Reconciliation of Science and Religion in Symbolo-Fideism

SHIRLEY BROWN MOON
THE RECONCILIATION OF SCIENCE AND RELIGION
IN SYMBOLO-FIDEISM

by

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For Christianity the *Pax Europa* of the nineteenth century ended long before Sarajevo. From the publication in 1859 of *On the Origin of Species by means of Natural Selection*, religion was in open warfare against science. By the end of the century the war was not going well for religion. Biology, anthropology, archeology, the "higher criticism" united in an attack on Christian premises, while "applied science"—technology—provided the materialistic comforts which made Christian promises utopian and unnecessary. The reaction of some Protestant and Catholic leaders to this threat from science was a retreat into fundamentalism. Others hastened to show that the recent discoveries were not really in conflict with religious truths at all. A third group, however, demanded that religion accept the new theories. These "modernists" saw in the struggle with science a wider confrontation between all of modern culture and religion, and in their reconciliation the survival of man and society. In France, Modernism was the name generally associated with the Catholic movement. The Protestant reaction was known as modern

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1 For a brief discussion of these three tendencies in Catholicism, Protestantism and Judaism, see C. J. H. Hayes, *A Generation of Materialism, 1871-1900* (New York: Harper & Bros., 1941), Ch. IV.

evangelical theology, symbolo-fidéism or, more simply, the Paris School. The leading apologists for this School were Auguste Sabatier and Eugène Méneégoz, who developed their theories during a long and close association on the Paris Faculty of Protestant Theology.

"To conciliate our science and our faith," said Sabatier, "is the inner and sacred task which imposes itself upon the consciousness of every man who thinks freely and wishes at the same time to be a man of profound morality." But Sabatier saw correctly that the science with which religion would have to come to terms was not the science of popular thought or of positivistic philosophy, with its crude materialistic metaphysics, but a new science. He traced the philosophical origins of this new science to the current Kantian revival which emphasized the activistic role of the intellect in all scientific observation and generalization, but sharply circumscribed its operation to the phenomenal world. The result was a science which stressed pragmatism, pluralism, relativism—the science of a Poincaré or a Duhem. Influenced by this same Kantian revival, Sabatier and Méneégoz saw the struggle between science and religion as a conflict between the phenomenal world of perception and the noumenal world of realities.


3 Modern evangelical theology was a favorite term of Méneégoz, op. cit., I, No. 19; II, No. 68. He also used the expression symbolo-fidéism in two articles, signed "T. P." ("Théologien protestant") in L'Eglise libre, Nos. 31 and 33 (1894). Again, Méneégoz reported that the term Paris School became popular after 1888, Publications, I, No. 12.

The Paris School attributed to science the qualities of autonomy, free inquiry, toleration and observation. Current religions, on the other hand, seemed to represent the exact opposites—heteronomy, obedience, intolerance and tradition. From the intellectual standpoint, then, the choice was clear, for the Paris School felt that the triumph of these scientific values was dictated not only by reason, but by the entire movement of history since the Renaissance. From the moral viewpoint, however, the issue was cloudy, for science, by its very nature, was deterministic; it could never provide the morality of selflessness necessary for man's individual and social well being. In Kantian terms, morality belonged not to the sphere of pure reason (the intellect), but to that of practical reason (the will). A disastrous either/or confronted the individual: "Must we then choose between pious ignorance and bare knowledge? Must we either continue to live a moral life belied by science, or set up a theory of things which our consciences condemn?"5

To a generation which rejected all artificial syntheses, this confrontation could not be logically aufgehoben. Here was an existential crisis in which the individual found himself torn between the dictates of his reason and his religion, the desires of his mind and his heart. To Sabatier and Ménégoz this psychological malaise also explained the current social unrest. The alienation within society should be described not in terms of a Marxist bourgeoisie and proletariat, but in terms of an intellectual élite, contemptuous of religion, and a believing mass, suspicious of science. The clash between science and religion, therefore, threatened the peace and salvation of both the individual and society.

The Paris School felt that it was religion which would have to change. Its Protestant heritage dictated that Catholicism, characterized by a spirit of authority, could never be reconciled with modern science. It would be like welding together a "clod of clay and an iron bar." The hesitations of Catholicism were also noted by many within the Church: "Modern life means science. We suspected as much and yet took no notice." This was not, however, quite the truth. The Church had already made its position clear in the doctrine of papal infallibility (1870) and in the encyclical promoting the study of Thomism (1879). The opposition of the Catholic hierarchy toward Modernism culminated in the 1907 encyclical Pascendi, which detailed the errors of the movement. The Church was taking notice of modern science—to condemn it. But the Paris School also believed that the predominant forms of Protestantism were equally incapable of effecting the necessary reconciliation. The doctrine of the divine inspiration of the Bible in both the older and modified orthodoxy was merely another appeal to infallibility; the rationalistic tendency of radicalism was a "Protestant scholasticism." The Paris School did, however, argue that Protestantism had the potential of reconciliation which was inherently lacking in Catholicism. It identified the Protestant ethic with the spirit of inquiry and freedom.


7 Statement of Père Didon in 1881, quoted in Dansest, op. cit., p. 23.

8 On this rebirth of Thomistic doctrine, Sabatier stated: "Malheureusement notre maladie consiste précisément à ne pouvoir plus, je ne dis pas la supporter, mais même la comprendre." Revue chrétienne, n.s. 5, No. 9 (Sept. 5, 1879), 586.

9 Above, p. 164, ft. 200.
that had produced the scientific and philosophical revolutions of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Weber later joined it to the economic revolution as well. The answer to the conflict, then, lay in the proper interpretation of the Protestant spirit.

The new Religion of the Spirit proposed by the Paris School could first of all be reconciled with science because it was based upon the "modern experimental method [which] puts us in immediate contact with reality, and teaches us to judge of a doctrine only according to its intrinsic value, directly manifested to the mind in the degree of its evidence." The scientific method meant, not the reduction of all knowledge to scientific knowledge, but the revelation of other forms of knowledge which were equal, or perhaps superior to, scientific knowledge. Sabatier's "science of theology," like Bergson's "science of metaphysics" or Blondel's "science of action," while insisting upon the importance of observation and analysis of psychological and historical facts, developed a religion that transcended the empirical limits of science in an appeal to feeling. The end of empiricism thus became a special kind of mysticism.

Sabatier's scientific theology developed a neo-Kantian distinction between religious knowledge and scientific knowledge, which Sabatier thought clearly showed the objectives, limits and dependencies of both. The subjective, teleological and symbolic nature of religious knowledge demanded a new approach to religion. Critical symbolism, as Sabatier called this approach, recognized that psychologically, ideas were abstractions of feelings, and that historically, changing institutions were projections of immutable principles. Applied to religious ideas and institutions, critical symbolism could then separate the true religious

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10 Sabatier, Religions, p. xv.
spirit from its metaphysical envelopes and historical expressions. It was hoped that the confusion between the content and the form of religion which had led in the past to anti-scientific attitudes on the part of theologians and to anti-religious attitudes on the part of scientists would then disappear. The essence of religion would be revealed, consequently, as an inner feeling of dependence on an immanent God which necessarily objectified itself into historical forms. Although the latter were subject to evolution and criticism, the heart of religion would emerge as being above science, beyond reason. Furthermore, critical symbolism would reveal that science represented one expression of a psychological and historical evolution toward autonomy which found both its origins and its culmination in religion.

The Paris School, therefore, saw in science—in scientific knowledge and scientific methods—not an irreconcilable foe, but an ally that could be used to prove the truths of their Religion of the Spirit. What they did not see was that this association with science, or rather with the new science, exposed their religion to the same problems of subjectivity, pluralism, pragmatism, anti-intellectualism that the new science had to face. These were some of the ideas that set the scene for the great twentieth-century conflict between reason and unreason, of which the nineteenth-century battle between science and religion was but the opening salvo.
PART I

PSYCHOLOGY AND EPISTEMOLOGY
CHAPTER I

A CRITICAL THEORY OF RELIGIOUS KNOWLEDGE

For the theologians of the nineteenth century, the new antichrist was not just science, but "scientism"—the belief that nothing was outside the scope of science or beyond the possibility of a scientific solution. "Science is a religion," eulogized Renan, "science alone will henceforth make the creeds, science alone can solve for men the eternal problems, the solution of which his nature imperatively demands."¹ Symbolo-fidéism rejected the religion of science, with its ersatz gods of matter and motion, but it insisted upon the possibility, even the necessity, of using science in the service of religion in the form of a science of theology. To the Paris School, science meant the esprit scientifique, the disinterested love of truth.² It meant the scientific method, an allegiance to observation and experimentation rather than to authority. Most importantly, it meant, with the advent of the "new science," a scientific theory of knowledge, a neo-Kantian epistemology that established the sphere of science by defining the limits of the intellect. For Sabatier, however, epistemology could not be separated from psychology, for the relationship of knowledge—both scientific and


religion—its object was dependent upon the nature of the mind. He therefore founded his scientific theology upon a neo-Kantian theory of knowledge which emphasized the distinction between scientific and religious knowledge, and a vitalistic psychology which assured their organic unity.

The Paris School hoped that a science of theology—the science of religion in action—would, by freeing religion from the stifling bonds of scholastic philosophy, reveal the true essence of faith and reconcile it with science. They believed that any discipline calling itself a science had to have a positive and definite object of study which it then subjected to observation and experimentation. The impassioned search for unique phenomena possessed every nineteenth-century science. In the natural sciences, the objects of study were natural phenomena, the facts of experience or experiment. In philosophy, the spiritualist school dealt with the psychological phenomena, i.e., it considered only certain immediate intuitions which were found in the consciousness as the

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3 The theory of religious knowledge was specifically developed by Sabatier, while the concept of salvation by faith belonged primarily to Ménégoz. Ménégoz, especially after the death of Sabatier, emphasized that fideism was actually compatible with more than one theory of knowledge and even complete without one. See Eugene Ménégoz, *Publications diverses sur le fideisme et son application à l'enseignement chrétien traditionnel* (3 vols.; Paris: Librairie Fischbacher, 1909-13), I, No. 12, p. 228; III, No. 205, p. 420; No. 222, p. 499. Auguste Sabatier, *Esquisse d'une philosophie de la religion d'après la psychologie et l'histoire* (7 ed.; Paris: Librairie Fischbacher, 1903 [c. 1897]), p. 406. Translated into English as *Outlines of a Philosophy of Religion based on Psychology and History*, trans. T. A. Seed (Harper Torchbook; New York: Harper & Bros., 1957 [c. 1897]). The English translation has been generally used in this paper except when it contains omissions.

primitive data of all philosophy. For symbolo-fidéism, the phenomena to be studied were the feelings of piety, despair and hope present in personal experience and projected into society and history through individual action.

Religious phenomena are psychological facts, which everyone discovers first in himself and then in the past. Theology therefore has two sources—psychology and history, and their union must constitute its entire method of observation, direct and indirect.

It was absolutely necessary to attach individual experience to history and collective experience. The Paris School could thus accept part of the ideas of the current "sociologisme." Religion was an important aspect of society; indeed, its study most appropriately belonged in sociology. But its psychological aspect was not the vague and delusive echo of its social reality, as the Durkheim school claimed. The individual consciousness was rather the fountainhead of the religious phenomena, as any "theology of experience" must recognize.

Sabatier believed that the proper task of scientific theology was to discover and describe the translation of the immediate God-given sentiment of piety into intellectual expressions such as figures, notions and doctrines, and to evaluate the ideas as an adequate expression of the

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6 Sabatier credited Schleiermacher with originating the religious phenomena as the object of study for theology. See Religions of Authority . . ., p. 347; Cf. Ménégoz, III, No. 192, pp. 362-66; Above, pp. 69-71.

7 Ibid., pp. 347-48.

8 Ibid., p. 357.

feeling. The starting point of this study would be in a "sober, critical theory of religious knowledge," which, because it made us "feel and touch the impassible limits within which our thoughts move" would create humility. For the Paris School, this meant a Kantian epistemology. Only Kant, according to Sabatier, allowed man to judge both his knowledge and his faculty of knowing—a judgment that at once created a truly "scientific" science and restored a sense of mystery to the universe.

Kantian philosophy was an attempt to synthesize empiricism, with its emphasis on sensation, and rationalism, with its emphasis on subjectivity. For Kant, knowledge was the unity of two elements: an a posteriori element from experience—matter, and an a priori element from the mind—form. From experience we received sensations which were ordered by the mind according to its innate forms of intuition—time and space, and by a priori categories of understanding—quality, quantity, relation and modality. Knowledge was thus the product of both matter and

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mind. Without experience the forms were empty; without the forms experience was chaos. Although the forms were necessarily applied to experience (the phenomenal world), Kant asserted that there was no reason to believe them applicable to things in themselves (the noumenal world). Scientific knowledge was limited to the phenomenal world; what it could not experience through the senses—God, immortality, freedom—it could not prove or disprove.

Religious knowledge for Kant originated in man's feeling of moral obligation. The idea of God resulted from practical problems, not theoretical exercises. From sense perception man experienced what is; from moral obligation he experienced what ought to be. Responsibility and obligation were the necessary forms of practical reason, just as intuition and categories were the necessary forms of pure reason. To guide man's moral actions, Kant developed two kinds of necessary laws, or imperatives. A hypothetical imperative made action dependent upon desired ends, while a categorical imperative made action necessarily independent of any specific end. The formula, "Act only according to a maxim by which you can at the same time will that it should become a general law," was the highest categorical imperative which imposed itself upon human action. Because man felt this moral necessity guiding his actions, he could logically postulate from moral law the existence of a lawgiver. For Kant, who generally maintained the primacy of ethics over religion, moral experience provided the justification for thinking of God as real, but it did not provide the basis for claims of religious knowledge.13

Sabatier accepted the Kantian theory of scientific knowledge, and felt that it was applicable to religious knowledge, "with some necessary modifications."14 Because he could not allow the alienation of pure reason from practical reason, he made an assumption that was characteristic of many late nineteenth-century philosophers.15 He posited the basic unity of the ego as a primitive datum. It was an experienced, a felt unity, not a logical reduction: "The ego of pure reason is also that of the practical reason and feels itself to be one and the same knowing and acting subject."16 The Kantian schism was, therefore, healed by life itself, in the organic oneness of individual consciousness. What epistemology separated, psychology re-united.

The reigning psychological school in nineteenth-century France stemmed from Comtian positivism. The theories of Théodule Ribot, Pierre Janet and Georges Dumas emphasized the need for a scientific study of psychic phenomena in order to free psychology from metaphysics. Their major principles included the law of association, which stated that present ideas or actions recalled their like from among previous experiences, and psycho-physical parallelism, which related every movement of the body to a process in the consciousness.17 This positivistic

14 Sabatier, Esquisse . . . , p. 411.


16 Sabatier, Outlines . . . , p. 286; Cf. also pp. 282, 289, 311, 80. Cf. this statement from Emile Boutroux, op. cit., p. 40: "Where do we find, in man, the dividing line between heart and intellect; in nature, the demarcation between bodies and souls?"

approach, however, was being challenged by a psychological theory which originated in Maine de Biran. It emphasized the need for introspection in order to establish psychic life as the dynamic, true reality, and the self as will and effort rather than substance or thing. Among its advocates were Félix Ravaisson, Charles Secrétan, Jules Lachelier, Alfred Fouillée and Henri Bergson.  

Bergson's early works, *Essai sur les données immédiate de la conscience* (1889) and *Matière et Mémoire* (1896) waged a formidable attack on the psychology of associationism and psycho-physical parallelism. According to Bergson, contact with the external world fractured the individual into two selves, the superficial self and the deeper self. The superficial self was merely an "outer crust" which represented a crystallization of the deeper self. This patina, however, was highly suitable to social life and to positivistic psychology.  

Bergson, however, proposed to return to the "real and concrete self and to give up its substitute." When man applied his intuition to the nature of consciousness, he would conclude that his inner states, rather than being states that changed, were nothing but change, where the slightest alteration created change within the totality. He posited a consciousness of interpenetrating tendencies which were separated and externalized only by thought, by the "reflective consciousness, because the latter

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20 Ibd., p. 129.
21 Cf. this emphasis on the totality with Duhem and Sorel, above pp. 25 and 60.
delights in clean cut distinctions, which are easily expressed in words, and in things with well-defined outlines, like those which are perceived in space."^{22}

The flavor of Biran and Bergson, if not the direct influence, is present in Sabatier's theory on the nature of consciousness. Change characterized man's internal life as well as his external world: "All is movement in us and around us."^{23} Within man, consciousness was composed of three faculties--feeling, volition and idea--which were mutually dependent, and which were dissoluble only by the intellect.

It must never be forgotten that these verbal distinctions are pure abstractions; that these elements co-exist, and are enveloped and implicated with each other in the unity of the ego. In the living reality there has never existed feeling which did not carry within it some embryo of an idea and translate itself into some voluntary movement. Never has an idea appeared isolated from all feeling and from all action. Never is will produced without being accompanied by some more or less obscure notion, without being inflamed and animated by some emotion of the heart.\footnote{Sabatier, Outlines \ldots, p. 235.}

Sabatier insisted that the "living reality" was an interdependency of these three elements, that man could not live his life without thinking it.\footnote{Sabatier, Religions \ldots, p. 359.} But he also frequently, and significantly, opposed, or at least separated, life and thought: "Life comes before thought.\ldots\)"\footnote{Sabatier, Outlines \ldots, p. 235.}

\footnote{Bergson, op. cit., p. 9. In the bibliography which followed the chapter on a critical theory of knowledge in Sabatier's Esquisse\ldots, he listed Bergson's Essai sur les données \ldots, but not Matière et Mémoire.}

\footnote{Sabatier, Religions \ldots, p. 359.}

\footnote{Sabatier, Esquisse \ldots, p. 293; Cf. Outlines \ldots, p. 234. Also cf. Ménégoz, Publications \ldots, No. 28, p. 291; II, No. 44, p. 91; and Eugène Ménégoz, "L'anti-fidélisme," Revue chrétienne, 4th ser., II (July 1, 1906), 44.}

\footnote{Sabatier, Religions \ldots, p. 359.}

\footnote{Sabatier, Outlines \ldots, p. 235.}

\footnote{Sabatier, Religions of Authority \ldots, p. 337.}
agreement with the "anti-intellectual" philosophies, he tended to equate life with action and will. "To live," said Sabatier, "is to act." Life was will; will sustained and animated intelligence, like everything else. Sabatier agreed with Charles Secrétan that if man were essentially will, then science could not be his final end, that intelligence was only a means. Science and thought were seen as only one of the forms of the inner activity of the will. For Sabatier, feeling always preceded ideas in consciousness. This meant that perception, either as external or internal sensation, was the primary and vital element in knowledge; conception was only secondary and abstract. What man did not come in contact with, i.e., experience, he could not know. Without experience man could have no conception, no reality and no truth.

27 Cf. for example, Henri Bergson's statement: "We are made in order to act as much as, and more than, in order to think—or rather, when we follow the bent of our nature, it is in order to act that we think." Creative Evolution, trans. Arthur Mitchell (New York: The Modern Library, 1911 [c. 1907]), p. 323. Also Maurice Blondel, L'Action: Essai d'une critique de la vie et d'une science de la pratique (1893) (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1950), p. 301: "Et ici [i.e., in daily life], comme partout, c'est l'action effective qui est la grand médiateuse; elle réussit à concilier ce qui, au point de vue static de la connaissance, pour une philosophie critique ou idéaliste, s'exclut formellement."


30 Sabatier, Outlines..., p. 280.

For Sabatier, therefore, a religious epistemology would have to maintain the unity of science and religion while asserting the unique characteristics of religious knowledge. It would prove that scientific knowledge and religious knowledge were reconcilable, but not reducible, that they were both solidaire and distinct—solidaire because of the basic unity of the ego, distinct because they belonged to two different worlds. They differed in three important aspects: their object, their direction and their language. Religious knowledge was unique because it was subjective, teleological and symbolic. But a comparison of Sabatier's views on scientific knowledge with the current scientific theories shows that the distinction was not as clear as he believed and that his concept of religious knowledge was very close to the emerging pragmatic spirit in science.
CHAPTER II

SCIENTIFIC OBJECTIVITY AND RELIGIOUS SUBJECTIVITY

Sabatier felt that a re-evaluation of the relationship of subjectivity and objectivity was necessary for a proper understanding of religious and scientific knowledge. He hoped to avoid both the pit and the pendulum—the extremes of Idealism, which reduced matter to mind, and materialism, which reduced mind to matter. He grasped what philosophers and scientists were beginning to assert; namely, that the scientific object was not totally independent of the thinking subject. But Sabatier de-emphasized this subjectivity in order to establish the special subjectivity of religious knowledge.

The philosophical tendency after Kant had been to try to synthesize the phenomenal and noumenal worlds in order to overcome the feeling of contradiction experienced by the individual. The greatest attempt at this synthesis was Hegelian Idealism, which joined the world of thought and the world of being in a totality of the rational. The generations that followed Hegel, however, were tremendously influenced by scientific theories which were creating an almost unbelievable materialistic progress. Nineteenth-century science, especially classical mechanics with its emphasis on the kinetic theory of matter, postulated a world of matter in motion whose laws were knowable through empirical observation and independent of all subjective judgment:

A first postulate [of nineteenth-century physics] was that it must be possible to arrive at the description of the
material world which does not in the least take into account either the scientist who experiments and reasons, or the means of investigation which he uses to observe the phenomena.  

This scientific attitude, projected into a general philosophy of mechanistic materialism, found its social expression in a Marxist interpretation (i.e., reversal) of Hegelianism. The close dependence of philosophy upon science meant that any challenge to the prevailing scientific notions would create significant repercussions in philosophy.

This challenge was issued by developments in mathematics, biology and physics. Early in the century the importance of the creative intellect was demonstrated by daring attacks on the postulates of Euclidean geometry. The non-Euclidean geometries of Bolyai, Lobachevski and Riemann not only transcended sense phenomena, but, to many of their contemporaries, common sense as well. The Darwinian theory of evolution, although generally considered to be a support for materialism, contained aspects that were actually destructive to a materialistic philosophy. In the struggle against a hostile environment, man was not a passive victim. Nature was seen as a dynamic unity of diverse, but mutually dependent organisms.

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35 Above, p. 38.

36 Barbour, op. cit., p. 87.
the subject was permanently re-established by Einstein's special theory of relativity which asserted the subjectivity of time:

The experiences of an individual appear to us arranged in a series of events; in this series the single events which we remember appear to be ordered according to the criterion of "earlier" and "later." There exists, therefore, for the individual, an I-time, or subjective time. This in itself is not measurable.37

The growing emphasis on the role of the intellect forced philosophers and scientists to discard the simplistic object-subject dualism that had resulted in the logical unity-through-reduction characteristic of both Idealism and materialism. For many, a modified Kantian philosophy seemed to provide a half-way house of intellectual refuge, as it reintroduced the idea of knowledge as a reciprocal relationship between mind and matter. Symbolo-fidéism shared in this Kantian revival, in the security it gave to scientific knowledge and in the sense of mystery it restored to religious knowledge.

Scientific philosophies in the late nineteenth century found it necessary to redefine the nature of the object of scientific knowledge. Scientists could not accept either the Kantian position, which claimed knowledge only of sensations, apart from a non-sensuous reality, or the materialistic viewpoint, which asserted knowledge of a reality beyond experience. They turned, instead, to various degrees of phenomenalism. Mach, for example, asserted that reality was actually a complex of interrelated sensations, e.g., light, color, sounds. The thing was merely a symbol of this combination, rather than the complex being a symbol of the

thing. \(^{38}\) Du
cem, on the other hand, admitted a reality apart from
observable appearances, but stated that science could say absolutely
nothing about it. \(^{39}\) Poincaré dismissed even the question of a different
reality as being beyond the interests of science: "It matters little
whether the ether really exists; that is the affair of the metaphysicians.
The essential thing for us is that everything happens as if it existed,
and that this hypothesis is convenient for the explanation of phenomena."\(^{40}\)
Sabatier agreed that the existence of the Kantian ding-an-sich was not only
unimportant to science, but actually harmful. This Unding, as he called
it, had to be discarded:

He that persists in distinguishing between the thing in
itself and the phenomenal thing will never be able to give
an account of the objectivity of the sciences of nature,
and of the kind of certitude that belongs to them. That
which appears to us from without is not doubtless all the
reality of the world; but it is a real world.\(^{41}\)

It was absolutely essential to Sabatier's philosophy that the realm of
scientific knowledge be real: "The intelligible no doubt is real."
Sabatier could not, however, accept the converse of this statement, for
to him it was not at all certain "that all the real was intelligible."\(^{42}\)
The intelligible real was the world of the scientist; the non-intelligible
real was not only beyond his knowledge, but beyond his very means of
knowing.


\(^{39}\) Pierre Du
Philip P. Wiener (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press,
1954 [c. 1906]), p. 115.

\(^{40}\) Poincaré, op. cit., p. 174.

\(^{41}\) Sabatier, Outlines . . . , pp. 299-300.

\(^{42}\) Ibid., pp. 277, 15.
The new science, therefore, accepted the reality of phenomena, but the "real facts" did not have the same meaning as they had had for materialism. Scientists began to distinguish between the "crude facts" and the "scientific facts." Poincaré reduced the difference to one of translation into a convenient language. Duhem, however, attributed it to the intervention of the mind: "An experiment in physics is the precise observation of phenomena accompanied by an interpretation of these phenomena." A selectivity of facts and theories was admitted based upon Mach's principle of economy of thought. The role of hypothesis in the creation of "natural laws" was emphasized as being necessary and legitimate. Poincaré, for example, defined certain types of hypotheses, e.g., mathematical, geometrical and mechanical principles, as "conventions," i.e., free creations of the mind, which, although based upon experience, transcended it in that experience could neither affirm nor negate them. While Poincaré's conventions had some of the characteristics of Kant's categories of the mind, they avoided the rigid a priori nature of those principles, and relied more on experience. For example, time and space were convenient conventions to Poincaré; they

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44 Duhem, op. cit., pp. 147-51.

45 The thing for Mach represented an economy of thought because it substituted a unity for the variety of sensations. It was further expressed in mathematical terms because that discipline represented the most economy of thought. See Aliotta, op. cit., pp. 59-67; Poincaré, Science and Method, op. cit., pp. 362-65; Duhem, op. cit., pp. 21-23. Both Poincaré and Duhem, however, stressed the idea of harmony, as well as economy, in the selection of facts and theories. See above, pp.

46 Poincaré, Science and Hypothesis, op. cit., p. 27.

47 Ibid., p. 28.
had been necessary forms of intuition to Kant. In short, these ideas pointed to a most important change in science. The passive, mirror-like mind of positivism was replaced by an intellect that interpreted and represented experience. Sabatier accepted this idea that the mind was a thinking and willing force, and not an inert and passive entity, that scientific knowledge required both experience and interpretation. But he understood the mental process in strictly Kantian terms. Science was the causal connection between phenomena, but the principle of causation was a Kantian category of the understanding.

The re-establishment of intellect, however, also brought about a re-instatement of intuition, an element of subjectivity that escaped Sabatier. Duhem stated that all his efforts to develop a method of physical theory were fruitless until he had an "intuition of the truths." He often seemed to identify this intuition with good, or common sense (not that this term is much clearer). For example, good sense would favor one theory over another even when pure logic would exclude neither of them. Poincaré defined intuition as the faculty that made us see the end from afar. It was this faculty that had inspired him to equate the transformations of Fuchsian functions with non-Euclidean geometry. He went so

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49 Sabatier, Outlines ..., p. 272.

50 Duhem, op. cit., p. 277.

51 Ibid., p. 218. It was Duhem's "common sense" that led him to reject the theory of relativity. See Donald G. Miller, "Ignored Intellect: Pierre Duhem," Physics Today, XIX, No. 12 (Dec. 1965), 52.

