United States and Paraguay, 1845-1860: Misunderstanding, Miscalculation, and Misconduct

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THE UNITED STATES AND PARAGUAY, 1845-1860:
MISUNDERSTANDING, MISCALCULATION, AND MISCONDUCT

by

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In 1845 the United States had its first, if tentative diplomatic relations with the Government of Paraguay. The people and Government of the United States knew as little of Paraguay as they did of Japan. To the United States the nation of Paraguay was a secluded and unknown state. But at this point the validity of this comparison between Japan and Paraguay ends. The United States never developed the interest in Paraguay that it did in Japan. There were two basic reasons which explain this indifference on the part of the United States, which was broken only by one sporadic exception. First, the United States never developed important commercial relations with Paraguay, largely because Paraguay had little to offer the merchants of the United States. Second, the United States faced no issue of vital national interest in its relations with Paraguay.

Therefore, it would appear that the relations between these two nations should have proceeded with a minimum of friction. However, friction did arise. The relations reached an impasse over a period of years because of misunderstandings, miscalculations, and the misconduct of the governments and agents of both nations. The culmination
of these events was the dispatching of a large United States naval force to Paraguay.

The object of this paper is to explore the manner by which these relations reached an impasse and the nature of, as well as the reasons behind, its subsequent resolution.

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MAJOR ABBREVIATIONS USED

Carrington Papers - Edward Carrington Papers, Rhode Island Historical Society

Claim Against Paraguay - Records of Boundary and Claim Commissions and Arbitrations, Claim Against Paraguay Under the Convention of 1859.


Difficulties with Paraguay - United States, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Report on Difficulties with Paraguay, 35th Cong., 1st sess., 1858, Senate Report 60.

E.P.A. - El Paraguayo Independiente.


Exploration - Letters, etc., From Lieutenant Thomas J. Page, Exploration and Survey of the Rivers Plate, Paraguay, etc., January 6, 1856 to August 4, 1856, Department of Navy, Naval Records Collection of the Office of Naval Records and Library, R.G. 45.


Paraguay Expedition - Paraguay Expedition and Brazil Squadron, Flagg Officer William B. Shubrick, September, 1858 to May, 1859, Department of Navy, Naval Records Collection of the Office of Naval Records and Library, R.G. 45.

R.O. 59 - Department of State, General Records of the Department of State, R.G. 59.
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I refused to recognize the independence of Paraguay because of the Argentine demonstration. Thus, the United States was placed in a difficult position of the Anglo-French action against Spain during the war. This was especially true during the period of the Anglo-French action which was largely due to the more important diplomatic operations in the Rio de La Plata basin as a whole. Paraguay, therefore, rationally understood these relations with great or even important issue at stake in the situation in the Rio de La Plata. The United States had no relations between the United States and Paraguay seen the second factor which shaped the United diplomat.

*which had serious repercussions*

standing with other nations, including the United States, the nation of Germany and subsequently led to a number of misunderstandings. This was due to the basis procedure of diplomatic protocol. This country deeply suspicious of all countries and also unaware of many arguments, namely her President Carter's anhelo agreements and eventual diplomatic contact with other nations her allies and as an independent nation. When Paraguay from the outside world, both as a Spanish colony and Paraguay, the first factor was the essential factor in shaping the early diplomatic relations between the United States and Paraguay played a decisive role in shaping

INTRODUCTION
it was felt that this would hinder Kosas in his attempts to thwart the English and the French.

The contrast of Paraguay's relations vis-à-vis the outside world to those of the other newly emerging nations of early nineteenth century Latin American has been ably summarized by a Paraguayan historian: "En el momento en que todos sus hermanas del continente se atropellaban por entrar en la historia, el Paraguay huyó de ella, y por cerca de treinta años se escondió tras la casa de doctor Francia."  

It is necessary, however, to bear in mind that by adopting a policy of isolation for his nation, the Paraguayan dictator Jose Gaspar Rodriguez de Francia, was by no means bringing about an abrupt change in the nature of the relations between Paraguay and the outside world. For as a Spanish colony Paraguay had experienced very little contact with foreigners and only limited contact with her fellow Spanish colonies.

There are numerous reasons which explain why colonial Paraguay was consigned to this fate. One reason was the nature of the Spanish imperial commercial system. Under this system Spain reserved to herself all of the external

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trade of her colonies, while supposedly shipping the colonies all the goods which they required from Europe in Spanish vessels. The colonies were generally to produce only raw materials and articles which did not compete with the products of Spain. While this system was detrimental to most of Spanish America it was especially detrimental to the Plata region because Spain purposely subordinated the interests of Southern South America to those of the Peru-Panama trade route for almost the entire colonial period.

Yet even when the Spanish commercial policy was relaxed towards the end of the eighteenth century Paraguay did not develop contacts with the outside world. This is explained, in part, by the isolated geographic location of Paraguay. Luis de Gasperi has written that Paraguay “es un pais mediterranea, situado en el mismo corazon de America.” However, a glance at a map of South America reveals that this is not as desirable a position as Gasperi indicates. Paraguay’s only contact with international currents is down the Paraguay-Parana-Plata river system, a route which is roughly eight hundred miles long. This outlet is not only long, but it is often more of a barrier than a highway:

The river has never offered an easy solution to the problem. Its braided channel is subject to frequent shifts of position, and winds about to such a degree that many miles of sailing are required to cover only a short direct distance.

Yet in spite of the fact that the Paraguay-Paraná-Plata is such a poor river for navigation, it provided, until the present century, the only connection between Asuncion and the outside world.5

Reinforcing this geographic isolation was the fact that Paraguay had few products which were of value in trade with other nations, or even with her fellow Spanish colonies. Paraguay did export considerable quantities of Yerba Mate (Paraguayan tea), and lesser amounts of tobacco, lumber, mules, cotton and other assorted products. In return she imported small amounts of gold, silver, wheat, wine, iron, metal tools, textiles, musical instruments and weapons.6

This trade, however, does not indicate a healthy economic life. Cecilio Baez, a Paraguayan historian, points out


6Information on trade during the colonial period is sketchy at best. Statistics, if available, are partial and/or contradictory. Therefore conclusions concerning Paraguayan trade must be derived on an impressionistic basis. The information presented above has been gathered from the following sources: Felix de Azara, Geografía física y esférica de las provincias del Paraguay, y Misión Guaraníes (Montevideo: Museo Nacional de Montevideo, 1904), 329-338, 4310447, hereafter cited as Geografía física; Azara, Descripción e historia del Paraguay y del Río de la Plata (Buenos Aires: Editorial Najel, 1953), 24-25, 50, 434, hereafter cited as Descripción; Bernard Moses, The Southern Spanish Colonies in the Last Half Century of their Dependence (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1908), 318-319; Robin A. Humphreys, ed., British Consular Reports on the Trade and Politics of Latin America, 1824-1826 (London: The Royal Historical Society, 1940), 44-449, hereafter cited as Reports; Bailey W. Diffie, Latin American Civilization: Colonial Period (Harrisburg: Stackpole Sons, 1945), 393-394;
that economy was "deplorable durante la época colonial." In 1777 the colonial governor of Paraguay informed the crown that the industry and commerce of the province were in complete decadence. The trade which did exist was not vital to the existence of the country, as the economic level of Paraguay was little above the subsistence level, with most of the trade conducted on a barter basis.

Paraguay's economy remained on a subsistence level for several reasons. One very important reason was that no valuable mineral deposits were found in Paraguay. This defect deprived Paraguay of the element which often acted as a catalyst to the economies of the other Spanish colonies. Still Paraguay did have a number of products which she could have used to build up a more extensive trade with her fellow colonies. However, the Paraguayans did not make the full utilization of the resources which their country did possess.

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10Azara, *Descripción*, 24-25.

because of their inefficient manner of cultivation and their lack of business acumen.\textsuperscript{12} The Paraguayan trade which did exist was subjected to taxes at every major port on its way to market. The result of this was the ruin of Paraguayan commerce. The Yerba Mate growers of Paraguay concluded that it was better to terminate their trade than to continue under these conditions.\textsuperscript{13}

Paraguayan commercial development was also hindered by the constant raids to which she was subjected to from the Portuguese bandeirantes to the east and from the Indians on the west. These attacks retarded the development of a more advanced and specialized economy.\textsuperscript{14} Nor was the situation aided by the prosperous Jesuit missions in Paraguay. The Jesuits occupied the best part of the country, to the south of the Tebescuari River. In addition they did not have to pay taxes and were granted other special privileges by the colonial governments. Because of these advantages the Jesuits were able to dominate the export trade of Paraguay to a considerable extent.\textsuperscript{15}

\textsuperscript{12}Azara, Geografía física, 329, 339, 442; Martin Dobrizhoffer, An Account of the Abipones, An Equestrian People of Paraguay (London: John Murray, 1822), 1, 104-105, 113.

\textsuperscript{13}Petition to the King of Spain, 1777, quoted in Baez, diplomacia, 1, 81-83.

\textsuperscript{14}Hippolito Sánchez Quell, Estructura y función del Paraguay colonial (Buenos Aires: n.p., 1947), 113. Hereafter cited as Estructura.

