendtian sense? The roots of the social have been found in Hobbes’s political thought, and grew during the world’s experience with imperialism and totalitarianism. Finally, the appearance of the social question, which arose during the French Revolution, and was championed by Marxist thought, thrust the social onto the political stage. While those factors certainly played a role in the tale of the social, the story must begin before Hobbes, before nineteenth century imperialism, and before twentieth century totalitarianism. To get the full account requires looking back to Greek antiquity itself, and the conflict between philosophy and politics. Once the conditions were properly suitable the social rose and changed politics into something so different from the Arendtian conception that it is virtually unrecognizable as politics.

The Philosophical Leveling

Arendt’s analysis of the conflict between philosophy and politics has been explored in its own right, however, its connection to the rise of the social has been largely neglected. Stated

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simply, in Arendt’s account of the Hellenic world, philosophy and politics were hostile to one another. As a result of this conflict the philosophers undertook a leveling of distinctions, putting all components of the vita activa on par with one another in that they were all done out of necessity. This destroyed the priority given to politics, which had placed it in a location above work and labor. This destroyed all of the distinctions with the vita activa. The only surviving distinction was that between the bios theoretikos and all other ways of life. This philosophical position then became widespread in other, non-Greek philosophies, and in religion. This process will be briefly recounted here.

It is important to understand that philosophy was not political. Philosophy was unspeakable, without, words, aneu logon, just as were those outside the political realm (Arendt, 2005). Philosophers’ knowledge “cannot be imparted to the multitude in the conventional manner of persuasion . . . because their revelation and perception are not communicable in speech at all . . .” (Arendt, 1958, p. 20). Put another way, philosophy was not capable of the kind of speech required for political action. For example, Socrates spoke at his trial, but was unable to persuade the Athenian establishment, nor was he able to persuade his friends that he must remain within the city (Plato, 1997a, 1997b). According to Arendt’s account of Plato, Socrates’s mistake was employing dialectic, philosophical speech, which was incapable of persuading the multitude, rather than rhetoric, political speech, which was designed for just that purpose (Arendt, 2005, p. 13). This demonstrated that the political realm was unsuitable for philosophy.

This event led to Plato and the Sophists denunciation of doxa, opinion, in favor of truth, which could only be discovered through philosophy. They doubted the ability of the polis and politics to achieve appropriately just ends, believing reason and philosophy the superior alternative. Plato portrayed the rebellion of contemplation, philosophy, against action, politics.
This pitted the philosopher’s life of the mind against the citizen’s life of action within the *polis* (Arendt, 2005, pp. 12-13). The moment Plato’s philosopher-king claimed the right to rule others based upon his superior reason the political became threatened (Arendt, 1982, pp. 16-27). He established what Arendt called a “tyranny of reason,” which did not use coercion, but nonetheless threatened politics by installing a philosopher-king in place of *isonomy* (Arendt, 1954d, p. 107). This was in Villa’s words “Plato’s revenge on the *polis* for killing Socrates and endangering his memory” (Villa, 1999, p. 217).

The “rise of political theory” negated distinctions that characterized Arendt’s classical world, and heralded contemplation as the highest activity, razing the differences between labor, work, and action and placing all in a subordinate condition to the *bios theoretikos* of the philosophers (Arendt, 1958, p. 85). Theorizing became a new form of action above all others. Politics was demoted to the level of necessity, and the *zoon politikon, homo faber, and animal laborans* were made equal. Humans even at their most primitive were beings of association. Political science as the study of associations could be seen as the master science to the degree that it could explain humans on the most basic level and not because its association with the polis as form of association elevated as a field of inquiry. The philosophers’ self-promotion to a superior status was expanded upon by the advent of Christian political thought and particularly with Augustine. Christianity placed religion, piety and religious contemplation, above all other forms of activity. This made popularly available a way of life above the distinction between public and private. While philosophy was only accessible to the few, religion was accessible to

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8 Arendt’s has been criticized for misreading Plato to accommodate her idealized view of the Greek *polis*, and exaggerating Plato’s conflict with it (Hull, 2002, p. 33).

9 However, Plato abandoned statecraft in favor of soulcraft (Plato, 1968, 591c-592b). As Villa noted this runs counter to Arendt’s account by abandoning the project of the ideal city in favor of developing an ideal soul (1999, p. 198).
the many and so the classical distinction could be abandoned by all men in favor of elevating either philosophy or religion (Arendt, 1958, p. 85). In this manner, religion was philosophy for the masses.

Moreover, philosophy also denied human plurality. Arendt believed that plurality was not just an external fact, but existed within each individual. Philosophy denied this believing that each individual could attain unity by turning inward and contemplating, arriving at truth. This was the case with Plato’s philosopher capable of escaping the cave in that famous allegory (Arendt, 2005). Plurality was also denied by maintaining that there was but one truth, one appropriate form, and hence, politically one way of proceeding. In essence, the philosophers conflated the beautiful with the good, the useful. This position was evidence by the Socratic knowledge in virtue formula. *The Republic*’s craftsman analogy showed individuals imitating transcendent ideas (Arendt, 1954d, p. 113; Plato, 1968, 596b). In utilizing this analogy “the ideas become the unwavering, ‘absolute’ standards for political and moral behavior and judgment” and this became the mode of proceeding with new “authoritarian forms of government” wherein the “source of their authority, which legitimates the exercise of power, must be beyond the sphere of power” (Arendt, 1954d, pp. 97-98, 110-111). Politics could no longer undertake action, but should simply follow the standards created outside of the political realm, by the philosopher. Politics must adhere to these “unvarying ‘yardsticks’” provided by philosophers (Villa, 1999, p. 93). *Isonomy* gave way to tyranny with the philosophy or religion playing the role of tyrant (Arendt, 1954d, p. 111).

Politics no longer existed for its own sake, for freedom. It was merely an instrument for implementing externally determined ideals. Thus, politics became a realm of means and ends, like work, and operated most efficiently by command and coercion. It was necessity, like work
and labor, needed to implement the true ideals of the philosopher or religionist, or more simply to maintain order. The result was “a categorical system of means and ends, of ruling and being ruled, of interests and moral standards” and in this new system “there is hardly any room for the spirit of starting an enterprise, and together with others, seeing it through to its conclusion” (Arendt, 2005, p. 45). In short, once this mode of thought took over the possibility of miracles was destroyed. To borrow the Tocquevillian language the possibility of great politics was no more, or to borrow Lincoln’s language there could be no great new birth of freedom as none belonging to the family of the lion or the tribe of the eagle could emerge. This brought politics to the level of the other components of the *vita activa*, and so made their methods appropriate to the political realm. This was a crucial part of the rise of the social. It was not just the Greeks who were responsible for this, but later philosophers as well. For example, in Arendt’s account, Marx conflated all human activity with labor, the difference between classes of men was merely who benefited from their labor (Arendt, 2005, pp. 90-92). Again, the importance of this position is that all human activity is undertaken out of necessity.

Philosophy had favored the internal *bios theoretikos* over all components of the *vita activa*. “They had discovered, in the activity of thought itself, a hidden human capacity for turning away from the whole realm of human affairs which should not be taken too seriously by men . . .” (Arendt, 1954b, p. 47). This resulted in turning inward, away from the public realm; freedom was no longer found in the presence of others, but within oneself. Philosophy was not accessible to all, nor would everyone accept the same philosophy, and many alternatives were available. Arendt cited from a wide variety of thinkers from Christians like Tertullian and Luther, to the quintessentially American Madison, to the radical Nietzsche who shared in the belief that a life removed from politics was preferable to, and more human than, the *bios*
politikos (Arendt, 2005, pp. 84-85). The political realm of equals was degraded in favor of isolation. Arendt wrote that, “it does not matter if man in his solitude searches for truth, finally attaining it in the speechless contemplation of the idea of ideas, or whether he cares for the salvation of his soul.” What mattered was the preference for solitude to living together (Arendt, 2005, pp. 84-85). This rejection of the world, this loss of the world, and this alienation from the world were related to the rise of the social.

**Hobbesian Man**

It was obvious from the tremendous effort Arendt devoted to the analysis of totalitarianism that she cared deeply about it, which should not be surprising given her experience as a refugee from Nazism. Arendt’s analysis of totalitarianism has been the subject of much commentary.\(^{10}\) However, few have directly linked *The Origins of Totalitarianism* to the rise of the social.\(^ {11}\) Despite this relative lack of scholarly attention Arendt’s analysis of totalitarianism played an important role in the rise of the social, bringing certain aspects of the social into being. Though Arendt’s most direct engagement with the rise of the social is located within *The Human Condition* the seeds of her thought on the topic were sown in *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, which was written over a decade prior. Pitkin wrote that reading *The Origins* in the light of *The Human Condition* made it seem as though Arendt’s argument had “had gone underground, where it had begun to proliferate and diversify, sending up new shoots everywhere in a rich but utterly unsystematic plethora of applications” (1998, p. 70).

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\(^{10}\) A number of Arendt scholars have explicitly dedicated effort to understanding her *The Origins of Totalitarianism*. For example, see Baehr (2002), Beiner (2000), Benhabib (2000, Ch. 3), Canovan (1992, Ch. 2), Canovan (2000), Dietz (2000), Kateb (1983, Ch. 2), Lang (1994), McGowan (1998, Ch. 1), Stanley (1994).

\(^{11}\) See Pitkin (1998, Ch. 5) and Degryse and Leuven (2008).
A component of the social and totalitarianism were born as twins with Thomas Hobbes as their father. Hobbes’s thought represented a sea change for Arendt giving rise to two of the phenomena of the modern age which concerned her the most. As Degryse and Leuven put it, for Arendt, Hobbes “was the philosopher who ‘expressed the values of the new social class,’ the bourgeoisie” (Arendt, 1966, p. 139; Degryse & Leuven, 2008, p. 243). Hobbes’s *Leviathan* was the foundation of a new body politic, one that was based upon the needs of the bourgeoisie, who were solitary and self-interested, and simultaneously the reconceptualization of man to fit neatly into that category, and to be content with the *Leviathan* state (Arendt, 1966, pp. 139-140).

Conceptualizing man in this way allowed Hobbes to conflate private interests with public interests. As Arendt put it:

Hobbes’s *Leviathan*, exposed the only political theory according to which the state is based not on some kind of constituting law—whether divine law, the law of nature, or the law of social contract—which determines the rights and wrongs of the individual’s interest with respect to public affairs, but on the individual interests themselves, so that “the private interest is the same with the publique” (Arendt, 1966, p. 139).

The only common interest shared by these men is security and so the private interest of each is the public interest of all: security. Men exchange their “political rights” in order to gain the security they so desperately need to escape the state of nature (Arendt, 1966, p. 139).

Hobbesian man, his singular interest in, and passion for power after power, the things he will give up to escape a life that is “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short” not only redefines man, but a number of other important concepts as well. Law, equality, power, freedom, all those things that comprised or resulted from politics took on new meanings and thus politics itself become something entirely novel. Equality in Hobbes’s state of nature was the equality to kill or

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12 Arendt believed that Hobbes understood the inaccuracy of his portrayal of man, writing “it would be a grave injustice to Hobbes and his dignity as a philosopher to consider this picture of man an attempt at psychological realism or philosophical truth” (Arendt, 1963c, p. 62).
to be killed, thus all men were equal in their desperation for security. Upon entering society men were equal in their subjugation to the state. Law was not reasonably debated and agreed upon by citizens but was beyond question and laid down by the state. Law now “emanated from the power monopoly of the state (and is not established by man according to human standards of right and wrong)” (Arendt, 1966, p. 139). Law was constructed, followed, and made legitimate by the fact that it was mandated by the state. “In regard to the law of the state—that is, the accumulated power of society as monopolized by the state—there is no question of right or wrong, but only absolute obedience, the blind conformism of bourgeois society” (Arendt, 1966, p. 141). Citizens capable of creating law were now mere subjects of it.

Power was no longer shared among equals, with none being commander or commanded. Power was nearly devoid of anything other than economic content. It was, according to Arendt’s analysis of Hobbes, “the accumulated control that permits the individual to fix prices and regulate supply and demand in such a way that they contribute to his own advantage” (Arendt, 1966, p. 141). Under such conditions “only chance can decide who will succeed” (Arendt, 1966, p. 141). This sort of world bore little resemblance to the world as it had previously existed, in Arendt’s account of the Greek polis, for example.

Freedom also took on “modern” meaning and came to be understood “as freedom from politics, the liberty not to engage in politics” (Arendt, 1966, p. 139). Arendt described this condition as follows: “The highest purpose of politics, ‘the end of government,’ was the guaranty of security; security, in turn, made freedom possible, and the word ‘freedom’ designated a quintessence of activities which occurred outside the political realm” (Arendt, 1966, p. 141). Classically, freedom was only possible within the political realm; it was now only possible outside of it. Freedom, then, was freedom from precisely what had previously defined it. The
state, and the act of governing, which only it could engage in, was the new location of politics: “For government, which since the beginning of the modern age had been identified with the total domain of the political, was now considered to be the appointed protector not so much of freedom as of the life process, the interests of society and its individuals” (Arendt, 1966, p. 141). In Arendt’s view it was clear that politics had taken on a new meaning, incorporating once excluded private elements. Necessity was the primary concern, Arendtian politics was removed from life, and thus, individuals were deprived of the freedom, equality, and power that they once shared within it.

Hobbesian man need not concern himself with the public good, as men previously had. The common good was nothing more than the sum of individual private goods (Arendt, 1954a, p. 148). Thus, “[t]he transformation of the family man from a responsible member of society, interested in all public affairs, to a ‘bourgeois’ concerned only with his private existence and knowing no civic virtue, is an international modern phenomenon” (Arendt, 1954a, p. 148). Man was socialized so as to fit into bourgeoisie society (Arendt, 1958, p. 35). This change, arising from Hobbes, this loss of concern and responsibility for the common good altered politics making it a mere function of society. Politics, as a function of society, existed to serve society not to contradict or act against it. Politics, thus, came to serve the sum of individual interests; serving any other concept of the good would be counter to its new definition as mere function.

Moreover, in Hobbes, society was understood in a limited way. Rather than the entire “web of human relationships,” as Arendt defined society in The Human Condition, it denoted only economic relationships. Politics, as a function of society, served but one aspect of society, economic interests. These economic interests were isolated and individual. Correspondingly, politics was utilized to protect and advance the economic interests of individuals. Under these
conditions men did not take the political playing field as equals, since they were not economic equals, indeed, the private sphere was a realm of inequality (Arendt, 1994, p. 129). For Arendt, equality was no longer possible, as it could only arise through politics of the Arendtian sort, where men became and interacted as equals. Arendt wrote: “Equality, in contrast to all that is involved in mere existence, is not given us, but is the result of human organization insofar as it is guided by the principle of justice. We are not born equal; we become equal as members of a group on the strength of our decision to guarantee ourselves mutually equal rights” (1966, p. 143). Since individuals were economically unequal, politics came to promote the more powerful interests. The ultimate form of this was imperialism.

**Imperialism**

Hobbes’s theory created a new notion of politics and a new understanding of man as bourgeoisie and correspondingly a new understanding of politics. These changes could be concretely seen developing at the level of the affairs and direction of state. This new bourgeois man, concerned only with individual interests, was able to seize and direct politics through the apparatuses of the parliamentary system. Arendt wrote that this system “allowed the liberal bourgeoisie to gain control over the state machine” (Arendt, 1966, p. 301). By Arendt’s account the effects were felt most acutely in Germany, due to the deprivation experienced post-World War I. The condition of deprivation experienced in that context naturally lent itself to a preoccupation with individual necessity:

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13 Arendt’s view on the subject is similar, to but distinguishable from, that of Marxists. The similarity lies in the means by which the bourgeoisie were seen to seize power. However, their views are distinguishable in that, for Arendt, “[i]mperialism must be considered the first stage in political rule of the bourgeoisie rather than the last stage of capitalism” (Arendt, 1963c, p. 62). Arendt was referring to, and to a degree polemicizing against, Lenin’s Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism, which she explicitly mentioned elsewhere in The Origins of Totalitarianism (Arendt, 1966, p. 19). Thus, for her, imperialism is not a purely economic movement, but one containing political elements.
Deprived of political rights, the individual, to whom public and official life manifest itself in the guise of necessity, acquires a new and increased interest in his private life and personal fate. Excluded from participation in the management of public affairs that involve all citizens, the individual loses his rightful place in society and his natural connection with his fellow men (Arendt, 1966, p. 301).

Arendt, unsurprisingly, understood participation as the crucial element of political rights referenced above. Political rights, and freedom generally, “means the right ‘to be a participator in government,’ or it means nothing” (Arendt, 1966, p. 97).

The imperialism Arendt had in mind was not just the 19th century origins of empire or colonialism, but rather the onset of a the type of politics required by capitalism and its newly emancipated people: the bourgeoisie (Arendt, 1963c, p. 218; 1966, p. 97). Crucially, the bourgeoisie took little interest in matters that were traditionally political and were instead sated by “every type of state that could be trusted with protection of property rights” (Canovan, 1992, p. 29). The bourgeoisie preoccupation with economics resulted in a new impetus directing the political affairs of state. The economy was restrained by the upper limit of domestic markets and required additional territorial inputs if economic expansion was to continue. This warranted the attention of the bourgeoisie who took newfound interest in the political affairs of state. In essence “the nation-state had proved unfit to be the framework for the further growth of capitalist economy,” and so with no other recourse they entered the political realm, redirecting the aims of the state.

The acquisition of new markets and resources, in short economic concerns, became the dominant foreign policy goal. Thus, language of the bourgeois businessman was integrated into the political realm of foreign policy. Arendt wrote: “The bourgeoisie turned to politics out of economic necessity; for it did not want to give up the capitalist system whose inherent law is constant economic growth, it had to impose this law upon its home governments and to proclaim expansion to be an ultimate political goal of foreign policy” (Arendt, 1966, p. 138). Power
became intertwined with property, as only the accumulation of the former could ensure the safety of the latter (Arendt, 1966, p. 124). However, the bourgeoisie never obtained absolute control over the state. “National institutions resisted throughout the brutality and megalomania of imperialist aspirations and bourgeois attempts to use the state and its instrument of violence for its own economic purposes were always only half successful” (1966, p. 126). Being only half successful led down the dark and unforeseen path to totalitarianism. The oppression and exploitation of foreign peoples “aroused national consciousness and desire for sovereignty among the conquered people, thereby defeating all genuine attempts at empire building” (Arendt, 1966, p. 137). The nationalism born in reaction to the only partially realized bourgeoisie push for imperialism turned upon the conquering nation-state, destroying their rule of law and leading them into the totalitarianism of the twentieth century and toward the rise of the social. Canovan wrote “in a nutshell, Arendt’s claim was that twentieth-century totalitarianism had been made possible by late nineteenth-century imperialism” (Arendt, 1966, p. 137)  

**Totalitarianism**

Totalitarianism embodied the premise that “everything is possible,” (Arendt, 1966, pp. vii, 303, 382, 387, 427, 436, 437, 440, 441, 459). However, in reality, everything is not possible, as has been repeatedly demonstrated throughout history. The totalitarian attempt to make everything possible was based upon fiction and domination. The result was inhuman atrocity, millions of deaths, and world war. As important as these are, what is more important for the purposes of my project is the manner in which totalitarianism was the root of some aspects of the

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14 There were, to be sure, inaccuracies in Arendt’s claims about totalitarianism. Benhabib’s critique of Arendt’s claim that imperialism led to totalitarianism was particularly interesting (Benhabib, 2000, Ch. 3).
social. Totalitarianism was the basis for the social by reducing humanity to a mass, by offering an alternative to the reality of the world, and by making politics evil.

The first pillar of totalitarianism was fiction. The totalitarian movement created a fictitious world through propaganda (Arendt, 1966, Ch. 11). The propaganda’s “form of infallible prediction . . . has become more important than their content” (Arendt, 1966, p. 348). The totalitarian must always be right and would stop at nothing in order to be so (Arendt, 1966, p. 349). It would also, certainly, portray events in the light most consistent with its fictional world. Thus, totalitarianism created a world in which it took on God-like prescience. Being always correct, this fiction was far more consistent than the real world. In this way it isolated people from the world, protecting them from “the never ending shocks which real life and real experiences deal to human beings and their expectations” (Arendt, 1966, p. 343). The results were to create a mass of people who were simultaneously gullible and cynical who “think that everything was possible and that nothing was true” (Arendt, 1966, p. 369).

Regardless of the wicked content of the totalitarian fictional world, it had already dealt a blow to Arendtian politics. A fictional world, even a pleasant one, denies the engagement with the world necessary for politics and action to occur. Of course, the totalitarian fiction was not pleasant, and hence, matters were even worse. However, Kateb interpreted Arendt’s claim that anyone could become infallible, with a suitable fiction and the use of violence, as meaning that she possessed too much faith in human ability to reshape the world (Arendt, 1966, p. 375; Kateb, 1983, p. 79). Canovan rightly pointed out that Kateb’s position overlooked such infallibility’s “extinction of creativity, even on the part of the leaders themselves” (Canovan, 1992, p. 57). If men can be made infallible and omni-prescient then there is no room for newness in the world, miracles become unneeded and impossible.
The second pillar of totalitarianism was total domination. “What is unprecedented in totalitarianism is not primarily its ideological content, but the event of totalitarian domination itself” (Arendt, 1953b, p. 80). Using what passed for politics at the time, which were certainly not of the Arendtian sort, totalitarian regimes attempted to prove that everything is possible by dominating every aspect of individual lives. Individuals were reduced to animal laborans, and even their labor was dominated by public power (Arendt, 1966, p. 475). This destroyed any distinction between public and private by making every aspect of human life the subject of violent domination. This too was unprecedented: totalitarianism was “not content” with destroying the capacity of individuals to be political actors by removing them from that realm, but felt the need to additionally destroy their private lives (Arendt, 1966, p. 475). Totalitarian governments are those “in which the totality of human life is claimed to be so totally politicized that under them there is no longer any freedom whatsoever” (Arendt, 2005, p. 108). It is no wonder then, that freedom was seen as incompatible with politics, and “cannot exist wherever politics has not yet found its limit and its end” (Arendt, 2005, p. 109).

The totalitarian methods of absolute domination and fiction were most fully displayed in the camps, which were the ultimate attempt to prove that everything is possible. The totalitarian fiction was in full effect, creating a continuous stream of objective enemies, once one group was eliminated the next was attacked (Arendt, 1966, p. 424). Once real enemies were eliminated totalitarianism turned to objective enemies who were, using the Bolshevik language, “criminals without a crime” (Arendt, 1966, p. xxxiii). These plans must be carried out to the greatest extent possible to make reality consistent with fiction. During the midst of the largest war ever seen, even while losing, Germany dedicated resources to exterminating objective enemies to complete

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15 Baehr provided an analysis of Arendt’s notion of “unprecedented,” comparing her analysis to that of sociologists, like Talcott Parsons (2002).
as much of its fictitious project, and to the extent possible remain infallible (Arendt, 1966, p. 422).

Once individuals were identified as part of a group of objective enemies their humanity was stripped away. First, the juridical person was killed off, they were no longer the subject of rights (Arendt, 1966, p. 427). Second, the moral person was destroyed, martyrdom rendered impossible, by making fate and punishment arbitrary they removed control over any aspect of life and death, heroism was impossible (Arendt, 1966, p. 451). Finally, all individuality was destroyed, every victim was identical to every other, incapable of action, and could in no way control anyone’s fate (Arendt, 1966, pp. 452-452). Pitkin compared individuals in this state to robots, an apt analogy (Pitkin 1998). Arendt used the phrase “living corpses” (Arendt, 1966, p. 451). Biological entity or robot, alive or a corpse, it is clear that humans in this state were not capable of individual or collective action and hence not capable of humanity in Arendt’s sense of the term.

Outside of the camps the situation was far less deadly, but only slightly less dire for the prospects of political action. Arbitrariness was extended throughout society; ad hoc decrees took the place of the rule of law or even the “never-resting, dynamic ‘will of the Fuhrer,’” for example (Arendt, 1966, p. 365). This made everyone a potential criminal without a crime. Furthermore, the constant fear of secret police, or their informants, had the desired effect of keeping everyone isolated (Arendt, 1966, pp. 419-437). This fear made intimacy, self-disclosure, and collective action impossible, and therefore, so was politics. Citizens, too, were reduced to a mass with no agency and no ability to act in concert.

**The Social Question**

Arendt, in *On Revolution*, laments that the sciences of psychology and sociology have
buried freedom, which was once accessible through Arendtian politics. In the portion of that work titled “The Social Question” she traced the role of necessity in the history of revolutionary thought as well as the proceeding “condensation of happenings into concepts” (Arendt, 1966, p. 124). The French Revolution was a watershed moment in the history of revolution in that it was a physical necessity, which “appeared now perhaps for the first time in the full light of history,” rather than as historical necessity. Arendt’s unique interpretation of the French Revolution was contrasted with the prior American Revolution which she viewed as a political revolution based upon common deliberation in a public realm (Arendt, 1966, p. 127). The French Revolution was viewed as a social revolution, though that exact term was not used. “The inescapable fact was that liberation from tyranny spelled freedom only for the few and was hardly felt by the many who remained loaded down by their misery” (Arendt, 1963c, p. 59). Thus, once the yoke of tyranny was cast off the revolutionaries faced the perhaps more difficult task of liberating those in misery from the burden of their unmet necessities (Arendt, 1963c, p. 59).

The French Revolution set the stage for the clash between the necessities of historical processes and life processes. The life processes represented the bodily needs which were the concerns of all humans, but occupied varying degrees of attention within individual lives. The French Revolution may have begun as a political affair but changed course once the poor engaged the cause. They were driven by the unmet, or very difficult to meet, bodily necessities, required for life to persist. Social theorists share in common a concern with necessity, with life processes: “they see a multitude – the factual plurality of a nation, or a people or society – in the image of one supernatural body driven by one superhuman, irresistible ‘general will’” (Arendt, 1963c, p. 74). The social question arose with the existence of poverty, a thoroughly dehumanizing force. Poverty differed from deprivation in that the former was a constant state of
acute misery and unmet need where individuals were totally at the mercy of the biological dictates of their bodies, while the latter may be more fleeting or may be more easily alleviated (Arendt, 1963c, p. 60).

Of the poor, Arendt wrote “[w]hen they appeared on the scene of politics, necessity appeared with them, and the result was that the power of the old regime became impotent and the new republic was stillborn; freedom had to be surrendered to necessity, to the urgency of the life process itself” (Arendt, 1963c, p. 74). The revolutionary government was taken hostage by the necessities of the people. Robespierre recognized this and announced that “‘everything which is necessary to maintain life must be common good and only the surplus can be recognized as private property’” (Arendt, 1963c, p. 60). Liberty, as he conceived it, was dragged down from its privileged position and in its place up went the demands of the Sans-Culottes who were concerned with “‘dress, food and the reproduction of their species’” (Arendt, 1963c, p. 60). Arendt blamed this change for unleashing the terror that ensued and dooming the Revolution. Robespierre himself viewed this as a failure lamenting that they had missed “‘the moment to found freedom’” (Arendt, 1963c, p. 60).

Therefore, as far as Arendt was concerned, the French Revolution missed its historical moment not due to ongoing battle with an entrenched tyrant, but because it was distracted by necessity and the need to alleviate poverty. The happiness and the welfare of the people replaced freedom as the ultimate goal. This, not the creation of freedom, was the truly historical moment of the French Revolution and would influence all subsequent revolutions. “The Transformation of the Rights of Man into the rights of Sans-Culottes was the turning point not only of the French Revolution but of all revolutions that were to follow” (Arendt, 1963c, p. 60). Dress, food, and life became the true underlying principles of revolution, replacing ideals of liberté, égalité,
fraternité present at the outset.

In *On Revolution* Arendt presented an original albeit controversial view of Marx, as her views on Marx nearly always were.\(^{16}\) Marx was “the greatest theorist the revolutions ever had” (Arendt, 1963c, pp. 60-61). Marx stood above all others as the theorist of necessity. He was more concerned with history than politics. Thus, he ignored the intentions of the revolutionaries, the foundation of freedom, in favor of emphasizing what he saw as objective forces of revolutionary events. Having come to these conclusions Arendt viewed Marx as anti-political, caring more about necessity. Arendt wrote that Marx “became convinced that the reason why the French Revolution had failed to found freedom was that it had failed to solve the social question” (Arendt, 1963c, p. 61). Marx’s conclusion was that freedom was not possible if poverty existed. “His most explosive and indeed most original contribution to the cause of revolution was that he interpreted the compelling needs of mass poverty in political terms as an uprising, not for the sake of bread or wealth, but for the sake of freedom as well” (Arendt, 1963c, p. 61). Marx learned that poverty can be a “political force of the first order” (Arendt, 1963c, p. 62). To make social conditions political Marx transformed the social question into a political question. His vehicle for this was the notion of exploitation wherein one class possesses the means of violence and uses them to rule over subordinate classes.

The social question brought private concerns over necessity into the public realm. This meant that whenever and wherever the social question arose politics would cease to be Arendtian and become a politics contaminated by social concerns. This doomed revolutions, and Arendtian politics generally. The rise of the social could, in part, be viewed as the creation of conditions under which social questions are constantly posed, thereby dooming Arendtian politics.

\(^{16}\) One commentator called Arendt’s reading of Marx “mistaken and gross distortion” (R. J. Bernstein, 1986, p. 247).
2.5 Contemporary Politics and the Rise of the Social

The question seems obvious given Arendt’s account discussed thus far: what is the meaning of politics in the contemporary world given its distance from idealized Arendtian politics? Arendtian politics, action, the ability to perform miracles, freedom, and isonomy were all based upon the critical concept of human plurality. However the rise of the social was a multifaceted concept, which manifested itself as the rise of content and modes of thought once previously confined to the private realm, the rise of conformity, the rise of alienation, and the rise of raw power. Given that these things preclude the possibility of Arendtian politics, what are contemporary politics? The word is still used, many dedicate time and massive amounts of resources to it, there are a plethora of media outlets obsessed with it, some content of life has always been designated political. Nevertheless, it is clear that what is contemporarily known as politics differs greatly from Arendtian politics.

The answer to the question, what are contemporary politics would be best answered with a description of the rise of the social. More explicitly, Arendtian politics was replaced by the rise of the social. “More than any elaborate theory, this unconscious substitution of the social for the political betrays the extent to which the original Greek understanding of politics had been lost” (Arendt, 1958, p. 23). To borrow from Wolin, who was critical of Arendt, what had occurred was “sublimation of the political into forms of association which earlier thought had believed to be nonpolitical” (Wolin, 2004, p. 385). Contemporary politics, then, would be precisely what will be described as the rise of the social’s content. All that was characteristic of Arendtian politics has been replaced in contemporary politics by what the rise of the social brought with it.

Introductory Remarks on the Social

Arendt defined the social in a unique way. As Pitkin noted her use of the term did not
reflect standard definitions associated with either the social, or society (1998, p. 177). Arendt had several original understandings of the social that became apparent from her use of the term. Her usage of the social occurred primarily in her discussion of its rise, indeed, it seems as though the social took on a unique meaning when its rise, rather than just its being, was the subject. It was the social’s rise, not its mere existence that brought about a change in what was considered the political, Arendtian politics, a change that was certainly detrimental in Arendt’s view. This rise, and the accompanying precluding of Arendtian politics, may be understood through the three approaches outlined below.

Broadly speaking Arendt’s rise of the social can be understood in three, not necessarily mutually exclusive ways. The first was the rise of the private. Things that were once confined to the private realms of life became public and entered politics. The private component of the rise of the social included the rise of both content and mentalities that were private in Arendt’s account of Greek dichotomies. The increased important of economics as both subject and means was one obvious component of Arendt’s thesis. One aspect of the rise of the social was economic interests being admitted into politics as well as economic modes of thinking and operating. Additionally, the rise of the private included the rise of other non-economic factors that, according to Arendt, were previously located in the private realm. Finally, the rise of the private included the rise of, and incorporation of violence and coercion into politics. Violence and coercion as elements of force had been confined to the private realm and were never permitted in politics.

The second understanding of Arendt’s discussion of the rise of the social was somewhat more nuanced, humanist, and less apparent from a cursory reading of Arendt. This reading moves the concerns of the economically dichotomous Cold War combatants to the background.
This more subtle meaning was informed by Arendt’s other work, not just *The Human Condition*. It was concerned with notions of freedom, human plurality, individuality, participation, and empowerment. The social was here seen as a totalizing, normalizing, disciplinary power, which created an oppressive conformity. Since freedom was only possible through pluralistic participation, once plurality and individuality were destroyed freedom became impossible. The social, then, was a force that exerted its power over individuals to bring about conformity, a problem previously noted by prominent liberals like John Stuart Mill and Alexis de Tocqueville. This understanding of the social did not so much concern itself with the content of politics as with the very possibility of politics. Conformity and totalization, by definition, precluded Arendtian politics.

The third understanding of the rise of the social was associated with one particular and influential scholar, Hannah Pitkin. Pitkin’s *The Attack of the Blob* was devoted entirely to an exploration of Arendt’s concept of the social. In that work Pitkin supported a broader understanding of Arendt’s rise of the social, as something akin to a form of alienation. The rise of the social brought about a condition wherein collectives of individuals were unable to control, or at times even influence, the large-scale consequences of their collective actions. This was a world in which politics has become meaningless in that the social has rendered it incapable of directing the collective affairs of human beings. Human agency had become meaningless and society, perhaps even the world, drifted aimlessly beyond the direction of mankind. World alienation had become universalized and total.

All three views of the social have prominent proponents and textual support. All three views are correct to a degree. The social, its rise, and its effect on politics can be best understood as a combination of all three of these components. The rise of the social does indeed affect the
substance of politics. Things that were once excluded from the public realm have found a place within it. Once private concerns and modes of thought are a large part, but certainly not all of this. Additionally, the rise of the social threatens the very possibility of Arendtian politics. The social is a totalizing, disciplinary power, which creates conformity, thus precluding the possibility of plurality and individuality, which are required for Arendtian politics. The combination of an alteration of the substance of politics and the prevention of the possibility of action may result in the extreme form of alienation described by Pitkin.

**The Rise of the Private**

Any understanding of Arendt’s definition of the social begins with her calling it the “curiously hybrid realm where private interests assume public significance” (Arendt, 1958, p. 35). The classical Greek distinction between the private and the public realms gave way, and the two were combined. The once private, particular, at times even individual, concerns of the private realm entered into the public realm. Arendt’s question, which would have been determinative in the Greek *polis* and the Roman *civitas*, *cura private negotii* or *cura rei publicae*, was no longer so. Private interest had become public business, and those dedicated to the public business necessarily found themselves dealing with private interests. This development “has not only blurred the old borderline between private and political, it has also changed almost beyond recognition the meaning of the two terms and their significance for the life of the individual and the citizen” (Arendt, 1958, p. 38). The political had been overrun by concerns that were once private, and as a result politics of the Arendtian sort languished from inattentiveness.

In rephrasing and expanding upon what has already been said, Arendt wrote, “[s]ociety is the form in which the fact of mutual dependence for the sake of life and nothing else assumes public significance and where the activities concerned with sheer survival are permitted to
appear in public” (Arendt, 1958, p. 46). What precisely was private and became public? It was a mixture of a number of elements. One element was economics. This included private economic concerns, like the poverty of the social question. However, it was not just the alleviation of poverty that was pursued politically. Additionally, the wealthy sought to protect their economic interests through political means. With the rise of economic interest came the rise of economic modes of thinking. The exchange market became a base model for non-economic human relationships. However, the private things that became public would not just be limited to economic interests. Other interests that were private in the system of Arendt’s Greek distinctions, like biology, sex, and reproduction, for example, became public. Finally, nonpolitical methods once restricted to the private realm entered into the public realm and politics, namely raw power, or force and coercion.

**The Rise of Economics**

Political science itself has given way to “‘national economy’ or ‘social economy’ or *Volkswirtschaft’” (Arendt, 1958, p. 28). The political science that remained took a novel and previously impossible form, “‘political economy’ would have been a contradiction in terms: whatever was ‘economic,’ related to the life of the individual and the survival of the species, was a non-political, household affair by definition” (Arendt, 1958, p. 29). Consistent with this, rather than being viewed as a collective of individuals, citizens, or actors, people were viewed as a “collective of families economically organized into the facsimile of one super-human family is what we call ‘society,’ and its political form of organization is called ‘nation’” (Arendt, 1958, pp. 28-29). People, as mere members of society, were those “whose everyday affairs have to be taken care of by a gigantic, nation-wide administration of housekeeping” (Arendt, 1958, p. 28). Housekeeping had once been confined to the private realm, its intrusion into the political realm
brought with it the concerns associated with necessity. In essence, the social question was routinized as a public matter and came to be popularly thought of as political. The necessitous content of the social question was no longer raised solely during periodic revolutions, but came to be an everyday occurrence.

One aspect of the rise of the social was the rise of the economic, which consisted of modes of thought, and ways of behaving, which were classically confined to the privacy of the household, and so, were out of place in the public realm. Benhabib referred to this component of the rise of the social as “the rise of commodity exchange” (Benhabib, 2000, p. 25). This was detrimental to the political. Kateb concisely phrased the idea: “the enemy of politics is economics” (Kateb, 1983, p. 117). The economic acquisition of needs based upon market exchange stepped into a new realm. However, the relationship between politics and economics was not as simple as Kateb’s concise phrasing. From the Arendtian perspective economics is certainly the enemy of politics in a number of ways, but it is not economics in its entirety that is the enemy.

After all, Arendt described economics as previously existing within the private realm, and therefore, existing in a somewhat harmonious, yet dichotomous, relationship with the political. Additionally, managing a political community, even one arcane and outdated as the Greek polis, must involve management of the state’s economic affairs. Furthermore, the content of Arendtian politics was always objective and aimed at the “world of things in which men move, which physically lie between them and out of which arise their specific, objective, worldly interests” (Arendt, 1958, p. 182). Exchange between entities was both a necessary component of economics and within “the field of action” (Arendt, 1958, pp. 209, 214). Collective economic interests may even be pursued in a manner consistent with political action; as was the case with
the early days of the labor movement which translated its pursuit of economic interests into a “full-fledged political battle” (Arendt, 1958, p. 219). Economics, then, need not be the enemy of politics, when private, economic concerns remained limited to certain areas of life, or when those interests were pursued in a political manner, the two may, at least theoretically, exist in harmony.

However, economics may also be rightly viewed as the enemy of politics for several reasons. First, economics become the enemy of politics when they stepped outside of the limits assigned to them by Arendt’s Greek distinctions. Benhabib provided an illuminating comparison between Arendt’s views and the work of Hungarian economist Karl Polanyi (Benhabib, 2000, 24-25). Polanyi wrote of a process of demystification, which occurred when economic relations were freed from any of the normative restraints which had previously bound them. This disembedded economics from the institutions which once housed them, e.g. the private realm, Greek oikos in Arendt’s thought (Polanyi, 1971).¹⁷ The result was that exchange relations became standard conduct in all areas of life. It was not economic exchange per se that was the enemy of politics, but rather the mindset of economic exchange applied universally to all human interaction. This was a mentalité expanding into an inappropriate context. To use Habermas’s metaphor, it was a colonization of the political. It was as though an imperialist nation colonized others and imposed not only its way of life, but its very way of thinking upon its subjects.

The economic functions were once located within the household where items were produced and consumed within the same walls. This changed when homo faber came “out of his isolation” and became a “merchant and trader and establishes the exchange market in this capacity” (Arendt, 1958, p. 163). However, economic exchange required publicness, the market was a place where individuals met and interacted with one another via what was common to

¹⁷ Benhabib also noted that the Marxist approach provided an account similar to Polanyi’s (Benhabib 2000, pp. 24-25).
them. It was, essentially, a form of public sphere. Arendt did recognize the publicness of the economic exchange market, but even when it and the accompanying mindset were confined by historical limits they were located within a public realm of a less ideal sort. “Historically, the last public realm, the last meeting place which is at least connected with the activity of homo faber, is the exchange market on which his products are displayed” (Arendt, 1958, p. 162). Even animal laborans have access to this market as "owners of their labor power" which was sold, leading to Marx’s self-alienation and degradation of men into commodities (Arendt, 1958, p. 162). A public realm based upon exchange could never be like the political realm, capable of producing freedom, because it could never meet the requirements of equality. If men were equalized to bring them onto equal footing, then the sole purpose of exchange would be negated and the exchange market would vanish. Inequality of conditions was a necessary condition for the existence of an exchange market, and it was precisely that market creating inequality that eliminated the possibility of truly free action. All the outputs of man became subject to economic exchange. All individuals came to be viewed as producers in all areas of life. There was no room left for politics characterized by action and primarily creating nothing but freedom.

Moreover, recall that values in exchange markets were determined by homo faber’s standards of utility, and that in exchange markets individuals are totally defined by their products (Arendt, 1958, pp. 164, 209). If this mentality were applied to all areas of life, the value of an individual human life would be reduced to the value of its outputs. There would be no intrinsic value to anything; rather a thing, activity, or person would only be as valuable as others deemed its contribution for exchanges. This could lead to dark consequences for those things deemed to be of low value by exchange market logic.
Within the broad concept of the rise of the social only a portion is specifically economic. Within the economic portion of the rise of the social, there is a still smaller part that directly addresses the welfare state as such. Arendt certainly expressed the view that the welfare portion of the welfare state had begun to take up too much of what passed for politics. Concern over the private household conditions of individuals had “overshadowed the political realm ever since the beginning of the modern age” (Arendt, 1954a, p. 155). In essence, the social question, and related questions became ever present in politics. The social as related to the social question and phenomena like poverty was the most easily accessible understanding of the rise of the social, and as such, has been the most commonly held. If this portion of the rise of the social was taken as the entirety it may be viewed as simply taking a stance within the antinomies of the Cold War era, which pitted the free West against the centrally planned communist East. The substance of politics had changed from that of Arendtian politics to include private economic matters that had not been previously included, and currently ought not to be included. If the argument was reduced to simply a statement that the private economics of the household should not be a part of the political, then it should be excluded from public concern. The economic affairs of the household were matters of public concern, controlled, and perhaps equalized to varying degrees by socialism, communism, and even a Western style welfare state. The Arendtian conception of the political would have excluded these concerns and left them in the dark private realm, unseen and uncared for by others. On this reading then Arendt could be portrayed as something of an extreme conservative, an advocate of radical economic freedom. Economics would be entirely beyond the pale of public concern, perhaps even outside of public knowledge.
The Rise of Other Private Concerns

With the ascent of the social component of the rise of the private it was not just economic concerns and modes of thought that increased in importance, but other once private concerns came to be incorporated into politics as well. The animalist and bare components of life also ascended, human biology for example. Agamben observed that “today politics knows no value . . . other than life” (1998, p. 10). With the view that life, its reproduction, its end, and its continuation were of public value, those concerns entered the political realm. Agamben went on to argue that Arendt, along with Foucault, understood that “at the threshold of the modern era, natural life begins to be included in the mechanisms and calculations of state power and politics turns into biopolitics” (1998, p. 3).

Arendt, never to my knowledge, used the term biopolitics. In fact, biopolitics like “political economy” was a contradiction. Whatever was biological was outside of Arendtian politics since it was associated with the necessities of life, with labor, and therefore, was the concern of animal laborans and so confined to the private realm. Such concerns would certainly never enter into Arendtian politics. The most extreme example of biopolitics would become totalitarian domination. Certainly totalitarianism sought to politically dominate all biological aspects of life.

Since necessities like biological concerns were a subject of politics, then there could be no freedom. Individuals would merely need to advance their interests in meeting their own necessities, and by any definition doing something out of necessity would not be doing it freely. Moreover, if the very existence and continuation of life was to be a political concern then it seems unlikely that things could be understood in the manner consistent with Arendtian politics, seen from many viewpoints. It strains credulity to think that an individual could see and
understand any issue from the viewpoint of ending their own life, or limiting reproductive choices. Making such matters political implies that such a viewpoint would be valid and present in the political realm. It makes the issues such as whether some individuals’ lives should be ended, or whether some should have their reproductive choices taken out of their own hands, political issues which are open to being decided in any direction. When individuals enter a political realm where these issues are open for debate and may directly affect them, it is no wonder that they vehemently advance their own private interests and are incapable of understanding the issue from alternative points of view.

An Interlude on Little Rock

Although Arendt was concerned with the political preoccupation with the social, and contended that household economics were classically non-political, this argument need not be taken to conservative extremes. Consider one of Arendt’s controversial pieces: Reflections on Little Rock. Arendt, to a degree, invited misunderstandings of the conservative sort by objecting to measures like mandatory school desegregation, which she addressed in Reflections on Little Rock, she even defended the position against her critics, before finally reconsidering (Arendt, 1959b, 2003). However, Arendt was not motivated by any sort of disregard for the plight of the disenfranchised or downtrodden. Arendt was acutely aware of the difficulties facing “unwelcomed children” (Arendt, 1958, pp. 175-181, 243-247; LeBeau, 2004). As a Jewish child in prewar Germany she experienced discrimination at the hands of classmates and anti-Semitic teachers, from whom her parents did all they could to protect her (Young-Bruehl, 1984, pp. 11-12). Additionally, Arendt had, albeit temporarily, experienced life as a stateless person, perhaps the most extreme form of disenfranchisement. This period of her life occurred between 1933, when she fled the Nazi regime, and 1951, when she successfully obtained American citizenship.
Arendt felt compelled to write her *Reflections* after seeing images of Elizabeth Eckford being accosted while simply attempting to attend school (LeBeau, 2004, pp. 54-55). Arendt was empathetic and considered the issue from the perspectives of both white and black mothers (Arendt, 2003, pp. 193-194).

Still, despite personal experiences and careful consideration Arendt objected to mandated school desegregation for several reasons. Arendt did believe that desegregation of public space and resources was appropriate (Arendt, 2003, p. 207). However, she also believed that mandated school desegregation was inappropriate “in that parents have the right to determine in which group their child should acquire its education” (Arendt, 1959a, cited by; Bernasconi, 1996). Arendt’s objection was that mandatory desegregation ran afoul of familial territory thereby circumventing that most basic of human institution’s ability to protect children, as her own parents had protected her. Additionally, Arendt believed that all should be free to associate or not based upon a free choice, as this had always been the nature of societies:

> What equality is to the body politic—its innermost principle—discrimination is to society. . . . In American society, people group together, and therefore discriminate against each other, along lines of profession, income and ethnic origin, while in Europe the lines run along class origin, education, and manners. . . . At any rate, without discrimination of some sort, society would simply cease to exist and very important possibilities of free association and group formation would disappear (Arendt, 2003, p. 205).

Mandated desegregation endangered the discrimination, or less unfortunately worded, organization around specific characteristics, which was a universal principle across societies. Additionally, it violated freedom of association. All this could have threatened the possibility of an Arendtian political realm. Berkowitz described her position as follows:

> What offends Arendt in the Little Rock case is not the ideal of desegregation, but the danger that well-intentioned governmental attacks on social discrimination will erode the walls of privacy that nourish the possibility of thinking and of acting—and thus of plurality. Since the space for solitary thought depends on the protection of a vibrant private realm, the protection of privacy is a necessary first step in the cultivation of
thoughtful political action (2010, p. 242).

Additionally, and perhaps mistakenly, Arendt believed that mandated desegregation made the intended beneficiaries worse off by placing them in a more humiliating situation than their previous one, destroying their pride and identity by forcing them into places and groups where they were unwelcomed (Arendt, 2003, pp. 194-195). For Arendt, in this context, being a pariah, a dignified outsider who was still able to participate, was preferable to being a parvenu, who completely assimilated and thereby denied their identity and past.

Furthermore, powerless and voiceless children should be protected and not be forced to bear the weight of a yoke, which would be properly placed upon the backs of adults as full-fledged citizens. Forcing children to deal with such a serious issue allowed adults to abdicate their responsibility, which “implicitly denies their responsibility for the world into which they have borne their children and refuses the duty of guiding them into it. Have we now come to the point where it is the children who are being asked to change or improve the world? And do we intend to have our political battles fought out in the school yards?” (Arendt, 2003, p. 204). Young Elizabeth Eckford should not have been forced to play the hero or the martyr, and which she would be was decidedly unclear in the moment. Arendt lamented the fact that neither her parents nor the NAACP appeared on the scene to take the brunt of the backlash (Arendt, 2003, p. 203).

Arendt actually opposed forced segregation in all areas of life and critiqued Southerners for abandoning both children and the laws by letting the mob seize control (Arendt, 2003, p. 202). She even personally avoided traveling to the South because she found the situation there “unbearable” (Arendt, 2003). Despite her thoroughly principled position against segregation and inequality and against mandated desegregation, her views on race were wanting in some respects. For example, she proposed a constitutional amendment to prohibit any institutionalized
segregation or inequality; however, as Bernasconi argued, this would have done nothing to address the non-institutionalized, but equally problematic racism (Bernasconi, 1996).

Moreover, in contrast to Arendt’s principled stand, Reflections also included a number of considerably less principled practical objections to mandated school desegregation. Arendt objected to desegregation of this sort at that moment because other issues, like anti-miscegenation laws were more blatant violations of the Constitution and a better starting point for the Civil Rights Movement (Arendt, 2003). Bernasconi again found Arendt’s position meaningless on the same grounds: if the underlying racism were not addressed virtually no one would take advantage of the new law, or would have engaged in legal activity and still been the target of racist discrimination (Bernasconi, 1996). Arendt expressed an additional practical, and somewhat dark concern, that addressing segregation and discrimination would worsen racial tensions, wishing to avoid a “danger point” she recommended caution in any attempt to address the issue (Arendt, 2003, p. 200). It is unclear just how change would be achieved if Arendt’s recommendations were followed, but it is clear that even at her most controversial she was not an extreme conservative unconcerned with the unfortunate, believing that any inequalities should remain outside of the light of the public realm. These are positions that could only be held by a caricature of the real Arendt.

Finally, in defending Arendt against a partial, and thus an incorrect, interpretation, it must be noted that Arendt thoroughly reconsidered her position on Little Rock. Some years later Dante Germino recounted a 1964 conversation with Arendt in which “she indicated that she had reversed her stand on racial integration of the public schools in the United States” (Germino, 1967, p. 142 n. 31). After the publication of Reflections Arendt’s position was criticized by the novelist Ralph Ellison who claimed that she misunderstood the situation and its importance
Arendt responded to this critique with a letter, in which she admitted to having gone in “an entirely wrong direction” and that she had failed to understand “the ideal of sacrifice” (Arendt, 1965). Arendt had not understood all of the nuances of the situation, nor had she “grasped the element of stark violence, of elementary, bodily fear in the situation” (Arendt, 1965). Perhaps Arendt had altered her stance and her view of the situation; perhaps she no longer believed that black children were being forced to play the parvenu. Alternatively, she may have been unable to translate her experiences with European anti-Semitism into an understanding of American racism, a problem not uncommon among European intellectuals.

**The Rise of Force**

As previously discussed, in Arendt’s characterization of Greek society the private realm was a realm of violence and coercion. It was a realm where the will was advanced by any means necessary. Part of the rise of private has been the rise of advancing one’s interest by any means necessary, including power and coercion. Part of this was due to the fact that individuals, being narrowly self-interested and primarily concerned with advancing their own interests do not behave as if they are among equals, although they do behave equally in a manner not yet discussed. Since only their own interests matter they are free to advance those interests however they please. They also need not even attempt to understand issues politically from multiple perspectives, just as the head of household had no need to understand the positions of his inferiors.

Issues are approached from an individual’s own viewpoint and an individual’s own perceived interests are decisive in determining the position adopted. Little effort is made to view political issues, or the world, from vantage points other than one’s own. Relatedly, as individuals

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18 For more on the Arendt/Ellison exchange see Elizabeth Young-Bruehl (1984, Ch. 7).
only approach issues from their own interests they continually stretch contemporary politics to incorporate issues not part of Arendtian politics. Cicero’s *cura private negotii* or *cura rei publicae* standard was no longer applied. Anything of private importance to an individual can be brought into public. For example, the once private life processes of *animal laborans* may be brought into public and pursued by any means.