52 Poincaré, The Value of Science, op. cit., p. 218.

far as to state that logic remained sterile unless it was fertilized by intuition. 54 Exactly what he meant here, without going into a Freudian interpretation, is difficult to say. It is, however, obvious that both Duhem's and Poincaré's "scientific" intuition is far from Bergson's mystical "sympathy by which one is transported into the interior of an object in order to coincide with what there is unique and consequently inexpressible in it." 55 But, nevertheless, it admitted into the clear realm of reason a fuzziness that the intellect could not dispel. Science appeared dependent not only upon rational and empirical processes, but upon some kind of creative leap into imagination that bore uneasy resemblance to Kierkegaard's leap into faith or Bergson's discontinuous leap in evolution. The limitations on the intellect that the intuitionists carried to extremes were partly placed there by the scientists themselves. 56

The emphasis on intellect and intuition was accompanied by a third element of subjectivity—the importance of faith. Increasingly scientists began to realize that science was not just a work of the intellect, or perhaps even primarily intellectual. The idea was emerging that the scientist did not work tabula rasa, but that he was dependent upon the assumption of certain concepts that, consciously or

54 Ibid., p. 483.


56 Karl Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies (Harper Torchbook, 2 vols.; New York: Harper and Row, 1963), II, 227-28 states that modern irrationalism emphasizes to extreme this intuitive element in scientific knowledge, claiming that it is the scientist's mystical insight into things, rather than his reasoning, which makes a great scientist.
unconsciously, served as prerequisites for scientific truths. Poincaré emphasized that it was impossible to conduct experiments without a preconceived idea. "Everyone carries in his own mind his own conception of the world, of which he can not so easily rid himself." Duhem also asserted that the interpretation of phenomena substituted "for the concrete data really gathered by observation abstract and symbolic representations which correspond to them by virtue of theories admitted by the observer [italics mine]." He further stated that scientific judgments always implied an act of faith in a whole group of theories. Science was a system that had to be taken as a whole, an organism, as it were, in which one part could not be made to function outside the totality. This assumption led Duhem, in contrast to Poincaré, to deny that a "crucial experiment" could be performed, as it was impossible to subject one isolated hypothesis to experimental tests.

The increasing emphasis on subjectivity plunged some philosophers and scientists, for example Bergson and Le Roy, into an extreme Idealism in which not only the laws, but also the facts of science became artificial creations of the mind. For most scientists, however, the

57 Milic Capek, The Philosophical Impact of Contemporary Physics (Princeton, New Jersey: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1961), p. 299, points out the present need to unmask the "inhibiting influence of our Euclidean and Newtonian subconscious in the minds of those physicists [e.g., even Einstein] who sincerely believe themselves to be entirely free from them."

58 Poincaré, Science and Hypothesis, op. cit., p. 129.

59 Duhem, op. cit., pp. 147, 159.

60 Ibid., pp. 183, 163.

61 Ibid., p. 190. Duhem's theory of belief in the totality of the structure bears interesting comparison with Georges Sorel's emphasis on belief in the totality of the myth. See above, p. 60.
constructions of the intellect were not arbitrary and capricious, for they were closely circumscribed by experience and prediction. Experience, or experiment, became the sole source of truth. Without a stimulation from experience the creative faculty of the intellect would not function. Without a verification by experience the work of the intellect would not result in fruitful anticipation and prediction:

A mathematical deduction, stemming from the hypothesis on which a theory rests, may therefore be useful or otiose, according to whether or not it permits us to derive a practically definite prediction of the result of an experiment whose conditions are practically given.

The mutual relationship between the subjectivity of science and the need for experimental stimulation and verification brought about an important change in one of the standards of nineteenth-century science—the concept of absolute objectivity. Sabatier, in spite of his neo-Kantian orientation, reiterated the classical position. For him the construction of the mind into necessary categories of thought could link phenomena only according to these laws. Once these laws were promulgated outside the ego, however, they assumed an air of independence which disguised their subjective origins. "This elimination of the subject from the conclusions of science thus becomes the sign and the measure of their objectivity." The amount of independence determined the "objectivity" of the science, which was nearly absolute for some, e.g., physics, and only approximate for others, e.g., history. Scientists,

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62 Ibid., p. 186; Poincaré, Science and Hypothesis, op. cit., p. 127.  
64 Duhem, op. cit., p. 137.  
65 Sabatier, Outlines . . . ., p. 301.
however, were discarding the notion of objectivity as elimination of the self. Poincaré expressed the new attitude that objectivity meant universality and intelligibility:

Nothing is objective except what is identical for all; now we can only speak of such an identity if comparison is possible, and can be translated into a "money of exchange" capable of transmission from one mind to another. Nothing, therefore, will have objective value except what is transmissible by "discourse," that is, intelligible. 66

Scientists necessarily redefined the purpose of science to agree with the new phenomenalistic, subjective and experimental attitudes. Science was limited to describing relations between phenomena which it then classified into a coherent system. Relationship replaced essence and classification replaced metaphysical explanation. Poincaré stated that science was only a system of relations, outside of which there was no knowable reality. 67 These relations, if true, represented a permanent part of the scientific structure. 68 To Duhem, physical theory was not "an explanation, but a simplified and orderly representation grouping laws according to a classification which grows more and more complete, more and more natural." 69 Sabatier also asserted that scientific theories

66 Poincaré, The Value of Science, op. cit., p. 349. This attitude today is usually called "intersubjectivity." For example, Popper, op. cit., II, 220 says: "To sum up these conclusions, it may be said that what we call 'scientific objectivity' is not a product of the individual's impartiality, but a product of the social or public character of scientific method; and the individual scientist's impartiality is, so far as it exists, not the source but rather the result of this socially or institutionally organized objectivity of science." Cf. also Barbour, op. cit., pp. 182-85 in his discussion of intersubjective testability and universality.


68 Ibid., p. 351.

69 Duhem, op. cit., pp. 54, 7, 9-19. For an explanation of the phrase "more and more natural" see above, p. 46.
were "judgments of existence" which bore only on the mutual relations of objects. 70

This consignment of the intellect to classification implied another limitation which met with varying degrees of acceptance among fin-de-siècle scientists; namely, the idea that science was oriented not toward knowledge, but toward action. For the first time in the history of philosophy the intellect was confined by some to a purely utilitarian role. 71 This extreme position is illustrated by Bergson, who saw the intellect as being concerned only with action motivated toward a practically useful end. 72 Le Roy, echoing Bergson, stated that science could teach us nothing of the truth; it could only serve as a rule of action. 73 Poincaré and Duhamel represented a more moderate position. Certainly Poincaré's insistence that conventions were only "commod" has a utilitarian ring. "One geometry," he stated, "can not be more true than another; it can only be more convenient." 74 According to Duhamel, physical theory, through classification, rendered laws "more easily and safely utilizable." 75 But Poincaré still asserted that a science devoted entirely to application, expecting immediate results, was impossible. 76

70 Sabatier, Outlines . . . , p. 292.
71 Parodi, op. cit., p. 286.
72 Bergson, Creative Evolution . . . , p. 171.
74 Poincaré, Science and Hypotheses, op. cit., p. 65.
75 Duhamel, op. cit., p. 30.
76 Poincaré, The Value of Science, op. cit., p. 279.
There is no escape from this dilemma; either science does not enable us to foresee, and then it is valueless as rule of action; or else it enables us to foresee, in a fashion more or less imperfect, and then it is not without value as means of knowledge.  

And Duhem argued that science could impart a knowledge of the external world which was irreducible to merely empirical knowledge, coming neither from experiment nor mathematical procedures. For Sabatier science definitely represented knowledge, not action, although this knowledge did give man power over nature. Following Kant, he considered science and the intellect to represent man's receptive life; feeling and will constituted his active life.

Sabatier's Kantian orientation both related him to, and alienated him from, the changes occurring in late nineteenth-century science. While science to him also meant the reality of phenomena, the importance of the intellect, the classification of relations, his philosophical framework was too rigid to allow room for the increasingly pragmatic orientation of science. To him, subjectivity and action were characteristic not of scientific knowledge, but of religious knowledge.

Sabatier's theory of scientific knowledge, therefore, centered on objectivity: "The object of scientific knowledge is always

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77 Ibid., p. 324.
78 Duhem, op. cit., p. 326; see above, p. 47.
79 Sabatier, Outlines . . . . , p. 300. Sabatier also subscribed to what might be called the "myth of the disinterested scientist," i.e., that the scientist is engaged in a religious-like pursuit of truth characterized by disinterestedness and heroism. But what science and religion often share is not forgetfulness of self, but fanaticism. For example, Duhem was exiled from Paris for incurring the wrath of Berthelot when he attacked Berthelot's "maximum work principle" in his doctoral dissertation. With true scientific impartiality Berthelot is reputed to have said that Duhem would never teach in Paris. See Miller, op. cit., p. 49.
80 Ibid., p. 297.
outside the ego, and it is in knowing it as an object outside the ego 
that the objectivity of that knowledge consists."\(^{81}\) His theory of 
religious knowledge, however, was based upon the opposite relationship.
Here the objects of religious and moral knowledge belonged to the 
subjective order, "that is to say, an order of psychological facts, of 
determinations and internal dispositions of the subject itself, the 
succession of which constitutes his personal life."\(^{82}\) God, the Good, 
the Beautiful were immanent within the subject and only revealed them-
selves through the personal activity of the ego.\(^{83}\) The ego could not be 
eliminated as Sabatier felt it could be for science.

To enclose God in any phenomenal form is, properly speaking, 
**idolatry;** to confine or dissipate the soul in external 
phenomenism, and to deny the seriousness and value of its 
religious and moral activity is **infidelity,** properly so called.\(^{84}\)

This subjectivity was seen in the very origin of the religious 
feeling. Just as the new science rescued the intellect from the passive 
role of recorder that it had had under materialism, Sabatier insisted 
that man was not the passive receiver of an external revelation that he 
was under orthodox theology. Man actively sought out God. He needed Him. 
"The gift of God," said Sabatier, "comes only to the felt need and the

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\(^{81}\)Ibid., p. 298.

\(^{82}\)Ibid., p. 301. Sabatier made little distinction between religion 
and morality, one being the love of God, the other a resultant love of 
mankind. "En bien," he stated, "la religion et la morale sont au fond 
identique et regies l'une et l'autre, non seulement par un besoin ou un 
gout de nature, mais par une loi, souveraine expression de la vocation 
divine, gravée à l'origine dans la nature même de toute âme humaine."

\(^{83}\)Ibid., p. 298.

\(^{84}\)Ibid., p. 305.
active desire of man." For Sabatier the religious instinct was, therefore, generated by despair, but this feeling of despair was not born of consciousness of sin, but from the need for survival against the determinism of nature. This was not Genesis, but the Origin of Species. The same Darwinian influence can be seen in those pragmatists who held a similar viewpoint regarding the birth of intellectual concepts, i.e., the need for survival against the environment led to the creation of scientific constructions. Man was, therefore, an active participator in religion. And his search could only lead back to himself—to the subjectivity of God. The immanence which Sabatier found had been well expressed by Pascal: "Thou wouldst not seek me hadst thou not already found me."

This subjectivity of God for Sabatier also meant that man could never know God apart from himself. Just as the pragmatic attitude emphasized that scientific knowledge was knowledge of relations, not of the thing in itself (if indeed this shadow even existed), Sabatier asserted that religious knowledge was knowledge of relations. It was not the essence of God that man could know; God in himself was unknowable. Here Sabatier did allow the Kantian ding-an-sich, which he

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85 Ibid., p. 328.
86 Ibid., p. 285.
88 Sabatier, Outlines . . . , p. 30.
89 Ibid., pp. 303-04. Cf. Ménégoz, Publications . . . , II, No. 77, that we don't know what Spirit is en soi.
had banished from the world of science, in order to account for the transcendence of God. For Sabatier it was the relationship of man to God that was important to man. Moreover, this relationship could be known, or rather felt. It was, as it was for Schleiermacher, the complete dependence of man on God; it was an irreversible functional relationship in which man was the son, and God, the Father.

The subjective and relational character of God that Sabatier asserted also meant that the proof of His existence was not demonstrable to logic.90 "One gains nothing by attempting to demonstrate objectively the existence of God. That demonstration is ineffective towards those who have no piety; for those who have it, it is superfluous."91 Here Sabatier assumed the existence of a religious feeling as a prerequisite for religious truth in the same way that the scientists assumed a scientific feeling as necessary for scientific truths. Without, for example, the feeling of dependence, man would not arrive at the idea of God as the Father; without the feeling of some kind of natural unity, the scientist would never be able to classify facts.92 The proof of God's existence, then, was subjective. "Truths of the religious and moral

90 Ibid., p. 302.
91 Ibid., p. 307.
92 Popper, op. cit., II, pp. 230-31 states in a similar vein: "The rationalist attitude is characterized by the importance it attaches to argument and experience. But neither logical argument nor experience can establish the rationalist attitude; for only those who are ready to consider argument or experience, and who have therefore adopted this attitude already, will be impressed by them. That is to say, a rationalist attitude must be first adopted if any argument or experience is to be effective, and it cannot therefore be based upon argument or experience . . . . We have to conclude from this that no rational argument will have a rational effect on a man who does not want to adopt a rational attitude."
order are known by a subjective act of what Pascal calls the heart."93 Religious certitude was established by the feeling of satisfaction experienced by the whole soul; it was the "happy feeling of deliverance, the inward assurance of salvation."94 It could be pragmatically argued from this, although Sabatier would not have agreed, that any concept was "true" that satisfied the needs of the individual for perpetuation. But Sabatier felt that he had overcome this subjectivity. The appeal to experience was as important to Sabatier's religious knowledge as it was to scientific knowledge. Just as experience stimulated and limited the working of the intellect for science, experience also stimulated and checked the acts of the heart for Sabatier. It was "the grand and sovereign mistress which, by detouring us from dry wells, slowly led us to the spring of life."95 The objectivity of religious knowledge for Sabatier, like the objectivity of scientific knowledge for Poincaré, lay in the universality of this experience:

It is not a question of isolated experience, of the experience of a single individual. The material world would be too precarious, and the field of observation too limited. The question refers to the individual life in its continuity, and to the life of the religious society considered in its historical development. 96

Religious knowledge, like scientific knowledge, required an "intersubjectivity" of method available to all. It required a sanction from a religious community, just as science required a sanction from the

93Sabatier, Outlines, p. 305. Cf. Nénégoz, Publications, i, no. 3, p. 67, that there was certainty in both orders, although the kind differed.
94Ibid., p. 306.
95Sabatier, Lettres, pp. 231-82.
scientific community. The contradiction between the ego and the world that gave rise to the religious feeling could be reached "by a mental analysis that everyone can follow, and verify the more easily in as much as it is always in course of reconstruction, by noting our own experience." For Sabatier, subjectivity also meant transmissibility, for the religious feeling necessarily expressed itself in images, doctrines, rites and institutions. This transmissibility for Poincaré, however, meant being intellectually understood by all; for Sabatier it meant being emotionally felt by all.

In maintaining the subjectivity of religious knowledge, Sabatier was accused of a loss of transcendence by orthodox theologians. But he hoped that emphasis on the subjectivity of religious knowledge would distinguish it clearly from the objectivity of scientific knowledge. This distinction was justifiable for his own Kantian concept of science, but it could not be applied to the new scientific spirit, which emphasized the subjectivity of scientific knowledge in a way increasingly further from Kantian necessity. For example, Duhem also agreed that religion and science belonged to different orders, but only because the object of religious knowledge was objective, and the concepts of scientific knowledge were subjective—the exact opposite from Sabatier's assertion:

Metaphysical and religious doctrines are judgments touching on objective reality, whereas the principles of physical theory are propositions relative to certain mathematical signs stripped of all objective existence. Since they do not have any common term, these two sorts of judgments can neither contradict nor agree with each other.

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97 Ibid., p. 11.
98 Above, p. 27.
99 Duhem, op. cit., p. 147.
Sabatier could not, however, alter his position, as subjectivity formed the basis of the other two characteristics of religious knowledge—teleology and symbolism.
The second characteristic of scientific and religious knowledge that Sabatier explored was the relationship between mechanism and teleology. Here he asserted that although the idea of cause basically belonged to the world of science, and the idea of end to the realm of spirit, the two were not mutually exclusive. Only science as a metaphysics, i.e., metaphysical materialism, excluded the idea of end and established the idea of cause as an absolute determinism and reductionism. The relationship that Sabatier found between mechanism and teleology was also being developed by the new science. As science lost its deterministic and reductionistic attitudes, as it surrendered the idea of ever knowing ultimate reality, it, paradoxically enough, readmitted the belief in ultimate reality.

Only a short time ago science stood for absolute knowledge of the nature of things. . . . It was, in short, the old time metaphysic, with its ambition for perfect knowledge, transferred to the world of experience. . . , which eliminated from the principle of things everything recalling human intelligence and freedom, so as to admit therein only material and mechanical elements.100

Boutroux’s description was of nineteenth-century science, a science dominated by the Laplacian concept of causality which postulated a corpuscular-kinetic view of reality in which time and space were continuous, events—even distant ones—were simultaneous, and the

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100 Boutroux, op. cit., p. 237.
positions and velocities of particles were both definable.\textsuperscript{101} The causal relationship developed was characterized by static and absolute determinism—static, because being was represented as an unchanging substance that unfolded its eternal identity in a causal sequence in which cause and effect were basically identical; absolute, because the identity of cause and effect meant that from any present state of the universe, both the future and the past states could be derived.\textsuperscript{102} The system was also reductionistic, for it was asserted that all explanations of cause and effect could be expressed in terms of the action of mechanical forces of attraction and repulsion, dependent only upon the distance between the static particles.\textsuperscript{103} It was further believed that all phenomena, physical and psychical, obeyed these mechanical laws. The nineteenth-century ideal was "to reduce everything in the whole universe completely and perfectly to purely quantitative changes in a few basic entities which themselves never changed."\textsuperscript{104} Such a system was complete; no uncertainty could exist, for an intellect which at a given instant knew all the forces acting in nature, and the position of all things of which the world consists—supposing the said intellect were vast enough to subject these data to analysis—would embrace in the same formula the motions of the greatest bodies in the universe and those of the slightest atoms; nothing

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\textsuperscript{101}Capek, op. cit., p. 122.
\textsuperscript{102}Ibid., pp. 137, 124.
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would be uncertain for it, and the future, like the past, would be present to its eyes.105

(Such an intellect would have to be God or the nineteenth-century scientist.) And no mystery could be tolerated: "Today," wrote the chemist Marcelin Berthelot in 1884, "the world is without mysteries."106 The idea of end was completely submerged in the principle of causation.

This picture of reality, however, was being challenged by developments in natural and physical sciences. The theory of evolution emphasized an irreversible process, an ascensional becoming that allowed room for the spontaneous variations of change.107 The idea that more complex organisms evolved from less complex ones was not compatible with a materialism that postulated an eternal substance.108 In physics the decline of the mechanical view was due to the inability of the kinetic theory of matter to cope with the increasing complexities of electromagnetic phenomena and optics without introducing more "weightless substances." The experiments of first Oersted and then Rowland revealed a relationship between electricity and magnetism that was not mechanical in nature, as the existing force was perpendicular to the line joining

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107 Antonio Aliotta, "Science and Religion in the Nineteenth Century," in Science, Religion and Reality . . . , p. 160; Barbour, op. cit., pp. 84-88. Barbour also notes that some of Darwin's advocates, such as T.H. Huxley, were determinists, since they interpreted chance as ignorance of natural laws rather than as spontaneity.

the magnetic pole and the wire and dependent upon velocity. The development of field theory emphasized that it was the nebulous field between two charges or particles that was important, and not the charges or particles themselves. Problems in field theory led Einstein to his theory of special relativity which restricted the laws of classical mechanics to inertial systems, reduced the laws of conservation of mass and energy to one law by equating mass and energy, and reversed the classical idea of time as an invariant. The nature of matter itself, the massy atom, was changing as the use of spectrum analysis and the discovery of cathode rays, x-rays and radioactivity developed the concept that matter was basically evolutionary. "Nature evolves," said Boutroux, "perhaps even fundamentally."

Philosophers and scientists began a reappraisal of natural laws that either eliminated or modified the deterministic, reductionistic and static causal relationship that had served as the basis of classical mechanics. Uncertainty, mystery and spirit returned to scientific knowledge. The analysis of determinism was, in general, represented by three lines of argument: 1) scientific laws were deterministic but nature was characterized by indeterminacy; 2) scientific laws were

109 Einstein, *op. cit.*, pp. 84-90, 121.
110 Ibid., pp. 125-50, 224.
111 Ibid., pp. 126-98, 224.
113 Boutroux, *op. cit.*, p. 357.
114 The previously mentioned phenomenalism and subjectivity also played a role in modifying the metaphysical claims of materialism. See above, pp. 20-29.
deterministic (more or less) and nature probably was, although it was beyond the ability of science to establish this; 3) scientific laws were deterministic and so was nature. Émile Boutroux's theory of probability represented the first argument; it was an attempt to establish the basic indeterminacy of reality in the face of scientific determinism. In 1874 Boutroux defended his doctoral dissertation, "The Contingency of the Laws of Nature," in which he asserted that contingency, not necessity, characterized the laws of nature. By this he meant that all reality was the irreducible synthesis of the possible and the act, i.e., the realization of one contrary in preference to another. Actually given reality was not a necessary sequel of the possible, but a contingent, i.e., free form of it. 115 "All things presented in experience are based on being, which is contingent in its existence and in its laws." 116 Reality for Boutroux was characterized by change and contingency, not by permanence and necessity. He distinguished between "scientific laws" that were imposed on reality and "real laws" that were harmonies toward which the action of different beings was tending. 117

Few scientists, however, accepted Boutroux's assertion of the basic indeterminacy of nature or of natural laws. Poincaré dismissed

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116 Ibid., p. 33. Here Boutroux is anticipating what Heisenberg was later to call the "restoration of the concept of potentiality." It is also found in Morgenau in the idea that the transition from the possible to the actual takes place during the act of observation, i.e., that it is caused by human ingression into the realm of nature. See Barbour, op. cit., pp. 299, 303-05.

his brother's-in-law theory of the contingence of the laws of nature as being "evidently insoluble."\textsuperscript{118} To Poincaré any question regarding the true nature of laws—contingency or immutability—was not only insoluble, but senseless.\textsuperscript{119} Still, as Poincaré stated in Laplacian-like terms, most scientists were absolute determinists, seeking the cause of every phenomenon that an infinitely powerful, infinitely well-informed mind could have foreseen from the beginning of the centuries.\textsuperscript{120} He asserted that each of the conquests of science was a victory for determinism.\textsuperscript{121} But Poincaré modified his notion of determinism by introducing possibility and probability into necessity and prediction. He interpreted scientific determinism under the more "modest form" of the possibility of making a classification of sequences, i.e., of organizing the relations between antecedent and consequent that seemed sufficiently alike to be classed together.\textsuperscript{122} He denied the classical identity of cause and effect, for a multitude of causes, not one cause, was responsible for a given effect, and the scientist had no means of determining the separate role of each cause.\textsuperscript{123} The element of chance, which Poincaré interpreted not as ignorance (as did Huxley) but in the positive sense of slight causes producing great effects, further complicated a simple cause-effect

\textsuperscript{118}Poincaré, \textit{The Value of Science}, op. cit., p. 340.

\textsuperscript{119}Henri Poincaré, \textit{Dernières pensées}, p. 29, quoted in Parodi, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 235.

\textsuperscript{120}Poincaré, \textit{Science and Method} [c. 1909], \textit{op. cit.}, p. 395.

\textsuperscript{121}Poincaré, \textit{Dernières pensées}, p. 244, quoted in Parodi, \textit{loc. cit.}

\textsuperscript{122}Poincaré, \textit{The Value of Science}, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 347.

\textsuperscript{123}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 226.
relationship. The importance of probability was also recognized by Poincaré, who pointed out that predicted facts could only be probable because of the uncertainty of experiment, but the probabilities were often great enough to provide a practical satisfaction. Determinism received a further blow from Duhem, who stated that the laws of nature were approximate, provisional and relative:

Any physical law, being approximate, is at the mercy of the progress which, by increasing the precision of experiments, will make the degree of approximation of this law insufficient: the law is essentially provisional. The estimation of its value varies from one physicist to the next, depending on the means of observation at their disposal and the accuracy demanded by their investigations: the law is essentially relative.

Pluralism became an added feature of these laws, for if a phenomenon admitted of one complete mechanical explanation, it would admit an infinity of others, all rendering an equally good account of the facts revealed by experience, and all thus having an equal claim to being a "true" law. This led Poincaré to allow even contradictory theories as useful instruments of research. Duhem, however, disagreed, since for him a physical theory had to have a logical coordination.

Sabatier represented the third argument, which postulated determinism as the basis of both science and nature. To him the "irresistible tendency of science will be to extend over the whole of the phenomena the ever-tighter network of an invincible necessity.

125 Poincaré, Science and Hypothesis, op. cit., pp. 128, 155.
126 Duhem, op. cit., p. 174. In addition the law was also symbolic. See above, pp. 51-52.
127 Ibid., pp. 101-02; Poincaré, Science and Hypothesis, op. cit., pp. 131, 177, 181.
Determinism is its last word." But determinism also characterized the phenomenal world itself, for to Sabatier there was a fundamental unity between the laws of thought and the laws of phenomena. This determinism, however, applied only to secondary, i.e., efficient causes; science could say nothing about final or first causes. Sabatier was anxious to give science a determinism which not even scientists were claiming in order to reserve freedom and action for the subjective order of religion.

The differences of opinion that characterized questions of determinism were missing from all discussion of reductionism. Boutroux denied that all the laws of nature were reducible to each other. "Science" was merely an abstraction—there were only individual and qualitatively different sciences and laws, which could be compared, but not blended into one science or one law. A similar argument was proposed by Duhem, who opposed the Cartesian reduction of all quality to quantity, since each intensity of quality could never be the product of several qualities of the same kind but of lesser intensity: "Bring together in a vast meeting as many mediocre mathematicians as you can find, and you will not have the equal of an Archimedes or of a Lagrange." Bergson also joined in the attack by showing the impossibility of reducing the qualitative states of consciousness to quantitative intensities. In a scathing attack on

128 Sabatier, Outlines ..., pp. 279-80.
129 Ibid., p. 300.
130 Boutroux, Natural Law ..., p. 211.
131 Duhem, op. cit., p. 112. Duhem also asserted that these qualities could be mathematically represented without reducing them to quantity as Descartes had done.
132 Henri Bergson, Time and Free Will ..., Ch. I.
psycho-physical parallelism, which reduced the mental to the physical; he showed the qualitative difference between perception and memory, in which memory emerged not as function of the brain, but as the totality of the past, part of which sprang up to aid present action. Sabatier also opposed the reduction of all mental to physical and vice versa. Like Boutroux, he considered "Science" to be an abstraction.

Fin-de-siècle scientists also discarded the third element in the Laplacian concept of causality—the notion that science and scientific laws were static. Laws of nature, formerly seen as absolute, were now seen to change, and more, to progress. Darwinian evolution by no means exempted the intellect and its constructions from the necessity of alteration and adaptation. This meant that science, too, progressed; it could not, therefore, be the eternal knowledge to which every other form of knowledge was reduced. Progress was not, however, interpreted as total flux. There were still elements of stability, but these elements were structures, not substances. For Duhem, every theory had two parts, a representative part which classified laws, and an explanatory part which claimed to explain ultimate reality. The former was passed on to new theories, while the latter fell out in order to give way to another explanation. Progress in physics was generated by the constant disagreement between laws and facts arising from new experiments, and by the constant modification of laws in order to represent facts more accurately.
accurately. "Thus this struggle between reality and the laws of physics
will go on indefinitely." Poincaré maintained a similar attitude
regarding the progress of laws. He stated that although theories seemed
to come and go,

there is something in them which usually survives. If
one of them taught us a true relation, this relation
is definitively acquired, and it will be found again
under a new disguise in the other theories which will
successively come to reign in place of the old.

Sabatier also recognized that scientific knowledge progressed. But for
him it could never become perfect because it was based upon the
inherently infinite nature of mathematics, because it had an inexhaustible
source of study and, most important, because it always encountered a
mystery impenetrable to its methods, i.e., the thinking subject itself.

Science could only create an infinite causal chain in the world of time
and space. Since there was no hope of making a circle of this infinite
line, science could never explain the totality of things.

The scientific surrender of all metaphysical claims was summarized
by Duhem: "In itself and by its essence, any principle of theoretical
physics has no part to play in metaphysical or theological discus­
sions." But this did not mean that for most scientists the purpose
was "merely" practical, that the classification of relations was "only"
useful. In fin-de-siècle France scientists still sought the Holy Grail.