\textsuperscript{15}Ibid.; Cecilio Baez, Resumen de la historia del Paraguay desde la época de la conquista hasta el año 1880 (Asunción: Talleres Nacionales de R. Kraus, 1910), 29. Hereafter cited as Resumen.
The Jesuits were also deeply involved in still another factor which handicapped the economic development of Paraguay. This factor was the nature of the colonial administrations which governed Paraguay. On the whole these governments were corrupt, inefficient, indolent and displayed little concern for economic progress in Paraguay. The conflict between the Jesuits and the colonists intensified this already bad situation.

Jusqu'à l'expulsion des Jésuites, le Paraguay offrit donc ce spectacle singulier d'être divisé en deux états hostiles l'un à l'autre, la république municipale d'Asuncion et la république guaraní des Jésuites, tous deux indépendants de l'état théorique, celui d'Espagne.\(^{17}\)

The total effect of these factors was that Paraguay, after a promising beginning, sank into decadence and stagnation.

De Asunción irradió - durante el siglo XVI - el movimiento centrífugo. De ella partieron españoles y mestizos paraguayos a sembrar ciudades a los Quartos vientos. . . . Pero Asunción, la ciudad madre y fundadora, que aporto los elementos de población y los medios económicas para su mantenimiento, quedó anémica, desangrada.\(^{18}\)

The isolation of the Paraguayan people from meaningful contacts with the outside world produced a people who

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possessed a remarkable degree of homogeneity, both physically and mentally. Elman R. Service points out that the outstanding difference between the colonization of Paraguay and that of the other regions of Spanish America was the rapidity and thoroughness with which the aborigines were adopted to the Spanish culture in Paraguay and integrated into a self-sufficient colony which developed national characteristics very early in its history.19

This phenomenon was possible because of the extensive inter-breeding between the Spanish male and the Guarani female, producing the mestizo which became the dominant element in Paraguay. Another factor which aided this development was that the subsistence level of economic life in Paraguay prohibited the development of two different cultural levels. The Spaniard and the native lived on almost the same level. As a result a distinctive national culture arose before the end of the sixteenth century and was not changed thereafter.20

This homogeneity was not disturbed for several reasons. One reason was that Paraguay never developed an educational system through which to spread the Spanish cultural tradition. The outstanding educators in Paraguay were the Jesuits, but


they had very little educational impact outside of their missions and their accomplishments in the missions are open to doubt. An additional factor is that few immigrants ever came to Paraguay. Thus the fabric of Paraguayan life was not permeated by new groups and new ideas.

As a result of this background the Paraguayans became an intellectually ingrown people who were suspicious of all foreigners. This attitude was retained by the Paraguayans even after they declared their independence from Spain. Paraguay's first two dictators were the personification of this frame of mind, which was to cause serious complications in the diplomatic relations of the United States with Paraguay.

Looking back into Paraguayan history, therefore, it is apparent that Francia's imposition of a policy of isolation upon the nation did not mark a sharp break with the past. Yet an interesting aspect of this development is that Francia initially attempted to break out of Paraguay's

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22Ibid.; James, Latin America, 283.

colonial dilemma. He sought to establish free trade with the outside world.24 However, Francia was intensely committed to the avoidance of all political connections with other political groups in the Río de la Plata region. Francia felt that only by following a policy of neutrality would it be possible for him to preserve the independence of Paraguay.25

Francia’s system of free trade and non-alignment was foiled by the political situation in the Río de la Plata basin. In spite of Francia’s demands for free navigation of the Paraguay-Paraná-Plata river system, the other political entities, realizing that they had a grip on Paraguay’s only outlet to the sea, demanded various political quid pro quo’s which Francia refused to consider. The initial leader in this movement was Buenos Aires, which was attempting to extend its control over the entire area covered by the colonial vice-royalty of the Plata. As part of its campaign Buenos Aires attempted to force the submission of Paraguay through diplomatic and then military means. When these failed Buenos Aires turned to the establishment of an economic stranglehold.

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over Paraguayan commerce by denying the Paraguayans the right to navigate the Parana' and Plata river systems unless Paraguay would accept the political domination of Buenos Aires.

The failure of Buenos Aires to control even the various parts of modern Argentina and Uruguay did not improve Paraguay's situation. Now Paraguayan commerce was at the mercy of numerous caudillos who controlled the riverine areas and considered it their right to detain, tax heavily, or even seize commerce which came their way. This became virtual piracy. Although such actions severely handicapped Paraguayan trade potential, Francia did not waver from his policy of non-alignment.26

Francia apparently gave some consideration to the use of force to open up the river systems to Paraguayan commerce, but a realistic appraisal of the situation probably led him to reject such a plan. At any rate he decided that his desire for international commerce would have to be sacrificed to the more important objective of preserving Paraguay's independence. To achieve this objective he began to gradually cut Paraguay off from all contact with the other Spanish-speaking political groups in the Plata area.27

26Ibid., 51, 146-155, 203-208, 230-231.
27Ibid., 231; Pitau, Terra Vierzo, 33-37.
While Francia cut his nation off from contact with its former fellow colonies, he turned to Brazil and to establish political and commercial relations. In doing this he was attempting to use Brazil as a counterweight to pressures from the Plata. Yet these relations with Brazil did not prosper. Francia placed so many restrictions upon Paraguayan trade after 1825 that it was reduced to a mere trickle. In 1829 Francia also broke off diplomatic contact with Brazil. Several reasons lay behind this action: (1) Brazil had unsuccessfully attempted to pressure Paraguay to join an alliance directed at Argentina, (2) Brazil had not formally recognized the independence of Paraguay, (3) Brazil had not supplied promised arms, nor (4) been willing to settle a boundary dispute. 28

Once embarked upon this policy of isolation Francia must have realized, if he had not before, that it had the advantage of not only preserving Paraguayan independence, but also the advantage of building up his domestic position. 29 Most of the political leaders in the Plata basin had, at one time or another, been involved in intrigues against Francia, which led them to form connections with groups within Paraguay which were in opposition to Francia. Isolation was

28 Chaves, El supremo, 212-223; Ramos, política del Brasil, 27, 55, 124.
29 Robertson, Letters, II, 279.
a way to sever such dangerous connections.\textsuperscript{30} Enrique Wisner, the first biographer of Francia, asserts that the need for such a policy was poignantly demonstrated in 1320 when Francia discovered a conspiracy against him among members of the colonial upper class in cooperation with Francisco Ramírez, who at that time controlled Corrientes and part of the Banda Oriental. After crushing the plot and executing many of the members of the upper class Francia was convinced that all contact with the adjoining Argentine provinces had to be terminated. Thus, Francia proceeded to make it virtually impossible for an individual to enter or to leave Paraguay.\textsuperscript{31}

Francia also feared the designs of European states upon Paraguay: "... sostenía que los Estados del viejo mundo primero traerian sus productos y despues sus cañones."\textsuperscript{32} Francia held a special fear of Spain and France. He suspected that the former might secure the aid of the latter in


\textsuperscript{32}Justo Pastor Benítez, \textit{La vida solitaria del dr. José Gaspar de Francia} (Buenos Aires: n.p., 1937), 171.
reconquering her lost empire.*33 Such fears were based upon a complete miscalculation of the importance of Paraguay. This erroneous type of thinking also led Francia to make a proposal for a commercial and political alliance with England. Francia told J.P. Robertson, through whom he wanted to make the proposal, that if such an alliance were formed Paraguay would be "the first republic of South America, as Great Britain is already the first of the European nations. The alliance seems, therefore, natural..."*34

Once Francia had adopted this system of isolation, which Juan Bautista Alberdi has termed "el aislamiento hermético del Paraguay,"*35 he adhered rigidly to it. Francia even refused to answer diplomatic notes which other governments sent to him.*36

To maintain this policy of isolation Francia realized that Paraguay had to be self-sufficient economically. To achieve this autarkical policy Pitaud asserts that Francia "revolutionna l'économie du pays pour qu'il se suffise à lui-même."*37 This was not quite the case, as Paraguay was

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33Besserer, Ensayo histórico, 83-117.
34Robertson, Letters, II, 283-284.
35Juan Bautista Alberdi, Los intereses Argentinos en la guerra del Paraguay con el Brasil, Vol. VI of Obras Completas (Buenos Aires: La Tribuna Nacional Bolivar, 1933), 257.
36Wisner, El dictador, 134-135.
37Pitaud, Terre vierne, 47.
necessitates comprehensive structural adjustment to ensure the productivity of the open market. Discoveries and innovations are paramount to overcome the stagnation and stimulate economic growth.

Our nation requires a strategy to allow the economy to possess enough of an abundance of scope to exploit these resources. Although several remedies have been proposed, the method that best supports the government's comprehensive view of the extent of the situation is through a planned economy. At the expense of the private- or state-owned enterprises, these remedies were also successful.

These remedies were also successful because they were in the exponentiation of the situation or state-owned enterprises. Remedies supported the regulation within a short period of time that exemplified this regulation or state-owned enterprises.

For example, the government must recognize that the recovery of the economy will be slow and will take time as well.
To maintain this system and his position in it Francia established a totalitarian state, with absolute power in his hands: "Todo el gobierno... se halla reconcentrado en la persona del dictador." Francia held an undisputed sway over the army, governmental bureaucracy, and the church. He also maintained an extensive spy system which extended even to the opening of all the mail. If these techniques were not sufficient Francia did not hesitate to resort to force to crush the opposition.