Along with the rise of the private came the rise of the economic mentalité. Exchange moved beyond the limits of the market for labor and commodities and was integrated into all areas of life. Life, in the presence of others, became subject to market exchange processes. This meant that individuals, or like-minded groups, could pursue their private, interests by economic means, means in which all were not equal, and so could be viewed as forceful and coercive. It should not seem odd that politics should suffer the same fate as other areas of life. Unsurprisingly, Arendt held a negative view of this type of development. She viewed the everyday politics of interest groups promoting their own narrow self-interests by pressuring elected officials as tantamount to bribery and intimidation tactics. Arendt saw the system as one rife with “corruption” and the everyday processes of contemporary politics as “blackmail” (Arendt, 1963c, pp. 245-245, 273).

It takes little imagination to understand how strongly Arendt would condemn the further proliferation of money and special interests in politics. Citizens United, McCutcheon, and Super PACs, among other developments have solidified and expanded the place of money in politics. Anonymous and unlimited donations have combined a level of unaccountability associated with bureaucracy with the “corruption” of politics. There may be accountability, but to whom officials are accountable and what extent is unknown, making the entire system more shadowy than ever before. Arendt would also find it strange and terrifying that corporations, or any nonhuman
entity, are considered “people” for political purposes. To equate money with speech demonstrates the extent to which the social realm has invaded the political realm. Speech, as a component of the *bios politikos*, was something of which only humans were capable. The mistaken belief that a nonhuman entity would ever be assigned a humanity-defining trait would be terrifying. This mistake would not only degrade politics, but also degrade the very notion of humanity. Surely, anything nonhuman must be *aneu logon*.

In addition to nonpolitical efforts at furthering interests by any means necessary, by power and means based on inequalities like economics, power has come into politics in another way. Namely power has become a primary subject of politics. “[M]arginal phenomena” like power “now manifestly become central to the entire realm of politics” (Arendt, 2005, p. 134). The modern nation-state has taken its role to be defending society from enemies, through the use of force over which it has exclusive control (Arendt, 2005, p. 143). Contemporarily, people believe “that the substance of politics is brute force” and “that domination is the central concept of all political theory” (2005, p. 192). Arendt lamented the fact that wars have come to be seen as the quintessentially political experience of the modern age and that this has led to violence being equated with political action (Arendt, 2005, p. 152). Ever concerned with possibility of the annihilation of humanity, as were many during the Cold War, Arendt was disturbed by the fact that politics had become synonymous with the application of that possibility. A primary topic of politics had become warfare, the very thing that by definition involved force and violence, rather than speech and understanding. Violence and the use of force had become both the subject and the method of contemporary politics. It was not that war was politics by other means, as Clausewitz formulated it, or that politics was war by other means, as Foucault believed. Instead, war was politics, and politics war.
For Arendt, the modern conception of power was summarized by Mao Tse-tung’s proclamation that “power grows out of the barrel of a gun” (Arendt, 1970, p. 11). This notion of power was a deplorable modern appropriation of the term to signify violence and could be distinguished from true power, strength, and force (Arendt, 1968, pp. 143-155). Power, in the sense of the Greek *kratia*, was a collective acting in concert to achieve a political purpose. Power could arise only in situations where a group interacted freely and communicatively. There must exist a number of openly debating individuals, which “is not accidental, because human power corresponds to the condition of plurality to begin with” (Arendt, 1958, p. 201). Power understood in this manner is distinguishable from strength, which can exist in a single individual, force which is natural and not a human creation, and most importantly violence which is based on coercion rather than persuasion. Mao’s modern assertion about power demonstrated the conflation of power with violence. Violence was once excluded from politics, but has worked its way into the political realm to the exclusion of the Greek/Arendtian conception of power. Power as violence does not grow solely from the barrel of a gun instead it exists when any form of coercion, manipulation, or strategy is exercised in place of free debate oriented toward understanding and persuasion.

**The Rise of Conformism**

If the rise of the private component of the rise of the social can be understood as the rise of economic interests, exchange, necessity and the accompanying modes of thought, then the conformism component can be understood as the rise of a totalizing, disciplinary force associated with mass society. This aspect of the rise of the social grew out of the totalitarian experience of the twentieth century. The rise of mass society negated human plurality and the possibility of heroic action and so eliminated the possibility for action and freedom along with it. Thus, it
meant that the conditions for Arendtian politics could no longer be satisfied. With Arendtian politics no longer possible, whatever was to be called political bore little resemblance to its previous incarnation.

Arendt wrote:

It is decisive that society, on all its levels, excludes the possibility of action, which formerly was excluded from the household. Instead, society expects from each of its members a certain kind of behavior, imposing innumerable and various rules, all of which tend to "normalize" its members, to make them behave, to exclude spontaneous action or outstanding achievement (1958, p. 40).

Action was replaced with mere behavior. Rather than heroic distinction, doing great deeds and speaking great words individuals were left with only the opportunity to behave as expected. Using the terminology that Pitkin found so useful, fear of being a pariah and flaunting societal expectations had compelled all to become parvenus (1998). Society has created a Procrustean bed into which any would-be Achilles is forced. Without action Arendtian politics were not possible, without them there was no possibility for freedom.

This aspect of the rise of the social was connected to the rise of economics. Individuals were expected to behave as economic actors, *homo economicus*, who were narrowly self-interested and motivated by maximizing their own economic interests. Therefore, society expects, in fact nearly demands, behavior of this sort in all areas of life, including the political realm. It was assumed by all that individuals were motivated by their private economic interests, were incapable of understanding the issues from all sides, political understanding in the Arendtian sense. As with this example, the economic aspect of the rise of the social, the behavioral demands make all the other components of the rise of the social self-reinforcing.

The individual, heroic aspect of life was moved form the public to the private realm. Arendt wrote that mass society “equalizes under all circumstances, and the victory of equality in the modern world is only the political and legal recognition of the fact that society has conquered
the public realm, and that distinction and difference have become private matters of the individual” (Arendt, 1958, p. 41). As previously noted a number of authors have pointed out the tension in Arendtian politics between individual, heroic action and collective, peer based dialogue (Benhabib, 1992, 2000; d'Entreves, 1994; Villa, 1999). It would seem that this tension had been practically resolved with the rise of the social tipping the scales in favor of the communal, equality aspect of politics at the expense of the heroic, action aspect. However, recall that the heroic nature of action was self-disclosing, and required an audience, who were perhaps more like participants. This requirement could not be met in the privacy of the public realm. Such confinement of action would deprive it of the necessary viewers, players, co-actors, etc. Since acting would not be possible in private it was not possible at all.

Additionally, the equality resulting from the rise of behavior was not of the sort found in Arendtian politics. This phenomenon did not ensure equality in the political arena; indeed such equality could be understood as having equal opportunity to participate in now banished action. Instead the rise of behavior would have the effect of making individuals equal in their tastes, manners modes of life, etc. Most crucially, it made them equal in that they were equally unpolitical. Put another way, the rise of behavior, as a component part of the rise of the social, made individuals equal in their inability to initiate or engage in political action. Individuals became equally incapable of performing miracles, or for that matter even witnessing miracles since none could perform them.

19 Undoubtedly, Arendt was bringing a new perspective to the study of “mass society” that was being explored by prominent sociologists at the time. For example, see William Kornhauser (1960); Riesman, Glazer, and Denney (1961); and Daniel Bell (1960).
Arendt also noted the danger that the rise of conformism and mass society could pose to individuals who did not conform. She wrote that when equality became pervasive it was seldom understood as nonpolitical principle, but that out of one hundred:

[T]here are ninety-nine chances that it will be mistaken for an innate quality of every individual who is “normal” if he is like everybody else and “abnormal” if he happens to be different. This perversion of equality from a political into a social concept is all the more dangerous when a society leaves but little space for special groups and individuals, for then their differences become all the more conspicuous (Arendt, 1966, p. 54).

Arendt had personally felt the danger of conformism in several ways. First, she was personally aware of the Jewish experience, particularly in Europe (Arendt, 1966, 1974, 1978; Young-Bruehl, 1984). In addition to Arendt’s experience as a German-Jew, she felt the threat of conformism in America as McCarthyism threatened potential deportation due to her husband’s prior Communist connections (Young-Bruehl, 1984, pp. 274-275).

Though America and Europe did not have the same experiences with totalitarianism both, nevertheless, experience this danger. In fact, America had a longer history of conformism due to its mass, rather than class based society (Arendt, 1954c). America also suffered from what Tocqueville had diagnosed as democratic or administrative despotism, the pressure of conformity (Tocqueville, 1969, pp. 691, 693). As Arendt understood it, “under the conditions of majority rule, society itself would be the oppressor, with no room left for individual freedom” (Arendt, 1954c, p. 609). Arendt wrote to Jaspers informing him that she had become somewhat disillusioned with America, where conformism was a “clear and present danger” and “self-censorship” was rampant (Arendt, 1953a). If self-expression was not possible, then neither was action based upon speech. There was certainly no possibility of miracles.

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20 Pitkin provided a detailed analysis of the parallels and connections between Democracy in America and The Human Conditions (1998, Ch. 7).
In Tocqueville’s account, this despotism would lead to a society of isolated individuals. “Each one of them, withdrawn into himself, is almost unaware of the fate of the rest” and as citizens have less and less connection to one another the political community falls apart (Tocqueville, 1969, p. 692). This led to a further difficulty for politics since “to be isolated is to be deprived of the capacity to act” and an individual who “isolates himself . . . forfeits power and becomes impotent” (Arendt, 1958, pp. 188, 201). However, freedom was now experienced only in private beyond the prying eyes of society and its behavioral pressures. Fear of societal pressure, or apathy could lead to a withdrawal from the public realm and the neglect of public issues. There was a connection between this withdrawal, this turning inward for the sake of freedom from others and the conflict Arendt perceived between philosophy and politics. Just like the ancient philosopher the modern individual found freedom only in his isolation. This is yet another way the rise of conformism and behavior prohibited Arendtian politics.

**The Rise of Alienation**

Hannah Pitkin’s *The Attack of the Blob* wove together all of the existing understandings of Arendt’s rise of the social to create a meta-understanding. Pitkin utilized the cinematic metaphor of a gigantic, ever growing, and ever consuming, alien Blob that threatened earth to describe Arendt’s social. The result was alienation on a worldwide scale. Pitkin summarized her position by writing that:

The social . . . should be understood as the absence of politics where politics belongs, a condition in which a collectivity of people – for whatever reason – cannot (or at any rate do not) effectively take charge of the overall resultants of what they are severally doing. The large-scale outcomes of their activities happen independent of any human agency, as if these people had been swallowed by some Blob (1998, p. 252).

Pitkin’s somewhat unfortunate metaphor of the person-swallowing blob was comprised of the private, including the economic mindset and necessity, the rise of behavior, including conformity and isolation, and the rise of an institutional structure prohibitive of human agency. Thus, the
only mode of government possible was the modern social form, the bureaucratic rule by nobody, in which all governmental functions were essentially automated with no room for discretion or plural exercise of power.

Pitkin undertook both a genealogy of the Blob and a psychological biographical account of Arendt’s constructing of it (Pitkin, 1998, pp. 18, 36, 177). The result was what Pitkin termed an “unmythologized” understanding (1998, p. 252). Pitkin’s analysis made the point that Arendt “gradually worked herself into a highly idiosyncratic use of the phrase,” [the social]. However, Pitkin did not imply that Arendt’s use was illegitimate (Pitkin, 1998, p. 201). Pitkin’s puzzle was not just how to describe the social blob, but how to get people to recognize their own failure to “take charge of what they are doing in the world” (Pitkin, 1998, p. 196). In short, how do people recognize that the blob has consumed them?

This understanding was characterized by the rise of the private interests, wherein people care little for the communal concerns, but instead are motivated by self-interests which were previously confined to the private sphere. Similarly, concerns about necessity have become public rather than private. Additionally, Pitkin discussed conformity and how it, in Arendt’s words, resulted in behavior rather than action. What Pitkin saw as the components of the blob created a mass of individuals whose distinctions had been leveled and were brought into a state of equality, better understood as conformity. She saw this condition as so totally equal in behavior that none could truly act in Arendt’s sense of the word, in the sense of working miracles.

Finally, Pitkin believed that all of these components resulted in an institutional, rather than potentially confusing social, structure that prevented Arendtian politics, and created a new form of alienation. Quoting Arendt, Pitkin wrote that the web of human relationships had
become characterized as “the social kind of ‘unitedness of many into one is basically antipolitical; it is the very opposite of togetherness’ characterizing political membership’” (Arendt, 1958, p. 214; Pitkin, 1998, p. 194). Individuals were merely capable of living together in conformity; action was no longer possible.

Pitkin’s work was a masterful account of Arendt concept of the social. It combined all of the previously discussed points to conclude that a form of world alienation was the result of the social. Under that condition individuals were unable to act. Pitkin’s result was a now familiar one; with the possibility of action precluded Arendtian politics were impossible. Without politics freedom was impossible. All this occurred as a result of the rise of the social.

The rise of the social changed politics in the manner just discussed. It brought private concerns, mentalities, and methods into the political realm. This precluded the possibility of Arendtian politics, action, miracles, and freedom. Contemporary politics then includes all of those aspects of private life. Additionally, the rise of the social included the rise of conformism, which also made Arendtian politics impossible. Finally, as Pitkin argued, the rise of the social included the rise of alienation. It created a world without agency or action, and worst of all, this alienation hides itself. In short, the rise of the social changed politics from the Arendtian sort to an unrecognizable realm that, contemporarily, is characterized by all of the aspects of the rise of the social just described.

2.6 Bureaucracy and Prejudice

With the change from Arendtian politics to contemporary politics, which include the various components of the rise of the social there came two, not yet discussed developments. First, the rise of the social entailed a new form of government, bureaucracy. Second, the nature of contemporary politics generated hostility toward the public sphere. Arendt argued that the
nature of contemporary politics that she found so objectionable has been off-putting to others as well.

Government has long been a concept integral to politics. If Arendtian politics is associated with the form of government she identified as *isonomy* in the Greek city-state, then contemporary politics is associated with the form of government she called bureaucracy. For Arendt, the concept of bureaucratic rule was a modern and, in a way, a terrifying concept:

As we know from the most social form of government, that is, from bureaucracy (the last stage of government in the nation-state just as one-man rule in benevolent despotism and absolutism was its first), the rule by nobody is not necessarily no-rule; it may indeed, under certain circumstances, even turn out to be one of its cruelest and most tyrannical versions (Arendt, 1958, p. 40).

Bureaucracy took ruling, and all of government and politics, out of the hands of individuals and placed it in “invisible hands” (Arendt, 1958, p. 45). Obviously, individuals cannot undertake political action if they have been removed from government. The loss of control and the futility of attempted action resulted in alienation from government and politics.

Bureaucracy was terrifying from Arendt’s perspective because of a commonality between it and tyranny. Both bureaucracy and tyranny were characterized by “arbitrary power”, which “owes no one any responsibility” (Arendt, 2005, pp. 77, 97). In extreme cases, the rule of nobody permits evil, Nazi atrocities for example, because it provides a way of “explaining away the responsibility of the doer for his deed,” it functions as a “kind of determinism” (Arendt, 1963b, p. 290). When dealing with bureaucracy decisions are made via the applications of “universal standards” after which there is no appeal, the universal standard is simply substituted for the will of the tyrant (Arendt, 2005, p. 77). The example of Nazi atrocities is certainly an extreme example and there is no reason to equate that possibility with every bureaucracy. It would be ludicrous to assign the possibility of atrocities to the EPA, for example, despite claims that may be made by extremist and sensationalist media outlets.
More mundanely, decisions are made and enacted at a level far above individual citizens. Through bureaucracy governments impose politics upon the citizenry. Arendtian politics could certainly not be possible when individuals are never given the opportunity to discuss the issues. Even the bureaucrats themselves are denied the opportunity to engage in anything resembling Arendtian politics. After all, bureaucracy is the application of universal standards, which leaves no room for action, debate, or freedom on the part of the bureaucrats. Rule following, or perhaps worse, having the rules applied to you without recourse would be nearly the opposite of Arendtian politics.

Perhaps contemporary individuals have sensed that there is something wrong with politics, or perhaps a politics of this sort is just unappealing. Regardless, Arendt believed that those who were not professional politicians, or professional political operatives, had developed a prejudice against politics (Arendt, 2005). Contemporary politics, somewhat accurately in Arendt’s eyes, has taken on negative connotations. As Arendt put it, the prejudice against contemporary politics developed because of the beliefs that “domestic policy is a fabric of lies and deceptions woven by shady interests and even shadier ideologies while foreign policy vacillates between vapid propaganda and the exercise of raw power” (Arendt, 2005, p. 98). Domestic politics have become viewed as “nothing more than a necessary evil for sustaining life,” or furthering private, individual, self-interest (Arendt, 2005, p. 110). Foreign policy has taken on the potential of unleashing annihilating, world destroying weapons, capable of decimating not just enemies, but all of humanity (Arendt, 2005).

This prejudice against and aversion to politics is directed against contemporary politics, rather than Arendtian politics. Conflating the current nature of politics with what politics could be is dangerous. In doing so, “they throw the baby out with the bathwater, confuse politics with
what would put an end to politics” (Arendt, 2005, p. 97). If the very notion of politics carries such negative connotations and becomes so avoided then Arendtian politics would seem as bad as the contemporary form of politics that has precluded its possibility. Arendt would likely argue that these prejudices have become more justified over time, rather than lessening, and that politics have degraded further, instead of moving back toward the ideal of Arendtian politics. Considering Arendt’s view, it is not surprising that freedom seems incompatible with contemporary politics. The question of “whether freedom does not first begin precisely where politics ends” is raised (Arendt, 2005, p. 108).

2.7 Conclusion: Problematic Distinctions and the Double Face

One problematic piece of Arendt’s thought on the matter, which she herself acknowledged, is distinguishing between the social and the political. Arendt’s concept of the rise of the social, as distinct from the political, has been called “somewhat vague,” while the social and political as general categories have been viewed as “too rigid” (Villa, 1999, p. 143; 2000, p. 19). Pitkin expressed the belief that what she viewed as Arendt’s idiosyncratic understanding of the social as a category was “a single, isolated mistake by a great thinker . . .” (1998, p. 2). In these views, the social is an odd category, which it may well be, encompassing many aspects not associated with the everyday use of the word. Beyond the unique wording, however, exists a more fundamental issue, that the social and the political are not as neatly separable and self-contained as Arendt portrays them. Some overlap must exist and the line between the social and the political, between administration and politics may be extremely difficult to draw. Arendt’s distinction between the social and the political then has been viewed as “provocative and disturbing,” not to mention “systematically misleading” (R. J. Bernstein, 1986, p. 247).

The problematic overlap between the social and the political runs deeper than a mere
difficulty of drawing boundaries; it may challenge the very tenability of Arendtian politics. As Mary McCarthy posed the question, “What is somebody supposed to do on the public stage, in the public space if he does not concern himself with the social? That is, what’s left” (Arendt, 1979, p. 315)? Arendt’s immediate answer was unsatisfying, simply that there is something left, but that this “something” is “utterly different” from moment to moment, from age to age (1979, p. 316). Fair grounds for the content of Arendtian politics in one age may be social, or antipolitical in another age. This unsatisfactory reply led some, like Jay and Botstein, to argue that Arendtian politics was utterly devoid of content and would, therefore, be meaningless (1978, p. 353).

Arendt responded further, after being pushed by Albrecht Wellmer, and admitted that many issues may have a “double face,” and that one of the faces could be political and the other face social, and hence left out of politics (1979, p. 318). The double faced, Janus-like nature of issues signified that one side was not political, that it could be figured out with certainty and so was appropriately the subject of administration rather than politics (Arendt, 1979, p. 317). The other side or face of the issue could be political, and so the topic of public debate; however, it would be detrimental to confuse the two faces. As Kateb put it, “[f]irst the effort to politicize administration injures administration. Second, the effort to politicize administration injures politics” (1983, p. 120).

The example Arendt provided was public housing. It would be debatable whether or not public housing should be integrated, but not whether it was needed, or the specifics of each housing unit (1979, pp. 318-319). Arendt expressed the belief that everyone was entitled to decent housing. This was known with certainty and should not be subjected to public debate. Furthermore, the precise square footage and number of bathrooms needed to constitute decent
housing could also be determined with certainty and should not be publicly debated. These could be determined and were the subject of administration, to be provided without doubt or question. However, the question of whether it should be mandated whom public housing recipients lived near could not be administratively determined. Thus, this type of question remained open to public debate. Issues of administration in such matters would be associated with goal-oriented, means/ends modes of conduct. Remaining with Arendt’s example, decent, and more than that sufficiently decent housing should be provided as efficiently as possible. Though Arendt did not mention school integration in the context of the double face, perhaps to avoid reopening a topic that had caused her some grief, it is another example of just this sort of issue.21

Arendt may have been mistaken about the political nature of integration, or unclear as to the lingering racism that would result from non-integration. If integration was ever an issue that could be the subject of Arendtian politics, its time as such is certainly passed. The matter would today be considered the subject of administration as integration and diversity have been proven to tangible benefits for all those involved. Regardless Arendt’s reasoning this sort of position led to a number of commentators viewing her in a negative light. In particular, some found her too dismissive of feminist concerns.22 Still other readers saw her as an outright racist.23 For example, Rich, a feminist, objected to Arendt and described reading The Human Condition:

The withholding of women from participation in the vita activa, the “common world,” and the connection of this with reproductivity, is something from which she does not so much turn her eyes as stare through unseeing. This “great work” is thus a kind of failure for which masculine ideology has no name, precisely because in terms of that ideology it

21 As previously mentioned, Bernasconi (1996) provided a detailed analysis of Arendt’s view of race as a double-faced issue.

22 For example, see O’Brien (1981, pp. 93-115) and Rich (1979, pp. 203-214).

23 In addition to Bernasconi (1979, p. 212), a number of others have provided discussion of Arendt’s potential racism. See Bohman (1996a) and Norton (1995).
is successful, at the expense of truths the ideology considers irrelevant. To read such a book, by a woman of large spirit and great erudition, can be painful, because it embodies the tragedy of a female mind nourished on male ideologies (1979, p. 212).

Arendt would certainly disapprove of the feminist slogan that “the personal is political.”

These criticisms, along with others, boiled down to the view that Arendt was elitist. Replying to her Reflections one critic wrote that “Miss Arendt has always sought to dissociate herself from the masses of people, she is an aristocrat, not a democrat at heart” (Spitz, 1959, p. 57). Her idealized version of politics was only possible for systems, which like the Greek polis, refrained from including anything necessary. Such systems were characterized by “the exclusion of the exploited by their exploiters, who can afford not to discuss economics, and devote themselves to ‘higher things,’ because they live off the work of others” (Pitkin, 1981, p. 336).

Greek citizens were only free from necessity because they had excluded entire classes of people from the public realm to provide necessities of life. Benhabib wrote:

If . . . the polis was only possible because large groups of human beings-like women, slaves, children, laborers, noncitizen residents, all non-Greeks-were excluded from it while they made possible through their labor for the daily necessities of life that “leisure for politics” that the few enjoyed, then is the critique of the rise of the social, which accompanied the emancipation of these groups from the shadowy interior of the household” and by their entry into public life also a critique of political universalism as such (Benhabib, 1992, p. 75)?

If large-scale exclusion, disenfranchisement, and even enslavement were required for Arendtian politics then how could she not be elitist, anti-modernist and anti-democratic? The exclusion of social issues from politics would only make matters worse.

The exclusion of social issues would impair the ability of certain groups to participate as political equals. Arendtian politics then could not be for everyone. The existing social arrangements favor some groups over others, excluding any discussion of them from the political

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24 Benhabib picked up on this point by titling her appendix “The Personal is not the Political,” though it focused on the Arendt-Heidegger correspondence rather than feminism (2000).
realm ensures that those arrangements are never altered. As Wolin put it, “[t]he ‘natural’ state of society contains important distinctions of wealth, birth, and education that are typically extended into political power. Thus social power is translated into political power which is then used to increase social power” (1994, p. 289). Arendt would then be a theorist of the status quo, wishing to forever cement the social and political relationships, as they exist at the outset. There would be no room for anything progressive.

This was, however, not Arendt’s position, at least it need not be assumed to have been her position. Arendt may not always been the most sensitive to race, or gender issues, in fact, she may have grossly misread the racial issues in America. Despite this, viewing Arendt as a racist, sexist, or elitist is unfair. Nor was Arendt’s distinction between the social and the political simply a mistake. Arendt was guilty of the unwarranted assumption that in America issues of basic rights, and social equality – since there was codified political equality – could be taken for granted. As Hinchman and Hinchman put it, “[i]t is not that Arendt is indifferent to social justice, but that she thinks, perhaps naively, that the demands of justice are (or should be) self-evident and, to that extent unpolitical” (1994, p. 178). This possible naivety, or possible overestimation of the sophistication of contemporary individuals’ understanding of justice opened Arendt to such criticisms. Pitkin saw Arendt’s “banishing,” not spending enough time explicitly addressing, justice from her work as a mistake because by doing so she “denied herself what might well be the most powerful weapon in her cause” (1981, p. 340). This was a grave oversight indeed.

However, Arendt’s position on matters like poverty was more straightforward than she was given credit for and consistent with her unwarranted assumptions about justice. In On Revolution Arendt, famously, described the social question. She wrote that it had doomed the
French Revolution (Arendt, 1963c, p. 60). That Marx had attempted to turn the social question into a political question and in doing so was mistaken (Arendt, 1963c, pp. 61-62). In her view “[n]othing . . . could be more obsolete than to attempt to liberate mankind from poverty by political means; nothing could be more futile and more dangerous” because it would fail and because it brought necessity into politics and eliminated the possibility of freedom (Arendt, 1963c, p. 114). Elsewhere Arendt wrote that “[t]he whole record of revolutions – if we only knew how to read it – demonstrates beyond doubt that every attempt to abolish poverty, i.e. to abolish the so-called social question, with political means is doomed to failure and for this reason leads to terror; terror, on the other hand, sends revolutions to their doom” (1963a, p. 17). Such statements seem to play into the hands of those who charge Arendt with elitism. However, the language is important. Just because Arendt did not believe the issue can be addressed politically, lest there be disastrous consequences, did not mean that the issue should not be addressed at all.

Arendt thought that social issues, like poverty, decent housing, and education could be addressed through administration and technology. Arendt believed that necessity, and all the accompanying negative associations, would be alleviated and would even “force us to fight super abundance” (1963a, p. 17). This would place “all economic matters on technical and scientific grounds, outside all political, considerations” (1963a, p. 17). Alleviating necessity would be the sphere of expert administrators who were practiced and efficient in such matters. In short, “the wreckage of freedom on the rock of necessity . . . is no longer unavoidable” (Arendt, 1963a, p. 18). This position was based upon still more unwarranted assumptions. First, it assumed that the technology to provide such necessity eliminating abundance had arrived. Second, that the technology was politically neutral. Third, that there were no trade-offs to be made in determining which necessities to eliminate, or which groups to benefit, that in effect all necessity could be
eliminated simultaneously. Finally, Arendt believed that ensuring that technology was used for these purposes was not itself a political issue (Arendt, 1963c, pp. 65-66, 117). Absent these assumptions the alleviation of the social question would not remain on the administration side of the double face, but would continue to contaminate politics. This may have been Arendt’s blunder, not a callous attitude toward the impoverished or minorities, but too optimistic an understanding of justice and human capabilities.

Still, even if Arendt was not an elitist, or anti-woman, or anti-black, and was overly optimistic about modern the ability of modern technologies to provide more than enough of the necessities of life, that does not mean that her version of politics was desirable or realistic. Perhaps the double face Arendt perceived was illusory, and instead merely two sides of the same face, and inseparable from one another. Along these lines Habermas noted, “the curious perspective that Hannah Arendt adopts: a state which is relieved of the administrative processing of social problems; a politics which is cleansed of socio-economic issues: an institutionalization of public liberty which is independent of the organization of public wealth . . . this path is unimaginable for any modern society” (Habermas, 1977, p. 15). Habermas is correct here; it would simply be impossible, and even undesirable, to separate the social issues from the political realm. Modern political systems would collapse if they attempted to entirely ignore social issues, like poverty and other social questions of that ilk. Bureaucracy, the social form of government, has proven itself time and again as the most efficient system to accomplish these ends. After all, if the public was what was common to all, then nothing could be more common than necessities which all need met.

This argument overlaps with another that must be mentioned, namely, whether Arendt was an antimodernist, meaning that she longed for a system incompatible with contemporary
values. The charge of antimodernism entails the claim that Arendt was so fond of the classical world she described that she longed for a return to that way of life and so was elitist. Alternatively, Arendt may have been a modernist who understood the plight of the exploited and the disenfranchised. Perhaps Arendt was a combination of the two as result of the tension between her German, *Existenzphilosophie* heritage and her experience as a Jewish German woman (Benhabib, 1990, 2000). It would be possible to find either strand in Arendt’s thought depending upon how she was read. Her work may be both simultaneously useful and dangerous. As Lasch wrote, Arendt’s account may be useful in that “it resurrects a moral and educative conception of politics that has been submerged by the modern definition of politics as administration” (1983, p. ix). However, Arendt may simultaneously be seen as dangerous if her thought advocates a “hierarchical distribution of power” (Lasch, 1983, p. x).

Regardless of whether Arendt is most accurately described as an antimodernist, modernist, or reluctant modernist she offered an alternative way of understanding the meaning of the political. She provided a new way to look at distinctions, in the classical Greek world, in the contemporary divide between what is social and what is political, and in the modernist/antimodernist dichotomy itself. Canovan made this point when she stated that “one of the purposes behind her much criticized distinction between the ‘political’ and the ‘social’ is precisely to enable her to make distinctions within ‘modernity’, and thereby to draw battle lines in different places” (1992, p. 22) Acknowledging that Arendt’s account of history was problematic, that there may be a way to read her as elitist, and that the double face is complex does not mean that her work had nothing to offer. If nothing more it provided a thought provoking account of what politics had become and raised the question of whether there was
some way to improve upon it, even if that improvement involved comparison to an idyllic, perhaps impossible vision.
CHAPTER 3 JÜRGEN HABERMAS

3.1 Introduction

In this section I examine Jürgen Habermas’s thought as an alternative and compliment to Arendt’s account of the rise of the social. Habermas’s reputation as perhaps the foremost theorist of the public sphere warrants a consideration of his thought. While the theoretical parallels between Habermas and Arendt’s analyses make an in-depth analysis of his thought indispensible to understanding the phenomena at issue. Habermas’s *Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere* examined the development of the bourgeois public sphere. At its height the bourgeois public sphere included a political realm that was, at least in Habermas’s idealized form, akin to Arendt’s idealized conception of the Greek *polis*. It was a place where an ideal politics occurred among free and equal individuals. As with Arendt’s *polis*, the functionality of Habermas’s bourgeois political sphere was short lived. The political mode of action gave way to the rising influence of formerly private considerations, mentalities, and means of communicating.

Habermas’s mature thought represented an effort to recover the idealized public sphere, including the political sphere contained within it. His *Theory of Communicative Action* and the affiliated concepts aimed for such a recovery as well as to offset the pathologies resulting from the public sphere’s decline. Habermas’s mature thought also offered a fresh articulation of the decline of the public at the hands of the social. Habermas detailed the altered form of communication prevalent in what passed for a public sphere. Additionally, the colonization of the lifeworld emerged as an important metaphor for the manner in which the contents and modes of action in the public sphere had given way to their non-public counterparts.
3.2 The Public Sphere

One of Habermas’s early major works, *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere*, addressed the rise, proper function, and eventual decline of the bourgeois public sphere, and with it politics. Supplementing *The Structural Transformation* with other works provides an account of Habermas’s view of how the public sphere should function, and how political, collective action should be undertaken within it. The early chapters of *The Structural Transformation*, I-III, described the development of early capitalism and the creation of the bourgeois public sphere. The middle chapters, IV-VI, described the decline of the public sphere, with the growth of the welfare state. While the final chapter, VII, framed the entire endeavor around the notions of publicity and public debate within political philosophy.

Generally speaking, a public sphere existed when citizens came together to express their opinions on matters of general interest to all, and subjected those opinions to rational discussion (Habermas, 1962, p. 27). This was the location of politics, set apart from the private sphere, comprised of civil society and the family, and the state, which was characterized by police power (Habermas, 1962, p. 30). Politics within this public sphere were characterized by the “people’s public use of their reason” (Habermas, 1962, p. 27). This public sphere was open to all, and all were regarded as equals while acting within it. Through the use of this reason, and the exposure of subjective, individual opinions to it, “something approaching public opinion can be formed” (Habermas, Lennox, & Lennox, 1974, p. 49).

For Habermas the bourgeois public sphere represented an idealized political realm, occupying a place similar to that of the *polis* in Arendt’s thought. Habermas’s Frankfurt School

References to Habermas’s *Structural Transformation* are to the 1989 English translation. The original publication date of 1962 is used to signify its chronological location in Habermas’s thought.
colleagues had summarily dismissed the potential of this public sphere due to its bourgeois nature (Habermas, 1986, p. 98). In Habermas’s early work, the conditions of the idealized political realm grew out of the cultural realm as a place where people “knew of no authority beside that of the better argument and because they felt themselves at one with all who were willing to let themselves be convinced by arguments” (Habermas, 1962, p. 41). The force of the better argument was able to carry the day in politics. One commentator characterized Habermas’s view of this period as the heroic era of liberal democracy (Kellner, 2000).

Like Arendt, Habermas began his account with the ancient Greek distinction between the public *polis* and the private *oikos* (1962, p. 3). Habermas viewed the Greek system as one in which citizens, freed from the demands of necessity, came together to debate the affairs of state, the application of law and the waging of war (1962, p. 52). Anything associated with mere necessity was confined to the privacy of the household, which propped up its male head as a free citizen. Within the private realm, the head of household exercised complete control over all matters, and he needed not subject his opinions to debate or reason (Habermas, 1962, p. 6).

In Habermas’s account, the sharpness of the Greek distinction was maintained through the Roman period, but by the medieval age had faded into ambiguity. Public concerns were common to all, and in that way, the opposite of particular, private concerns that pertained to the status of a specific lord. Simultaneously, a lord’s power to command was public and different from the power of the head of the household who held sway only over his private realm. Most importantly, the medieval public was not a sphere of debate among equals, as the idealized Greek *polis* had been. Instead, this public was little more than a stage upon which the lord could display himself and his power (Habermas, 1962, p. 7). Since the public functioned as mere
audience, observing the lord’s display, politics was reduced to the whims of those lords and was dictated to their inferiors.

After the medieval period, the vague public/private distinction changed yet retained its ambiguity. While the feudal age witnessed the expansion of the lord’s power into new areas of life, the early capitalist period saw the creation of the “nightwatchman” state (Habermas, 1962, p. 144). In this period, the state moved away from society. The state’s publicness was the counterpoint to privacy and autonomy, experienced by economic agents and members of households. The town filled the space between these public and private realms, thus becoming tantamount to a public sphere (Habermas, 1962, pp. 30, 31-32). Early capitalism revolved around trade, centered in towns, rather than industrial production. As trade markets developed in towns, they came to dominate the surrounding region without necessarily threatening the power of the feudal lord (Habermas, 1962, p. 15). The feudal aristocracy even promoted trade, benefiting from it, and consuming the luxuries it provided (Habermas, 1962, p. 16).

As capitalist trade expanded, the towns’ significance declined as the nature of entrepreneurs changed. Burghers, the craftsmen and shopkeepers of a particular town, were displaced as the dominant entrepreneurs by the newly formed bourgeoisie, comprised of merchants, bankers, and manufacturers. The bourgeoisie’s interests were not geographically confined to towns (Habermas, 1962, p. 23). This expanded range of economic interests had important effects on political systems, requiring an expanded government with a standing army and police force, as well as an expanded system of administration and taxation. This government, unified throughout an expanded territory, ensured predictability of legal and tax regimes, thereby allowing entrepreneurs to calculate risks and rewards. The lord and his private funds were reduced to the status of merely another economic agent (Habermas, 1962, pp. 17-18). The state
eventually turned from trade to production as the capitalist activity worthy of promotion (Habermas, 1962, p. 19).

Correspondingly, the household lost its status as the primary locus of production. Previously, economics had been a private concern, as when production was located in the Greek *oikos*. Production, along with the other aspects of economics, were now important to the entirety of the population and so a public concern and thus a subject of state action, through promotion and regulation (Habermas, 1962, p. 19). The rise of joint stock companies, which required collective funding, added further publicness to economics. A notion of privacy was retained in that economic agents behaved autonomously as consumers and laborers. Thus, economics had become a hybrid realm with both public and private components.

The new public realm was born of the interaction between the private lives of economic agents, family members, and the public state. Under capitalism, the public was aware of itself and its difference from the state; this enabled opposition to the state, differing from feudalism where individuals were mere subjects. The public was comprised of citizens whose lives were simultaneously private and publicly regulated by state policy. This public possessed the ability to subject the state’s policies to rational debate and even critique, a feat never accomplished by the feudal commons (Habermas, 1962, pp. 18, 23-24). According to Habermas, this type of public had a political aspect and a literary aspect. The public sphere and its relationship to the state and the private sphere and the content of each are shown in Figure 1.
The Literary Public Sphere

In Habermas’s account, the market economy was not the sole cause of the bourgeois public sphere. The development of an information market was of equal importance. In the early capitalist period merchants received pertinent information through private correspondence, or “news letters” (Habermas, 1962, p. 16). A change occurred in the mid-seventeenth century with the advent of “political journals”, which combed through “news letters” to find and publish information of general interest. This included commercial information “about Imperial Diets, wars, harvests, taxes, transports of precious metals, and . . . reports about foreign trade”, as well as news about “miracle cures and thunderstorms, the murders, pestilences, and burnings” (Habermas, 1962, pp. 20-21).

The state used these journals for official purposes, and in the process, directed them toward the bourgeois public as the primary readership. The “political journals” started carrying information that the government wanted to distribute and in this manner became instruments of administration. Though these journals were laced with information that the government wanted disseminated throughout the entirety of the population, only the “educated classes” read them.
The bourgeois “doctors, pastors, officers, professors, and scholars” would read the journals and then convey the information to the lower social classes (Habermas, 1962, p. 23).

Habermas argued that the situation changed with the rise of modern literature as the state’s definition of a readership was no longer determinative. The press shifted from merely conveying information to functioning as a medium of rational and critical debate. This ability allowed the politically oriented citizen to demand that the state rationally justify its policies and laws, and subject those positions to rational debate. However, in Habermas’s account, this ability first developed in the realm of literature and art. The seventeenth century coffeehouses and salons were public spaces for discussing all aspects of life, especially culture. Information regarding commerce was exchanged in coffeehouses, and even a lowly shopkeeper could visit frequently, thus gaining access to crucial business information. Additionally, the coffeehouse exposed its patrons to novel ideas and debate. For example, Habermas opined that in the “Rotary Club, presided over by Milton’s secretary, Marvell and Pepys met with Harrington who here probably presented the republican ideas of his Oceana” (1962, p. 33). Whatever other purposes the salons served, they also provided an arena for the presentation and critique of new works (Habermas, 1962, p. 34).

Art also became more commercialized as a product for bourgeois consumption. Referencing Walter Benjamin, Habermas noted that art lost its “aura of extraordinariness” (Benjamin, 2008, p. 223; Habermas, 1962, p. 36). This could be contrasted with the feudal system, under which art had been little more than a display of feudal power, or used to further the aims of the state or church. Art had lost its role as mere representation by acquiring an audience that desired and consumed cultural works for their own sake rather than for their representational quality (Habermas, 1962, p. 39). These new cultural consumers constantly
demanded new products (Habermas, 1992, p. 423). Consuming art, be it new or classical, required the audience to express its opinions and tastes. Expression of subjective views entailed exposing them to the views held by other members of the cultural public. In this way personal preferences were exposed to debate and critique. Simultaneously, the professional art critic was born. Whereas an aristocratic connoisseur had been able to talk over the ignorant audience, the critic needed to both express expert opinion and have that opinion accepted by the bourgeois audience. In this way, the public began to employ debate to legitimize authority, and to a degree, control it (Habermas, 1962, pp. 40-41).

During the seventeenth century, the scope of the literary public expanded as “periodicals” made the coffeehouse and salon experience available to a broader section of society. While periodicals began with debates about art, literature, and culture, their scope soon widened to include moral and social commentary and debate. As Habermas put it, Joseph Addison, for example, “viewed himself as a censor of manners and morals; his essays concerned charities and schools for the poor, the improvement of education, pleas for civilized conduct, polemics against the vices of gambling, fanaticism and pedantry and against the tastelessness of the aesthetes and eccentricities of the learned” (1962, p. 43). By reading and writing, processing and debating, the bourgeois as audience and participant came to understand itself as a public. Periodicals combined with salons and coffeehouses to instill the bourgeoisie with the ability to engage in and accept the outcome of rational debate.

The novel was also essential in creating the substance of bourgeois subjectivity. The novel, according to Habermas, was born out of letter writing. A key development was Richardson’s *Pamela* (Richardson, 1740). That novel demonstrated the complexity of bourgeois family life; it featured the interaction between coexisting privacy and publicity. It was out of this
complex interaction that the political public sphere was born. At this point the outlook on human affairs had shifted from the mindset of classical Greece to a modern one. The intimacy of the family was now seen as allowing freedom and was the realm of individuals’ authentic selves. Habermas wrote that around the mid-eighteenth century, the private letter that communicated thoughts in total privacy between trusted acquaintances or relatives, was the most articulate expression of what was “purely human” (1962, p. 48). It was at this point that privacy came to be related to freedom in the contemporary manner.

Privacy even penetrated into the household, separating family members, in that each now had their own room, their own private space. However, the bourgeois home and the letter each possessed a component of publicity. The private quarters of individual family members existed in the presence of the parlor where the family would expose itself to neighbors and in so doing make itself public (Habermas, 1962, p. 45). Similarly, letters were exposed to wider audiences when circulated, or even published (Habermas, 1962, p. 49). Exposure of the private to a coexisting public had parallels in the exposure of subjective, personal taste to public opinions in the world of art. *Pamela* was intended to represent a correspondence, and by telling a story in this way, the bourgeois readers came to value a type of public intimacy (Habermas, 1962, pp. 50-51).

Bourgeois intimacy was, however, merely an idea. Though the bourgeois believed themselves autonomous, they did so only by ignoring their dependence upon property owners and the economy more generally. Therefore, the intimacy was not real, and concealed the true relationship between the private and public realms of life. Furthermore, this outlook ignored the exclusivity of its nature; it was blind to the fact that the propertyless were not part of the bourgeois. Despite its falsity and self-deceptive nature, it contained a kernel of truth in the
premise that relationships between individuals were based upon their common humanity (Habermas, 1962, p. 48). For example, letters, novels, and periodicals were public and available to any who could purchase and read them (Habermas, 1962, p. 37). Additionally, entering the salons and coffeehouses meant leaving social status at the door (Habermas, 1962, p. 36). This removal from the prevalent social conditions made the public akin to the Greek *polis* by virtue of the fact that it was removed from the realm of necessity and production (Habermas, 1962, p. 160). This demonstrated a fundamental tension ever present in the public, the conflation of the bourgeois with humanity as a whole, or as Habermas phrased it: *l'homme* (1962).

**The Political Public Sphere**

The tension between the bourgeois and *l'homme* resurfaced in Habermas’s account of the political public sphere. The truth contained within the bourgeois public sphere manifested in the critical examination and legitimation of government. Habermas noted the condition of the political public in 1784 Prussia where Frederick II rejected any private individual’s ability to comment on public affairs of state. This was justified on the grounds that “a private person is not at all capable of making such judgments, because he lacks complete knowledge of circumstances and motives” (Habermas, 1962, p. 25). This position could be contrasted with developments in France and Britain where politicians, thinkers, and jurists saw the need to justify a role for private individuals’ opinions in government. For example, John Locke saw some role for “conscience”, a notion of justice, in public opinion; however, he viewed it as unreflective and uneducated, leading him to consider opinion to be closely related to personal preference, tainted by prejudice (Habermas, 1962, pp. 91-92). Jean Jacques Rousseau similarly appealed to *bons sens* in the formation of the general will, although he discounted public debate, believing that it would mislead the simple minded (Habermas, 1962, pp. 98-99). In analyzing the American
Revolution, Edmund Burke argued that legislation could not be justly applied “without regard to the general opinion of those who are to be governed” (Habermas, 1962, p. 94). In a more elitist move, French physiocrats tolerated absolutist government provided that it considered their scholarly reflections (Habermas, 1962, p. 95).

Britain possessed both the most fully developed bourgeois public sphere and the most advanced capitalist system. Once censorship was curtailed, journals became extensively involved in political debate and commentary. England repealed the Licensing Act, doing away with the primary forms of censorship, despite opposition from the monarchy over fears of the impact of political discussion. The Whig politician Robert Harley drew prominent writers like Pope and Swift into politics (Habermas, 1962, p. 59). This led to the creation of explicitly political and satirical journals, like the *Examiner*, the *Observer*, and the *Review*, in the place of the literary and moral journals, which had been only tangentially related to politics. There were two additional crucial developments. First, in the early eighteenth century, government control over the political press withered when the Tory *Craftsman* and *Gentlemen’s Magazine* entered the scene. The representation of multiple sides of issues permitted genuine political debate (Habermas, 1962, p. 60). Second, in 1803, the press was granted access to the House of Commons and granted the freedom to report on parliamentary affairs (Habermas, 1962, p. 62). These developments cleared the way for the fourth estate. Bentham explained the connection between publicity and public opinion by arguing that if parliament acted on behalf of the public, then the public could oversee and contribute to its considerations (Habermas, 1962, p. 100).

The situation in Prussia was far removed from the one in Britain. In the former, the public, and its ability to understand the affairs of state, was met with distrust. In the latter, political entities responded to unfavorable election results and corruption by valuing the “public
spirit”, “the sense of the people”, and “the common voice” (Habermas, 1962, pp. 63-64). The British tendency grew stronger and more articulate. For example, in 1792, William Pitt’s elitism was staunchly opposed by Charles Fox, who demanded that parliament give the public a means of forming opinion which should then be respected by the government (Habermas, 1962, p. 66). Again, the pattern of submitting subjective positions to rational examination and criticism emerged. The physiocrats had argued that governmental activity should be subjected to the reasoned positions of scholars. This was now taken a step further and parliamentary action should engage with publicity, specifically, the laws it enacted should be based upon the public’s reasoning, rather than solely arising from the will of the sovereign (Habermas, 1962, pp. 53-81).

The necessity of law being justified by public reason, rather than the subjective will of the sovereign, or the interests of a dominant class, was an important theme (Habermas, 1962, p. 83). Much of the activities of the fully functional, mature political public sphere revolved around ensuring that state control over individuals was properly rooted in that public. The “public scrutiny of private people come together as public” was repeatedly applied to law and legal reforms, and in Habermas’s view, was the function of the public sphere (Habermas, 1962, p. 76). The legal reforms in question were primarily focused on creating a separation between the state and the private realm, including the family and the economy. The bourgeois mind linked the economy and the family as entities that had been controlled under feudalism but were now free under capitalism. By way of example, in the early eighteenth century, British state intervention in wages, training, and exchange was curtailed (Habermas, 1962, p. 77). This was characteristic of the larger trend that saw the economy being regulated by the commodity exchange market while interventionist and mercantilist policies declined (Habermas, 1962, p. 80). Rather than the private realm of intimacy existing from time immemorial and now being freed from the
constraints of feudalism, as the bourgeois believed, Habermas argued that it was newly constituted in the capitalist period; privacy was, for him, a bourgeois theoretical construction.

In Habermas’s account, as detailed above, the political public mitigated the arbitrariness of the sovereign will, by exposing it to rational, public debate and criticism (Habermas, 1962, p. 83). However, Habermas also identified a problematic ambiguity, namely, that the rationality constituting public debate had become intertwined with a version of instrumental rationality. The perception of this ambiguity was rooted in Habermas’s belief that the bourgeois public’s interest in the rationality of the legal system was concerned with instrumental predictability rather than the inherent justice of dialogical reason (Habermas, 1962, p. 80). Moreover, the bourgeois ideology embedded in the public sphere was based upon two faulty conflations. First, as previously mentioned, it involved the conflation of the bourgeoisie with l’homme. It was assumed that individuals in bourgeois economic positions represented humanity in its entirety. Second, a system ordered on the basis of free market capitalism was conflated with a just and natural society. This meant that the bourgeois political public valued and promoted only negative rights, preventing interference with the private realm and emphasizing freedoms associated with property ownership (Habermas, 1962, p. 83). These conflations were deceptively self-justifying. In a market of many small-scale producers, none could become dominant or construct prohibitive barriers to new producers entering the market. Correspondingly, the bourgeoisie did not believe itself an exclusionary class, since any possessing the appropriate skill and fortune had the opportunity to acquire property (Habermas, 1962, p. 87).

See Schecter for an account of Habermas as a critic of instrumental rationality (2010, Ch. 6).
The Philosophy of the Public Sphere

Habermas’s Interpretation of Kant

Habermas acknowledged a philosophical struggle around the concept of the public sphere. In this struggle, Mill and Tocqueville argued in one direction, while Kant, Hegel, and Marx promoted another. Habermas addressed this struggle in the pivotal fourth chapter of *Structural Transformation*. Kant articulated the problem of government as the problem of bringing morality and politics into unity with one another. Kant envisioned a society in which citizens conformed to the rule of law because they recognized that the law was identical to their moral duty; fear of punishment for disobedience was irrelevant. Such a society and its unity could be achieved only through reason, and violence was not permitted in its creation (Habermas, 1962, p. 103). This society embodied Kant’s notion of enlightenment (Habermas, 1962, p. 104; Kant, 1983a, p. 33). Enlightenment would free humanity from its self-imposed tutelage, which included superstition, prejudice, and domination. Critical public reason, publicity, counteracted this tutelage.

However, the realization of a just and enlightened society was problematic. The problem arose from Kant’s distinction between the phenomenal and the noumenal. The phenomenal coincided with the empirical world, as humans collectively perceived it. The noumenal, on the other hand, was independent of human perception, the world as it existed in itself; this could not be articulated in the thought of the phenomenal realm. Humans were both phenomenal and noumenal beings. Humans, as phenomenal beings, were perceptive of the world and physically of the world. Humans, as noumenal beings, were rational and autonomous. The problem unfolded in efforts to connect political domination and reason. As Habermas expressed it,
domination was phenomenal, and politics a part of the *res publica phanomenon*; meanwhile, reason was noumenal, and justice of the *res publica noumenon* (Habermas, 1962, p. 114).

Kant attempted to employ publicity in bringing the phenomenal and the noumenal into unity with one another through two approaches. In the first approach, Kant attempted to create the *res publica noumenon* from the *res publica phanomenon*. He did this by assuming that a naturally occurring, historical order produced the juridical conditions necessary for a just society. In the second approach, Kant attempted to show that the *res publica noumenon*, viewed as moral progress, created the *res publica phanomenon*. Here, the juridical conditions necessary for a just society could only come to exist through human action, specifically, educating the public and by doing so creating moral progress.

Kant utilized a historical mechanism, “unsocial sociability”, to theorize autonomous moral agency, and with it the possibility of a just society within existing societies (Kant, 1983c, pp. 31-32). This mechanism was the notion that inevitable conflicts between societies, and individuals within societies, ultimately brought about peace. For example, in a civil society, some individuals may abandon their reason by succumbing to their own selfish motives. However, these individuals must act publicly and doing so, theoretically, will check their unreasonableness. Kant articulated the problematic conflation of the bourgeois with *l’homme*. Since publicity operated through the functioning free market, and the agents within this market were property owners, some were necessarily excluded from its freedom. Specifically, wage-laborers needed to sell their labor to make a living, and so in this condition were subject to material necessity, and hence, unable to conduct themselves freely.