137 Ibid., p. 177.
139 Sabatier, Outlines . . . , p. 293.
140 Ibid., p. 312.
141 Duhem, op. cit., p. 285.
They saw scientific knowledge as an instrument of spiritual perfection, the scientific world as a reflection of the spiritual world. To Poincaré, for example, astronomy (which Sabatier had considered to be one of the most objective sciences) was useful:

because it raises us above ourselves; it is useful because it is grand; that is what we should say. It shows us how small is man's body, how great his mind, since his intelligence can embrace the whole of this dazzling immensity, where his body is only an obscure point, and enjoy its silent harmony. Thus we attain consciousness of our power, and this is something which can not cost too dear, since this consciousness makes us mightier. 142

Poincaré saw the search for facts as being guided not only by utility, but also by the "sense" of the harmony, of the unity, of the simplicity in nature. 143 The purpose of mathematical physics, therefore, was not only calculation and integration, but revelation—the unveiling of the hidden harmony of things. 144 Duhem, a devout Catholic, also agreed that an underlying harmony existed, that scientific classification could approach a "natural classification":

Thus physical theory never gives us the explanation of experimental laws; it never reveals realities hiding under the sensible appearances; but the more complete it becomes, the more we apprehend that the logical order in which theory orders experimental laws is the reflection of an ontological order, the more we suspect that the relations it established among the data of observation correspond to real relations among things, and the more we feel that theory tends to be a natural classification. 145

142 Poincaré, The Value of Science, op. cit., p. 289.
143 Ibid., p. 355; also Poincaré, Science and Method, op. cit., pp. 366-68; Science and Hypothesis, op. cit., p. 130.
144 Poincaré, The Value of Science, op. cit., p. 284.
145 Duhem, op. cit., pp. 26-27. Duhem maintained that his own Catholicism did not influence his physical theory, op. cit., p. 274. Perhaps not, but he himself admits the theory he ends up with is strikingly in accord with those of St. Thomas and Scholasticism. Ibid., p. 310.
For Duhem, physical theory could thus impart a knowledge of the external world that transcended empirical knowledge, originating neither in experiments nor in mathematics. Science was not a metaphysics itself, but it was based upon belief in a metaphysical order.

In a word, the physicist is compelled to recognize that it would be unreasonable for the progress of physical theory if this theory were not the increasingly better defined and more precise reflection of a metaphysics: the belief in an order transcending physics is the sole justification of physical theory.

But for both Poincaré and Duhem, this idea of harmony, of natural order was not a return to the clock-like universe of the eighteenth century. Belief in the existence of harmony was an act of faith, not a scientific demonstration.

Sabatier could accept this concept of harmony, as he also felt that the principle of causation had to be supplemented by the idea of end. His proof for this was the psychological unity of the consciousness, i.e., that individual action was dependent upon both the idea of cause and the idea of end. From this psychological observation, Sabatier jumped to a metaphysical truth, for just as neither cause nor end alone could explain action, neither category alone could explain the universe. Each was valid, although incomplete, in its own domain. Scientific knowledge must be confined to secondary causes, but to be intelligible it must be supplemented by teleology. Sabatier insisted that any teleological statement—that there was reason or thought in things, that

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146 Ibid., pp. 326, 334-35.
147 Ibid., p. 335.
148 Ibid., p. 27; Poincaré, *Science and Method*, op. cit., p. 367.
they moved toward an end or realized an order, harmony or good—
subordinated matter to spirit, and was thus an act of faith belonging to
the subjective order. "So soon as the savant rises above the simple
description of phenomena, and wishes to organize his cosmos by formulating
the unity and harmony of it, he necessarily borrows this principle of
organization and of harmony from the experiences of his subjective
life." 150 And of course Sabatier assumed that the scientist's subjective
life would concur with Sabatier's own theories on the subjective order.
For Sabatier, to know the world scientifically was to know its causal
relations; to know it religiously was,

while taking it as it is, and in no wise contradicting the
scientific laws according to which it is governed, to
determine its value in relation to the life of the spirit;
it is to estimate it according as it is a means, a hin­
drance, or a menace to the progress of that life.151

Man's spiritual life for Sabatier was also in a state of becoming
that resulted from the clash of scientific determinism and moral
activity—"the antimonies whose permanent conflict produces the
ascensional progress of the world and of life." 152 Progress marked it
just as much as it marked science. But in religion, too, all was not
total flux. Sabatier also claimed an element of stability—the religious
feeling—and an element of change—the expression of that feeling which
varied because of historical period, geographical environment and race. 153

Sabatier hoped to effect a harmony between the idea of cause and

150 Ibid., p. 296.
151 Ibid., p. 304.
152 Ibid., pp. 309, 277.
153 Ibid., p. 331.
the idea of end which had been lost since the medieval synthesis of science and theology. The tendency in science since Galileo had been to discard a teleological explanation for a descriptive one, to concentrate on efficient, not final or formal causes. God was seen as a First Cause, as the Great Clockmaker, who had created a static but well-ordered and efficiently operating machine. This religious rationalism was questioned by Hume and Kant, who banished teleology from the phenomenal world. The materialism of the nineteenth century reduced teleology to mechanism; no idea of end was necessary or sought for other than that of matter in motion. The tendency in theology had been to prolong the Aristotelian and Thomistic rational and empirical argument for teleology in the face of mounting scientific opposition. The argument from design with its static picture of reality was shaken by Darwinian evolutionary theories, but it was not discarded. It was merely transformed to include not just specific organisms or organs, but the evolutionary process as a whole. 154 As long as theologians insisted that this argument was rationally derived from experience, there arose conflict with science. Sabatier maintained the validity of the argument, but removed its rational support, making it rest upon an act of faith. At the same time, he insisted that this credo was necessary in order to give science any meaning.

Scientists, then and now, have tried to find this deeper meaning to science, to believe that "the cosmic religious experience is the strongest and noblest mainspring of scientific research." 155 But there


is a significant difference between the way Sabatier, and, for example, Poincaré interpreted this spiritual value of science. For Poincaré it was science itself that provided the moral uplift, e.g., astronomy. To Sabatier scientific determinism represented the antagonist in the struggle for spiritualization. It had mainly a negative, rather than a positive role.
Sabatier asserted that the third characteristic of religious knowledge was its symbolical nature. He sharply distinguished between scientific ideas and religious symbols. Influenced by the "naive realism" of materialism, Sabatier interpreted scientific ideas as being equivalent to their phenomenal objects. This interpretation was, however, being challenged by late nineteenth-century scientists who began to emphasize the symbolical nature of scientific knowledge. These scientific symbols represented the free, creative activity of the intellect. Sabatier's religious symbols, by contrast, represented an increasing reliance on non-rational approaches to knowledge that emphasized the sterility of intellectual concepts.

The metaphysical materialism of the nineteenth century had assumed that science provided an exact and complete conceptual description of natural phenomena as they were in themselves. The subjective and phenomenalistic approach of the new science could not support this simple viewpoint, however. Although it was agreed that the mind, stimulated by experience, possessed the faculty of constructing symbols, it was not asserted that this construction was equivalent to reality.

The most detailed theory of scientific symbolism was developed by Duhem. According to this "ignored intellect," an experiment in physics...

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proceeded in two steps: first came the precise observation of phenomena accompanied by an interpretation of these phenomena; then this interpretation substituted for the real and concrete data, abstract and symbolic representations. Between the abstract symbol and the concrete fact a correspondence existed, but not a complete parity. "The abstract and symbolic formula by which a physicist expresses the concrete facts he has observed in the course of an experiment cannot be the exact equivalent or the faithful story of these observations." The symbol failed to represent the fact adequately because a single theoretical fact could be translated into an infinity of practical facts, and a practical fact corresponded to an infinity of theoretical facts. This meant that a symbol could not be true or false, but that it was chosen to stand for the reality it more or less represented. When this symbol no longer represented this reality satisfactorily, it was discarded. Duhem's judgment on the inadequacy of scientific language to scientific fact was to be proven in the atomic world which we find "is not only inaccessible to direct observation, and inexpressible in terms of the senses; [but which] we are unable even to imagine . . . ."

In contrast to the theory of Duhem, Sabatier insisted upon the equivalence of the scientific idea to its phenomena. This insistence was

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157 Duhem, op. cit., p. 147.
158 Ibid., p. 151.
159 Ibid., p. 152.
160 Ibid., p. 168.
161 Ibid., p. 174.
162 Barbour, op. cit., p. 158.
based upon his general theory of the origin of consciousness. Science began with sensations, which were always accompanied by an image representing the object that produced the sensations and relating that object to the self. From this image was derived an idea—the algebraic notation of our impressions and movements. Since to Sabatier the object of scientific sensations was an objective phenomenon, he felt that it could be represented exactly. But such was not the case for the object of religious feelings. The symbolism, i.e., the inadequacy and impermanency of idea to reality, which Duhem felt characterized scientific knowledge, was transferred to religious knowledge by Sabatier.

In developing his theory of symbols, Sabatier undoubtedly owed much to Schleiermacher. But he was also influenced by the temper of his own age which accepted the idea, promoted by science itself, that intellectual concepts could not provide knowledge of a reality beyond phenomena, but asserted the belief that non-intellectual constructions—those created by feeling, by will—could provide some degree of this knowledge. These constructions, moreover, were seen as the true mobilia behind individual and social action. Characteristic of these constructions were Sabatier's symbols, Bergson's images and Sorel's myths, which, in spite of important differences, reflected and projected the revolt against reason under way at the turn of the century.

For Sabatier, Bergson and Sorel experience—spiritual, psychological and social reality—was the necessary starting point for their constructions. It was from the need to participate in, or to express,
this reality that the constructions arose. For Sabatier and Bergson
these representations were an inadequate expression of experience.
Sabatier patterned the development of religious consciousness after his
theory of scientific consciousness. It, too, originated in sensations--
feelings of love, awe, confidence--which subsequently gave rise to
images and ideas. But the object of these sensations was not a pheno-
menon, as it was for science; it was transcendent. To represent this
transcendence, however, we had only the same tools as those used to
represent objects--the imagination with its phenomenal images and the
understanding with its logical categories. "Religious knowledge is
therefore obliged to express the invisible by the visible, the eternal
by the temporal, spiritual realities by sensible images." The
transcendence of the object and the natural limitations of the subject
resulted in the inadequacy of any religious representation, the rela-
tivity of all religious knowledge. For Sabatier this meant that not
even revelation could bring religious ideas adequate to their object,
and consequently, pure and absolute truth.

If God wished to make us a gift that we should receive, must
He not have suited the form of it to that of our mind? . . .
If God, in speaking to us of His mysteries, used other than
these human means, we should not understand Him at all, so
that the revelation would no longer be a revelation.166

Thus Sabatier's religious symbolism embodied an important aspect of the

165 Ibid., pp. 316-17.

166 Ibid., p. 326. Poincaré also believed that man's mental construc-
tion limited his capacity for knowledge: "Not only science can not
teach us the nature of things; but nothing is capable of teaching it to
us, and if any god knew it, he could not find words to express it. Not
only can we not divine the response, but if it were given to us we could
understand nothing of it; I ask myself even whether we really under-
stand the question." The Value of Science, op. cit., p. 350.
pragmatic spirit—the idea that knowledge was incapable of presenting absolute truth. Science had surrendered its claims to metaphysics, and Sabatier did the same for religion.

This cannot, however, be said of Bergson, who was looking not for relativism, but for a new absoluteness. For Bergson the object of metaphysics was duration, or time-as-experience, which he defined as the dynamic, creative, interpenetrating, irreversible process of becoming that constituted psychological and biological existence. But unlike Sabatier, Bergson asserted that it was possible to gain knowledge of the absolute by intuition, which he (sometimes) defined as "the direct vision of the mind by the mind . . . immediate consciousness, a vision which is scarcely distinguishable from the object seen, a knowledge which is contact and even coincidence." Bergson's philosophy rested upon a confusion of subject and object which might be summarized in the


168 If this definition seems confusing, we offer here some quotes from Bergson that might clear up the problem: "Within myself a process of organization or interpenetration of conscious states is going on, which constitutes true duration." Time and Free . . . , p. 108. "An evolution which is yet not an increasing quantity; a pure heterogeneity within which there are no distinct qualities." Ibid., p. 226. "This is to replace ourselves in pure duration, of which the flow is continuous and in which we pass insensibly from one state to another: a continuity which is really lived, but artificially decomposed for the greater convenience of customary knowledge." Matter and . . . , p. 243. And finally, duration "gnaws on things and leaves on them the mark of its tooth." Creative Evolution . . . , p. 52.

169 Henri Bergson, "Introduction II [c. 1922]," in Creative Mind. . . , p. 36. Bergson had more definitions of intuition than he had of duration. For example, Julien Benda, Le Bergsonisme; ou une philosophie de la mobilité (5 ed.; Paris: Mercure de France, 1917), pp. 31 ff lists six different major definitions of intuition. Bergson defended these changes by stating: "But in a general way the change of terminology has no serious disadvantage when one takes the trouble each time to define the term in its particular meaning, or even simply when the context makes the meaning sufficiently obvious." From "Notes," in The Creative Mind. . . , p. 306, Note 26,
formula: "I perceive myself enduring, I am, I am duration." Sabatier tried to avoid this identity by asserting the transcendence of the object, as well as the immanence that formed the basis of the subjectivity of religious knowledge. Bergson, like Sabatier, stated that we only had two means to express this reality—image and concept. But either representation was necessarily inferior to intuition, and inadequate to duration. There was always an incommensurability between the simple intuition and the means of expressing it.

For Sorel the origin of myth was also in experience, in the "torment of the infinite" that man felt when confronted with "the fluid character of reality." The uncertainties of this reality led man to construct artificial worlds. These constructions could be fashioned either by the will or by the intellect. Neither was the equivalent of reality; they were not meant to be descriptions of reality.

If all representations were so inadequate, the question naturally arises, why create them? Sabatier's answer was an attack on the intuitionist school, of which Bergson was "master," which asserted the possibility of an immediate, intuitive experience of reality. According


173 Sorel, Reflections . . . , p. 32.
to the Kantian critique of pure reason, and the pragmatic attitudes of
the "new science," experience must be accompanied by the interpretations
of the mind. There was no such thing as "pure experience." The same
was true of religious experience for Sabatier. There was no "pure piety"
 apart from a symbolical representation. Piety only became conscious for
us and discernible to others when incarnated in expression or intellectual
image. Sabatier constantly denounced mysticism, which pretended to
have this pure feeling, as individually and socially ineffective. Bergson's reply would naturally differ because of his belief in the
"intuition of duration." This intuition made expression, in Sabatier's
meaning, unnecessary; the feeling could exist independent of the
expression of that feeling. But Bergson did admit two reasons for
expressing this intuition, and hence resorting to symbols; the need for
communication and the observation that all thought, whether "intellection"
or intuition, always utilized language. Sorel also denied that man
could immediately submerge himself in the flow of a fearful and mysterious
reality. But man still had to live in this reality. The myth allowed
man to act with freedom and morality in the present reality of flux and
determinism by creating a hypothetical and human-determined future
reality.

175 Ibid., p. 331.
176 Bergson, "Introduction to Metaphysics," in The Creative Mind
 . . . , p. 194.
177 Bergson, "Introduction II," in The Creative Mind . . . , pp. 48,
39.
178 Sorel, Reflections . . . , p. 135.
Sabatier called his construction a symbol; Bergson's was an image, Sorel's a myth. But they all shared the idea that they were human creations, a spontaneous outflow of feeling or will, not a reflected and calculated creation of reason. They also were not limited to the simple picture presented. All had the power of generating other images in a Yeatsian succession of "images that yet/Fresh images beget." Sabatier's symbol was the unity of the religious feelings and the "strong and simple" image that sprang spontaneously from those feelings. Soul in body—the symbol was a living organism, which, for Sabatier, meant that it was subject to the Darwinian formula of adapt or die. Symbols that lost their living content had to be discarded. But just as Poincaré (but not Duhem) states that some principles of mechanics would never be abandoned, Sabatier felt that some symbols were normative in relation to others, i.e., that they represented the Christian ideal so completely as to warrant never being abandoned. "The Heavenly Father," "The Kingdom of God," all of the "exclusively religious" words of Christ were normative symbols.

The primitive symbols, fruits of inspiration and not of logical reflection, image-laden words, spontaneously flowing from the consciousness of Christ, are eternal because they enclose, in a metaphor lacking all scientific pretension, a purely religious content which proves itself capable of a perpetual reproduction in the interior life of his disciples and of infinite interpretation in their thought.


180 Sabatier, Esquisse . . . ., p. 403.
But even these normative symbols expressed only the relationship of man to God; they could not explain His essence. The value of the symbols was in how they expressed this relationship.\textsuperscript{181}

Bergson's image held the same intermediary position between concrete feeling and abstract concept as that held by Sabatier's image. It was almost matter in that it allowed itself to be seen, and almost mind in that it no longer allowed itself to be touched.\textsuperscript{182} For Bergson the image kept us in the concrete.\textsuperscript{183} Without the intermediary image we could only speak of someone's "original intuition" in abstract terms. Like Sabatier's symbol, the Bergsonian image did not express reality, if expression meant ultimate explanation. Bergson preferred to state that they "suggested." Certainly Bergson's own colorful writing attests to his belief in the image. His use of metaphor, of simile, of comparisons, makes for lively, if not logical reading; for example, his comparison of life to a "cavalry charge," where:

\begin{quote}
the animal takes its stand on the plant, man bestrides animal-
ity, and the whole of humanity, in space and in time, is one
immense army galloping beside and before and behind each of us
in an overwhelming charge able to beat down every resistance
and clear the most formidable obstacles, perhaps even death.\textsuperscript{184}
\end{quote}

To paraphrase the French officer who witnessed another charge, that of the Light Brigade at Balaklava, "C'est magnifique, mais ce n'est pas la philosophie."

\begin{footnotes}
\item \textsuperscript{181} Sabatier, Outlines ..., p. 322.
\item \textsuperscript{182} Bergson, "Philosophical Intuition," in The Creative Mind ..., p. 139.
\item \textsuperscript{183} Bergson, "Introduction to Metaphysics," in The Creative Mind ..., p. 195.
\item \textsuperscript{184} Bergson, Creative Evolution ..., p. 295.
\end{footnotes}
The development of Sorel's myth, which was greatly influenced by Bergson's image, resulted from Sorel's observation that "all men who are participating in a great social movement always picture their coming action as a battle in which their cause is certain to triumph." The myth was a product of the will, of the "deeper consciousness," which created a picture of the future conforming to its own desires, believed in the truth of this picture, and tried to impress it on reality through action. Myth was not, nor never need be, reality itself, for a myth was not a description of things, but an expression of a determination to act. It was believed to be true; whether it was, was not, or ever would be was unimportant. It also, in striking similarity to Duhem's theory on the totality of physical theory, had to be taken as a whole. No one aspect could be separated and analyzed. Sorelian myths also had a progression comparable to Sabatier's symbols, because like Sabatier, Sorel considered these constructions to be Janus-faced, one side directed inward to psychology, the other outward to history and sociology. For Sorel the content which all "true myths" had in common was a will-to-deliverance, a pessimism and a catastrophic concept of change. The form of these myths varied, however. Christianity once was the best form of this myth, but Sorel felt that it had to be replaced by Socialism.

All three men considered that the worst thing that could happen to their symbol/image/myth was for it to become intellectualized, i.e., abstract and empty. For Sabatier this metamorphosis occurred when the

185 Sorel, Reflections, p. 62.
185 Above, p. 25.
187 Ibid., p. 78.
image became alienated from the original feeling and was considered in itself by reflection. The result was an idea, which was then taken as a representation of the object. The original metaphorical content was gradually eliminated by generalization and abstraction until only the pure idea was left, e.g., ideas of the Infinite and the Absolute. In a Nietzschean reversal of values, Sabatier believed these abstractions represented the lowest, not the highest development of religious knowledge. Such an assertion was not only anti-historical, but anti-intellectual as well, for it negated all religious history and philosophy since the first primitive exclamation of awe. The Kantian decree that pure forms had no meaning without experience meant that the image-as-idea would have no truth without subjective feelings. Although Sabatier implied that the perfect form of symbol was the simple metaphor, "sans pretention scientifique," doctrines, rites and institutions could also be considered as symbols, the value of which varied according to the degree of the original feeling which they contained. It also seems that for Sabatier these primitive metaphors, such as the previously mentioned normative symbols, would be less subject to progress, to criticism and to conflict with science than those tending more toward idea.

Bergson expressed a similar disdain regarding the ability of ideas to capture duration:

188 Sabatier, Outlines . . . , pp. 324-25.
189 Sabatier, Religions of Authority . . . , p. 372.
It is enough for us to have shown that our duration can be presented to us directly in an intuition; that it can be suggested indirectly to us by images, but that it can not—if we give to the word concept its proper meaning, be enclosed in a conceptual representation.191

The danger in concepts was the same as that seen by Sabatier—they generalized and abstracted until only pure form remained.192 For example, Bergson compared the moving, changing, colored and living unity with the abstract, empty and motionless concept of unity.193 Submerged in the flow of duration, Bergson reversed the role of image and concept. Here the previously obscure image gave a direct vision, and the formerly clear concept became the metaphor.194

To Sorel the intellectualized myth was a utopia or philosophical myth. A utopia was a product of the intellect, of theorists, who after creating a rational model for reality, tried to patch up the present system to make it conform to the idea.195 The best example of a philosophical myth was democracy, with its abstract man who enjoyed his abstract rights of equality, suffrage and education.196 It was possible for dynamic myths to degenerate into these philosophical myths. This was what had happened to Christianity by the end of the nineteenth century.

192 Ibid., p. 196.
193 Ibid., p. 199.
194 Bergson, "Introduction, II," in The Creative Mind . . . , p. 44.
195 Sorel, Reflections . . . , pp. 32-33.
Enervated by rationalistic liberal Protestantism, it had lost its dynamic content.

The activistic and anti-intellectual orientation of these constructions is especially seen in an analysis of their purpose, which was to awaken man to an experience, so that he could then find it in himself. They all called forth an effort on the part of the individual. They could not be passively accepted; they had to be personally experienced. To Sabatier the symbol, being the embodiment of a feeling, could only address itself to the emotions, not to the intellect. Its purpose was to recreate in another the original emotion of the individual who had produced it. Thus for Sabatier, the greatest initiators in the religious orders have been the greatest creators of symbols. Christ had been the perfect symbol-creator, for the soul, hearing the Parables, meditated and experienced the living content they contained because they addressed themselves to the activity faculty of the ego, i.e., the heart. They awakened and set in motion the subjective activity of the ego. While these symbols lacked the clarity of scientific ideas, Sabatier asserted that they possessed greater power and reach because they alone provided the meaning and the end of man's action. They alone took man beyond phenomena into the realm of mystery. "The idea of symbol and the idea of mystery are correlative." They gave man knowledge, but not understanding of this mystery. In a Baconian equation of knowledge

\[197\] Sabatier, *Outlines...*, p. 323.
\[198\] Ibid., p. 327.
\[199\] Ibid., pp. 318, 233.
\[200\] Ibid., p. 320.
comprehension for Sabatier) and power, he stated:

We need to know [connaitre] that which we adore; for no one adores that of which he has no perception; but it is not less necessary that we should not comprehend [comprehend] it; for one does not adore that which he comprehends too clearly, because to comprehend is to dominate.\(^{201}\)

Not only religious consciousness, but social consciousness—the fusing of men into a nation, a church, humanity—depended upon symbols. "It is not science that rules the world," stated Sabatier, "it is symbols."\(^{202}\)

For Bergson's theory the need for individual effort was also paramount, as the image had to be assimilated actively into one's own experiences. "To him who is not capable of giving himself the intuition of the duration constitutive of his being, nothing will ever give it, neither concepts nor images."\(^{203}\) The task of the philosopher, through images, was to awaken the introspective effort which would lead to the intuition of duration.

Sorel's myth, born of the need to act, could obviously have but one purpose—the stimulation of intuitive action.

Use must be made of a body of images which, by intuition alone, and before any considered analyses are made, is capable of evoking as an undivided whole the mass of sentiments which corresponds to the different manifestations of the war undertaken by socialism against modern society.\(^{204}\)

\(^{201}\)Ibid., p. 321.

\(^{202}\)Ibid., p. 319. Sabatier was, of course, writing in the days of pre-1914 Europe. Today, with an intellectual sophistication resulting from two World Wars, we are in a position to see that it is neither science nor symbols alone which rule the world, but science at the service of symbols.


\(^{204}\)Sorel, Reflections..., pp. 130-31.
The task of the socialist leader was to be the awakener who "stirs the ashes and thus makes the flames leap up." Sorel also connected myth with mystery. "No effort of thought, no progress of knowledge, no rational induction will ever dispel the mystery which envelops Socialism." It could only be expressed by a powerful construction—the myth of the general strike.

Sorel felt that his theory of myths would help explain social movements which had proven so baffling to the intellect. He tried to "be a rational sociologist of the unconscious." Bergson hoped, through images, to communicate, to objectivize a philosophy which by its nature was subjective. Sabatier saw in his theory of symbols the basis for a new method for religion, called critical symbolism, which would provide both a pious and critical approach to all religious creations. By clarifying the living reality of symbols, "without ignoring the psychological and historical determinism which rules their appearances," by separating the Religion of the Spirit from its historical forms, critical symbolism would become the great mediator in the warfare between science and religion.

205 Ibid., p. 6.
206 Ibid., p. 164.
207 Horowitz, op. cit., p. 128.
208 Sabatier, Outlines . . . . , pp. 334-37.
PART II

PSYCHOLOGY AND RELIGION
CHAPTER V

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL ORIGIN AND NATURE OF THE
RELIGIOUS FEELING

Although Sabatier developed an essentially Kantian religious epistemology, characterized by subjectivity, teleology and symbolism, this did not mean that he considered religion itself to be a form of knowledge. Ménégze accepted the theory of critical symbolism, but he, too, asserted that religion was neither an epistemology nor a philosophy. To the Paris School, religion was clearly a form of feeling. All that mattered to Ménégze was its existence. "Faith in God," he stated, "can be living in our soul without rendering an exact account of the way it is produced."¹ Sabatier agreed with this fideist principle, but he still wanted to discover the origin of religious sentiment in order to establish the limits of science and the permanence of religion. He rejected the Kantian moral argument, and, influenced by Schleiermacher, traced the origin of the religious sentiment to an existential feeling of dependence, which was identical with consciousness of an immanent, personal, but still transcendent God with whom man communicated by prayer. Sabatier's denial of any positive role to reason in the origin of the religious sentiment relates him to intuitionists such as Bergson.

while his emphasis on psychological need repeats a theme common to Modernists such as Blondel.

Kantian duality had sharply separated the phenomenal self, subjected to a pre-determined causality, from the noumenal self, characterized by moral freedom. Because pure reason was incapable of proving the existence of God by the traditional teleological, cosmological and ontological arguments, the proof would have to be derived indirectly from practical reason. For Kant, the moral law moved the will to strive for the highest good, which, in turn, should bring happiness. The necessary unity of virtue and happiness (the *summum bonum*) and the obvious lack of such a unity in the phenomenal world resulted in the three postulates of practical reason: 1) immortality, to provide the possibility of the attainment of the moral ideal; 2) freedom, to allow the self to follow the dictates of the moral law in the face of phenomenal determinism; 3) the existence of God, to serve as the necessary condition for the assured unity of happiness and virtue.

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3 Ibid., p. 177. Kant gave the following summary for a moral argument for God (ibid., pp. 177-78): "The *summum bonum* is possible in the world only on the supposition of a highest cause of nature, having a causality corresponding to moral character. Now a being which is capable of acting in accordance with the idea of law is an intelligence (a rational being), and the causality of such a being according to this idea of law is his will. Consequently, the supreme cause of nature, inasmuch as it must be presupposed as a condition of the *summum bonum*, is a being that, through intelligence and will, is the cause of nature, and consequently its author, i.e., God. It follows that the postulate of the possibility of the highest derived good (the best world) is likewise the postulate of the reality of a highest original good, i.e., the existence of God. It has been seen to be a duty for us to promote the *summum bonum*; consequently it is not merely legitimate, but it is of necessity connected with duty as a need, that we should presuppose the possibility of this *summum bonum*, and since this is possible only under the condition of the
"Happiness," objected Schleiermacher, "is alien to my moral feeling." His Pietistic soul considered an ethical foundation for the truths of religion to be as unsatisfactory as a rational argument or a supernatural revelation. The only basis for faith, he asserted, was the religious experience itself. Schleiermacher's theological empiricism then discovered that religion was a feeling, that it was the highest form of feeling and that it was the feeling of absolute dependence upon God.