Francia’s control over Paraguay was made easier by the fact that there was no group capable of organizing his overthrow. The only group which had possessed this potential was the small colonial elite, but it was eliminated as a resistance group in 1820 when Francia executed many of its leaders. The lower class Paraguayans, the bulk of the population, constituted no threat for Francia. This group apparently held Francia in high respect because, as a young lawyer, he had often defended the cause of the poor against the rich, without asking for compensation. Also, Francia’s severe measures were not taken against the Paraguayan masses, but instead against the elite.

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40 Ibid., 182.
41 Ibid., 218-219, 262-263; Chaves, El supremo, 192-199, 260-267.
42 Ibid., 51, 234-245.
43 Ibid., 16.
nature of Francia's regime enough to arouse opposition, for Paraguay had never known democracy as all of the colonial governments were autocratic. Thus Francia's administration seemed but a continuation of the past. Underlying all of these reasons was the character of the Paraguayan people. Foreign observers from the colonial period into the Francia reign were struck by the passiveness and docility of the Paraguayans. This was not an activist, let alone a revolutionary temperament.

The last half of Francia's era in Paraguay was a period in which he faced no serious threats. Domestically he ruled unchallenged. Externally Brazil came to honor Francia's policy of isolation, realizing that he would not align himself with Argentina against Brazil. Francia also managed to live in peace with Juan Manuel de Rosas, the dictator of Argentina. Rosas did not encroach upon Paraguayan soil and Francia in turn did not give shelter or aid to Rosas' numer-
cour enemies.

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44 Baez, La tiranía, 13.
45 Robertson, Letters, II, 302; Azara, descripción, 303; Mengger, Ensayo histórico, 273.
46 Enfrain Cardozo, El imperio del Brasil y el Río de la Plata: antecedentes y estallido de la Guerra del Paraguay (Buenos Aires: Librería del Plata, 1951), 44. Hereafter cited as imperio del Brasil.
While Paraguay retreated from contact with the nations beyond her borders, the second factor which influenced the early relations between the United States and Paraguay appeared. This was the Anglo-French intervention in the Río de la Plata basin. The cause for this intervention was the threatened dominance of Rosas over Uruguay. The two European powers had been concerned with the situation since 1842. However, their attempts to bring peace and to protect their commerce had been defeated through the intransigence of Rosas.\(^{48}\)

As the situation deteriorated even further during 1843 and 1844 the two European nations once more resumed an active role, this time at the urging of Brazil.

Brazil feared Argentine domination of Uruguay for three reasons: (1) she feared that if Rosas established his control in Uruguay he would threaten the existence of the Brazilian Empire by aiding the ever present separatist tendencies in her province of Río Grande do Sul, (2) she was opposed to Rosas design of reconstructing the colonial viceroyalty of the colonial viceroyalty of the Plata, (3) she had her own designs on Uruguay.\(^{49}\)

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Although it would have seemed logical for Brazil to aid the cause of Fructuoso Rivera, who was leading the Uruguayan opposition to Argentine domination, she adopted just the opposite policy. In March, 1843 she signed a treaty with Argentina which was directed against Rivera. The reason for this move was that Rivera had been aiding the revolution in Rio Grande do Sul. The Brazilian officials felt that by this treaty they would be able to crush this revolt and also participate in the pacification of Uruguay. However, these plans were upset when Rosas rejected the pact. This action by Rosas produced a definite change in the attitude of Brazil, which felt that Rosas was determined to control Uruguay.\footnote{Ibid.}

Brazil now turned to England for aid. Viscount Arbantes was sent to Europe in August of 1844. He was able to secure from Aberdeen a promise that England would send an armed neutral force to protect the sovereignty of Uruguay. But Aberdeen insisted that France's participation in the project had to be secured. France agreed to join, but Guizot in turn insisted that the Brazilians must be eliminated so as to keep up the appearance of a neutral intervention.\footnote{Cady, Intervention, 129-140. Cady points out that the real motivation was not the situation in the Rio de la Plata, but rather to help bring about a general rapprochement between England and France.} The Anglo-French intervention first took the form of mediation, but this approach was unsuccessful and the situation steadily
deteriorated until the two European powers declared a joint blockade of Buenos Aires on September 18, 1845. 52

Against the background of these events Paraguay began to move away from the isolationist policies of Francia. With the death of Francia a new dictator assumed control of Paraguay. This man was Carlos Antonio López. Daniel Ammen, an American naval officer, described López as a "large heavy man, apparently three-fourths Indian, fleshy, with massive jaws." 53 Visitors were also struck by the fact that López did not rise to greet them nor did he take off his hat, unless the visitors were of exceptional importance. Infrafron provides the following explanation for this unusual procedure:

Parece que su preocupación consistía en dar el mayor relace posible a su decoro oficial, pero quizás temieron de que consultando con alguien sobre materias protocolares revelara alguna ignorancia, reeditó por su cuenta en lo del sombrero, una usanza olvidada. 54

López continued the system of government which he had inherited from Francia, centralizing all power in his own hands. However, and in contrast to Francia, López wanted to introduce all of the technological advances of the nineteenth century into his remote nation. This did not


54 Infrafron, expedición, I, 31.
mean that he contemplated changing Paraguay into a laissez-faire state. For, in spite of the issuance of several decrees welcoming foreign enterprises, López maintained Francia's rigid state control over the economy.\(^{55}\)

López's first attempts to break with Francia's isolationist policy were marked with limited success in some cases and complete failure in others. To a large extent, however, López still suffered from the heritage of Francia:

Dr. Francia had created a nation, but he had not taught it that other nations existed and had rights. He had fostered a national self-consciousness of morbid intensity, and in this characteristic Carlos Antonio López was a typically provincial Paraguayan. He was the victim and defender of a tradition.\(^{56}\)

Another aspect of the lingering heritage of Francia was the ignorance of Paraguayans in matters of diplomacy, a fault which President López shared.\(^{57}\)

López displayed both of these handicaps in his first attempt to break with Francia's isolationist policy. In July, 1841 López signed a treaty with the rebellious Argentine province of Corrientes. This was a treaty of amity, commerce, and navigation and also contained provisions

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\(^{55}\) Bizé, Resumen, 58-59, El Paraguavo Independiente, September 6, 1845. Hereafter referred to as E.P.I.


\(^{57}\) Ramón J. Cárcano, Guerra del Paraguay, Orígenes y causas (Buenos Aires: Editoras Domingo Viau y Cía, 1939), 143. Hereafter cited as Orígenes.
relating to the demarcation of disputed boundaries between the two political entities. López, apparently unaware of the close relationship between Argentina and Paraguay, attempted to improve conditions by arranging a meeting between the two governments. Instead of recognizing Corrientes, López asked Rosas to recognize the independence of Paraguay. Rosas refused, pointing out that Paraguay had been completely independent since 1842. López soon felt the disfavor of Rosas. In December, 1842, he asked Rosas to recognize the independence of Paraguay, but Rosas did not reply until April 26, 1843. He refused to recognize the independence of Paraguay, but assured López that “las armas de la Confederación Argentina turbarán la paz y tranquilidad del pueblo paraguayo.”

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55. Tratado de amistad, comercio y navegación con el gobierno de Corrientes, Asunción, July 31, 1841, and tratado provisional de límites con el gobierno de Corrientes, Asunción, July 31, 1841. Both in Paraguay, Colección de tratados históricos, I, 21-24, 12-14.


points out that Rosas "Teme la protección del Paraguay a los unitarios insurrectos de Corrientes. Ensaya contenerlos entre el peligro y el halago." 62

López protested against Rosas' refusal, but took much of the sting out of his message when he added that he hoped Rosas would not obstruct commerce between the two nations. 63 Rosas, by this time occupied with the Anglo-French intervention, waited for seven months before reiterating his refusal to recognize Paraguay, this time on the dubious grounds that such an act would place both countries in great danger. However, he assured López that Argentina was disposed to maintain commercial and otherwise friendly relations with Paraguay. 64

It took Rosas only six months to forget this promise. As part of his campaign to defeat Corrientes, Rosas closed the Paraná to commerce. 65 At the same time relations between Corrientes and Paraguay became tense because the former seized several of the latter's commercial vessels. 66 López managed

62 Cárceles, Crímenes, 142.

63 López to Felipe Arana Argentine Minister of Foreign Relations, Asunción, August 30, 1843, quoted in Báez, diplomática, II, 709.

64 Rosas to López, Asunción, March 27, 1844, quoted in ibid., 9-10.

65 Rosas to López, Buenos Aires, October 3, 1844, quoted ibid., 12-14.

to resolve his differences with Corrientes by signing a treaty which provided for the searching of vessels. While this treaty stabilized Paraguayan-Corrientes relations it worsened relations between Paraguay and Argentina. Rosas was enraged over this treaty and in retaliation issued a decree denying all vessels the right to leave from any port of the Argentine Confederation for Paraguay or Corrientes. On January 17, 1845 General Obre, Rosas' puppet in Uruguay, issued a similar decree.