The publicity of free market capitalism forced the otherwise selfish bourgeoisie to behave both rationally and morally. Additionally, noumenal freedom was only realized in the material
security and freedom from necessity afforded property owners. However, this unifying, moralizing solution was problematic in several ways. First, it may not have created anything beyond a “pathologically enforced social union,” in essence the bourgeoisie may have been outwardly moral, but nothing more (Habermas, 1962, p. 109). The just society was not to be based on compulsion; though publicity was not the same as fear of legal punishment it was compulsion nonetheless. Second, this unity presupposed an idealized form of free market capitalism, one characterized by a never actually realized state of perfect competition. Absent idealized capitalism, freedom was compromised.

Contemporarily, the notion of the publicity of capitalist market forcing morality upon its actors has become even more problematic. Corporations and individuals now routinely hide financial assets in offshore accounts, actors create straw men, and increase the opaqueness of an already complex system. Additionally, electronic instruments execute economic activity at speeds beyond human comprehension. The publicity of the marketplace cannot have the effect of forcing participating entities into behaving morally when much of market behavior is unseen and when seen done with such complexity and rapidity that it is essentially obscured. The decline of the possibility of publicity created morality has also been experienced in politics. The entry of anonymous and unlimited monetary sums into politics has subjected the processes of that realm to the obscurities and complexities of the economic realm.

If “unsocial sociability” malfunctioned, then political action oriented toward humans as phenomenal beings was required to bring about the juridical conditions for a just society. As phenomenal beings, humans sought happiness over goodness. If humans were to freely accept a political order, to realize the unity of politics and morality, then they must be happy within that political order. Creating the requisite happiness meant that political action must concern itself
with social welfare issues. As Habermas put it, the task of politics was “to make the public satisfied with its condition” (Habermas, 1962, p. 113). In essence, social questions pressed for answers.

Kant took the position that refining the morals of the populace would bring about the *res publica noumenon*, this would, in turn, create the *res publica phenomenon*. The task of publicity, then, was moral progress, to be accomplished by morally educating the public. This method of creating the desired unity was also troublesome. It was unclear who would be the teachers of this moral education. If it came from the state, then would the content of morality not merely be redefined to bring it into unity with the prevailing politics? Was there already an existing group of morally enlightened elites? If so, the hierarchical division between morally enlightened elites and the unenlightened masses would replace the division between the bourgeois property owners and the wage-laborers. Furthermore, whence came the morally enlightened elite? They would need to understand the *res publica noumenal* prior to its actual creation. If publicity were to survive public debate, then just society would have to be worked out in the process of that debate, rather than being imposed upon it.

**Habermas’s View of Marx and Hegel**

Engaging Hegel, Habermas began considering the possibility that the bourgeois public sphere had failed. Hegel did not assume free movement between classes, as Kant had, and so gave greater weight to the conflict between the bourgeoisie and wage labor, or the “disorganization of civil society” (Habermas, 1962, p. 119). This disorganization was crucial, if a disorganized public were the basis for a state, then that state would merely reflect the public’s disorganization and class conflicts. Hegel’s solution was to relegate the public sphere to a merely educative role, stripping it of critical, formative function, and promoting government to a
dominant position. Hegel placed governmental questions outside the scope of the general public, in a move similar to Kant’s distinction between the morally enlightened elites and the unenlightened masses. In Hegel’s view, public debate was capable of little more than showing the public that the state was a common concern shared by all. This was the only position upon which the conflicting, subjective interests of the disorganized public could ever agree (Habermas, 1962, p. 120).

Marx both advanced and altered the Hegelian position. He grounded the concept of a disorganized society in a new analysis, while simultaneously rejecting the need for a dominant state. In his analysis, the view of the public sphere as an apolitical entity was based upon a false consciousness, specifically, the conflation of the bourgeois with l’homme. Habermas’s analysis was influenced by Marx’s, in that he recognized the very concept of bourgeois privacy as based upon a system of negative rights that protected property and removed it from state interference (Habermas, 1962, p. 125). However, the recognition that the public sphere was employed as an instrument of class oppression did not warrant discarding it. Perhaps control of the public sphere could be wrested from its bourgeois foundations: for example, the proletarian press was expanding (Habermas, 1962, p. 126). As the bourgeois public sphere began to lose its strictly bourgeois nature, becoming more inclusive, an important change occurred. Specifically, the more inclusive public sphere grounded reason and autonomy upon a genuine public, rather than upon a purely imagined privacy, as the bourgeois had. As a member of the public sphere, the individual ceased to be solely a property owner and became a citizen. In Habermas’s account of Marx, this subjected domination to reason by abolishing class based politics, and domination could finally be based upon a truly inclusive public (Habermas, 1962, pp. 128-129).
Habermas believed that Marx remained committed to a philosophical view of history that saw the realization of a just society as part of a natural order. Marx was dedicated to Kant’s first attempt to resolve the problems of the public sphere. This was the belief that autonomy and reason would be brought about by the realization of a naturally just social and economic order. Put another way, just as the bourgeois suffered from the self-deception that the private realm, as they understood it, was always present and had been freed from the fetters of feudalism, Marxists suffered from the deception that a just economic order was natural and would be realized once the corruptions of capitalism were resolved (Habermas, 1962, p. 140). As Marxists pursued this solution, liberal thought moved in a different, yet still problematic direction.

**The Liberal Thought of Mill and Tocqueville**

Mill and Tocqueville took the path not traveled by Marxists, favoring Kant’s other solution. Liberal thinkers acknowledged the socialists’ ability to recognize the bourgeois ideology inherent in the public sphere. However, liberals also recognized the failure to realize the socialist vision. Their solution was to acknowledge the need for political reform to counteract the injustices of bourgeois society (Habermas, 1962, pp. 130-131). Whereas Marx saw an inclusive public sphere as resolving the disorganization that troubled Hegel, liberals believed that inclusion only accentuated that disorganization.

Mill favored expanding the franchise and opposing the “aristocracy of money, gender, and colour, against the minority democracy of the propertied, and against the plutocracy of the grande bourgeoisie” (Habermas, 1962, p. 132). However, Mill viewed attempts to alter the public sphere to include non-property owners’ criticism of the bourgeois as merely a new form of conflict and domination. This inclusion was not the subjection of domination to rational debate that was needed (Habermas, 1962, p. 131). Public opinion was viewed as little more than
a collection of subjective opinions. As more subjective opinions and viewpoints were brought into the public sphere, the result was bargain, compromise, and satisficing, rather than rational debate leading to mutual consensus.

Worse yet, public opinion itself could assume a tyrannical form. Upon achieving a critical mass, majority opinion demanded conformity and punished criticism and nonconformity. Public opinion, then, may function to curb the power of the state; however, allowing it to direct the state could be dangerous. This led Mill and Tocqueville to favor representative government. As Mill put it, in that form of government political questions would be resolved “only by appeal to views, formed after due consideration of a relatively small number of persons specially educated for this task” (Habermas, 1962, p. 136). This carried with it a form of the exclusivity and elitism similar to the class divisions along property lines that plagued the bourgeois public sphere.

3.3 Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere

Social-Welfare and Mass Democracy

The concluding chapters of The Structural Transformation detailed the decline of the public sphere and articulated an account of late capitalism. As Habermas wrote, “[t]he communicative network of a public made up of rationally debating private citizens has collapsed . . .” (Habermas, 1962, p. 247). Thus, the structural transformation represented Habermas’s description of a decline in the properly functioning political sphere. Habermas pinpointed the Great Depression of 1873 as a significant turning point in the history of the public sphere. This international crisis cast doubt upon both the once assumed efficiency of capitalist economies and the self-created yet prevalent bourgeois illusions (Habermas, 1962, p. 144). The nearly century long success of capitalism was now seen as the result of historical circumstances and not a
universally repeatable or natural phenomenon. As a result, the free market was no longer seen as organized on the basis of naturally just principles. Furthermore, the false bourgeois beliefs that anyone could move between classes and that free markets were characterized by perfect competition between small, non-dominant producers were called into question as the result of the rise of an oligopolistic economy.

These changes not only affected the belief systems of the bourgeois and other members of society, but also state activity. In response to the crisis, the state became more active than it had previously been (Habermas, 1962, pp. 236-237). The state cast off its limited role as a “nightwatchman” to become more active. This development paralleled Arendt’s account of the rise of housekeeping. No longer just a monitor of the existing order, the state increasingly began to regulate the economy and sought to mitigate the inequities of capitalism. At this point, the state became a major provider of goods and services. Simultaneously, the proletariat gained the ability to challenge their economic relegation through legitimate channels, as they were granted increased opportunities for political participation (Habermas, 1962, p. 146).

One of the themes in Habermas’s analysis of the late nineteenth century was the shift from a liberal state, of the nightwatchman variety, to a more active state, of the social welfare variety. Habermas characterized this shift as a change from private to public law. In the pre-shift liberal state, constitutions primarily ensured the negative rights of the bourgeoisie through private law. In that condition, the organization of society was left to what was believed to be the natural, rational, and just functions of the free market. These bourgeois negative rights were codified in the nineteenth century. The criticism was that despite being seen as politically neutral, these rights actually had the effect of perpetuating the inequality between the property owning bourgeois and the propertyless (Habermas, 1962, p. 224).
The above criticism received a response in the shift from private to public law. The public law of the state, which was newly reconstituted in its welfare form, provided protections for the propertyless. This came in the form of increased regulation of the previously private areas of life, for example, work, the family, and the economy. Additionally, the state redistributed economic resources as well as other material goods, like housing (Habermas, 1962, p. 149). Habermas did not view these developments as novel attempts to organize society recognizing that the state had always organized society, even if that organization came from the state’s decision not to intervene. Rather than being the natural condition independent of the state, the stark inequalities of the capitalist system represented an artificial order maintained by the state through its system of private law. As the shortcomings of market justice were recognized, state intervention became necessary to ensure substantive justice, lest there be a political crisis of unresolvable severity. Thus, state intervention was both necessary and justified to continue the liberal tradition (Habermas, 1962, p. 224).

Public law went beyond providing positive rights and meeting social welfare needs, by encouraging mass political participation. Since the state now monitored and organized society, it should be answerable to all, not merely the bourgeoisie. The diverse and conflicting views of all strataums of society should be included in such considerations, not merely the positions of economically powerful interests (Habermas, 1962, pp. 229-230). The public sphere was to be expanded, to include all members of society. However, Habermas believed that this never, in fact, occurred and part of his task was to explain why this promise went unfulfilled.

While the new social welfare state, characterized by mass democracy, brought certain improvements over its nightwatchman predecessor, it suffered from a critical flaw. It had the effect of dissolving the hard won bourgeois distinctions between the public and private realms of
life. The result was what Habermas called an “interweaving of the public and private realm” (Habermas et al., 1974, p. 54). The state increasingly became an actor in society, economic and otherwise. Businesses and private organizations were enmeshed into state functions by performing tasks on its behalf (Habermas, 1962, p. 197). The bourgeois public sphere, the realm of rational debate and politics, had occupied the space that existed between the state and society. As the relationship between those entities changed, so too did the nature of the public sphere.

Consider the similarities between the Greek *polis* and the functioning bourgeois public sphere. The *polis* functioned as a realm of free debate because considerations of necessity were excluded from it. Analogously, the bourgeois public sphere had functioned as a realm free from considerations of necessity because such consideration and conflicts were confined to the capitalist market. The issues that found their way into the public sphere, and once there subjected to rational debate, were those of common concern to the entirety of the public sphere. They were in this sense political. The assumption was that the bourgeois shared some common concerns and that the natural, if fictional, justice of the marketplace resolved any nonpolitical conflicts. As these conditions withered, the political public sphere changed. Collectives representing factional interests, trade unions, political parties, joint stock corporations, and interest groups, for example, replaced the individual members of the public. Additionally, economics entered the public sphere both as substantive issues and as a mode of behavior. Economic interests entered into public, political debate and this precluded the possibility of rational agreement of the sort achieved in the bourgeois public sphere and the *polis*. The economic mode of resolving conflict, bargaining, trading, and haggling, replaced rational criticism, debate, and consensus (Habermas, 1962, p. 198).
**Late Bourgeois Subjectivity**

Habermas’s account of the decline of the public sphere was related to the matter of the bourgeois subject, as the decline was not solely attributable to the inclusion of inequality in the public sphere. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the economic component of the private realm underwent a change. The nature of work was forever altered as capital became ever more concentrated in fewer hands. Small-scale producers could not compete as large joint stock companies began dominating the market. As a result, economic agents became less autonomous as control was vested within corporate bureaucracies. Modern professional managers rose to power as the primary corporate decision makers. The situation had become one in which even those who exercised decision-making power did so only as detached bureaucratic administrators rather than as property owners (Habermas, 1962, p. 152).

Large corporate entities sought control over the entirety of workers’ lives. A single corporation dominated all aspects of life in a given town. It provided social and cultural activities, housing, and pensions ensured dependence even after retirement (Habermas, 1962, pp. 154-157). Simultaneously, the role of the family was displaced as the welfare state assumed more of its traditional functions, like education, care for the elderly, and healthcare, for example. The mitigation of risk had shifted from the family to the state (Habermas, 1962, p. 157). With these developments, income became more important than property. Consumption became an important way of defining life, and depended upon the regularity and quantity of income, displacing property as capital and even the events of the life cycle.

The result was a new conception of privacy and intimacy. The bourgeoisie notion of privacy, and the private realm generally, faltered as it revolved around property and the autonomy it had provided. The conflation of the bourgeois with *l’homme* had been revealed as
faulty. The bourgeois considered man an autonomous being insofar as he was free to act however he pleased. This autonomy was possible only when free from necessity and material concerns. Man’s autonomy, rationality, and noumenal freedom had depended upon overlooking man’s phenomenal nature and needs (Habermas, 1962, p. 160). The change in the nature of cultural consumption revealed that freedom was inhibited under the late capitalist system.

The literary public had been based upon the market for both culture and information, which had become affordably accessible and widely available through that market’s functions. The value of cultural goods was determined by the critically and rationally debatable opinion of the bourgeois. These opinions were not insulated and subjective, but rather rationally defended. Modern forms of consumption replaced consumption based upon rational debate, and this led to commodity fetishism, which entailed the penetration the market’s exchange relations into all areas of life (Habermas, 1962, p. 161). Cultural works became “pre-digested” and were brought down to match the sophistication of the masses, where they had previously increased consumers’ sophistication to match their own level (Habermas, 1962, p. 169).

The new type of cultural good allowed no role for critical reflection or rational debate. Rational debate surrounding cultural goods disappeared as appeal to one’s own private subjective preferences and prejudices became sufficient justification for consumption. Autonomy was no longer associated with the use of reason and freedom from the demands of material necessity. Instead it became synonymous to the pursuit of pleasure obtained by satisfying preferences. Subjectivity was no longer connected to a rational public and was completely internalized (Habermas, 1962, p. 171). Public defense of private opinion was no longer required, this was echoed in the very structure of the home as the parlor fell out of fashion (Habermas, 1962, p. 157). Discussion was reduced to regurgitating pre-formed opinions, the critique of which was
unwelcome and irrationally dismissed (Habermas, 1962, p. 246). Thus, modern culture, including media, undermined the possibility of rational debate and reflection. Once lost in the prefigurative cultural arena, these functions were soon lost in other areas of life, including politics.

**The Roles of Advertising and Media**

Habermas detailed journalism’s transformation from its political nature in the eighteenth century to its modern commercially driven embodiment (1962, pp. 180-189). The lynchpin was the creation of constitutions marking the change from private to public law, from the liberal nightwatchman state to the welfare state. Prior to the codification of the freedoms of expression and the press, journalism either succumbed to political censorship or fixated upon the need for free political expression (Habermas, 1962, p. 184). When focused upon freedom of political expression, there was little opportunity for commercialization. The removal of state censorship lessened the need for that focus, freeing media outlets to publish more profitable content. Additionally, the media was affected by the transformation of commercial activity under the welfare state.

Once free from censorship, the media found a new source of revenue in advertising. Oligopolistic producers required advertising to stabilize markets, this was made more important by mass-production of goods (Habermas, 1962, p. 189). Selling subscriptions ceased to be publishers’ primary source of income, as subscription sales became mere instruments of selling advertising space, as advertisements became the most important source of income. With this development, the press changed; it no longer needed to address itself to, or foster, rational debate. Instead, the press could find higher profits in appealing to readers as individual
consumers. The goal became to publish whatever would sell issues, since circulation numbers were directly tied to the profits realized through ad sales.

Advertising embodied a larger trend. Previously, the public sphere had been free from private, economic competition. With the rise of advertising, that competition became public, as its goal was to favorably present private interests and competitions to the public (Habermas, 1962, p. 192). While advertisements were the blatant presentation of private interests, public relations were self-aware advertising that proceeded more subtly. Public relations addressed the public as a collective entity attempting to defend positions, while advertising appealed to individuals as consumers. Habermas’s examples of public relations included the responses from the Pennsylvania Railroad and the Standard Oil Company to their social critics (1962, p. 193). The commonality of advertising and public relations lay in the way both sought to procure public support for private interests.

Advertising and public relations were, however, a far cry from the publicity of the fully functional bourgeois public sphere. They appealed to a public that was an aggregate of individuals, and rather than appealing to rational debate intentionally avoided it. Public relations avoided debate by manipulating and selectively presenting facts to create erroneous appeals to public interests, thereby presenting themselves as promoting objective rather than subjective interests (Habermas, 1962, p. 194). Advertising and public relations, through their promotion of private, subjective interests and their efforts to avoid rational debate, undermined the possibility of a functional public sphere.

**Politics**

Due to its effectiveness, public relations became the dominant form of communication in the political realm. This was furthered by the rise of the modern political party in the nineteenth
century. Previously, elected representatives had been accountable to their constituents as co-
members of their common public sphere, and as such subject to rational debate and criticism
(Habermas, 1962, p. 204). In that condition, political parties were informal organizations that
allowed their member representatives to engage in rational debate with their constituents
(Habermas, 1962, p. 202). In the nineteenth century, formal party apparatuses emerged which
initially appealed to class interests and then to as broad a segment of the population as possible.
As institutional formalism set in, parties organized bureaucratically and a class of professional
politicians arose. These professional political operatives were less accountable to their
constituents than to party as party membership took precedence over participation in the public
sphere. As the politician broke from his constituents, so too parties broke from the specific
interests they once represented. Parties utilized advertising, public relations, and propaganda to
garner support from as wide a swath of the population as possible (Habermas, 1962, pp. 203-
215). The primary goal of party politics was to attain and maintain power rather than promote the
public interest.

Parties were still dependent upon continued public approval of their platforms. However,
the newly developed techniques of political communication, advertising, public relations, and
propaganda, did much to avoid rational debate. In large part, debate was avoided by appeals to
unconscious inclinations and “real needs”, discontents, longings, prejudices, etc., of the
population (Habermas, 1962, pp. 217-218). Misjudging these real needs could result in rejection
and the loss of power. However, appealing to real needs did not necessarily require meeting
them. Rational reflection would have been capable of making obvious the objective interests
underlying the real needs, but this was avoided by the parties’ use of political communication
(Habermas, 1962, p. 219). Nor was the party capable of rationally reflecting upon or debating
these needs. Rather than understanding, parties used positivistic methods to gauge opinion and appeal to what voters thought they wanted (Habermas, 1962, p. 243).

The result was not the identification of the objective problem or the discovery of an objective solution. These real needs were connected to the inequities of capitalism. A combination of several developments allowed capitalism’s problems to go unrecognized. First, the proletariat became more affluent and behaved primarily as consumers, even with respect to the state, rather than as citizens (Habermas, 1962, p. 211). Second, political parties ceased to represent specific classes in favor of seeking broadly based support, and took no part in educating the electorate on class specific interests or conflicts (Habermas, 1962, p. 203). Elections were no longer rational contests about the justice, equality, or the direction of society, and were instead about capturing and maintaining political power.

Habermas was concerned with mass culture taking the place of autonomous individuals capable of constituting a rational public. He cited Adorno who saw the prevailing mass culture “as glorifying reduplication and justification of the state of affairs that exist anyway” embodied by the pervasive slogan “become what you are” (Habermas, 1962, p. 216; see Horkheimer & Adorno, 2002). Habermas was also influenced by C. Wright Mills on this topic (Habermas, 1962, p. 249; Mills, 1956). As Habermas phrased it elsewhere, modern populations were “allowed to do, in the consciousness of their freedom, what do they must” (1973, p. 196). The population could not enter politics as rationally debating citizens, only as subjectively interested consumers.

Reflective public opinion was replaced by a collective of individual prejudices and preferences, as Habermas termed it, “non-public opinion” (1962, p. 211). Stated differently, “the public opinion once emergent from [the rational public] has partly decomposed into the informal
opinions of private citizens without a public and partly become concentrated into formal opinions of publicistically effective institutions” (Habermas, 1962, p. 247). Individual preferences could not meet in rational debate because they were portrayed as a false public good by political communications.

Habermas’s depiction of contemporary society was pessimistic. The potential of the bourgeois public sphere had gone unfulfilled. Furthermore, the interconnectedness of society and the state led to “refeudalisation” (Habermas, 1962, p. 231). Under that condition the public ceased to be a sphere of rational debate to check and legitimate the use of power. Rather, the nature of the public sphere became akin to what had been prevalent during feudalism. The public sphere became a space for interest groups to display their power, as had the feudal lords of old. One commentator wrote that, in Habermas’s account, “the interconnectedness between a sphere of public debate and individual participation has been fractured and transmuted into that of a realm of political information and spectacle, in which citizen-consumers ingest and absorb passively entertainment and information” (Kellner, 2000, p. 265).

Since the state now sought to regulate once private concerns, those same concerns sought to influence the state and this led to refeudalisation: “Large organizations strive for political compromises with the state and with each other, excluding the public sphere whenever possible” (Habermas et al., 1974, p. 54). These organizations took the form of special interest groups, trade associations, corporations, and the political party, now more concerned with attaining and maintaining power than with its constituents’ interests. These organizations solely promoted their own interests, rather than attempting to determine the public good, and so were accompanied by the rise of an economic mentalité. However, these politically dominant organizations could not be too obvious in their domination. “But at the same time the large organizations must assure
themselves of at least plebiscitary support from the mass of the population through an apparent
display of openness (demonstrative publizität)” (Habermas et al., 1974, p. 54). This publicness
did not imply the presence of a functioning political realm, in other words, publizität did not entail öffentlichkeit. The mass appeal was achieved through public relations and propaganda,
which avoided debate by manipulating and carefully selecting facts to create erroneous appeals
to a false public good, thereby presenting these groups as promoting public rather than private
interests.

The now dominant organizations viewed this manipulation as necessary in order to avoid
the appearance of legitimation crises, which would otherwise be obvious as dominant
organizations controlled a system growing ever less responsive to a citizenry incapable of
critically debating or forming reasoned opinions in the same manner as the functioning bourgeois
political realm (Habermas, 1976a; 1996, p. 396). These organizations would use any means at
their disposal, be they those associated with the economic mentalité, manipulative public
relations or propaganda, or coercion. The end result was that the force of the better argument
could no longer carry the day, as the better argument would always run afoul of the promotion of
some private interest. Alternatively, private interests were made to appear as public good and all
claimed the force of the better argument for their own, while none recognized such claims from
others no matter their legitimacy. Habermas wrote that the political realm “becomes a field for
competition of interests, competitions which assume the form of violent conflict” and that the
“depoliticization of the mass of the population and the decline of the public realm as a political
institution are components of a system of domination . . ..” (1970b, p. 75; 1974, p. 54).

Despite a pessimistic depiction of the public sphere, Habermas did not end his analysis
there. Politics were not entirely futile, as the influence of political communications was not
totally determinative of outcomes. Habermas identified two currents in the public sphere that counteracted manipulative communications. First was the staged publicity of manipulative communications, and second, the critical processes of public communication (Habermas, 1962, p. 232). Although constrained in influence, Habermas believed that public spheres could exist within bureaucracies (Habermas, 1962, p. 248). Even if rational debate amongst autonomous citizens was no longer politically worthwhile, individuals could still exert some influence within organizations and so to a lessened extent, affect the conflict of special interests. Therefore, state structures could be checked, and possibly have their power legitimized, by the scrutiny of well-organized and funded political parties and interest groups (Habermas, 1962, p. 233). These could potentially function in a manner similar to the bourgeois public sphere. Habermas’s ideal of an accountable welfare state could be realized by rational exchange between groups, where each was rationally accountable to its membership (Habermas, 1962, p. 232). He defended the role that rational debate could still play in furthering objective, public interests (Habermas, 1962, p. 234). Habermas suggested two ways of increasing the impact of rational debate. Equality could be improved, which would render conflict over private access to resources less important, or alternatively, the possibility of nuclear annihilation could overshadow insignificant private interests and bring humanity together (Habermas, 1962, pp. 234-235).

**Further Reflections on the Public Sphere**

Thirty years after the publication of *The Structural Transformation*, Habermas offered his thoughts on his earlier work as well as responses to some critics. Habermas’s philosophy had undergone significant development and it was not surprising that he was unsatisfied with some elements of his *Structural Transformation*. Despite expressing some dissatisfaction with his previous analysis, Habermas largely confirmed the positions he had taken. He was especially
supportive of the importance of democracy and the necessity of rational criticism and debate in a just, legitimate, and democratic society.

Habermas acknowledged critics who had recognized the disjointed nature of his account (1992, p. 430). Specifically, Habermas had idealized the bourgeois public sphere, early on, and later was overly pessimistic in describing its decline. Habermas admitted that he overly simplified the shift from a “culture-debating public to a culture-consuming public” (1992, p. 438). Habermas explained away some of his previous simplicity and pessimism, attributing it to the context of 1950s Germany. Both Douglas Kellner and Thomas McCarthy noted that the entirety of the Frankfurt School was influenced by bearing witness to capitalism’s collapse into monopoly, socialism’s collapse into Stalinism, and the recent tragedies of fascism (McCarthy introduction in Habermas, 1984b, pp. xviii-xix; Kellner, 2000, p. 264). However, Habermas also noted a theoretical problem with his account of human subjectivity. In some respects Habermas’s retrospective self-critique echoed his critique of Adorno. The Structural Transformation failed to account for the extent to which humans were embedded in the lifeworld, and in so doing, downplayed humans’ mundane discursive abilities (Habermas, 1992, p. 437).

Habermas abandoned his belief that the rational debate of the public sphere had been confined to a realm within bureaucratic organizations. The public sphere could, in a manner, function in everyday actions within society. Habermas noted several examples of this mundane rational activity. First was the impact of public discussion on voting choices (Habermas, 1992, p. 438). Second, he cited the fact that even mass media audiences were capable of critical responses and activity, rather than being passive un-reasoning consumers (Habermas, 1992, p. 239). However, the line of research this optimism relied upon has been critiqued as overstating the independence of media consumers (Morley, 1995). Some have gone further than Habermas’s
initial position, theorizing the existence of a media based feudalism where “political authority is increasingly legitimated through media based acclamation”, and the public sphere is “increasingly reduced to manipulative publicity that simulates a dialogue about issues and candidates, evoking norms of communication with a visual hyperreality detached from actual dialogue” (Warren, 1989, p. 528).

Habermas also noted associations which fostered rational public debate, as well as providing a political check on governmental power, and even acting as a political resistance, as was the case during the 1980s in Eastern Bloc nations (1992, pp. 454-455). These “voluntary unions” were independent of both the economy and the state, and included “churches, cultural associations . . . academics . . . independent media, sports and leisure clubs, debating societies, groups of concerned citizens and grass-roots petitioning” (Habermas, 1992, p. 453). Despite these reconsiderations, Habermas maintained his belief regarding the impact of mass media on contemporary life. He noted that even the most important political events were such that their “mode of occurrence” was televisual, as was the case with the break-up of the Soviet Union (Habermas, 1992, p. 456).

On a larger scale, Habermas acknowledged that the he had erroneously treated society as a “totality” in The Structural Transformation (1992, p. 443). This overlooked the extent to which the bourgeois public sphere had been defined by its exclusivity. Habermas was aware of class tensions and the exclusivity of the public sphere, and yet had focused upon its bourgeois nature. By doing this, he believed that he had underestimated the rational activity that occurred within the “plebian” public sphere (Habermas, 1962, p. xviii; 1992, p. 423). Other commentators noted this weakness and described a “proletarian” public sphere (Negt & Kluge, 1972). This oversight was crucial as it played a role in the very constitution of the public sphere (Calhoun, 1992, p. 37;
Fraser, 1992). Habermas admitted that he had previously viewed the activity of the proletariat was viewed as little more than the background for bourgeois action (1992, p. 427). Having rethought his position Habermas acknowledged the existence of “competing public spheres”, and the “pluralization of the public sphere” (1992, pp. 425-426).

Much like the proletariat, women had been excluded from consideration. Although women may have been members of the literary public, playing a significant role in salon culture, they were excluded from the political public. Certain aspects of the public sphere were generated by this exclusion, as was the case with the exclusion of the proletariat. Habermas noted that it was conceivable that his idealized public sphere had been patriarchal, depending upon the exclusion and domination of women for its very existence (1992, p. 428). The short shrift given women in *Structural Transformation* did not go unnoticed. Specifically, Fraser advocated a reconsideration of what was appropriate substantive content for the public sphere (1997a, pp. 85-89). For example, the concerns of minority groups may not be common to all but should be considered public because they were inextricably linked to a just and democratic society (Benhabib, 1992; Fraser, 1997a, pp. 85-89; 1997b).

Habermas also noted that the contrasts between the idealized public sphere and its contemporary counterpart were portrayed in too stark a manner. He partially attributed this pessimism to Adorno’s influence (Habermas, 1992, p. 438). Habermas had described the eighteenth century bourgeois public sphere as too homogenous, as mentioned above. That public sphere could, alternatively, have been understood as comprised of competing interest groups, and thus, as being made up of coexisting and competing public spheres (Habermas, 1992, p. 425). This would include the previously mentioned plebian public sphere, as well as a number of other

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possible publics or counterpublics (Eley, 1992; Ikegami, 2000; Warner, 2002). Alternatively, Fraser theorized that the larger public sphere was composed of weak publics that operated in civil society to form opinion and identities, and strong publics, located within institutions where the already formed opinion was implemented (Fraser, 1992, pp. 89-92; see Habermas, 1996 Ch. 8). This understanding provided an alternative to the decline of the public sphere; the differences between the early and late public spheres could be seen as the result of a self-transformation (Habermas, 1992, p. 430). Adopting this view, the decline of the bourgeois public sphere could be seen as the inclusion of previously marginalized and excluded groups, and as such, the expansion of political debate.

Habermas’s portrayal of the public sphere was also affected by the lack of attention paid to social movements (Calhoun, 1992, p. 36). The social movement most familiar to Habermas was the student movement, on which he coauthored 1961’s _Student und Politik_. He believed that the movement contained authoritarian or fascist tendencies, and that it was motivated by action for action’s sake. Habermas later walked back some of his criticism of the movement as fascist (see Holub, 1991, Ch. 4). Habermas’s caution, if not opposition, to social movements led to his being critiqued as conservative, as incorporating too much of capitalism and bourgeois society’s ideology, and too critical of leftist tactics, and thus, as an obstacle to the very change he claimed to favor (Holub, 1991, pp. 94-98). Habermas’s was the sort of failure to move beyond the liberal, capitalist system that drew the ire of Slavoj Žižek, among others, who desired a move away from that system:

[T]he left has a choice today: either it accepts the predominant liberal democratic horizon (democracy, human rights and freedoms . . .), and engages in a hegemonic battle _within_ it, or it risks the opposite gesture of refusing its very terms, of flatly rejecting today’s liberal blackmail that courting any prospect of radical change paves the way for totalitarianism . . . it is the advocates of changes and resignifications within the liberal-democratic horizon who are the true utopians in their belief that their efforts will amount
to anything more than the cosmetic surgery that will give us capitalism with a human face (2000, p. 326).

Habermas’s unfriendliness to social movements in general, the student movement in particular, and hence his failure to include them in his consideration of the public sphere, contributed to his pessimism. This unfriendliness paired with the inability, or unwillingness, to move beyond the capitalist structure drew critique from the left.

Habermas had asserted that the importance of the public sphere arose from its ability to allow individuals to “generalize their interests and to assert them so effectively that state power is transformed into a fluid medium of society’s self-organization” (1992, p. 431). Thus, the account of democracy in The Structural Transformation was influenced by Abendroth and radical democracy. In Further Reflections, Habermas questioned the self-organization of society on several grounds. First, Habermas expressed the view that contemporary institutions were too powerful and complex to be controlled by public debate taking place in the lifeworld, aside from the matter of whether public debate was rational or not. The best that public debate could achieve was preventing the citizen from becoming even more consumer-like, preventing administration and economics from becoming even more dominant in every day and political life (Habermas, 1992, p. 444). Second, with the admission that rational political debate could not control the economy, it must be acknowledged that the role of economic conflicts in the declining public sphere was overemphasized. Since the bourgeois public sphere was not a totality, much of the debate within it may be seen to address “existential issues” (Habermas, 1992, p. 448) 448. These issues concerned the formation of group self-identity and their accompanying conceptions of the good life. Pluralistic democratic debate gave voice to these marginalized groups.
3.4 Crises of Legitimacy

The next pertinent step in Habermas’s thought came with the publication of Legitimation Crisis. This work was published in 1973, more than a decade after Structural Transformation, and more than a decade prior to Further Reflections. Legitimation Crisis continued to analyze late capitalism, and was greatly concerned with the capacity, or lack thereof, for change in contemporary capitalism and society as a result of a misconstrued notion of politics. The work addressed a world in which states were still of the social welfare variety described in The Structural Transformation. Moreover, Habermas was expressly concerned with utilizing the resources of Marxist theory to explain late capitalism. The ultimate problem of Legitimation Crisis remained a familiar one: how could legitimate government, one responsive to the public, be possible in a situation where a rational politics was absent? As Habermas wrote:

The political system fails as a guardian of social integration if its decisions even though effective, can no longer be traced to legitimate law. The constitutionally regulated circulation of power is nullified if the administrative system becomes independent of communicatively generated power, if the social power of functional systems and large organizations (including the mass media) is converted into illegitimate power, or if the lifeworld resources for spontaneous public communications no longer suffice to guarantee an uncoerced articulation of social interests. The independence of illegitimate power, together with the weakness of civil society and the public sphere, can deteriorate into a “legitimation dilemma,” which in certain circumstances can combine with the steering trilemma and develop into a vicious circle. Then the political system is pulled into the whirlpool of legitimation deficits and steering deficits that reinforce one another (1996, p. 396).

Marxist Approaches

As previously described, the role of the state had changed from that of the liberal, nightwatchman to the social welfare state. The state had become more active to offset the negative externalities of capitalism, at least to an extent and at least for selectively chosen groups (Habermas, 1979, p. 194). Additionally, capitalism had shifted from a competitive marketplace to one where production was concentrated in the hands of a few large corporations (Habermas,
Habermas approached the phenomenon of late capitalism from two standpoints within the Marxist tradition. He considered an “orthodox” approach in which the state, no matter how interventionist, did not interfere with the anarchic system of commodity production (Habermas, 1979, p. 51). Alternatively, Habermas considered a “revisionist” Marxist approach, wherein the anarchy of production has been replaced by planning on the part of an interventionist state (Habermas, 1979, p. 59).

Habermas found fault with both approaches. The orthodox approach could not deal with a contemporary capitalism in which surplus value and labor value could not be determined as they previously had been. State intervention in capitalism through infrastructure, education, and investment had made labor more productive. The state had made “reflexive” labor more important and useful while orthodox Marxism considered it unproductive (Habermas, 1979, p. 56). Habermas viewed reflexive labor as crucial to the continual increase of the productivity of direct labor (Habermas, 1979, pp. 55-57). In short, Habermas rejected the old labor theory of value. Free market wages were replaced by a “quasi-political” wage system affected by unions and governmental intervention in the wage negotiations of certain industries (Habermas, 1979, pp. 38,57). Furthermore, the nature of use value changed as its content, education, housing, and healthcare, became the subject of political struggles in the welfare state (Habermas, 1979, p. 58). Democracy was not merely a manifestation of class conflict, as believed by the orthodox approach. Citizens had some outlets for exerting pressure, and thus a degree of control over government.

The revisionist approach within the Marxist tradition was capable of acknowledging the “recoupling” of politics and economics (Habermas, 1979, p. 36). However, Habermas argued that the belief that the state was capable of controlling and planning economic development
could only be held if the state was given too much credit, combined with a healthy dose of naivety. Planning was typically only applied to, and effective in, dealing with crises. Some amount of anarchy would inevitably remain in commodity production, despite the best efforts of the state (Habermas, 1979, p. 60). Both Marxist approaches viewed the relationship between politics and economics too simplistically. They did not wholly separate as the orthodox model held, nor did they wholly converge, as was the position of the revisionist model.

Having found Marxist approaches lacking, Habermas postulated a more complex, elusive, and perhaps even deceptive relationship between the two. The state did intervene in economics, however, it cultivated the appearance of distance from a free economy (Habermas, 1979, p. 195). Thus, a new and fundamental tension was revealed between the private use of surplus value and the administration of economic and social interests for the sake of the collective good (Habermas, 1976a, p. 36). It was a tension between the state’s need to secure the support of its citizens, and with that support its legitimacy, and the conflicting interests of capital.

**Systems Theory**

The weaknesses and over simplifications Habermas found in Marxist approaches led him to a form of systems theory. Specifically, he analyzed late capitalism in terms of three subsystems: the economic, the political, and the sociocultural. The economic subsystem revolved around securing surplus value. The sociocultural subsystem utilized the appropriate structures and worldviews to create social integration. Between the economic and sociocultural subsystems lay the complex concept of the political that Habermas divided between the administrative and

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28 See Habermas (1988, pp. 74-88) for his critique of systems theory.
legitimation systems (Habermas, 1976a, p. 60). Here, Habermas’s approach shared some aspects with Claus Offe’s (Offe, 1984, 1985, 1992).

The connections between the three primary subsystems were those of inputs and outputs. The outputs of the sociocultural subsystem were norms, meanings, and worldviews, all of which created social integration. The economic system’s outputs were consumable values. The political systems outputs were administrative decisions. The outputs of both the economic and the political subsystems were the inputs for the sociocultural. The economic depended upon the political’s administrative decisions, the motivations and integration of the sociocultural system, as well as capital, labor, land and the state’s improvement of labor as its inputs. The political relied upon mass loyalty of the population and the consumable outputs of the economic as its inputs. This complex and interdependent relationship meant that if one of the subsystems faltered, the others would follow suit. A crisis of either inputs or outputs in one of the three negatively affected the other two, creating a vicious cycle of crises.

Four types of crises occurred in late capitalism. Legitimation crises occurred in the political system due to its inability to manage the economic system, and its inability to secure the peoples’ loyalty. Rationality crises in the economic subsystem arose from an inability to navigate the tension between private economic interests and the satisfaction of the collective good, including resolving inequalities. The sociocultural subsystem could create motivation crises when the expectations and needs of citizens, created by worldviews and norms, conflicted with the prevailing distribution of economic goods or administrative decisions. A rationality crisis in the economic system was manifested at the system level, while the legitimation and motivation crises occurred at the level of the lifeworld. The fate of the capitalist system rested upon that
system’s ability to solve such crises, in effect, on the system’s potential for change (Habermas, 1976a, pp. 31, 39-40).

**Rationality Crises**

Absent the potential for responsive change several types of crises were possible. Figure 2 summarizes the various subsystems originating the crises as well as how they were manifested at the level of the system and identity.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Point of origin (subsystem)</th>
<th>System Crisis</th>
<th>Identity Crisis</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Economic</td>
<td>Economic Crisis</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political</td>
<td>Rationality Crisis</td>
<td>Legitimation Crisis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socio-Cultural</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Motivation Crisis</td>
</tr>
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</table>

(Held, 1982, p. 183).

The political subsystem’s outputs were funded by taxation. The taxation system, and any change in it, needed at a minimum to be justified by its efficiency, if not by appeals to more just or beneficial distributions, it must be an effective means of achieving the specified ends. Put another way, it was based upon instrumental rationality (Habermas, 1976a, p. 62). A crisis of rationality occurred when decisions were enacted that were not rationally justifiable. Alternatively, a crisis occurred if decisions about ends were simply incorrect and the economy and society became unstable. Things were complicated by the tension between private economic interests and the collective good of society.

Habermas provided two examples of rationality crises (1976a, p. 47). The first example came from Joachim Hirsch, and was connected to the aforementioned orthodox Marxist view. Habermas believed that the problem with this view was that it could not understand that failures
of the state and failures of the economy were not distinct and separable. State failure was never clear-cut; it depended upon the specific population’s expectations and tolerances. Economic failure, on the other hand, was characterized by unemployment and bankruptcy (Habermas, 1976a, pp. 63-64). Failures in economic planning could even be beneficial for the state if it could absolve itself of responsibility. A perceived inability to regulate the economy would limit the degree to which economic victims could make demands upon the state (Habermas, 1976a, p. 65).

Furthermore, rationality crises could exist within norms and worldviews; this was demonstrated by Habermas’s second example. This example came from Offe who maintained that rationality crises arose when the state’s mechanisms to control the economy and society, e.g. taxation, subsidies, interest rates, and redistribution, were ineffective (Habermas, 1976a, p. 67). In essence, Offe argued that social behavior could not be controlled by the manipulation of monetary policy. For example, some individuals were not motivated by economic concerns, but rather the inherent goals of their chosen career. They were considered abstract labor and were often found in public services like education, social work, and healthcare. Additionally, an increasing number of individuals were being removed from the workforce by lengthening education, earlier application of retirement and pensions, incarceration, and the recognition of chronic afflictions. Lastly, as the economic system became increasingly complex, it became more difficult, if not impossible, to gather sufficient data upon which to base changes in policy intended to manipulate behavior.

Therefore, decisions about economic policy were transformed into political questions as the goals and values motivating decisions became more important than the more easily determined, instrumental means of realizing an end (Habermas, 1976a, pp. 66-67). Ultimately, instrumental rationality gave way in an increasing number of instances to communicative
rationality that would be capable of critically examining and justifying the outcomes sought. This entailed crises of the system being sent to the lifeworld for resolution as a rationality crisis could quickly become a legitimation crisis. If, however, the communicative potential of the lifeworld could not be taped into then the crisis would fester. The processes of colonization circumvented the communicative potential of the lifeworld and questions sent there were either blatantly left unresolved or were merely given the appearance of resolution. Such crises were essentially referred to the lifeworld that was dominated by aspects of the system that had proven insufficient for their resolution.

**Legitimation Crises**

As previously mentioned, the scope of state administration increased to encompass areas previously beyond its purview, like the economy and once private social life including the family, education, and healthcare. As this expansion occurred, legitimation became more important (Habermas, 1976a, p. 71). Habermas’s analysis provided two theories dealing with the problems associated with the increasing importance of legitimation. His first theory rested upon “structural dissimilarity” between state administration and sociocultural meanings and worldviews that secured integration and legitimacy. As dissimilarity increased, state administration became less able to secure the legitimacy it required. His second, complementary theory, was that when the state’s need for legitimacy was met, it had problematic, unforeseen consequences, the ability of citizens to critique the political process, for example (Habermas, 1976a, p. 50).

The dissimilarity between political administration and the sociocultural subsystem could be understood as the dissimilarity between the types of rationality prevalent in each subsystem. Specifically, it was the dissimilarity between instrumental rationality and communicative
rationality, between efficiency and meaning as ends. The instrumental administrative system was unconcerned with meanings. Administration increasingly intervened in areas of life that were organized around traditional, taken as natural, belief systems that were not reliant upon justification. This was previously seen in the belief that there was a natural order and justice to the unrestrained capitalist free market. These traditional worldviews were taken as natural and assumed to be beyond the scope of critical and rational reflection or debate (Habermas, 1976a, p. 70).

This opened the door for legitimation crises in two ways. First, the application of administration in these areas drew their naturalness into question. Human action was increasingly responsible for the organization of areas that had, in the past, been beyond such responsibility. Second, there was “no administrative production of meaning” since instrumental reason was unconcerned with meanings (Habermas, 1976a, p. 70). Administration was incapable of creating novel justifications for relationships which were no longer viewed as natural, or had deviated from their natural state.

If the administrative system was caught manipulating meanings to justify its creations, then any legitimation it had acquired in doing so would be forfeit (Habermas, 1976a, p. 71). The furthest the administrative system could push was the exploitation of existing expectations and preferences. Those associated with privacy were especially ripe for this exploitation. The state played upon “civic privatism”, the individual interest in acquiring material goods from both the state and the economy, paired with the absence of interest in political participation. The state also preyed upon existing “familial-vocational privatism”, characterized by an escape into private family life combined with an interest in the consumption made possible by success in the labor market (Habermas, 1976a, p. 75). These forms of privacy meant that the state could ease its need
for legitimacy by ensuring the provision of material goods and thereby distracting a large number of individuals from politics.

However, state administration went further than its reliance on privacy and distraction. The administrative system attempted to classify problems as depending upon subjective decisions, rather than rational public debate. Additionally, it could attempt to distract the public’s attention away from the genuine problem (Habermas, 1976a, p. 70). The administrative system could hum along smoothly so long as it met society’s expectations concerning consumable goods. This solution was not sustainable due to the tension between private economic interests and the collective public good (Habermas, 1976a, p. 73). Put simply, not all conflicting preferences and expectations could be met indefinitely.

Habermas’s second theory dealt with the expansion of administration bringing taken for granted values and meanings into doubt. Tradition, the existing way of dealing with and understanding the world, ceased to function as it previously had. Administrative intervention brought newly intensified reflection and discussion of these norms and meanings. Confusion, fatalism, and existentialism were avoided by education and debate. Community activities became key to debate and renewal and counteracted the growing pervasiveness of privatism. Again, the state responded strategically, this time by coopting participation oriented citizens and groups into the administrative decision making process, thus taking on an added air of legitimacy (Habermas, 1976a, p. 72). This brought with it the unintended, and for the state, problematic, effect of developing the citizenry’s ability to criticize state administration (Habermas, 1976a, p. 73). This, in turn, resulted in withholding or questioning legitimacy.
Motivation Crises

The political subsystem’s inability to acquire legitimacy was due in part to its inability to generate meanings; it was also partly due to the sociocultural system’s resistance to manipulation and withholding of loyalty. Restated, a crisis could occur when the political subsystem received insufficient inputs from the sociocultural subsystem’s outputs; this was a motivation crisis. The sociocultural subsystem could produce too few outputs when it received too little input from its fellow subsystems, which would feed into the lives of the individuals within the population (Habermas, 1976a, p. 48). Crises within the system were social crises when they affected the sociocultural subsystem. These crises demanded action from individuals who needed to engage in interpretation, criticism, and alterations of everyday practices.

Habermas again proposed two theories that could account for motivation crises. His first theory reasoned that such crises occurred when the privatism so crucial to legitimacy was challenged. As privatism was threatened, there were no alternatives to fill its role. Habermas’s second theory held that the sociocultural subsystem not only created crises, but also “overloaded” the late capitalist system. This overload resulted from a novel and universal politics and morality, which criticized existing structures, especially the class system (Habermas, 1976a, p. 50).

In detailing his first theory, Habermas described privatism as a combination of pre-bourgeois tradition and bourgeois ideology now codified as law. Civic privatism was rooted in bourgeois law that viewed the individual as a holder of state protected rights and personal freedoms, rather than as an active political participant. This system contained a paradox: the state needed citizen participation at some times, while wanting absolute authority at others, requiring that certain areas be left to the sole control of the state (Habermas, 1976a, p. 76). Familial-
vocational privatism was rooted in utilitarianism, individualism with an emphasis on possession, and religious traditions like the Protestant work ethic, all of which combined to create a dedication to capitalism (Habermas, 1976a, p. 77). The connecting theme was that capitalism relied upon these already existing privatisms, among other things, to concoct its ideology and was never able to generate a novel ideology of its own.

Late capitalism saw these traditions, and hence the ideology it relied upon, threatened. Traditions began to be questioned and were found wanting in a number of areas, including the scientization of politics (Habermas, 1976a, pp. 79-80). As administration expanded, so did the scope of its instrumental reason and the technocratic approach. This expansion made the lifeworld’s traditional communicative reason less effective. Simultaneously, society’s pluralism increased, which called traditional belief systems into question as they encountered rival belief systems. A worldview became a matter of subjective personal preference and commitment.29 Furthermore, the once pervasive commitment to capitalism was weakened by a number of factors. First, the emergence of concrete labor (Habermas, 1976a, pp. 83-84). Second, rising quality of life and affluence made individuals less dependent upon continued and uninterrupted labor to meet their needs (Habermas, 1976a, p. 83). Finally, the link between work and reward became less absolutist with the recognition that it depended upon a fairness that the market did not necessarily possess (Habermas, 1976a, pp. 81-82).

The Critical Potential Inherent in Late Capitalism

The same tendencies that challenged tradition and capitalism had the potential to produce a critically reflective, and thus politically functional society akin to that existing within the idealized bourgeois public sphere. A number of disciplines, science for example, permitted

29 Weber compared this situation to polytheism (Weber, 1948, p. 149).
criticism (Habermas, 1976a, p. 84). The change from the nineteenth century that affirmed fictitious bourgeois ideals, to the twentieth century “post-auratic” art was of greater importance. Benjamin believed that the mechanical reproduction of art removed its aura and expanded its appeal beyond the more affluent classes (Benjamin, 2008). Adorno argued that art’s avant-garde expression called into question bourgeois art’s illusory naturalness. This encouraged critical reflection on art as a process and convention, rather than a natural product (Adorno, 1997, Ch. 6). This sort of art demonstrated “the irretrievable sacrifice of bourgeois rationalism” (Habermas, 1976a, p. 85). Art’s weakness lay in its inability to take its reflective capacity to a broad audience. It was always confined to elites, as Adorno believed, and not capable of the mass appeal that Benjamin had foreseen (Habermas, 1976a, p. 86).  

The critical potential of law and morality were far less ambiguous than the potential of science and art. Habermas provided an overview of the development of law and morality (1976a, pp. 86-89). The most important development was that of natural law and natural rights, based upon universal, abstract principles seeking a logical consistency that took the place of force in ensuring adherence. Natural law’s universalism was undermined by the fact that formal legal systems were specific to cultures and nations, thus any law was applied only to citizens and not to l’homme.

Morality had greater potential for universal consistency. Utilitarianism was rejected for leaving judgment to subjective, personal preference. The Kantian approach was more likely to yield a universal result by applying the rational justification for action to all (Kant, 1983b, p. 15). However, Kant’s approach did not account for the degree to which needs and motivation were culturally rooted, thus, universalism and particularism came into conflict. Unsatisfied with

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30 Though not widely studied, several authors have provided accounts of Habermas’s somewhat limited contribution to aesthetics, see (Duvenage, 2003; Roblin, 1990).
previous attempts to create a universal ethics, Habermas struck out in a new direction that resulted in his communicative or discourse ethics (Habermas, 1976a, p. 89). Under this notion, all affected by an ethical system must engage in a discursive process to form a collective will and freely agree to the ethical system. Habermas’s yet to be discussed communicative ethics was capable of acknowledging individual and cultural particularism, yet simultaneously could result in a just ethical system. It would also reconstruct the conditions of genuine political discourse that had been most recently possible in the idealized bourgeois political sphere, albeit in a far more inclusive manner.

The critical capacities of law, morality, art, and science were socialized into citizens who accepted only principles that could be rationally justified, rejecting those that relied solely upon dogmatism and tradition (Habermas, 1976a, p. 91). By implication, the fact that a belief or worldview was accepted within a society did not constitute its legitimacy. According to Habermas, the factual question of acceptance, and that acceptance being tantamount to legitimacy, was the position that systems theory had taken (1979, p. 199). The adoption of this view would mean that legitimacy would be nothing more than meeting the expectations of a particular culture (Habermas, 1979, p. 202). Larger questions of justice would be subsumed by empirical questions of acceptance, and thus, systems theory collapsed as a perspectivist proposition. Universal validity required Habermas’s communicative ethics articulated as universal pragmatics and communicative action. Habermas’s theories had the potential to recover the mode of communication and action that could no longer be found in the political sphere.