Schleiermacher determined the nature of religion by first assuming that religion was a mental activity. An examination of the three faculties of mind—knowing, doing and feeling—then led to the elimination of both knowing and doing. He had, therefore, "proved" that religion was feeling: "Piety in its diverse expressions remains essentially a state of Feeling." He stated that Steffen's definition of feeling was "closely akin" to his own: "What we here call feeling is the immediate presence of the whole undivided being, both sensory and spiritual; of the existence of God, it inseparably connects the presupposition of this with duty, i.e., it is morally necessary to assume the existence of God."


5Knowing was eliminated because "anything which, in its rise and fall, is not the measure of the perfection of a given object cannot constitute the essence of that object." Doing was eliminated because an action will "be pious in so far as the determination of self-consciousness, the feeling which had become affective and had passed into a motive impulse, is a pious one." Friedrich Schleiermacher, The Christian Faith, trans. from the 2nd German ed. (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1960), pp. 9-10. Cf. the discussion in Brandt, op. cit., pp. 264-66.

6Ibid., p. 11; Cf. Brandt, op. cit., p. 266.
unity of the person and his sensory and spiritual world." For Schleiermacher, therefore, feeling meant self-consciousness rather than simple sense perception.

Schleiermacher, however, recognized different types and levels of feeling. The lowest stage of feeling was represented by self-interest and a desire for physical satisfaction. A higher level was attained in social sympathy and an appreciation for the sublime. The highest development of feeling was reached by religion, which occurred when

the individual regards himself as a part of the whole world . . . and after he has assimilated the unity of everything finite into his self-consciousness [feeling], and feels himself dependent on God. But in that he feels himself as only one part of the whole world, all opposition between himself and other particular finite objects is done away with. Religion, therefore, was a feeling of sympathy or love made possible by the unity of all beings in God.

Schleiermacher insisted that this sympathy was possible only when the common ground of man and his world was conceived of as a Being outside the finite totality. This qualification resulted from Schleiermacher's division of feeling into the feeling of freedom (activity) and the feeling of dependence (receptivity). Since both aspects of feeling were always present in every encounter between finite beings, "neither an

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7 Ibid., p. 7; Brandt, op. cit., p. 270.
8 Brandt, op. cit., p. 267.
9 Ibid., pp. 270-75.
10 Der christliche Glaube, 2nd ed., sec. 10, par. 2, quoted in Ibid., p. 273 (italics Brandt's).
11 Brandt, op. cit., p. 273.
12 Ibid.
absolute feeling of dependence, i.e., without any feeling of freedom... nor an absolute feeling of freedom, i.e., without any feeling of dependence... was to be found in this whole [finite] realm. Schleiermacher maintained that because experience did establish a feeling of absolute dependence as a universal fact, there must be a Being outside the realm of reciprocal activity. For Schleiermacher, therefore, the revelation of God to man or in man meant that, "along with the absolute dependence which characterizes not only man but all temporal existence, there is given to man also the immediate self-consciousness of it, which becomes a consciousness of God." In the development of experience, religion was a natural, even a necessary moment, for only through religion could the perfection of the individual and the world be achieved.

Hegel was extremely critical of Schleiermacher's "philosophy of feeling" because it denied the role of reason in religion and, consequently, defined the religious feeling as absolute dependence. The source of this error, according to Hegel, lay in Kantian duality, which had destroyed the harmony between faith and reason required for the perfect life by banishing God to an unknowable realm of feeling.

Although Hegel agreed that religion should become a "matter of feeling, and turn about into the heart," he asserted that feeling became spiritual feeling only by virtue of reason. Only the possibility of a rational

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13 Schleiermacher, op. cit., p. 15.
14 Ibid., p. 18.
15 Brandt, op. cit., pp. 260, 305.
16 Ibid., p. 234.
evaluation of ideas saved religion from subjectivity. In a famous passage which Schleiermacher's disciples never forgot, Hegel stated:

Among the feelings of the natural man is a feeling of the divine; but the natural feeling of the divine is one thing, the spirit of God another . . . . But that this natural feeling, even, is a feeling of the divine, is not due simply to its being feeling: the divine is only in and for spirit. If feeling is to constitute the chief character of man, he is thereby put at the level of the animal, for it is characteristic of animals . . . to live according to feeling. And if religion in man is based solely on feeling it is correct to say, that this has no further determination than to be a feeling of dependence, and so a dog would be the best Christian, because it has this feeling most intensely. . . .

Hegelian logic would not allow a feeling of absolute dependence to be anything more than a temporary moment in the development of individual self-consciousness. To turn it into a permanent and final state, as Schleiermacher had done, was to misinterpret its true (i.e., Hegelian) dialectical nature. Hegel consigned the feeling of absolute dependence to the lowest levels of individual and religious consciousness. It was embodied in the Lord/Servant relationship, which first emerged when the self, in order to achieve recognition by another self, risked a life and death struggle which ended in mastery for one and "thinghood" for the other. It appeared, internalized, in the "unhappy consciousness," i.e., consciousness of self as a divided and contradictory being, as free and unchangable (the Lord) and dependent and changeable (the Servant). It reappeared in the first stages of religion when God, seen as either substance or abstract spirit, was all-powerful and man was nothing. But for

17 From the Preface to Hinrich's Die Religion in innerem Verhältnisse zur Wissenschaft, quoted in Ibid., p. 329.

Hegel this Lord/Servant relationship did not remain a static feeling of freedom vs. dependence. The lord recognized his dependence on the servant, while the servant, through labor asserted his own independence. The "unhappy consciousness" realized that he "carries his lord inside himself, yet at the same time is his own slave." The highest development of religion saw the establishment of God as concrete Spirit (Christianity), where God and man were one because God was in the community of men, i.e., the Church. For Hegel, the absolute dependence of man upon God was impossible because God only comes into being when man "knows" Him.

The nineteenth century witnessed an increasing hostility to the Hegelian system with its dialectical mediation of opposing terms (such as freedom and dependence) where, as Kierkegaard bitterly stated, "every moment [performs] those everlasting dog-tricks of flopping over and over until it flops over the man himself." The tendency in late nineteenth-century subjectivist philosophies was to return to the Kantian position.

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21 In the Encyclopaedia, #564, Hegel stated: "To begin with, this contains the following propositions: God is only God insofar as he knows himself; his knowing himself is, furthermore, a self-consciousness in man and man's knowledge of God that goes on to man's knowing himself in God." Kaufmann, who quotes this passage, interprets it as follows: "What does this mean if not that God does not know himself until man knows him; and since 'God is only God insofar as he knows himself,' God comes into being only when man 'knows' him." Walter Kaufmann, Hegel: Reinterpretation, Texts, and Commentary (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1965), p. 275.

that the existence of God could not be proven by pure reason. They
discarded, however, the ethical derivation of God, and argued that
religious truths could be experienced through feeling, intuition or
action. But although they rejected The System, they could not avoid
the influence of the dialectical method.

The starting point for Sabatier's philosophy of religion was,
like Schleiermacher's, empirical rather than moral or rational. Indivi-
dual experience proved that religion was both a natural and a necessary
aspect of being. "I am religious," said Sabatier, "because I am a man."  
He considered religion to be the natural and necessary result of the
eternal conflict between man and the world. This conflict emerged from
the essential duality of the human ego. On the one hand, the ego
engendered activity, i.e., centrifugal action, or the reaction of the
ego upon things by the will. On the other, it reflected passivity, i.e.,
centripetal action, or the action of external things upon the ego by
sensation.  
(This duality is comparable to Schleiermacher's division of
feeling into activity and receptivity.) By acting, living and willing,
man formed a knowledge of himself. Through observing, reasoning and
generalizing he arrived at a knowledge of external things.  
From the
origin of consciousness, according to Sabatier, man felt that there was
a mortal conflict between his idea of himself as morally free and his

23 Auguste Sabatier, Outlines of a Philosophy of Religion based on
Psychology and History, trans. T. A. Seed (Harper Torchbook; New York:
Harper & Bros., 1957 [c. 1897]), p. 29.
24 Ibid., p. 13.
25 Ibid., p. 283.
idea of the world as causally determined. In lyric words that echo Bergson, Sabatier stated: "Springing up from the centre, the wave of life breaks itself inevitably on the rocks of outward things." The conflict of the ego and the world was the primary cause and origin of all pain. But this pain, for Sabatier, had a divine purpose because it heightened consciousness. It caused the self to reflect and to see itself as two beings—an ideal ego and an empirical ego:

Hence comes its torment, its struggles, its remorse, but also the impulse ever renewed, the indefinite progress of its spiritual life, of which each moment seems to be but a degree from which it ought to rise to a stage still higher.

This torment, according to Sabatier, changed the three faculties of mind into their opposite states. Knowledge became knowledge of ignorance. Feelings of pleasure and happiness became pain and sorrow. Free will became determinism: "I do not do that which I approve, and I do not approve that which I do: I feel myself free in my will and I am

26 Ibid., p. 152.

27 Ibid., p. 13. Cf. Bergson: "From our point of view life appears in its entirety as an immense wave which starting from a center, spreads outwards, and which on almost the whole of its circumference is stopped and converted into oscillation . . . " Bergson was speaking of life in general, however, while Sabatier meant individual effort. See Creative Evolution, trans. Arthur Mitchell (New York: The Modern Library, 1911 [c. 1907]), p. 290.

28 Ibid., pp. 13-14. This was a common theme of German Idealism. Cf. Hegel: "For Suffering itself is henceforth recognized as an instrument necessary for producing the unity of man with God." (Philosophy of History, trans. J. Sibree, New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1956, p. 324) Nietzsche: "You want . . . to do away with suffering . . . and we . . . would rather have it increased and made worse than it has ever been! . . . The discipline of suffering, of great suffering—know ye not that it is only this discipline that has produced all the elevations of humanity hitherto?" (Beyond Good and Evil in The Philosophy of Nietzsches, New York: The Modern Library, #225, pp. 329-30) Blondel, above, p. 85.

enslaved in action." Sabatier agreed with Schleiermacher that neither knowing nor acting could provide the ultimate answer to man's problems. Thought, represented by science, only increased determinism and destroyed the will. But the destruction of morality also doomed science, since the ego was a unity. For Sabatier this was a practical struggle, not a theoretical exercise: "It is an internal dissolution of the being itself, a struggle between its elementary faculties in which the mind is weakened, droops and dies." This Hegelian notion of complete despair or total alienation as a necessary moment in salvation or self-consciousness was a common theme in the late nineteenth century.

Sabatier stated:

That is a salto mortale, some superficial spirits will say, astonished at an apparent deduction which thus makes the religious activity of the ego spring from its own distress and despair. To which we respond: it is on the contrary a salto vitale, the instinctive and at the same time reflective act which moves the mind to affirm to itself the absolute value of spirit.

Because the struggle was one of life and death, because the problem was practical and not theoretical, man had to choose life. In the Hegelian dialectic of the Lord/Servant, however, the self-consciousness chose life, and subsequent slavery, because it was

30 Ibid., p. 16.
31 Ibid., pp. 17, 281-82.
32 Ibid., p. 282.
33 See, for example, the comparative discussion of this theme for Marx, Kierkegaard and Nietzsche in William J. Bossenbrook, The German Mind (Detroit, Michigan: Wayne State University Press, 1967), pp. 393-94.
logically impossible to choose death. In Sabatier's thought, which was influenced by Darwin, the divided ego chose life because it was biologically impossible for it to do otherwise. The desire to live was collectively, if not individually, irresistible. Sabatier compared faith in life to the instinct of conservation: "It is a higher form of that instinct--instinct accompanied by consciousness and reflective will." Religion, therefore, had as its unshakable basis the desire to live which found itself continually threatened by the conflict between the scientific idea of determinism and the moral idea of freedom.

Then, following Schleiermacher, Sabatier announced that this life-impulse (élan de la vie) was based upon an empirically given feeling of absolute dependence: "It rests upon a feeling inherent in every conscious individual, the feeling of dependence which every man experiences with respect to universal being. Which of us can escape this feeling of absolute dependence?" It confronted man whenever he realized that his destiny was decided according to the laws of cosmic evolution, whenever he tried to discover in himself, or in any series of individuals, sufficient reason for his existence. "In face of the universe and its laws,"

35 Since the goal of self-consciousness is recognition, this cannot be gained from a dead person; conversely, the dead person has gained recognition, but only at the loss of his life. Death, according to Hegel, only resulted in abstract negation, not concrete independence. (Phenomenology, p. 233) For an analysis of Hegel's concept of death, see Alexandre Kojève, "L'idée de la mort dans la philosophie de Hegel," in Introduction à la Lecture de Hegel (Paris: Librairie Gallimard, 1948), pp. 527-73.

36 Sabatier, op. cit., p. 286.

37 Ibid., p. 19.

38 Ibid., pp. 19-20.

39 Ibid., p. 20.
wrote Sabatier, "the individual ego is necessarily called on to submit and to renounce itself. The only matter of importance is to know upon what altar we shall make this sacrifice." Furthermore, according to Sabatier, this altar could not be the material universe because such a choice would not "console" man because of his pride. He stated that mind had originally revolted against external things because they were of a different nature, and "because it is the proud prerogative of mind to comprehend, to dominate, to rule things and not to be subordinate to them." Therefore, man's superior spirit required dependence upon a Universal Spirit, and Sabatier, again following Schleiermacher, identified the feeling of dependence with consciousness of God:

This feeling of our subordination thus furnishes the experimental and indestructible basis for the idea of God. . . . Before all reflection, and before all rational determination, it is given to us and, as it were, imposed on us in the very fact of our absolute dependence; without fear we may establish this equation: The feeling of our dependence is that of the mysterious presence of God in us.

Consciousness, therefore, made both the self and the universe dependent upon a third party, a spiritual power, which thus reconciled man to matter.

For symbolo-fidéism, God as Universal Spirit also meant that He was immanent, distinct and personal. Consciousness of God meant a consciousness of God within man which would reach its highest development in Christianity. Sabatier, like Bergson, envisioned an "outer crust"
which had a deeper self:

Where is the thoughtful man to-day who has not broken the thin crust of his daily life, and caught a glimpse of those profound and obscure waters on which floats our consciousness? Who has not felt within himself a veiled presence and a force much greater than his own?  

Sabatier found that "in the Me there is a mysterious guest, greater than the Me, and to which the Me instinctively addresses its prayers and its trust." The presence of the Spirit of God in the spirit of man was seen in the active energy of the latter. "God lives and works in man, man lives and works in God," said Sabatier. This immanence, however, did not mean identity. The Paris School opposed the attempt of the "philosophies of identity" to equate man and God, "to shut up God in a phenomenal form, to bind Him to something material, local or temporary, to blend the Creator with the creature . . . ." Ménégoz also argued that this Creator, as an Inner Spirit, was a self (moi), for the notion of spirit and the notion of personality were identical to man. The inward God, the spiritual power upon whom man was dependent, was therefore a personal God, not an impersonal force.

Following Kant, however, Sabatier and Ménégoz asserted that this religious solution to the fatal conflict of the intellect and the will was a practical solution, an act of trust and moral energy, not something

44 Ibid., p. 64; above, p.
46 Sabatier, Outlines . . . . , p. 40.
that could be demonstrated scientifically. This did not mean the solution was less certain, but only that it was of a different order of certainty. It did not mean that it was less necessary, but only that it was of a different type of necessity—of life vs. intellect. Sabatier created a very pragmatic basis for the origin of religion and the existence of God. He had assumed that proving man's need for a Universal Spiritual Being was identical to proving the existence of that Being, even though he qualified the "proof" by making it a moral judgment. Because he felt this need is, was and always will be universal, he considered religion to be eternal. He did not consider that such a need, if indeed it exists, could be met by another entity, e.g., the State.

The essence of religion, therefore, was "a commerce, a conscious and willed relation into which the soul in distress enters with the mysterious power on which it feels that it and its destiny depend." But this dependence was not the "vague sentiment of absolute dependence" and total resignation developed by Schleiermacher. Sabatier felt that his definition was made "concrete" by his notion of prayer. Prayer was the realization of this commerce; it was religion in act, real religion. Prayer reconciled the two antithetical elements of the religious sentiment—passivity, or the feeling of dependence, and activity, or the movement of liberty. It was both submission, which made man recognize and accept his dependence, and faith, which transformed that dependence

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49 Sabatier, Outlines, p. 286; Hénégoz, op. cit., I, No. 1, p. 3.
50 Ibid., p. 25.
51 Sabatier, Religions, p. 372.
into liberty. "Religion, then," said Sabatier, "is a free act as well as a feeling of dependence... so that the truly religious man lives at once in a free obedience and in an obedient liberty."\(^{52}\) For Sabatier, religion thus represented the vital and happy reconciliation of dependence and freedom.\(^{53}\) Prayer saved man from being a mere spectator to the religious drama. Sabatier's emphasis on action, a recognized theme of late nineteenth-century science, history and philosophy, was applauded by William James, who stated: "It seems to me that the entire series of our lectures proves the truth of M. Sabatier's contention."\(^{54}\)

Sabatier's theory of the psychological and pragmatic origin of religion can be closely compared with the more overtly anti-intellectual, immanent and vitalistic philosophies of Bergson and Blondel. Bergson also maintained that religion could not be founded upon reason, that it could not be intellectualized without losing its dynamic content.\(^{55}\) The intellect was directed toward matter and action, toward decomposition and crystallization; it was characterized by a "natural inability to comprehend life."\(^{56}\) Religion, on the other hand, was related to life—to instinct and the élan vital. Bergson divided religion into two

\(^{52}\) Sabatier, *Outlines...*, p. 27.


\(^{54}\) William James, *The Varieties of Religious Experience: A Study in Human Nature*, being the Gifford Lectures of Natural Religion delivered at Edinburgh in 1901-02 (New York: Longman's, Green and Co., 1910), p. 465. James further stated that it was possible that the results of such prayer might be exclusively subjective, and that what was immediately changed was only the mind of the praying person (p. 466).


\(^{56}\) Bergson, *op. cit...*, p. 192.
types—static and dynamic. Static religion was, first of all, a defensive reaction of nature against the dissolvent powers of the intellect because nature protected the society, and individual intelligence preached egoism.\(^57\) Secondly, religion was a defensive reaction of nature against the representation, by intelligence, of the inevitability of death.\(^58\)

Static religion was characterized, therefore, by myths, which Bergson defined as "intellectual instincts," i.e., imaginary representations called up by the instinct to offset the depressing reality seen by the intellect.\(^59\) Static religion was mainly a social preservative; dynamic religion, however, was an individual propulsion. It was equally anti-intellectual in its origins, however, It sprang from the vital current of life, the \textit{élan vital}, and embodied itself in exceptional men.\(^60\)

This impetus is thus carried forward through the medium of certain men, each of whom thereby constitutes a species composed of a single individual. If the individual is fully conscious of this, if the fringe of intuition surrounding his intelligence is capable of expanding sufficiently to envelop its object, that is the mystic life.\(^61\)

Mysticism, therefore, was a feeling which certain individuals had that

\(^{57}\)Henri Bergson, \textit{The Two Sources of Morality and Religion}, trans. R. Ashley Audra and ClaudesTey Brereton (Anchor Book; Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Co., 1954 [c. 1932]), pp. 122, 119. The religious views of Bergson, although appearing later than either Sabatier's or Blondel's, reveal a similar influence of the philosophy of immanence.

\(^{58}\)Ibid., p. 131.

\(^{59}\)Ibid., pp. 162, 119. Bergson states: "For example, the vital impulse knows nothing of death. But let intelligence spring to life under pressure from this impulse, and up comes the idea of the inevitability of death: to restore to life its impetus, an opposing representation will start up, and from it will emerge the primitive beliefs concerning death." (\textit{Ibid.}, p. 138.)

\(^{60}\)\underline{Ibid.}, p. 235.

\(^{61}\)\underline{Ibid.}, p. 268.
they were the instruments of a God who loves all men with an equal love and who bids them to love each other. For the mystic, God acted through the soul and in the soul. Mysticism, however, meant nothing to the man who had no experience of it.

Blondel's *L'Action* (1893) has been compared to Hegel's *Phenomenology of Mind* in structure and in method. In content, however, it proposed a philosophy of immanence and action. For Blondel, the origin of the religious sentiment was in the psychological schism of will into a manifest will (the volonté vouluë) and a willing will (the volonté volontaire). The manifest will was directed toward "partial and successful ends which present themselves to us as the means or occasions of accomplishing our destiny." But beneath this particular goal of willing something was a deeper concept of will, a primitive élan, an élan volontaire. Individual life, according to Blondel, was the unfolding and awareness of the schism between these two wills, between the real and the ideal, what man was and what he wanted to be. The goal of man was the unity of these two mutually dependent wills, when man actually willed all that he was inherently capable of willing: "Our destiny has no meaning except the

62Ibid., p. 311.
63Ibid., p. 232.
64Ibid., p. 237.
ultimate equation of the two initial and final wills. 67 Because this union was not reached, because the deeper will was not sated by the phenomenal world, man had to turn to the "supernatural" realm. He then realized that his own will and the need to act were God's immanent way within the individual. The source of man's will and action was, therefore, in God. Blondel, like Sabatier, assumed that because man felt a need for something, that his need would find fulfillment. 68 Blondel stated:

It is impossible not to posit the question of human destiny, impossible to give it a negative solution, impossible to find either in oneself or others the desire of one's heart, in a word, impossible either to stop, advance, or withdraw, by virtue of one's own power. There is something in my acts which I cannot understand or equal, something which keeps me from falling back into nothingness, and which is a reality only because it is nothing that I have willed hitherto. It is this never ending conflict of what cannot be with what must be that brings us to the affirmation of the "one thing necessary." 69

For Blondel, the individual had now reached the supreme alternative of choosing himself or God: to be god without God and against God.

67 Note by Blondel in "Vocabulaire Philosophique," Bulletin de la Société française de philosophie, XXII, 2, pp. 82-83, quoted in Ibid., p. 51.

68 Of this attitude, Antonio Aliotta has stated: "Who authorizes us to exclude the idea that our individual life must not instead develop without ever reaching the desired goal? It must not of necessity exist because there is need of it. Could not the ideal at which the will aims be inexhaustible and therefore unable to effect itself completely? Everything which is willed need not of necessity exist; nor, on the other hand, do things exist solely insofar as they are willed. Blondel founded all his philosophy on an entirely arbitrary equation, that 'to exist' equals 'to be willed.'" "Science and Religion in the Nineteenth Century," in Science, Religion and Reality, ed. Joseph Needham (New York: George Braziller, Inc., 1955), p. 181.

or to be God through and with God.\textsuperscript{70} Blondel did not really believe that man could choose against God, for only a positive choice imparted to his life the dynamic synthesis which was God, at once transcendent and immanent, infinite and finite. Only by losing himself in God, by submerging his action in God, by crediting all his action to God, did man save himself and give meaning to his action. Man's supreme action, therefore, was passivity before God.\textsuperscript{71} This position, according to Blondel, could only be gained through suffering and pain, without which man could never arrive at a disinterested or courageous action. The existence of God was, therefore, a living experience, not a cosmological, teleological or ontological argument.\textsuperscript{72}

The religious philosophies of Sabatier, Bergson and Blondel all partake of what has been called an "Augustinian current" in French Idealism, i.e., a type of religious reflection based upon an intuition of an inner spiritual activity which attempted to establish the transcendent by way of the immanent.\textsuperscript{73} In this attempt, all three, while professing a strict empiricism, introduced arbitrary and irrational elements. This is seen in Sabatier's assertion of absolute dependence, in his biological \textit{élan de la vie}, in his equation of need and existence. It is seen in Bergson's insistence on intuition, on the \textit{élan vital}, on the mystic experience. It is seen in Blondel's emphasis on will, on the \textit{élan volontaire}, on his equation of existence and will. This

\textsuperscript{70}Ibid., p. 356.

\textsuperscript{71}Ibid., p. 387.

\textsuperscript{72}Ibid., p. 343.

current, for all three, necessarily flowed to only one end—the Christian experience. 74

74 Bergson probably would have become a Catholic if it had not been for the Jewish persecution in Nazi Germany. As it was, he asked for a Catholic priest to say prayers at his funeral. See Jacques Maritain, Bergsonian Philosophy and Thomism, trans. Mabelle L. Andison and J. Gordon Andison (New York: Philosophical Library, 1955), p. 337, ft. 1.
CHAPTER VI

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE CHRISTIAN CONSCIOUSNESS

For Sabatier, the primitive consciousness of God was perfected through psychological stages of development. The original universal feeling of dependence, impelled by divine will and human wants, necessarily evolved into its purest form—Christianity. In the filial and fraternal relationship preached by Jesus Christ, in the call to "Love God, and thy neighbor as thyself," the religious consciousness attained its highest development. Man had only to immerse himself in the consciousness of Christ. The Christian experience, as pictured by the Paris School, emphasized feeling not thought, subjectivity not objectivity, faith not demonstration. And faith, as a Modernist critic remarked, became "very small and modest"; religion was "reconciled with science because it no longer encounters it."

Religious consciousness, as Sabatier defined it, was "the feeling of the relationship in which he [man] stands, and wills to stand, to the universal principle on which he knows himself to depend, and with the universe in which he sees himself to be a part of one great whole."

Because Sabatier saw religious consciousness as merely a higher form of

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75 This development was also historical. See above, Part III.
77 Sabatier, Outlines ..., p. 143.
general consciousness, this relationship could only take specific forms: "Man has only three means of coming into existence with his fellows or his gods—interest, law, and love." These three means, for Sabatier, were the religious counterparts of the three faculties of mind: interest corresponded to thought, law to will and love to feeling. The interdependence which characterized the mental faculties was also true of the religious relationships. Only abstract thought, for example, made them three distinct religions—a religion of nature, a religion of law and a religion of love. Just as Sabatier placed feeling and then will above thought in general consciousness, he considered the religions of love and then law to be superior to the religion of nature in religious consciousness.

The religion of nature represented the first and lowest stage of psychological development. In the eighteenth century, "natural religion" had come to mean a religion based upon reason rather than revelation, e.g., Deism. Then Hegel used the term to include all religions in which the Absolute was not yet conceived of as Spirit, the immediate phase of which was magic. Sabatier argued that a "religion of nature" included rational religions and primitive superstitions, because they were both based upon sensation. The stage of interest corresponded to the instinct of self-preservation, the life of sensations, needs and appetites. It was characterized by magic, incantation and sacrifice.

78 Sabatier, Religions . . . , p. 369.
79 Ibid., p. 370.
81 Sabatier, Religions . . . , p. 372.
Because the man of sensations was impressed by physical power, he quaked before "the unsleeping bolt of Zeus, the lightning-breathing flame..." Man contrasted his own absolute dependence with God's absolute authority, "for only Zeus is free." All traditional metaphysics, according to Sabatier, merely represented the reflection upon and abstraction of this total feeling of helplessness: "This is the uncommensurable antithesis between the finite and the infinite, between weakness and strength, the ephemeral and the eternal, the insignificant creature and the universal and perfect being." Sabatier thus challenged the idea that these abstract speculations represented the highest form of religion. To him they were the lowest. The impossibility of a dialectical reconciliation of these opposing terms by theoretical reason condemned the man of sensation to either empirical atheism or pantheism.