Roses actions against Paraguay were not only in retaliation for López's dealings with Corrientes, but also because Paraguay had drawn close to Brazil. On September 14, 1844 Brazil had recognized Paraguayan independence. Less than a month later the two nations signed a treaty in which Brazil promised to help Paraguay secure the recognition of her independence and to attempt to prevent the outbreak of hostilities between Argentina and Paraguay. If, however, the latter occurred Brazil pledged herself to secure for

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67 Treaty between Paraguay and Corrientes, December 2, 1844, quoted ibid., 16-17.
68 Rosas to López, Buenos Aires, January 8, 1845, quoted ibid., 17.
69 Obre to López, Cuartel General, January 17, 1845, quoted in E.P.I., July 19, 1845.
70 Jose Antonio Fiminta Bueno Brazilian Minister to Paraguay, to Lopez, Asuncion, September 14, 1844, quoted in Colección de tratados, 1, 319.
Paraguay just and complete satisfaction for any injuries she received.\footnote{71}

Brazil's objective was to keep López from an accommodation with Rosas. Brazil believed that only through the preservation of Paraguayan independence could she hold her provinces of Rio Grande do Sul, Sao Paulo, and Matto Grasso. That Brazil accomplished her objective was demonstrated by two events. First, Rosas protested vigorously against Brazil's recognition of Paraguayan independence.\footnote{72} Second, Corrientes and Paraguay signed an offensive and defensive military alliance.\footnote{73} Box and Cardozo assert that in taking this action López was acting as a tool of the Brazilians, who were pursuing their traditional scheme of breaking Argentina up into small independent states.\footnote{74} On the other hand Baez points out that at this time the English and French fleets had just forced their way up the Parana River. Therefore the moment seemed opportune to López to join with the various anti-Rosas forces.\footnote{75}

\begin{itemize}
\item \footnote{71}{Treaty of Alliance, Commerce, Navigation, Extradition, and Lands, Asuncion, October 7, 1844, quoted in ibid., 320-330.}
\item \footnote{72}{Box, Origenes, I, 18-20.}
\item \footnote{73}{Treaty of Alliance, Offensive and Defensive, Asuncion, November 11, 1845, quoted in Coleccion de tratados, I, 33-40.}
\item \footnote{74}{Box, Origenes, I, 20-21; Cardozo, Imperio del Brasil, 45.}
\item \footnote{75}{Baez, Resumen, 78.}
\end{itemize}
**Rose**

The peace treaty would not attain with the English and French agents.

**differences between Argentina and Paraguay** so that the efforts of the United States focused on reconciling the efforts of the United States appeared in Paraguay. The diplomat

It was at this point that the French diplomat agreed.
The first direct intimation which the United States received of the change in Paraguay's relations vis-a-vis the outside world came in the Spring of 1843 from the Paraguayan Minister Plenipotentiary to Buenos Aires, Andrés Gil, who was seeking recognition of his nation's independence from various governments.\(^1\) Gil informed the United States Consul in Buenos Aires, Amory Edwards, that Paraguay held "most friendly" feelings towards the United States and that any citizen of the United States going to Paraguay would receive the same treatment that Paraguay accorded to her own citizens, adding that the government of Paraguay wished to "see the flag of the United States in their waters."\(^2\)

Edwards was enthusiastic over the prospects of opening relations with Paraguay. Although there is no evidence to indicate that Edwards had reliable information at hand he informed Secretary of State Webster that Paraguay was probably

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the most fertile area in South America and would offer
the United States a market for a "large amount of manufac-
tured cottons and flours, giving in return, dry hides, coffee,
indigo..." Edwards also ventured the opinion that Para-
guay, because of her location in the middle of the South
American continent, "must soon exercise a most important
role in the politics of the South American states...."3

This preliminary intimation by Gil was followed in Nov-
ember of 1843 by a formal request from President López that
the United States ("the Great North American Confederacy")
recognize the independence of Paraguay.4 Once again the
Paraguayan request had the vigorous support of Edwards, who,
in addition to repeating his previous arguments, added that
Paraguay was reserved in its attitude towards Great Britain
and apparently looked to the United States as its principal
support.5

In response to these promptings Secretary of State John
C. Calhoun asked the new United States Charge d'Affaires
at Buenos Aires, William Brent, to obtain information about
Paraguay for the Department.6 From the instructions which
were drawn up for the first United States diplomatic agent

3Ibid.

4López to Edwards, Asunción, August 28, 1843, Enclosure in Edwards to Webster, Buenos Aires, November 10, 1843, Consul-

5Ibid.

6Calhoun to Brent, Buenos Aires, July 15, 1844, Instruc-
to Paraguay it would seem that Brent supplied little or no information.

These instructions were drawn up for Edward Augustus Hopkins, who was appointed as Special Agent to Paraguay on June 10, 1845. Why Hopkins was appointed to this position is an interesting question. He did not seem to possess the usual qualifications for such an appointment. His earlier career certainly did not recommend him for such an assignment. Hopkins, the son of John Henry Hopkins, the first Protestant Episcopal Bishop of Vermont, had entered the United States Navy in 1840 and had served as a midshipman until 1845. During this period of naval service he had been court martialed three times, with the charges against him ranging from "disobedience of orders" to "scandalous conduct, quarreling, and using provoking and reproachful words." Hopkins was charged with striking fellow officers and threatening the life of a policeman after he had been arrested for breaking windows on shore. Commodore Daniel


8Military Archives, National Archives, Court Martial Records, Vol. XXXXIII, no. 842 and Vol. XLI, no. 786.

9F. H. Gregory, Captain of the U.S. Frigate Harriet, to the Secretary of the Navy, Rio de Janeiro, June 17, 1844. Brazil Squadron, Commodore Charles Morris, December 16, 1841 to November 3, 1842; Commander Daniel Turner, April 19, 1844 to April 28, 1845. Department of Navy, Naval Records Collections of the Office of Naval Records and Library (RG 45). These records, located in the Military Archives of the National Archives in Washington, D.C.
Turner of the Brazilian Squadron stated: "In all my experience I have never known so insubordinate and lawless an officer. . . ."¹⁰

Hopkins appears to have had a many sided but not very complex personality. His personal characteristics were fully displayed in his activities as a special agent and were to have a profound effect upon the result of his mission. Hopkins consistently demonstrated excessive self-confidence, which usually led him to underestimate the problems and/or the people with whom he was dealing. Hopkins was also very impressionable. This quality was coupled with a lack of perceptiveness. The result was his penchant to make hasty judgements which were often completely wrong. These qualities were capped by a quick temper, or, at best, an unpredictable temperament. Hopkins also suffered from a severe case of Europhobia, more especially Anglophobia and made constant references to the sinister workings of English gold.

Yet Hopkins did have some characteristics which were not completely negative. For instance, he had a lively imagination "at all times ready to help out where facts were wanting, and a volubility that could deluge with assertions whoever opposed him in controversy." Nor did he suffer from the handicap of modesty: "He had not the great fault of most of his countrymen, of being embarrassed and hampered

¹⁰ Turner to the Secretary of the Navy, Rio de Janeiro, June 22, 1844, ibid.
by excessive modesty." Hopkins was also a man of tremendous drive and energy, possessing the ability to inspire others to have confidence in his plans, although "he was of so arrogant and overbearing a disposition that no one could long act with him in any enterprise." Washburne also points out that Hopkins was a fine musician who could sing a song or play the guitar in "a way that astonished the simple Paraguayans."11

Just how all of these attributes entitled Hopkins to the appointment he received is not clear. Hopkins stated that at the time of his appointment he was still in the United States Navy, although he resigned soon after receiving the appointment.13 Certainly the naval career of Hopkins was no recommendation since the third court martial had recommended his dismissal, and it was only the intervention of President Tyler which made it possible for him to resign.14 Perhaps the reason for his appointment was his belief in the great commercial possibilities of the interior of South America.

11 Charles Ames Washburne, The History of Paraguay, with Notes of Personal Observations, and Reminiscences of Diplomacy Under Difficulties (Boston: Lee and Shepard, 1871), 1, 353. Hereafter cited as Paraguay. Washburne was the United States Minister to Paraguay throughout most of the 1860's, a tenure marked by an amazingly consistent record of failure. Washburne's lack of success, however, did not make him more sympathetic to Hopkins.

12 Ibid., 354.

13 "My Life Record," quoted in Ynsfran, expedicion, I, Appendix III, 249.

14 Peterson, Hispanic American Historical Review, XXI, 247.
This, and the fact that the post was so insignificant.

Hopkins emphasized the first and perhaps inferred the second when he said, in describing the manner of his appointment,

... having been appointed U.S. Special Agent to Paraguay without any political influence whatever, owing to a memorial I wrote to President Polk of my desires to open Paraguay and Bolivia to the contact of the world, and establish steam navigation on the river Plate and affluents.¹⁵

Perhaps Hopkins' memorial did have some effect, for in his instructions Secretary of State Buchanan stated that this "interesting country" had not received from the United States the attention "which its importance demands."

Buchanan went on to instruct Hopkins to point out to Paraguay the danger of entangling alliances, citing the beneficial results of this policy for the United States. Hopkins was also told to determine the political situation in the Plata area. Buchanan was especially interested in the designs of Argentina upon Paraguay and wanted to know if Argentina intended to cut Paraguay off from international

¹⁵"My Life Record," quoted in Ysfran, expedicion, I, Appendix III, 249. Hopkins petition is not in the State Department Records in the National Archives. Hopkins retained this visionary concept of the area throughout his and was long active with various designs, especially in Argentina. See Victor L. Johnson, "Edward A. Hopkins and the Development of Argentine Transportation and Communication," Hispanic American Historical Review, XXVI (February, 1946), 19-37. Hopkins apparently picked up this interest in the Plata region while serving with the Brazil Squadron. Perhaps he also became interested in this area through the influence of his father, who, at one time, had almost gone to South America to establish a foundry. See John Henry Hopkins, Autobiography In Verse (Cambridge: Riverside Press, n.d.), 37-38.
contacts by forbidding her the use of the Parana and Plata rivers. If Hopkins found the latter to be the case he was to "assure the authorities of Paraguay that the government of the United States, should this become necessary, will freely interpose its good offices with that of Buenos Ayres to induce it to open that river to the trade of other nations." 16

Buchanan also instructed Hopkins to send the Department a copy of the constitution of Paraguay and to provide information on the manner in which the government was administered under it. Hopkins was to answer a number of additional questions on Paraguay so that the Department would have more detailed information on that country, especially on the amount of its foreign commerce and its possibilities for trade with the United States.