3.5 Communicative Action

Outlining the conditions necessary for the existence of a functioning political realm and democratizing it occupied Habermas’s more mature thought. Craig Calhoun noted that
Habermas’s mature theories were efforts to recover the pre-structural transformation functions of the bourgeois political sphere, while Dana Villa described that position as “uncontroversial” (Calhoun, 1992; Villa, 2008, p. 174). Habermas’s *The Theory of Communicative Action* and the accompanying concepts, like the ideal speech situation, and discourse ethics can be understood as efforts at such a recovery. The ideal speech situation reformulated the conditions Habermas theorized as being present in the functioning bourgeois political public. Within that situation, individuals communicated and defended claims recognizing the force of the better argument and relating to one another as subjects rather than opponents, aiming for consensus rather than strategic victory (Habermas, 2001a, pp. 147-148). By recovering discourse and allowing communicative action Habermas’s theory would counteract the corrupting influences that entered into the public discourse with the structural transformation of the public sphere. For example, communicative action would mitigate the manipulative or corruptive influences of steering media like mass communications and money.

The alternative to communicative social action was strategic social action, which was now “a normal component of the political system” (Habermas, 1984b, pp. 285-286). These different types of possible communications are represented in Figure 3. Strategic action of this type aims solely to achieve its ends; individuals employing it would view others as mere objects and seek to manipulate them rather than truly engage with them. The purpose of strategic action was victory over one’s opponent rather than freely agreed upon consensus (Habermas, 2001a, p. 148). The force of the better argument could not carry the day as the better argument would not be acknowledged, but strategically manipulated or dismissed. Claims would not be properly defended. The very form of speech used, at least its purpose, was altered to strategic rhetoric not relying upon rational argument or evidence (Habermas, 1993c, pp. 266-267).
Figure 3  Types of Action

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Action Orientation</th>
<th>Oriented to Success</th>
<th>Oriented to Understanding</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nonsocial</td>
<td>Instrumental Action</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social</td>
<td>Strategic Action</td>
<td>Communicative Action</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Habermas, 1984b, p. 285).

The prevalence of strategic relations created an environment in which communicative competence could not even develop. This rendered individuals incapable of acting communicatively even if they were presented with the opportunity to do so. There would be no citizens capable of participating in a properly functioning political realm. This account demonstrates that with the structural transformation, the activity of the political sphere became strategic, and the very possibility of political action in the communicative sense was precluded.

**Universal Pragmatics**

Motivated by the concerns of *Legitimation Crisis*, Habermas constructed universal pragmatics as a theory of mundane, everyday communication. The theory of communicative action could be seen as a description of a situation where communication would be political, where the relationships between individuals would resemble those in the truly political past ages albeit more inclusive. Habermas’s theory of universal pragmatics was most fully developed in *The Theory of Communicative Action* where the concept was viewed, not just as a theory of communication, but also as a comprehensive social theory. Within the concept, Habermas drew a distinction between non-social action, which was instrumental, and social action. The terminology may seem odd, however, social action could be of the political sort, and non-social of the administrative sort. Social action was then divided into communicative action and strategic
action. Strategic action was strictly oriented toward achieving its ends; an individual employing it would view others as mere objects and seek to manipulate them rather than truly engaging with them. Communicative action more closely resembled an idealized political action focused on achieving mutual understanding. An individual undertaking communicative action would view others as subjects and attempt to construct intersubjective understanding with them (Habermas, 1979, p. 209; 1982, p. 263).

The goals of universal pragmatics were twofold. It sought to theorize conditions that would make communicative action possible. Additionally, in the possibility of communicative action, it sought the creation and maintenance of a meaningful, ordered, stable and just society. Habermas argued that social life, amongst others, could be understood as being based upon the ability to communicate, to perform “speech acts,” where action took place through words (Habermas, 2001b, p. 85).31 Society and the ability to act within it were constituted by words; universal pragmatics represented a novel effort to explain this constitution and ability.

Habermas’s project was, in part, inspired by what he viewed as the failure of previous “constitutive theories” (Habermas, 2001b, pp. 18-22). Habermas grouped these theories together on the basis of their following Kant in appealing to a transcendental subject. They broke from Kant in emphasizing the mundane constitutive capacities of social agents rather than recognition as being constitutive of society. These theories held that society was not constituted through mere cognition, but instead through the taken for granted everyday practice of individuals. Thinkers adopting such theories included Marx, Lukács, Dilthey, Gadamer, Husserl, and Schutz. These theorists described the constitutive power differently. Dilthey and Gadamer employed the terminology of hermeneutic interpretation, Marx labor, while Husserl and Schutz theorized their

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31 Habermas was indebted to Austin’s formulation; he had described the way in which actors “do things with words” (1975).
version of the lifeworld. Habermas critiqued these theorists on varying grounds. For example, Husserl saw the constitutive power as residing only within discrete members of society while Marx and Lukács assigned it to a holistic social subject. The common theme of the varied critiques was that these theorists to a greater or lesser extent neglected interaction and hence were unable to account for the constitution of society as arising solely from intersubjectivity (Habermas, 2001b, pp. 18-25).

Habermas also found systems theory problematic in that it described a subject absent a system of rules (2001b, p. 16). However, Habermas approved of the manner in which systems theory emphasized the role that rules played in creating society. He went so far as to endorse Noam Chomsky’s structural linguistics and synthesized it into his own universal pragmatics (Habermas, 2001b, p. 68). Chomsky’s “deep grammar” referred to a set of rules, unconsciously applied, on an everyday basis, that allowed individuals to communicate with one another. This mundane ability allowed communication, and hence the creation of meaning, between individuals and their actions. This led Habermas to adopt and analyze Ludwig Wittgenstein’s concept of language games.

Habermas viewed Wittgenstein’s concept of language games as operating in a fashion somewhat similar to his own theory (2001b, p. 52). The pertinent point was that players need not be able to explain the rules, but need merely know how to follow them, and recognize nonconformity, to keep the game functioning. Furthermore, players’ knowledge of how to follow the rules allowed them to continue play in novel situations (Habermas, 2001b, p. 53). This was a community based concept, in that other players were required to check a speaker, and private language could not exist. Additionally, and a bit radically, knowing how or why something existed as it did was more important than merely knowing that it existed. The context in which
the series of ad hoc games was embedded was more critical than their correspondence to facts in
the nonlinguistic world. Knowing definitions and grammatical rules was meaningless if the
context of language was not grasped. “It is snowing” would be an appropriate response to the
question “what is the weather like?” However, that statement is nonsensical as a response to the
question “who wrote *The Theory of Communicative Action*?” Speakers created the context and
establish the conditions, or rules, for meaningful responses and interactions (Habermas, 2001b,
p. 73).

The bridge between previous linguistics and society lay in Habermas’s and
Wittgenstein’s concern with “speech acts” (Habermas, 1979, pp. 31-32). Speech acts constructed
the context of everyday social life. They established specific sets of relationships, both social and
moral, between those involved in the communication. Speech acts were contained within the
contexts of language games. However, Habermas noted that Wittgenstein had not constructed a
comprehensive social theory, providing more linguistic therapy than theory (2001b, p. 53).
Wittgenstein had not identified a core of language common to all users, independent of context
or culture, and this was precisely the task Habermas set for universal pragmatics. 

Wittgenstein’s approach was problematic in that language users were so deeply embedded in the
context of the rules that they were incapable of critically reflecting upon those rules, questioning
their legitimacy, or rationally debating them. This was related to what Habermas called the
“double structure” hidden by the language game concept, which required language users to
simultaneously relate to one another and the subjects of their communications (2001b, p. 62).

When playing a game, the participants related as opponents within the game and not
necessarily as human subjects. Communication through language would be different, in that the

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32 A task Wittgenstein took up in his early work but had abandoned as illusionary by the time of
goal would a mutual understanding between subjects (Habermas, 2001b, pp. 101-102). A game could proceed when the players did not understand one another’s intentions; in fact, the point of many games was to conceal one’s intentions. Games, in this understanding, would be based upon strategic reasoning. Such players would not be communicating despite following a common set of rules. Habermas argued that language was the opposite: essentially the point of communicative action was to attempt to understand one another’s positions and intentions, rather than conceal them (2001b, p. 59). Although, non-social strategic action would more accurately resemble a game played by opponents whose goals were nothing more than victory over one another. This situation may be more akin to contemporary politics than Habermas’s truly communicative interactions would be. In this context understanding political interaction as a game makes sense.

When communicating, if individuals misunderstood one another’s intentions or positions, then communication broke down; the same would not be true of games. If game players failed to follow the rules, the game could be paused and the rules discussed or explained. If communication failed, the only resort would be the further use of language; there could be nothing to fall back upon. As Habermas observed, language was reflexive and contained its own metalanguage. The same was not true of games (Habermas, 2001b, pp. 57-58, 73). Thus, language must entail the capacity for users to relate to one another and to sustain communication, in a metalinguistic fashion.

The game metaphor also inaccurately portrayed the way individuals related to language. Both Wittgenstein and Habermas recognized this intimacy with language and the way it “meshes with our life” (Habermas, 2001b, p. 57). Human development must be understood as the development of language using creatures. For example, the acquisition of the word “no” marked
an important stage in the development of a child. Nay saying entailed the recognition of the self and the other as social agents; additionally, it entailed critical reflection upon the negated statement. To say “no” required the recognition that whatever was rejected could be otherwise; it was not a law of nature, but some challengeable artificial construction. This entailed the recognition of intention and counter-intention formulation (Habermas, 2001a, p. 140). Habermas went beyond his predecessors in believing that so long as social agents acknowledged one another as competent subjects, they were capable of questioning the legitimacy of the rules they encountered (Habermas, 2001b, p. 60).

**Content and Force**

The foregoing account addressed only one side of the double structure while neglecting language’s cognitive aspect. One could hold the view that language games existed independent of the nonlinguistic reality, and hence structured reality. Habermas took a different approach: language provided the possibility of experiencing, rather than creating reality (Habermas, 2001b, p. 58). Speech acts possessed illocutionary content that enabled individuals to do things with words, and cognitive statements possessed propositional content that made statements about reality (Habermas, 1976b, p. 157; 1979, pp. 36, 41). These two components were present in all speech as was the potential for interaction between them. Performing a speech act could create a dispute over the facts contained therein. Similarly, a cognitive statement could be followed by a discussion regarding the relationship between the conversing individuals. Language acted reflexively; communication breakdowns were prevented by using language to discuss the conversation taking place through the medium of language (Habermas, 2001b, p. 74).

The importance of communication was mutual understanding, made more likely by the reflexivity of language, and contained in the idea of illocutionary force. The illocutionary aspect
of speech created relationships between subjects. More precisely, successful speech acts created relationships between subjects, and those relationships were freely entered. They would generate the contexts in which meaningful communication could occur through questions, agreements, objections, denials, confessions, betrayals, apologies, and promises (Habermas, 2001b, pp. 82-83). Stated differently, successful speech acts permitted participants to understand and accept the intentions of other participants (Habermas, 1979, p. 35; 2001a, p. 144). Ultimately, Habermas changed his emphasis from recognition of intention to mutual acceptance of the verifiability of claims communicated through speech acts (Habermas, 1984b, pp. 295-305). Habermas emphasized context generating speech acts, deemphasizing those based upon existing institutions, like voting and marriage, for example (1979; 2001b, p. 84).

The goal was to provide a basis for critique. The illocutionary force inherent in speech acts was based upon rationality. The concern was over how relationships should be established, not how they were actually established. The rules of language, or any rules for that matter, should not be blindly accepted. Instead, reasons must be given to legitimate rules; if rational reasons could not be offered then rules could be abandoned. The rationality of illocutionary force was communicative rationality. In constructing this rationality, Habermas presented an alternative to other forms of reason like instrumental and dialectical rationality. Communicative rationality offered the prospect of political communication and action resembling what had taken place in the bourgeois public sphere.

**Validity**

Validity claims and challenges to them contained the rational basis of illocutionary force. When a statement was made, the validity of its implicit or explicit claims could be freely challenged. Challenges had to be addressed through a satisfactory defense of the validity of the
claims before conversation could continue. In short, the answers to challenges had to be characterized by the “unforced force of the better argument” (Habermas, 2001b, p. 95). This could occur through the examination of the four types of claims contained within any statement: truth, rightness, intelligibility, or sincerity of validity claims. These four types of validity claims corresponded to Habermas’s four domains of reality: the world, external nature; our world, society; language; and individual internal nature (Habermas, 1979, p. 68).

Truth claims concerned the relationship between a statement and the objective world; challenges to them questioned their cognitive content. Rightness claims addressed the relationship between the speaker and the moral, social, and cultural aspects of reality. Challenges to a rightness claim questioned the speaker’s standing to create the type of relationship or context their speech act purported to create. Intelligibility claims were related to the linguistic appropriateness of the statement. Disputing an intelligibility claim challenged linguistic coherence and required an interpretation or clarification. Finally, sincerity claims addressed the relationship between the statement and the intention of the speaker. Challenging sincerity questioned speakers’ representations of their own intentions.

According to Habermas, challenges to truth claims were resolved in two ways (1979, pp. 63-64). First, empirical evidence could persuade the challenger of the truth claim’s validity. Secondly, evidence may be disruptive, rather than supportive, of a claim; empirical evidence could run counter to a truth claim. This was related to Charles Pierce’s model of science as disruptive of previously held presumptions and expectations which served as the foundations for action (Habermas, 2001b, p. 88). When experience ran afoul of expectations, further appeal to experience rarely resolved the conflict; instead, rational argumentation provided the resolution sought.
Habermas rejected correspondence theories of truth, the notion that truth occurred when a statement corresponded to reality or to empirical evidence (2001b, pp. 86-88). Habermas was not arguing that a statement’s truth was independent of whether it corresponded to reality (2001a, p. 148). He found fault with correspondence theories in that they did not recognize that statements existed within speech acts (Habermas, 2001b, p. 86). His problem was not with correspondence generally, but specifically with the manner in which truth was assigned. For the assignment of truth, Habermas made a pragmatic turn to consensus theory, which held that a statement would be true when its truth was freely accepted by everyone “who could have entered into discourse with me” (2001b, p. 89). Habermas sought to avoid relativism by employing Pierce’s concept of truth, which held as true what the community of scientists would agree upon over the long term. Truth must be agreed upon not just by those who were present but also by anyone who could have been present at any time, including individuals who did not yet exist. Truth was always only provisional.

As crucial as the parties to the discussion were, the character of the discussion was of equal import. It was discourse rather than everyday communication that could result in truth. Discourse was the form of argument that took place after the assertive force of a statement’s content had been set aside (Habermas, 1976b, p. 164; 2001b, p. 100). Discourse would deal with theory or statements as hypotheticals. Discourse approached statements as expressing an appearance and not making actual objective claims about reality (Habermas, 1976b, pp. 165-166). The particular nature of discourse did not place it beyond the application of normative standards. In the rare circumstances when normative standards were met truth could be redeemed in a scenario of freely given consensus and mutual understanding.
The first normative requirement was that discourse be non-exclusionary, that every competent participant was free to enter the discussion. Habermas admitted that this requirement was problematic as it was difficult to judge individuals’ competency to engage in discourse until they actually engaged (2001b, p. 96). This problem could be mitigated. Since truth claims were only provisionally made, discourse, like any communication, occurred within the context of assumptions about what counted as evidence and about how the world worked (Habermas, 1982, p. 273). Given these conditions, it was conceivable that competence, and problems with evidence, may go temporarily unnoticed. Humility replaced certainty in judgment since new evidence could alter the validity of a truth claim and require a reassessment of competence. Secondly, equality of opportunity to participate in discourse must exist, since none may be excluded. Drastic imbalances in power, or inequalities would distort the situation and prohibit discourse. All participants deemed competent, must have equal opportunity to initiate, engage in, and continue discourse (Habermas, 2001b, p. 98).

Claims to rightness were similarly defended. If the right to create a social relationship was questioned, then the social conventions permitting that creation were appealed to. If resorting to social conventions was not dispositive, then the parties could resort to practical discourse, which was similar to the theoretical discourse applied to truth claims. The norm would be considered as an existing condition; whether it should exist would be questioned (Habermas, 1976b, p. 166). Put another way, the legitimacy of the norm appealed to would be at stake and treated as hypothetical during practical discourse (Habermas, 1979, p. 64).

Claims about intelligibility and truthfulness would be resolved differently. With respect to intelligibility, if rephrasing or explanation was not dispositive, then the parties resorted to a process of hermeneutic discourse (Habermas, 2001a, p. 148; 2001b, p. 94). Challenges to
truthfulness claims could not be resolved through a form of discourse and instead required the empirical comparison of actors’ stated intentions to their behaviors (Habermas, 1979, p. 64; 2001b, p. 90). These validity claims were, for Habermas, the truly universal properties of speech (Habermas, 1976b, p. 161). This was a precursor to portraying competency in communication as the foundation for social relationships and it emphasized the importance of communicative rationality.

**Communicative Competence**

Habermas believed that communicative competence developed in stages. In creating a three-stage developmental model, Habermas drew from the work of Lawrence Kohlberg (Habermas, 1976b, pp. 162-166; 1979, p. 69; 1990, pp. 116-194; 1993a, pp. 113-132; 2001a, pp. 137-146). While Kohlberg focused on moral development, Habermas saw moral development as one part within the broader concept of communicative competence. The development of communicative competence allowed individuals to handle ever more complex social interactions. This entailed understanding relationships, the ability to repair communication failures, and crucially, the ability to understand the world from second and third person viewpoints rather than being constrained to the personal, subjective worldview (Habermas, 1990, p. 138). This involved decentering the self, understanding world perspectives, and the ability to differentiate between different types of speech acts (Habermas, 1990, pp. 137-138).

In the first pre-conventional stage, language use began. However, the individual, normally a child, retained a natural conception of himself. The view of authority would be one associated with reward and punishment, and only obeyed due to force (Habermas, 1976b, p.

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33 Habermas’s reliance on Kohlberg has been critiqued for focusing on the general other at the expense of the concrete other. For a feminist perspective, see Gilligan (Gilligan, 1982; Gilligan & Murphy, 1980). Similarly, Benhabib critiqued Habermas as being utopian in his failure to incorporate both notions of the “other” (1986a, 1986b).
The second conventional stage brought with it a transition from natural to social identity. The individual gained the ability to recognize and employ different types of speech acts. The roles of speaker, hearer, and bystander were differentiated. Norms were obeyed not for punishment and reward, but rather due to the recognition of their universality. Progress through the developmental stages brought reflective critical capacity. What was blindly accepted at a previous stage may be called into question in a subsequent stage.

In the third and final post-conventional stage, the individual was capable of engaging in discourse having acquired the ability to discern discrepancies between the way things were and the way things should be (Habermas, 1982, p. 272). Upon completion of this stage of development, the individual, by that point an adolescent, would be swayed by the force of the better argument, rather than the recognition of an existing rule. Legitimacy would turn on rationality rather than authority (Habermas, 1976a, p. 89). Ego identity prevailed and reason was expected to be generally applicable. Habermas summarized the development through these stages as culminating in the ability to differentiate “between the lifeworld and the world” (1990, p. 138).

### 3.6 Ideal and Distorted Communication

**Ideal Speech**

Habermas described a situation in which communication was not distorted by power imbalances.\(^{34}\) The absence of such imbalances, equality of communicators, would permit the possibility of political communication and action. All would be equally free to initiate or continue discussion, and to challenge one another. Additionally, all would be equally able, and

\(^{34}\) In earlier works Habermas used the phrase “ideal speech situation”; however, he later worried that that term could incorrectly imply that the situation could be realized in actual life (1982, p. 261; 1993a, p. 163; 2001b, p. 102).
equally willing, to defend the validity claims implicitly or explicitly presented in their statements. To that end, they would be able to cite evidence or norms to support their claims, or if that was insufficient, to engage in discourse. Claims that could not be properly defended would be removed from the interaction. It was expected that all would be held accountable to these standards (Habermas, 2001a, p. 147). Individuals engaged in ideal speech related to one another as subjects rather than opponents in a strategic game. This communication aimed for mutual understanding and freely agreed upon consensus, rather than victory over an opponent (Habermas, 2001a, p. 148).

Habermas recognized the difficulty of attaining ideal status, but believed that communicative competence entailed the assumption of the ideal’s existence (2001b, p. 102). Furthermore, the ideal speech situation required that everyday communicative competence contain a critical potential (Habermas, 2001b, p. 97). This critical potential allowed individuals to recognize discrepancies between ideal and actual communications (Habermas, 2001b, p. 97). Ideal conditions would be assumed until there was sufficient evidence to warrant their abandonment.

The inevitable occurrence of non-ideal conditions would replace understanding with coercion. Overtly distorted communications occurred when a party utilized its “privileged access to weapons, wealth or standing, in order to wring agreement from the other party” (Habermas, 1982, p. 272). Resort to these means precluded the possibility of communicative action, and instead strategic action occurred. Victory would take precedent over mutual understanding or freely agreed upon consensus, and the other parties were not viewed as subjects but objects to manipulate. The very form of speech used, at least its purpose, would change to strategic rhetoric abandoning rational argument and evidence (Habermas, 1993c, pp. 266-267). Overtly distorted
communications could occur in any sphere of life and their existence within the political sphere precluded the possibility of the idealized politics of the bourgeois public sphere. Overt distortions were problematic, but their overtness made them less problematic than systematically distorted communications that could go unnoticed. These forms of non-ideal communication are represented as a form of social interaction in Figure 4.

**Figure 4  Social Interactions**

![Figure 4](image)

(Systematically Distorted)  Unconscious Deception  Conscious Deception  (Manipulation)

(Systematically Distorted)  Unconscious Deception  Conscious Deception  (Manipulation)

(Habermas, 1982, p. 264).

**Systematically Distorted Communication**

Overt distortions of speech situations would be obvious. Habermas distinguished those obvious distortions from subtler systematic distortions. Systematic distortions were more problematic because they involved the deception of one or more of the parties. Due to the covert nature of systematic distortions, they could go unnoticed (Habermas, 1970a, p. 206). Habermas initially drew upon the psychoanalytic method, which explained the way public articulations of neurosis were prevented by individuals’ defenses. Those affected by neurosis engaged in self-deception, unable to recognize the manifestations of their neuroses. For example, an individual may believe himself to be coherently communicating, despite being incoherent to others. This would represent systematically distorted communication if the incomprehensibility could not be resolved because of the neurosis (Habermas, 2001a, p. 150). Habermas gave another example of
a couple whose marriage was a shambles, yet deceived themselves about the health of their relationship and their mutual affections (2001a, p. 152). Shifting from the psychoanalytic perspective back to universal pragmatics, speech’s internal organization had been overburdened just as speech’s external organization had (Habermas, 2001a, p. 147). Specifically, the incoherent individual was unable to deal with validity claims to intelligibility, while the couple embodied problems with truthfulness. In both examples, inability to deal with challenges to validity claims and conflict resulted in the loss of communicative competence. Systematically distorted communication and the loss of communicative competence was pathological and evidence of an unhealthy society.

Habermas also used the family and its relationships as an example of a social system (2001a, pp. 159-164). This example explicated the above-mentioned overburdening, and demonstrated how system crises translated into lifeworld crises. A family’s ability to function as a social system was inextricably related to the potential for internal conflict. Conflicts could arise from power imbalances within a family. Hierarchical systems, like the family, could only achieve consensus by prohibiting communicative action. Conflicts could, theoretically, be resolved with communicative action in an ideal speech situation. However, in practice, discourse would destroy any consensus that had been achieved, and so critically reflecting upon the family structure was impossible. Therefore, the hierarchical nature of the family would never be critically reflected upon, rationally debated, or even recognized as problematic. Since discourse was impossible, familial relationships would be characterized by strategic, rather than communicative action. Another negative result of systematically distorted communication was the inability to develop communicative competence. Individuals accustomed to a strictly strategic environment never developed the capacity for discourse.
The family’s problems mirrored the problems discussed in *Legitimation Crisis*. Society had been thoroughly permeated by power imbalances, which were not critically reflected upon, or even recognized, but as with the family, inhibited communicative action, discourse, and the ideal speech situation. A crisis of meaning resulted from the overburdening of the legitimation, economic, and political systems. A rational defense of the norms underlying society could not be articulated. As a result, meaning became a “scarce resource” (Habermas, 1976a, p. 77).

Contemporary society, as late capitalism, could only be sustained by substituting value, e.g. consumer goods, for meaning. Deemphasizing and distracting from the importance of meaning avoided demands for a rationally articulated legitimacy claim.

Habermas presented an account of a world where political and economic organizations suppressed the demands for legitimation. The state also suppressed these demands because it proved unable to articulate a coherent, rational legitimizing argument. These were not merely problems of practice and communication; more fundamentally, these were problems in the very nature of thought within society. With the prevalence of systematically distorted communicated, the opportunity for ideal speech, and the development of communicative competence necessary for it, were precluded. The degree of subtlety and deception involved ensured that none could recognize that strategic action had replaced communicative action, that an altered and manipulative form of politics had become prevalent. The politics of the bourgeois public sphere was not impossible and this remained hidden.

**3.7 Discourse Ethics**

Habermas constructed universal pragmatics as a basis for a system of communicative ethics (Habermas, 1976a, pp. 102-110). This included individuals’ moral competence as a component of their communicative competence (Habermas, 1993a, p. 34). The concept was
retitled discourse ethics. Discourse ethics maintained Habermas’s concern with politics and political theory, while displacing the Marxist influence by engaging liberal political theory’s notions of justice. This involved the explicit articulation of the following “rules of discourse”:

1. Every subject with the competence to speak and act is allowed to take part in a discourse.
2a. Everyone is allowed to question any assertion whatever.
2b. Everyone is allowed to introduce any assertion whatever into the discourse.
2c. Everyone is allowed to express his attitudes, desires, and needs.
3. No speaker may be prevented, by internal or external coercion from exercising his rights as laid down in (1) and (2) (Habermas, 1990, p. 89).

By entering into communicative action individuals committed themselves to these rules. These rules defined the force of the better argument, the logical character of discourse, and the moral relationship between parties. Breaking these rules was a “performative contradiction” (Habermas, 1990, p. 80).

Habermas also believed that everyone sufficiently competent to engage in discourse recognized the necessity of universality. This universality held that all legitimate norms must satisfy this condition: “All affected can accept the consequences and the side effects its general observance can be anticipated to have for the satisfaction of everyone’s interests and these consequences are preferred to those of known alternative possibilities for regulation” (Habermas, 1990, p. 65). All parties must accept the norm upon considering all available information. Additionally, Habermas’s principles of discourse ethics were presented as “[o]nly those norms can claim to be valid that meet (or could meet) with the approval of all affected in their capacity

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35 Karl-Otto Apel also dealt with this development (1980). Habermas wrote that discourse ethics would be more accurately referred to as a “discourse theory of morality” (1993a, p. vii).

36 The concept of performative contradiction was an effective device in prior philosophy. Habermas cited Rene Descartes’s cogito argument as an example (1990, p. 80).
as participants in a practical discourse” (Habermas, 1990, p. 66). Norms could only valid if they were so judged through open, intersubjective rational argument.

Discourse ethics was differentiated from alternative systems by virtue of its being cognitive, universal, and formal (Habermas, 1990, pp. 120-121). It was cognitive in that moral judgments were justified through argument, making communicative reason an alternative to instrumental reason (Habermas, 1976a, pp. 105-106). It was universal because the justification of norms depended upon the force of the better argument, rather than contextual or cultural preferences. Discourse ethics was formal in its focus on the way in which norms were justified, or created to begin with, while being unconcerned with the content of norms. This allowed Habermas to avoid an elitist system whereby norms and their justifications were handed down to a people.

Habermas’s theory utilized “ideal role taking”, as articulated by George Herbert Mead, and understood as the ability to recognize and take on the positions of others (Habermas, 1990, pp. 121, 154). Habermas distinguished his theory from that of John Rawls. Rawls utilized the veil of ignorance and the original position to blind social system designers to their eventual place within that system (Rawls, 1972). Rawls, in veiling the parties, reduced plurality into singularity.

37 Habermas did not believe that morality completely excluded compromise, which he viewed as just if and only if it represented “an arrangement that (a) is more advantageous to all than no arrangement whatever, (b) excludes free riders who withdraw from cooperation, and (c) excludes exploited parties who contribute more to the cooperative effort than they gain from it” (Habermas, 1996, p. 166).

38 However, Habermas acknowledged that the realization of universal ethics was dependent upon the historical conditions of post-traditional societies (Habermas, 1976a, p. 90; 1990, p. 107).

39 See Habermas (1984a, pp. 3-43; 1993b, pp. 149-204) for his thoughts on Meade.

40 As Habermas acknowledged, his system was similar to that articulated by Rawls in a number of respects (Habermas, 1990, p. 198; Rawls, 1972, 2001). Hedrick has provided a thorough account of the relationship between the thought of Habermas and Rawls (2010). Also, see McCarthy (1994).
The result was an ersatz consensus agreed upon by identical individuals engaged in a shallow form of debate. Habermas avoided this by insisting that the parties to his discourse would be real individuals addressing real issues. Furthermore, the formalistic nature of discourse ethics was concerned with seeing procedures followed rather than dictating what outcomes were reached. In an exchange with Rawls, Habermas stated that his theory was concerned with the manner in which political constitutions were formed rather than their contents (Habermas, 1998a, pp. 49-73).

Discourse ethics connected, albeit subtly, discourse and the lifeworld (Habermas, 1990, pp. 177-178). The lifeworld created solidarity to stave off crises of legitimacy, and its cultural values were not questioned in their entirety. These values made the members of the lifeworld social agents capable of action. Despite this, a lifeworld could oppress its members by not allowing appeal to anything beyond its own values. For example, if the values of the lifeworld marginalized or oppressed a group, then that group needed to appeal to values beyond the lifeworld to remedy their situation. Discourse ethics provided recourse to those marginalized or oppressed by the values of their lifeworld. Though a lifeworld’s values could not be questioned as a totality, an individual norm could be questioned. An individual possessing communicative competence could challenge a norm, thereby demanding its rational defense; this was the very moment of justice. Norms could be rejected requiring that they be defended through rational discourse or be abandoned and restructured (Habermas, 1990, p. 200).

Discourse ethics did not provide content, and relied upon substance that was rooted in a lifeworld; it was, in Adorno’s sense, a minimalist ethics (Adorno, 1974; Habermas, 1990, pp. 86,121). It recreated a consensus sufficient to allow life to continue where crises had weakened social norms. Discourse ethics addressed how the norms and values of the lifeworld should be
defended. Alternatively, a maximal ethics would emphasize the role played by cultural values in articulations of the good life and seek to bring about that life without providing adequate defense against systematically distorted communication.

Habermas’s theory was located within a particular historical context and so could be seen to be reliant upon that context. However, he argued that his was not a maximal ethical theory because it was unresponsive to conceptions of the good life, but acknowledged differences between the actual state of affairs and any conception of the good life. Such differences revealed themselves through human suffering, or in Adorno’s terminology, “damaged life” (Adorno, 1974; Habermas, 1990, p. 205). Habermas avoided endorsing any particular set of cultural values, or a particular ordering of society. Discourse ethics constantly questioned any set of values by challenging the existing system and forcing it to defend itself on rational terms.

Habermas oscillated on the possibility of the existence of the conditions necessary for discourse ethics. At times he implied that they could be approximated (Habermas, 1984b, p. 42). At other times he presented them as a theoretical construction that must be simultaneously “claimed and denied” (Habermas, 1987, p. 325; 1996, p. 322; 1998b, p. 22). At still other times, Habermas took the position that rational consensus, arising from discourse ethics, was possible in neither theory nor practice. Habermas wrote, “this entropic state of a definitive consensus, which could make all further communication superfluous, cannot be represented as a meaningful goal because it would engender paradoxes (an ultimate language, a final interpretation, a nonreviseable knowledge, etc.)” (1998c, p. 418). If issues were resolved through discourse there would be no need for future discourse. Habermas quoted Albrecht Wellmer on the subject: “Even if the ideal reference points are understood as aims that are not attainable in principle, or attainable only approximately, it remains ‘paradoxical that we should be obliged to strive for the
realization of an ideal whose realization would be the end of human history’” (Habermas, 1998b, p. 365). Reaching an ultimate agreement prohibits all future efforts. Habermas’s theory may, then, be a performative contradiction.

Habermas avoided this problem by distinguishing justification from application. That distinction also resolved the criticisms Habermas applied to Kant’s moral philosophy, that abstract moral judgments required that parties possess an impossible to achieve level of information, and that such judgments would be too abstract to be meaningfully applied to real situations (Habermas, 1990, pp. 190-215). Klaus Günther acknowledged a critique along these lines; his argument was particularly interesting since Habermas engaged with it in revising his discourse ethics (Günther, 1993, pp. 217-220; Habermas, 1993a, pp. 35-39; 1996).

It was Günther’s distinction between justification and application discourse that Habermas adopted. Initial justification discourse revolved around what was just and created norms. Application discourse then determined whether that just norm applied to specific circumstances. Discourse would be never ending since novel situations would always arise, and an unrealistic amount of knowledge was not required. Furthermore, this allowed Habermas to avoid juridification, a yet to be discussed problem of modernity. Habermas quoted Günther:

In justification only the norm itself, independently of its application in a particular situation, is relevant. The issue is whether it is in the interest of all that everyone should follow the rule . . . In application, by contrast, the particular situation is relevant, regardless of whether general observance is also in the interest of all (as determined by the prior discursive examination). The issue here is whether and how the rule should be followed in a given situation in light of all of the particular circumstances . . . What must be decided is not the validity of the norm for each individual and his interests but its appropriateness in relation to all of the features of a particular situation (Habermas, 1993a, p. 37).

Just general norms could remain just when applied to specific situations. Discourse outcomes would not be binding everywhere and always. This avoided the critique contained within Kant’s
moral philosophy and irresolvable conflict when multiple norms seemed to apply. Genuine political debate could occur when creating norms and also when determining their application.

The lasting outcomes of justification discourse were always open to reinterpretation through application discourse (Habermas, 1996, pp. 219-220). However, this raised another issue. What exactly was the purpose of the initial justification discourse since it could always be modified or ignored? All discourse could be application discourse; the effect of the theory would lose nothing in the absence of its justification component. J. M. Bernstein leveled a critique along this line (1995, pp. 222-228). Since each novel situation had to be made to mesh into the larger pattern of society, why not consider novel situations afresh, without a previous standard? Bernstein admitted that this theory was workable in a political system with the legislative deliberation akin to justification discourse and judicial consideration similar to application discourse (1995, p. 228). However, he remained opposed to the application of this type of system to everyday life since it “yields a politicization of the ethical that reduces the complex achievements of our coherent normative order to mere consensus . . .” (J. M. Bernstein, 1995, p. 228). In short, Bernstein pointed out the danger of relativism, or contextualism.

Habermas’s poststructuralist critics brought another critique to bear. They believed discourse ethics and rational consensus were impossibilities, which meant that difference and disagreement must persist, and this was the core of human plurality and democracy (Mouffe, 2000, p. 48). Jean-François Lyotard articulated the fear that Habermas’s approach would impose consensus upon a diversity of positions, that conformity would be forced upon nonconformists. He argued that even a charitable reading of Habermas revealed that his scheme did nothing more than ignore dissent in favor of a merely imagined consensus (Lyotard, 1984).

\[41\] For more on the poststructuralist critique of Habermas on this point see Thomassen (2007, Ch. 1).
Maurizio d’Entreves framed the entirety of the debate between Habermas and the postmodernists as hinging upon the responsibility to action versus the responsibility to otherness, openness to dissonance, ambiguity and difference (1997).

### 3.8 Lifeworld and System

Habermas’s earlier theories were drawn together in three themes of *The Theory of Communicative Action*. In his introduction to that work, Thomas McCarthy wrote that these themes were the explication of communicative rationality, an understanding of a society based upon two levels, the system and the lifeworld, and a theory of modernity (Habermas, 1984b, p. xl). That work’s method was not straightforward but instead proceeded through historical reconstructions, engaging the history of sociological thought from the founders to contemporary thinkers, and interspersed with more explicit articulations of the theory of communicative action.

The first theme, communicative rationality, was already covered by Habermas’s previous writings on universal pragmatics; however, *The Theory of Communicative Action* was not merely a restatement, but provided an expanded critique of philosophy and sociology’s failure to appropriately value natural language and intersubjectivity. *The Theory of Communicative Action*’s analysis of communicative rationality advanced two aims. First, it contained Habermas’s articulation of the intersubjectivity and language that constituted existence. Second, it corrected what Habermas saw as a flaw in his earlier work on universal pragmatics. Specifically, the work refocused his thought on sociological issues which he felt had been abandoned to address philosophical ones.

The second theme, a concept of a society understood through the dual levels of the system and the lifeworld, was concerned with properly working out the connection between those two levels. The level of the lifeworld had not been fully developed, and had not progressed
much beyond the earlier phenomenology or thinkers like Edmund Husserl and Alfred Schutz. Habermas now further developed the lifeworld, properly accounting for its intersubjective and linguistic nature. This account opened the door to address the third and final theme, an account of modernity.

**Lifeworld**

The social theory of communicative action was concerned with the creation and maintenance of society. Society, as a shared social world, arose as a product of human interaction characterized as either mutual understanding through communicative action, modeling the political action of the bourgeois public sphere, or manipulation through strategic action. The novel issue addressed was the difference between general communicative competence and the competence to act in specific social contexts. The lifeworld generated the context for specific competence, a necessary complement to general communicative competence (Habermas, 1984a, p. 130; 1984b, pp. 70-71). Stated differently, it was the movement from universal knowledge of language to the ability to differentiate the subjective, social world and the objective world (Habermas, 1998b, p. 238).

Habermas used the example of a construction crew to illustrate the move from universal competence to context specific competence (1984a, p. 121). An experienced worker instructed a new worker to fetch beer for the crew’s break. The instruction could be analyzed as a validity claim whose truthfulness, intelligibility, sincerity, or rightness could be challenged. However, the new worker could go beyond challenging the validity of the instruction. The fundamental understanding of the situation could be challenged. The new worker could apply context specific competence not provided by general communicative competence. In questioning whether or not a break was imminent, he would challenge the pace of work presumed by his more experienced
colleague. By questioning the right of the more experienced to issue instructions the young worker would challenge the jobsite’s hierarchy.

Such challenges resulted from breakdowns in mutual understanding surrounding the cultural and social context of the lifeworld. The parties made conflicting presumptions about the prevailing norms of their lifeworld context. Assumptions about the lifeworld went unexamined until some crisis forced their examination (Habermas, 1998b, p. 243). Under normal conditions, the lifeworld could be understood as a “naïve familiarity with an unproblematically given background” (Habermas, 1984a, p. 130). A challenge to this given background questioned the relationships between parties. Resolving crises required appeal to the context specific competence of the lifeworld, rather than general communicative competence.

Challenges to the assumptions of the lifeworld did not challenge its totality, but specific portions of it (Habermas, 1984a, p. 132). The specific assumptions or norms questioned depended upon the context and content of the challenge. Habermas described this as “topic-dependent contextual knowledge” (1998b, p. 241). For the construction crew only the plan to get beer was challenged, not the lifeworld as a whole. Resolving the challenge required parties to build upon mutually accepted aspects of the context. The construction workers may have agreed that the crew did get a break while holding differing expectations about timing. Usually there would be more agreement than disagreement surrounding understandings of the lifeworld; only understandings of the specific situation would be different. Habermas understood a situation to be “a segment of lifeworld contexts of relevance” (1984a, p. 122). Disagreement would be over specific contexts and activities in which the parties found themselves. The dispute over getting beer questioned the informal hierarchy and practices of that particular worksite, but it would not challenge the legal norms of society. Habermas wrote that a lifeworld was simultaneously
determinate, in imparting interpretation and understanding, and porous, in that it was constantly shifting as novel experiences arose (1984a, p. 130).

Habermas’s conception of lifeworld differed from those of his predecessors. While alternative articulations were based upon perception as the key manner of experiencing the world, Habermas focused on the role of language. Language was the medium through which the lifeworld, and disagreements about it, were articulated, challenged, and defended. Language did not shape experience, but did affect a situation’s meaning. When crises arose meaning and understanding were challenged, requiring mutual efforts to redefine the world to realign experience and meaning. This permitted Habermas to move away from the formality of universal pragmatics and give new substance to the idea of mutual understanding.

The ability to redeem the lifeworld applied when specific and limited situations were challenged (Habermas, 1984a, p. 137). Questioning the totality of the lifeworld would negate the ability to act or form relationships within it. Habermas noted that this view was problematic because it gave the impression of individuals being directed by the lifeworld, rather than interacting with it. This would entail a return to the sort of philosophy Habermas sought to avoid (Habermas, 1987, p. 342). This philosophy of consciousness was avoided by adding the perspective of the observer to that of the already present participant. The ability to construct narrative from within a given context was key as it required knowledge of traditions, social groups, the perspective of the observer, and the nature of individuals involved (Habermas, 1984a, p. 137). This led to Habermas’s next step, the shift from a formal notion of the lifeworld to a sociological one (Habermas, 1982, p. 247). The intention was to describe the general structure of lifeworlds moving from the context specific particularism back to generality. The
intuitive knowledge required for the production and maintenance of the lifeworld was formalized.

Habermas’s conception of the lifeworld was comprised of three components: culture, society, and personality (1984a, p. 138). Habermas incorporated these three already existing sociological concepts, and linked them with the three aspects of statements. Culture was connected to the objective world and understood as a “store of knowledge from which those engaged in communicative action draw interpretations susceptible of consensus as they come to an understanding about something in the world” (Habermas, 1987, p. 343). Society was linked to the intersubjective world and described as “the legitimate order from which those engaged in communicative action gather solidarity, based on belonging to groups, as they enter into interpersonal relationships with one another” (Habermas, 1987, p. 343). Finally, personality was mapped onto the subjective world and made up of “acquired competences that render a subject capable of speech and action and hence able to participate in processes of mutual understanding in a given context and to maintain his own identity in the shifting contexts of interaction” (Habermas, 1987, p. 343). The three structural components of the lifeworld were thus connected to the necessary ability to make and sustain distinctions between the objective, intersubjective, and subjective worlds (Habermas, 1984a, p. 137). Furthermore, as represented in Figure 5, the components of the lifeworld each contained the potential for action oriented toward the mutual understanding that communicative action aimed for and had been possible in the idealized bourgeois public sphere.
This mapping of lifeworld structures onto these three realms was problematic. Since culture was associated with the objective world it was associated with truth claims. This entailed a particular understanding of culture that did not include art, for example, as a component.\textsuperscript{42} This understanding of culture acknowledged that the lifeworld provided the basis for science, and thus viewed science as a component of culture (Habermas, 1998b, pp. 239-240). Individuals acting within a culture discovered knowledge. Culture was, however, not constitutive of knowledge. Reality was ever present to refute, and force re-articulations of knowledge. Individuals required culture to come to mutual understandings on the state of knowledge and the objective world. Culture was a rational standard necessary for creating continuity between a specific situation and

\textsuperscript{42}Habermas later acknowledged that he had given too little credit to the “world-disclosing” ability art possessed (1998b, pp. 245-246).
the rest of the lifeworld (Habermas, 1987, p. 344). Specific interpretations, understandings, and items of knowledge were always exposed to a standard of rationality and already acquired knowledge. This was crucial for coherent everyday practice to continue (Habermas, 1984a, p. 137). Ultimately, Habermas understood culture as the basis for a meaningful world, and meaning would become scarce if there were difficulties in sustaining the lifeworld (Habermas, 1984a, p. 140).

Society was judged by its solidarity, as culture was by its rationality. Society was concerned with norms applicable to relationships and awareness of membership in a common community. A loss of normative motivation resulted from society’s inability to create solidarity and sustain the lifeworld (Habermas, 1982, p. 280). When society successfully sustained solidarity and the lifeworld, novel situations could be incorporated into existing social identity and everyday practice continued uninterrupted. A successful society would construct a social space wherein life could be lived with the applicable meaning and norms.

Personality was more closely associated with a particular historical context, depending upon the appropriate socialization of individuals. Specifically, individuals needed to acquire the necessary competence and values to act appropriately in the lifeworld. Habermas’s notion of socialization relied upon Mead’s, where individuals first acquired the ability to fill roles within the family and later as members of the larger society (Habermas, 1993b, pp. 149-204). Issues arose with the continuity between the particular situation and the broader, general context. Successful socialization resulted in individual personalities existing harmoniously within the historical traditions of society (Habermas, 1984a, pp. 140-141). However, society did not exist independent of individuals, society did not create individuals, and society should not be viewed as a mere compilation of individuals. Habermas’s symbolic construction of the lifeworld shifted
between the competence ingrained in individuals and the lifeworld. Thus, individuals were only metaphorical “members” of society (Habermas, 1987, p. 343).

Habermas described a lifeworld sustained by continually reproduction through the interaction of the lifeworld’s structural components: culture, society, and personality. Socialization helped create personality by embedding the values and motivations consistent with the norms of the particular society. Once socialized, individuals were competent to relate to the objective world. A successful society not only ordered relationships between individuals, but also instilled the sense of solidarity necessary for mutual understanding and discourse. Culture was the source of legitimacy and knowledge, while it simultaneously defined and ensured the continuation of knowledge, checked by rationality (Habermas, 1984a, pp. 141-144).

**Rationalization**

There were several problems in this account of the lifeworld. First, the lifeworld was a historical development and did not always exist. Second, by emphasizing the congruence of the particular and the general, the view could become conservative with limited possibility for social change. However, the lifeworld must be capable of change to become increasingly rational. Habermas located several potential solutions to these problems within the foundations of his social theory. He proposed a thought experiment borrowing Emile Durkheim’s concept of mechanical solidarity (Habermas, 1984a, p. 87). This experiment posited a totally integrated society held together by religious ritual where there was total uniformity of culture, society, and personality. Conflicts did not arise because their resolutions were predetermined by religious authority, borrowing from Wittgenstein, Habermas wrote that language had gone on holiday (Habermas, 1984a, p. 87). Stated differently, this society was “sociocentric”, and individuals

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43 For the extensive treatment of Durkheim’s phylogenetic account of the transition from sacred to secular society, see Habermas (1996, pp. 43-111).
were not capable of “decentering” (Habermas, 1984b, p. 69). Individuals were incapable of differentiating their views from the views of others, because no difference existed. Since all understanding and meaning was identical and in accordance with religious dictate, there was no possibility or resources for challenges or debate. Only in the presence of differing viewpoints did challenge occur, and debate over the accuracy of views became necessary to achieve agreement. Language was on holiday because it had no role to play.

Habermas theorized a process called the “linguistification of the sacred”, which was the ability to subject beliefs to critical reflection and rational scrutiny (1984a, p. 77). This could lead to the emergence of the previously imagined total solidarity. Language’s holiday ended and as a result solidarity became less assured and only achieved through rationality (Habermas, 1987, p. 345). Conservative societies valued tradition more highly and so they went farther in assigning meaning to novel experiences. In such societies, novel experiences were less likely to disrupt the reproduction of the lifeworld. More liberal societies faced greater challenges in giving meaning to novel experience and binding them to tradition.

Achieving coherence between the novel and the traditional required abstraction as form and content parted ways (Habermas, 1984a, p. 146). Socialization needed to incorporate the ability to employ abstraction and the ability to deal with novelty. More abstractly, universal, and general approaches were required to legitimate society and culture. As a corollary, justice and truth parted ways as society and culture became increasingly distinct. Governmental legitimacy was no longer a given simply because that government held power. Personality and society also became less congruent with the expansion of societal roles. Culture and personality grew apart, as the former could no longer be dogmatically imposed upon the later. Thus, a continual need for new cultural works arose (Habermas, 1984a, p. 148). The trend was one of replacing dogmatic
belief with rational critique. Continuity could not be sustained by continuing traditions and came only from critical engagement with tradition.

The rationalized lifeworld, which critically reflected upon tradition, existed at the opposite end of the spectrum from Durkheim’s fictional society of mechanical solidarity. The rationalized lifeworld was the “vanishing point” for the lifeworld of total integration (Habermas, 1984a, p. 146). The three structures of the lifeworld were continually subjected to processes resembling communicative action. Legitimacy, and hence continued acceptance, was dependent upon possessing the force of the better argument, rather than age.

System

Habermas adopted a systems theory approach to address the shortcomings and idealism of the lifeworld. Taken on its own the lifeworld was overly idealistic in grounding all interactions in an already idealized notion of discourse. Furthermore, a lifeworld only analysis overlooked material concerns that must be addressed if the cultural necessities of the lifeworld were to be met. Left unaddressed, this would have led Habermas to the “hermeneutic claim to universality”, the notion that sociological inquiry ended by recreating the understanding that individuals possessed of their own culture (Habermas, 1984a, p. 148). Habermas, partially through debate with Gadamer, opposed a purely hermeneutic approach generally, and the hermeneutic claim to universality specifically (Habermas, 1971, 1980; 1988, pp. 143-185). That approach was unable to recognize the potential of systematically distorted communication to disrupt the system because it assumed that the lifeworld provided sufficient resources to understand and provide meaning to society (Habermas, 1984a, pp. 149-150).

Reconsider the society characterized by mechanical solidarity, which possessed a hermeneutically transparent lifeworld where individuals easily understood all possible
interactions. Additionally, the culture of that society would have no trouble supplying shared meaning for all interactions (Habermas, 1984a, pp. 156-157). This society had a vanishing point other than rationalization. It could vanish when growing complexity was met with meaningless forms of organization that originated and were sustained completely outside of the lifeworld rather than through mutual understanding. The result was similar to mechanical solidarity, in that challenges to validity claims could not be raised. This society was beyond the scope of rational debate or critical reflection as order was imposed upon the lifeworld from an external point. As a result, the lifeworld would weaken and lose any force it once possessed. Habermas noted the similarity to Adorno’s account of a totally administered society, as well as Luhman’s view of contemporary society (Habermas, 1987, p. 353). Habermas explained this negative aspect of the evolution of society using systems theory. He simultaneously believed that his persistent acknowledgment of the lifeworld allowed him to avoid the pitfalls of an approach rooted entirely in systems theory.

Habermas’s understanding of systems revolved around their ability to produce and maintain a border between themselves and the more complex external system (Habermas, 1984a, p. 151). Analyses of social phenomena could proceed through examining the lifeworld or the system. These alternative approaches rested upon an analytic distinction between their “depth of field” (Habermas, 1993c, pp. 252-253). Culture, for example, could be analyzed as one of the structural components of the lifeworld, or alternatively, as a subsystem within a system. Systems theory considered society from an observer’s viewpoint and supplied counterintuitive explanations (Habermas, 1993c, p. 252). It did not provide much of interest to actual members of society, and portrayed them as possessing little in the way of agency. By contrast, the lifeworld
approach provided an explanation that could be understood by members of society. It made tacitly recognized components of society more explicit.

The two approaches also differed in what they were unable to explain. The lifeworld approach stressed the importance of human agency and was unable to explain unintended consequences arising from that agency. Unintended consequences were viewed as meaningless. Alternatively, systems theory provided an account of unintended consequences. Social integration was the ability of individuals to coordinate their actions around mutual understanding. Meanwhile, systems integration resulted from the coordination arising from the consequences of actions (Habermas, 1984a, p. 202). From a systems view, individuals were concerned with the consequences of actions, rather than the meaning of those actions. The system approach could not account for the understanding of individuals within society. Thus, it could not account for the effect that a lack of understanding of administration and economics could have on systems integration. This lack of understanding could lead to alienation, for example, and this would go unacknowledged by systems theory (Habermas, 1984a, p. 151; 1993c, p. 253).