The second stage of religious consciousness for Sabatier was the religion of law, which evidently developed because man "desired" to escape from the physical/metaphysical conflict caused by a life of sensation. Sabatier did not logically deduce this stage, he simply

82 Aeschylus, Prometheus Bound, II 359-60.
83 Ibid., I 50.
84 Sabatier, Religions... , p. 372. This development can be compared to the first stage of Kierkegaard's Either/Or, the aesthetic stage, characterized by sensation and immediacy, in which he equated the sensual aesthete with the intellectual aesthete. "Here Kierkegaard attacks what had been held to be the highest value in the tradition of Western philosophy, the thinker's speculative detachment from life..." William Barrett, Irrational Man: A Study in Existential Philosophy (Doubleday Anchor Books; Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Co., 1952), p. 164.
85 The ethical stage was also the second stage of Kierkegaard's development, characterized by choice in time, duty and the paradox between the universality of duty and the particularity of the ethical self. Søren Kierkegaard, Either/Or, trans. David F. and Lillian J. Swenson and Walter Lowrie (2 vols., Anchor Books; Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Co., 1959), II.
asserted the psychological impossibility of remaining in the stage of interest. This moral stage was characterized by the opposition and respect of reciprocal interests, by the notion of a contract, by the idea of justice binding upon both God and man. The chasm between man and God was, therefore, bridged—a mediator emerged, but in the form of an impersonal law. Man became moral: "That which man now adores is force subjected to the law of righteousness. The strong God . . . had become the holy God, the God of the compact, the avenger of violated law . . . ." But this stage, according to Sabatier, contained a tragic contradiction that would force the religious consciousness to a higher, final transformation. This contradiction was the sense of sin—the feeling of man that he ought to do right and that he does wrong. "When he had violated the law of righteousness he feels the shudder of remorse, the terror of that condemnation which awaits him at the tribunal of the judge who cannot be deceived." A new and deeper chasm was created between man and God:

In vain does man seek to close it by throwing into it expectations, good works, and good resolutions: in all cases the religion of law necessarily ends, as in Judaism, in a strict and superficial pharisaism, or, as in the pagan world, in moral despair or the vain negation of the duty of righteousness.

The religions of interest and law had no psychological permanency for Sabatier because they could not provide the answer to salvation, i.e., to the question of how to establish man's union with the principle

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86 Sabatier, Religions . . . , p. 371.
87 Ibid.
88 Ibid.
89 Ibid., p. 373.
of his own being and to realize his harmony with God and the world. Because Sabatier could not admit that perhaps there was no unity, no harmony, he postulated the existence of a third stage. For Christianity, love bridged all chasms, metaphysical and moral. Jesus Christ developed religious consciousness to its highest point—a filial relationship between man and God, and a fraternal relationship between men. These relationships sprang from an immediate intuition in the consciousness of Christ. For Sabatier there could be no question of the worship of Christ as a man (Jesusolatry, as he called it). Only the revelation of God that Christ possessed was important. It represented the essence of Christianity: "This feeling, filial in regard to God, fraternal in regard to man, is that which makes a Christian, and consequently it is a common trait of all Christians." In Christianity religious evolution was accomplished—the original antithesis between man and God disappeared as they interpenetrated each other until reaching the moral unity of love, wherein God became interior to man and lived in him, and man became interior to God and found in him the full expansion of his being.

This filial relationship, according to Sabatier, was not a theoretical speculation, but an immediate and practical result of Christ's inner experience. He pointed out that in his Parables Christ did not simply use the term "Father," but that he qualified it as "the father of the family," the "head of the house." This terminology was clear to

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90 Ibid.
91 Sabatier, Outlines . . . , p. 145.
92 Sabatier, Religions . . . , p. 294.
93 Sabatier, Outlines . . . , pp. 145-46.
94 Ibid., p. 147.
Sabatier: "It is because the father does not exist without his children and because humanity, on earth at least, is the family by means of which the paternity of God is realized." This statement reveals a fundamental confusion in Sabatier's philosophy resulting from his attempt to fuse Idealism and evolutionism. Is he stating here that God has always existed as the Father, but that man has only gradually become aware of the relationship? In this case it is merely man's knowledge of God that changes. Or does he mean that God exists as the Father only because man recognizes him as such? In this case it is not man's knowledge of God that changes, but God Himself. Sabatier further stated that this filial relationship was the perfect relationship because man felt that it entirely satisfied his religious need. Here Sabatier seemed to be emphasizing that this relationship was less a question of an objective reality than a subjective desire. Did he mean that satisfaction was a criterion for truth, i.e., that what is true will satisfy man's needs, or that it was the content of truth, i.e., that man's needs will determine the truth?

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95 Ibid., p. 154. The phrase "on earth at least" also has interesting evolutionary connotations.


97 Sabatier, Outlines . . . . , p. 134.

98 De Wolf notes that Lovejoy has pointed out that pragmatists often vacillate between practical consequences serving as a useful criterion for truth, and practical consequences as the whole meaning of truth. See L. Harold De Wolf, The Religious Revolt against Reason (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1949), p. 166.
For Sabatier, the fraternal relationship was also practical rather than theoretical. Sabatier insisted that Christ did not speak of brotherhood as a theory or doctrine of human fraternity. It was rather "a passionate sentiment, a deep felt similarity and kinship, a true family life, in which this Elder Brother's heart reverberated on the one hand with the love and pity of the Father, and, on the other, with the miseries and distress of His brethren." Mankind formed a fraternity based upon love and not upon reason—the ideal of the eighteenth century.99

The highest religious development was, therefore, expressed in the consciousness of Christ. To reach this development, man had to immerse himself in His experiences:

In the last analysis, and to go down to the very root of the Christian religion, to be a Christian is not to acquire a notion of God, or even an abstract doctrine of his paternal love; it is to live over, within ourselves, the inner spiritual life of Christ, and by the union of our heart with his to feel in ourselves the reality of our filial relationship to him, just as Christ felt in himself the Father's presence and his filial relation to him. It is not a question of a new teaching, but of a transformed consciousness.100

Christ, or rather the consciousness of Christ, was the mediator between man and God, because Sabatier assumed that man, through his own virtue,
could not achieve this filial and fraternal revelation. Ménégoz placed much less emphasis on this revelation and, correspondingly, less on Christ. This living over, this feeling, this transformation, was the Christian experience. The very nature of this experience, the fact that it belonged to the practical order, made it impossible to define, according to Sabatier:

I am not ignorant of the fact that to souls who are strangers to this inner life the words Christian experience represent only something vague and intangible . . . . Far from being vague and obscure, Christian experience to everyone who is conscious of it, is something morally clear, accurately determined, which each finds, not only in himself but in every one whose consciousness has been awakened to the same life. 101

From the above two quotations, it is possible to draw a very clear picture of the Christian experience. It reflected the major elements of Sabatier's general psychology and epistemology—it was anti-intellectual, noncommunicative and exclusive.

The Christian experience was anti-intellectual not just because the emphasis was placed upon feeling, upon living, but because feeling and living were used in a way which tended to exclude thought. The Christian experience, as conceived of by Sabatier, lay totally outside the realm of reason. It lived only by becoming immediate. This experience could not be communicated in the rational sense of communication. Poincaré spoke of the importance in science of a "money of exchange." 102 Sabatier stated: "Religious truths cannot be borrowed like money, or, rather, if you do so borrow it you are none the richer." 103 Thirdly, the experience was essentially exclusive. This assertion contradicts a common error...

101 Ibid., p. 361.
102 Above, p. 27.
103 Sabatier, Outlines, p. 61.
made in referring to Sabatier's theory as "democratic." It is true that Sabatier considered this to be an experience that all might have: "There is only one gateway to heaven, a gateway which is open to the humble and to the great, on the same conditions." It is true that he believed that the instinctive piety of the unlearned was as accurate as the historical criticism of the professor. But still the experience was aristocratic because it was based upon the above anti-intellectual and noncommunicative elements. The have-nots, for whoever had the experience did not need a definition of it, and whoever did not have the experience would not understand it anyway. There was no way of imparting that knowledge to one who did not have it, because it was not really "knowledge." Sabatier seems to be replacing rational communication by an interior radiation. It must still be asked why some had the experience and others did not. Since Sabatier assumed the universality of the feeling of dependence, those who remained outside the Christian community did so willingly, through prejudice.

The Christian experience was also, perhaps even above all, an act. Sabatier repeatedly stressed that the religious consciousness was not a fixed state, but a movement of the soul, a desire, a need. It was "not a state of repose, but a constant oscillation of the soul between

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106 Ibid., p. 196.

107 Ibid., p. 31.
self-judgment and self-examination."\textsuperscript{108} The Christian consciousness was not a victory won, but a "permanent revolution," for "Christianity is nothing if it is not in us an ideal which is never reached and an inner force which ever urges us beyond ourselves."\textsuperscript{109} Just as the Christian consciousness was movement, the Christian life was action. Sabatier had no use for asceticism:

A religious life which remains hidden in the individual consciousness, which does not communicate itself, which does not create any spiritual solidarity, any fraternity of soul, is as if it were not; it is a mere film of feeling, an ephemeral poetic flower, which has no more effect on the individual himself than it has on the human race.\textsuperscript{110}

For the Paris School, the Christian experience was completed by the notion of salvation. Sabatier asserted that although Ménégoz’s approach had been different, they had both arrived at identical conclusions regarding the notion of salvation.\textsuperscript{111} The formula, expressed by Ménégoz, was that "we are saved by faith alone—sola fide—indpendently of our beliefs."\textsuperscript{112} The important element here was the unusual distinction between foi and croyances. For Sabatier this distinction was explained by his general religious psychology and epistemology. For Ménégoz it was an arbitrary distinction which he made little attempt to prove.

\textsuperscript{108} Sabatier, Religions . . . . , p. 367.
\textsuperscript{109} Sabatier, Outlines . . . . , p. 165.
\textsuperscript{110} Ibid., p. 331.
\textsuperscript{111} Ibid., p. 331.
\textsuperscript{112} Ménégoz, op. cit., I, No. 18, p. 262.
To Sabatier Christ had demanded just one condition for forgiveness and salvation—sinners should return to God by an act of repentance and confidence. It was by faith and in faith that redemption was realized, for it was in faith that the alienation or antagonism between God and man disappeared. Faith was an act of the heart and the will, a moral act. Belief, on the other hand, was an act of thought, an intellectual judgment. The two belonged to different faculties of mind and to different orders of knowledge. Faith, not belief, saved the soul. But Sabatier's theories of mind and knowledge dictated that faith could not be found without belief. The two were always joined because every psychic act tended to become conscious and to produce a representative and suggestive image or idea capable not only of perpetuating the memory of the act, but also of reproducing it. This meant that every religious feeling clothed itself in an intellectual form as a means of self-manifestation and propagation. Faith and belief were both distinct and solidaire. They were distinct because of their objects—the object of faith was a religious reality immediately manifested to consciousness without any other demonstration than the inward revelation of the Holy Spirit. They were solidaire because of an organic connection; their solidarity was a vital one.


114 Sabatier, The Doctrine of Atonement . . . . , p. 95.

115 Sabatier, Religions . . . . , p. 335.

116 Ibid., p. 336.
In the domain of the soul's life all things are interlinked and interdependent, there is an uninterrupted series of mutual actions and reactions of all its elements. Even a momentary interruption is disease; long continued it is death. If faith gives birth to doctrine, doctrine in its turn may produce faith, and in every case it either sustains faith or paralyses it. No feeling is sterile for thought; no thought is sterile in the life of the heart. Ménégoz coined the word "fédéisme" to describe his religious philosophy, although he objected to the term "philosophy." He published his major work on fédéism in 1879, and then spent the next forty years iterating and reiterating his notion of sola fide. But there was a change in his position. In his early works he stressed the distinction between faith and belief because he lacked a psychological theory which would justify their unity. He later incorporated Sabatier's idea of "organic unity."

In Réflexions sur l'évangile du salut (1879), Ménégoz stated that the idea of salvation arose from the miseries of life and from man's feeling of being created to live, not to die. It was clear to Ménégoz that man arrived at salvation by pardon of his sins, so that the only question to solve was how to achieve pardon. The answer could not be obtained by reason; it had to be revealed in consciousness. The consciousness of Jesus Christ gave the answer to the problem of pardon:

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117 Ibid., p. 337.

118 Menegoz, op. cit., I, xiv-xv. There were many confusions and clarifications regarding this formula. For example, Granjou suggested: "L'homme est sauvé par sa foi saisissant la grâce de Dieu, indépendamment de la correction des ses croyances et nonobstant ses erreurs de croyances." Ménégoz objected that this was a little long. (II, No. 54, p. 341.)

119 Ibid., I, No. 1, p. 8.
God's love for man. Christ announced the doctrine of salvation by faith. Faith was the unique and absolute condition of salvation. It was an internal determination, a gift of the heart to God, a movement of the self toward God. It was the product of the immanent action of God, an acting spiritual force. Like Sabatier, Ménégoz insisted that faith was an active, not a passive phenomenon. For Ménégoz, salvation by faith was not a theory, but a living reality, a personal experience of one who had been near death: "Fidéism is not a conception of the world; it is not a religious philosophy, a theological speculation, a dogmatic system. It is the glad tidings which announce the grace of God to the repentant sinner. It is the Gospel of salvation." Christ had announced it, Paul and Luther had repeated it, and now there was Ménégoz to resuscitate it. It appears that Ménégoz began to stress the solidarity between faith and belief only after the appearance of Sabatier's works on religious psychology and epistemology. In 1903-04 Ménégoz wrote that faith was an act of the whole self—of thought, feeling and will. It was impossible to consider faith without thought. Doctrines were idées-forces, a term of Fouilée's.

120 Ibid., p. 15.
121 Ibid., I, Nos. 1, 11; II, No. 49.
123 Ibid., II, No. 49, pp. 203-06.
124 Ibid., II, No. 100, p. 562.
125 Ibid., II, No. 44, p. 91.
126 Ibid., p. 131.
127 Ibid., p. 93.
Churches, according to Ménégoz, had been responsible for confusing faith and belief and had based salvation upon both. Orthodox Protestantism demanded intellectual obedience to the doctrine of the divine inspiration of the Bible, and based salvation upon faith in the Bible. Liberal Protestantism also confused faith and belief, and rejected both for love and charity. But Ménégoz denied that love of God and neighbor were enough. He could evidently accept Sabatier's emphasis on the filial and fraternal relationship because, although Sabatier taught that love of God and man made one a Christian, he also insisted that faith alone was required for salvation. Ménégoz stated that it was possible to consecrate oneself to God and to be saved even without belief in Jesus Christ, although he really did not think it too likely, as the two usually went together. Both Sabatier and Ménégoz agreed that the notion of salvation progressed, that the form changed although the essence remained the same, i.e., the notion of a sacrifice made. Ménégoz believed that his formula of sola fide allowed man to use his reason freely without fear of damnation because of intellectual errors. There could then be no conflict with science.

128 Ménégoz (ibid., p. 91) noted that the Greeks had translated ἀμώουνα as ἰστες, which implied both faith and belief, while the former really only meant confidence, fidelity, attachment to the gift of life.

129 Ibid., I, No. 1, p. 31; III, No. 143, pp. 159-62.

130 Sabatier, Religions... p. 327.

131 Ménégoz, op. cit., I, No. 1, p. 47 and No. 22, p. 274.

132 Ibid., I, No. 5, p. 111.

133 Ibid., II, No. 49, p. 219.
The simplicity of the Religion of the Spirit can easily be seen in symbolo-fidéism's modification or rejection of those traditional Christian beliefs which had proved to be the most objectionable to the intellect and had often been proved wrong by scientific developments. Among these doctrines were the notions of sin, revelation, miracles and inspiration, especially as applied to the Bible. Sabatier did not believe in sin in the sense of Original Sin. To him sin was psychological, not biological. He asserted that the story of Genesis was denied by all the sciences. The Garden of Eden represented a poetic state of perfection, of absolute freedom which repulsed him. He argued that the myth of the Fall really indicated the first awakening of moral consciousness accompanied by a feeling of painful contradictions. For Sabatier, therefore, sin appeared to be the conflict between man and nature, especially his own nature. Sabatier emphasized the voluntary and inevitable aspects of sin. Man stood self-accused of sin. He condemned himself for doing evil even though he felt that he was not free to do good because of his inherent nature. This inner fatality, not a transgression, separated man from God. Sin, however, was only one aspect of the Christian consciousness. Its antithesis, for Sabatier, was love, the sense of the blessed reconciliation with God. "The reciprocal passage from one to the other was the constant activity, the very life of the Christian consciousness."

134 Sabatier, The Doctrine of Atonement . . . , pp. 16-19; Esquisse . . . , p. xii.


136 Sabatier, Esquisse . . . , p. xii.
This passage was effected by repentance, a subjective judgment, and by faith, a subjective trust in God. Sabatier also asserted that sin and pardon were not successive, but simultaneous states present in one another which conditioned, intensified and developed each other:

Thus the sense of sin reappears, in the joy of pardon, under the form of a profound feeling of humility, which binds the Christian more closely than ever to the common misery of his fellow men, forces upon him a deeper sense of his entire solidarity with them, and impels him to take his part in their unceasing struggle, not deeming himself better than they. In like manner the sense of the love of God is already active in the sense of sin, awakening repentance and faith and giving rise to an ethical hope.  

The only unpardonable sin was persistent contempt and violation of the witness of God in the consciousness.  

Ménégoz asserted that perhaps Sabatier treated sin too lightly, but that his own fideist interpretation was orthodox. He believed that without sin, you could have a "beautiful philosophy," but not a "true religion."  

In contrast to Sabatier, Ménégoz felt that man did have the freedom to reject or accept evil and to do good. He interpreted sin as a transgression against God's will, for to Ménégoz, man fought not only nature, but also God. Sin separated man from God, while faith united them.  

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138 Ibid., p. 333. Cf. Matthew, XII, 31: "Wherefore I say unto you, All manner of sin and blasphemy shall be forgiven unto men: but the blasphemy against the Holy Ghost shall not be forgiven unto men."
141 Ibid., I, No. 11, pp. 225-26, 234.
142 Ibid., III, No. 220, p. 490.
Consciousness of sin, to Ménégoz, was a universal fact, immediate and absolute, without need of demonstration. Like Sabatier, Ménégoz believed that the only unnadonable sin was "the effective rejection of the testimony, conscious or unconscious, of the Holy Spirit in our heart."

The Paris School necessarily rejected the idea that revelation was the supernatural communication of a body of immutable truths, imposed upon a passive humanity. Sabatier stated:

Religion is simply the subjective revelation of God in man and revelation is religion objective in God. It is the relation of subject and object, of effect and cause, organically united; it is one and the same psychological phenomenon, which can neither subsist nor be produced save by their conjunction.

Revelation, according to Sabatier's psychological interpretation, was interior, evident and progressive. Revelation was first of all interior because God could only reveal Himself as spirit, in the piety He inspired. Revelation was, as Ménégoz agreed, the internal witness of the Holy Spirit. Sabatier did, however, note that this interior revelation was only made in connection with some external event of nature or history. He stated:

Let us boldly conclude, therefore, against all traditional orthodoxies, that the object of the revelation of God could only be God Himself, that is to say the sense of his

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143 Ibid.
144 Sabatier, Outlines ..., p. 32.
145 Ibid., p. 52.
147 Ibid., p. 53.
presence in us, awakening our soul to the life of righteousness and love. 149

Secondly, revelation was evident; it was "the veil withdrawn, the light come true." 150 Revelation had no need of proof: "Two things are equally impossible: for an irreligious man to discover a divine revelation in a faith he does not share, or for a truly pious man not to find one in the religion he has espoused and which lives in his heart." 151 Thirdly, revelation had progressed with the growth of mental enlightenment and with the nature of piety. 152 Prayer led to revelation which led to purer prayer which led to higher revelation. It was an irreversible process, however, and man could not return to a primitive state of superstition. 153 Revelation had gone through three stages: mythical, dogmatic and psychological. 154 Sabatier readily admitted that his notion of revelation was subjective, but he argued that it was also objective and concrete because all men had this presence of an indwelling God. 155 The criterion for a revelation was simple:

Every divine revelation, every religious experience fit to nourish and sustain your soul, must be able to repeat and continue itself as an actual revelation and an individual experience in your own consciousness. What cannot enter thus as a permanent and constituent element into the woof

149 Ibid., p. 45; cf. p. 33.
150 Ibid., p. 54.
151 Ibid., pp. 33-34.
152 Ibid., p. 34.
153 Ibid., p. 33.
154 Ibid., pp. 35-61.
155 Sabatier, Outlines . . . , p. 56.
of your inner life, to enrich, enfranchise and transform it into a higher life, cannot be for you a light, or consequently a divine revelation.\textsuperscript{156}

Sabatier stated that this psychological notion of revelation as interior, evident and progressive was the synthesis between supernatural and natural, between the immediate and the mediate, between the universal and the particular.\textsuperscript{157} But even revelation could not touch the central core of religion, the initial mystery—the relation in our consciousness between God and man, infinite and finite, universal and individual.\textsuperscript{158}

Symbolo-fidéism rejected the orthodox attempt to prove the compatibility of miracles and modern science by interpreting miracles as natural facts the laws of which were unknown in Biblical times.\textsuperscript{159} Although the views of Sabatier and Ménégoz were essentially the same, their emphasis differed. They both believed that for the ancients, there had been only one definition of a miracle; it was an event contrary to the natural course of things, produced by special intervention of the divine will.\textsuperscript{160} Sabatier then developed a psychological notion of miracle. He postulated that the ancient notion of miracle was actually composed of two types of judgments which belonged to two different orders: an intellectual and scientific judgment implying a view of nature, and a religious one

\begin{itemize}
\item\textsuperscript{156}Ibid., pp. 60-61.
\item\textsuperscript{157}Ibid., p. 62.
\item\textsuperscript{158}Ibid., p. 64.
\item\textsuperscript{159}Ménégoz, op. cit., I, No. 7, n. 136.
\item\textsuperscript{160}Ibid., 130; Sabatier, Outlines . . . , n. 69.
\end{itemize}
implying an absolute confidence in God. The religious judgment was compatible with modern science; the outdated Biblical world outlook had to be discarded. The Biblical interpretation of miracle as a conflict between natural law and God's will had been overcome by the revelation of Jesus Christ. For piety, therefore, the laws of nature became the immediate expression of the will of God.

Ménégoz developed a psychological and voluntaristic conception of miracle. First, he was not interested in the facts, but in beliefs. "Whether the miraculous story be true or legendary, if the narrator believed it, his faith has a value of its own, a religious value." He also saw the laws of nature as being the expression of God's will. God did not, although he could, violate these laws. Ménégoz illustrated his voluntaristic interpretation of miracles by pointing out that for a determinist, the intervention of free will in fatal evolution would seem like a miracle. But for those who believed in liberty, this miracle was accomplished daily, even by utilizing the laws of nature. For the ancients, therefore, miracle interrupted the natural course of things and contradicted the laws of nature. For Ménégoz, miracle interrupted the fatal course of things and conformed to the laws of nature. Therefore,

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161 Sabatier, Outlines . . . , pp. 73-74.
162 Ibid., np. 72, 79.
163 Ménégoz, op. cit., I, No. 7, p. 150.
166 Ibid.
he said:

Instead of destroying miracle, as certain apologists would do by trying to remove its miraculous character, we proudly and joyously proclaim our faith in miracle, in stressing the free activity of God and the granting of prayers, and in resolutely combatting the determinism which could crush our life in its fatal gears. 167

The Paris School considered divine inspiration to be in the same class as supernatural revelations and supernatural miracles:

All these manifestations, formerly held to be supernatural, are now recognized as morbid phenomena, of which mental pathology describes the physiological causes, the natural course, the fatal issue . . . . Formerly they deified these demented and tormented souls; in the Middle Ages, and up to the eighteenth century, they burned them; we pity them and care for them. This is much the best for all concerned. 168

Sabatier insisted upon a human, psychological and real conception of inspiration. 169 It was neither "unnatural" nor passive. Religious inspiration was the organic penetration of man by an orthodox God. 170 It raised man above himself, sharpening his intellect. "It is the hour when he is most himself, when his particular genius has first play, when his moral originality is greatest, when he is most certainly the organ of eternal truth." 171 Symbolo-fideism attacked the orthodox viewpoint which insisted upon the divine character of everything in the Bible (theon-neusty). Sabatier insisted that "the word of God is in the Bible, but

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167 Ibid., p. 154
168 Sabatier, Outlines . . . , pp. 84-85.
169 Ibid., p. 86.
170 Ibid., p. 88.
171 Ibid., p. 87.
that all the Bible is not the word of God."  

For symbolo-fidéism, the dominant element of religious consciousness, and in particular, the Christian experience, was clearly subjectivity. Subjective experience and evaluations permeated the few "beliefs" which were maintained in the Religion of the Spirit. Neither Ménégoz nor Sabatier attempted to deny this subjective aspect. "The reason behind our convictions," said Ménégoz, "is therefore always the testimony of our consciousness." Sabatier, in a Platonic dialogue with a friend, phrased the problem:

Adelphi: You open for them [Protestants] only the door of an unlimited subjectivity . . . .

Sabatier: At last the great word is out, the scarecrow with which men think to repel everything and ward off all the dangers. We must avoid all subjectivism, and for that reason we will not have a subjective criterion. But can there be any other?

The Paris School evaded the charge of total subjectivity, however, by appeals to God and to history. Ménégoz insisted that in every subjective judgment there was a divine element which was independent of the subject and objective "in the highest degree." God as the Father was transcendent; as the Son He was objectively immanent, i.e., in humanity; as

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172 Ibid., p. 51. Other doctrines which were also objectionable to the scientific mind were also discarded by symbolo-fidéism, e.g., the corporeal resurrection of Christ, the Virgin Birth, Christ as identical to God, substitutive excommunication. See Sabatier, The Doctrine of Atonement . . . ; Ménégoz, op. cit., II, Nos. 182, 183, 185.

173 Ménégoz, op. cit., I, No. 1, n. 9.

174 Sabatier, Religions . . . , p. 261.

the Holy Spirit He was subjectively immanent, i.e., in the individual. 176

Sabatier emphasized the universality of the religious experience, a
universality which, because of divine power and human psychology,
objectified itself historically:

Thus the inner revelation becomes consistent and objective
in history; it forms a chain, a continuous tradition, and
becoming incarnate in each human generation, remains not
only the richest of heritages, but the most fecund of
historical powers. 177

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176 Ibid., I, No. 36, p. 348. Ménezoz also noted that these three
were distinct only to representative thought.

177 Sabatier, Outlines ..., n. 57.
PART III

PSYCHOLOGY AND HISTORY
CHAPTER VII

A PSYCHOLOGIE HISTORIQUE

For Sabatier, the reconciliation between science and religion was the goal of the historical process. His psychologie historique—i.e., the study of the concrete and infinitely varied forms of the human spirit in the history of its development—was derived from eighteenth- and nineteenth-century ideas on nature, human nature and history. 1 Similar to Kant, Sabatier hoped to make history the mediator between the phenomenal world of the intellect and science, and the noumenal world of the will and morality. 2 But his philosophy of history, while in many ways an advance on the reigning positivist theories of history, emphasized the subjective and emotional, rather than the objective and rational aspects of historical knowledge.

The Idealistic philosophies of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries discarded the medieval notion that the natural world was a

1Auguste Sabatier, Mémoire sur la notion hébraïque de l'esprit in La faculté de théologie protestante de Paris à M. Édouard Neuss (Paris: Sandoz et Fischbacher, 1879), pp. 5-6. Menégoz generally followed Sabatier's concepts of history, although Menégoz could hardly be said to have had a philosophy of history.

2Lewis White Beck states that "the philosophy of history, then, like the philosophy of art and the philosophy of biology as expounded in the Critique of Judgment, must be a conceptual link between Kant's two worlds of nature and morality." "Editor's Introduction" to On History by Immanuel Kant, trans. Lewis White Beck, Robert E. Anchor and Emile L. Fackenheim (Indianapolis and New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc., 1963), p. xviii.
substance created by and dependent upon God. Berkeley, for example, denied the existence of any material substance and argued that all reality was mental. Kant asserted that reality as noumena (i.e., seen in itself) was mind, that only as phenomena (i.e., viewed from outside) was it nature. But nature was also seen as being essentially static. Any movement that existed was considered to be cyclical, based upon unconscious repetition. Even the Hegelian doctrine of "evolution," for example, was based upon a logical deduction, not a temporal and biological development: "Nature," said Hegel, "is to be regarded as a system of grades, of which the one necessarily arises out of the other, and is the proximate truth of the one from which it results--but not so that the one were naturally generated out of the other."

The Romantic movement also modified the belief that human nature was always the same. Human nature was formed by the gradual evolution of man towards a state of reason and a rational state, and history was the story of this progress. Kant developed the idea that history, like nature, required a teleological principle to make it understandable. As in the case of science, this "plan of nature" was incapable of being proved scientifically, being a subjective but necessary viewpoint.

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4 Collingwood, op. cit., p. 96.