On the question of recognition Buchanan said:

Should the government have proceeded in regular order, maintaining the rights and performing all of the duties of an Independent Power, more especially should it have been treated as such by the surrounding nations, the President will not fail to recommend to Congress at its next session the recognition of its independence. Should it have acquired, in your opinion, the firmness and consistency of an independent nation, you might suggest that the President would be pleased to see a diplomatic agent from Paraguay in the United States on the next meeting of Congress in December next; and that he entertains not the least doubt but that its independence would be speedily recognized by that enlightened body. 17

17 Ibid.
However, Buchanan cautioned Hopkins that before he should take such action he must be well satisfied by a thorough inquiry that "Paraguay is in fact an independent nation and is capable of maintaining her independence."

The last paragraph of Buchanan's instructions are interesting because they reveal that the Secretary of State had some doubts about sending Hopkins on this mission. It also foreshadows the difficulties with which Hopkins was to become involved. In it Buchanan said:

"The industry and zeal which you have manifested in collecting information on the subject and presenting it before the President, have mainly caused your selection for the mission, notwithstanding that you are younger than most of those to whom such trusts have been confided, he is willing to repose confidence in your ability and discretion. I doubt not your conduct will justify this confidence. Your success may depend upon your perfect control over your temper, under all circumstances, and upon your prudence in abstaining from the least intimation that you are a government agent, unless this shall be clearly necessary to accomplish the objects of your mission."

Buchanan did not explain how Hopkins was to convey these instructions to the Paraguayan Government and still keep his mission secret. Or was Hopkins to keep the mission secret from the other nations? This desire for secrecy would have placed the most experienced and capable diplomat in a very trying situation; since Hopkins was neither capable nor experienced, the situation was almost impossible.

18Ibid.
When Hopkins arrived in Rio de Janeiro in August, 1845, he found the Anglo-French intervention eminent and the American diplomats accredited to Brazil and Argentina very concerned. These men, William Brent at Buenos Aires and Henry Wise, the American Minister in Brazil, were convinced that the British and the French intended to use an intervention to impose their hegemony over the Plata, while ostensibly protecting Uruguay. Although Wise had reservations about Rosas which Brent did not have, they were in substantial agreement that Rosas, in opposing the Anglo-French intervention, was acting as the protector of hemispheric interests.

Both men felt that the United States should not stand by passively in this coming struggle, though they had no authorization from Washington to take any kind of action. In spite of this handicap both men were active in attempting to thwart what they considered the evil designs of the European nations upon American soil.

William Brent had offered his "mediation or services" on April 11, 1845 to Argentina in its dispute with Montevideo. Brent later admitted that he made this offer because Argentina

19 See above pages 18-20

20 This is the Henry A. Wise (1806-1876) who was a prominent figure in American domestic politics in the period preceding the Civil War. See Henry A. Wise, Seven Decades of the Union (Richmond: J.W. Randall and English, 1881).

had requested it. Brent revealed that he had even gone so far as to remove his original stipulation that it be considered as a confidential offer. Felipe Arana, the Argentine Minister of Foreign Affairs, appears to have encountered no serious obstacles in persuading Brent that he could make this offer even though it was not authorized by Washington. Brent reported that:

At the time they made this request they stated to me that it was obvious that the circumstances under which the note was addressed having taken place since my departure from the United States no specific instructions could have been given to me in relation to it. But at the same time that if the spirit of my instructions would admit me to make the proffer public it would be highly agreeable and eminently useful to them and they were sure it would aid greatly to the determination of peace.

Arana's disingenuous reasoning had the desired effect upon Brent, so that

I felt that the spirit of my instructions did allow me to take such a position. Knowing too that I had been sent out 'for the purpose of confirming between the United States, and the Government of the Argentine Confederation perfect harmony and good correspondence; and seeing that this was a matter highly interesting to the two nations, and an opportunity eminently tending to confirm this harmony, and good correspondence between the Governments, I did not hesitate to accede to the request of the Argentine Government.

Before Brent had begun his "mediation or services" the English and French Ministers arrived, also to attempt to arrange the difficulties between Montevideo and Rosas.

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22 Brent to Buchanan, Buenos Aires, August 2, 1845, ibid.

23 See above, pages 17-18.
Upon their arrival Brent changed his tactics. He called for a joint meeting of Arana, William Guseley of Great Britain, and Baron Deffaudes of France. Brent also proposed his own inclusion in the meeting. In this move Brent appears to have been acting as a "tool" of Rosas, who undoubtedly wanted Brent included in the mediation because of his decidedly pro-Argentine outlook. However, it should be pointed out that Brent believed that he was acting in a manner which best served the interests of the United States. Guseley was initially favorable to the idea, but Deffaudes was opposed killing the idea on the grounds that his instructions contemplated his action only in conjunction with Guseley. The real reason for their rejection of Brent was that he was, they believed, a tool of Rosas.


26 Guseley gave the following opinion of Brent: "The fact is that Mr. Brent, young in diplomacy, although of advanced age, - and anxious to render himself conspicuous in his first diplomatic appointment, and ambitious of placing the United States before the world as exclusively the champion of all America and especially of these Republics - is a ready tool in the hands of General Rosas. The Governor, working on his senile vanity, and flattering his personal and strong national prejudices and hostility to England, causes him to write notes, call diplomatic meetings, make protests . . . ." Quoted in Cady, Intervention, 148. On one occasion Brent is supposed (there is no documentation for the
Although Brent offered to withdraw his offer of "friendly services" and consequently played no role in the ensuing mediation, the attempts of the English and French collapsed. The failure of these negotiations was signaled by the announcement on September 20, 1845 of a joint Anglo-French naval blockade of the coasts of Argentina.

With this development, which Brent had long feared, the American Charge once more plunged into a frenzy of activity. On September 23rd he informed the blockading powers that the United States did not acknowledge the validity of the blockade and stated that the United States would demand recompenses for its citizens who suffered from the blockade. Brent also publicly urged Rosas to resist the blockade. Brent's actions elicited a protest from Great Britain, and Louis McLane, the American Minister to Great Britain, was informed

quote) to have introduced himself to Ouseley with the following remark: "Yo soy el representante de la doctrina de Monroe y del espíritu monarca. . . ." See Carlos Pereyra, Rosas y Thiers: la diplomacia europea en el Río de la Plata (1830-1850) (Buenos Aires: Talleres Gráficos de Padilla & Contreras, 1944), 175.

27 Brent to Arana, Buenos Aires, July 26, 1845, Despatches, Argentina, Vol. 5, R.G. 59.


29 Brent to Ouseley, Buenos Aires, September 23, 1845, Enclosed in Brent to Buchanan, Buenos Aires, September 23, 1845, Despatches, Argentina, Vol. 5, R.G. 59.
that Brent's activities had seriously embarrassed England and France. 30

While Brent was engaging in his unsuccessful course in Buenos Aires, Wise was active in Rio de Janeiro. In November, 1844, almost a year before the realization of the Anglo-French blockade, and at the same time that Abrantes was sent to England, Wise was approached by Francia, the Brazilian Foreign Minister. The latter inquired of Wise if the United States would unite with Brazil in putting an end to the war between Montevideo and Argentina by force, if necessary, rather than permit England and France to intervene. Wise replied

that the United States had long assumed and acted on the policy to prevent European intervention in the wars of North America, and that they had even interposed to protect South American states, and I had no doubt that they would approve the same course on the part of Brazil in this instance, and would interpose their good offices to arrest the war of Montevideo.

The ambiguity of Wise's reply to Francia was not matched by the explicit recommendations which he made to Calhoun. Wise urged the Secretary of State to lead the United States into a larger role in the affairs of South America. Wise stated that the United States was looked to as the power whose

30Mo Lane to Buchanan, London, October 3, 1845, Despatches, England, Vol. 55, R.G. 59. An interesting aspect of this note is the following section: "Lord Aberdeen said that England and France had not invited the cooperation of the United States from any want of respect towards us, but, on the contrary, that they would have been most happy of our cooperation, if they had supposed we could have been induced to give it."
interposition would be regarded with the most favor by all parties. He pointed out that he felt that Rosas was amenable to American mediation and that either he or Brent could carry out such a mandate.