System as Colonizer

Once uncoupled only as methodological approaches the lifeworld and the system became truly distinct from one another under modern capitalism (Habermas, 1993c, p. 255). States still required legitimacy and so were grounded in the social structure of the lifeworld; for example, law was but a shell containing social interaction (Habermas, 1984a, p. 178). States purported to organize interactions while in reality they merely created a space in which already existing interactions took place. Interactions were more reliant upon existing norms within society than the letter of the law. However, state sanctioned organization penetrated and affected the
lifeworld. For example, as capitalism placed greater emphasis on the role of money, it became the prominent steering medium of life. This threatened the viability of the lifeworld.

Money had acted as a steering medium in simple markets without endangering the lifeworld. In simple markets, money provided a way for strangers to enter into instrumental relationships with one another. Strangers would meet as buyer and seller without needing to share much in the way of meaning. There would be no moral connection between the two. For example, sellers were not responsible for how buyers intended to use a product. All they cared about was the monetary amount and use value of the exchange. If more sellers entered the marketplace, it would have the unintended but predictable consequence of driving the price of a good down. Conversely, yet equally predictably, if more buyers entered the marketplace, the price of a good would be driven up. Thus, money coordinated action without supplying meaning. These actions would be coordinated but lack the understanding and possibilities provided by language.

Money provided a manner for sending simple and schematic messages. It compelled specific actions on behalf of both holders and recipients, creating an instrumental relationship between them. Money had much in common with power as an effective steering medium. Money, however, surpassed power in several ways. Money could be more readily circulated within a system, it could be accumulated and stored, it could be easily quantified, the recipient was not put at a disadvantage as with power, and most importantly, money did not require legitimation as power did (Habermas, 1984a, pp. 265-266). Money once required some form of backing, like the gold standard, but so long as it was recognized as currency, it could operate as a steering medium. It was unlikely to encounter normative questions of whether what passed for currency ought to be accepted as such. Exchange and hence currency could take any form; the
exchange of gold, Euros, or dollar bills, would all operate in the same manner and have the same effect.

Contemporarily, money as a steering medium has transcended any physical form. It can take the form of credit, the corresponding debt, or more abstract financial mechanisms like derivatives. The global economy, as well as smaller scale incarnations, is dominated by abstract and instantaneous electronic exchanges. Fortunes can be made and lost unconnected to any physical medium. The dominance of money, or perhaps more accurately today, finance, has been obscured by such development. It determines the fate of nations, the influence of corporations, and the daily life of individuals all while remaining primarily beyond observation. Its ever evolving speed and increasing level of abstraction has resulted in a state where most do not understand its influence and even those professionally responsible for its regulation struggle to match its frenetic pace.

Simple incarnations of markets and exchanges existed in many stages of civilization and did not in themselves represent a threat to the lifeworld. The threat arose when the principles of exchange relationships infiltrated all areas of life, and in so doing colonized the lifeworld. Within capitalist societies, exchange became the primary social institution. In earlier capitalism, bourgeois legal systems provided a framework for resolving conflicts between competitors and dealing with market failures (Habermas, 1984a, p. 178). However, money and the principles of exchange were so effective as steering mediums that they moved beyond the borders of the economic subsystem and began to steer in all subsystems. In addition to affecting all aspects of life within all subsystems, money came to affect the relationships between the subsystems themselves. For example, the state relied heavily on taxation and power, and became reliant on money as a primary steering medium. Tax incentives and financial penalties became a primary
means of compelling behavior desired by the state. Another example was the diffusion of wage labor within society; this overtook more traditional modes of work, and deemphasized the use value of products. Laborers became almost singularly concerned with the monetary compensation they received for their labor, rather than the resulting product. Everyday life was altered, and this alteration could be seen in the ever increasing urbanization and industrialization that characterized modern capitalist societies (Habermas, 1987, p. 351).

The colonization of the lifeworld could be summarized as the intrusion of money and power as steering mediums into all the institutions and relationships of the lifeworld. The state began to reorganize itself along economic lines. The economy cast off the relationships that had once embedded it in the lifeworld. It became supreme and subjected all other institutions to its principles and modes of thought as mere subsystems. The lifeworld, in its entirety, was threatened with relegation to the status of a subsystem within the economy. This organized all action around strategic lines; coordination was solely motivated by instrumental and purposive rationality concerned with consequences, specifically, the consequences of economic style exchanges. Action, based upon mutual understanding resulting from discourse and communicative rationality, would no longer be possible. Critical discourse was prohibited by the central role of money and the principles of economic exchange. In effect, money filled the unquestioned role that dogmatic acceptance of belief had filled in earlier societies, in that it prevented both critical reflection and rational discourse. Habermas wrote, “the more the welfare state goes beyond pacifying the class conflict lodged in the sphere of production and spreads a net of client relationships over private spheres of life, the stronger are the anticipated pathological side effects . . . that entails both a bureaucratization and a monetarization of core areas of the lifeworld” (1984a, p. 364). Since money required no legitimation, it was unaffected
by rational debate. The actions of the state did little more than codify the existing dominance of this mentality (Habermas, 1987, p. 355).

The modern state had expanded its citizenry, as more were able to participate in the political realm. However, that realm took on a new and less meaningful role. As Habermas put it: “The establishment of basic political rights in the framework of mass democracy means, on the one hand, a universalization of the role of citizen and, on the other hand, a segmenting of this role from the decision-making process, a cleansing of political participation from any participatory content” (1984a, p. 350). The political sphere no longer spoke to the state in terms of governing decisions, representing genuine participation. Instead citizens became clients. They make demands upon the state as a supplier of goods. All the state need do is meet the demands of its clients, regardless of its direction. This is a form of politics that “has shrunk to administration” (Habermas, 1984a, p. 354). The result has been an absence of non-clientalistic demands in the political sphere. Quoting Weber, Habermas noted that one result has been “the complete elimination of ethics from political reasoning” (Habermas, 1984a, p. 324).

A number of subsequent authors have seized on the notion of the individual as consumer and the state as supplier, a result of Habermas’s colonization of the lifeworld, some seemingly independent of Habermas’s account. John Clarke et al. noted the general trend to recast the government-citizen relationship as a supplier-customer relationship (Clarke, Newman, Smith, Vidler, & Westmarland, 2007). More specifically, Lizabeth Cohen quoted a Clinton Administration report that stated:

> Effective, entrepreneurial governments insist on customer satisfaction. They listen carefully to their customers—using surveys, focus groups, and the like. They restructure their basic operations to meet customers’ needs. And they use market dynamics such as competition and customer choice to create incentives that drive their employees to put customers first (2003, p. 396).
This report demonstrated that the economic, customer/supplier relationship had permeated government. Catherine Needham noted that the U.K.’s Blair government, along with other recent labor and conservative governments, sought to move the relationship between the government and citizens toward an economic, consumer-supplier relationship by utilizing tactics similar to those outlined in the Clinton Administration’s report (2003). David Bollier contributed an exhaustive list of the ways local governments had followed this trend from selling naming rights, to branding cities, to outright municipal endorsements of everything from ice cream to rental cars to underwear (2003, p. 158).

One effect of colonization was what Habermas called juridification, *Verrechtlichung*, which was the increase of formal law in contemporary states (1984a, p. 357). Habermas wrote, “it is the medium of law itself that violates the communicative structures of the sphere that has been juridified” (1984a, p. 370). Additionally, “From the start, the ambivalence of guaranteeing freedom and taking it away has attached to the policies of the welfare state” (Habermas, 1984a, p. 361). In this vein Habermas continued, “[i]t is now the very means of guaranteeing freedom that endangers the freedom of the beneficiaries” (Habermas, 1984a, p. 362).

Individuals were, essentially, reduced to clients, or customers, rather than being citizens capable of interacting with the state or their fellows. Individuals were only capable of seeking victory as communicative understanding and action had no place in concretely defined legal relationships. “As legal subjects they encounter one another in an objectivizing success-oriented attitude” (Habermas, 1984a, p. 369). This system could not account for every context that would arise, and so situations and individuals were forced into the formalized set of rules, regardless of the specific context. Habermas wrote, “the situation to be regulated is embedded in the context of a life history and of a concrete form of life; it has to be subjected to violent abstraction, not
merely because it has to be subsumed under the law, but so that it can be dealt with administratively” (1984a, p. 363). All life occurrences would be forced to fit into the predetermined set of general rules.\footnote{Habermas was not simply opposed to law, but later distinguished between colonizing law and law with communicative foundations, in the deliberation of those subjected to it (Habermas, 1984a).}

Another aspect of the colonization of the lifeworld could be seen in the world of culture. The degree of cultural differentiation increased as experts in various areas, like art, law, morality, and science, grew apart (Habermas, 1984b, p. 159). Not only did these areas move away from one another, but they also became more distant from all other aspects of the lifeworld. The resultant condition was one in which elites in various areas would not communicate with one another, and lay members of society were far removed from decision making in all areas. Cultural areas were increasingly technocratic and bureaucratic, and the experts in each area were specialized to the extent that they were excluded from nearly all other areas. Thus, the public was even further removed from realms where ideal communicative action could occur.

The colonization of the lifeworld by the system caused meaning to become rare, and was the source of a new form of conflict in society. As Habermas put it:

In the past decade or two, conflicts have developed in advanced Western societies that deviate in various ways from the welfare-state pattern of institutionalized conflict over distribution. They no longer flare up in domains of material reproduction; they are no longer channeled through parties and associations; and they can no longer be allayed by compensations. Rather, these new conflicts arise in domains of cultural reproduction, social integration, and socialization . . . The issue is not primarily one of compensations that the welfare state can provide, but of defending and restoring endangered ways of life. In short, the new conflicts are not ignited by distribution problems but by questions having to do with the grammar of forms of life (1984a, p. 392).

Being concerned with this, rather than economic issues, was a departure from the Marxist perspective that had influenced Habermas’s early work (Habermas, 1984a, pp. 348-349). Rather
than being primarily concerned with economic redistribution, the concern was over the now colonized and no longer properly functioning lifeworld. Social movements took the place of class based conflicts in expressing societal discontent (Habermas, 1984a, pp. 393-396).

Critiques like Žižek’s, leveled above, took on new clarity. Habermas was concerned with where the lines between the system and the lifeworld should be drawn, and how the distinctions could be maintained, rather than how to do away with the system and its corrupting imperatives altogether. Habermas was then seen to be implicitly defending capitalism, and hence, taking a conservative position (McCarthy, 1991; Shabani, 2003). The defense of capitalism would not be a critical fault in and of itself. Capitalism as a concept contains a wide variety of possibilities from the Anglo neo-liberal strand to the more managed incarnations of the European continent. It could be argued that Habermas, in concurrence with Marx, viewed the ailments of modern society “as treatable through transforming capitalist relations of production” (McCarthy, 1991, p. 119). This critique then is only damning for those who view capitalism in all its forms as unsalvageable, e.g. Žižek.

Colonization and the accompanying process of juridification were detrimental to many aspects of life in modern society, politics included. The system lacked the linguistic meaning only found in the lifeworld. Individuals may sense the lack of meaning to participation in the political sphere. As a result, individuals seek recourse via the only readily available avenue and “privatized hopes for self-actualization and self determination are primarily located, namely, in the roles of consumer and client” (Habermas, 1984a, p. 356). Additionally, these developments inhibited the development of communicative competence. Communicative action, discourse and

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45 Also, see Habermas’s comments on social movements in Horster and van Reijen (1992). Cohen and Arato (1992) also considered social movements from a Habermasian perspective. Holub (1991) explored Habermas’s relationship with the student movement in particular.
mutual understanding were not possible in a lifeworld colonized by a system. The possibility of communicative action was precluded; all that remained was instrumental and strategic action either openly or in some unperceived manner. Due to these impossibilities, colonization led to a malfunctioning lifeworld characterized by crises of reproduction, anomie, loss of meaning, and outright psychological pathologies (Habermas, 1984a, p. 145). These malfunctions in the lifeworld, in Habermas’s account, became characteristic of modernity.

The differentiation between the private sphere, the sphere of public authority, and the public sphere that Habermas presented in *Structural Transformation*, as represented in Figure 1, has disappeared. None of the three spheres remain distinct from one another. All have coalesced into one contemporary sphere colonized by the economic subsystem and functioning in accordance with its principles of exchange. This unitary sphere of life has no place for communicative action and the force of the better argument carries little weight. Issues are approached subjectively, rather than objectively, and the promotion of private interests takes precedent. Under the best circumstances others are potential partners in market exchanges, under less optimal circumstances they are objects to be manipulated and taken advantage of in those exchanges.

Further complicating already complex matters, the absence of a properly functioning lifeworld goes unnoticed. Habermas wrote that rather than communicative relations “we find the shamming of communicative relations in bureaucratically desiccated, forcibly ‘humanized’ domains of pseudopolitical intercourse in an overextended and administered public sphere” (Habermas, 1984a, p. 386). Habermas argued that the “systematically independent organizations of the state are fictively transposed back into the horizon of the lifeworld . . .” (Habermas, 1982, p. 283). In short, that “[w]hile the system is draped out as the lifeworld, the lifeworld is absorbed
by the system” (Habermas, 1984a, p. 386). Echoing Arendt, the substitution of politics went unnoticed, we are unaware that colonization has occurred, or by way of Benhabib, we are unaware that the blob has consumed us.

### 3.9 Conclusion

Habermas provided an account that offers both an alternative and complement to Arendt’s rise of the social. His early work detailed the development and decline of a properly functioning notion of politics, akin to the Greek system that developed within the bourgeois public sphere. That notion of the political declined, leading to the pathologies of modernity. The contemporary age saw an altered notion of the political with the inclusion of private interests, the absence of critical reflection and rational debate, and the inability of individuals to even develop the capacity for discourse. There were corresponding legitimation crises, and the lifeworld was colonized by the system. Furthermore, all aspects of life became mere subsystems of the dominant mode of thought and behavior that was modeled on economic exchange.

The public sphere, including the political sphere, no longer stands between the private and the public realm. These realms have collapsed into one another and become integrated into one another. As a result, the state intervenes in aspects of life that it previously left alone. Simultaneously, and perhaps more problematically, once private, non-political, modes of interaction have become prevalent in the public realm. As colonization took place strategic and instrumental modes of action were reinforced as the dominant forms of relationships. Habermas’s theory of communicative action may be viewed as an articulation of the conditions that would allow a revival of a healthy politics; however, the very pathologies that led to the decline of the political sphere may prevent its reemergence.
CHAPTER 4 MICHEL FOUCAULT

4.1 Introduction

Michel Foucault’s approach to power, and those who continue to utilize his approach, address politics in a very different manner than pre-Foucauldian scholars, non-Foucauldian scholars, or mainstream political scientists. This is due to the fact that in Foucault’s analysis the relationship between the state and what it governs have changed. As a result new forms of governance have emerged. They exist in different locales, have become more pervasive, and act on their subjects in different ways and in fact the subjects have come to act upon themselves in a self-disciplining manner. In my analysis of Foucault I describe a conception of politics that has been altered over time, becoming both more topically inclusive and whose power has become more diffuse. It is a politics that has moved beyond the borders of any structure or institution that was previously conceived of as political. There is a new form of governance that effectively accomplishes the tasks of traditional powerbearing political structures, or at the very least compliments those structures.

In this section I examine some of Foucault’s key concepts with respect to power as a framework for understanding how the nature of the political has necessarily changed as the exercise of power has changed. Correspondingly, at times it was a change in the political that resulted in alterations to forms of power. It is difficult to consider Foucault’s work without simultaneously considering the work of those commentating on, expanding upon, and modifying his work. Perhaps this is due to his early death in 1984 at the age of fifty-seven, perhaps it due to the nature of his work, which introduced novel concepts only to abandon them and move on, as was the case with biopolitics and governmentality as explained below.\(^46\) Regardless, Foucault’s

\(^{46}\) For an account of Foucault’s life and death, see James Miller (1993).
thought is but one component of the Foucauldian line of thinking examined here. Foucault’s work was but a part, the foundational part, of a coherent and influential research program that has developed beyond the work of a single individual.

Specifically, I investigate three key concepts. First, I address panopticism and the creation of self-disciplining individuals within the political realm as a result of the rise of panoptic, or surveying power. This was modeled on Jeremy Bentham’s institution of the panopticon, or inspection house. Foucault expanded Bentham’s notion of a singular institution to the organization of society as a whole. Second, I examine biopolitics and the way the nature of the political changed to encompass life processes and operate at the level of biological function. To borrow the Arendtian language, the biological functions of *animal laborans* were incorporated into politics. Third, and finally, I consider Foucault’s overarching concept of governmentality, which has connections to and has come to encompass many of the other, and prior, aspects of Foucault’s thought. Governmentality, perhaps more explicitly than the other concepts deals with the arrangement of the state, though it certainly goes beyond this to include non-state structures. Particular attention is paid to neoliberal governmentality, which is not only a key strand of governmentality research, but also a unique constellation of power, of particular importance to democratic states.

Foucault provides us with a spectrum along which the practices of government may fall. This spectrum ranges from traditional forms of governmental sovereignty, as practiced by state institutions, to forms of self-regulation, where the individual performs the work of government on its behalf. This way of thinking permits a more complex look at the levels at which governance can occur and the means by which governance can operate. Thinking of government in this way takes a further step by questioning the normally perceived antinomies between
freedom and subjectivity. Our understanding of such concepts is shaped by the ways in which governmental apparatuses operate and the spaces provided as seemingly free from them. What exists is a complex relationship between such concepts rather than a sharp distinction between them.

The result is a politics that is more inclusive than it once was. This is a politics that has come to incorporate nearly every aspect of life, including those that were once private and beyond the scope of the state or any other public entity. Simultaneously, a framework emerged in which power that was monopolistically controlled by the state was extended and enmeshed into non-state entities, thereby, allowing the state to govern from afar. The result is an unprecedented state of affairs in which all things have been subjected to political control, while state apparatuses have, to a degree, shifted enforcement of behavior to non-state institutions. This diffusion of power, which was once exercised solely by state institutions, has gone so far as to coopt the individual who now self-regulates on behalf of the state. A key path to this self-regulation was the development of the concept of panopticism.

4.2 Panopticism

It would be impossible to address Foucault’s conception of panopticism without at least briefly mentioning Jeremy Bentham’s panopticon. Bentham’s panopticon was, in brief, a prison in which the inmates could be observed at any time without their knowledge. The desired effect was that the inmates would behave as if they were under observation at all times (Bentham, 1995b). The standard design was a central tower occupied by observers with a surrounding ring, which housed those potentially under observation. The purported purpose of the inspection house was the utilitarian administration of the penal system, although its actual purpose along with the
entirety of Bentham’s project has been questioned. While rooted in Bentham’s singular institution, the inspection house, Foucault’s panopticism permitted a wider application of the concept to society at large (Foucault, 1977, pp. 195-230). Some have seen Foucault’s interpretation of and expansion upon Bentham as containing problematic distortions of the latter’s work (Dinwiddy, 2003; Engelmann, 2003; Schofield, 2009). Others have examined the connections running between the two authors without becoming preoccupied with rescuing Bentham’s image (Brunon-Ernst, 2012b).

Foucault believed his concept of panopticism embodied the transformations that took place at the beginning of the nineteenth century. Thus, he opened his *Truth and Juridical Forms* by observing that “[p]eople at the beginning of the Nineteenth Century . . . did not fail to notice the appearance of what I’ve been calling – somewhat arbitrarily but, at any rate, in homage to Bentham – ‘panopticism’” (Foucault, 1994, p. 70). Foucault believed the societal transformation and move toward panopticism was important, however, its description required a modification of Bentham’s original concept. Michel de Certeau described Foucault’s transformation of the panopticon into panopticism as follows: “The first step is a découpage: it isolates a design of some practice from a seamless web, in order to constitute these practices as a distinct and separate corpus, a coherent whole, which is nonetheless alien to the place in which theory is produced . . . In the second step, the unity, thus isolated, is reversed” (1995, p. 334). As

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47 Some claim that Bentham was primarily concerned with the protection of rights and maintaining the rule of law (Hart, 2001; Rosen, 1983). For example, Schofield noted that Bentham intended the panopticon as a vast improvement over the conditions of prisoners at the time (2009), Foucault himself acknowledged the noble intentions of the reforms. Others maintain that Bentham produced authoritarian measures aimed at total social control (Hume, 2004; Long, 1977; Rosenblum, 1978). By way of example, Himmelfarb charged that Bentham did not consider potential inmates fully human and hence undeserving of the rights that went along with that status (1985; 1995, pp. 32-81).

48 The panoptical connection between Foucault and Bentham is the most obvious and widely investigated; however, there are others, for example, see Brunon-Ernst (2012a).
described elsewhere Foucault routinely selected facts on the basis of their helpfulness toward the ultimate explanatory goal (Bevis, Cohen, & Kendall, p. 172).

The purpose here, however, is to investigate Foucault’s concept so I will set aside Bentham’s influential work and focus upon the Foucauldian application. Bentham’s project was to architecturally construct singular institutions, be they factories or prisons, which embodied the continuous prospect of potential observation. The ultimate end of the project was to teach and instill the mode of behavior the institution desired. Foucault applied this notion to the modern state, which possessed panopticism as one of its traits. Thus, panopticism was defined as “a type of power that is applied to individuals in the form of continuous individual supervision, in the form of control, punishment, and compensation, and in the form of correction, that is the molding and transformation of individuals in terms of certain norms” (Foucault, 1994, p. 70). The effect the panoptical prison had on prisoners was universalized within a territory by the society-wide application of panopticism. Desired and expected behaviors became the norm and took the place of actions that were novel, unexpected, or undesirable.

Foucault’s most famous treatment of panopticism came in Discipline and Punish published in 1975. However, in earlier lectures Foucault can be seen wrestling with the creation of the concept. For example, in the aforementioned Truth and Juridical Forms there is a fairly straightforward description of the panopticon:

The Panopticon is a ring-shaped building in the middle of which there is a yard with a tower at the centre. The ring is divided into little cells that face the interior and exterior alike. In each of these little cells there is, depending on the purpose of the institution, a child learning to write, a worker at work, a prisoner correcting himself, a madman living in madness. In the central tower, there is an observer . . . able to see everything without anyone seeing him (Foucault, 1994, p. 58).

Similar descriptions can be found in other pre-Discipline and Punish works, such as Foucault’s 1973-74 lecture Psychiatric Power (2006b, pp. 74-75), as well as works written several years
later, e.g. *The Eye of Power* (1980a). In *Discipline and Punish* itself Foucault provided his most in-depth articulation of the panopticon:

At the periphery, an annular building; at the centre, a tower: this tower is pierced with wide windows that open onto the inner side of the ring; the peripheric building is divided into cells, each of which extends the whole width of the building; they have two windows, one on the inside, corresponding to the windows of the tower; the other, on the outside allows the light to cross the cell from one end to the other. All that is needed, then, is to place a supervisor in a central tower and to shut up in each cell a madman, a patient, a condemned man, a worker or a schoolboy. By the effect of the backlighting, one can observe from the tower, standing out precisely against the light the small captive shadows in the cells of the periphery. They are like so many cages, so many small theaters, in which each actor is alone, perfectly individualized and constantly visible (Foucault, 1977, p. 200).

The original notion of the panopticon remained pervasive throughout Foucault’s development of panopticism.49

Foucault described the panopticon as “a diagram of a mechanism of power reduced to its ideal form” the result was “a marvelous machine which, whatever use one may wish to put it to, produces homogenous effects of power” (1977, pp. 202, 205). This homogenous effect was the self-regulation of behavior brought about by the constant potentiality of surveillance. As William Bogard put it, “this should not be confused with an ideological formation or a representation which masks the truth of social relations . . . . It is an unstable historical formation neither universal nor the totality of social relations, but rather the form of a changing amalgam of localized events and processes” (1991, pp. 327-328). The panopticon could only be applied in “rigorously closed” systems, e.g. schools, hospitals, and of course prisons (Foucault, 1977, p. 207). The self-regulating behavior produced by the panopticon resulted in a system of control

49 In addition to the works already mentioned, see Foucault’s *About the Concept of the “Dangerous” Individual in Nineteenth-century Legal Psychiatry* (1984a, p. 186); *What is Called Punishing?* (1984b, p. 385); *Questions of Method* (1991b, pp. 81-82); *The Punitive Society* (1997c, pp. 32-35); *Security, Territory, Population* (2009, pp. 66, 117).
and helplessness in the face of all-powerful institutions. It could be possible for these institutions to possess the inescapable power to completely order life within their confines.

This has led some, like Duccio Trombadori, to critique Foucault for offering too pessimistic an account of a totally paralyzing disciplinary society (Foucault, 1991c). Trombadori wrote “Foucault, far from providing a new stimulus for demands of liberation, limits himself to describing a mechanism of pure imprisonment” (Foucault, 1991c, p. 20). Others charged Foucault with falling into “monolithic relativism” (Taylor, 1984, p. 179). This was the claim that Foucault’s concept of power was normatively one-dimensional and could not explain why resistance was preferable to the acceptance of domination or why some exercises of power should be resisted while others were accepted (Fraser, 1981, p. 286).50

However, in his treatment of power Foucault did not go so far as the elimination of freedom and the emergence of domination. He wrote that “[p]ower is exercised only over free subjects, and only insofar as they are ‘free’” (Foucault, 2000d, p. 342). In power relations there must be some other capable of action. Furthermore, relations of power permit a choice of action “faced with a relationship of power, a whole field of responses, reactions, results, and possible inventions may open up” (Foucault, 2000d, p. 340). Power, for Foucault, was not as simple as A forcing B to do something, or A preventing B from doing something (Foucault, 2000d, pp. 340-341). Rather, power existed within a complex array of relationships and entailed altering the possibilities of another party’s action.

The strategic nature of a relationship, with respect to influencing the possibilities of action, did not necessarily imply that the relationship was acceptable or unacceptable. Nor did such relationships necessarily violate the interests of the party being strategically influenced. For

50 Also, see Habermas and Benhabib’s Modernity versus Postmodernity (1981) and Habermas’s The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity (1987).
example, offering advice or rational argument may influence the possibilities of action just as manipulation and violence may. Some of these influences would be acceptable exercises of power and others unacceptable. Influence over possibilities that arise out of institutionalized inequality or persistent asymmetric relationships would be objectionable and proper foci of resistance (Patton, 1998, p. 69). Instead of considering power relationships good or bad it may be more useful to think of them as more or less “dangerous” on the basis of their likelihood to develop into circumstances resembling domination (Foucault, 1997b, p. 256). This necessitates the exercise of examining particular relationships of power to differentiate between those that offer the possibility of “practices freedom” and those that threaten to turn into states of domination (Foucault, 1997a, p. 283). Foucault wrote the following addressing Habermas’s work:

The idea that there could exist a state of communication that would allow games of truth to circulate freely, without any constraints or coercive effects, seems utopian to me. This is precisely a failure to see that power relations are not something that is bad in itself, that we have to break free of. I do not think that a society can exist without power relations, if by that one means the strategies by which individuals try to direct and control the conduct of others. The problem, then, is not to try to dissolve them in the utopia of completely transparent communication but to acquire the rules of law, the management techniques, and also the morality, the ethos, the practice of self, that will allow us to play these games of power with as little domination as possible (1997a, p. 298).

Hence, Foucault did not see the need to combat all relationships of power or remove all strategic of influence from social interaction.

Foucault did allow for the possibility of resistance to dangerous power relationships and even endorsed some contemporary resistances, like the gay rights movement and the women’s movement (1997d). These movements challenged asymmetric power structures and institutionally created inequalities that came close to solidifying states of domination. Both

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51 Along these lines also see Michael Kelly (1994), and Samantha Ashenden and David Owen (1999).
movements changed political, social and cultural power relationships and even challenged scientific dialogue. Such resistance can create the possibility of practices of freedom through altering relationships of power and even resisting definitions. Foucault wrote “[m]aybe the target nowadays is not to discover what we are, but to refuse what we are” (Foucault, 2000d, p. 336). Foucault appeared to believe that more acceptable social practices could arise in the wake of resistance (Foucault, 1991c, pp. 159-163). Whether such resistances could be instigated prior to the solidification of domination may be an open question, adopted on a case-by-case basis. There was also the problem of whether individuals or collectives could recognize that they are on the impaired side of dangerous power relationships. Put another way, can we even recognize that we are in a panopticon, or that it is a potentially dangerous power relationship?

Visibility of power was an important aspect of the panoptical relationship. Foucault wrote that:

Bentham laid down the principle that power should be visible and unverifiable. Visible: the inmate will constantly have before his eyes the tall outline of the central tower from which he is spied upon. Unverifiable: the inmate must never know whether he is being looked at any one moment; but he must be sure that he may always be so . . . the Panopticon is a machine for dissociating the see/being seen dyad: in the peripheric ring, one is totally seen, without ever seeing; in the central tower, one sees everything without ever being seen (1977, pp. 201-202).

Importantly, then, the panoptic relationship was an unequal one, as there existed a rigid dichotomy between the observed and the observer, the warden and the inmate, the doctor and the patient, the instructor and the pupil. This structure not only hides the physical form of the observer but other aspects of the operation. The observed is not privy to the observer’s motives, ethics, or practices. This must be a source of uneasiness. Not only is the observed subjected to the self-regulating control of the observer but he also may lack any knowledge of his captor’s intentions.
The importance of the observed parties lack of knowledge and seeing, paired with the observer’s potential to constantly survey have led some authors to focus on sight as key component of social control. Some, such as Martin Jay (1986) and Majid Yar (2003), have adopted sight as the primary point of commentary and critique. Indeed, sight was important, as Foucault put it “visibility is a trap” (1977, p. 200). Sight entailed silent observation and modern technology has permitted the replacement of the human seer with a mechanical seer in the form of video cameras, as extensively used in London, or unmanned drones as controversially employed by America. Taken to extremes panoptic sight creates an Orwellian society. Bogard argued that Foucault’s position on the relationship between the observed and the observer should be read as a result, rather than as a cause, of the panoptic principle:

If Foucault emphasized the importance of the gaze . . . it was always with a view to other problems: first, of the standardization of multiple techniques – the concrete operations – for partitioning space and ordering temporal relations (i.e. imposing form on the multiplicity of human conduct), and second, of linking these operations to the forms of discursive knowledge which direct the gaze and give it its object (1991, pp. 336-337).

The purpose of panopticism, then, revolves around ordering as much as around seeing. It allows the creation of social categories and the appropriate filing of individuals into them. Population management during plagues was one early application that led to the prospect of domination (Green, 1999).

Opposed to the closed nature of the panopticon, panopticism “is the general principle of a new ‘political anatomy’ whose object and end are not the relations of sovereignty but the relations of discipline” (Foucault, 1977, p. 208). The primary purpose of panopticism was identical to that of the panopticon:

to induce in the inmate a state of consciousness and permanent visibility that assures the automatic functioning of power. So to arrange things that surveillance is permanent in its effects, even if it is discontinuous in its action: that the perfection of power should tend to render its actual exercise unnecessary; that this architectural apparatus should be a machine for creating and sustaining a power relation independent of the person who
exercises it; in short, that the inmates should be caught up in a power situation of which they are themselves the bearers (Foucault, 1977, p. 201).

Uncertain of whether he is being watched but certain of the possibility of being watched the inmate regulates his own behavior. He behaves as if he is being watched at all times so as not to incur disciplinary action from the observer who may or may not be watching. Thus, the rules of the institution or the society are enforced by the internal self-regulation of individuals. As Foucault put it, “[h]e who is subjected to a field of visibility, and who knows it, assumes responsibility for the constraints of power; he makes them play spontaneously upon himself; he inscribes in himself the power relation in which he simultaneously plays both roles; he becomes the principle of his own subjection” (1977, pp. 202-203). This sort of control represented a transition from traditional power to self-regulating individuals. In other words it was a shift from externally applied “heavy” power to a “lighter” power, from resource consuming physical punishment to seemingly less resource intensive non-physical control (Foucault, 1977, p. 203). This was the power of “mind over mind” (Foucault, 1977, p. 206).52 Correspondingly, the theatrical “great spectacle” of torture and execution gave way to an “age of sobriety” in punishment (Foucault, 1977, p. 14). In line with Foucault’s analysis of the pastoralization of power, discussed with governmentality, the goal was no longer simply to exert control over the body, but rather, to discipline the entire life of the individual.53

Foucault used the metaphor of a historical royal menagerie to describe panopticism. However, “the animal is replaced by man, individual distribution by specific grouping and the

52 Foucault’s language here was borrowed from Bentham’s 1787 letter from Russia in which he described his Panopticon as “[a] new mode of obtaining power of mind over mind, in a quantity hitherto without example; and that, to a degree equally without example, secured by whoever chooses to have it so, against abuse” (1995a, p. 29).

53 Sigmund Freud articulated this has the internalization of the of the power of control, as the victory super-ego which made civilization a possibility (Freud, 1961). Similarities between Foucault and Freud should not be surprising given their shared Nietzschean influence.
king by the machinery of a furtive power” (Foucault, 1977, p. 203). Individuals within a panopticon, or a panoptic society, no longer live natural lives. They can be isolated, sorted, compared, and always observed. “[T]he panopticon does the work of a naturalist” (Foucault, 1977, p. 203). Simultaneously, “the Panopticon is also a laboratory” (Foucault, 1977, pp. 203-204). The level of observation, the ability to sort and compare individuals whether they are inmates, patients, students, workers, or merely individuals, permits experimentation.

The social world could be structured and manipulated to bring about the desired behaviors. Foucault wrote of panoptic observation:

This enclosed, segmented space, observed at every point, in which the individuals are inserted in a fixed place, in which the slightest movements are supervised, in which all events are recorded, in which an uninterrupted work of writing links the centre and the periphery, in which power is exercised without division, according to continuous hierarchical figure, in which each individual is constantly located, examined and distributed . . . (1977, p. 197).

Thus, Foucault was not only writing about the control over the body and mind through various techniques, but also, as Bogard observed, the “mechanics of administration” (1991, p. 334). Foucault was concerned with the “generalized mechanism of panopticism” (Foucault, 1977, p. 216). This mechanism was “indefinitely generalizable” resulting in a “disciplinary society” (Foucault, 1977, p. 216). Ever advancing techniques and technologies made panoptic observation possible at the societal level while simultaneously alleviating the need for a human observer to be constantly on duty. Far from requiring a human observer “[w]hat are required are mechanisms that analyze distributions, gaps, series, combinations, and which use instruments that render visible, record, differentiate and compare: a physics of a relational and multiple power” (Foucault, 1977, p. 199). Such mechanisms can be entirely automated as commentators, surveillance scholars, and even casual news consumers have noticed.
Examples of new formulations of panopticism abound and I have limited discussion to a few relevant and important accounts. Descriptions of various new takes on panopticism that have cropped up post-Foucault and could have continued endlessly with discussion of the panspectron detailing the manner in which open information creates a system of constant surveillance (DeLanda, 1991; Palmås, 2011), the fractal panoptic (De Angelis, 2001), the myopic panopticon which explains distortions in monitoring (Leman-Langlois, 2003), the industrial panopticon (Butchart, 1996), the neo-panopticon (Mann, Nolan, & Wellman, 2003), the panopticon-at-large (Lyon, 1994, pp. 57-80), the social panopticon (Wacquant, 2001), the polyopticon (M. Allen, 1994), the urban panopticon (Koskela, 2003), the educational pedagogopticon (Sweeny, 2005), or the synopticon as the many observing and admiring the few (Mathiesen, 1997). Panopticism has been expanded to include and applied to a vast variety of settings. For example, Vicente Berdayes (2002) developed the concept of panoptic discourse to demonstrate how management theories applied panopticism within organizations.

Some have used Foucault’s panopticism not only as a way to understand society-wide surveillance structures but also as a point of entry into his thought generally as well as the far-reaching works on governmentality. Foucault did much to bring panopticism and the panopticon under scholarly scrutiny. As David Lyon, in describing the modern electronic panopticon, wrote “[t]hough many historians of ideas or systems of punishment have recognized the importance of the panopticon, it is really only since Foucault that interest in it has become widespread” (1994, p. 62). Many have equated panopticism with pervasive surveillance though, at times, the emphasis on the techniques or the nature of surveillance overlooks its universalizing effects on behavior. In addition to those already mentioned there is no shortage of freshly coined terms used to describe various surveillance paradigms.
Some attempts to update panopticism leave the core of the concept intact. Some have expanded the notion of panopticism with little alteration. For example, Stephen Gill presented the idea that the panopticon now operated on a global scale and individuals, as well as nations, fall under panoptic surveillance (1995). Alternatively, Nic Groombridge described a more democratic system, “an ‘omnicon’ where all watch, or might potentially, watch all” (2003, p. 43). The democratic omnicon would at least allow the potential to observe all; the guardians would themselves be guarded, to answer the question posed by everyone from Juvenal (2004) to the blockbuster film *Watchmen* (2009). By contrast, Didier Bigo has argued that society operates as a “ban-opticon” which employees profiling technologies to place members of suspect categories under panoptic surveillance and influence (2002; Bigo & Guild, 2005). “This global ban-opticon has contributed to the securitization not only of terrorism but . . . of citizenship and migration, which highlights the relationship between protection and the political” (Fierke, 2007, p. 183).

It is no surprise that panopticism and its derivations have been criticized. Some have argued that attempts to move the panoptical principle from singular institutional sites of confinement and surveillance have limited its usefulness and stretched its accuracy. Such claims charge that when theorists make the move from Bentham’s inspection house to Foucault’s disciplining society they go too far. The panoptical principle cannot be applied to a wide public arena because the necessary surveillance and normalizing corrective action would simply not be possible in non-carceral settings (Mc Cahill, 2002; Norris & Armstrong, 1999). Such authors were, however, addressing the effect of CCTV as the primary mechanism of surveillance. While this technology is lacking, it has advanced much since these pieces were authored and has been combined with other methods of surveillance and data accumulation. Even when only
considering the use of CCTV more than a decade ago, the concept of the panopticon could not be outright dismissed, but only qualified as Norris and Armstrong put it, “[w]hile we do not disagree that introduction of CCTV to public space represents a move toward panopticism, we need to recognize that the totalizing vision of the panoptic prison is not simply reproduced on the streets with the introduction of cameras” (Norris & Armstrong, 1999, p. 92). The concept remains useful but must be subjected to the limits that differentiate society from a more contained system in which total control would be far more practically achieved.

Others have challenged the wholesale applicability of the panoptical concept in modern society, as opposed to those who challenge its empirical accuracy in specific contexts. These critics believed that the conditions that would permit the possibility of a panopticon vanished. Foucault’s disciplinary society was short lived and by the middle of the twentieth century was fading. The perceived breakdown was the result of vanishing institutional boundaries and with them the sites wherein panoptic discipline had functioned. The interiors where panopticism had been at least a possibility were fading. Deleuze wrote:

We’re in the midst of a general breakdown of all sites of confinement – prisons, hospitals, factories, schools, the family. The family is an “interior” that’s breaking down like all other interiors – educational, professional, and so on. The appropriate ministers have constantly been announcing supposedly appropriate reforms; but everyone knows these institutions are in more or less terminal decline. It’s simply a matter of keeping people busy until the new forces knocking at the door take over (1995, p. 178).

Panoptical, disciplinary societies gave way to “societies of control” as their institutions were replaced by “ultrarapid forms of apparently free-floating control” (Deleuze, 1995, p. 178). Control was fluid and modulating and so not dependent upon fixedness as discipline had been. As Deleuze put it “[c]onfinements are moulds, differing mouldings, while controls are a modulation, like a self-transmuting moulding continually changing from one moment to the next, or like a sieve whose mesh varies from one point to another” (1995, pp. 178-179). Deleuze also
recognized a role for advanced technology to monitor and control “dividuals” and saw the entire shift as “rooted in a mutation of capitalism,” which he terms “metaproduction” (1995, pp. 180-182).

Similarly, Zygmunt Bauman (2000) wrote of the rise of fluid societies, at the expense of collapsing institutions. A critical component of Bauman’s analysis was his contention that powers once held by institutions or the state were now held by individuals resulting in his titular concept liquid modernity:

an individualized, privatized version of modernity, with the burden of pattern-weaving and the responsibility for failure falling primarily on the individual’s shoulders . . . . Solids are cast once and for all. Keeping fluids in shape requires a lot of attention, constant vigilance and perpetual effort – and even then the success of the effort is anything but a foregone conclusion (Bauman, 2000, pp. 7-8).

Bauman also described post-disciplinary power brought about by individualization. He emphasized the use of technology, with the database as an example (1998, p. 51).

However, for Bauman cultural change took precedence over technological development. He asked “Is there life after Panopticon” (Bauman, 1998, p. 48). The fixedness required by the panopticon had been replaced by “extraterritoriality” and a marked end to “the era of mutual engagement: between the supervisors and supervised, capital and labour, leaders and their followers, armies at war” (Bauman, 2000, p. 11). Ultimately, Bauman expanded on Mathiesen’s (1997) notion of synopticon. The synopticon’s functions could be contrasted with the confinement and coercion of the panopticon. In the former:

Locals watch the globals. The authority of the latter is secured by their very remoteness; the globals are literally “out of this world”, but their hovering above the worlds of the local is much more, daily and obtrusively, visible than that of the angels who once hovered over the Christian world: simultaneously inaccessible and within sight, lofty and mundane, infinitely superior yet setting a shining example for all the inferiors to follow or to dream of following; admired and coveted at the same time – a royalty that guides instead of ruling (Bauman, 1998, pp. 53-54).
Bauman’s version of the synopticon altered the operation of the panopticon. While the panopticon prohibited unsurveyable space, the synopticon brought all personal and private life into view (Bauman, 2000, pp. 26-30). Bearing a resemblance to a society organized around televisual spectacle the many observed a few.

Bauman argued that his notion of individualization was a part of the pervasive logic of neoliberal mode of governance, one understanding of governmentality. Structures contributed to their own decline by adopting this logic by increasingly promoting the rule of “unbound ‘market forces’ and free trade” (Bauman, 1999, p. 28). This tendency led to the rise of what Bauman termed “consumerism,” which entailed the consumerization and economization of the state, politics, and relationships within their frameworks (Bauman, 2002, 2010). Consumerism was detrimental, for Bauman, in that despite its claims of granting individuals greater freedom it removed them from politics by closing them off from the public sphere, rendering them consumers rather than citizens. He wrote:

Once the state recognizes the priority and superiority of the laws of the market over the laws of the polis, the citizen is transmuted into the consumer, and a consumer “demands more and more protection while accepting less and less the need to participate” in the running of the state. The overall result is the present “fluid conditions of generalized anomie and rejection of the rules” in all their versions. (Bauman, 1999, p. 156).

Bauman’s solution was to emphasize the republican notion of freedom, focusing on a collective common good, over the neo-liberal notion of laissez-faire freedom, which markets routinely promised and failed to deliver (Bauman, 1999, 2004).

A number of authors have taken the above sort of critique as a point of departure. Agamben’s “zones of indistinction” represents a new mode of power, one which uses data to monitor and direct individuals as they move across the no longer existent boundaries between public and private life, ultimately rendering behavior malleable and predictable (1998). Bauman (1998), Rose (1999), Diden and Laustsen (2002), and Hardt and Negri (2000) found similar
apparatuses at work. The visual surveillance permitted by the panoptical design of the inspection house was ultimately replaced by more sophisticated methods of “dataveillance.” This new technology makes possible the automatic inclusion or exclusion of individuals from citizenship, spaces, or services (Bogard, 1996; Rose, 2000, pp. 324-327). The historical configurations of the discipline society were replaced by the configuration of a society of power/control.

Some have remained committed to an extended form of panopticism as a method of analyzing surveillance while focusing on the role of ever advancing technology. For example, Boyne argued that “the Panoptical principle is not fading away, and that developments in screening and surveillance require the retention of the Panopticon as an analytical ideal type” (2000, p. 285). Such authors retain the basic triad underlying panopticism: observe-classify-normalize. In this line of thought the social contexts and locations of surveillance will, of course, not always be in-line with the ideal type. According to Boyne, the most productive way forward is to adopt a Derridean approach: placing panopticism under erasure thereby retaining it as a tool while “simultaneously denying its validity as description” (Boyne, 2000, p. 303). Gandy described the “panoptic sort” of entire populations into categories such as “normality” and “abnormality” based upon the data from information systems (1993). This sorting by pervasive information systems is then used to deny or provide opportunities to workers, consumers, and citizens.

Similarly, Mark Poster seized on the monitoring of personal information, communications, and large data to construct his notion of the superpanopticon. Like Foucault, Poster recognized that surveillance had been spread throughout society and was no longer concentrated in a single institution. “Today’s ‘circuits of communication’ and the databases they generate constitute a Superpanopticon, a system of surveillance without walls, windows, towers
or guards” (Poster, 1990, p. 93). Poster argued that the superpanopticon “reconfigures the constitution of the subject” in a new way (1996, p. 182). Subjects are recreated in a form of hyperreality “the subject has been multiplied and decentered, capable of being acted upon by computers at many social locations without the least awareness by the individual concerned yet just as surely as if the individual were present somehow inside the computer” (Poster, 1996, p. 186). As a subject, each individual exists outside of themselves within some, probably multiple, databases where they are acted upon and monitored at times with and at times without their knowledge.

**From Panopticism to Governmentality**

Ever-developing technology results in advances in panopticism, or your preferred – opticism, and continually creates new forms of “political machines” (Barry & Wissenburg, 2001; Thrift, 2006). The political machine, to which Thrift refers, ties arts of surveillance into governmentality:

> Political knowledge has become systematized in networks of devices which require technological capacity to operate and discriminate. Most particularly, we can point to the use of computer software to encapsulate scientific methods that have recast the old arts of patrol, diagnose, cross-reference, and survey, thereby beginning to produce something like continuous government which will act as a kind of politics by default. Two main methods of working toward this continuous government are currently in operation. The first of these is profiling, simulations of the likes and dislikes of citizens that present a recurring problematic for and solution to government (Elmer, 2004). The second is track and trace, the attempt continuously to track citizens’ spatial routines, producing what might be called a real-time census in which the state of citizens can be continually updated . . . (Thrift, 2006, p. 553).

This approach to emerging technologies of surveillance connect panoptical concepts, like control societies (Deleuze, 1995), coded bodies (Aas, 2006), social sorting (Lyon, 2009), banopticism (Bigo, 2008) as apparatuses of continuous government, to governmentality. Processes of e-government (Henman, 2010) and emergent internet orders of governance (Flyverbom, 2011) can similarly be read as specific constellations of disciplinary power related to governmentality.
To conclude this treatment of panopticism, its connection with governmentality and the intrusion of government into new areas of life more generally must be noted. While delivering a lecture on biopolitics in 1979, from which the governmentality concept was born, Foucault noted that “[e]conomic freedom, liberalism in the sense I have just been talking about, and disciplinary techniques are completely bound up with each other” (Foucault, 2008, p. 67).54 Foucault argued that liberalism as a governmental form did not “leave more white spaces of freedom” and instead constantly worked to produce freedom, which was then consumed by that same government (Foucault, 2008, p. 67). By way of example, liberalism portended to permit free market laissez-faire economics, while in fact that economic system existed only because government had extended its reach into the market. It had observed the market and stepped in to correct what it viewed as undesired behavior, applying “control, constraint, and coercion” to construct its freedom (Foucault, 2008, p. 67). This intervention occurred through two modes of action. First, as with Roosevelt’s welfare policies, the government could directly influence “the function of producing, breathing life into, and increasing freedom, of introducing additional freedom through additional control and intervention” (Foucault, 2008, p. 67). Second, less directly, previously panoptical “[g]overnment, initially limited to the function of supervision is only to intervene when it sees that something is not happening according to the general mechanics of behavior, exchange, and economic life” (Foucault, 2008, p. 67).

54 Foucault, somewhat problematically, viewed Bentham as the prime representative of liberal thought. This led to his contention that the Panopticon was “the very formula of liberal government” (Foucault, 2008, p. 67). Foucault’s view of liberalism may have been different, or perhaps his case strengthened, had he adopted some other thinker as representative of liberalism. To complicate matters further it has been argued that Foucault misread Bentham in *Discipline and Punish*, for example, see Garland (1993).
4.3 Biopolitics

Biopolitics became an important topic in Foucault’s work during a 1976 lecture (Foucault, 2008) and in *The History of Sexuality* (Foucault, 1978), though the term had previously appeared in a prior 1974 lecture on the *Birth of Social Medicine* (Foucault, 2000a, p. 137). As with many of Foucault’s important conceptual developments, biopolitics was used to denote different ideas at different times and there are several aspects of biopolitics that will be addressed here. First, it should be noted that Foucault, at times, supplemented the term “biopower” for biopolitics without clearly distinguishing between the two. The two concepts are certainly related though not always equivalent. Second, biopolitics represented a novel formulation of political power and a radical transformation in political thought and modes of conduct. Third, biopolitics was integrally tied to the rise of racism in the modern age. Fourth, biopolitics at times denoted the liberal art of government and is tied to Foucault’s work on governmentality in this way. Foucault eventually moved away from the examination of biopolitics, and as was his tendency left much in the way of unexplored territory. For example, he desired to move away from the naturalization of power and find a way to understand the “art of living” that could exist outside of the universal normative claims of biological science (Foucault, 1978). This field of study has been taken up by a variety of subsequent scholars impacted by Foucault’s work.

Foucault analyzed the mechanisms of power with an eye toward their historical limits and applications. This led to a distinction between traditional sovereign power and the more newly emergent biopower. Sovereign power was exercised by deduction; essentially, the deprivation of goods and services, and in extreme cases the deduction of the subject’s life. Deduction was being used in a mathematical sense of removal with the case of a life this meant annihilation, rather
than deduction in the sense associated with logic, e.g. as opposed to induction. Foucault believed that the sovereign “right of life and death” dramatically changed in the period after the 17th century. Sovereign power had become integrated with biopower, a power that operated by means other than mere deduction: “‘Deduction’ has tended to be no longer the major form of power but merely one element among others, working to incite, reinforce, control, monitor, optimize, and organize the forces under it: a power bent on generating forces, making them grow, and ordering them rather than one dedicated to impeding them, making them submit or destroying them” (Foucault, 1978, p. 136). This novel manifestation of power could foster and secure life through administration. The change occurred not only within the political realm, but was related to changes in other areas of life as well. For example, the growth of scientific and medical knowledge, as well as the increased productive capacity of industry and agriculture were required for the “entry of life into history” (Foucault, 1978, p. 141). Advances in science, medicine, technology, and social administration permitted “relative control over life” as “methods of power and knowledge assumed responsibility for the life processes and undertook to control and modify them” (Foucault, 1978, p. 142). By contrast, prior to the integration of biopower, occurrences of disease and famine could be viewed as “pressure exerted by the biological on the historical” (Foucault, 1978, p. 141).

The negating deductive power over legal subjects gave way to a power concerned with and applied to living beings. While sovereign power either deducted a subject’s life or permitted the subject to live, biopower was capable of fostering life or preventing its existence (Foucault, 2003, p. 241). Foucault recognized two forms of biopower over living beings: control over the population, or security, and control over individuals, or discipline. Before describing these two forms of power an important qualification is necessary, namely, that these two were not entirely
separable and in fact define one another. Foucault wrote that they form “two poles of development linked together by a whole intermediary cluster of relations” (1978, p. 139). Foucault also noted that “mass” and “individual” are not dichotomous, but rather, exist together within a pandemic technological framework whose purpose is the simultaneous control over the human species and the individual human body (see Foucault, 2003, pp. 242-243). Discipline, for example, is applied to the individual, but presumes a multitude of such individuals existing within a population who are subject to the technology of security. Meanwhile, population creates an aggregation of individuals existing within some political framework.