6 Collingwood, op. cit., p. 82.

7 Ibid., pp. 94-95.
Kant denied the Enlightenment belief that man's happiness was the ultimate purpose of nature, and insisted that the essence of mind which the plan of nature was realizing was freedom, or autonomy, i.e., the power to make laws for oneself.\(^8\)

The production of the aptitude of a rational being for arbitrary purposes in general (consequently in his freedom) is culture. Therefore, culture alone can be the ultimate purpose which we have cause for ascribing to nature in respect to the human race ... \(^9\)

The complete realization of reason, however, exceeded the limited lifetime of the individual, requiring generations for its development.\(^10\)

Thus, Kant "achieved the remarkable feat of showing why there should be such a thing as history."\(^11\) The motive force which Kant felt triggered the development was man's natural antagonism, i.e., his "unsocial sociability."\(^12\) History, therefore, was a picture of greed, folly and ambition.\(^13\)

Fichte, as a pupil of Kant, applied the Kantian doctrine of categories to history and arrived at an equation of temporal succession and logical development.\(^14\) Time, according to Kant, was a form of

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\(^8\)Ibid., p. 97.


\(^10\)Immanuel Kant, "Idea for a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Point of View [c. 1784]," in On History ..., p. 13.

\(^11\)Collingwood, op. cit., p. 98.

\(^12\)Kant, "Idea ..., p. 15.

\(^13\)Collingwood, op. cit., p. 101.

\(^14\)Ibid. p. 109.
intuition of pure reason, and the temporal relationship of before and after was the logical or conceptual representation of antecedent and consequent. Therefore, Fichte argued, the concept of history as both a progress and an advance in rational freedom followed a logical development which was structured in a necessary sequence of thesis-antithesis-synthesis. This meant that historical, abstract freedom generated its own opposite, authority, which in turn was negated by a third stage. This synthesis destroyed the external relationship between authority and the individual, thus creating concrete freedom.\(^{15}\)

Schelling, developing the ideas of Kant and Fichte, emphasized that whatever existed was knowable, a manifestation of the Absolute. In contrast to Fichte, who considered the logical structure of the concept to be completed prior to history, Schelling saw history as the temporal process in which knowledge and knower were being created.\(^{16}\)

Hegel represented the culmination of this Idealistic concept of history as the history of liberty. For Hegel, man's freedom, being identical to his consciousness of freedom, obeyed the logical laws of dialectical development in a process which was not merely individual, but also universal, not only rational, but Reason itself: "History in general," stated Hegel, "is therefore the development of Spirit in Time . . . ."\(^{17}\) The Hegelian Formula for the development of historical

\(^{15}\) Ibid., pp. 106-07.

\(^{16}\) Ibid., pp. 111-13.

freedom became famous:

The History of the world is none other than the progress of the consciousness of Freedom... of the various grades in the consciousness of Freedom... the Eastern nations knew only that one is free; the Greek and Roman world only that some are free; while we know that all men absolutely (man as man) are free... 18

Like Kant, Hegel recognized the importance of passions in history, but instead of making them the opposite of reason, Hegel's theory of the "cunning of reason" turned them into tools of reason. 19 The presence of these passions, however, still made history "the slaughter-bench at which the happiness of peoples, the wisdom of States, and the virtue of individuals have been victimized..." 20

Sabatier's psychologie historique was an attempt to modify and to combine these idealist theories in a way acceptable to his own religious orientation. He did not accept the sharp distinction between Naturwissenschaften and Geisteswissenschaften and tried to unite them by means of the theory of evolution while still maintaining the immutability of the force responsible for the change. He failed, however, because of the psychological nature of his philosophy of history. While he retained the emphasis on freedom, he rejected all theories that reduced this freedom to reason, and history to logic. Sabatier did agree that there was an element of logic in history. Discarding the Kantian restriction of history to political development, he agreed with Schiller that there were histories of ideas--histories of morality, of religion, of aesthetics. 21

18 Ibid., p. 19.
19 Ibid., p. 33.
20 Ibid., p. 21.
History is the ever-sliding sieve of human ideas, or rather, if another comparison may be permitted, it is a stream whose waters, continually filtered by their passage through successive layers of sand, discharge in each the immunities which they took from that preceding and thus slowly attain an ever greater degree of limpidity.  

And ideas, as Sabatier recognized, had a logical development. They advanced sometimes by association and synthesis, sometimes by contradiction and analysis. They constantly changed, and their present form was never immutable or final but only temporary. "Every system," he stated, "has its immanent logic which impels it toward its point of perfection, and thus revealing its internal inconsistencies or insufficiencies, impels it no less irresistibly to dissolution and ruin." In this sense, Sabatier agreed with Schiller that, "Die Weltgeschichte ist das Weltgericht."  

But ideas, according to Sabatier's epistemology, always followed a feeling, and were more or less expressions of this feeling depending upon their degree of abstraction from this feeling. The ancient Catholic doctrine of infallibility, for example, represented an abstract, metaphysical idea, which, in order to become real and active, had quit

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24 Sabatier, Religions . . . , p. viii.

25 Ibid.

26 Above, p. 16.
the abstract sphere and had become incarnate in a visible organ—the priesthood, council and Pope. According to Sabatier, the content of the infallibility of the Pope was logically contained in the original principle of Church authority and was its logical conclusion and fulfillment.27 With such an idea, the historical transition was indeed a logical process—the real was the ideal because the ideal was a logical abstraction.

But history, for Sabatier, spoke more contently than logic.28 In agreement with Kant he asserted that history as the story of freedom was not a logical principle, demonstrated by reason, but a subjective, although necessary activity of the spirit:

> The conviction that human life is a serious thing, that it is so by the consecration of the entire being to duty, that the history of humanity is the history of its moral education, that it has a purpose, and consequently, laws, is not the result of scientific demonstration, but an act of moral energy, which must be performed under penalty of resigning oneself to universal vanity and spiritual death.29

A principle of the practical moral order could not be deduced by logic, but had to be worked out by life itself.30 Sabatier insisted, therefore, that the historical development was one of natural evolution, rather than of deductive reasoning.

Sabatier's evolutionary terminology, however, concealed a philosophy of nature which was based upon an eternal and unchangeable

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28 Ibid., p. 13.
29 Ibid., pp. 240-41.
30 Ibid., p. 152.
inner force. For the clock-like universe of the eighteenth century and the Laplacian model of the nineteenth, Sabatier substituted an image of nature as evolutionary, teleological and divine. He asserted that nature could no longer be seen as complete and immutable; rather, it was in a constant stage of becoming, in a perpetual childbirth, endlessly creating new marvels. 31 "At each stage Nature surpasses itself by a mysterious creation that resembles a true miracle in relation to an inferior stage." 32 He discarded the assumption that perfection could be at the beginning of such a process, thereby denying not only the eighteenth-century concept of a state of nature, but also the Paradise upon which it was based. Everything in nature, he felt, was preparatory to something else; each form of life was the preface to a higher form—naturally, not deductively, as in the Hegelian system. 33

The theory of evolution, however, did not provide a moral or religious criterion for change. In order for change to become a true development, it must be considered in relation to an end. 34 Sabatier's teleological viewpoint toward nature blended Christianity and idealism with a dash of Darwinism. For medieval Christianity, nature was God's creation, a divinely organized theater for man's fall and salvation. With Kant, God's plan, which had been used to prove His existence, became nature's plan. Kant argued that we must attribute design to nature in

31Auguste Sabatier, Essais de la philosophie de la religion d'après la psychologie et l'histoire (7 ed.; Paris: Librairie Fischbacher, 1903 [c. 1897]), n. viii; Sabatier, Outlines . . . , n. 51.
32Ibid., pp. 81-82.
33Ibid., pp. 81-82.
34Stace, op. cit., n. 314.
order to investigate it. This teleological judgment, however, was a subjective evaluation which logically culminated in the postulation of an intelligent cause, but did not prove the existence of Divine Being. Furthermore, according to Kant, there was sufficient reason to assume that man was not only a natural purpose (i.e., an organized and self-organizing being) but the ultimate purpose of nature. In the Hegelian dialectic the highest level of nature also was represented by man, "for whom a mere natural life is a living death . . . ." The necessary deduction of man from animal life overcame the self-estrangement of the Idea in nature which had constituted a "sickness unto death."

For Sabatier, nature's plan was also God's plan. He asserted that behind phenomena was the "potential energy" of nature--not a substance, but a force--a latent force in each phenomenon that raised it up and led it to surpass itself:

Life is a force, ideal in its essence, real in its manifestations. It can only manifest itself in the organisms that it creates and animates. But, while incarnating

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35 Kant, Critique . . . , #75, pp. 245-48.
36 Ibid., #83, p. 279.
38 Ibid., #273-98, p. 187.
39 Sabatier, Esquisse . . . , p. viii; Eugène Ménégoz held a similar view that beneath life was something, something which was, lived, acted, eternally. It was universal, he felt, to seek this permanent reality behind fugitive appearances. See Publications diverses sur le fédéisme et son application à l'enseignement chrétien traditionnel (3 vols.; Paris: Librairie Fischbacher, 1909-13), III, No. 204, pp. 414-16. Auguste Sabatier, "Lettres à un ami," Revue Chrétienne, 3rd ser., XVI (Mar. 1902), 207.
itself in its works, it does not exhaust itself or remain imprisoned in any of them.\textsuperscript{40}

This "hidden force," this incommensurable "potential energy" was an ever open, never exhausted source of creations at once magnificent and unexpected.\textsuperscript{41} Sabatier identified this force with the creative energy of God himself.\textsuperscript{42} "God works and acts in nature," he stated.\textsuperscript{43} From Kant, Sabatier borrowed the idea that this teleological judgment could not be confirmed or denied by pure reason, although it was necessary for scientific thought. Sabatier considered it to be a subjective affirmation, dependent only upon faith: "No man can have felt the presence and action of God in his heart without finding traces of his presence active in all the universe."\textsuperscript{44}

Sabatier accepted the familiar image of man as a link between the world of nature and the realm of the spirit.\textsuperscript{45} He felt that if man did

\textsuperscript{40}Sabatier, Outlines . . ., p. 161.

\textsuperscript{41}Ibid., p. 82. This theory of God's incessant creation led Sabatier to deny the One Creative Act as the only creation. He considered it to be only relative, i.e., neither absolute nor perfect. See The Vitality of Christian Doomas and their power of Evolution: A Study in Religious Philosophy, trans. Mrs. Emmanuel Christen (London: Adam and Charles Black, 1898), pp. 60-68.

\textsuperscript{42}Sabatier, "Lettres . . ., 207.

\textsuperscript{43}Sabatier, Religions . . ., p. 268. Sabatier did make one reference, however, to evolution in the physical order as a "necessary and unconscious process, a mechanical and continuous movement . . . without either effort or danger." This was not, however, his usual interpretation. See Outlines . . ., p. 119.

\textsuperscript{44}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{45}For example, Kant, Critique . . ., #83, p. 280, states that man is always a link in the chain of natural purposes. Cf. also Herder's idea of a chain of cultural stages in "Herder and the Philosophy of History," in Essays in the History of Ideas by Arthur O. Lovejoy (New York: G. O. Putnam's Sons; Canopic Books, 1960), p. 169.
not raise himself above the brute, he necessarily fell beneath it.\(^{46}\)

Nature, therefore, played a dual role: in a positive sense it prepared for the advent of the spirit; that was its reason for being. In a negative sense, the spirit could only triumph by raising itself above nature.\(^{47}\) But in contrast to Christian and Romantic thought, which tended to see man as both the means and the end of God's or nature's plan, Sabatier asserted that the creation of God was not yet achieved, that man was certainly a means in this creation, but only apparently the end of the process.\(^{48}\) The series of higher animals only seems to have been closed by man's appearance:

The smallest germ suffices to carry life where it never was before, and to rekindle it when it seemed extinct. We may cease to be its organs, but it will never be without organs, there will always be those to propagate it, for its all powerful force is incessantly creating them. It is the fruit of the Spirit. But the Spirit never ceases its activity. It has been at work since the world began, it will continue to work until its end.\(^{49}\)

Sabatier's concept of nature, therefore, in spite of the influence of the theory of evolution, was actually much closer to the Idealistic philosophies which treated phenomena as veils concealing a spiritual reality somehow related to man.\(^{50}\) "Phenomena," said Sabatier, "are simply veils."\(^{51}\) Sabatier, however, did not consider this reality to be the Kantian thing-in-itself or the estranged Hegelian Idea. For Sabatier,

\(^{46}\) Sabatier, \textit{Outlines . . .}, p. 12.

\(^{47}\) Sabatier, \textit{Religions . . .}, p. xx.


\(^{49}\) Sabatier, \textit{Religions . . .}, p. 277.

\(^{50}\) Cf. Collingwood, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 97.

\(^{51}\) Sabatier, \textit{Outlines . . .}, p. 320.
what man discovered in nature was the immanent, mysterious activity of God.

This activity, this creation, however, did not represent total flux. Neither Sabatier nor Ménégoz entertained the idea that God Himself was coming into existence, "that the Divine himself is included in this great universal movement; that God is not, that he is being created."²⁵² They still maintained the substantialistic scholastic position that God Himself was immutable and unknowable, that only his works were mutable and knowable. There was certainly a difficulty in proposing, as symbolo-fidéism seems to be doing, "an absolutely unchangeable ground of continuous change," but it was the tendency of the age to find some absolute in an ever-increasing realm of relativity.²⁵³

Whereas the eighteenth century had contrasted the progress of history with the immutability of nature, and positivism had reduced the historical process to the natural process, Sabatier considered

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²⁵³ Harold Hoffding, The Philosophy of Religion, trans. B. E. Meyer (London: Macmillan and Co., Ltd., 1906), p. 68; Cf. Above, p. 168. Sabatier's theories have been compared with the evolutionary theory of Henri Bergson, but not enough attention has been paid to this important aspect; namely, for Sabatier, the force, as God, was both transcendent and immanent, immutable and unknowable, infinite. For Bergson, the life-force was only immanent; it was only much later that he identified it with God; it was knowable through intuition, and, very importantly, it was finite: "But the impetus is finite, and has been given once for all. It cannot overcome all obstacles." Henri Bergson, Creative Evolution, trans. Arthur Mitchell (New York: The Modern Library, 1911 [c. 1907]), p. 277; Henri Bergson, The Two Sources of Morality and Religion, trans. R. Ashley Audra and Clodwesley Bratston (Anchor Books; Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Co., Inc., 1954 [c. 1932]), pp. 220-21; Jean Piaget, "Bergson et Sabatier," Revue chrétienne, 4th ser., I (March 1914), 192-200.
evolutionary nature to be a confirmation of his psycholonical concept of history. And this philosophy of history mirrored the same mixture of evolutionary, idealist and substantialistic ideas that characterized his philosophy of nature. History, like nature, never repeated itself. The creative nature of the historical process meant the inability to foretell the future: "Our work," said Sabatier, "is that of the historian, not of the prophet." He asserted that every historical phenomenon was dependent upon its antecedents, and that no old form was ever entirely abolished or a new form created in a vacuum. There were, therefore, no breaks in the chain of history. He completely denied the efficacy of apocalyptic change, which, by the end of the nineteenth century, characterized both reactionary and revolutionary historical theories. A historical institution, such as the papacy, like any


55Sabatier was not, however, consistent in his view that history never repeated itself. On pp. 32 and 216 of Religions . . . , he decided it did not; on p. 101 he decided it did.

56Sabatier, Outlines . . . , n. 136. Sabatier did, however, prophesy, for example, that the death of Brigham Young would undoubtedly lead to the dissolution of his religion. "Revue du mois," Revue chrétienne, n. s. 3, No. 10 (Oct. 5, 1877), 637.

57Ibid., n. 117.

organism, had to adapt itself to ever-changing conditions; 'its destiny
depends upon its gift of self-adaptation to the necessities of modern
times.'

The force behind this development for Sabatier, was God. History
in its progressive development was the universal and permanent revelation
of God. The agent of this divine process was the great individual,
rather than the people of a nation. The emphasis on the activity of
individuals vs. the passivity of the masses was a common theme of late
nineteenth-century thought. The major characteristic of such individuals
was their ability to arouse the emotions of the masses. The earlier
concepts of an aristocracy of birth or an aristocracy of knowledge were
thus replaced by this aristocracy of feeling. Sabatier did not con­
sider his individuals to be qualitatively different from the masses,
however. They did not have a different type of piety, but only a deeper
one. In the neo-Romantic tradition, Sabatier's individual was the
concrete embodiment of the Spirit: "It is a law of the moral and re­
ligious life," stated Sabatier, "that no progress, no renewal, can take

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59 Sabatier, Religions . . . . , p. 137. Sabatier sometimes took the
pessimistic view of history earlier mentioned for Kant and Hegel; for
example, he stated that "the whole reality of human history [is] a tissue
of prejudices, illusions, unconscious errors, ignorances, and preconcep­
tions. . . ."  Ibid., p. 190.

60 Ibid., p. 242.

61 Irving Louis Horowitz, Radicalism and the Revolt Against Reason

62 Sabatier, Outlines . . . . , p. 88. Ménégard considered a man of
genius to be a living synthesis of contradictions. Publications . . . . ,
place except by means of great individualities in whom the new ideal is incarnated and made visible.⁶³ A universal religion, for example, was never the product of an unconscious evolution governed by fatal and external laws. It was always the work of a great individual, in whom "a creative breath not his own breathes from his breast."⁶⁴ Thus possessed, Sabatier's prophets, like the Hegelian "world historical individualis," produced actions that far exceeded their intentions.⁶⁵ Only these prophets were important in religious movements; they were the symbol creators. They left on history a "track of light, which brightens, broadens to the perfect day."⁶⁶

But historical change, for Sabatier, was under the same substantialistic limitations as biological change. Every organism, every institution, contained a principle of stability and a principle of movement. The former, representing the latent force of God, was unchangeable. The latter, being the external realization of this immutable principle, varied with the natural and historical environment.⁶⁷

Sabatier's psychologie historique reveals a confusion common to much of late nineteenth-century English, German and Italian thought, where the aversion to positivism resulted in an emphasis on the subjective,

⁶³ Sabatier, Religions ..., p. 149.
⁶⁴ Ibid., p. 150.
⁶⁵ Sabatier, Outlines ..., p. 105; Religions ..., pp. 100, 152; Hegel, Philosophy ..., pp. 29-33.
⁶⁷ Sabatier, Outlines ..., p. 329.
psychological aspects of the historical method. To Sabatier, "history is psychology going back into the past as far and as fully as the documents will permit; psychology is history carried down to the present moment and into the personal experience of the thinker." Historical knowledge had to possess the Kantian a posteriori and a priori elements common to all types of knowledge. Here the matter was the historical event. Unlike the positivists, however, Sabatier recognized the difference between a historical event and a scientific fact. The latter, for Sabatier at least, was the real objective phenomenon which the scientist observed, independent of himself, according to the principle of causality. The historical fact, on the other hand, was never real in the scientific sense, as it was always in the past. The historian, therefore, never observed historical facts; he merely collected testimonies of those who had spoken of these facts, i.e., he only collected the ideas of the witness, which he then subjected to rational criticism. Historical criticism was not even concerned with the reality of such past events, but only with the subjective representation men had of them. In addition, the historical fact could never have the same degree of

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68 Sabatier, Religions . . . . p. 349.
69 Above, pp. 11-12.
70 Dautique, op. cit., p. 93; Sabatier, Religions . . . . p. xvi; Ménégoz also distinguished between events, which were living facts, and the recital of the event which were narratives. The task of the historian was to separate the true and false in these narratives. But Ménégoz also noted that whether true or false, the narratives themselves were facts which exerted their individual powers. See "Triple . . . . pp. 45-46.
71 Sabatier, Religions . . . . p. 270.
Objectivity as the scientific fact because the historical event possessed
an "outside" and an "inside"--the physiognomy of the act was determined
by the psychological cause. Like Hegel, Sabatier believed that it was
not the expression which was primarily of importance, but the thought
behind it.  

The form of historical knowledge, the principle by which the
historian interpreted the matter of history, was his own experience.

we are men, and . . . we fashion the history of beings that
we know have been similar to ourselves. We can, in our
own intimate experience, verify and reproduce through
imagination the movements we attribute to historical heroes.
In other words, we can relive all the history of the past,
and it exists truly for us to the extent we have resuscitated it in ourselves.

History, therefore, like science and religion for Sabatier, had the
general outlines of its structure determined in advance by the conditions
under which the mind of the historian could exist. Historical knowledge
was thus limited in the same ways that scientific knowledge and religious
knowledge were: "We only know that by which we or our kind have been in

72 Cf. Collingwood's (op. cit., p. 115) discussion of Hegel. Sabatier
suggested, for example, that two events, such as the Massacre of St.
Bartholomew and the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes, might appear
externally similar, and that only an examination of the motivating ideas
would reveal the first to be an expression of the Italian spirit and the
latter to be the product of the Jesuit Spanish spirit. Neither, of course,
was part of the French spirit. See Auguste Sabatier, La révocation de
l'édit de Nantes et les Jesuites in Etudes sur la revocation de l'édit de

73 Quoted in Dartique, op. cit., p. 98.

74 Cf. Collingwood, op. cit., p. 124.
some degree effected."75 Just as sensation existed only for he who perceived it, history existed only for he who told it or thought it. It was really only a succession of subjective conceptions of the spirit, "an interior creation, which humanity sings to itself." The scientist gave nature its order and meaning. The historian, however, gave history not only its order, but its reality as well: "It is we who give history its importance, just as we give it its reality."76

While Sabatier was right in discarding the spectator-historian of Kantism and positivism, his own activistic interpretation had its serious drawbacks. First, it was the historian's "intimate experience," his "imagination" which allowed him to "relive" the past. Sabatier's theory that what really mattered was living the past rather than thinking it was an extension of his action-directed rather than reason-centered psychology. Secondly, what the historian could not experience based upon his own personal life could not, at least for him, be "real." (This would presumably be true also for his readers.)

Everything changes, even our manner of thinking. Why do certain things appear absurd or grotesque in the imaginations of the past? Because we have lost the faculty of comprehending them. It is as impossible for us to think in Greek as it is to speak in Greek.77

Carried to extremes, this would mean religious history could only be written by religious historians, Christian history only by Christians.

75 Sabatier, Outlines . . . , n. 270.
76 Quoted in Dartique, op. cit., nn. 97-98.
77 Sabatier, Outlines . . . , n. 246.
and symbolo-fidéist history by symbolo-fidéists. This represents a complete loss of all objective history.

While there is no obvious connection, there is an interesting comparison between Sabatier's approach to history and those of British, German and Italian neo-idealists of his time. For the English philosopher F. H. Bradley, the past must be verified by the historian's own personal experience. Thus, the historian was not simply a mirror, but an interpreter. But interpreting the past in the light of his own experience meant that if a fact were encountered for which he had no experience, verification would be extremely difficult. The result would be that no historical testimony could establish events as real, i.e., as members in and of our universe, if they had no analogy for present experience. In Germany, Dilthey regarded historical data as representing a chance to relive intuitively the ethical and religious activity of the minds that had produced the events. Therefore, historical

Menégoz also felt that not everyone could be an historian: "The historical sense, like the artistic sense, is a charisma, a natural gift, a privilege accorded by the Creator in various measures. He who does not have this historical sense is no more apt to write history than he who does not have a musical sense is qualified to write a symphony. And in the same way that there are people who believe themselves to be musicians who are not, equally there are people who delude themselves on the value of their historical judgment." Publications . . . , J, No. 37, p. 364.

F. H. Bradley, The Presuppositions of Critical History in Collected Essays (2 vols.; Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1935), 71, 24, 27. Bradley did not, however, equate experience with sensation: "Experience means the verification in the concrete, and the bringing to consciousness (formally or in detail) of our known or unknown actuating principle and presupposition; and 'personal' means that our world is to be a unity answering to our oneness—it means the emphasis of the idea of system in a new man." Ibid., Note E, p. 70.

knowledge represented the inward experience of the object, while scientific knowledge represented a spectator attitude towards the object. The richer the historian's life, the richer his interpretation. The Italian philosopher, Benedetto Croce, also insisted upon the historian's re-living of the past, which meant both ascertaining and interpreting the facts. Historical knowledge meant both grasping the past as it had been understood by itself, and then relating it to the present. Hence for Croce, "every true history is contemporary history." The subject of history, however, could only be the rational.

Sabatier's psychologie historique would, therefore, have to reveal the principle of freedom that he believed to be the basis of historical development. It would have to show that this principle, although belonging to the subjective order of will, necessarily found itself projected into historical forms and perverted by human thought. Sabatier felt that only a complete psychological and historical approach to this principle of freedom would create the proper understanding of the conflict between science and religion and the necessary bases for their reconciliation.

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82 Hughes, op. cit., pp. 202-13; Collingwood, op. cit., pp. 190-204.
CHAPTER VIII

THE HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF THE
PRINCIPLE OF AUTONOMY

From the subjectivity of individual experience, psychologically-oriented philosophers in the late nineteenth century often turned to the objectivity of the social world and the historical process, "as if it were sufficient to realise the intimate and full contact of the self with itself in order to find there the secret of life and the answer to the great universal enigma ... ." For Sabatier, this meant that the reconciliation between science and religion had to be the historic task of humanity because of the basic psychological relationships they embodied. Science, or the scientific idea, represented an experience of the world, characterized by determinism. Religion was actually composed of two elements—the moral idea, acquired by the exercise of will, characterized by freedom, and the religious sentiment, the willing subordination of this free will to a spiritual power which it considered to be the ground of both itself and the world. This psychological structure of consciousness, however, since all feelings and ideas necessarily

projected themselves into action, had to become concrete. Since Sabatier asserted that consciousness was the goal of human evolution, this concrete projection became an historical process. The psychological problem of freedom and determinism thus emerged historically as the struggle between autonomy and authority. Sabatier revealed the basic anti-historical nature of his subjective approach, however, when he made all history since Jesus Christ a vast purification rite.

With Bergson, the projection from consciousness to society took about thirty-three years. In his first works, there was no need of a social or historical process, because society and history could only deal with the "social self," i.e., the spatialized self, which was not the true self, the self which endured. In Creative Evolution, he was concerned with the biological evolution of this self, of the self-realization of the élan vital. Once consciousness was established, intuition, not history, would reveal the true duration. Bergson, in spite of urgings by some of his followers, did not apply his élan to historical and social problems until 1932. In the Two Sources of Morality and Religion the inherent differences between the intellect and the intuition explained the qualitatively different states of society—the "closed society," characterized

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85 Bergson, Creative . . . . Collingwood, op. cit., pp. 188-89 points out the importance of Bergson's theory of memory for historical thought, i.e., the past being preserved in the present. But Collingwood concludes by stating that nevertheless Bergson's philosophy is anti-historical because for Bergson it is an immediate intuitive experience without recourse to thought or meditation.
by pressure and exclusion, and the "open society," characterized by attraction and universality. 87

For Blondel, the subjective failure to unify the divided wills led the self immediately out into the phenomenal world, through five stages of expansion: from sense intuition to subjective science, from the threshold of consciousness to the voluntary operation, from internal effort to the first exterior expansion of action, from individual action to social action, from social action to superstitious action. In this development, however, the will still remained divided. The profound will thus organized a world outside itself which increasingly conformed to its own desires. 88 At the same time, contact with this world changed the self: "For once one has acted, there is a new perspective, like a strange life which is incorporated into the agent; the will is something else than

86 Sorel wrote Croce: "Quel dommage que Bergson n'ait pas l'énergie d'âme nécessaire pour donner aux modernes de nouvelles manières de poser les questions sociales!" See "Appunti e documenti—Lettere di Georges Sorel a B. Croce," La Critica, XXVIII (1930), #322 (Feb. 1, 1919), 50; #275 (May 21, 1916), 357. In a little pamphlet in 1914 Bergson did apply his theory to one historical problem—the war. France emerged as the representative of the élan vital; Germany was seen as the embodiment of practical action, matter. While France sought its principle of life outside itself, Germany fed "only on its own brutality." The Meaning of the War: Life and Matter in Conflict (New York: Macmillan Co., [c. 1914]).

87 Bergson, The Two Sources . . . . The terms "open" and "closed" society have been made famous in recent literature by K. R. Popper, The Open Society and its Enemies (2 vols.; New York and Evanston: Harper and Row, 1962). Popper, however, goes to great pains to show how his use of the terms differs from that of Bergson. See I, 202, 294, 314.

it was before; consciousness has changed."  

But Blondel's development, while it postulated the existence of social forms such as the family and the state as necessary extensions of individual action, was not actually a historical process.