However, in January, 1845 Wise seems to have changed his course. He revealed to Calhoun that he had been urging Brazil to take the initiative by offering her good offices in the dispute between Argentina and Montevideo. Then Wise switched back to his original course when the possibility of an Anglo-French intervention seemed to become more and more distinct. In July, 1845 he sent to Secretary of State Buchanan a message in which he pointed out that the action of the United States stood a good chance for success because of the trust which Rosas had in Brent. He asserted that if the United States would settle the Argentine-Montevideo dispute and thwart the English and French she would become the protector and benefactor of the cause of the American states and secure a vast extension of her commerce. All this could be obtained, he pointed out, without departing from the established and wise policy of non-interference and of avoiding all entangling alliances, and without committing themselves the United States to any


32 Wise to Calhoun, Rio de Janeiro, January 12, 1845, ibid.
The agreement made by the governments of the United States and Great Britain had been withdrawn, and the United States had rejected the proposal. The United States had made it clear that they were not willing to enter into a new agreement with Great Britain.

It was at this moment that the possibility of a conflict between France and Italy had been mentioned. The French government had expressed its concern over the conflict, and it was feared that a conflict between France and Italy could lead to a war.

The French and Italian governments had been working together to try to prevent a conflict between the two countries. However, it was feared that a conflict could not be avoided.

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situation and told him to impress upon the Paraguayans that if his plan were successful, Paraguay would secure Argentine recognition of her independence. Wise also urged that in attempt to get Rosas to voluntarily grant recognition to Paraguay.

Hopkins' correspondence clearly indicates that he generally accepted the ideas of Wise, although with his usual "modesty" he gave the impression that the ideas were his own. The only point where the two men seem to have differed was on the role of Brazil. While Wise did not suspect Brazil of aligning with the intervention, Hopkins definitely did. Hopkins felt that Brazil was cooperating with the intervention for reasons of self-aggrandizement and also to set up petty monarchies in South America. Hopkins believed that only Rosas ("this sterling upholder of republican principles") was opposing European ("the unrighteous league") designs. Nevertheless Hopkins shared Wise's opinion of the dangerous consequences of Paraguay's joining with the intervention. Therefore Hopkins urged that the State Department give Wise sufficient powers to put his plan into effect. In the meantime Hopkins said that he would urge Paraguay to send a

35 Ibid.; Buchanan's instructions to Hopkins definitely disprove Hill's assertion that Hopkins was "appointed a special agent to aid in carrying on the negotiations to settle the Argentine-Paraguayan difficulties." See Lawrence F. Hill, *Diplomatic Relations Between the United States and Brazil* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1932), 107-108.

special deputation to Argentina. He was certain that such a move would settle the difficulties between the two states.\textsuperscript{37} Hopkins was delighted at the prospect of so easy a coup:

I am sufficiently amused at the prospects of so quietly and securely outwitting the cabinets of these two monarchies joined with Brazil, whilst they think that we sit by and calmly look on, afraid or unwilling to interfere, we are ruining all their hopes, and prostrating all their plans.\textsuperscript{38}

The last sentence is interesting in that it reveals that Hopkins, because of his suspicion of Brazil, felt that he should concentrate on bringing about an agreement between Argentina and Paraguay.

Sometime after the middle of August Hopkins and his interpreter-secretary, Alejandro Bagust, set out for Paraguay by going overland through Brazil. Hopkins had disguised himself as a scientific man, but in the now subdued province of Rio Grande do Sul he aroused so much curiosity ("even to the extent of walking into our rooms uninvited") that he adopted the "simple character of a literatus in pursuit of historical information."\textsuperscript{39} The change was not 

\textsuperscript{37}Hopkins to Buchanan, Rio de Janeiro, August 5, 1845, Despatches, Special Agents, Vol. XIII, R.G. 59.

\textsuperscript{38}Hopkins to Buchanan, Rio Grande do Sul, Brazil, August 26, 1845, \textit{ibid}.

\textsuperscript{39}Hopkins to Buchanan, Rio Grande do Sul, September 19, 1845, \textit{ibid}. 
very effective for Wise was forced to admit to the Brazilian government the true nature of Hopkins' mission. 40

While at Rio Grande do Sul Hopkins also heard that three ships, which Hopkins believed to be French, were on their way to Paraguay to conclude an alliance between France and Paraguay. In order to beat this expedition to Paraguay, Hopkins traveled on horseback for one month and ten days reaching the Paraguayan capital of Asunción on November 8, 1845.

Hopkins was apparently given a very warm reception in Paraguay. He describes his progress toward Asunción as meeting with "receptions at every post on the way." Placed at his disposal was

a small band of soldiers and an officer as a guard of honor. Consequently, wherever I stopped, I found all prepared for me with the greatest care and attention. The night preceding my entry into the capital I slept at Bacoleta, one league from the city, and was accompanied in the morning by four judges of the Court of Appeals, to the 'quartel de honoras,' where I was received by the Minister of Commerce. v . . . 41

However, it appears that Hopkins' imagination was at work, for as Ynsfran points out:

En el Paraguay de aquel entonces no había Corte de Apelaciones, ni ministro de Comercio, ni "quartel

40 Wise to Buchanan, Rio de Janeiro, September 16, 1845, Despatches, Brazil, Vol. 15, R.G. 59.

41 Hopkins to Buchanan, Asuncion, November 31, 1845, Special Agents, Vol. 13, R.G. 59. Hopkins obviously misdated this note. Not only is there no November 31st, but Hopkins also relates events which took place up to the middle of December.
pronominal and structural some that
noted the "secret" update of "republican
and popular" has been of the most important and adequate
in doubt in my mind that the conduct of General Ross
through Pennsylvania eyes. He informed Burnham that there was
under the influence of the very favorable impression

Hoptite would alter these opinions drastically
like our own. It is not possible to know more about Pennsylvania
least each day, and it is possible to know more popular, and considerable
the people, according to Hoptite, live in "contentment and
contrast that it is possible to the state of Pennsylvania. But at least one particularly so in the strong
understatement, ventured that it was not exactly the case of the government of Pennsylvania; however, in one of his note
other people on the contentment. However, on the subject
the extent to which these menaces are carried to far superior to any
the "considered opinion was that the Pennsylvania were in
the experience very favorably impressed with Pennsylvania
expenditure of the infrastructure on houses in the case of

de honores? Pese uttimo solo se le pudo contar e un
On the same day that he arrived (November 8th) Hopkins had his first interview with President López. He delivered the following message to the Paraguayan President:

Vengo a estudiar la situación y los recursos del Paraguay a fin de que el gobierno de los Estados Unidos reconozca su independencia y se inciencen vinculaciones comerciales entre nuestros dos países. Mi gobierno tiene interés en que el Paraguay se mantenga al margen de la intervención europea, y de ser posible la resista, pues, contra todo derecho y conveniencia de las Américas, esa intervención significa una inervencia en los asuntos de la Plata que no hará sino complicarlos todavia más.  

46 The Brazilian Minister in Asuncion, Pimenta Bueno reveals that this message was not what López had hoped for from the United States. The Paraguayan President asked Hopkins three times if he did not have an additional message. Hopkins replied in the negative on each occasion. López then proclaimed that Paraguay did not have to reveal her domestic condition in order to obtain recognition of her independence. According to Bueno, López added que entonces sin exigencias pensaría sobre las relaciones que conviene abrir con los Estados Unidos que actualmente ni a provenían cual sería su política a respeto de la intervención; que entretanto agradecia mucho a boa vontado dos Estados Unidos, e assim despachou Hopkins.  

47 Pimenta Bueno to Limpo de Abreu, Brazilian Foreign Minister, Asuncion, December 5, 1845, quoted in Ynsfrán, expedición, 1,50.
The reason behind López' very negative response to Hopkins' mission was that the Paraguayan President was pushing to complete his alliance with Corrientes. When he had heard of the arrival of Hopkins on Paraguayan soil on November 6th he had decided to wait and see what Hopkins' instructions were and the nature of his mission. López had apparently hoped for some kind of aid from the United States in his struggle with Rosas and thus was severely disappointed when his interview with Hopkins indicated that it was not forthcoming.

On the day after his first interview with López the Brazilian Minister, Pimenta Bueno, and Hopkins had an interview which had far-reaching consequences. Hopkins recorded Bueno as saying that Brazil was opposed to the Anglo-French intervention "tooth and nail." Bueno insisted that the Arbantes mission had asked only that Britain and France intervene peacefully to settle a boundary dispute between Brazil and Uruguay. Bueno impressed upon Hopkins the fact that Brazil shared the attitude of the United States towards the Anglo-French intervention. The Brazilian Minister pointed out to Hopkins that Brazil felt that it was for the United States to settle the controversy by quick action through Brent and Wise. Hopkins was elated with this information and asked Bueno from where he had obtained it.

48 See above, pages
49 Chaves, Presidente López, 83.
He stated that Senor Llimpo Abreu had held a conference with Mr. Wise, the very day I left Rio. I no longer hesitated to tell him that it was the exact policy of my government, and in fact the only policy she could pursue. He at once grasped my hand with the utmost joy. He then offered me every facility of communication with Mr. Wise, by special express through Brazilian territory, the President of Paraguay doing his share to her borders, which I immediately accepted.50

Hopkins did not inform the Secretary of State of that which was said after the proceeding exchanges. According to Bueno, Hopkins went on to say that his mission was to mediate between Paraguay and Argentina. When Bueno asked Hopkins why he did not inform Lopez of this in their interview Hopkins replied: "Porque antes quería conocer su modo de pensar y su repuesta categórica y áspera no me dio tiempo."51

At this point Hopkins was exceeding his instructions since Buchanan had not authorized him to become involved in any such manner. The stimulus which Hopkins did receive to push him towards such a course was a message from Wise to tell Lopez that the American Minister in Brazil would be glad to be "the medium of any communications" and "to be the instrument of any kind offices to her in behalf of the U. States."52 In view of the inability of Wise to undertake mediation it is impossible that he should have envisioned

50 Hopkins to Buchanan, November 31, 1845, loc. cit.
51 Bueno to H.M.E., Asunción, December 5, 1845, quoted in ibid., 87.
52 Wise to Buchanan, July 31, 1845, loc. cit.
Hopkins taking such a course. Hopkins offered no explanation for his move. Perhaps it was another of his impulsive moves; perhaps he did not understand the difference between kindly offices and mediation; perhaps it was his fondness for the spotlight.