This distinction must also be approached cautiously as it cannot be maintained while engaging in historical investigations. Foucault’s theoretical distinction is problematized when empirically examined. Thus, there existed apparatuses, or alliances between the two forms of biopower. For example, during the 19th century the state’s regulation of a population relied upon a number of institutions like philanthropic organization and insurance schemes. Similarly in the 18th century the state relied upon police technology, which existed both as a disciplinary institution and as the state’s means for monitoring and regulating the population. The powers were, at times, exercised simultaneously. Another example is the “apparatus of sexuality,” which was important for the maintenance of a population and simultaneously for the regulation of individual bodily behavior. Thus, the apparatus of sexuality stood “at the pivot of the two axes,” the individual and the population (Foucault, 1978, p. 145). Sexuality had been “the theme of political operations, economic interventions . . . and ideological campaigns for raising standards of morality and responsibility: it was put forward as the index of a society’s strength, revealing of both its political energy its biological vigor” (Foucault, 1978, p. 146). Simultaneously, it
operated as a “stamp of individuality” always at work “behind” and “underneath” outward behavior (Foucault, 1978, p. 146).

Foucault described “two transcriptions” that occurred during the 19th century. The first was the “openly biological transcription” of race war (2003, p. 60). This transcription drew upon perceived knowledge of biology while framing conflicts as evolutionary “struggles for existence.” In the second transcription race war was examined dialectically as a class conflict. As a result the revolutionary discourses substituted social class for politically constructed understandings of race (Foucault, 2003, pp. 61, 78-80). Foucault argued that the resulting version of racism was of “vital importance” because it generated the validity of killing in the presence of the newly emergent biopower (2003, p. 256).

First, with respect to security as biopolitics, control over the population, emerged in the later part of the 18th century (Foucault, 1978, p. 139). This biopolitical technology was directed at that the social body and the life processes that affected it. The accumulation and distribution of wealth, birth and death rates, incidences of disease and the promotion of health came under the control of “technology of security” (Foucault, 2003, p. 249). This entailed instruments that sought “to establish a sort of homeostasis, not by training individuals but by achieving an overall equilibrium that protects the security of the whole from internal dangers” (Foucault, 2003, p. 249). The purpose was to offset the inherent and unpreventable risks associated with a population necessarily comprised of biological beings.

The technology associated with population was differentiated from the other, and prior, disciplinary power over the individual as a living body (Foucault, 1978, p. 139). This “anatomopolitics” regarding the human body had already begun in the 17th century and viewed the body as a biological machine (Foucault, 1978, p. 139). Disciplinary power in this context aimed for the
optimization of economic outputs and simultaneous acquiescence of the political subject. Discipline, then, was the combination of the economic and the political. Foucault described the historical moment in which discipline was created as “the moment when an art of the human body was born, which directed not only at the growth of its skills, nor at the intensification of its subjection, but at the formation of a relation that in the mechanism itself makes it more obedient as it becomes more useful, and conversely” (1977, pp. 137-138). Once developed as a technology, discipline could fill the role left vacant by the decline of pre-modern means of control, serfdom, for example.

For Foucault, biopolitics was characteristic of modernity. It was only when life entered into political strategy with the emergence of biopolitics and the “incorporation” of power that society reached the “threshold of modernity” (Foucault, 1978, p. 143; 1980b, p. 125). Foucault analyzed the processes by which life emerged as a central and organizing principle of politics. This development was a radical break from the politics that preceded it. However, biopolitics was not merely added to existing political modes of power and content. Instead, it altered the very heart of politics by permitting new forms of sovereignty and knowledge. The change was fundamental:

For the first time in history . . . biological existence was reflected in political existence . . . But what might be called society’s “threshold of modernity” has been reached when the life of the species is wagered on its own political strategies. For millennia, man remained what he was for Aristotle: a living animal with the additional capacity for a political existence; modern man is an animal whose politics places his existence as a living being in question (Foucault, 1980b, pp. 142-143).

Thus, biopolitics represented a characteristically modern mode of exercising political power.

Foucault differentiated between the two forms of biopower on the basis of their dates of emergence, instrumentalities, and purposes. They were also differentiated by their positions with respect to institutions. Security could be seen at the state level and was applied across the
entirety of the population, as it existed independent of any individual institution. This biopower was concentrated as the state centralized and took on the power to regulate the entirety of its population. This centralization and regulation were dependent upon the ability to measure and account for resources and the ability to collect and make sense of demographic data describing the population. On the other hand, the development of discipline occurred within individual institutions. For example, discipline could be found within schools, hospitals, asylums, militaries, and prisons. Discipline could come in a variety of forms, Foucault’s most noted example being the panopticon. Thus, within biopower Foucault identified two series: “the population-biological process-regulatory mechanisms-State” related to population and security, and “the body-organism-discipline-institution series” of disciplinary control (Foucault, 2003, p. 250).

As biopolitics, and biopower, replaced traditional forms of power the formation of norms became important. Normalizing society emerged, replacing natural law as the ordering principle of society:

It is no longer a matter of bringing death into play in the field of sovereignty, but of distributing the living in the domain of value and utility. Such a power has to qualify, measure, appraise, and hierarchize, rather than display itself in its murderous splendor; it does not have to draw the line that separates the enemy of the sovereign from his loyal subjects. It effects distributions around the norm (Foucault, 1978, p. 144).

Rights were replaced by norms. In this instance, the absolute right of the sovereign was replaced by the new methods for comparing, measuring, and calculating life.

Foucault was not arguing that the sovereign “power over death” vanished entirely, rather that it was subjected to a new power aimed at regulating and managing life. The issue was now the survival of a living population and not the existence of a sovereign. In this way the power over death was unconstrained in that it was intended to protect and serve life all along. However, as biopolitics brought efforts to manage, preserve, and secure life it also brought frighteningly
efficient means of destroying life, as there emerged a “death-function in the economy of biopower” (Foucault, 2003, p. 258). Foucault wrote:

 Wars were never as bloody as they have been since the nineteenth century, and . . . never before did the regimes visit such holocausts on their own populations . . . . Entire populations are mobilized for the purpose of wholesale slaughter in the name of life necessity: massacres have become vital. It is as managers of life and survival, of bodies and the race, that so many regimes have been able to wage so many wars, causing so many men to be killed (Foucault, 1978, pp. 136-137).

Foucault ascribed the rise of modern racism to this development.

**Racism**

Foucault undertook a genealogy of modern racism. His account is undoubtedly lacking in some respects. For example, he does not address the role colonialism played in racist discourses.55 His analysis began in his 1976 lectures when the emphasis of biopolitics shifted. The “break between what must live and what must die” was now a central component of biopolitics (Foucault, 2003, p. 254). Sovereign power had been organized and exercised through a political-military discourse. This discourse had emerged to “challenge royal power” by the 17th century (Foucault, 2003, p. 58). This powerful discourse was present in England’s Puritan revolts and in the French aristocrats’ antagonism toward Louis XIV. Race was present in these resistances but represented political, historically based divisions within society and was not yet linked to biological traits. At this time groups were distinguished from one another on the basis of non-biological characteristics, such as religion, language, or geographical origin. These challenges to power generated questions surrounding the purported universality of laws and the legitimacy of the sovereign. In Foucault’s account discourse on race emerged in efforts to resist the pressures of existing societal power transformed into the imperative to protect society from

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living dangers. In this way “[r]acism is, quite literally, revolutionary discourse in an inverted form” (Foucault, 2003, p. 80).

Foucault’s conception of biopower up to this point had been oriented toward the management and preservation of life and racism moved the concept in a new direction. “How can a power such as this kill, if it is true that its basic function is to improve life, to prolong its duration, to improve its chances, to avoid accidents, and to compensate for failings” (Foucault, 2003, p. 254)? The answer was that “at this point racism intervenes” (Foucault, 2003, p. 254). Racism served two primary ends in Foucault’s account. First, it divided society along newly defined biological lines. The purpose was “to fragment, to create caesuras within the biological continuum” (Foucault, 2003, p. 255). Previous conceptions of race had viewed society as consisting of two distinct races, but during the 19th century this gave way to a society viewed as “biologically monist” (Foucault, 2003, p. 80). Racism’s new divisions overturned this monistic conception.

However, rather than perceiving an external threat, racism created an internal threat. The outcome was a “racism that society will direct against itself, against its own elements, and its own products. This is the internal racism of permanent purification, and it will become one of the basic dimensions of social normalization” (Foucault, 2003, p. 62). Once dividing lines were placed within society they could be viewed as the lines “between what must live and what must die” (Foucault, 2003, p. 254). This meant that one side of the line was more valuable than the other. It also meant that some races were superior to others and should be accorded superior positions. Foucault employed an unusual notion of death, which included “indirect murder.” This included killing politically and socially, rather than strictly biologically. For example, killing politically and socially could mean “exposing someone to death, increasing the risk of death for
some people, or, quite simply, political death, expulsion, rejection, and so on” (Foucault, 2003, p. 256).

In addition, racism served a second purpose that went beyond merely drawing a line between life and death. Racism created a dynamic relationship between those on either side of the line by “the establishment of a positive relation of this type: ‘The more you kill, the more deaths you will cause’ or ‘The very fact that you let more die will allow you to live more” (Foucault, 2003, p. 255). This system meant that the continued life of one demanded the death of another. The already established line determined which were worth of living and which must pay for that life by forfeiting their own. Murder, disappearances, and exclusions secured the lives of another group. This went beyond mere life, but ensured the health of life as well. Foucault wrote that “the fact that the other dies does not mean simply that I live in the sense that his death guarantees my safety; the death of the other, the death of the bad race, of the inferior race (or the degenerate, or the abnormal) is something that will make life in general healthier” (2003, p. 255).

The protection and achievement of racial purity required massive endeavors of identification, exclusion, and when necessary physical violence. It required a centralized state with the resources to execute this racist vision. The state at the end of the 19th century was willing and able to do so. Foucault argued that at this point “state racism” was the guiding rationality for action (2003, p. 261). Once the state adopted this rationality it “is no longer an instrument that one race uses against another: the state is and must be, the protector of the integrity, the superiority of the purity of the race. The idea of racial purity, with all its monistic, Statist, and biological implications: that is born at the point when the theme of racial purity replaces that of race struggle” (Foucault, 2003, p. 81). The state had become a weapon that could only be wielded by one group and which had constructed for itself pressing and legitimate needs
for its use. Thus, racism was “inscribed as the basic mechanism of power, as it is exercised in modern states” (Foucault, 2003, p. 254).

Foucault provided examples of two concrete developments in this vein. One was the Soviet Union which carried out policing along medical lines, identifying as sick, any who opposed the ruling ideology. This allowed Soviet society to achieve purity by cleansing itself of impure, unhealthy ideology (Foucault, 2003, pp. 82-83). The second example was Nazi Germany, which had employed the logic of race war both internally and externally. Germany simultaneously engaged in combat with enemies from outside its ever expanding borders as well as those lurking within. This “implied both the systematic genocide of others and the risk of exposing oneself to a total sacrifice” It was driven by the desire for the privileges justly deserved by “superior blood” (Foucault, 1978, p. 150).

With respect to the deadly side of biopolitics the work of Roberto Esposito has been both interesting and important (2008). He provided an account of political thought since Hobbes, arguing that important concepts, such as security, freedom, and property, can be viewed as falling within a “paradigm of immunization” (Esposito, 2008, p. 45). Immunity initially preserved life, but eventually shifted into a self-destructive mode. The life processes are reduced to simple biology, and this “immunitary logic” eventually leads to the destruction of life (Esposito, 2008, p. 56). Esposito’s paradigm included the life preserving and life destroying aspects of biopolitics as two components of the same concept. Extermination policies were extreme forms of immunization efforts. This was a politics of life, but also a horrific politics of death, or thanatopolitics (Esposito, 2008, Ch. 4). Achille Mbembe, similarly, argued that “necropolitics” the power over death, the power to decide who lives and who dies, represented a crucial aspect of the modern age (Mbembe, 2003).
Biopolitics of Liberalism and Resistance

As biopower was expanded, resistance to it naturally grew as an inevitable expression of freedom. Biopolitical control over life created counterclaims upon the power structure. Foucault wrote:

Against this power . . . the forces that resisted relied for support on the very thing it invested, that is, on life and man as a living being . . . . What was demanded and what served as an objective was life, understood as the basic needs, man’s concrete essence, the realization of his potential, a plentitude of the possible. Whether it was Utopia that was wanted is of little importance; what we have seen has been a very real process of struggle; life as apolitical struggle was in a sense taken at face value and turned back against the system that was bent on controlling it (1978, pp. 144-145).

As control over life increased, it became an impetus for and the subject of new social and political skirmishes. Biopower was exercised through disciplining individual bodies as biological entities and managing the population in various ways. This new power gave rise to the demand for new rights within the newly controlled areas. Right to life, to health, and to bodily sovereignty and integrity were now claimed.

Foucault argued that biopolitical struggles had certainly been important since the 1960s and perhaps as early as post-World War II. Biopolitical struggles arose as opposition to subjectivation, joining longer standing struggles against older forms of domination (Foucault, 2000d, pp. 331-332). Struggles of this sort represented a “developing crisis in government” (Foucault, 2000b, p. 295). They were unique in the fact that they represented an opposition to “government of individualization” (Foucault, 2000d, p. 330). They disputed the legitimacy of normalizing rules governing the body, ways of life, and sexual relationships. These now questioned normalizing influences began losing their power. These struggles can be seen in conflicts over the valid definitions of mental and physical health and disease, sexual relations, personal relationships, basic needs, as well as various movements from women’s rights to environmentalism.
Roberto Esposito is again useful as he offered a biopolitical countermeasure to his thanatopolitics. Consistent with Foucault and Agamben, who is discussed below, Esposito considered totalitarian governments and democratic governments as existing on the same continuum. However, Esposito offered an “affirmative biopolitics” of individual and collective bodies capable of defending themselves by opposing immunitary rationality. Thus, this biopolitics was “capable of overturning the Nazi politics of death in a politics that is no longer over life but of life” (Esposito, 2008, p. 11). Perhaps the biopolitical struggles that Foucault pointed to are examples of just such a defensive reflex.

**Biopolitics in Contrast and Development**

Foucault’s conception of biopolitics shares certain features with the thought of Hannah Arendt. Although the two thinkers did not reference one another, general connections between their thought have been noted (A. Allen, 2002; N. Gordon, 2002), and connections between their thought on biopolitics, though Arendt did not emphasis that term, have been found (Blencowe, 2010; Braun, 2007). Braun argued that their projects were similar in that they both sought to “unearth the roots,” of totalitarianism and atrocities, which both located within modernity (2007, p. 8). Braun connected the thought of Arendt and Foucault at several points with respect to the biopolitical, each of which were themselves connected to totalitarianism.

First, was the “zoefication of humans,” the control over and concern for bare existence (Braun, 2007, p. 8). Foucault expressed this as biopolitical control over life and the preservation of life, while Arendt expressed it as the priority of labor and the transformation of politics into housekeeping. As Braun wrote:

Thus, while Foucault stresses that life is a resource which gets mobilized, Arendt points out that life is constantly (re)produced. Both, however, state that individual life functions as a force that feeds into the dynamic of a larger process, be it as a resource or as a product, and that the newly emerging sphere of the social is not least characterized by the
constant consumption of life in order to maintain the dynamic of this process. They both, I argue, make the diagnosis . . . that the rise of the social implies a certain degradation of individual lives to mere means of sustaining and feeding the economy (2007, p. 9).

In both, the continuation of society and its economic processes had become the most important good.

Second, Braun connected Foucault and Arendt at the point of politics, through biopolitics, being reduced to administration and the administration of life (2007, p. 10). Biopolitics, for Foucault, entailed the monitoring, development, and application of the population as a resource. This was “a specifically technocratic understanding of politics in modernity: politics is mainly the set of technologies required to achieve certain ends such as the increase of the welfare and productivity of the population” (Braun, 2007, p. 10). Arendt also saw modern politics as managing life and administering its necessities and government as a housekeeper. Arendt lamented the loss of politics as an end in itself that this entailed, while Foucault lacked this normative lament.

With respect to biopolitics, as with many aspects of Foucault’s thought, the post-Foucault developments are as important as the work actually conducted during his lifetime. I will address several strands of thought conceptually building upon Foucault’s biopolitics. Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri’s incorporation of capitalism represents the first strand. The second strand can be found in Giorgio Agamben’s concept and expansion of the bare life. Third, I provide a brief overview of the position of Ferenc Fehér and Agnes Heller who take a different position, arguing that biopolitics represents a retreat, rather than an expansion of politics.

For Hardt and Negri biopolitics meant more than physical control over life and death, and was characterized by the vanishing of previously existing borders between production and reproduction or economics and politics. In one of their coauthored works, Empire (Hardt & Negri, 2000), they described a newly emergent world order characterized by the intermeshing of
the legal-political realm and economic structures. Empire represents both a form of world
domination and “a new form of sovereignty” (Hardt & Negri, 2000, p. xi). As a part of this
change, the authority of the individual nation-state has declined in importance, overshadowed by
supranational organizations, like the European Union, and nongovernmental organizations.
Simultaneously, Hardt and Negri noted a shift away from constitutionally guaranteed freedom
toward policies conforming to Foucault’s logic of police. The new sovereignty that they identify
did not have an outside or a center and operated as interlocking politically decisive units that
construct a systematically and logically different form of rule (Hardt & Negri, 2000, pp. 186-
190). Economically, Empire means an integrated global capitalist system the impacts of which
can be seen in bodies and minds, as well as markets.

Hardt and Negri saw an important change take place in the 1970s, as industrial capitalism
was replace by “cognitive capitalism” (Negri, 2008, p. 64). Capitalism was socialized into life
and thought like never before. Cognitive capitalism was identified by the transformation it
created in the working individuals through its informatized, automated, networked, and
globalized production. These transformations of the productive process blurred the distinctions
between physical and intellectual labor as well as between individual and collective labor leading
to the emergence of “immaterial labor.” Immaterial labor could be identified by three features:

The first is involved in an industrial production that has been informationalized and has
incorporated communication technologies in way that transforms the production process
itself . . . Second is the immaterial labor of analytical and symbolic tasks. Finally, a third
type of immaterial labor involves the production and manipulation of affect and requires
(virtual or actual) human contact (Hardt & Negri, 2000, p. 293).

Capitalist exploitation now operated differently, by incorporating the intellectual, affective, and
cooperative aspects of work. All the powers of groups and individuals and all spheres of life
could now be harnessed to create surplus value. “There is nothing, no ‘naked life,’ no external
standpoint, that can be posed outside this field permeated by money; nothing escapes money” (Hardt & Negri, 2000, p. 32).

Building upon Foucault, Hardt and Negri described biopower as “the real subsumption of society under capital” (2000, p. 255). They claimed that the process of wealth generation “tends ever more toward what we will call biopolitical production, the production of social life itself, in which the economic, the political, and the cultural increasingly overlap and invest one another” (Hardt & Negri, 2000, p. xiii). They attributed to Foucault a “structural epistemology” which led to his holding too static a conception of biopolitics (Hardt & Negri, 2000, p. 28). Foucault’s work was too concerned with the top-down processes of biopolitics, while Hardt and Negri desired a dynamic account of empire. As a corrective, Hardt and Negri combined their notion of universally present biopower with Deleuze’s (1995) work on control societies. Hardt and Negri followed Deleuze’s position of dispersed and omnipresent control. Biopolitics was applied to life within society while also being applied to the private details of individuals’ lives. They described biopolitics as “control that extends throughout the depths of the consciousness and bodies of the population – and at the same time across the entirety of social relations” (Hardt & Negri, 2000, p. 24).

Further differentiating their work from Foucault, Hardt and Negri drew a finer distinction between biopolitics and biopower. “Biopower stands above society, transcendent, as a sovereign authority and imposes its order. Biopolitical production, in contrast, is immanent to society and creates social relations and forms through collaborative forms of labor” (Hardt & Negri, 2004, pp. 94-95). Biopolitical production contained two components of capitalist socialization. They described the disappearance of two boundaries. For Hardt and Negri, these dual disappearances signaled the move from the modern to the postmodern era. First, they described both the
disappearance of the boundaries between economics and politics, and how the absence of that boundary was characteristic of the new capitalism. Life was now determinative of production, rather than the creation of life being limited to the sphere of reproduction, and as such subordinated to labor processes. As a result, the line between production and reproduction vanished, similar to the line between economics and politics. Biopower came to represent a crucial part of production, while it had previously represented the reproduction and assurance of the continuation of the relationships necessary for production. Empire, then, was a “regime of biopower” wherein the political constitution ordering and regulating the political body merged with economic production (Hardt & Negri, 2000, p. 41). As a result, the previously distinct economic and political realms came to share practices and modes of thought. As Hardt and Negri put it, “[p]roduction becomes indistinguishable from reproduction; productive forces merge with relations of production; constant capital tends to be constituted and represented within variable capital, in the brains, bodies, and cooperation of productive subjects. Social subjects are at the same time producers and products of this unitary machine” (2000, p. 385; see Hardt & Negri, 2004, pp. 334-335).

Second, biopolitical production entailed a “civilization of nature” (Hardt & Negri, 2000, p. 187). This meant there was a new type of relationship between nature, as anything previously outside of the production process and culture. Nature “has become capital, or at least has become subject to capital,” and meanwhile, life became an object ripe for the intervention of capitalist technology (Hardt & Negri, 2000, p. 32). Natural process were now subjected to commercial interests and used as productive inputs, and biology became an object of political and legal regulation. “Previous stages of the industrial revolution introduced machine-made consumer goods and then machine-made machines, but now we find ourselves confronted with machine-
made raw materials and foodstuffs – in short, machine-made nature and machine-made culture” (Hardt & Negri, 2000, p. 272). Nature was incorporated into economic discourse and action oriented toward it aimed to translate it into a source of profit.

In Hardt and Negri’s work, the postmodern age, an age with no line of demarcation between culture and nature or politics and economics, offered no external point of reference that would allow truth or life to oppose their conception of empire. Empire created a world that it could come to dominate: “Biopower is a form of power that regulates social life from its interior, following it, interpreting it, absorbing it, and rearticulating it. Power can achieve an effective command over the entire life of the population only when it becomes an integral, vital function that every individual embraces and reactivates of his or her own accord” (Hardt & Negri, 2000, pp. 23-24). Empire then was an “autopoietic machine” capable of creating and using nature, of generating subjects and ruling their lives, and of creating its own justifications and rationalities. Within this reality it was no longer possible to demarcate what empire had meshed together.

The other influential strand of post-Foucault biopolitics was represented, and heavily influenced, by Giorgio Agamben, who, for example, claimed the existence of an “inner solidarity between democracy and totalitarianism” and viewed the concentration camp as the key “biopolitical paradigm of the west” (Agamben, 1998, pp. 10, 181). An important difference between the thought of Foucault and that of Agamben was their view of the interruptive nature of biopolitics. Foucault, as previously mentioned, saw the emergence of biopolitics in the 17th and 18th centuries as a radical break with the preceding traditions. By contrast, Agamben viewed history as a coherent tradition from the Greeks, to Nazi concentration camps, to contemporary politics. In essence, for Agamben, sovereign power presumed biopower, and its exercise may
represent a radicalization of power, but a radicalization that had been inherent throughout Western history.

Agamben considered not just Foucault but a number of others, including Arendt and was particularly influenced by her *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (Arendt, 1966). Agamben argued that the distinction between *bios* (political life) and *zoe* (bare life) had been present since ancient Greece. This distinction was between political life and bare life was demarcated by the protection of the laws of the polis: “[t]he original juridico-political relationship is the ban” (Agamben, 1998, p. 181). The distinction was between being a person exposed to whatever dangers may come and a person protected with the full legal weight of the political entity. Agamben illustrated his thesis by using *homo sacer*, a conceptual individual he locates in Roman law. *Homo sacer* could be killed without punishment by virtue of his existence outside of the political realm. The bare life could be negated, with or without cause, as a function of sovereign power. The existence and designation of a class of such people was coherent with the tradition exemplified by Roman exiles and Nazi concentration camp victims. Agamben provided modern examples: asylum seekers, refugees, or the brain dead, perhaps a case could be made for undocumented immigrants. The defining feature of modern *homo sacer* was their exclusion from politics: they existed in a bare sense, as a biological mass, yet not as political individuals (Agamben, 1998).

Agamben argued that the concentration camp was “the hidden matrix of the politics in which we still live” (Agamben, 2000, p. 44). This indicated the aforementioned “inner solidarity between democracy and totalitarianism” and the connection between the development of human rights and the denial of those rights (Agamben, 1998, p. 10). He went on to describe the concentration camp as the “hidden paradigm of the political space of modernity” (Agamben,
1998, p. 123). Agamben did not intend to ignore the drastic differences between the concentration camp and all other contemporary life, nor did he intend to downplay the horror associated with such distinct places. Rather, Agamben had in mind the commonalities between those places where the bare life was produced and institutionalized. He wrote that “the camp is the space that is opened when the state of exception begins to become the rule” (Agamben, 1998, pp. 168-169). This could be the concentration camp, the refugee camp, stateless asylum seekers, or the undocumented immigrant detention or deportation center.

The important biopolitical shift occurs when the previously peripheral bare life becomes central to political existence. The exceptions at the edges of politics become incorporated into political strategies as they become rules creating a “zone of irreducible indistinction” (Agamben, 1998, p. 9). Following this, Agamben wrote of two biopolitical faces, “[t]he spaces, the liberties, and the rights won by individuals in their conflicts with central powers always simultaneously prepared a tacit but increasing inscription of individuals’ lives within the state order, thus offering a new and more dreadful foundation for the very sovereign power from which they wanted to liberate themselves” (Agamben, 1998, p. 121). Though the bare life was present, even foundational, to various forms of government, those forms, democracy and totalitarianism or dictatorship, are distinguishable from one another. The point was that they shared foundations and notions of biopolitical sovereignty that were already historically present and manifested differently in different periods, though these notions were radicalized and contextualized differently. While the Nazi camp is an exception, Agamben sought to identify regularity and normalization of its tendencies to demonstrate that the bare life had become inextricably tied to political rationality because the existence and prolongation of life were increasingly tied to politics (Agamben, 2000, pp. 37-45).
Agamben argued that biopolitics had become even more radicalized and integrated into political normality since the decline of Nazism and Stalinism. It had “passed beyond a new threshold” (Agamben, 1998, p. 165). Nazi biopolitics targeted finite identifiable populations, but “in our age all citizens can be said, in a specific but extremely real sense, to appear virtually as *hombres sacri*” (Agamben, 1998, p. 111). Thus, “in modern democracies it is possible to state in public what Nazi biopoliticians did not dare to say” (Agamben, 1998, p. 165). The bare life was no longer applicable to externally identifiable individuals, but rather has become internalized and universalized,

Every society sets this limit; every society — even the most modern — decides who its “sacred men” will be. It is even possible that this limit, on which the politicization and the exception of natural life in the juridical order of the state depends, has done nothing but extend itself in the history of the West and has now -in the new biopolitical horizon of states with national sovereignty – moved inside every human life and every citizen. Bare life is no longer confined to a particular place or a definite category. It now dwells in the biological body of every living being (Agamben, 1998, pp. 139-140).

Ferenc Fehér and Agnes Heller (1994) interpreted biopolitics as the retreat of political science. They drew upon Foucault’s concepts and definitions related to biopower. There was, however, an important difference between them. They viewed the ever-increasing social importance of the body and life as political regression. They drew a sharp line between this biopolitical situation and “traditional modern politics” (Fehér & Heller, 1994, p. 38; see Heller, 1996). Biopolitics, for them, was an antipolitical form. While Foucault viewed biopolitics as a characteristic of modernity, Fehér and Heller, by contrast, saw it as a break from modernity. They located biopolitics in their theory of modernity and postmodernity by examining the American discourse surrounding race, gender, and the environment during the 1990s. Biopolitics was a “politics of the body,” and was of growing significance (Fehér & Heller, 1994, p. 17; Heller, 1996, p. 3).
For example, within the contexts they investigated, Fehér and Heller considered the discourse, politics, and changes concerning everything from race to health. Similar to authors previously discussed, Fehér and Heller linked contemporary biopolitics, which is integrated into democratic processes, to Nazism, which they called “an early experiment with biopolitics” (Fehér & Heller, 1994, p. 21). Thus, what they found concerned them. They feared the “totalitarian venom” that permeated biopolitical issues (Fehér & Heller, 1994, p. 27). They argued that the biopolitical tradition found an “intellectual mentor” in the French thought of the postwar period, which emphasized “difference,” was skeptical toward universals, and prioritized the aesthetic over the ethical (Fehér & Heller, 1994, pp. 51-57). The new biopolitics emerged during the 1980s, as in the face of potential nuclear annihilation life and security was valued above freedom (Fehér & Heller, 1994, p. 22). This valuation represented the fundamental characteristic of the biopolitical, the prioritization of life, and its security, over the form of life or freedom. The biopolitical was the moment at which “in the name of the integrity of The Body – freedom is sacrificed” (Fehér & Heller, 1994, p. 104). The American security state post-9/11 could be offered as an example as fear of Soviet nukes has been replaced by fear of terrorist attacks that could occur anywhere at any time.

**From Biopolitics to Governmentality**

Biopolitics was an important component of Foucault’s thought and it has remained useful as an analytical framework. Foucault addressed the notions of biopower and biopolitics in works like *History of Sexuality* (1978) and *Society Must be Defended* (2003). Foucault’s lectures on neoliberalism began with biopolitics as an indispensible frame of reference. However, once the topic of governmentality arose it moved to the forefront, displacing biopolitics (Bröckling, Krasmann, & Lemke, 2011, p. 7; Elden, 2006, p. 32; Golder, 2007, p. 160). Foucault was
cognizant of this shift and believed that the ability to adequately address biopolitics depended upon an understanding of the regimes in which biopolitics occurred (Foucault, 2008, p. 317). If Foucault’s plan was to address the background of liberal and neoliberal regimes and then return to biopolitics, he never completed the project, as his lectures remained focused on the subject of governmentality.

One approach has employed biopolitical concepts to make sense of governmentality studies. This approach examined the politics of life as capable of existing in multiple forms, constellations, and apparatuses (Fassin, 2011; Rainblow & Rose, 2006; Rose, 2007). Another approach has treated biopolitics as a constant component of governmentality. Biopolitics in this sense serves as a broad category into which virtually all exercises of power can be placed (Agamben, 1998). The first approach may be seen as responsible for a rebirth of biopolitics as a semi-independent topic of study. The second approach has kept biopolitics relevant all along, although it has done so by generalizing it and connecting it to the broad concept of governmentality.

4.4 Genealogy of Governmentality

Governmentality dealt with the “conduct of conducts” (Foucault, 2000d, p. 341; 2008, p. 186). This entailed the idea that the state was not the sole source of power. Rather than merely emanating from a single monolithic, centralized source, power was exerted from a wide variety of sources. Individuals attempted to regulate their own conduct and the conduct of others. Governance could come from the family or the workplace, for example. The concern was with specific contexts and how conduct was governed within them. Governmentality, however, did not address all contexts in which power could occur (Foucault, 2009, p. 116). Its aim was to understand the space located between the extreme ends of a spectrum represented by “strategic
relations” and “states of domination.” The concept was not intended to address those common
“strategic games between liberties” that occur in all types of communities (Foucault, 1997a, p. 299; Barry Hindess, 1996, pp. 98-113). Governmentality was also not intended to address extremely rare cases involving absolute domination. The space between those extremes was the space where the “techniques,” “rationalities,” and “arts” of government occurred. Since governmentality as a concept did not address states of domination employing it as an analytical tool presumes that some degree of freedom, some space of resistance was possible for those being examined (Foucault, 1997a, p. 300). For governmentality to be appropriately applied the possibility of not acting in accordance with the will of power must be present.

Foucault’s clearest and most direct exposition of the concept of governmentality contained the following three concepts:

1. The ensemble formed by the institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, the calculations and tactics that allow the exercise of this very specific albeit complex form of power, which has as its target population, as its principle form of knowledge political economy, and as its essential technical means apparatuses of security.

2. The tendency which, over a long period and throughout the West has steadily led towards the pre-eminence over all other forms (sovereignty, discipline, etc.) of this type of power which may be termed government, resulting, on the one hand, in the formation of a whole series of specific governmental apparatuses, and, on the other, in the development of a whole complex of savoirs.

3. The process, or rather the result of the process, through which the state of justice of the Middle Ages, transformed into the administrative state during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, gradually becomes ‘governmentalized’ (Foucault, 1991a, pp. 102-103).

The concept of governmentality was initially born during a series of lectures at the Collège de France in 1977 and 1978. The lectures were to address the “genealogy of the modern state” (Foucault, 2009, p. 354). Foucault delivered several lectures consistent with the preplanned topic only to change course upon commencing the fourth lecture. Valverde wrote that:
frustratingly for governmentality scholars, he does not explain why he changed terms. He simply walks in one day (February 1, 1978) and declares that if he were able to go back and correct the theme and title of that year’s lectures, he would no longer use the advertised title, ‘Sécurité, territoire, population,’ but rather ‘Lectures on Governmentality.’ Then he goes on to talk about techniques of governmentality, with security quietly receding into the background (2008, p. 29).

The change in topic recast the triangular relationship between security-population-government. Senellart attributed the shift to Foucault’s interest in power techniques beyond traditional conceptions of sovereignty, which he had linked to the “art of exercising power in the form of the economy” or “economic government” (2007, p. 379). Valverde suggested that Foucault reoriented his lectures on governmentality and biopolitics to move away from a research program overly directed at authoritarianism toward a broader approach to governmental systems (Valverde, 2008). Whatever motivated Foucault’s change in direction, that change itself led to a novel way of viewing government.

Additionally, Foucault’s concept of governmentality provided a fruitful base for subsequent research. According to Senellart, “[m]aybe more than any other moment in Foucault’s teaching, this illustrates his taste for the labyrinth into which I can venture, in which I can move my own dis-course, opening up underground passages, forcing it to go far from itself, finding overhangs that reduce and deform its itinerary” (2007, p. 380). The ability of subsequent authors to venture into the labyrinth of governmentality has resulted in a large and continually growing body of governmentality literature. This should not be surprising given Foucault tendency to approach topics “as a researcher: explorations for a future book as well as the opening up of fields of problemization were formulated as an invitation to possible future researchers” (Ewald & Fontana, 2007, p. xiv).

Foucault’s Governmentality, as the notion of governing one’s self and others, has been utilized in a variety of ways. Governmentality, generally speaking, has been traced across
various times, regions, and contexts (Bröckling et al., 2011; Dean, 2010; Donzelot & Gordon, 2008; Münch, 2010; Rose, 1999; Rose, O'Mally, & Valverde, 2006). For example, it has been employed for the study of the rationales and techniques of criminal justice (O'Malley, 1996b; Rose & Miller, 1992; Stenson, 1993). One of the most compelling appropriations of governmentality, and one that is examined in some detail below, is the governmentality of neoliberalism.

Moving Beyond the Previous Conceptions of Power

In well-known works during 1970’s Foucault was critical of the juridical conception of power (see Foucault, 1978; Foucault, 1979). The traditional, juridical conception of power treated power as concentrated and centralized at some hub, a government or sovereign for example. Foucault had been using “Nietzsche’s hypothesis” against the juridical concept, he had been viewing power from above (Foucault, 2003, pp. 14-19). Power had been approached as a struggle, a confrontation, or a war (Foucault, 1977, p. 26). Hence, Foucault wrote that the political theory of power had not yet cut off the king’s head (Foucault, 1978, p. 89; 1980b, p. 121). To only conceive of power in terms of the sovereign was the mistake of understanding power only in terms of a specific historical, and now outdated, manifestation. The means of exercising power is always transitory and adherence to a sovereign centered concept was “utterly incongruous with the new methods of power whose operation is not ensured by right but by technique, not by law but by normalization, not by punishment but by control, methods that are employed on all levels and in forms that go beyond the state and its apparatus” (Foucault, 1978, p. 89). The state must now be viewed as “superstructural in relation to a whole series of power networks that invest the body, sexuality, the family, kinship, knowledge, technology, and so forth . . . . [T]his meta-power with its prohibitions can only take hold and
secure its footing where it is rooted in a whole series of multiple and indefinite power relations that supply the necessary basis for the great negative forms of power” (Foucault, 1980b, p. 122).

According to Foucault, analyses of modern forms of power required “a political philosophy that isn’t erected around the problem of sovereignty, nor therefore around the problems of law and prohibition” (Foucault, 1980b, p. 121). In essence, the king, or the theoretical focus on the king, must be removed. This theoretical beheading was only a first step and once it has been completed we must answer the following: “How is it possible that his headless body often behaves as if it indeed had a head” or more mundanely “how are a macro-social order, and macro forms of domination, constructed out of the diversity of micropowers” (Dean, 1994, p. 156)? This beheading and providing an answer to how the headless body could continue to operate was an important component of Foucault’s project.

Responding to that critique Foucault developed an alternative: the “microphysics of power” (Foucault, 1977, pp. 26-27). Adopting that approach power would be viewed singularly or generally, but always as “dispositions, manoeuvres, tactics, techniques, functionings” (Foucault, 1977, p. 26). Given this understanding of power, Foucault viewed the investigator’s role as one of mapping, differentiating, and understanding the different arrangements of power (Jessop, 2006). Though microphysics was oriented toward powers in specific settings and relationships, families, workplaces, prisons, it did not claim that large-scale patterns did not exist. Rather the microphysics of power indicated that larger patterns were provisional constellations of overlapping micro powers. “Major dominations are the hegemonic effects that are sustained by all these confrontations” (Foucault, 1978, p. 94). Major power systems at the international or national levels were potentially in a constant state of flux or could vary by context.
There were several weaknesses in the microphysics of power that led Foucault to the notion of governmentality (Bröckling et al., 2011). First, the Nietzschean influence of describing all power relations in terms of war metaphors, as Foucault did in Discipline and Punish and his lectures on sovereignty, biopolitics, and race was limiting (Foucault, 1977, 2003). The move to governmentality was intended to address these limitations (Bröckling et al., 2011, pp. 1-2). Walters speculated that the prior approach had left too little room for subjects possessing at least some degree of freedom (Walters, 2012, p. 15). Foucault’s new approach remedied this by finding “recalcitrance of the will and the intransigence of freedom” within power relationships (Foucault, 2000d, p. 342). With a new way to account for the freedom of subjects Foucault could examine the way the strategies of government interacted with individual strategies, the concept he called the “conduct of conducts” (Foucault, 1997g, p. 225). The “technologies of the self” could be considered and linked to the techniques of government (Foucault, 1997f). This was crucial since governments had recourse to “processes by which the individual acts upon himself” (Foucault, 1993, p. 203). The new approach allowed Foucault to leave behind inadequate metaphors and formulate a “necessary critique of the common conceptions of ‘power’” (Foucault, 1997e, p. 88).

Marxist critics seized upon the second problem with the microphysics of power. In essence the critique was that Foucault had been overly concerned with the diffusive nature of power and as a result was unable to provide an adequate account of the state as an institution of power (Golder, 2007; Poulantzas, 1978, p. 44). Generally stated, Foucault’s framework could not deal with large-scale manifestations of power. Several commentators noted that Foucault had already attempted to address this criticism (C. Gordon, 1991, pp. 4-5; Walters, 2012, pp. 15-16). For example, Foucault’s treatment of biopolitics in Society Must be Defended took the topic of
discipline, as had been addressed in previous works, and applied it on a massive scale (Foucault, 1977, 2003). Discipline was now applied to population, “a global mass that is affected by overall processes characteristic of birth, death, production, illness, and so on” (Foucault, 2003, pp. 242-243). The state applied power on this scale by using new techniques. Governmentality took considerations of the state farther than microphysics alone could have.

Some commentators maintain that governmentality described the power structures characteristic of liberalism (Donzelot, 2008, p. 116; Rainbow, 2003, p. 55). These commentators seized upon the instances where Foucault used governmentality in contexts related to one particular “family” of governance, namely, the liberal mode of governance (Rose et al., 2006, p. 97). In those instances Foucault used governmentality to reference the liberal modes that were first employed in the eighteenth century (Bröckling et al., 2011, p. 7; Foucault, 2009, pp. 108-110). While understanding that liberal governance was an important component of governmentality, especially for contemporary scholars of liberalism, it was not the entirety of the concept. Foucault assigned the term governmentality a “very broad meaning” (Foucault, 2000d, p. 341). Recognizing this, others have argued that Foucault used governmentality in a number of contexts some general and some specifically applied to liberalism, among other things (Bröckling et al., 2011; Dean, 2010; C. Gordon, 1991; Barry Hindess, 1996; Walters, 2012).

While some of Foucault’s successors have applied governmentality to a vast array of power structures, Foucault himself limited the concept and used it only when examining the governance affiliated with the state. In the lectures where Foucault most explicitly addressed governmentality he made clear his intention to employ it as a new approach to the study of the state (Foucault, 2008, pp. 2-3, 76-78; 2009, p. 120). Foucault conceived the concept as a historian, his “data” consisting of the “archive” of texts comprised of historical and philosophical
pieces addressing how conduct could best be governed (Scheurich & Mckenzie, 2005, p. 841). Governmentality could be understood as the “genealogy of the modern state” rather than a theory of the state (Foucault, 2009, p. 354). It was the way the modern state developed, tested, and refined the arts and techniques it employed to govern conduct. It was the conditions and contexts that made the modern state as a mode of governance possible. It was a window into the state as a source of governance over individuals.

Foucault had previously described his method as the archaeology on knowledge, which excavates the rules that exist beneath the logic and language and operate at a subconscious level, thereby influencing systems of thought (Foucault, 1972). The critical contribution of archaeology was that it allowed the investigator to proceed without relying on conscious individual subjects. Foucault explicitly employed this method in several works, such as The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences (1970) and The Birth of the Clinic: An Archaeology of Medical Perception (1973). Archaeology was limited to understanding the practices of an era or context or comparing eras or contexts, but lacked the ability to explain changes in systems of knowledge or ways of thinking. For example, in Foucault’s History of Madness (2006a) archaeology allowed him to explain the different systems of knowledge related to madness during from the 17th to 19th century, but archaeology alone could not excavate the causes of changes in those systems.

Eventually, Foucault added the genealogical method, which appeared for the first time in Discipline and Punish (1977), to his analyses. This was intended to supplement archaeology and offset that method’s shortfall. In utilizing genealogy Foucault had borrowed an analytical tool from Nietzsche (Foucault, 1998). Genealogy as a method could explain the changes from one system of thought to another. As with Nietzsche’s genealogical investigation into the
development of morals, Foucault would explain the transitions between systems of thought as mundane and historically contingent, rather than as part of any rational historical progression. Thus, with morality for Nietzsche or Madness, or more pertinent here Governmentality, for Foucault, systems of thought and perceptions of knowledge changed in an aimless manner. Put another way, there was not progress, of the scientific type, in these areas. Morality merely changed without necessarily more closely approximating absolute moral truth, the same could be said with the definition of madness or society’s understanding of it.

Several scholars have noted the importance of conducting studies of governmentality as genealogy (Bevir, 2010; Bröckling et al., 2011; Dean, 2010; Valverde, 2007; Walters, 2012 Ch. 4). This approach rejected the notion of constancy in power relationships or human society more generally. Brass wrote that Foucault’s genealogy addressed “moving objects, not the fixed objects to which we are accustomed in our social science disciplines, defined clearly, related to a model, a system, an order” (2000, p. 313). Genealogy went beyond merely understanding the evolution or historical forms of the state. Donzelot described it as a “remarkable method for challenging the way we think about supposedly universal objects like madness, delinquency, sexuality and government” (2008, p. 115). Political concepts were given the same treatment Foucault had previously given individual experiences, like madness.

Donzelot further explicated Foucault’s unique approach, writing that Foucault:

did not set out to show the historical relativity of these objects, or even to deny their validity, as has often been said, but postulated a priori their non-existence, thus dismantling all of our certainties concerning them, including that of their pure historicity. This enabled him to reveal how something which did not exist could come about, how a set of practices were able to come together to produce a regime of truth with regard to these objects, a combination of power and knowledge which makes it possible to say, at least insofar as this regime of truth succeeded in being effective, what was true and false in matters concerning madness, delinquency, sexuality and government (2008, p. 115).
Foucault did not abandon the existing conceptual content political science had used to investigate the state as a theoretical entity (Foucault, 2008, p. 2). Consistent with Donzelot’s description Foucault’s method did, however, abandon the notion of political concepts as pre-made, universal constants (Foucault, 2009, p. 118). In the genealogical approach nothing is taken as constant or given, political concepts are not a stable foundation upon which to build a theory of the state, instead it recognized that they could change across contexts. Foucault approached each concept as a “transactional reality” that was not always present and was “born precisely from the interplay of relations of power and everything which constantly eludes them” (Foucault, 2008, p. 297).

As Paul Veyne wrote, “[o]bjects seem to determine our behavior, but our practice determines its own objects in the first place. Let us start, then, with that practice itself, so that the object to which it applies is what it is only in relation to that practice . . . . The relation determines the object, and only what is determined exists” (1997, p. 155). The key to Foucault’s genealogy was to examine the processes and contexts that brought objects into being, rather than simply examining the objects themselves. All things should be understood and studied as effects rather than as mere objects. In practice, this led to Foucault’s seeing processes as empirical events, hence the repeated use of emergent events, birth as a titular metaphor for example.\footnote{This emphasis on the empirical is what led Veyne, somewhat oddly, to bestow upon Foucault the title of “the first completely positivist historian” (1997, p. 147).}

Foucault emphasized the multi-casual nature of such events as effects. The researcher was required to analyze “an event according to the multiple processes which constitute it” (Foucault, 1991b, p. 76). Furthermore, the researcher should understand the “full weight of causality” by not being satisfied with merely necessary conditions and “constructing around the singular event analyzed a ‘polygon’ or rather a ‘polyhedron’ of intelligibility, the number of whose faces is not...
given in advance and can never properly be taken as finite” (Foucault, 1991b, p. 77). Thus, in
theory, genealogy became the empirical process of explaining the historical emergence of
techniques and arts of government explained using “causal multiplication” and “eventalization”
(Foucault, 2009, p. 116).

Foucault aimed to “retrace the history of what could be called the art of government”
(Foucault, 2008, p. 1). The vastness of such a project cannot be overstated. This art was practiced
within all ages and at all times at many different levels. This was why Foucault wrote that the
term government referred to a “thousand and one different modalities and possible ways that
exist for guiding men, directing their conduct, constraining their actions and reactions”
(Foucault, 2008, pp. 1-2). Foucault restricted this impossibly massive project in several ways
rendering it somewhat more realistically achievable. First, Foucault examined only situations
wherein governance was connected with “the exercise of political sovereignty” (Foucault, 2008,
p. 2). This project was concerned with the history of the arts out of which the state had emerged.
As Bröckling noted, “Foucault considers the ‘genesis of political knowledge’ of governing
humans from Ancient Greek and Roman ideas on the subject to early modern reasons of state
and ‘political science’, and onward to relevant liberal and neo-liberal theories” (2011, p. 3).

Second, by virtue of emphasizing the art of government, Foucault approached the state in
a limited way. This approach was distinct from that which might be taken by a traditional
political scientist, historian, or sociologist. Foucault focused on “the level of reflection in the
practice of government and on the practice of government” (Foucault, 2008, p. 2). Stated
differently, Foucault was concerned with “government’s consciousness of itself” (Foucault,
2008, p. 2).\footnote{Foucault was not satisfied with this formulation (Foucault, 2008, p. 2).} At times Foucault referenced seemingly superficial structural changes, but it was
always within the context of understanding specific emerging developments in the art of
government. For example, Foucault analyzed some locales as “veritable small, micro-state
laboratories” for the art of government. He described seventeenth century Germany as a group of
small states “situated between feudal structures” with the “imperial idea…hovering over its
territory” to explain why the science of police was particularly well developed in that state
(Foucault, 2009, p. 317).

There was another reason for the expansive nature of governmentality as a concept.
Foucault also paired his genealogy of governmentality with an analysis of the development of
subjectivity. As the state changed the constellation of techniques it used to govern, the life
experiences of its subjects underwent corresponding changes. Foucault’s lectures were,
simultaneously, accounts of these two inexorably related phenomena. The “governmentalization
of the state” was necessarily paired with the “history of the subject” (Foucault, 2009, pp. 109,
184). Thus, the modern art of government concerned itself with:

a sort of complex of men and things. The things government must be concerned about . . .
are men in their relationships, bonds, and complex involvements with things like wealth,
resources, means of subsistence, and, of course, the territory with its borders, borders,
qualities, dryness, fertility, and so on. “Things” are men in their relationships with things
like customs, habits, ways of acting and thinking. Finally, they are men in their
relationships with things like accidents, misfortunes, famine, epidemics, and death
(Foucault, 2009, p. 96).

Every potential human activity, interaction with the world or one another was brought within the
scope of governmental concern. No aspect of life existed outside of the realm of government.
This expansion was, however, not Foucault’s primary concern. He was more interested in the
rationalities and techniques of government. Therefore, Foucault did not focus governmentality
on centralized state structures but rather explored the “tricky combination in the same structures
of individualization techniques and of totalization procedures” (Foucault, 2000d, p. 332).
**Governmentality and Liberalism**

While governmentality served purposes beyond providing an understanding of liberalism, it has proven useful in that endeavor. At times Foucault used governmentality to describe the liberal mode of governance:

> by “governmentality” I understand the ensemble formed by institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, calculations, and tactics that allow exercise of this very specific, albeit very complex, power that has the population as its target, political economy as its major form of knowledge, and apparatuses of security for its essential technical instrument (Foucault, 2009, p. 108).

This liberal approach to the art of government took an economical perspective on governance. In other words, liberal governance was guided by principles of economic efficiency. The goal of liberalism was “the art of the least possible government” (Foucault, 2008, p. 28). The aim was to avoid “governing too much” (Foucault, 2008, p. 17). This “self-limited” nature was a departure from the prior “unlimited presumption of the police state” as “frugal” governance became the order of the day (Foucault, 2008, p. 17).

Foucault identified liberalism as growing out of the works of British political economists as well as French physiocrats and economists in the eighteenth century. It privileged certain forms of knowledge, those conducive to the new approach to governance. Liberalism elevated political economy as a field placing high value on its expertise in understanding markets. With liberalism the market was held in high regard and occupied a privileged position as an independent and “natural” sphere (Foucault, 2008, p. 31). The market was beyond the reach of other realms of life, however, it was the standard by which governmental conduct and policy formulations were judged (Foucault, 2008, pp. 31-32). For example, John Stuart Mill (2002) formulated a view of individual liberty in terms of economic competition in using the metaphor of a “marketplace of ideas.”
Despite liberalism’s preoccupation with frugality, its onset did not necessarily entail an expansion of freedom. The art of the least possible government did not leave more room for unsupervised individual action. As Foucault wrote, liberalism is “not a form of governmentality which would leave more white spaces for freedom” (2008, p. 63). Instead, liberalism adopted a novel approach, understood as “the management of freedom” (Foucault, 2008, p. 63). Simultaneously, in liberalism “[f]reedom is something which is constantly produced” (Foucault, 2008, p. 65). Freedom was produced in certain areas, work and market exchange, for example, while managing to serve state purposes. This mixture was made possible by the “interplay of freedom and security” (Foucault, 2008, p. 65). The freedom invoked here is something similar to Jean-Jacques Rouseau’s formulation of citizens “forced to be free.”

Freedom was constructed and perceived in a certain, and historically contingent way, this was the only acceptable way of understanding freedom, any other way of life must by definition lack freedom. This went against the prevailing view of the American Enlightenment, which sought to carve out some space of freedom beyond the grasp of governance.