Sabatier's union of psychology and history was really no more successful as a concrete treatment of historical development. For Sabatier, the goal of the historical process, of universal evolution itself, was consciousness—the final cause and the profound reason of things. Where it assumed a moral character it was "crowned in the eyes of the whole universe with an inviolable and sacred majesty." Human nature had differentiated itself from animal nature only by its superior moral development. This differentiation, however, was a constant struggle, and moral evolution was the slow development, the painful subordination of physical laws to moral laws, which Sabatier identified with the Kantian categorical imperative.

The force behind this moral evolution, the same force behind natural evolution, was, of course, God:

Emerging from animality, man is not, he is being made; he is called to realise his moral being according to what physiologists call a "directing" or a "morphological" idea latent in his organism, which is what Christians call the power and vocation of the Holy Spirit inherent in.

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89 Ibid., p. 158.
90 Sabatier, Religions ..., p. xx.
91 Ibid., p. xix.
92 Sabatier, Outlines ..., p. 12.
his soul. This ideal, or rather, this force which from on high calls him and draws him, is the moral substance of his \( \text{Me} \), the ideal law of his being, which he must obey under peril of destroying himself, of falling short of life and happiness, of losing himself.\(^{93}\)

This "moral substance" was not, however, a substance in the sense of matter. But it was "substantialistic" in that Sabatier assumed the force, or form, to be given, immutable and, as God, unknowable. Moral evolution, therefore, was not evolutionary in the sense that moral consciousness was totally the product of the historical process. Sabatier posited, rather, an original moral "substance" which had assumed different, and progressively higher, expressions in the course of its development. For example, immanent in man's consciousness was the unchanging form of the Good: "Everywhere and always man has sought the good, but he has formed different ideas of it, and these ideas have become more and more noble and pure in proportion as his life itself has been ennobled and purified."\(^{94}\) While the particular expression was determined by the historical environment, he emphatically denied, and Blondel would have agreed, that the momentary real was ever the ideal, i.e., that the is would equal the ought to be. Perhaps this moral distinction is justified, but Sabatier did not see that there can be no such distinction between the historical is and the ought to be at a given moment in the historical process.\(^{95}\)

The essence of moral consciousness, for Sabatier, was autonomy.\(^{96}\) But autonomy did not mean absolute freedom or license. Like the idealists,

\(^{93}\) Sabatier, Religions ... , p. 321.

\(^{94}\) Sabatier, Outlines ... , p. 295.

\(^{95}\) Cf. Collingwood, op. cit., p. 109.

\(^{96}\) Sabatier, Religion and Modern Culture in The Doctrine ... , p. 208.
he denied the desirability, or even the possibility of an abstract freedom. Abstract freedom was identical with absolute indetermination, an equation without meaning or reality to Sabatier. In a Kierkegaardian-like notion of choice, Sabatier insisted that it was not a question of freedom vs. determinism, but of freedom and determinism vs. nothing: "Liberty is a quality, a form of the activity of the spirit, but the spirit is free only to determine itself, and not to remain in a state of indetermination, which would be self destruction. Indetermination is annihilation." Sabatier, therefore, had a law, which in morals was duty: "Liberty is the form of duty and duty is the substance of liberty." Sabatier, therefore, would presumably have agreed with Bergson that freedom admitted of degrees, that one could be more or less free the more or less one recognized his duty. This law of freedom, however, must be recognized as an interior one, as obedience to the law of one's own being. Therefore:

To say that the mind is autonomous is not to hold that it is not subject to law; it is to say that it finds the supreme norm of its ideas and acts not outside of itself, but within itself, in its very constitution.

97 Sabatier, Religions . . . , p. 320. Paraphrasing Kierkegaard, William Barrett states in Irrational Man: A Study in Existential Philosophy (Doubleday Anchor Books; Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1962), p. 165: "The fundamental choice, says Kierkegaard, is not the choice between rival values of good or bad, but the choice by which we summon good and bad into existence for ourselves."

98 Ibid.

99 For Bergson, however, freedom admitted of degrees dependent upon the relationship of the deeper self to the act performed. See Time and Free Will . . . , p. 166.

100 Sabatier, Religions . . . , pp. 300, 321.
It is to say that the consent of the mind to itself is
the prime condition and foundation of all certitude.\textsuperscript{101}

In the moral progress of humanity, however, autonomy found itself
to be faced with authority, the individual consciousness with the social struc-
ture of family, school, tribe, city, Church.\textsuperscript{102} Authority reflected the
collective need for survival. Its roots were in the organic conditions
of the life of the species and its end was in the formation of the
individual.\textsuperscript{103} Boutroux criticized Sabatier for not recognizing the
permanent nature of authority, but this was a misreading of Sabatier's
ideas, for he never denied the need for authority.\textsuperscript{104} What Sabatier
asserted was that it was necessary to distinguish between the principle of
natural and legitimate authority, spontaneously created in a society which
was enduring and had a mission to accomplish (i.e., the development of
individual autonomy), and the theory of dogmatic authority, supernatura-
ized and made absolute under pretext of strengthening society.\textsuperscript{105}

Dogmatic authority, he felt, must disappear, or rather, as for Fichte, it
must be internalized so as to be seen as being essentially identical to
one's own law. As the authority of material force, customs, tradition
and code yielded to the inward authority of the conscience and reason, it

\textsuperscript{101} Ibid., p. xvi.
\textsuperscript{102} Ibid., n. xxi.
\textsuperscript{103} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{104} Emile Boutroux, "Esprit et autorité à pronos du dernier ouvrage de
\textsuperscript{105} Sabatier, Religions ..., p. 143.
became transformed into true autonomy. The sphere of rule did not decrease, but rather rule would be better obeyed as it became immanent in the conscience and will of man, and as it became identified with his own moral nature. An infallible authority was actually a contradiction, because authority was only a means, not an end. It never had its reason for existence in itself, for it was always dependent upon the consent, conscious or unconscious, willed or enforced, of the individual.

It was not, therefore, a question just of authority vs. autonomy, as if the choice were a simple either/or. All autonomy rested upon authority; the two were allied and opposite, both equal and necessary aspects of moral progress. "History is a moral pedagogy, whose vitality lies in this perpetual struggle between the autonomy of the conscience and social authority." Their conflict made the path of the human race a road to Calvary, a road which the son of man was perpetually climbing, bearing his cross. But Sabatier did not identify effort with achievement. The goal was not in the present, but in the future, and, in its highest expression, not in this life, but in the next. In achieving this goal, Sabatier again denied all efficacy to force, which, as in the French Revolution, only created more authority. Reason and conscience were the only instruments of change which his liberalism would allow.

107Ibid., p. xxvii.
108Ibid., p. xxviii.
109Ibid., p. xxii.
110Ibid., pp. xxi-xxii.
Sabatier felt that since the Renaissance there had been a great acceleration in the development towards autonomy. He did not, however, demonstrate this historically. He merely broadly asserted that such was the case. For example, modern philosophy had begun with the Cartesian effort of mental self analysis. From Descartes through Leibniz, Locke, Hume and Kant, the autonomy of philosophy from religion had increased. Kant also had established the autonomy of ethics. Conscience became as independent and as sovereign as reason. A similar development had occurred in the physical sciences. With Galileo, Kepler and Newton, observation and experimentation were placed above authority, and the mind was constituted as the supreme judge in the realm of natural knowledge. The experimental method, according to Sabatier, was only an application and practical demonstration of the autonomy of the mind in the realm of the laws and phenomena of nature. In the last two centuries, according to Sabatier, historical criticism, raised up by God, developed as a form and continuation of the experimental method, i.e., as the triumph of the principle of autonomy. No external witness could prevail against the inner and peculiar law of reason, for this sovereign law judged both the testimony and the witness. The assent of ourselves to ourselves appeared as the sole foundation of all rationality and morality.

The principle of modern culture is the autonomy of the reason and the conscience, and consequently of peoples and their governments, as well as of philosophy, art, and science. This principle asserts itself in the progressive secularization of institutions and laws, by the enfranchisement of the human mind from priestly and so-called supernatural tutelage. We have eliminated the

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111 Sabatier, Religion and Modern Culture . . . , p. 173.
supernatural from science and philosophy; little by little we shall eliminate it from politics and social life.\textsuperscript{112}

But one thing remained outside the sphere of autonomy, in constant conflict with modern culture—religion as expressed in the Catholic Church and in the Protestant Bible. For Sabatier, however, this could only be a temporary exclusion. Just as the idea of science and the idea of morality were psychologically completed by the notion of God, the autonomy of reason and conscience had to be historically accompanied by the autonomy of religion. The authority of God represented the highest form of authority which faced the autonomous consciousness. There would no longer be a conflict when it was recognized that the law of God was not external, but internal, that the perfection of autonomy, of which science was merely a part, lay in the recognition of the authority of an inward God.\textsuperscript{113} It had to be shown that the infallible Church and the infallible Bible were merely human authorities which had attempted to usurp divine authority, misrepresenting God under the pretext of making Him more real and concrete.\textsuperscript{114}

Sabatier asserted that the psychological evolution of the religious consciousness through the three stages of interest, law and love had a parallel historical development.\textsuperscript{115} For Sabatier, these stages were now in

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{112}Sabatier, Religions \ldots, n. 138.
\item \textsuperscript{113}Menégoz, Publications \ldots, I, No. 39, pp. 450-51, considered authority to be the testimony of the Holy Spirit in the past (history, the Bible), while autonomy was the testimony of the Holy Spirit in the heart.
\item \textsuperscript{114}Sabatier, Religions \ldots, p. 257.
\item \textsuperscript{115}Above, Chapter VI.
\end{itemize}
the Christian consciousness because they had historically evolved—and the Christian consciousness was the result of that evolution—and they had historically evolved, because they were inherent in the psychology of the religious consciousness itself: "Such are the profound stratifications of the Christian consciousness, corresponding to those which history discovers in the religious evolution of humanity." The parallelism which he tried to establish, however, was by no means exact, because of the inherent difficulty of fitting history into any preconceived scheme, psychological or otherwise. The religion of nature roughly corresponded to the primitive and early pagan era, the religion of law to the pagan and prophetic period and the religion of love to the time of Jesus Christ, "when the fullness of time had come." This religious development, as seen by Sabatier, was from the particular to the universal, from substance to spirit, from authority to autonomy, from egoism to disinterestedness.

The stage of interest was characteristic of the domestic or tribal community. The "natural religions" of these tribes were instinctive, animistic, idolatrous and polytheistic. This polytheism, however, was not without its order: "The subordination which disciplined the heads of the tribes on earth ranged the divinities under the authority of a supreme head. Force at first gave this supremacy." Man was acutely aware of this divine power, this authority, in contrast to his own weakness and

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116 Sabatier, Religions ..., p. 374.
117 Sabatier, Outlines ..., p. 94.
118 Ibid., n. 102.
slavery. Prayer to the god was guided only by self-interest: "It is human selfishness addressing itself naively to the selfishness of the gods." 119 Because of the external nature of man's relationship to these transcendent powers, he could never know if his sacrifices, usually in the form of food or gifts, were acceptable. 120

The tribal period was succeeded by a national or ethnic era, which Sabatier equated at times with Greece, at times with Israel: "The religion of Greece, as witness the Homeric poems, was a confederation of local cults and deities, just as Hellas was a federation of previously unconnected tribes." 121 This was the stage of moral discovery, when Confucius, Buddha, the prophets of Israel, the philosophers of Greece simultaneously came to feel that the true relation of man to God must be a moral relation. 122 "In becoming moral, man has moralised his gods, who, in their turn, becoming models and authorities, have greatly helped to moralise the race." 123 The religion of law was best represented by the covenant of God with Israel, which resulted in man's sense of sin before the inflexible laws of God. Although conceived of as Spirit, God still remained an external authority to man, separated by a moral chasm.

The third stage was the religion of love—the universal religion of Christianity. Although Sabatier considered Buddhism and Mohammedanism to

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119 Ibid., p. 105.
120 Ibid., p. 109.
121 Ibid., p. 95.
122 Ibid., p. 109.
123 Ibid., p. 102.
be universal religions, both were flawed: Buddhism, by the existence of an esoteric philosophy for sages and a superstitious and polytheistic cult for the masses; Mohammedanism, by naturalistic elements from old Arabic cults and a parochial Orientalism. Only by becoming identical with Christianity would these religions become truly universal. In Christianity alone, in the supreme revelation of God as internal was there absolute freedom of the spirit. Prayer finally became an act of pure trust and self-abandonment, of disinterestedness the most religious and complete. In Christianity alone did man see his own inner law glorified to become the supreme law of things. Inward experience replaced all forms of external authority.

Sabatier, who had already denied that perfection could be at the beginning of biological evolution, recognized the difficulty of introducing it at the beginning of a historical process which was supposedly both evolutionary and progressive. He repeatedly denounced "philosophies of identity" which merely unfolded an eternal Substance or First Cause. He argued that a total or plenary perfection could not, indeed, be found as the first link in an historical chain, but that Jesus Christ represented a qualitative, not a quantitative perfection. The development of history up to the religion of love was, therefore, evidently a qualitative

124 Ibid., pp. 97-98.
125 Ibid., n. 110.
126 Ibid., n. 112.
128 Sabatier, Esquisse . . . , p. viii.
development for Sabatier, and Jesus Christ represented the highest expression. The historical process after Christ must, therefore, only be a quantitative development. Hence, history, for Sabatier, was divided into two general periods—first, a qualitative period, up to the advent of Christianity, then a quantitative one, the expansion of Christianity. But since in this expansion the original quality of Christianity had been lost, or rather suppressed, a third period was underway to return to the original qualitative purity expressed in the consciousness of Christ.

Sabatier stated that with Christ it was the quality, or intensity of being that mattered, for He represented the perfect relationship of God and man, filial and fraternal love, and Christianity represented the ideal religion. But Christianity also was an historical religion because it appeared as a real fact in the consciousness of a real person, and the reality of both Christ and his followers was an observable phenomenon. From the beginning the ideally perfect religion had thus appeared as an historical and positive religion.

Sabatier, therefore, did not and could not profess the extreme viewpoint, often felt in Ménégoz and later formalized by Couchoud (Le mystère de Jesus, 1924) that Christ had never existed. According to Sabatier, He had been real, and He had been a man, otherwise it would have been impossible for his followers to identify with him. For Sabatier,
the human reality of Christ meant the reconciliation of time and eternity, of history and metaphysics. Sabatier felt that Christ Himself had had an acute sense of his own historical being, that he had felt himself to be within the contingencies of history, and that death was a part of history. Sabatier, therefore, denied that Christ's death, even to Christ, represented a penal satisfaction. For Sabatier, Calvary must be seen as a human drama, the grandest and most tragic in history. To make it a metaphysical act was to promote Christ out of history to become the supreme and eternal sacrificer. Then, Sabatier argued, instead of a human drama, happening in history and capable of being repeated by his followers, it became a priestly function, a transient act of ritual purification accomplished outside humanity. It was, therefore, wrong to take Christ out of history, to make him a part of metaphysics.

Sabatier recognized that the necessary historical nature of Christ's life also meant that He necessarily reflected the cultural level of His period. Sabatier emphasized that as an historical figure Christ was bound to his race by flesh and blood, and to his generation and his time by the general knowledge that He had of the world (which was precious little). His teachings, therefore, often reflected the then current scientific and philosophical conceptions which it was not only right, but necessary to

132 Sabatier, The Doctrine of Atonement ..., p. 36.
133 Ibid., p. 130.
134 Ibid., p. 54.
136 Sabatier, Outlines ..., p. 231.
analyse or to abandon in order to understand His true meanings: "Each of His sentences or parables is enclosed in a hard shell that has to be broken before you can get at the kernel."\(^{137}\) (But Sabatier also implied that Christ did this deliberately in order to make His listeners expend an effort.)\(^{138}\)

Once posited, therefore, this qualitatively ideal religion had to progress, to realize itself. The psychological unity of the consciousness which Sabatier postulated, i.e., the mutually dependent association of feeling, will and idea, dictated that a feeling must take form and action. Every religious and moral idea was under a psychological necessity to translate itself to those outside and to realize itself in facts.\(^{139}\) The Christian principle, too,

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\text{must enter into evolution in history in order to manifest its originality and its force, to realise in individual and social life, in the realm of thought and in the realm of action, in a word in the whole of civilization, all its virtualities and all its consequences.}\(^{140}\)
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This realization, however, could only be a quantitative progression, for "no reform, no perfecting, could raise Christianity above itself, that is to say, above its principle . . . ."\(^{141}\) And this realization took on all the aspects of a Darwinian struggle for survival against all the elements

\(^{137}\) Ibid., p. 149.
\(^{139}\) Sabatier, Religions . . . , p. 26.
\(^{140}\) Sabatier, Outlines . . . , p. 174. This recalls Karl Löwith's remark about Hegel's idea that the Christian religion was realized by reason in the secular world: "As if the Christian faith could ever be 'realized' at all and yet remain a faith in things unseen!" Meaning in History (Phoenix Books; Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1949), pp. 58-59.
\(^{141}\) Ibid., p. 173.
of the past which preyed on human weakness and mass inertia. War was its very life: "To cease to fight is to succumb; ... to be submerged by the rising tide of human superstitions; it is to die." A strange description for the religion of love!

Sabatier, adopting a Joachimitic approach to religious history, stated that Christianity had passed through three forms, each reflecting a different relationship of authority and autonomy: the Messianic, the Catholic and the Protestant—the infancy, adolescence and adulthood of the religious consciousness. Joachim's development, however, had been linear; Sabatier's process, unlike his evolutionary theory, was ultimately cyclical. In the first period, two opposing parties existed: the upholders of tradition and its authority, and the partisans of freedom, faith and individual inspiration. Sabatier considered this first Christianity to have had a Jewish body, since it persisted in the authority of the Mosaic law, in the practical application of its precepts and in the belief in apocalyptic Messianism. But this body conflicted with its Christian soul, and it was "these contradictions and conflicts which set Christian life and thought in movement ..." The inner principle won only by virtue of the individuals raised up by God, such as Stephan and Paul. The Messianic aspect was, upon the destruction of Jerusalem, "transformed into a Church theocracy."

142 Ibid., p. 171.
143 Ibid., pp. 171-72.
144 Ibid., p. 181.
145 Ibid.
146 Ibid., p. 192.
The Catholic Church, to Sabatier, represented the oldest self-styled absolute authority. It had infected Christianity with the rationalism of the Greeks—"those abstract concepts, substance and hypostasis, nature and person, essence and accident, matter and form"—and the constitution of the Roman Empire, where the universal and absolute monarchy of the Caesars first set the pattern for the anarchy. The Church, as a visible institution based upon the concept of infallible authority, shattered the unity of religion and morality realized in Christ and subjugated the autonomy of the individual consciousness. The religious element was, therefore, externalized and imposed as a divine authority. A mechanical conception of the relationship between God and the world emerged.

Catholicism began, then, in the Church of the second century, when, under the unconscious action of tradition and of pagan habits, the need was felt of objectivising and materialising the Christian principle in an external fact, or imprisoning the kingdom of God in a visible institution, the immanent revelation of the Holy Spirit in the decisions and acts of a priesthood. This tendency, once born, would be irresistible.

Logic then dictated that the authority of the Church be incarnated in the simplest organ, hence, the movement from individual bishops to council to Pope. By assuming infallibility, however, the Catholic Church tended to crystallize and arrest authority at a point onerous to the level of autonomy reached by the general culture.

147 Ibid., p. 194.
148 Cf. Above, n. 156. Sabatier liked to conceive of the Catholic Church under the category of mechanical, whereas his own philosophy might be called energetic or vitalistic.
149 Sabatier, Outlines . . . , n. 200.
150 Above, n. 117.
But Sabatier felt that medieval Catholicism still contained the essence of the Christian spirit, a spirit which expressed itself sporadically in great individuals such as St. Augustine and St. Bernard. Finally this latent power emerged in the Reformation of Luther and Calvin, when authority, at least in principle, was once more vanquished by conscience. In its rejuvenation it shared the life of the age, influencing and influenced by modern culture. It became, as did all other normal activities of the spirit, more and more laicized. In Protestant subjectivity the religious element was no longer separated from the moral element; it no longer asserted itself as a truth or morality superior to human truth and human morality.

Then, Sabatier stated, in the seventeenth century, as in the second century, the word of God was materialized and imprisoned in the tradition, letter and code of Scripture. But for Sabatier this was not just a historical accident. It was a question of the psychological law, according to which man transferred the qualities of the divine object to its human institutions, and the historical law, which required mental and social forms, ideas and customs of earlier ages to persist and to project

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151 The influence of Protestantism on economics has been well documented by Weber, Tawney, Robertson, Hyma. More recently, its influence on science has been noted. For example, Barbour, on cit., n. 48 states: "Puritanism in particular seems to have lent support to scientific endeavor. Without belittling advances that occurred elsewhere, one can say that seventeenth-century England was the turning point in the history of science, and that the Puritans were its chief agents."

152 Sabatier, Religions ..., n. 176; above, n. 148.
themselves into higher civilizations. The doctrine of the sovereign authority of the Scriptures was thus turned into an external authority. Roman intolerance, Sabatier noted, had been merely intolerable. Protestant scholasticism was ridiculous. Not until Schleiermacher, whose position for Sabatier was analogous to Newton's in science and Kant's in ethics, did the Christian consciousness finally pass the strait which separated the theology of authority from the theology of experience. Once again the autonomy of thought corresponded to the autonomy of the religious consciousness. But Sabatier emphasized that this evolution was really only a return to the pure essence and primitive condition of early Christianity. To him, progress meant realization, but he identified realization with purification. Thus the Christian principle:

could only recognize itself, take cognizance of its true nature, separate itself from that which was not itself; it could only disencumber itself of every material, temporary or local element, of all which it had become surcharged in the course of ages, and which was neither religious nor moral, by remounting to its source, and by renewing its strength, through reflection and criticism, at its original springs.

Protestantism, as Sabatier's Religion of the Spirit, could not, therefore, conflict with science. Their reconciliation could be found in the principle of autonomy itself:

153 Sabatier, Outlines . . . , pp. 278-79. Both of these laws represent merely a different way of expressing the inner nature of consciousness, i.e., the projection of ideas and feelings, and the mutual dependence of ideas, feeling and will. Above, n. 16.


156 Sabatier, Outlines . . . , p. 217.
The transformation of the Christian consciousness and its liberation from all exterior servitude began on the day when piety and science first met. They will be completed, and the religion of the Spirit will reign, all systems of authority having been done away, on the day when piety and science shall have become so mutually interpenetrated as to be thoroughly united into a single entity; inward piety the conscience of science, and science the legitimate expression of piety.157

Nowhere was the unity better revealed for Sabatier, than in a pious, but critical, study of dogmas.

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157Sabatier, Religions... , p. 318.
CHAPTER IX

A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF DOGMAS

The attempt in fin-de-siècle science to redefine the relationship between theory and fact found its parallel in religion in the controversy over the relationship between dogmas and history. Building upon the earlier theories of Schleiermacher and Newman, theologians emphasized the evolutionary and often pragmatic nature of dogmas. Sabatier's interpretation, which was based upon his symbolical religious emnistemology, considered dogmas to be psychologically and socially necessary, but still derivative and evolutionary in nature. Modernists, such as Loisy and Blondel, developed theories of dogmas which, in many respects, can be compared to those of Sabatier.

Sabatier's great debt to, but clear divergence from Schleiermacher is once again seen in their notions of dogmas. At the basis of Schleiermacher's philosophy was the idea that religion was a feeling that had no direct contact with thought. Religious doctrines were only an expression or description of a prior and independent religious feeling. They were not "un ensemble inorganique de credenda." For Schleiermacher, 


159 Quoted in Alec R. Vidler, The Modernist Movement in the Roman Church, its Origin and Outcome (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1934), p. 34.
dogmas, in the sense that Sabatier used the term, really should not exist at all, as they were due to a "misunderstanding." Those that had been philosophized and rationalized should be purified. To Schleiermacher, who lacked Sabatier's identification of subjective states and objective actions, it was only desirable that a subjective experience be objectified, not necessary, as it was for Sabatier. Schleiermacher also asserted that dogmatic statements about God and the world had only a secondary and derivative position in theology, behind those propositions which described human states of mind. The former should always be reducible to the latter.

Newman's Catholicism, according to Sabatier and Ménégoz, prevented him from developing a true evolutionary theory of dogmas. The most thorough expression of Newman's ideas on dogmas is An Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine (1845), which was finished just before his conversion to Catholicism. Whereas Schleiermacher had related dogmas to

160 Brandt, op. cit., p. 281.
161 Ibid., p. 282.
162 Ibid., p. 288. Brandt points out that Schleiermacher was not always consistent in his treatment of dogmas, however. For example, Brandt asserts that Schleiermacher's doctrines actually fall into two different groups, which Brandt calls empirical and metaphysical. The first group, e.g., the Bible, the Virgin Birth, are considered in relationship to the religious man's feelings. Doctrines of the second group, "seem to be straightforward assertions about the objects of metaphysics, about which one might appeal to philosophical argument if one were interested in knowing whether they were true. Nevertheless Schleiermacher claims that they were in some way simply the expression or description of religious feelings." Ibid., pp. 285-86.
163 Sabatier, Outlines . . . , p. 239, Sabatier Religions . . . , p. 66; Ménégoz, Publications . . . , III, No. 107, pp. 24-27. For a comparison between Newman and Sabatier see the article by Hilfrid Ward, "Newman and Sabatier," Fortnightly Review, LXXV (1901), 808-22.
feeling, Newman connected them to what he called man's "illative" sense, i.e., an unconscious, instinctive intuition which revealed God in the form of a concrete and living reality, without recourse to reason or to abstract notions. Dogmas were the reflective, explicit translation of this implicit belief. They arose when the mind, habituated to the thought of God, turned to contemplate the object of its adoration and began to form statements about it. For Newman, although religious truths had been presented all at once to inspired teachers, they could not be comprehended all at once, because they had been received and transmitted by non-inspired human media. They had, therefore, required long periods of time and continued profound thought for their full elucidation. Thus Newman, following Kant, believed that "from the nature of the human mind, time is necessary for the full comprehension and perfection of great ideas." He called his theory a "Theory of Development of Doctrine," i.e., the process by which the aspects of an idea were brought into consistency and form, being the germination and maturation of some truth or ideas.

164 Aliotta, op. cit., p. 72.


166 Ibid., p. 30. Newman stated, "that from the first age of Christianity, its teaching looked towards those ecclesiastical dogmas, afterwards recognized and defined, with (as time went on) more or less determinate advance in the direction of them; till at length that advance became so pronounced, as to justify their definition and to bring it about, and to place them in the position of rightful interpretations and keys of the remains and the records in history of the teaching which had so terminated."

167 Ibid., p. 29.
apparent truth on a large mental field. In this development, the doctrine both modified and was modified by its environment. These doctrines, however, were never adequate to the intuition of the Divine felt by the illative sense. Dogmas for Newman were only symbols which were subject to a process of development, only attempts to translate intimate and concrete religious experiences into intellectual formulas which became more and more complete. The external authority deciding upon the true developments of doctrine and practice was the infallible Catholic Church. Newman established "seven Notes of fidelity in intellectual developments" for distinguishing a true development for a corrupt one: 1) preservation of type, 2) continuity of principles, 3) power of assimilation, 4) logical sequence, 5) anticipation of its future, 6) conservative action upon its past, 7) chronic vigor.

Sabatier's interpretation of dogmas, while expressing many of the aspects developed by Schleiermacher and Newman, clearly reflected the psychological, social and scientific orientation of the late nineteenth century. The basis for his interpretation of dogma was his symbolical religious epistemology. Feeling always preceded thought, and all thought, according to Sabatier, had to incarnate itself in language. But the words

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168 Ibid., p. 38.
169 Ibid., p. 39.
170 Aliotta, op. cit., p. 73.
171 Newman, op. cit., p. 78.
172 Ibid., pp. 169-206.
were not identical to the thought; they were symbols. Dogmas like all symbols had a soul and a body, i.e., a mystical and practical religious element, springing from piety, and an intellectual or theoretical element, supposing reflection and discussion. The first was a living principle, the second but an envelope and expression. The intellectual form of a doctrine was derived from the scientific mind, and was, therefore, subject to the laws and the conditions which made scientific thought accurate and true. These laws were those of logic—the formal conditions of thought. The matter of dogmatic thought was the experimental knowledge of the universe gained by the sciences, of history gained by historical criticism and of consciousness gained by psychology. Dogmas, therefore, as intellectual abstractions and derivations of the religious feeling, could never be the ultimate cause of religion.