Upon learning that Hopkins intended to offer his mediation Bueno received the permission of Hopkins to so inform the Paraguayan President. Bueno urged López to accept the offer and to give it a chance for success by holding off on the ratification of the military pact between Corrientes and Paraguay. López indicated to Bueno that he would accept Hopkins' mediation although he did not expect it to be successful. However, López refused to delay the signing of the military alliance with Corrientes, reminding Bueno that the United States was "muy lejos", while Corrientes and her army were "muy cerca."53

Hopkins formally made the offer of mediation during his second interview with López on November 10th. Hopkins first informed López that the United States would recognize Paraguay's independence at the next session of Congress. This violated his instructions, as Buchanan clearly did not envision that Hopkins would make such an unconditional statement.54 Hopkins then went on to say that he was offering

53 Ibid.
54 See above, page 33.
mediation as he was authorized to do. López could have put an end to Hopkins mediatory efforts if he had asked to see Hopkins' credentials. He did not take even this rudimentary precaution, instead he accepted Hopkins' passport in lieu of credentials. The Paraguayan President seemed as ignorant of diplomatic procedures as the American Special Agent.

Although López was pleased with Hopkins' statement on recognition, he seemed indifferent to the offer of mediation. He stated that he would reply to it later and pointed out that he intended to go through with his alliance with Corrientes. The next day he ratified this alliance. Hopkins had long recognized the dangerous implications of such a pact for his plans for an Argentine-Paraguayan rapprochement. While still in Rio Grande do Sul he had received the misinformation that the pact had already been ratified. He termed it an "egregious error" but added that once he got to Paraguay he was certain that he could get her to correct her mistake. Hopkins had attempted to do this in his interview on November 10th with López, but had been unsuccessful. After the pact was ratified by


56 Bueno to H.M.E., December 5, 1845, loc. cit.

57 See above, page

Paraguay Hopkins informed Buchanan that he would confine his efforts to preventing a league between Paraguay and England. He apparently meant that he would do this through his mediation efforts by bringing about a settlement of the difficulties between Paraguay and Argentina.

Hopkins, confident as usual, was sure that he could accomplish the task: "This can easily be done. It is my policy to let Paraguay fight Rosas on her own account if she must, until I hear from you, but keep out European influences."59 Hopkins did not explain how he was going to keep Paraguay from reaching an agreement with Britain in the event of a Paraguayan-Argentine clash. Nor did he seem to have realized that whether Paraguay did or did not reach an understanding with England and France, a war between Argentina and Paraguay would have the result which both Brent and Wise feared; Rosas would have to fight land forces in the north as well as the Anglo-French naval forces.60

On December 5, 1845, López informed Hopkins that he accepted the mediation of the United States. He laid three conditions. First, that Rosas immediately recognize the independence of Paraguay. Second, Rosas was to promise, backed with a guarantee by the United States, that as soon as circumstances permitted a treaty of navigation and limits

59 Hopkins to Buchanan, November 31, 1845, loc. cit.
60 See above, page 35; and below, page 61.
he better that went and were in very effect of position, and the argument was not brought between persuade and argument. Another reason was one was that he did not really understand the nature of the beginning Hopkins determined to carry on the mediation. He called them "moderate" several reasons. I say Hopkins was not deterred by the terms which I hope I had.

69 reference Independent 69
that he did not mention the mediation in the official Gazette, that he did not mention the mediation in the official Gazette, Newfoundland Independent 69, another indication of Pope's lack of confidence was the fact it he also joined with contemporaries to decry war upon Russia. Hopkins was interested in that on the day before he accepted.

After the consumption of a General Peace. In paragon - counter motive would not be considered until there is free indication. Indeed, that the question of the paragon would be stated which would secure the opening of the paragon.
Minister at Rio de Janeiro has been directed by Rosas, in all things, to take the advice of Mr. Wise. More substantial than this was a promise which Hopkins said that López made to reduce his commitment to Corrientes from 12,000 to 4,000 men and to restrict them to defensive purposes.

Acting upon these faulty premises Hopkins set about implementing his mediation offer. He requested Wise to obtain information concerning Rosas' attitude toward the Paraguayan demands. He also requested Buchanan to give him adequate powers to carry out the mediation, while humbly pointing out the anxiety which he was enduring for his country:

Thus every feeling of my nature is ready to help such suffering moderation and such affectionate advances as these. But, every throb of patriotic blood burns in my veins, and every thought of love for my country, in which I claim not to be the least among my brethren, swells in my brain, when I think that I am here tied hand and foot, powerless, profitless.

Hopkins also informed the Department that it was important to have a commissioner at Asunción. He nominated himself for the position of course. He terminated his pleas with the dramatic demand: "Either give me the power to act or tell me to come home." It would be almost six months before Buchanan would reply.

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64 Hopkins to Buchanan, September 16, 1845, loc. cit.
65 Hopkins to Buchanan, November 31, 1845, loc. cit.
66 Ibid.
67 Ibid.
This correspondence would seem to indicate that Hopkins planned to remain in Asuncion, where he could attempt to keep López from joining the intervention while Brent and Wise carried on the negotiations. However, on January 1, 1846 Hopkins left Asuncion for Rio de Janeiro. He later explained to Buchanan that he became convinced of the utter fruitlessness of remaining in Paraguay until he heard from Washington. He also said that he did not want to trust his important dispatches to "menial hands" and thought that his personal appearance would quicken events because of his recent arrival from Paraguay.

While Hopkins was in Paraguay Wise had been attempting to keep alive the idea of good offices from Rio de Janeiro. His hopes for the success of this venture had undergone a series of ups and downs. In September, 1845, immediately after Hopkins left for Paraguay, Wise was very optimistic because of conversation which he had had with General Tomas Guido, the Argentine Minister in Brazil. In response to a question from Wise on the reaction of Argentina to possible recognition of Paraguayan independence by the United States, Guido replied confidentially that the independence of Paraguay was already established and that there was no way for Bosan to fight this fact. Therefore, continued Guido, "I

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think that a recognition of Paraguay by the U. States would be approved by the Argentine Republic.69

However, Wise’s mood had soon changed to one of depression. When he heard of the Paraguayan-Corrientes military alliance he believed that his plans were ruined.70 Then his hopes were revived once again when he received a communication from Hopkins informing him that he was attempting to pacify López and asking him to request that Brent attempt to do the same with Rosas.71 Wise by this time had received a copy of Hopkins’ instructions and was apparently concerned with Hopkins’ unauthorized offer of mediation. He states that he wrote a letter to Hopkins on January 12th hoping that he had merely offered the “good offices” of the United States and had given no guarantees or in any other manner interfered in the internal affairs of any nation.72

In spite of these doubts Wise sent Robert M. Walsh, the secretary of the American legation in Rio de Janeiro, with a message to Brent that informed him of Hopkins’

69 Wise to Buchanan, Rio de Janeiro, August 27, 1845, Despatches, Brazil, Vol. 15, R.G. 59. Guido was deliberately misleading Wise. See below, page 69.

70 Wise to Buchanan, Rio de Janeiro, November 24, 1845, Despatches, Brazil, Vol. 14, R.G. 59.

71 Wise to Buchanan, Rio de Janeiro, January 12, 1846, ibid., Vol. 15.

72 Wise to Buchanan, Rio de Janeiro, January 11, 1846, ibid.
actions and urged Brent to try to obtain Rosas' acceptance of López' terms.73

No one was more surprised with the appearance of Hopkins in Rio de Janeiro than Wise. Wise had assumed that Hopkins would stay in Asuncion with a view to keeping López from joining the Anglo-French intervention, especially as the two European nations had just forced their way up the Parana River and were believed to have their ships in close proximity to Paraguay.74 Wise seems to have recovered quickly from the surprise of Hopkins' appearance. In the two days that Hopkins spent in Rio de Janeiro the American Minister managed to obtain appointments for Hopkins with the Brazilian Foreign Minister, Limpé de Abreu, as well as with Guido. In his interview with the former Hopkins was assured that Brazil would observe a policy of neutrality in the struggle between Rosas and the European powers. Abreu also stated that Brazil wanted a peaceful and permanent settlement of its problems with its neighbors. Guido promised that he would cordially recommend the mediation to his government.75

Despite these non-committal replies from both Argentina and Brazil, the latter did desire to find a way to end the

73 Wise to Brent, Rio de Janeiro, January 12, 1846, enclosure in Wise to Buchanan, Rio de Janeiro, February 16, 1846, ibid.
74 Wise to Buchanan, January 11, 1846, loc. cit.
75 Wise to Hopkins, Rio de Janeiro, February 11, 1846, Despatches, Argentina, Vol. 5.
Anglo-French intervention. Brazil favored the success of Hopkins' mission as a means to accomplish this end.  