Foucault conceived of security as a specific mode of governance. Security was not used in the colloquial sense, as an arena of national policy. Nor was security used in the traditional sense, as a basic need of all men. The meaning of security was conveyed by the example of how three types of historical governmental regimes dealt with the crime of theft (Foucault, 2009, pp. 4-9). The first approach to theft was simple, theft was forbidden and transgressors were punished in some physically damaging manner. During the eighteenth century the situation surrounding theft changed with the second approach. New methods of surveillance were employed to monitor

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58 For examples of alternative conceptions of freedom see Isaiah Berlin’s classic *Two Concepts of Liberty* (1969) and Benjamin Constant’s lesser known *The Liberty of Ancients Compared with That of Moderns* (1988).
the occurrence of crime while the punishment was altered by the emergence of the penitentiary. In addition to the gruesome physical punishments, the state could confine offenders, force them to work, morally reeducate them, and attempt to redeem them. The third approach emerged most recently and is the one Foucault associated with security. Larger picture questions were posed to the system, as crime became a statistical object. This allowed more expansive management of crime as it was related to a host of other problems and policies. Is it more cost-effective to tolerate more crime or punish crime more severely? At what rate do offences occur? How are other demographical statistics related to the crime rate: age, sex, race, employment status? How does the incident of crime vary by region and penal system? Answering such question was the form of security that liberal governmentality set as its goal. 59

**Pastoralization of Power**

Foucault began with the intention of exploring the change in political power that occurred in the eighteenth century. This was the change “from a form of power targeted on a territory to a form of power bearing on a population” (Donzelot, 2008, p. 117). Foucault delivered three lectures moving beyond biopower and biopolitics to explain how population is governed by security, which entailed a different logic. Foucault would eventually return to those points, but only after a foray into attempting to discover the origins of the ideas and practices associated with the “government of men” (Donzelot, 2008, p. 120). This led Foucault to formulate the concept of pastoral power as a prelude to governmentality (Golder, 2007, p. 167). 60

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59 In Emile Durkheim’s (1983) thought it was a movement from organic to mechanical social solidarity and from repressive to restitutive law.

60 As with several other areas, Foucault did not fully develop his concept of pastoral power. This may be partially attributed to his untimely death, which left his work on Christianity unfinished. For example, his fourth volume of The History of Sexuality that was to focus on Christianity was left incomplete and never published per Foucault’s request.
power was examined in a genealogical fashion rather than as a standard history. Pastoral power should not be thought of as emerging, playing its role, and disappearing, allowing new forms of power to take its place. Walters utilized Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of a rhizome to explain the analysis of pastoral power (Deleuze, 1995, pp. 3-25; Walters, 2012, p. 24). Rhizomes grow underground setting up various roots and shoots that emerge in the future, as was the case of the influence of pastoral power on future power structures.

The new subject took Foucault in a new direction as he looked back toward “the historical rise of the Christian pastorate as a technology of power” (Golder, 2007, p. 162). Political theory had been largely concerned with the relationship between the citizen and the political community, formulated as the city-citizen relationship. Foucault went backwards by juxtaposing this game with, and tracing its development from, the shepherd-flock relationship (Foucault, 2000c). Here Foucault adopted a method similar to that used in his Discipline and Punish. Namely, he explored power that had previously been ignored. In formulating his theory of governmentality he found the notion of a shepherd controlling his flock more useful than the traditional notion of a political entity ruling its citizens. Foucault wrote, “[w]hat is it . . . that characterizes this power of the shepherd, which we can see is foreign to Greek thought, but present and intense in the Mediterranean East, especially in the Hebrews? . . . The shepherds power is not exercised over a territory but, by definition, over a flock, and more exactly, over a multiplicity in movement” (2009, p. 125).

In short, Foucault presented a conception of power that “took its model from the fold” rather than the “town” (Foucault, 2009, p. 130). He continued, writing that pastoral power:

is a power that guides towards an end and functions as an intermediary towards this end. It is therefore a power with a purpose for those on whom it is exercised, and not a purpose for some kind of superior unit like the city, territory, state or sovereign . . .
Finally, it is a power directed at all and each in their paradoxical equivalence, and not at the higher unity formed by the whole (Foucault, 2009, p. 129).

The end mentioned was salvation in the Christian model from which Foucault drew his inspiration. Consider the seemingly odd example of Fyodor Dostoevsky’s “Grand Inquisitor,” which demonstrates the extent to which pastoral power could be politicized when sufficiently supported by a dominant administrative hierarchy (2003). Pastoral power, like other forms of power, was a general category that occurred in differing contexts in the Ancient world. The Christian model was the most important specific context, the one that became most influential in terms of replication and influence on future contexts. The early Church integrated notions of permanent pastoral care and instilled a compulsion for self-examination in its flock. Self-examination was a unique addition to governance. As Hindess put it, Christianity found a way “to turn the guidance of conscience into an integral part of a continuous relationship between the shepherd (or his local representative) and each member of the flock” (1996, pp. 121-122). This wove together government, even self-government of the individual through reflection and confession, with the government of the whole. Personally intimate aspects of life, even completely internalized thoughts or emotions, were now linked to external political rule.

In Foucault’s narrative pastoral power had changed in several important ways by the sixteenth century. First, the Christian Church splintered under the pressure of the Protestant Reformation and other “insurrections of conduct” (Foucault, 2009, p. 228). Despite the seemingly radical nature of such insurrections, they did not seek to do away with pastoral power. Instead, they were directed toward the specific organizations holding power as new communities and social movements sprang up. They created splinter sects and new shepherds. The real effect was the spread of pastoral power which strengthened its control over the “material, temporal, everyday life of individuals” (Foucault, 2009, p. 229). Second, pastoral power trickled into new
areas of life and moved beyond its religious constraints. Foucault wrote that pastoral power was now applied to governing children, families, and the self (Foucault, 2009, p. 230).

Pastoral power eventually exerted pressure upon the secular state, placing the sovereign in a difficult position. The sovereign was “required to do more than purely and simply exercise his sovereignty” (Foucault, 2009, p. 236). The expectation arose that sovereigns would not simply rule but govern individuals.\(^6\) Governing individuals and exercising sovereignty made modern state power unique. Foucault distinguished between “the political form of government” and the “problematic of government in general” (Foucault, 2009, p. 89). The new concept of government encompassed nearly all areas of life: raising children, the family, the self, controlling a private business entity, a community, and also governing the conscience and the soul (Foucault, 2000d, p. 341). Despite examining a broad field, governmentality was still focused on explaining a narrower problematic, how the population was controlled by the state and how individuals came to control themselves on behalf of the state. An investigation into governmentality could examine how control may be exerted in a specific temporal or geographic context.

The influence of pastoral power could be seen in various aspects of modernity. It was located both within and outside of state structures (Barry Hindess, 1996, pp. 122-123). Pastoral power can be seen in the modern “welfare state problem” which required “the tricky adjustment between political power wielded over legal subjects and pastoral power wielded over live individuals” (Foucault, 2000c, p. 307). Pastoralism could also be seen outside the state in charitable and humanitarian endeavors aimed at offsetting the byproducts of development and

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\(^6\) Foucault acknowledged a number of additional factors, like the collapse of feudalism, that opened the door for the new form of power (Foucault, 2009, p. 329).
capitalism, as well as the government and self-government of individuals through counseling programs (Walters, 2012, p. 24).

Thus, the modern state combined the political power of the ancient Greek *polis* with the pastoral Christian goal of guiding the private lives of individuals. Greek politics was focused on commonalities between people, the universal nature of law and the public space. The Christian effort aimed to bring what was not common, what was particular to individuals into the public space. The relatively late-coming religious efforts even targeted the otherworldly souls of individuals, attempting to lead them to salvation (Foucault, 2000d, pp. 300-311; 2009, pp. 115-190). This complex combination even went beyond concern of material fact and physical occurrence. The new sovereign as pastor must learn the complexities of and pay heed to the “inner truth” of the subject (Foucault, 2000d, p. 333).

In the modern state, the earlier goal of salvation was secularized and rearticulated within the framework of state politics. In this context Foucault wrote about the twin tendencies of totalization and individualization, which created “a modern matrix of individualization, or a new form of pastoral power” (Foucault, 2000d, p. 334). A new form of political salvation replaced the archaic and otherworldly eternal salvation promised by religion. The art of government attempted to bring about political salvation in virtually all aspects of human affairs, and central to the art of government’s project was,

- a sort of complex of men and things. The things that government must be concerned about . . . are men in their relationships, bonds, and complex involvements with things like wealth, resources, means of subsistence, and of course, the territories with its borders, qualities, climate, dryness, and so on. “Things” are men in their relationships with things, like customs, habits, ways of acting and thinking. Finally, they are men in their relationships with things like accidents, misfortunes, famine, epidemics, and death” (Foucault, 2009, p. 96).

Each entry in this expansive list of “things” about which the state concerned itself could be interpreted as relating to the security of the population, the modern state’s *raison d’État*. 
Raison d’État

The combination of government over individuals and the exercise of sovereignty was not rooted in pastoral power. It came from another important concept in Foucault’s lectures on governmentality, raison d’état. The concept may be familiar in the sense of national interest taking precedent over ethical considerations. Foucault moved beyond the common notion of the concept, seeing it as a critical point of emergence. It marked the emergence of the type of governance typical of the state, as things were cast in terms of states, their actions, and their conflicts. Raison d’état marked the merger of the art of governing individuals and politically governing.

Foucault viewed the work of the great Florentine theorist Niccolò Machiavelli as influential in the emergence of governmentality. “But far from thinking that Machiavelli opens up the field of political thought to modernity, I would say that he marks instead the end of an age . . .” (Foucault, 2009, p. 65). As was customary for Foucault, he issued an invitation for a future research program related to The Prince, which he himself never completed, “the history of the text is interesting; or rather, it would be interesting the relationship between this text and all those that followed it, criticized it, and rejected it” (2009, p. 89). Even lacking this investigation Machiavelli played an important role in the formulation of governmentality. Foucault was, on the whole, less concerned with appropriating Machiavelli in a novel way than with tracing the reception of Machiavelli in political thought. Foucault wrote that Machiavelli “did not define an art of government, but an art of government will be looked for in what he said” (2009, p. 243). Machiavelli, then, was not crucial “because of what he said, but insofar as the debate is

62 Interpretations and commentaries addressing both Foucault and Machiavelli are plentiful; however, literature addressing the Foucault’s reading of Machiavelli is relatively sparse although increasing as of late. For examples, see Curtis (2002), Holden and Elden (2005), Singer and Weir (2008), Marasco (2012).
conducted through him” and because of the way The Prince was a “constant point of repulsion” (Foucault, 2009, p. 243; 289).

Initially, The Prince was not an object of repulsion, but this changed when early anti-Machiavellians, like Giovanni Botero and Guillaume de La Perrière, objected to both its amoral and irreligious nature. Anti-Machiavellian works formed “a positive genre, with its specific object, concepts and strategy” (Foucault, 2009, p. 91). Machiavellianism created its detractors who required the negative image against which to make their points. Foucault summarized the Machiavellian caricature drawn by the anti-Machiavellians as follows:

For Machiavelli, the Prince exists in a relationship of singularity and externality, of transcendence, to his principality. Machiavelli’s Prince receives his principality either through inheritance, or by acquisition, or by conquest; in any case, he is not part of it. It makes no difference whether the link that binds him to his principality is one of violence, or tradition, or one established through the compromise of treaties and the complicity of agreement of other princes, it is, in any case, a purely synthetic link; there is no fundamental, essential natural, and juridical connection between the Prince and his principality: externality, the Prince’s transcendence, is the principle. A corollary of this principle, of course, is that inasmuch as it is an external relationship, it is fragile and constantly under threat. It is threatened from outside by the Prince’s enemies who want to take, or re-conquer, his principality, and it is also threatened internally, for there is no a priori or immediate reason for the Prince’s subjects to accept his rule (Foucault, 2009, pp. 91-92).

This, however, should not be understood as an art of government. “Being able to hold on to one’s principality is not the same as possessing the art of government” (Foucault, 2009, p. 92). The prince’s ability to secure his exceptional position and retain control over his territory should not be conflated with a true art of government capable of securing populations, peoples, and bodies.

Machiavelli, understood in this way, marked the “highest point” of ensuring the “safety (sûreté) of the prince and his territory” (Foucault, 2009, p. 65). The concept of governmentality addressed a “completely different problem that is no longer that of fixing and demarcating the territory, but of allowing circulations to take place, of controlling them, sifting the good and bad, ensuring that things are constantly moving around, going from one point to another, but in such a
way that the inherent dangers of this circulation are cancelled out” (Foucault, 2009, p. 65). This embodied the shift from territory to population, from the safety of the prince to the “security (sécurité) of the population” and this represented the raison d’état of the modern state’s governmentality (Foucault, 2009, p. 65).

The application of raison d’état was a birth-like event; it was the birth of the state, an important step in the genealogical analysis of governmentality. Foucault likened the birth of astrophysics to raison d’état’s birth creating the field of modern politics (Foucault, 2009, p. 276). Prior to astrophysics, the Earth had been viewed as the center of the universe, the stars as gods, and numerous subsequent incorrect iterations attempting to understand the cosmos. It was astrophysics that permitted human understanding of the Earth and the universe as objects compliant with scientific laws. Foucault’s point was that even though we cannot today imagine stars as God’s, this was not always the case. It required a birth-like event, a Kuhnian paradigm shift in understanding for this to become the prevailing viewpoint. This was similar to the case of politics and modes of governance. Today, it is difficult to think of them in terms other than those associated with states. This new “principle of intelligibility” was born of raison d’état, it was the moment of the paradigm shift which provided the state as a “reflective prism” (Foucault, 2009, p. 287).

For Foucault raison d’état marked the era when authorities began acting like a state in the modern sense. Government from this time onward was conducted “rationally because there is a state and so that there is a state” (Foucault, 2009, p. 287). He wrote:

the state functions as an objective in this political reason in the sense that it is that which must result from the active interventions of this reason or rationality . . . . What the intervention of raison d’état must arrive at is the state’s integrity, its completion, its consolidation, and its reestablishment if it has been compromised . . . . The is therefore the principle of intelligibility of what is, but equally of what it must be (Foucault, 2009, p. 287).
Elements of states, like criminal justice systems, national militaries and tax regimes, previously existed (Foucault, 2009, p. 247). However, it was the new rationality of *raison d’état* that brought these already existent elements together and applied them simultaneously in new ways as the state.

The state aimed to govern for an indefinite time (Foucault, 2009, pp. 259-260). It was not preparing for any eventual final day, as was the case of Christian shepherds controlling their flocks. The state’s task was further complicated by the fact that it existed within a world of competing states, each attempting to secure its indefinite existence. It was a context of numerous internal and external moving and competing parts that states must account for in order to be successful and ensure their continuation. Like astrophysical bodies, the state existed in a context of continual processes. The moving elements did not just entail material components but nonmaterial concerns like competing ideologies and existential threats as well. Each state applied its own political science to its tasks of governing and existed “independently of the prince or any other holder of sovereign power” (Barry Hindess, 1996, p. 110).

The state abandoned traditional approaches to sovereignty based on traditional sources of guidance, moving to “to an art of governing that finds the principles of its rationality and the specific domain of its application in the state” (Foucault, 2009, p. 364). As with other concepts, Foucault was concerned with the way *raison d’état* utilized emergent techniques in its practice of the art of government. Having abandoned tradition, the state sought new ways to conduct its affairs. It tried “setting up two major assemblages of political technology” (Foucault, 2009, p. 312). Both were oriented toward security. Together they required a new form of knowledge, statistics, as in the case of liberal governmentality and security (Foucault, 2009, pp. 274, 315). The first was crucial for states required balance in an international system of competing states.
The state used “military-diplomatic technology that consists in securing and developing the state’s forces through a system of alliances and the organization of an armed apparatus” (Foucault, 2009, p. 365).

The second looked to the internal security of the state and involved police power. Foucault was more focused on this internal dimension of *raison d’état* than on the outward, international dimension. Some have pointed to this as the reason that much of the subsequent work on governmentality has focused on the internal aspects of the state and why some view it as an inadequate mechanism for studying international relations (Joseph, 2010; Selby, 2007). Additionally, some commentators, like Hindess (1996, pp. 119-123), have viewed police power through the lens of pastoral power, while others like Valverde (2007), have treated them as distinct concepts. The relation between the two will become evident from the discussion of police.

Rather than locating a new meaning of police as a concept Foucault returned to an older meaning referring to works of von Justi, Delamare, and Turquet de Mayerne. These were voluminous works concerning everything from commerce to mining and aimed at improving the internal condition of a state through policy implementation, legislation, and law enforcement. This understanding of police revolved around “the set of means for bringing about the internal growth of the state’s forces” (Foucault, 2009, p. 365). The state needed to grow stronger and more efficient to ensure its continued survival from within. To accomplish this task the state required detailed knowledge of all internal events to maximize its resources. Police power was similar to the procedures that had long occurred in smaller scale entities on a national level. Techniques were applied on new levels “[m]aking the town into a sort of quasi-convent and the
realm into a sort of quasi-town is the kind of great disciplinary dream behind police” (Foucault, 2009, p. 341).

A component of this type of power was the administrative bureaucratic apparatus, without which law making and law enforcement would not have been possible in the modern sense. Foucault did not devote much direct study to bureaucratic administration or the state’s monopoly on administration, preferring instead to examine specific settings like the prison, the school, and the hospital (Foucault, 1973, 1977). Foucault’s notion of discipline began with mundane concepts of administration of control over the physical body. Professional administrative knowledge was not a given, but was formed over time through practices aimed at controlling behavior. The administration of control like other professions were made up of professional disciplines comprised of “groups of statements that borrow their organization from scientific models, which tend to coherence and demonstrativity, which are accepted, institutionalized, transmitted and sometimes taught as sciences” (Foucault, 1972, p. 178). Thus, through experimentation administrative rules were created to govern bureaucratic approaches. For example, bookkeeping standards evolved and included both empirical knowledge and “administrative objectivity” (Porter, 1992). Foucault’s primary theoretical contribution was not a complete account of the bureaucratic state, but rather the demonstration of how professional administrative knowledge of administering control over the body was constituted.

John O’Neill (1986) suggested that the most fruitful approach to the study of institutions would be to consider Foucault’s archeological forays into disciplinary power in conjunction with Weber’s analysis of the bureaucratic state. In fact, O’Neill claimed that Foucault broadened “the Weberian concept of administrative power into the embodied strategies of industrial power”
However, Charles Alford (2000) warned that it was a mistake to compare the two thinkers’ conceptions of disciplinary and centralized power. In distinguishing himself from Weber, Foucault wrote:

One isn’t assessing things in terms of an absolute against which they could be evaluated as constituting more or less perfect forms of rationality, but rather examining how forms of rationality inscribe themselves in practices or systems of practices, and what role they play within them. Because it’s true that “practices” don’t exist without a certain regime of rationality. But rather than measuring this regime against a value-of-reason, I would prefer to analyse it according to two axes: one the one hand, that of codification/prescription (how it forms an ensemble of rules, procedures, means to an end, etc.) and on the other, that of true or false formulation (how it determines a domain of objects about which it is possible to articulate true or false positions (Foucault, 1991b, p. 79).

As Goldstein wrote, Foucault offered “historians a way of conceptualizing the relationships between forms of applied knowledge and their external environments” (Goldstein, 1984, p. 184).

There was an important difference between police power and pastoral power. Pastoral power’s goal was the protection of the individuals; police power’s primary goal was the continuation of the state. While the shepherd aimed to preserve his flock above all else, the state utilizing police power was willing to sacrifice its flock to ensure its own preservation when necessary. The subsistence and happiness of the flock was necessary insofar as it was instrumental to the state’s existence. Ensuring welfare prevented internally generated crises that could have threatened the state. Police power, similar to pastoral power, has continued, even outside of the contexts of extreme police states. The state would not hesitate to sacrifice its people to defend itself in war. In Habermas’s thought, citizen compliance in this regard was dependent upon the success of legitimation processes.

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63 Relatedly, Szakolczai (1998a, 1998b) traced connections between Weber’s history of science and conduct of life, and Foucault’s archaeological and genealogical approaches to subjectivity.
Diffusive police power was pervasive within liberal democracies. It could be seen in the complex and often perplexing regulations aimed at producing efficiency and a harmonious social order. At the national level any number of difficult to navigate federal regulations could be cited, and perhaps the tax code serves as the most familiar example. Even local governments take part, as municipalities enforce complex regulations even with respect to the collection of garbage and recyclables. Non-governmental organizations wield similarly incomprehensible power as neighborhood associations dictate everything from parking regulations down to the color of paint applied to an individual home’s front door.

The state’s power and the operation of the military-diplomatic system and the police power required knowledge at an unprecedented level of detail: enter statistics (Foucault, 2009, p. 274). Bridging both assemblages of power was concern over currency and commerce wherein statistics was an unparalleled tool (Foucault, 2009, p. 365). Statistics equipped the state with knowledge of its level of effectiveness; field usage provided knowledge of which techniques were most effective in which contexts. Furthermore, statistics allowed states to view themselves and their rivals in comparative perspective, thereby aiding in the preservation of an international balance of power. The state’s emergent power assemblages would have been impossible absent this newly developed mode of examination.

Police power armed with statistics made the enforcement of biopower all the more effective. The state’s raison d’état permitted it to determine what was in the best interest of its survival and sacrifice individuals in pursuit of that purpose. These observations raised a question for Foucault, namely, how could the state have become more welfare oriented than ever before, while simultaneously becoming more dangerous to its own people (Foucault, 2003, p. 260). His answer was informed by Nazi Germany and was phrased as “state racism.” The racist state could
divide its people along racial, religious, ethnic, or other lines. Some categories of citizens were useful in furthering the state’s existence. Their lives were to be improved and their happiness and the corresponding cooperation it bought were worth pursuing. Other categories were not useful and could be discarded, all of which was done in the name of the state’s pursuit of its raison d’état.

The emergence of the modern state was marked not only the birth of raison d’état, but also by the birth of political economy as a concept. Foucault wrote

the new science called political economy arises out of registering the new network of constant and multiple relations between population, territory and wealth; and this corresponds to the formation of a type of intervention characteristic of government, namely the intervention in the field of economy and population. In other words the transition from the art of government to political science, from a regime dominated by the structure of sovereignty to one ruled by techniques of government occurs in the eighteenth century around the theme of population and consequently centres on the birth of political economy (Foucault, 1991a, p. 101).

Thorough governmentality was dependent upon the ability to operate in an economic matter. Regimes were required to master this new political science to improve the techniques by which they governed. This was true of all constellations of governmentality, but economics took on special import within one particular constellation: the neoliberal mode of governmentality.

**Neoliberal Governmentality: Power Beyond the State**

Governmentality was connected to the doctrines of neoliberalism, particularly its approach to economics and the status given to economics. Foucault argued that the liberal economic model entailed the state watching over the market economy and permitted intervention only when it was absolutely necessary (Foucault, 2008, p. 86). However, in the most recent post-

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64 There may be other understandings of the concept of neoliberalism as well. Wendy Larner, for example, identified several understandings of neoliberalism as policy, as ideology, and as governmentality (2000). See Peck for an intellectual history of the concept (2008). Additionally, see Harvey for a non-Foucauldian description of the state’s role within neoliberalism (2005).
war period Germany faced a drastically different and unique situation, namely, the presence of a market, but the absence of a state. Historically, the state existed and was limited to ensure that markets developing within it were free. As Foucault pointed out “[t]he problem the Germans had was to resolve the exact opposite: given a state that does not exist, how can we get it to exist on the basis of this non-state space of economic freedom” (Foucault, 2008, pp. 86-87)? The ordoliberals of the Freiburg School, including economists and jurists like Wilhelm Röpke, Walter Eucken, Alexander Rüstow, and Franz Böhm, provided an answer that created a new relationship between the economy and the state. It was characterized by a “circuit” that existed “constantly from the economic institution to the state” (Foucault, 2008, p. 84). One key characteristic of the resulting structure was that “[t]he term ‘politics’ can no longer be utilized as if its meaning was self-evident; it must be the object of analysis” (Burchell, 1996, p. 38).

At the outset of his analysis Foucault noted certain similarities between the Freiburg School and the Frankfurt School. Both had appeared in the 1920s, both were involved in the political-academic problem in Germany during that period, both were shaped by experiences of exile, both viewed Nazism as a significant phenomena which demanded explanation, and both drew their starting point from Max Weber (Foucault, 2008, p. 105). Despite their similarities, the two schools established very different programs. While the Freiburg school was reconstructing the rationality of capitalism in order to prevent the social irrationality of capitalism from endangering the system, the Frankfurt school was attempting to construct a new social rationality to resolve capitalist irrationality (Foucault, 2008, pp. 105-106). The two schools also diverged with respect to their accounts of Nazism. The Freiburg School believed that Nazism emerged due to the absence of liberalism and a market economy. The alternatives were, for them, liberalism and various forms of state intervention. The Frankfurt School, took a diametrically opposing
approach by arguing that capitalism and fascism were causally linked (Burchell, 1996, p. 270; Foucault, 2008, pp. 106-115).

This relationship raised an additional question: how could a free and dominant economy be a state’s “guarantee and security” (Foucault, 2008, p. 102)? The question could be restated: how could the principle of economic freedom simultaneously function as both the foundation and limitation for a state? The ordoliberal answer was that the state should be conceived anew and that the free market economy should indicate that state’s “internal regulation from start to finish of its existence and action” (Foucault, 2008, p. 116). Foucault further explained that:

instead of accepting a free market defined by the state and kept as it were under state supervision – which was, in a way, the initial formula of liberalism . . . – the ordoliberals say we should completely turn the formula around and adopt the free market as an organizing and regulating principle of the state, from the start of existence up to the last form of its interventions. In other words: a state under the supervision of the market rather than a market supervised by the state (2008, p. 116).

The economy was now set up as prior to and dominant over the state. This arrangement provided legitimacy for the state and it served to make the state “acceptable to those who most mistrusted it” (Foucault, 2008, p. 117).

The ordoliberal position was compounded by their understanding of the market as an arena of ruthless competition, where it had previously entailed “free exchange between two partners who through this exchange establish the equivalence of two values” (Foucault, 2008, p. 118). The result of this understanding of the market allowed the ordoliberals to call laissez-faire principles into question as “naïve naturalism,” while competition, by contrast, “is absolutely not a given of nature” (Foucault, 2008, p. 120). The notion that markets are unnatural permitted the position that they should be tied to the state, rather than simply left to their own devices. The market must be tied to the state since it could not naturally exist and required constant involvement to persist. Foucault explained that:
Government must accompany the market economy from start to finish. The market economy does not take something away from government. Rather, it indicates, it constitutes the general index in which one must place the rule for defining governmental action. One must govern for the market, rather than because of the market. To that extent you can see that the relationship defined by eighteenth century liberalism is completely reversed (2008, p. 121).

Perfect competition did not naturally exist, nor was it likely to exist under even perfect conditions. It was to be aimed for and enabled by the conditions resulting from political and legal interventions.

Foucault identified three important results of the ordoliberal anti-natural position on the market. First, the existence of separate political and economic realms was not possible. The spheres of government and economics were necessarily overlapping, as the market could not exist otherwise. Second, historically speaking, the state and the economy had always been reciprocally linked. Third, capitalism could not be sustained by its own internal logic, since it lacked sustainable logic. Capitalism was always dependent upon the institutional structure of the state. Thus, the creation of a new state structure could create a new mode of capitalism. A new economic order, recognizing the connections with the society and the state could be created (Foucault, 2008, p. 160). Following from the third result, the ordolebals rejected Sombart’s hypothesis that a mass society would result from modern capitalism, claiming quite the opposite: that uniformity was the result of the market’s enemies attempt to constrain it, if market freedom were ensured mass society would not emerge (Foucault, 2008, pp. 146-147). They also rejected Schumpeter’s claim that capitalism was necessarily monopolistic, instead believing that any monopolist impulses could be controlled and need not be detrimental (Foucault, 2008, pp. 177-178).

The creation of an institutional framework that would allow the free market to persist, and entailed the diffusion of market principles into government, had certain implications for
social policy. First, as principles of free market enterprise entered into all aspects of life, social relations were to be modeled on economic relations. As a result, inequality must be permitted as the natural result of unnatural competition. This was a “vital policy,” in Rüstow’s terms, after all, individuals managing their everyday lives were engaged in a form of enterprise just as a firm within the market (Foucault, 2008, p. 148; C. Gordon, 1987, pp. 314-315). A second and connected implication for social policy was the necessary alteration of legal institutions and the law. Entrepreneurship and market principles needed to be inserted into the core of everyday life. The law must be redefined to ensure that the economic mindset was created and would become pervasive. Intervention to maintain the existence of the market was not only necessary within the market, but within all facets of life (Foucault, 2008, p. 160).

This arrangement required a new art of government, or governmentality, to function. Foucault wrote that the function of government was now to ensure that an appropriate degree of competition was permitted although this role “should not be identified with laissez-faire, but rather with permanent vigilance, activity, and intervention” (2008, p. 132). This constellation of government and economics, the neoliberal constellation, entailed the control of market rationality over government. Government, society, and politics now operated as markets and their purpose was to secure the dominant position of competition, which played a “regulatory role at every moment and every point in society” and allowed the “general regulation of society by the market” (Foucault, 2008, p. 145). Peck called the permeation of economic principles into non-economic areas of life “regulatory incursions,” which resulted from a “rediscovery and reinvention of an Ordoliberal ethic” (Peck, 2010, p. 23).

In addition to the German ordoliberal-Freiburg model Foucault considered the American neoliberal counterpart, the Chicago School. He considered a number of thinkers associated with
American neoliberalism, such as Becker, von Mises, Hayek, Simons, Schultz, and Stigler. Foucault explained that the important characteristic of the Chicago School was its expansion of the economy into non-economic, in his terms social, realms of life. Again, the idea was that economic forms of decision-making and mentalités were transposed onto non-economic spheres. The distinction between the American and the German models was a fine one. The German model sought to govern society in the name of the economy, while the American model attempt to recast the non-economic social sphere as an economic domain. The economic mode of thought became the principle that lent legitimacy to government action as government became an enterprise in the economic sense, whose purpose was to support and extend to market style competition throughout society (Foucault, 2008, p. 323).

American neoliberalism had two goals in expanding the scope of economics. First, it contained a desire to understand why individuals behaved as they did in deciding how to allocate their resources. The goal was to economically understand individual decision-making. It was an “extension of economic analysis” and created “the possibility of giving a strictly economic interpretation of a whole domain previously thought to be non-economic” (Foucault, 2008, p. 219). They believed that all decisions were economically justified and could be understood in economic terms, that no realm of life was ordered by anything other than economic rationality, or in Habermas’s terms instrumental rationality. Second, they wanted government to be critically examined in economic terms and using free market concepts. These concepts and the rationality contained within them represented “a sort of permanent economic tribunal confronting government” (Foucault, 2008, p. 247).

Foucault considered two examples that were illustrative of the neoliberal approach. First he considered the neoliberal theory of human capital. To fill out a theory of human capital, to
understand labor, the neoliberals considered the vantage point of the laborer. This was necessary because human capital is unlike other forms of capital in that the characteristics capable of earning profits, the skills and knowledge, are inseparable from the actual laborer, unlike a piece of capital whose owner can rent it out. The formation of human capital was dependent upon the physical make-up of the laborer and his entrepreneurial investment to acquire valuable skills, such as education and training. These were “innate elements and other, acquired elements” (Foucault, 2008, p. 227). This approach transformed wage laborers into entrepreneurs operating within a free market who were responsible for making autonomous investments to determine the value of their capital. In other words “homo economicus is an entrepreneur, an entrepreneur of himself” (Foucault, 2008, p. 226). Economics was no longer merely a means by which to analyze processes, but instead had become the means of analyzing “the strategic programming of individuals’ activity” (Foucault, 2008, p. 223).

Departing momentarily from Foucault’s analysis, let us turn to several other thinkers. Consider Pierre Bourdieu’s description of the market relations between firms now operating at the level of individuals within the workforce:

Competition is extended to individuals themselves, through the individualization of the wage relationship: establishment of individual performance objectives, individual performance evaluations, permanent evaluation, individual salary increases or granting of bonuses as a function of competence and of individual merit; individualized career paths; strategies of ‘delegating responsibility’ tending to ensure the self-exploitation of staff who, simple wage laborers in relations of strong hierarchical dependence, are at the same time held responsible for their sales, their products, their branch, their store, etc. as though they were in- dependent contractors. This pressure toward ‘self-control’ extends workers’ ‘involvement’ according to the techniques of ‘participative management’ considerably beyond management level. All of these are techniques of rational domination that impose over-involvement in work (and not only among management) and work under emergency or high-stress conditions. And they converge to weaken or abolish collective standards or solidarities (1998).

Additionally, Wendy Brown (2005) explicitly noted the ways in which homo economicus differed from citizen, as traditionally conceived. Citizens could ban together, address common
problems, and achieve collective ends. *Homo economicus*, however, was only capable of rationally calculating which actions would be to his own benefit, and interested in and capable only of undertaking those things economically deemed personally beneficial. She wrote:

The model neoliberal citizen is one who strategizes for her or himself among various social, political, and economic options, not one who strives with others to alter or organize these options. A fully realized neoliberal citizenry would be the opposite of public-minded; indeed, it would barely exist as a public. The body politic ceases to be a body but is rather a group of individual entrepreneurs and consumers . . . (Brown, 2005, p. 43).

Thus, becoming an entrepreneur had the effect of “depoliticizing social and economic powers” and reducing “political citizenship to an unprecedented degree of passivity and political complacency” (Brown, 2005, p. 43).

Implicit in this was the creation and endorsement of structures that institutionalized and exacerbated inequality as the foundation for future human activity. Simultaneously, the individual is portrayed as existing in a state of total freedom and autonomy. Seen as existing in such a state, individuals are completely responsible for their own lot. They are responsible for individually making decisions, which maximize their economic status, the value of their labor, their strategic reserves, and the whole of their individuality as a business endeavor. Those who fail to make the proper economic calculations have simply led a “mismanaged life” with no one but themselves to blame (Brown, 2005, p. 42). This mismanagement would not just be considered an economic failure, but a moral failure as well. If there were institutions, collectives, or governments behind these individual failures blame is slow to fall upon them and their consequences less severe. Consider, for example, the housing bubble and subprime mortgage collapse in the United States. In the wake of these events the individual homeowners paid a heavy price for overvaluing their assets or failing to negotiate more favorable terms, while the financial institutions eventually revealed as the culprits continued to operate without long term
repercussions or significantly altering their practices.

Returning to Foucault’s second example, consider the manner in which the neoliberal Chicago School applied an economic analysis, using free market criteria, to criminality and the penal system. Foucault was particularly interested in the work of Gary Becker, who seemed the most extreme proponent of the neoliberal project on this subject (Foucault, 2008, p. 251). The criminal is an entrepreneur “who invests in an action, expects a profit from it, and who accepts the risk of a loss” (Foucault, 2008, p. 253). The criminal, as *homo economicus*, approached a murder and a petty theft in much the same way as economic prospects. The function of the criminal justice system was to create negative externalities sufficient to economically regulate and deter criminal acts. As Foucault put it, “[i]t has to concern itself with a conduct or series of conducts which produce actions from which the actors expect a profit and which carry a special risk, which is not just the risk of economic loss, but the penal risk, or that economic loss which is inflicted by the penal system . . . . In other words, it will have to react to the supply of crime” (2008, p. 253). The penal system had abandoned the objective of eliminating crime, instead its aim was market intervention to “limit the supply of crime solely by a negative demand” (Foucault, 2008, p. 256). In this view, the criminal was a rational-economic individual, like any other, and not a psychologically or biologically deviant personality. This represented a dramatic departure from the previous conception of *homo criminalis* (Pasquino, 1991).

This approach to human capital and criminality was similar to the Chicago School’s approach to other aspects of life. The individual was viewed as a economic actor whose behavior could be manipulated through strategic “modifications in the variables of the environment,”
since he would react rationally to them (Foucault, 2008, p. 269).\textsuperscript{65} It is worth noting, as Hindess has, that the perception of neoliberal approaches may be contextually dependent:

Against the background conditions in which the great nineteenth- and twentieth-century social policy regimes were set in place, many governmental programmes now repudiated by neo-liberalism could plausibly be represented as promoting autonomy. Against a very different contemporary background in which, at least in the more advanced Western societies, the existence of a suitably calculable population is easily taken for granted, these same programmes can be seen as undermining autonomy. Neo-liberalism is a liberal response to the achievements of the liberal mode of government (1993, p. 311).

Neoliberalism and perceptions of it were, necessarily, dependent upon the contexts and the historical transformations of governmentality that they entailed. Thus, the added responsibility that came with the care of the economic individual of himself could be interpreted as an extended exercise of autonomy. As Rose and Miller put it, this “language of the entrepreneurial individual, endowed with freedom and autonomy, has come to predominate over almost any other in the evaluations of the ethical claims and power and programmes of government” (1992, p. 200).

The goal of government was now “action at a distance” (Rose & Miller, 1992, p. 180). The individual was free to economically weigh potential profits and losses and this could be seen in all areas of life. O’Malley identified three processes at work in shifting from state-run, society wide risk avoidance to private, individual risk avoidance, or as he termed it prudentialism. This consisted of:

the retraction of socialized risk-based techniques from managing the risks confronting the populace; their progressive replacement through the extension of privatized risk-based techniques; and the articulation of this process with the strategic deployment of sovereign remedies and disciplinary interventions facilitate, underline and enforce moves towards government through individual responsibility (O'Malley, 1996b, p. 199).

Risk within the governmentality literature is not always understood in the traditional sense. For example, Castel (1991), Defert (1991), and Ewald (1991) all viewed risk as a way of viewing

\textsuperscript{65} Also, see Gordon (1991, p. 43), Burchell (1991, 1996), Hindess (1993, pp. 307-311), and Rose (1996b, pp. 50-62).
problems, in particular, a highly probabilistic abstract utilized in decision making, rather than something concrete.

All of these decisions constitute what is contemporarily known as “power” which was “assembled into complexes that connect up forces and institutions deemed ‘political’ with apparatuses that shape and manage individual and collective conduct in relation to norms and objections but yet are constituted as ‘non-political’” (Rose, 1996b, pp. 37-38). In one of the earliest efforts to discover the political implications of Foucault’s work on governmentality Jacques Donzelot worried that power would become the new driving force of history:

We would have then not a power and those who undergo it, but, as Foucault shows, technologies, that is to say always local and multiple, intertwining coherent or contradictory forms of activating and managing a population, and strategies, the formulae of government . . . theories which explain reality only to the extent that they enable the implementation of a program, the generation of actions; they provide through their coherence a “practical object” (practicable) for corrective intervention of government programmes and redirection (1979, p. 77).

The state would no longer be a driving force behind historical developments. Instead it would only be “a support for technologies” or a mere “effect of governmental strategies” (Donzelot, 1979, p. 78). The state government itself was governmentalized.

Neoliberal governmentality adopted government from a distance as a key technique of governance, as responsibility and the cost of failure shifted to the individual. This involved technologies of subjectivity and the resulting freedom – if indeed the result was freedom – was of a qualified sort:

not liberation from social constraints but rendering psychological constraints on autonomy conscious, and hence amenable to rational transformation. Achieving freedom becomes a matter not of slogans nor of political revolution but of slow, painstaking, and detailed work on our own subjective and personal realities guided by an expert knowledge of the psyche (Rose, 1989, p. 213).

Barbara Cruikshank provided an example by analyzing a unique technology of the self, the emergence of American self-esteem movements (Cruikshank, 1996). She demonstrated that that
the self-esteem model believed that a variety of public problems were the result of the individuals involved lacking self-esteem. In Cruikshank’s work, and elsewhere, techniques of community and self-help have been connected to the governmentality of poverty, drug addiction, and alcoholism (Cruikshank, 1996, 1999; Rose, 1999; Valverde, 1998).

Self-esteem advocates and the corresponding California Task Force to Promote Self-Esteem and Personal and Social Responsibility constructed “a technology of subjectivity that will solve social problems from crime and poverty to gender inequality by waging a social revolution, not against capitalism, racism and inequality, but against the order of the self and the way we govern our selves” (Cruikshank, 1996, p. 231). This represented neoliberal governmentality altering the line between the public and the private spheres of life. Similarly, Monica Greco wrote of the “duty to be well” (1993). Self-esteem, however, was dependent upon the mode of assessment, rather than any objective concept. The self was continually assessed against collective measures thereby creating a tenuous and constantly re-examined accord between personal states and levels of esteem and the public goals of government (Cruikshank, 1996). Self-help serves as an example of governmentality as the internalization of the self or the personality at the level of the individual.\footnote{William James (2009) identified this trend of internalization in his lectures at the University of Edinburgh in 1901 and 1902.} Governmentality of the self is also related to the presentation, marketing, or sale of the self of the sort outlined by Dale Carnegie’s influential \textit{How to Win Friends and Influence People}, and the countless updates and spin-offs that have achieved a degree of fetishism in the business world (1936).

Miller and Rose (1990) examined the way private, individual decisions were seized by the entrepreneurial mode of market competition. Decision-making became based upon cost/benefit considerations in all realms of life as the previously non-economic realms were
overtaken by economic mentality. All things were addressed as economic goods, including
employee health as “the quest for profit of entrepreneurs and the personal well-being of
employees could be brought into alignment through psychological expertise” (P. Miller & Rose,
1990, p. 21). Leisure, well-being, and self-fulfillment were economic considerations that served
the ends of economic efficiency. Self-determination became an economic resource to be
optimized. In short, “[t]hrough this loose assemblage of agents, calculations, techniques, images
and commodities, consumer choice can be made an ally of economic growth: economic life can
be government through the choices consumers make in their search for personally fulfilling
forms of existence” (P. Miller & Rose, 1990, pp. 25-26). The result was economic self-
government in accordance with the aims neoliberal governmentality. Miller and Rose closed one
work by concluding:

Political authorities no longer seek to govern by instructing individuals . . . Individuals
themselves, as workers, managers, and member of families can be mobilized in alliance
with political objectives, in order to deliver economic growth, successful enterprise and
optimum personal happiness . . . . Modern political power does not take the form of
subjectivity. Rather, political power has come to depend upon a web of technologies for
fabricating and maintaining self-government (1990, p. 28).

The governmentality of neoliberalism explains a political, social, and economic project
conflating those spheres, as well as the public and private into a single domain organized in
accordance with economic rationality.

Neoliberal governmentality is usually portrayed as an array of structures in which
individuals have no choice but to live their lives. Alternatively, Sam Binkley (2006) has
suggested that despite the neoliberal attempt to collapse all realms of life into one another, the
subject individual possesses the ability to maintain the borders between realms and chooses
when to move from one to the other. However, Binkley’s account was primarily concerned with
the control individuals can exercise as consumers. In fact, this ability may only exist because it
was constructed by neoliberal governmentality and “defines a significant feature of self-governmentality” (Binkley, 2006, p. 345). The control and freedom presented to the consumer may be of a trivial nature. Freedom of the consumer may be nothing more than the freedom to choose from among a spectacular array of breakfast cereals. This would be far removed from freedom as political freedom or collective self-determination. Furthermore, it is not clear whether a case could be made for the ability of individuals to exercise similar control in maintaining borders with respect to other spheres of life.

At the outset of studies on neoliberal governmentality there was disagreement between those adopting that approach and those undertaking cultural studies. Ian Hunter (1988, 1993, 1994) argued that education for the lower classes was primarily concerned with instilling in citizens the skills needed to effectively perform self-governance. It was eventually realized that culture could be an incarnation of governmentality. Tony Bennett (1997, 2004; Jin, 2008) explained how cultural institutions, like museums, could embody specific governmental rationalities. Work along these lines demonstrated how governmentality could become manifest in the rationality of planning and curating museums, and how such entities could influence the subject and its relations through the organization of cultural institutions (Bennett, 2004). By way of example, such analyses have been applied to everything from urban garden planning (Certoma, 2013) to historical memorials (David, 2010).

Studies of neoliberal governmentality have gone beyond even the cultural arena. This analytic framework has been applied to a massive array of topics to understand contemporary government beyond the state and to push the limits of the concept. The purpose of such efforts has been to understand political power through its mobile and changing manifestations. Governmentality has been used to understand environmental protection against climate change
through self-government via “carbon dieting” (Paterson & Stripple, 2010). It has been applied to human pregnancy (Weir, 1998) and used to examine the international mobility of Polish sausages (Dunn, 2005). It has been applied to visa regimes associated with the “international self,” and the role of airports as centers to manage the risks of population movement (Salter, 2006, 2007). A number of writers have focused on governmentality in emergency preparedness, risk assumption, and organizational resilience (Amoore, 2009; Aradau & Munster, 2008; Collier & Lakoff, 2008b; de Goede, 2008). Jonathan Simon has used governmentality concepts to examine the connections between the war on crime and the regulation of life (Simon, 2009).

Neoliberal governmentality and its market principles were present everywhere and always. There was nothing outside of this expansive reach. Market logic permeated all aspects of life: “the problem is not whether there are things that you cannot touch and others that you are entitled to touch. The problem is how you touch them” (Foucault, 2008, p. 133). The ordoliberal process of marketization and the dominance of the competition it entailed represented the core of the neoliberalism that followed, and has been updated from time to time (Foucault, 2008, p. 117). Neoliberal government’s central and defining purpose was to promote the market, and the market’s structures themselves extended into the government’s institutions. The market’s freedom, for neoliberals, was greatly aided by the exposure of the government to competition through the privatization of state activities (Foucault, 2008, pp. 143-144). Privatization would move “the centre of gravity of governmental action downwards” (Foucault, 2008, p. 148). This

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67 Foucault drew fine distinctions between ordoliberalism, French neoliberalism, and American neoliberalism (Foucault, 2008, pp. 192-193). Hindess (1997) argued that the fact that contemporary strands of neoliberalism are distinctly labeled indicates that they are the result of different developmental processes. Hall cautioned that the term neoliberal entailed “too many things to merit a single identity” (2011, p. 706) Thus, Peck wrote that the concept only survived through “continued mongrelization” (2010, p. 24). Similarly, Brenner and his coauthors labeled it a “rascal concept” (2010, p. 185).
permitted functions that were once carried out by government to be performed by market competitors.

Foucault described the emergence of techniques of audit as an alternative path, should privatization not be immediately possible. If a particular governmental function could not be privatized then it could at least be transformed to operate via market principles, in other words, governmental functions could be “de-statized” (Rose, 1996b). This resulted was a drastic increase in “performance indicators” to measure and compare performance as market competition became the dominant rationality (De Angelis, 2006, p. 219). This permitted an “audit explosion” (Rose, 1999, pp. 153-155). The accountability of government was no longer understood in terms of responsiveness to the political needs of citizens. The new governmental accountability took the form of government being accountable to the market and being able to justify its practices in market terminology. Accountable government is government that conducts itself competitively. Graham Burchell noted that the neoliberal mindset desired “autonomization” via emphasis on “a kind of economic or enterprise model of action that pursues a competitive logic” (1996, p. 28).

It is worth noting that the retreat of government and the onset of a free market, enterprise model does not involve less government, as would be applauded by political conservatives, rather it entails the retreat of the non-economic mode of government. Even in cases where the government itself, in addition to operating in accordance with economic rationality, actually shrinks, this does not indicate a decrease in governance. Larner used the term “market governance” to represent this stability in the amount of governance, as well as to indicate the new location of governance (1997). The result was a government, perhaps even a larger government, under a new mode of operation. Mechanisms are created that function
autonomously to bring about governmental results through the assignment of risk to the “enterprise” or the individual entrepreneur, often times a government employee perceived in marketized terms. These entrepreneurs are responsible for overseeing their own enterprises and ensuring that they are economically competitive within the marketplace.

This competitive logic is maintained through governmentalized government which constantly conducts surveillance of itself in the form of the audit. Marilyn Strathern argued that the audit represented a new managerial practice, but is “a now taken-for-granted process of neo-liberal government” that is the heart of that system’s “ethos” (2000, p. 3). Similarly, Peter Miller identified the use of accountancy practices as a technology of neoliberal governmentality (2001). This is a form of government self-assessment. “Where audit is applied to public institutions – medical, legal, educational – the state’s overt concern may be less to impose day-to-day direction than to ensure that internal controls, in the form of monitoring techniques are in place” (Strathern, 2000, p. 3). Michael Power (1997) also demonstrated that the mundane technologies of budgets, audits, and benchmarks were key to the neoliberal form of management, governing from a distance, with the ultimate goal being the assurance that government is competitive to the extent and in the manner prescribed by market logic.

It has been argued that neoliberal rationality is a highly specific rationality (Rose, 1996a). This body of literature focusing on governmentality as an investigation into neoliberalism has normally taken the form of overarching theoretical analysis, while examinations of the specific techniques and constellations of the neoliberal art of government have been lacking. There are obviously exceptions to this observation. Anthropologists James Ferguson and Akhil Gupta (2002) broadened the geographic scope of governmentality as neoliberalism. They viewed the state-centric nature of the understanding of neoliberalism as governmentality as a weakness.
They aimed “to extend the discussion of governmentality to modes of government that are being set up on a global scale” (Ferguson & Gupta, 2002, p. 990). They considered the extent to which traditional state functions have been transferred to non-governmental international actors, particularly in Africa. Additionally, Mitchell Dean and Barry Hindess (1998), and Larner (2000) examined neoliberal governmentality within specific contexts – Australia and New Zealand respectively. Consider the rise of NGOs in Eastern Europe and Africa, which have generated both support and hostility. In contrast to the specificity of neoliberal governmentality, some utilized it as a category to explain programs within a variety of settings. For example, Pat O’Malley (1996a) attempted to apply the framework to indigenous forms of government.

The understanding of governmentality must also be extended in light of technological developments, which create new spaces of human activity. These spaces have often not been directly, intentionally, or specifically governed from a distance. Such spaces have, however, been tangentially governed by constellations of power and technologies of the self that have already been ingrained in individuals. Of course, all forms of governmentality have technological dimensions and that technology periodically advances. As with previous advances in the technologies of governance, contemporarily emergent technologies would always be fruitful grounds for examination. Nigel Thrift pointed to the importance of such efforts as his analysis stepped beyond existing realms of power in examining “other kinds of space/time/place that are now coming to constitute a kind of permanent political shadow world as a result of the institution of new kinds of political machine” (Thrift, 2006, p. 553). Considerations of this type would circle the analysis back into discussions of panopticism and surveillance. These concepts are certainly connected to governmentality, particularly neoliberal governmentality since technological advances that drastically further the ability to survey have become most advanced
in contemporary neoliberal states. However, Governmentality is itself a massive field of study that has taken on a life, and utility, far beyond Foucault’s original scope. As Bröckling noted, governmentality has become an “independent research field” (Bröckling et al., 2011, p. 9).

4.5 Conclusion

Foucault’s work, its legacy, and those who contribute to it by continuing to engage in research using his framework still stand somewhat apart from mainstream political science. Wendy Brown pointed out the paradoxical fact that Foucault’s impact has been strongest on topics and thematics with which Foucault himself was little engaged. Post-colonial and subaltern studies scholars, feminist theorists, critical race theorists, critical legal theorists, and theorists of political subjectivity and of international relations have made use of Foucault’s work on power, discourse and the body; however, these were not Foucault’s own research interests (Brown, 2006, p. 76).

Foucault’s legacy remains most impactful in those areas rather than in traditional fields of political science. At one point Paul Brass set out to write of the “Foucauldian Turn in Political Science,” but could not do so and was forced to acknowledge that he did not think “such a turn has occurred in the discipline” (Brass, 2000, p. 305). While the Foucauldian turn in political science never materialized, Foucault has had more influence in social theory due to the links between him and other influential thinkers in that field, Weber, Habermas, and Bourdieu for example.

Despite failing to gain influence in mainstream political science the research program that Foucault began, although left unfinished, can make a vital contribution to that field. Power, after all, is of central concern in political science. Political science’s concern, however, is understandably and traditionally limited to power possessed by state apparatuses and how the state exercises that power. This traditional mode of viewing the world would be both outdated and lacking in explanatory potential from a Foucauldian perspective. Indeed, the Foucauldian approach to political power seems stranger when compared to traditional conceptions of the
political. Due to its originality such an analysis of politics is necessary, if Foucault is to be believed, because the very nature of politics has changed the modern world as power has been exerted in more areas and has become more diffuse. The nature of politics and political power has changed and so the conceptual target of political science has moved and no longer resembles its former self.