Sabatier contrasted his own theory of dogmas, which might be called vitalistic psychology, with what he did call the Catholic theory of mechanical psychology. The latter represented a simple cause and effect—the cause was the Church and the effect was the feeling of piety. Sabatier, on the other hand, insisted that it was not a simple causal relationship, that there were three movements in the religious phenomenon, i.e., the inner revelation of God, which produced the subjective piety of man, who in turn created such historical religious forms as dogmas. Sabatier, therefore, like Newman, recognized that the role of human subjectivity

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173 Sabatier, Vitality . . . , p. 28; Outlines . . . , p. 240. He also mentioned a third element in Outlines . . . , pp. 223-24; namely, an element of authority coming from the Church.

174 Sabatier, Religions . . . , pp. 360-61.
in the development of dogmas meant that historical objectivity could only be relative and inadequate based upon the very nature of its subjective passage. Sabatier believed that the Catholic Church, by externalizing revelation and then identifying it with dogmas, had reduced a living process to a mechanical motion.  

Sabatier emphasized not only the psychological derivation, which Schleiermacher and Newman had both recognized but also the social importance of dogmas: "Dogma, doctrines, received beliefs, are nothing else than the intellectual expression of the common religious consciousness in a given society." While Sabatier might consider it theoretically possible to have a symbol without having a society, it would not be possible to have dogma without a society. He, therefore, defined dogmas as one or more doctrinal propositions (i.e., acts of thought) which, in a religious society, have become the object of faith, the rule of practice and belief, as a result of the decisions of the competent authority. They were, therefore, phenomena of the social, as well as of the psychological life. In the individual, the instinct of conservation had created faith, in the religious society, it had created dogmas. Dogmas, therefore, for Sabatier, arose when a religious society, for its own preservation, needed to suppress controversies.

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175 Sabatier, Outlines . . . , pp. 227-29.
176 Sabatier, Religions . . . , p. 357.
177 He would have considered it only theoretically possible because of his belief that an individual could not exist separate from society. See Outlines . . . , p. 56.
178 Ibid., pp. 19 and 230.
179 Ibid., p. 234; cf. Bergson on religion and social preservation, above, p. 82.
not supernatural revelation, was the mother of dogmas.\textsuperscript{180} For example, at the same time orthodoxy and heresy emerged, the former representing the collective opinion and the latter the individual opinion. Heresy, therefore, was not erroneous thought, but merely minority thought. For Sabatier, the existence and the form of dogmas always answered to an imperative need of the epoch of intellectual growth at which man had arrived, not to a theoretical question.\textsuperscript{181} The early fathers of the Church, for example, had been men of action, not men of theory.

Every religious society, therefore, by the very fact that it endured, created a doctrinal tradition which assumed a divine character and aspired towards an absolute authority. Sabatier stated he recognized that because of the "revolting consequences" of Catholic dogmas some had been led to deny their utility entirely. But for Sabatier it was impossible to deny the organic place and practical importance of dogmas, because his psychological and social assumptions required their existence as the necessary objectification of the religious sentiment and the necessary unification of the religious society.\textsuperscript{182} Many have misunderstood this aspect of Sabatier, insisting that he opposed doctrine completely.\textsuperscript{183} But Sabatier emphatically stated that discarding doctrine

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{180} Sabatier, Vitality . . . , n. 31.
\item \textsuperscript{181} Sabatier, Outlines . . . , pp. 232-33.
\item \textsuperscript{182} Ibid., n. 234.
\end{itemize}
would destroy religion:

A religious life which did not express itself would neither know itself nor communicate itself. It is therefore perfectly irrational to talk of a religion without dogma and without worship. Orthodoxy is a thousand times right as against rationalism or mysticism, when it proclaims the necessity for a Church of formulating its faith into a doctrine, without which religious consciousnesses remain confused and undiscernable. 184

Thus, while he did not deny the existence of dogmas, Sabatier did not equate them with the principle of religion or attribute to them any supernatural origin. He drew the analogy (a rather poor one) from biology, that if the life of the Church were compared to a plant, then the doctrine would be the seed, the last to be formed, but an absolute necessity. It was needed in the pedagogic mission of the Church.

Sabatier hoped that such a psychological and social interpretation would allow him to dispel three myths associated with dogmas; namely, that they were the essence of religion, that they were immutable and that they should therefore be free from criticism. 185 The essence of religion to Sabatier was the revelation of God felt in piety. Since Sabatier's theories demanded that essence be immutable and unknowable, a rational formula could obviously not be immutable. Sabatier stated that the proof of the mutability of dogmas was in the fact that they had a history, i.e., they evolved. He traced the historical development of the dogma of the infallibility of the Pope to prove this point. Dogmas, like language,

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184 Sabatier, Outlines ..., p. 244; Cf. Religions ..., p. 353, and Vitality ..., p. 39.

185 Ibid., p. 238; Sabatier, Vitality ..., pp. 13-17 has a slightly different list.
were modified in three ways: by desire, by acquiring a new meaning without changing form and by the renaissance of an old dogma or the creation of a new one. The mutability of dogmas meant that they were subject to criticism. The evolution of dogmas was both possible and necessary because they were composed of material borrowed from current science and philosophy, and this material was constantly changing, evolving and carrying dogmas in its train. Only criticism could distinguish these elements in dogma—the truly religious and permanent from the philosophical and fleeting:

Without doubt, if religion could remain in the realm of pure sentiment, it would be beyond the jurisdiction of science; but religion expresses and realises itself in doctrines and institutions which cannot be exempted from criticism. These doctrines . . . bear upon their face the indelible date of their birth, [they] implicate . . . certain notions borrowed from the philosophy and general science of a bygone period of human history. To force them upon the philosophy and science of to-day and tomorrow is not merely to commit an anachronism; it is to enter upon a desperate conflict in which the authority of the past is defeated in advance.

This criticism was the task of Dogmatics, or the science of dogmas. But Sabatier did not see seven criteria for judging these dogmas as Newman had, but rather only one: the relationship of the dogmas to the living Christian principle of filial and fraternal love.

186 Ibid., pp. 244-45; Sabatier, Vitality, pp. 41-42. Language was Sabatier's model for this aspect of change in dogma.
187 Ibid., p. 246.
188 Sabatier, Religions, p. xvii.
189 Sabatier, Outlines, p. 235.
190 Ibid., pp. 260-61.
Sabatier's theory of dogmas has many points in common with the interpretations of physical theory developed in the new science. Religious laws, like natural laws, were no longer seen as an objective body of immutable and universal truths. Dogma, like physical theory, represented an intellectual abstraction from an original experience. This experience was the stimulation and only criterion of truth for both kinds of laws. But the profundity and complexity of that experience rendered these intellectual representations inadequate, provisional and relative. They were still, however, useful and necessary. The history of dogma, like the history of physical theories, revealed their transitory nature. Sabatier stated that the history of a dogma was its inevitable criticism; Duhem asserted that to give the history of a physical principle was to make a logical analysis of it. But there is an important difference between Sabatier's dogmas and, for example, Duhem's physical theory. To Sabatier, dogmas did not progress in the sense that they increasingly revealed the living principle upon which they were based. To Duhem, on the other hand, there was a steady progression through modification of the adequacy of formula to fact.

Sabatier's philosophy of religion and his science of dogmas were directly responsible for a flurry of activity among Modernists anxious to delineate their concepts of dogma from those of the Protestants. Loisy, in

191 Above, pp. 44-45.

L'evangile et l'église (1902) objected both to Sabatier's *Esquisse* (1897) and to Harnack's *Das Wesen des Christenthums* (1900), which he felt was similar to the *Esquisse* in viewpoint and conclusions.

At bottom, "... Sabatier and Herr Harnack have wished to reconcile Christian faith with the claims of science and of the scientific spirit of our time. The claims must indeed have become great, or be believed to be great, for the faith has become very small and modest... Religion is thus reconciled with science, because it no longer encounters it." 193

Loisy argued that religion could not be reduced to a single, unchangeable element (e.g., a filial conception of God) in the consciousness of Christ, because such an interpretation removed religion from reality and deprived it of its historical and rational support. It meant that if this sole truth did not appeal to men, then there was nothing left to look for in Christ's message. 194

For Loisy, the effect of such a monolithic interpretation of the essence of the Gospel was equally disastrous for dogmas, for it would make all Christian development of doctrine, as well as institutions and ritual, "a vast aberration." 195 But, he argued, the Gospel could not have existed as a pure essence; rather, it had been constantly transformed into living doctrines. Furthermore, this transformation had not been a logical deduction, but an organic development, for dogmas were contained in primitive tradition not like a conclusion in the premise of a syllogism, but as a germ in a seed. He agreed with Newman that dogmas existed as more or less

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193 Loisy, *op. cit.*, n. 6.
conscious facts or beliefs before becoming the subject of speculation or official judgments. 196

These aspects of Loisy's ideas did not differ too much from Newman's. But Loisy went on to assert theories that resembled those of Sabatier. Dogmas reflected a cultural level, according to Loisy, and must, therefore, accommodate new cultural levels when they arose. He argued that although the dogmas may be divine in their origin and substance, they were human in structure and composition. 197 Dogmatic definitions, therefore, were naturally related to the stage of human knowledge in the time and under the circumstances when they were constructed. And since immutability was not compatible with the nature of human intelligence, a considerable change in the stage of knowledge might render necessary a new interpretation of old formulas (a very Sabatieran interpretation):

In such a case, a distinction must be drawn between the material sense of the formula, the external image it presents, related to ideas received from antiquity, and its proper religious and Christian significance, its fundamental idea, which can be reconciled with the new views of the constitution of the world and the nature of things in general. 198

Drawing upon science, Loisy suggested that just as "certainty" in nature and science was always in movement, always relative, always perfectible, so was certainty in dogmas. He did not assert that truth was changeable; he did argue that man's mental image of truth was changeable. Dogmas were really symbols: "Faith addresses itself to the unchangeable truth, through

196 Ibid., p. 249.
197 Ibid., p. 211.
198 Ibid.
a formula, necessarily inadequate, capable of improvement, consequently of change. Dogmas, for Loisy, not only developed (as they did for Newman) but they changed, and it was in treating development as change that his heresy consisted.

Loisy's _L'Evangile_, and the resultant controversy, caused Blondel to consider the problem of dogmas in *Histoire et Dogme* (1903). While he insisted that he wrote the pamphlet with no one in particular in mind, it certainly stood as a refutation of Loisy, whom he saw as a representative of historicism, which Blondel defined as the attempt to look for the whole subject matter of history in the evolution which unfolded the series of events under the pressure of external forces, and the form in a mechanical

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200 The distinction between development and change was made in the decree _Lamentabili sane exitu_ (July 4, 1907) which listed sixty-five propositions, mostly taken from Loisy, dangerous to the faith. This was followed by the encyclical _Pascendi Gregis_ (Sept. 8, 1907), which condemned modernism as the "poisonous fruit of all heresies," and delineated the two errors at its roots: 1) an agnosticism according to which God was "unknowable," so that reason had little to offer in finding a ground for faith, resulting in a mere "intellectualism"; 2) the role of "Vital Immanence," i.e., a need for the divine deep down in man's nature which made him seek and find God. Both errors, it was stated, sacrificed the rational element in religion to the intuitive, subjective and romantic element. From this description it is easy to see that orthodox Catholicism tended to equate Modernism with symbolo-fidéism, for these two points clearly are expressed by Sabatier and Ménegoz. The Modernist movement suffered another blow in Pius's _motu proprio_, _Sacrorum Antistitum_ (Sept. 1, 1910), which required all pastoral priests to sign an anti-modernist oath, a requirement later extended to all candidates for ordination. See E. E. Y. Hales, _The Catholic Church in the Modern World_ (Garden City, New York: Hanover House, 1955), pp. 177-190; Thomas P. Heil and Raymond H. Schmandt, _History of the Catholic Church_ (Milwaukee, Wis.: Bruce Publishing Co., 1957), p. 563; Adrien Dansette, _Religious History of Modern France_, trans. John Dingle (2 vols.; Freiburg: Herder, 1961), II, 305-07. This _motu proprio_ has just been lifted by Pope Paul VI according to a _New York Times_ release in the _Sacramento Bee_, July 18, 1967, p. A2.
explanation. But the truth of Christianity for Blondel was not found in an idea extracted from an isolated fact or in the fragmentary interpretation of the successive movements of history, but in a new appreciation of the whole, in the concrete realities, in the person of Christ and the Church.

Blondel, in what appears to be a development of Newman, asserted that there was a fullness in the Bible only partially expressed. The picture of Christ in the Gospels was, therefore, only a rudimentary one. The real Christ was not just in the Bible, but could also be obtained from the total effort of generations of believers. There was, then, a need to look beyond the texts and testimony intellectualized by literary expression, to look for complementary sources and authentic information.

Therefore, for Blondel, between history (Christian facts) and dogma (Christian beliefs) stood Tradition, "the living synthesis of all the speculative and ascetic, historical and theological forces." In order to pass from facts to dogmas we needed this mediation of the collective life and the slow progressive labor of the Christian tradition. Tradition preserved not so much the intellectual aspect of the past as the living reality:

In brief, whenever the testimony of Tradition has to be invoked to resolve one of the crises of growth in the spiritual life of Christians, it presents the conscious mind with elements previously held back in the depths of


202 Ibid., p. 244.

203 Ibid., p. 245.

faith and practised, rather than expressed, systematized or reflected upon. . . . It does not have to innovate because it possesses its God and its all; but it has always to teach something new because it transforms what is implicit and "enjoyed" into something explicit and known.205

Tradition, therefore, anticipated and illuminated the future by the effort it made to remain faithful to the past. It was the guardian of the initial gift in so far as the gift had not been entirely formulated or even expressly understood. It freed man from the Scriptures, although he never ceased to rely on them.206

Dogmas, therefore, were not the simple adaptation of Christian facts and feelings to philosophical thought, which would make them as mutable as the systems and climates of human thought. They were, rather, the incarnation in history of ideal demands, which simply "rediscover" a substantial and antecedent reality and mark out the orientation of Christianity in a definitive way.207 Dogmas were the expression of a perpetual and experienced reality, not the result of a dialectical exercise upon the texts.208 Both the facts and dogmas were simply the faithful translation of the indivisible synthesis of Tradition into different languages.209 To understand a dogma, one had to bear within him the fullness of the Tradition which had brought the dogma to light. In this sense, Blondel stated, it was true that faith in dogmas presupposed a living faith (Sabatier's contention). But even the most fully worked out

205 Blondel, "History and Dogma. . . . pp. 267-68.
206 Ibid., p. 268.
207 Ibid., p. 252.
208 Ibid., p. 278.
209 Ibid., p. 286.
doctrinal formula was only provisional in its scientific form, according to Blondel.210

Through Tradition, then, it could be seen that even things which may have been said still might need further elucidation, and things which have not been said, because the Jews of the first century could not have understood them, can still be said.211 For Blondel, the definitions of doctrines were not innovations, but the authentic recognition of collective anticipations and of collective certifications. Tradition represented an infallible authority, and hence man’s own ideas must be submitted to it, "for the facts affirmed by the Authority of the Church presuppose the work of the collective reason, and are not therefore answerable to individual reason alone."212 Blondel was never condemned, as was Loisy, although it can be seen that there were many elements in his concept of Tradition that might have been. Perhaps the reason was that given by his friend Mourret:

You were well inspired to call your synthetic principle by its traditional name, Tradition. If you had called it "the collective expression of the Church," or the "action of the infallible spirit on the Christian community," or some analogous expression, you would have been thoroughly compromised.213

Sabatier found one truth in the Gospel, the principle of fraternal and filial love. It was projected into intellectual formulas by

210 Blondel illustrated this point by the scientific example that just as in physics the hypothesis of a fluid has been discarded as language, but the facts and laws it served to make known have not been discarded. Ibid., p. 271, ft. 1.

211 Ibid., p. 273.


213 Ibid., p. 168, quoted in Ibid., p. 217.
psychological laws and social necessities, and these formulas underwent an historical development. But history did not touch the principle of these formulas, which, properly speaking, had no historical development, only an initial historical positing in the consciousness of Christ. Loisy, on the other hand, insisted upon the multiplicity of truths expressed by the Gospels and the Church, but still saw them as being historically developed in formulas which changed with the cultural level of the times. Blondel inserted Tradition, a rather mystical concept of the collective life and reason of Christianity, between history and dogma. In all three men, although less so in Loisy, there was an antithesis presented between "something" which lived, was practiced, enjoyed, and which, for some reason or another, was subsequently intellectualized. There was the insistence upon recovering, upon returning to this something, rather than inventing something new. Again we see the need—in an age devoted to, obsessed by progress—for absolute values, and the inherently nonrational nature of these values.
CONCLUSION

Shortly before his death, Sabatier stated that in the chain of
evolution each generation had its own part to perform in thinking and
acting.¹ The generation of the eighteen nineties—the generation of
Poincaré, Duhem, Sorel, Bergson—opposed to the a priori "intellectualism"
of the preceding age and to the anti-intellectual positivism of their own
times, developed a rational and empirical approach to man, nature and
society which re-interpreted the role of the consciousness, the meaning of
time and the nature of knowledge.² Symbolo-fidéism adopted this method
and applied it to the conflict between science and religion, a conflict
that Sabatier considered to be the basis for all historical, social and
psychological problems. Supported by a theology that was the empirical
equal of all the "natural" sciences, a "new" Religion of the Spirit would,
hopefully, resolve the crisis. Faced with Darwinism, symbolo-fidéism
limited the theory of evolution to the ideological projections and
historical expressions of religion. The essence of religion, however,
remained immutable and free from criticism. Faced with positivism, it

¹Auguste Sabatier, The Doctrine of Atonement in The Doctrine of
Atonement and Religion and Modern Culture, trans. Victor Leuliette (New

²For an excellent study of the men of the 'nineties, see H. Stuart
Hughes, Consciousness and Society: The Reorientation of European Social
Thought, 1890-1930 (Vintage Books; New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc.,
1958). For the positivist transition from an ultra-intellectual theory to
an anti-intellectual one, see Talcott Parsons, The Structure of Social
Action (2nd ed.; Glencoe, Illinois, 1949), pp. 64, 67, 111-14, and
accepted a materialistic reality of phenomenalism and causal determinism—a reality of the intellect which truly "disenchant[ed] the soul and withered the heart." But against this reality the Paris School posited a non-rational reality of freedom and faith which gave meaning to the material world. Science and religion thus represented two orders, two certainties, two ways of knowing which were both distinct and solidaire.

To Sabatier and Ménégoz, symbolo-fidéism, by reconciling the conflict between science and religion, provided a solution to the social and individual chaos of the time. Above all, however, it represented the resolution of their personal crises. It was Sabatier’s own inner torment that had caused him to ask how it was possible "to reconcile a spirit of serious and loyal research with an intense Christian life . . . . to remain Christian while maintaining the rights and the privileges of human nature?" It was Ménégoz’s near-fatal confrontation with death that had led him to the formula of sola fide—salvation by faith alone, independent of beliefs. Symbolo-fidéism was not an abstract doctrine to its originators, but a living experience.

The reconciliation proposed by symbolo-fidéism, as satisfying as it might personally have been to Sabatier and Ménégoz, entailed certain assumptions that were individual preferences that cannot be empirically supported, or social attitudes that have been historically superseded. Sabatier’s scientific theories, while recognizing the active role of the

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intellect, relied upon a positivist interpretation of certainty, determinism and realism and upon a Kantian duality of reason and purpose. By the end of the century scientists recognized that theoretical statements about nature were pragmatic, functional and approximate. Probability theory later asserted that the only exact laws were statistical; the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle stated that in some phenomena accuracy of knowledge for one variable precluded accuracy for the other variable. The uncertainty of scientific knowledge is also related to the problem of determinism. While determinism is still accepted by some scientists, many take an agnostic attitude or deny it completely.\(^5\) This wide range of opinion among scientists themselves brings into question the validity of founding a theology upon the assumption of a scientific and determined reality opposed to a religious and free reality. Sabatier also misinterpreted the nature of scientific representation, which, even in his time, was changing from the realism of scientism to the symbolism of the new science. Scientists were beginning to realize that their "objective" method was based upon assumptions which in themselves were not capable of being proven empirically. Sabatier also based his scientific approach upon a priori assertion—the universal feeling of dependence—but, unlike the scientists, he did not recognize his own "intellectualism." While Sabatier associated science with knowledge and religion and morality with action, the pragmatic tendency was to overcome this Kantian duality by showing that the activity of the scientists themselves was oriented, at least in part, toward a practical end, and that science itself originated

in an act of free will. Symbolo-fidéïsm, by adhering so closely to the Kantian distinctions, had to rely on the unity of a vitalistic psychology which elevated feeling and will over the intellect.

The religious tenets of symbolo-fidéïsm—such as the immanence of God, the action of the Holy Spirit, the nature of the religious experience—were unacceptable to many, indeed, to most of Sabatier's contemporaries. The protestant orthodox theologian, Charles Babut, for example, complained of any such "reconciliation" where religion did all the reconciling. To Emile Doumergue, another persistent orthodox critic, symbolo-fidéïsm negated the personality of God, the religious authority of Christ and personal immortality. The only religious evolution that Doumergue accepted was the evolution from rational liberalism to fidéïsm to agnosticism. On the subject of evolution, Georges Godet, writing in the orthodox journal, *La foi et la vie*, argued that if the theory of religious evolution were accepted, then logic demanded that Christ and Christianity would be surpassed. The Christian democratic priest, Georges Fonsegrive, charged symbolo-fidéïsm with being an aristocratic religion because its interior faith and morality required a culture far beyond the

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masses. By far the most common criticism of symbolo-fidéism was its subjectivity. Edmond Stapfer, a member of the Paris School, complained that symbolo-fidéism represented an ultra-subjectivity where right could not be distinguished from wrong, where all was relative. According to Roger Holland of the Free Church of Luxembourg, the Religion of the Spirit sacrificed the transcendent God to an immanent Spirit. The Catholic philosopher, Emile Boutroux, characterized symbolo-fidéism as "subjectivity without content." Charles Babut, shocked by Sabatier's symbolism and subjectivism, believed that Christianity must fight the trend toward a conscious and morbid self-analysis.

Sabatier and Ménégoz, however, argued that the characteristic trait of all modern philosophy since Descartes was the tendency toward subjectivity. Although symbolo-fidéism maintained the Cartesian duality of the ego and the world, its conception of subjectivity of truth as


12 Roger Holland, "Quelques observations sur l'Esquisse d'une philosophie de la religion par M. Auguste Sabatier," *Rivue chrétienne*, 3rd ser., VI (April, 1899), 284.


personal experience was much closer to a Kierkegaardian existentialism than to the Cartesian cogito. The proposed reconciliation of science and religion required the surrender of all rational proofs for religion. According to Sabatier, a rational argument could only produce a rational truth. Rationalism, which for Sabatier meant empiricism rather than "intellectualism," could only reveal that religion belonged to another order—subjective and non-rational. The intellect and scientific experience were bounded by the Kantian forms of time and space. Feeling and religious experience, on the other hand, were beyond time and space, and hence could not be analyzed or even defined without being "intellectualized." Symbolo-fidéism thus reconciled science and religion only by alienating the intellect from life considered as action, will and feeling.

In 1910 Menégoz made the prophetic statement that the enemy of religion was no longer science, but history. Certainly history did turn out to be the enemy of a psychologique historique which assumed a gradual and continuous progress toward scientific, moral, religious and social autonomy. The First World War, by destroying the idealistic conception of history as the story of liberty, further accentuated the subjective nature of the Religion of the Spirit.

The war also brought important changes in the theological situation in France. In the eighteen nineties, French Protestantism seemed hopelessly divided over the conflict between science and religion. The

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17 After the Synode of 1872, the Huguenot Church was split into two parties, the Eglise réformée de Droit (orthodox) and the Eglise réformée de Gauche (liberal). In 1907 the more moderate of the orthodox joined with
Huguenot and Lutheran churches were dominated by an orthodox (evangelical) wing that opposed historical criticism and scientific compromises. Sabatier and Ménégoz had both been educated as orthodox pastors, but they abandoned orthodoxy because they believed it to be anti-historical and anti-scientific. They could not, however, seek refuge in liberalism, because they considered it to be anti-religious. "If orthodoxy, with its anti-scientific spirit, repulses men of science," wrote Ménégoz, "liberalism, with its scoffing criticism, repulses men of faith." The Paris School, therefore, was to be a via media, combining the faith of orthodoxy without sacrificing the reason of liberalism. Symbolo-fidéisme was scorned by the orthodox theologians, but warmly embraced by Liberal Protestants, although neither Sabatier nor Ménégoz ever considered himself to be a member of the liberal faction.

The liberals to form the Union des Eglises réformées. The more orthodox did not join until 1938 with the creation of the Église réformée de France (approx. 450,000 members). A minor group still remained intransigent and formed the Église réformée évangélique indépendante. The Lutheran Church consisted only of the Église évangélique luthérienne until the re-annexation of Alsace-Lorraine added the Église de la Confession d'Augsbourg. In 1950, the two churches founded the Alliance nationale des Eglises luthériennes de France (approx. 298,000 members). See Raoul Stéphane, Histoire du protestantisme français (Paris: Librairie Arthème Fayard, 1961), pp. 261-88, 301-41; Paul Fargues, Histoire du Christianisme (6 vols.; Paris: Librairie Fischbacher, 1929-39), VI, 283-324.


In the post-war years, the Paris School of Theology was still dominated by Liberal Protestants faithful to the methods of Sabatier and Ménégoz. But there was also a renaissance in orthodoxy with the appointment of Auguste Lecerf to the Chair of Sacred Languages and Literature, and with the introduction of Karl Barth to French theologians. Barth's "crisis" theology presented a dynamic refutation of many aspects of Sabatier's scientific theology. Barthism stressed the complete difference in object, and, consequently, in method between science and religion, rather than their similarity; it emphasized the transcendence of God as the "Wholly Other," rather than the immanence of the Holy Spirit; it insisted upon the revelation of God only in Jesus Christ, rather than in the need and religious experience of man; it pointed to man's sinfulness, rather than to his goodness.

The post-war generation—the generation of a Barth, a Heisenberg—did not, and could not, see the struggle between science and religion as Sabatier and Ménégoz had seen it. The true conflict was no longer between science and religion, but between faith in reason and faith in unreason.

Sabatier and Ménégoz were certainly not denouncing reason. But symbolo-

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20 Fargues, op. cit., pp. 416-17; Stéphan, op. cit., p. 314.


22 Karl Popper, The Open Society and its Enemies (Harper Torchbook, 2 vols.; New York: Harper & Row, 1962), II, 246, states: "The nineteenth-century conflict between science and religion appears to me to be superseded. Since an 'uncritical' rationalism is inconsistent, the problem cannot be the choice between knowledge and faith, but only between two kinds of faith."
Deism, stripped of its quasi-scientific and pseudo-historical objectivity, reveals, in its radical subjectivity and symbolism, a glorification of unreason.
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AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL STATEMENT

The author enrolled at the Navy Pier Branch of the University of Illinois in 1954. Two years later she transferred to the Urban campus and received her B. A. (highest distinction in history) in 1958 and her M. A. in history in 1959. Professor R. P. Stearns advised her B. A. thesis, "The Preparation of the English Mind for the Abolition of Imprisonment for Debt," and her M. A. thesis, "The Religion of Voltaire and the Philosophical Dictionary." While at the University of Illinois, she was made a member of Phi Alpha Theta, Phi Kappa Phi and Phi Beta Kappa. She received University Honors and was valedictorian of her class. Personal reasons made it impossible for her to accept the Fulbright Fellowship which she was awarded in 1958. Her studies towards a Ph. D. continued at Wayne State University, Detroit, Michigan. From 1958-61 she was a Graduate Teaching Fellow. Her program was oriented towards modern European history with a minor in English literature. While at Wayne State she joined the American Historical Association. In 1961 the author moved to California. She was a part-time lecturer at the University of California at Los Angeles from 1961-62, a lecturer and then assistant professor at California State College at Long Beach from 1962-65, and a part-time lecturer at Sacramento State College in 1966. She is employed as a lecturer at the latter for Spring 1968. The author was born in Chicago on December 16, 1936. She is married to Donald W. Moon, Ph. D., and has an infant daughter, Anita.