However, portraying Foucault as a thinker concerned only with power existing outside of political structures, in cultural arenas for example is a mistake for several reasons. First, Foucault did explicitly concern himself with political constellations, as with governmentality’s concern over the relationship of the state to the economy. Second, Foucault, and this chapter, demonstrated that exercises of disciplinary power outside of the traditional political sense functions for governmental ends and are capable of contributing to or even displacing traditional concepts of the exercise of state power. The practices of government then can be understood as existing along a conceptual continuum. Traditional state practices may still take place or they may be supplanted by less easily perceived government from afar, or even manifested in our own practices of self-regulation.
CHAPTER 5 CONCLUSION

In this closing chapter I perform two pressing tasks. First, I briefly draw connections between Hannah Arendt, Jürgen Habermas, and Michel Foucault, as they were presented in the preceding chapters. Without moving too deeply into lengthy repetition of what has already taken place I point out areas of parallel between the three authors. Second, I translate these theoretical parallels into concerns bearing upon the nature of contemporary politics. I provide examples of real-world political manifestations of the theoretical diagnosis that has been conducted here through the works of Arendt, Habermas, and Foucault. This second task includes an examination of potential prescriptions that could remedy some of the negative aspects of the alteration that has occurred to politics. Some of these are commonly held positions on political reform that are not often viewed in the theoretical light presented here, while some are more radical reforms.

5.1 Parallels and Convergences

In the preceding chapters I analyzed the works of Hannah Arendt, Jürgen Habermas, and Michel Foucault, as well as the secondary literature, at length. Given what has already been established in the previous three chapters it will be useful to explicitly identify some areas of commonality between the three theorists. A brief recapitulation of some of the primary points is in order to demonstrate the connectedness of Arendt, Habermas, and Foucault’s theoretical positions. Each of these thinkers claimed that what is considered political has changed over time. Arendt presented a notion of pure politics that existed only within the idealized Greek polis. Her idealized conception of politics declined with the rise of the social, which incorporated previously nonpolitical aspects of life into politics. Arendt theorized the Greek polis as the idealized political realm; this was separated from all matters considered social. Arendt believed that in the modern age the social had overtaken the political to dominate the public sphere, which
was now a social sphere wherein private interests dictated public concern. The rise of Arendt’s broadly construed social brought a number of things into the public, formerly political realm, including: economics as both a subject and a mode of operation, private lives, life processes, power as both a subject and mode of operation, conformism, and alienation. The rise of the social re-defined politics and along with it freedom, while precluding the possibility of action, freedom, or politics in the Arendtian sense.

Habermas portrayed a pre-structural transformation of the public sphere containing a functional form of discourse, which developed the skills and conditions necessary for the existence of a discursive political sphere. This bourgeois public sphere was, however, typical of an epoch, and it eventually declined with the intrusion of private concerns. Habermas characterized the emergent form of politics as non-ideal communication, either systematically distorted or of a sort permitting only strategic action. This was diametrically opposed to the ideal politics that would be possible under conditions allowing genuine communication and true communicative action. A host of corrupting mentalities, influences, and interests had permeated actual politics. Citizens were no longer equal members of a public sphere communicating in a manner that would allow the force of the better argument to triumph and were instead opponents to be manipulated, coerced, and conquered. In Habermas’s more mature work he constructed a theory of communicative action that would bypass the corrupting influences of the social to reconstruct genuinely communicative and truly political forms of action.

Foucault, along with a range of subsequent researchers adopting his methods and terminology, similarly demonstrated a change in politics. Foucault described the genealogy of politics and power, though he did not engage in the type of normative lament found in the writing of Habermas and especially Arendt. Absent from Foucault’s account was any depiction
of an idealized public sphere. He detailed the inclusion of biological processes in politics as well as the state’s ability to capitalize on biology as a new means of control. Foucault’s development of panopticism as a theory expanded the singular panopticon to the societal level. When panopticism existed individuals knew that they could be under surveillance at any moment, and so must behave at all times as if they were. Panopticism resulted in a disciplinary society. Foucault’s wide-ranging concept of governmentality provided a means of thinking about the constellations and locations of power as governance became more thorough and complete and yet often distanced from the traditional state. Some constellations of power created a privileged place for the economy, which provided a universalized mode of thinking and the standard by which all areas of life were judged.

Arendt was the most idealistic of the three; the problems with the Greek *polis* have already been noted, but she nevertheless portrayed it as a place where perfect politics took place among a few select free and equal citizens. Habermas perceived a certain historical era as producing an idealized form of bourgeois public sphere and sought to recreate conditions of perfect communication capable of emulating a still idealized, although more inclusive, public sphere. Foucault lacked movement toward any idealization. This represents an important difference between the three theorists. While Arendt and Habermas could yearn for the piecemeal return of some bygone era or theorize a solution to the difficulties they described this was not present in Foucault’s thought. For Foucault the normative element was lacking, as his was more a project of description than prescription. In Foucault’s account, then, it is not that politics has necessarily changed for the worse, just that it has changed. If the change can be described as a change for the worse it is because more control was now possible, rather than because some ideal was being abandoned.
Turning away from their notions of an ideal public, or lack thereof, I want to consider their identifications of the changing nature of the political. Perhaps the most obvious and pressing connection between the three theorists is their position on the inclusion of economics in the political sphere. All three described the entrance of economy into politics as a sea change for politics in the modern era. For Arendt this meant the inclusion of economic concerns that would be more properly dealt with by administration or housekeeping than politics and, of equal importance, the privileged status given the economic mindset. Similarly, Habermas described the way both economic interests and the economic mode of bargaining and exchange had replaced the political and communicative processes by which the force of the better argument stood a chance of winning the day. Foucault also described an altered relationship between politics and economics, as economics became a means by which governance could be exerted upon the population and the individual. Foucault too saw the economic mindset as having taken over decision-making in all areas of life, demonstrating how all decisions and actions could be understood in economic terms.

The result of the privileged status of economics is that politics is primarily conducted along economic principles; principles that Arendt identified as more appropriate for administration carried out by a bureaucratic apparatus than the politics of free and equal citizens. Individuals can primarily be understood as *homo economicus* rather than *zoon politikon*. As such they enter into politics prepared to bargain and make trade-offs with an eye toward advancing their private and subjective economic interests. Communicative political understanding, conceived as understanding an issue from all sides, has been replaced by the project of advancing private interests. Since the political sphere was now about the advancement of private interests the mentality and mode of action attached to that ultimate end was now applicable. In addition to
bargaining and exchange, manipulation and strategic relations became the norm, which were previously prohibited in idealized political spheres. The relationships that were, for Arendt, not permitted within the *polis* now become common in politics. This went beyond individuals of equal ability and resources engaging in gamesmanship to gain a competitive advantage. As individual’s and organization’s private interests and resources entered into play, differential resources and abilities were utilized to construct a system benefiting economic interests. Thus, the economic mode of action was regularized and institutions were structured to benefit these interests. Different constellations of governance emerged to favor the field of economics, the economic mindset, and economic interests.

Another important similarity in the account presented is the rise of conformism in the contemporary age. For Arendt, Habermas, and Foucault conformism arose through the normalizing of the population. Governmental control over life conditions brought all into similar circumstances. Arendt believed that conformism left no possibility for political action. None would engage in novel endeavors because all understood that to be abnormal was dangerous. Thus, Arendt described the rampant self-censoring inclinations of Americans in an age when pariahs felt a compulsion to become parvenus. Foucault explained this position in a different way with the panopticism of society. All know that they may potentially be under surveillance at any given time and so must behave at all times as if they are. These individuals will self-regulate, self-censor, and normalize themselves, realizing that whatever is not normal is considered dangerous. Individuals living under such conditions will behave rather than act. Public opinion, or rather, public expectations can rule dangerously and tyrannically.

The current security apparatus that has become so prevalent in advanced Western democracies is an all too literal example of panopticism. From CCTV monitoring for which
London has famously acquitted itself to America’s NSA surveillance programs, panopticism is obviously associated with security. I will set these examples aside for the moment; they will be taken up again below when I consider other ways in which panopticism leading to conformism, self-discipline, and self-censorship can be detrimental to politics. At the most basic level the pluralism required for democratic politics could not exist when all held the same views. Arendt’s notion of politics requires both equality and pluralism. If pluralism were quashed and only equality remained, there would be little prospect for politics. Economic equality would not necessarily be the death knell for politics, and would not be unless that equality became absolute. After all, there is much to contest beyond economic matters. However, if opinions, viewpoints, and thoughts never emerged as speech, and thought itself was eventually self-censored, that would be detrimental to nearly any conception of democratic politics.

A part of this self-censorship or self-discipline is not only law abidingness or political self-restraint in the face of McCarthyism or the more recent post-9/11 “for us or against us” narrative. This pressure to behave was in many cases a pressure to behave in accordance with the newly dominant economic rationality. Action was once located within the political realm of life. Now self-regulated behavior was the norm in all areas of life. However, the appearance of freedom was conjured in the economic sphere, which was connected to all areas of life. Although beguiling to many, economic freedom and economic action was at all times constrained by the institutional rules of the state’s preferred system. It was the freedom to behave as *homo economicus*, to act as dictated by the economic mentalité, and to be free to apply this mode of life to all spheres. Unsurprisingly, people seize this opportunity, for lack of any others, and economics becomes more firmly entrenched in politics and the mindset dominant in individual psyches. Freedom became the freedom to conform to social and economic norms and
expectations. Arendt saw this as the end of politics and the beginning of the social realm. Foucault described a process by which this system was self-enforced while allowing the possibility of resistance. Habermas recognized similar problems associated with mass society and attempted to promote a more pluralistic and just democratic society through his theoretical models of discourse ethics and communicative action. Habermas also described the manner in which instrumental rationality as well as its institutional representatives had colonized the lifeworld. The idea of the lifeworld as theoretically distinguishable from the system may set the thought of Habermas apart from that of Arendt and Foucault.

The result was a political realm dominated by economic concerns and mentalités, which are self-enforced by individuals. Indeed, all areas of life can be seen as dominated by economics, although if Arendt’s account is to be believed this was the case even in the Greek world of rigid distinctions. Once the realm of politics was no longer a realm of action among those who were truly equal, since individuals possess different resources and those resources are allowed to enter into politics, it became a realm of not only economic relations, but a realm of force as well. In Arendt’s account force was stricken from the political sphere. It was permissible only where individuals were aneu logou. As described in Chapter 2, similar to economics, force became both a subject and a means of politics. Politics became not only a realm of economic bargaining and trade-offs to maximize economic goods, but a space of raw power, coercion and manipulation. Absent a communicative public sphere, Habermas described the way communication became strategic, manipulative, distorted, and coercive. In the pre-idealized bourgeois public sphere a powerful lord could simply rule by dictate. In the modern world, at least in democratic states, to dictate policies is not sufficient; instead, the appearance of communicative politics is created even though such a politics is strategically and perhaps even systematically distorted. Foucault
described the growth of the state’s internal police and the development of the political-military complex, and beyond this the inclination, nearing obsession, to ensure security from enemies both internal and external.

It is not difficult to paint a portrait of the state as security obsessed, or to list the innumerable constellations of state apparatuses geared toward the assurance of security. Certainly, security is a legitimate goal of the state; a state must after all ensure the persistence of its population and itself if that is necessary to protect life. The Greek *polis* did this and any state that did not would not be long for this world, especially in more volatile eras than the present. However, this was not always the proper and primary focus of politics. More often than not paying heed to security concerns is necessary to protect and maintain the political realm, but protection from armed opposition was not the subject of politics. It may even be a political matter when existential threats to the system arise, but it is not the only political matter, which dominates everywhere and always. This may be a matter for the security apparatus and its civilian leadership, a matter for properly publicly concerned experts. After all, how much freedom could truly exist if the choice was between continuation or annihilation? If you have nothing to hide you have nothing to fear. How can Achillean words and deeds be uttered and acted upon if the choice is between the dichotomously Schmittian categories of friend or foe? If you do not concede, then you are yourself a danger. This choice is strategically manipulative. Security is set up as the primary political issue of the day and then in essence there is no viable choice.

A distinction can be drawn here between persuasion and violence or force. Genuine persuasion through speech which allowed the force of the better argument to carry the day was the very essence of Arendtian politics and communicative action. Other means of persuasion
which relied upon raw power or manipulation rather than the force of convincing words were antithetical to politics. This included modern beliefs like Mao’s that power grows from the barrel of a gun. This notion of power was also characterized by Foucault’s inversion of Clausewitz, the idea that politics is war continued by other means. While persuasion and understanding privileged the better argument exchanges permitting force enabled the position with the most raw power at its disposal to triumph.

Force is used to dictate the outcomes of debates about the use of force, and accompanying political concerns. The state’s apparatuses and with it the public concern, and the political sphere have been oriented toward security. With those concerns force in the form of coercion and manipulation override genuine discourse to achieve the outcome of a continued and growing concern with security and the perpetuation of security as the dominant issue. Issues that are not necessarily matters of security are either linked to security, subjected to the means of force, or both. The most obvious example can be found in Cold War era economics when the dichotomy between friends and foes was based upon the distinction between capitalist or communist. Today, the private realm may be the only space left for some degree of freedom, yet this too has been infiltrated by security as metadata, or as more intrusive information on phone calls and emails is collected. The claim “if you have nothing to hide you have nothing to fear” brings about manipulative acceptance, and security extends farther into the remaining untouched areas of life, and behavior is farther subjected to self-disciplining tendencies.

The result is a politics that in lieu of being a realm of freedom for the benefit of those involved becomes a realm where all behavior is aimed at achieving desired outcomes, often the promotion of private interests. In this realm of gamesmanship anything goes to promote subjective self-interest or perceived self-interest. Politics is something to be won. Constellations
of institutions are structured to restrict play and possible outcomes to a certain set. Discipline, conformism and strategically structured choices ensure that most do not violate the rules or aim toward undesirable results. Economic interests are promoted and the economic mindset dominates. Consistent with this mindset advantages are pressed and this means taking advantage of resource disparities. Genuine communicative discourse is discouraged since politically understanding an issue from all sides would require questioning the correctness of individual positions. In this form of politics security is employed as a focal point and force is employed as a means.

The primary issues of the political realm become economics and security. With economics not winning for one’s own position means giving something up, either in the form of current resources or future profits. This is unacceptable to profit maximizing *homo economicus*. Economic means are used to structure the game in certain ways, and individuals conform to the rules, as doing so is required for success. Those who do not succeed have only themselves to blame for being poor CEOs. Security is the other dominant issue of politics, and in security there is no real choice possible, and so no freedom to dissent or strike out in a novel direction. When dealing with issues of security and the use of force, ends can be sought by any means necessary. The choice is between life and death and rules are only a hindrance in this ultimate pursuit. Thus, force, manipulation, coercion, and any constellation of apparatuses may be employed to achieve the only outcome that can possibly be chosen. Economics and security have become the two issues and mindsets within the modern political realm and both have predetermined goals that are sought by any means necessary. Thucydides’s depiction of life in nonpolitical spheres is now true in all areas of life.
Before proceeding I would like to note that this could be read as a bit conspiratorial, though this was not the intent or the point. I am not arguing that there is some hidden elite class of puppet masters pulling the strings. Disparities of resources, access, and abilities certainly bring differing levels of influence, and this is made all the more important in a political sphere where all advantages are utilized to increase profits or advance private interest. However, even the most influential elites are playing the same impoverished political game. They possess advantages that stack the deck in their favor in a political realm where de jure equality is negated by relevant de facto inequality. Elites are more likely to have their private economic interests advanced, win office, or have their interests more strongly represented by those in power. In all of this they are still involved in a political realm that has changed drastically over time and is no longer a space for freedom. They too must play the game and do not experience freedom in the political sense, although their lifestyles are more extravagant and absent of poverty, hunger, and above mere survival. Even the most powerful and influential will not experience politics in Arendt’s sense of the highest form of human activity.

The existing system is beyond the control of any class of individuals. If politics was collective self-determination based upon freedom, then none experience politics in the modern age. We do not realize that the blob has swallowed us, that our communications are systematically distorted, or that governmental and non-governmental apparatuses shape our behavior and compel us to shape our own behavior. The changes to the political described here are so pervasive and so ingrained that they are not recognized. Other possibilities for politics are difficult to imagine. There is widespread alienation from freedom, from action, from politics, and from public life, which was once highly valued. The alienation itself is taken as given; how could it be otherwise?
5.2 Practical Diagnoses and Prescriptions

In this section I briefly translate the theories that have been discussed to this point into diagnoses of practical problems and present some limited prescriptions toward altering the political for the better. Altering the conception of the political may be seen as either a recovery of the spirit of some bygone age, or as coming closer to some more just and free theorized ideal. Although the accounts of Arendt, Habermas, and Foucault differ in certain respects they share some common underlying themes. If all three thinkers presented were reduced to simplistic versions of their shared statements on the contemporary political sphere we would be left with the following: (1) Private interests, especially economics, has become too influential in politics, as well as other realms of life, as both a subject and a mode of conduct. (2) Power, coercion, and strategic manipulation have become dominant in politics both as subjects and as modes of conduct. (3) Politics has become about winning or achieving desired outcomes by shaping individual behavior, rather than about freedom. These are obviously broad oversimplified statements, but are central parallels between the works of Arendt, Habermas, and Foucault. These theoretical claims can be translated into practical manifestations of the problems that plague the prevailing conception of the political.

The questions of what is left of ideal politics or how to recover ideal politics cannot be definitively answered. These are actually the wrong questions. More appropriate and answerable questions would be something like: how can politics more closely resemble the ideals? How can the problematic aspects of politics presented here be minimized? How can politics be realistically changed to offset the negative aspects of the developments that have been detailed here? These questions can be answered, and in answering them it may be possible to alter politics for the better by permitting more individual space, more freedom to speak and act, and
less influence by nonpolitical interests, among innumerable other things. Comprehensive answers would be required to address problems on a national, if not global scale, and be unfathomably complex. Rather than beginning with a project of such intimidating scope, I consider some still difficult yet decidedly more comprehensible endeavors. Some such projects have already begun or have been formulated elsewhere, if not undertaken in an effective manner. However, they have not necessarily been understood within the context of combating the developments described by the theorists that I have been considering.

The sociologist Erik Olin Wright has suggested one possibility, although it is large-scale and perhaps too utopian for implementation. He proposed restructuring social institutions aiming for emancipatory effects from a variety of contemporary ills, particularly in Wright’s mind, the problems associated with capitalism (Wright, 2010, 2012). Such a large project is daunting, however Wright has made some concrete, small-scale recommendations. For example, he and others have pointed to participatory budgeting as one real world instance of empowering utopian institutional design. In participatory budgeting politicians and technocrats relinquish some control as neighborhood assemblies come together, debate, and elect representatives to take their proposals to a city-wide budget council (Baiocchi, 2003; Fung & Wright, 2003; Wright, 2010 Ch. 6; 2012, pp. 9-10). This model started in Brazil, and much attention has been paid to its original context, however, as Wright notes it has spread to other cities, including districts in New York and Chicago (Wright, 2012, p. 10). Such efforts bring citizens back into discussions from which they have long been excluded in favor professionals and technocrats taking care of them.

Proposals like these have only been implemented on the small scale and may only be possible locally. Jefferson’s ward system may be a well-known example of this type of

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68 For a project of similar scope and approach, see Levitas (2013).
structure. The difficulty of course is to ensure that small-scale, local participatory systems have some substantive say in important decisions. Municipal budgeting may not be exciting enough, or deemed important enough to draw widespread participation. Although perhaps if practices like this became commonplace, then participation would increase as they come to be viewed as an important component of democratic practice. Additionally, perhaps there could be some way of incorporating larger-scale decisions into the local process or having local decisions speak to bigger questions. This may represent the creation of a form of political glocalism, or the French mondialization. It may be possible for technology to permit participation on a larger scale to an extent never before possible. For online participation to be considered a public sphere the interactions that take place there may need to become richer than they commonly are now. It seems doubtful that communicative understanding could be achieved with exchanges of one hundred-forty characters or less. Furthermore, for online interaction to be considered a political sphere or to contribute to political decision-making elaborate security apparatuses would have to be developed to ensure that the process was not technologically rigged. The anonymity associated with online interaction would likely also need to be done away with. Additionally, the successful implementation of more participatory systems may also require more extensive civic education to ensure that individuals have a better understanding of the importance of their decisions and how these decisions affect the whole of society.

The foreseeable objection to participatory budgeting, and other such suggestions, in this context is that budgeting is itself an economic act and thus more properly administrative than

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69 Arendt was familiar with this proposal, but did not endorse it. She was dismissive of Jefferson’s system in particular writing that it “would spell the end of general suffrage as we understand it today,” and that it was impractically revolutionary (Arendt, 1963c, pp. 279, 250). Arendt claimed that Jefferson himself understood these shortcomings and that is why there is no mention of the system in his own formal writings (Arendt, 1963c, p. 250).
political, in Arendt’s terms. How can politics be saved from economics or economic influence lessened if economics remains a primary subject of politics? This question could be asked of a number of Wright’s other suggestions, for example, solidarity funds, worker owned cooperatives, and basic social income. Economics may not be the enemy of politics; rather it may be the economic mindset and the controlling relationship between economics and the state, along with virtually all other spheres of life that is problematic. Economic structures and interests have acquired the power to dictate the rules of the game, but it may be possible to make decisions about how to enforce those rules politically or to create economic structures that operate by processes more closely resembling genuine politics. Wright’s suggestions would move participatory democratic politics into a position to exert more control over economic concerns at the grassroots level. This may be able to reign in the hold economics possesses over politics. Even if economics, at least in some small instances, were democratized, the mode of conduct within those political spheres would need to be something more ideal than strategic. The ultimate goals of the individuals in those circumstances should be discovering the good of the community through open, free, and equal debate and not promoting individual self-interest. This would be hard to achieve, but would be more likely to result from debates between individuals than debates between politicians trained in the arts of coercive rhetoric and dependent upon funding from dominant economic interests. This subject will be returned to below.

Considering another proposal associated with Wright, namely, unconditional basic minimum income, yields similar results. Unconditional basic income would provide every individual legally residing within a state with a guaranteed income sufficient to keep them above the poverty line with no strings attached (Wright, 2010 Ch. 7; 2012, pp. 11-12). The state long

70 For a more in depth discussions of the proposal for unconditional basic income, see the essay in Wright (2006), also see van Parjis (2013).
ago entered into the social welfare game and yet does a poor job of providing for the basic needs of its citizens. In fact, despite politics becoming a system of housekeeping it is desirable for the state to be involved lest we find ourselves with an ideal *polis* occupied only by free billionaires propped up by the labor of the masses who are unable to participate. The political sphere would be better as an inclusive realm although the political freedom of the impoverished could be questioned. The social question has become relevant and will always remain so after being let out of the bag. Humanity may be better for it, but this does not mean that the social question must dominate politics. Unconditional basic income would, in essence, be a way to answer the question and hence remove it from political debate or at least lessen its pressing or all consuming nature. Unconditional basic income would go at least part of the way toward ensuring equality among those who meet in the political sphere. Similarly, Thomas Piketty’s (2014) recent proposal for a universal progressive tax approaches the issue from the upper end of the wealth spectrum. These types of proposals would not result in individuals becoming absolute economic equals, or equal to the extent that they were in classical Greece, but at least there would be, to borrow from Rousseau, none so wealthy that they could buy another and none so poor that they are forced to sell themselves. The role of economic necessity in politics could be alleviated.

A similar case could be made for provisions like universal healthcare. To a certain extent it would entail government involvement in healthcare, although government is already involved in that area in that it creates a privileged place for economic interests. Universal healthcare could be undertaken in the name of making citizens more equal and thus more likely to communicate politically rather than being entirely preoccupied with satisfying their most basic needs. Overall, a policy of meeting minimum basic needs would withdraw the basic needs of life from the political agenda and diminish the effects of drastic economic inequality on political equality. The
extent to which the state guarantees the essential needs of life vary from local to local. The widespread trend during the current austerity phase, following the global financial crisis which began in 2008, has been to provide less to those who are most in need. Those economically struggling to meet their basic needs of food, shelter, and health, for example, are unlikely to enter into the political sphere as free and equal participants. An expansion of healthcare to include more of the population would improve the prospect of a more equitable form of politics. Guaranteeing the essentials of life would also free individuals from their dependence upon private employers as the sole reliable source of such essentials. In short, the best prospect for approximating an idealized politics is to travel farther into the social abyss originally responsible for its theoretical downfall. Such concrete suggestions, which would enhance individual control and participation, may indeed deepen democracy as their proponents claim. Individuals could reclaim power from bureaucratic and technocratic apparatuses. However, along with the form and frequency, the very nature of political debate would need to be altered.

Living near the once thriving industrial hub Detroit, I cannot help but consider recent events there. Following years of mismanagement and corruption by any standard, the once powerful city filed for bankruptcy. The state government appointed an emergency manager to oversee the city’s finances. Citizens responded with disruptive, although short-lived, protests. This represents the conflicting nature of contemporary movements and embodies the same conflict present in propositions that would deepen democracy, like Olin Wright’s. Initially, this type of movement is reactive, as any attempt to reclaim control over politics may necessarily be. To require genuinely spontaneously generated action then, may be to require too much and set an impractically high standard.
Most paradoxical, however, is the fact that any ability to reclaim public control over politics has been oriented toward economic control. In the case of Detroit, citizens unsuccessfully demanded that financial decisions be returned to the realm of democratic politics, instead of vesting such decisions in an appointed administrative position. Similar comments could be made of anti-austerity protests in Greece and elsewhere. However, budgeting decisions may be more properly considered administrative, rather than political. The fixation upon economic subjects reflects the fact that it is the most readily accessible point at which public debate can be brought back in. On these types of subject it may be possible for participatory democratic politics to begin retaking control. Perhaps it could play the role of the non-political bourgeois public sphere in Habermas’s work. It may be a space in which individuals can develop discursive abilities that could later be applied to other issues. The fact that economic decisions serve as a point of entry is both discouraging and hopeful. It is discouraging in that it demonstrates that economics have so displaced politics that any effort to recover democratic governance orients itself toward economics. Simultaneously, it is hopeful in that there are citizens who want democratic politics to mean something, who want their actions in the public sphere to have some impact upon their collective and individual lives. There is at least some desire to escape from the social blob and regain control, even if administrative decisions are all that can conceivably be controlled.

Contemporary social movements have recognized and attempted to weaken the hold that economics exerts over politics. The now diminished Occupy movement, albeit poorly organized and as a result incapable of conveying entirely coherent messages, held as its core the demand that subjective corporate influence on government be lessened. More concretely articulated calls for reform along these lines are embodied by common calls for political reform, such as
overturning the Citizens United decision, i.e. limiting corporate campaign contributions, the Court’s McCutcheon decision could be added to this, doing away with Super PACs and political dark money, publicly financing elections, etc. These types of reforms may limit economic influence in the political sphere; this would, in turn, limit the extent to which the economic mentalité dominates political decision-making. Creating a context capable of offsetting economic rationale and profit maximization for either public or private entities would be a crucial step in altering politics. Reforms of this sort have been widely and popularly discussed, but have yet to be seriously implemented. If anything the trend seems to be in the opposite direction, toward more economic influence over government and entanglement with politics.

Another disconcerting development is the impending demise of internet neutrality in the United States. The principle of net neutrality requires openness of the internet, that is the private companies providing the internet connection would not be permitted to favor content of certain types or from certain sources, or censor content. Without internet neutrality powerful private entities would be free to make selected content more easily accessible, charge higher rates for accessing unfavorable contents, or perhaps even censor competitors content. The end of net neutrality may have relatively innocuous effects to the extent of having to wait longer for entertainment downloads from certain sources. A worst-case scenario could see information restricted as deemed economically beneficial by corporations. It is not a secret that individuals gather a great deal of information from online sources. If an informed citizenry were important in democracies, then the quality of participation would certainly be harmed by potentially restricted access to information. Political news or information pertinent to voting decisions could be controlled by private entities seeking to maximize their economic benefits. This would be tantamount to economics not only being a subject and mode of politics, but economic control
over what information about politics is available. This would impair individuals’ ability to make informed and free decisions about politics.

Arendt took the position that the Roman obsession with the protection and renewal of their political founding was a valid form of politics. In particular, she noted the Roman ability to expand the political realm and make friends of enemies by expanding the scope of those included in their political sphere (Arendt, 2005). Immigration reform, a much discussed yet rarely acted upon issue in the United States, may have a similar impact. Immigration reform could be another piece of strengthening the political realm. The greater the proportion of a nation’s population that is comprised of legal or illegal alien residents who would like to engage in politics as citizens but are unable to do so the more exclusive that nation’s political sphere. As is evident from the previous discussion of Agamben, immigration can be fit into this theoretical framework in a number of ways. The distinction among residents along legal lines is worth drawing. Legal noncitizen residents are full citizens in the economic sense though not in the political sense. They participate in the economy in the same manner as citizens; however, they are excluded from participating in the political sphere. Illegal residents, who are also noncitizens, participate in a shadow economy, where economic and political rights are often lacking. They too do not participate in the political sphere. Opening the political sphere to more of these individuals would make it more inclusive, thereby expanding political equality and plurality. This system of permitting large scale participation in the official or shadow economic spheres while prohibiting participation in the political sphere is vexing, especially since the denial of political equality is motivated by economic, profit maximizing motives.

The argument could be that entrance into the political sphere is extremely valuable and should be difficult to acquire. Alternatively, the argument could be that economic participation
or economic citizenship is more important than political citizenship. Considering the first argument, it would follow that withholding entrance into the political sphere is debasing any noncitizen resident into a mass of *aneu logon* or a modern version of *homo sacer*. This is the view expressed by those wishing to keep the political sphere exclusive. Citizenship is held aloft as a good, which would be diminished if extended to some large number of others. Inclusion of these people in the political sphere would both enrich their lives via politics and may enhance politics by bringing additional viewpoints and individuals who hold citizenship in high esteem. The second argument seems more consistent with the actual practice of current Americans. More time and effort is spent participating economically, working, producing, and purchasing, than is spent participating politically. This is routinely evidenced by low voter turn out and low levels of political knowledge. The paradox is that Americans restrict entrance into the political sphere (even those born with citizenship cannot enter until turning eighteen) while simultaneously on a large scale opting out of participating themselves.

Expanding the political sphere to be more inclusive may by one part of politics, namely, the creation and maintenance of political membership. Another possible path may involve the protection of a founding, as was also the case with the Roman republic (Arendt, 2005). Could constitutional fetishism, of the type alluded to by Louis Hartz (1955) represent a more pure form of politics? To answer this it is necessary to determine exactly what an obsession with honoring and protecting the founding would entail. It would require the constant maintenance, reappraisal, and renewal of a political realm. It would need to be more than scattered holidays celebrating independence or the birthdays of founding fathers. It would also require more than basic education, though that would certainly be a necessary component. This would still leave open the danger that politics would be reduced to nothing more than talk about what politics is, reducing
the political to a realm devoid of content. Politics then must entail the maintenance of the
fundamental principles of politics, which permit the presence of other subjects.

In the American system, and other similar systems, the maintenance of the political realm
and adhering to the principles of the founding seems most obviously the realm of the judiciary.
More troubling is that it would confine politics to the highest level of judicial deliberations.
Restricting politics to what takes place in the Supreme Court, or similar institutions like the
German Constitutional Court would be problematic. This would be even less inclusive than the
*polis* of Greek antiquity. Politics in the United States could only be engaged in by a few elites
with lifetime appointments. A textbook understanding of the Supreme Court would meet this
criterion. Nine black robed Platonic guardians of the principles of the republic would debate the
merits of an issue and determine which possible outcome most closely preserves the letter of the
Constitution and the spirit of the founding. Even if we wished to restrict politics to this level
some would suggest that what takes place in the Supreme Court is not a politics aimed toward
understanding and achieving the most desirable outcome, but rather partisanship oriented toward
promoting some predetermined end. Attorneys and those organizations filing amicus briefs
normally advocate one side of the conflict. Even at this elite and exclusive level it may be that
this severely limited definition of politics does not take place.

Efforts to popularize the preservation of the founding have been neither inclusive nor
grassroots and have espoused an ersatz notion of founding principles and politics. I have in mind
the contemporary political movement calling itself the Tea Party. The movement of those calling
themselves Tea Party patriots gained popularity in recent years, primarily among extreme
conservatives, by purporting to desire a return to the founding American principles and strict
adherence to the Constitution. The problems with the Tea Party’s approach are abundant; among
there are charges that the group is exclusionary, nativist or racist (Belk, 2012; Disch, 2012; Walker, 2011); that they lack an understanding of the principles they claim to uphold (Wood, 2010); that they are backed by billionaires attempting to influence policy to their advantage or at the very least strongly influenced by elites (Fallin, Grana, & Glantz, 2013; Skocpol & Williamson, 2012); or that they are unwilling to compromise to even attempt to understand alternative perspectives. If any of these charges are true, and at least a few of them seem to be, then the Tea Party would not represent an effort to preserve the rules under which genuine politics could function and instead is a manifestation of the symptoms of the problems of modern politics. The challenge is to discern between genuine appeals to the spirit of a political founding and self-interested appeals to strategic misinterpretations of a founding.

Even though the judiciary must necessarily be exclusive and the contemporary Tea Party movement is plagued with problems, this does not mean that a preservation of founding principles cannot be a component of politics. The problem is envisioning what such an inclusive commitment of this type would look like, while acknowledging that the constitutional rules of the founding have been necessarily altered and updated. The Roman approach of repetition of the founding through imperialistic expansions is undesirable and has proven nearly impossible, as efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan have demonstrated. It seems necessary that the focus on founding principles be primarily internally focused, although spreading the gospel of American democracy abroad in a peaceful manner may be permissible. A commitment to founding principles could be as simple as making the commitment to neither violating the laws or political institutions nor tolerating their violation by others, as called for by Lincoln in his Lyceum address. More fundamentally, debate about how to recover or reinstitute a more genuine version of politics may be some component of that genuine politics. As already hinted at, this could involve not just the
commitment to democratic principles, but ensuring that the political realm is more inclusive and accessible to all, and simultaneously, ensuring that those who enter the political sphere do so on an equal footing free from the demands of necessity and concerns about the life processes.

Concerns about the extent of equality or the nature of the equality required for a functional political realm would veer into questions of distributive justice. Relevant here is Jean Hampton’s notion of relational equality, which she traces back to Aristotle:

We want, he says, a society in which people treat each other as equals (no one should be allowed to be the master of another or the salve of another) and in which these equals treat each other as partners – or “civic friends.” The way to get that is to pursue not exact equality of resources but sufficient equality to ensure that no one is able to use his greater wealth to gain political advantage over others in a way that damages their partnership (Hampton, 1997, p. 158).

Inequalities of resources that create inequalities in political relationships are undesirable and may need to be offset to protect the integrity of democratic politics. This motivated Elizabeth Anderson to argue that we should be “fundamentally concerned with the relationships within which the goods are distributed, not only the distribution of goods themselves” (Anderson, 1999, p. 314).71 So long as political relationships can be characterized as being relationships of equals, then resource differences may not negatively affect politics. This position would shift the question from one about the nature of equality to an empirical question about the level at which resource inequalities compromise political relationships, or whether political relationships can be considered equal under conditions of drastic inequalities.

The most pressing contemporary issues with respect to recovering a more genuine, albeit idealized, version of politics, are related to the above-described issues of equality and access. Both sets of issues speak to whether the contemporary political sphere will be an open realm or

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whether it will exclude most individuals, while being accessible only to a handful of elites, as was the case in antiquity. Such a political realm could surely not be considered democratic by modern standards. In addition to questions of formal inclusiveness, e.g. citizenship, there are questions of the actual effectiveness of inclusiveness, which are inseparable from questions of equality. Although citizens may be included in the political sphere and de jure political equals, inequalities could be so great or exclusion from certain opportunities so serious that they are de facto unequals. Despite formal equality of citizenship some may be more influential or possess enough resources and power to sway political apparatuses in their favor.

For example, one particularly important matter pertaining to informal inequality is education. While all citizens may be formally equal, not having the same access to education affects not only future economic prospects, but future political prospects as well. It is difficult to envision a political realm populated by equals where some have far more advanced levels of education. In extreme scenarios communication about issues and understanding of governmental operation becomes difficult and manipulation more likely. Regardless of the distribution of resources, individuals cannot be considered equal within the political realm if they do not all possess a basic understanding of how that realm, and the institutions over which it is sovereign operate. Of course, educational distribution is integrally connected to distribution of wealth. It must be remembered that some inequality of wealth or distribution of resources is not necessarily unjust or undemocratic as evidenced by the work of John Rawls, for example.

Additionally, Arendt identified forgiveness as a miraculous form of political action, one she linked to the Christian tradition (Arendt, 1958, pp. 236-243; 2005, pp. 57-60). Forgiveness entails the possibility of forming a new chain of events, rather than continuing to progress through an already initiated sequence. Forgiveness could alter contemporary politics in a number
of ways. Forgiveness as a political act on the part of a political entity may also be considered an alternative to retaliation. Of course, forgiveness of trespasses should not be so extensive that it endangers the existence of a nation. It could be applied to the debt of developing nations, which could lead to a more prosperous future for those nations while making friends out of potential enemies. This would also ensure that economics did not taint potential political relationships. Analogously, the government could institute programs resulting in the forgiveness of domestic debts to allow people to stay in their foreclosed homes, to aid those hindered by onerous student loans, or other financial arrangements that threaten the ability to satisfy physical necessities. The promises made in entering into contractual arrangements are also important, but when made from unequal footing or when consenting to intentionally obscured terms that importance may be reduced. Individual responsibility is still an important factor in a society where individuals possess rights of self-determination; however, choices that are detrimental to politics may need to be offset.

While creating a more inclusive political realm and encouraging a greater degree of equality within that realm are important, those moves may be insufficient for creating a political realm of the sort Arendt and Habermas desired. It would also be necessary to address the nature of discourse in the political realm, which contemporarily more closely resembles strategic or instrumental rather than political or communicative interaction. Each side of any given political debate attempts to win over their opponents, or more realistically the undecided. Many support positions that will most benefit themselves, rather than the best course of action for the collective. Nearly anything goes in such efforts and coercion, manipulation, and bargaining are the standard. Dialogical approaches of attempting to understand from all sides and support the best option are exceptional occurrences. Correctives to the nature of the approach to the political
realm would be difficult to enact. Creating a greater degree of political and economic equality
may help decolonize the political realm and make economic concerns less pressing. However,
while the opposing sides may be less contrary to one another under conditions of greater political
equality, absent a utopian socialist near complete equality there would always exist conflicting
positions.

Theoretically, Habermas pointed the way with his ideal speech situation and more
specifically discourse ethics (Habermas, 1996). It may be difficult to practically incorporate an
ideal speech situation into real-world political interactions. Habermas outlined an epistemic
procedure through which democratic processes could produce both reasonable outcomes and
result in collective learning (Habermas, 2006). In this procedure citizens communicating in civil
society and media operations in the political public sphere construct considered positions which
impact the deliberations of elected lawmakers. Several commentators have noted that this may
generate legal frameworks in which free citizens could live despite lack of agreement about what
they consider good (Bohman, 1996b; McCarthy, 1998). While this explains the legitimacy of
legal regimes in democratic societies, and leaves space for citizen input about which Habermas
was too skeptical in his early work, it would not necessarily result in communicative/political
understanding or a non-instrumental approach to behavior in the political sphere. Despite its
difficulties it seems that Habermas’s communicative approach may be the most fruitful among
those that have been constructed. The more that economic colonization, and money as a steering
media, can be offset in other ways, the greater the potential for communicative action and
deliberative democracy to return to the functioning of the political sphere Habermas described in
pre-structural transformation Europe.
As for the disciplinary self-censoring society, this may be one of the most difficult among a host of already exceedingly complex issues. The rise of disciplinary society is a bit more enigmatic. A part of this enigmatic nature is due to the fact that disciplinarity appears to be inextricably linked to security, the indispensable obsession of all states and of modern states in particular. Perhaps it will be useful to consider disciplinarity, self-censorship, and conformism as a divided issue, one component of which is associated with physical security, in the sense of national security preventing military or terrorist attacks. The other component of discipline and conformism would be unrelated to that security, in the sense of national security, would deal with discipline and conformism resulting from governing from a distance or the tyranny of public opinion.

First, consider discipline related to security. The panoptical nature of contemporary government has only been furthered by revelations about the scope of domestic surveillance in the United States, most obviously as conducted by the National Security Agency, although the Central Intelligence Agency and other groups have been implicated as well. Technology has enabled observation of individuals at any moment, and individuals must live every moment with the knowledge that they may be under observation. This instills in the individual the importance of self-regulation. Of course, there is a distinction to be made between those who would engage in crimes against individuals or the state but refrain from doing so because of the knowledge that they would be surveyed, stopped, and punished and those who self-censor so as not to be ostracized or subjected to suspicion because of their political views. Some self-censorship is useful while some is harmful. The extension of governmental-like power to nongovernmental entities can be seen here. After all, individuals are surveyed not just by the NSA, but also by the
companies that allow our emails to be sent, and market researchers tailoring advertisements to make it more likely that we make a purchase.

These trends are politically detrimental to the extent that they create a system of conformity in which individuals are incapable of or unwilling to engage in original speech or action for fear of reprisal. When the pressure of public opinion and self-imposed conformity become determinative of individual deeds, the political realm is endangered. This is a difficult category to measure and even more difficult to counteract. Obviously, it would be problematic if the power of surveillance were abused via application to nonviolent advocates of unpopular political positions. Such was the case with J. Edgar Hoover’s surveillance of Martin Luther King Jr., for example. The FBI’s surveillance of Dr. King would have been far more pervasive and his cause likely hindered had Hoover had today’s technology at his disposal. The surveillance did not deter King from advocating his unpopular political positions or from speaking great nonviolent words or doing great nonviolent deeds. It is unclear whether potentially heroic political actors are being deterred by the possibility of surveillance or the self-regulating conformity that may follow from it. To the extent that they are then politics has been harmed.

Preventing security related disciplinary measures from harming the legitimate political sphere would be a difficult task. It seems impossible to imagine a state without a massive security and surveillance apparatus given the nature of the contemporary world, the persistence of traditional security threats and the emergence of asymmetric security threats. The emphasis on security is not likely to weaken and the answer may be a more targeted less broadly applied surveillance with a strong system of oversight. The key would be to ensure that would-be creative political reformers are free from reprisal, while violent subversives representing a threat to innocent life can be deterred. Following from this the now common call to curtail surveillance
would be beneficial to the political sphere. Even a decreased surveillance may be problematic as the line between necessary and abusive must be drawn somewhere. Individuals near the surveillance line may not be certain of which side they are located upon. Anyone advocating an existentially threatening, although nonviolent view is likely to be perceived as a threat. To the extent that this limits political debate and precludes novel possibilities it would be undesirable. The limitation of surveillance would be an oversimplified step, however, there would still be the constellation of governmental and nongovernmental factors leading to self-government and conformity that would be difficult to parse through and would vary from context to context.

The current objections to pervasive domestic surveillance have been raised at the grassroots levels and by political elites. This demonstrates that Foucauldian resistance can operate even in the face of panopticism. There can exist counterdiscourse aimed at protecting or expanding a space of freedom in the face of disciplining apparatuses. This has come from the highest levels of government as Senator Diane Feinstein’s ongoing row with the CIA demonstrates. Of course, freedom from having your emails read by the employees of security agencies does not necessarily translate into political freedom. However, it is difficult to imagine political freedom existing in a context where individuals fear reprisals for expressing unpopular political thoughts that may question the current regime. Still, the freedom to organize peaceful protests or to nonviolently challenge current practices or theories must be maintained to ensure political freedom. The trick is to make the manipulatively constructed adage ‘if you have nothing to hide, then you have nothing to fear’ into a reality. It must be emphasized that counterdiscourse is nothing to hide, that creative or original thought must be encouraged rather than deterred or feared. Perhaps this counterdiscourse could be considered genuinely political despite its being reactive rather than spontaneous.
The second component of discipline and conformity may be more related to governing at a distance or social pressure to conform to modes of behaving and thinking. This discipline may be even less required by the contemporary world than the security component, since it cannot be argued that this form of discipline is necessary to preserve the very existence of democratic states or protect the lives of their populations. Governing at a distance through the dispersal of governance apparatuses to nongovernmental entities results not only in discipline, but self-discipline. This can be seen not only in the ability of private economic entities to shape individual behavior as well as the pressure that can be exerted by collectives of individuals on others. A result of this is conformism to behavior as economic agents, the reluctance to deviate from that mode of conduct, and again unwillingness to be express views or take actions that could lead to one being viewed as a pariah.

Combating this non-security discipline and conformism can be related to some of the measures already mentioned. Relieving individuals of the necessity to behave as economic actors and meet the expectations of the market and its actors may be useful. Perhaps guarantees of satisfying the most basic of life necessities through measures like unconditional basic income and universal healthcare would alleviate some of the disciplinary requirements of devoting one’s efforts to behaving as *homo economicus*. Self-regulation as an entrepreneurial individual may be less important under those conditions. Furthermore, collective control over the workplace or the budgetary process, as suggest by Wright, could wrest control back from the undemocratic entities that oversee the disciplinary society. Another possibility would be to decrease the distance between government in the traditional sense and the non-governmental entities to which governance has been extended. It may again seem paradoxical to call for increased government control in this discussion. However, the functions of governance that are responsible for the
disciplinary and self-regulated society have been extended to non-governmental entities, like corporations, that are not subject to democratic control. The ability to counter this disciplinarity embedded in the private realm would be beyond the control of even a properly functioning political sphere. The reintegration of governance into government thereby removing governance from private hands would at least permit the possibility of democratically controlling it. In short, it may be necessary to subject the private corporation to increased political control to prevent it from exerting undue influence over individual lives.

Conformism arising from social pressure in the Arendtian and Tocquevillian sense could also be related to a suggestion already made with respect to the security component of discipline. Counteracting this type of conformism requires the protection and encouragement of a plurality of viewpoints, even unpopular ones, of understanding things politically, and of encouraging creative and novel thinking about social, political, and governmental problems. If the ability to engage in spontaneous and free speech and deed are considered political, then society must encourage just such efforts. Novelty and diversity of ideas should be embraced and fear of ostracism must not be allowed to interfere by necessitating self-censorship. Perhaps creativity could be encouraged by alleviating economic necessity or lessening the disciplinary power of the security apparatus and the influence of private entities possessing the power of governance that demand self-regulation. Spontaneity and originality may also be encouraged by ensuring greater de facto equality within the political sphere by limiting economic influence that results in significant advantages or renders the system incapable of change.

However, something more may be required. Encouraging miraculous novelty in political thought, speech, and deed requires thinking about politics in a different way. Politics cannot be viewed as a means for achieving economic or security ends, as restricting thought to these
standards of rationality and providing presumably predetermined ends will necessarily limit the possibilities available. In essence, politics may need to be approached as an art rather than as a more determinant science like physics or economics in the social sciences. I do not intend to connote the art of government in the Foucauldian sense of the phrase and I will instead use the phrase “the art of politics.” This would be opposed to the concept of politics as political science, although I do not mean to imply that the government, its institutions, and the citizenry could not still be studied scientifically, or that doing so would necessarily be antithetical to an art of politics. The art of politics would be the mode of acting within the political sphere, the way citizens and elected officials conduct themselves. The point would be to think creatively and without constraint, save for not infringing upon the lives of freedoms of individuals. Within the political sphere individuals should be able to communicate freely, creatively, and equally. For all intents and purposes this would be consistent with the Arendtian notion of politics as well as Habermas’s communicative action, and the more emancipatory elements of Foucault. This would require institutions capable of promoting the proper sort of political and democratic education. Historical examples like the settlement house movement spurred by Chicago’s Hull House could be considered. The point is to create contexts in which it is possible to think artistically and creatively about politics, and perhaps some of the suggestions discussed in this conclusion are a first concrete step in that direction.

None of the potential remedies mentioned are complete remedies. They would all need to be undertaken to offset the various transformations of politics. Furthermore, none of the potential remedies are easy to implement and may be even more difficult to realize. The practicalities of simultaneously harnessing the collective will, altering powerful institutional arrangements, and changing the way of thinking about politics are difficult barriers to overcome.
They would require tremendous structural and societal changes in the way the political entity behaves, its make-up, and the way its individual members think. Irrespective of what steps can be taken toward the realization of an inclusive political realm that can be truly characterized as a sphere of free and equal individuals capable of meaningful action, the first step is simpler and more achievable.

The first step in recovering the type of genuine or idealized politics which existed prior to the transformations described by Arendt, Habermas, and Foucault, and to ensuring that the political realm is a realm of inclusivity, equality, and hence freedom, is the realization that it may not entail those characteristics. We must realize that politics has not always existed in its contemporary form. As has been demonstrated through the examination of the theoretical works of these thinkers, the political realm has not been a static concept or mode of behavior from time immemorial. Politics used to mean something different than it does today. The changes may have occurred for a variety of reasons, as outlined in the preceding chapters. It may be difficult to step outside of the contemporary mindset and language to imagine a drastically different meaning of the word politics and a perhaps unrecognizable political sphere. This endeavor may be necessary prior to implementing any reforms. To return to Pitkin’s B-movie metaphor, our first step must be to realize that we have been consumed by the blob (Pitkin, 1998). This theoretical blob that has consumed humanity and displaced politics has grown to include aspects of Arendt’s, Habermas’s, and Foucault’s thought, and as a result its existence will become even more difficult to recognize if not completely unrecognizable.

Whether a recovery of the political, or a favorable alteration, is possible or desirable remains debatable. Some possible initial steps in that direction have been touched upon here, the first of which is the recognition of alternative conceptions of politics. There exists another aspect
of this project that could be contested. After recognizing the possibility of an alternative construction of politics, even if that alternative is more theoretical than historical, the question of which alternative is more desirable must be addressed. We must evaluate whether it is worth attempting to alter the contemporary notion of politics in an effort at recovering something from the past. The decline of politics was regrettable to Arendt, and to a lesser extent Habermas, but this is certainly not determinative. Beyond charges of naiveté, perhaps the normative lament over the loss of true politics is mistaken. We may conclude that we are better off with the sort of political realm that we currently have. We may prefer our contemporary meanings of freedom to those of the past; we may prefer politics like those in the modern United States to the politics of ancient Greece. I would not preclude the possibility that some may arrive at these judgments.

However, for such judgments to be meaningful we must understand the alternatives to be judged. This requires the recognition that the political sphere could be different and necessitates a comparison between its theoretical or historical incarnation and its contemporary counterpart. This requires engagement in thinking about the nature of the political sphere, its history, and the changes that have occurred. In short, in order for the judgment to be meaningful it requires engagement in thinking about the political, and the alterations to it that have been discussed here.

Thinking on this matter is the first step in evaluating competing conception of the political. This thought may itself be some rudimentary form of politics in the classical sense, although it must certainly be followed by some form of action in order to be truly political in the most genuine sense of the word.
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ABSTRACT

THE RISE OF THE SOCIAL AND THE CHANGE IN THE POLITICAL:
A CONSIDERATION OF ARENDT, HABERMAS, AND FOUCAULT

by

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I explore parallels within the work of Hannah Arendt, Jürgen Habermas, and Michel Foucault. I examine the unexamined connections and commonalities among the works of these three preeminent political theorists with the aim of understanding our common, contemporary construction of “the political.” Specifically, I examine the way that each of these theorists describes a condition wherein the very concept of “the political” has undergone significant changes. I demonstrate how these thinkers converge around the notion that what was once understood as “the political,” has come to include concerns, modes of thought, and forms of action that were previously considered unpolitical. Each theorist approaches the problem from a different perspective, describes different processes, and expresses different concerns; however, they ultimately agree that a change to “the political” has occurred. I trace this common theme through the different articulations provided by each theorist from Arendt’s rise of the social to Habermas’s transformation and colonization of the public sphere to Foucault’s concepts of governmentality and biopolitics.
AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL STATEMENT

I was born in Battle Creek, Michigan and completed High School there. I received a Bachelor of Arts degree in International Relations from James Madison College at Michigan State University in 2004. After being out of school for several years, I resumed my education and received a Master of Arts degree in Political Science from Wayne State University in 2010. My wife Emily and I currently live in Novi Michigan. We are expecting our first child, a son, in July of 2014.