Wise attempted to help Hopkins by drawing up a confidential letter which the latter was to use for his own guidance and was to show only to Brent when he arrived in Buenos Aires. Wise later explained to Buchanan that he wrote this letter and gave support to Hopkins' mediation because "it must be remembered that he [Hopkins] was duly authorized to tender that mediation." But this is in contradiction to Wise's own note to Hopkins on January 12, 1846, in which Wise recognized that Hopkins had no such powers.  

Wise never did offer a satisfactory explanation for this contradiction. Perhaps he held the illusion that the mediation would be successful and that all would be forgiven if he presented the Department with a fait accompli.

Wise's letter to Hopkins, dated February 11th stated that the terms proposed by Paraguay are not only fair and just, but the acceptance of the mediation of the United States upon their basis is the only honorable and politic mode for General Rosas to avoid a most fatal blow from the only source of real danger to the Argentine Republic in its present crisis. Without Paraguay Paz [Corrientes General] can do nothing, and the armed intervention Cannot Assail except by water. Paraguay can invade the Argentine territory by land and by forces similar to its own, such as England and France cannot employ.

76 Ynsfrán, expedición, I, 63.
77 Wise to Buchanan, Rio de Janeiro, March 6, 1846, Despatches, Brazil, Vol. 15, R.G. 59.
78 See above, page 55.
But Paraguay can now be pacified and made a neutral friend at once, and be made a contributor of transit duties on a fair and moderate scale, to the Argentine Gov. forever. But if G. Rosas blindly refuses to accept this mediation on the terms proposed, the consequences must be most disastrous to his Gov. and Country.

Wise further advised Hopkins to remain in Buenos Aires for ten days only. If Paraguayan independence had not been granted and the mediation not favorably received in this period Hopkins should return to Asuncion to inform López and then return immediately to the United States. Wise also urged Hopkins to work closely with Brent. 79

Wise's letter demonstrates that he, like Hopkins, was looking at the situation through Paraguayan eyes. For instance, Hopkins wrote a letter to Buchanan, dated February 12, 1846, in which he asserted that he would win over Rosas by pointing out that his safety depended upon the success of the mediation, because Paraguay was "the most united, the richest, and the strongest nation of the new world." 80

Hopkins left Rio de Janeiro for Buenos Aires the same day that he wrote the above letter, and arrived at Buenos Aires on the night of February 27th. While at sea Hopkins once more reiterated to Buchanan his opinion that Paraguay should be recognized by the United States. He had stated this belief even before setting foot upon Paraguayan soil and had repeated the plea while in Paraguay. Hopkins also

79 Wise to Hopkins, February 11, 1846, loc. cit.
80 Hopkins to Buchanan, February 12, 1846, loc. cit.
asked, once again, for sufficient powers to carry on the mediation which he was already engaged in at the moment. 81

Upon his arrival in Buenos Aires Hopkins found that Brent had already offered mediation, even before he had any knowledge of the activities of Wise and Hopkins. Brent had been spurred into activity by the Corrientes-Paraguayan military alliance. 82 Like Hopkins and Wise, Brent feared that this alliance would drive Paraguay into the arms of the English and French. Therefore, Brent offered the mediation of the United States to Argentina and Paraguay, although he had no authorization to do this.

On January 20, 1846, Brent paid a visit to Felipe Arana, the Argentine Foreign Minister. Brent told Arana that the Anglo-French intervention was a growing threat and pointed out that if it obtained a base of operations in Paraguay, it would have the most disastrous consequences, which should be escaped at all costs. Brent said that the United States, as a friend of continental liberty, desired to see the republics of the hemisphere live in peace and harmony and did not want to see them "enslaved by Great Britain." Brent

81 Hopkins to Buchanan, U.S. Sloop "Saratoga" at sea, February, 1846, Special Agents, Vol. 13; Hopkins to Buchanan, Rio de Janeiro, August 26, 1845, ibid; Hopkins to Buchanan, November 31, 1845, loc. cit.

82 Cecilio Baez asserts that when Rosas was faced by the double threat of the intervention and the Corrientes-Paraguayan alliance he intimated to Brent and Wise that the mediation of the United States would be welcome. See his Resumen, 78-79. There is no record of such an intimation in the diplomatic correspondence in the National Archives.
also indicated that he felt that British control of the Plata basin would constitute a direct threat to the cotton growers of the United States. Control of the Plata basin, was, in Brent's opinion, aimed at destroying the United States as a cotton producing nation. Brent argued that having failed to do this by their inability to block the entrance of Texas into the Union, Great Britain was now trying to enslave the Plata region with the same objective in mind. Brent added that the success of this policy would place the nations of this area under the "misgovernment and tyranny" which had, he said, characterized Britain's government, "without exception," in every country which they had come to control.

Brent then asked Arana if Argentina would not accept an offer of mediation by the United States to settle the difficulties between their nation and Paraguay. Although it is highly unlikely that Brent's anglophobic tirade had any great effect upon Arana, the latter told Brent that he was sure that Rosas would accept the offer. On January 26 Arana asked Brent to submit the offer in writing, to which Brent readily agreed.

For reasons which are not clear Brent did not immediately submit the offer in writing. But, on January 30th, Walsh arrived bearing Wise's message of January 12th. Brent now felt that he was doing the proper thing in this situation.

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83 Brent to Buchanan, Buenos Aires, February 2, 1846, Despatches, Argentina, Vol. 5.
As a result he submitted his offer of mediation in writing to Arana. 34

Rosas accepted Brent's offer on February 26th, blaming Paraguay for the bad state of their mutual relations and declaring that Argentina had no hostile intentions towards Paraguay. To demonstrate the supposed good intentions of Argentina, Rosas, the very next day, ordered General Urquiza, the Governor of Entre Ríos, not to invade Corrientes. 35

Hopkins arrived in Buenos Aires on the same day that the order was issued to Urquiza. On March 2nd Brent and Hopkins called on Arana. This meeting was a dismal failure and forecast the same result for the mediation. Arana immediately objected to the presence of Hopkins, saying that Hopkins had no official character and that Rosas was not obligated to receive explanations on the Paraguayan question from any person other than Brent. However, when Brent and Hopkins told Arana that they had come to talk privately and confidentially he agreed to converse with them. Hopkins then reviewed the mediation efforts up to that time. At this point Hopkins committed an inexplicable blunder. As an indication of American sincerity and also hoping that it would serve as credentials, Hopkins allowed Arana to read Wise's letter

34 Ibid.
35 Arana to Brent, Buenos Aires, February 26, 1846; Arana to Urquiza, Buenos Aires, February 27, 1846. Both enclosed in Brent to the Secretary of State, Palermo, Virginia, September 6, 1847, Despatches, Argentina, Vol. 5, R.G. 59.
of February 11th. The letter had a bad effect upon Arana, who regarded it as an ultimatum. An attempt by Hopkins to smooth matters over had just the opposite effect since Hopkins made some rather forceful statements. Arana replied that it was obvious that Hopkins was favorable to Paraguay. When Hopkins asked if he could assist Brent at the conference table, Arana responded that Rosas would decide on this request, but that if the matter were left to him he would rule that only Brent was qualified to participate.86

There seem to have been several reasons why this interview went so badly. Hopkins certainly did not handle himself well. On the other hand it appears that Arana went out of his way to disqualify Hopkins from the mediation. He was certainly correct when he said that Hopkins had no credentials to carry on the mediation. But he had accepted Brent’s mediation on two different occasions with the full knowledge that Brent had no authorization to take such actions. Perhaps the real reason behind the attitude of Arana was that Rosas was no longer interested in the mediation. At the time that he had first indicated his interest in the mediation Argentina was hard-pressed by the Anglo-French intervention and by Corrientes and Paraguay in the north. But the latter threat had been eliminated on February 4, 1846 when Argentine troops had defeated the Corrientes.

86 Arana to Guido, Buenos Aires, March 28, 1846, cited in Ynsfran, expedicion, I, 73.
army. Also, the Paraguayan army, under the leadership of Francisco Solano López, the nineteen year old son of President López, had retreated back to Paraguay without firing a shot. After this victory there was no reason for Argentina to accept the mediation, yet they could not block it entirely. Perhaps they felt that it would be easier to let it die on terms favorable to Argentina if it were entrusted to the friendly hands of Brent, certainly the inclusion of Hopkins would only make such a policy more difficult.

In addition to his troubles with Arana, Hopkins also quarreled with Brent. Hopkins, like many other observers, regarded Brent as a mere tool of Rosas, and called him a "mere child" in Rosas' hands, "utterly unfitted to assert or support the dignity of his position or his country." Hopkins also criticized Brent for his lack of desire to work with "promptitude and certainty." 88

That Hopkins was resolved to be rid of the hindrance of Brent was demonstrated when he made a night visit to the home of Arana. During this interview Hopkins curtly informed Arana that he had only fifteen days to reply to the Paraguayan terms, adding that his was sufficient for

87 Cárcea, Origenes, 145.

the conclusion of the negotiations. Hopkins also pointed out that he was not in the habit of being lenient. Arana replied just as curtly, saying that he would not answer without sufficient time for consultation and that he was not accustomed to working so fast on such a serious question.

When Arana still had not replied by March 7th Hopkins directed a note to Arana asking him for his passports so that he could leave for Paraguay on March 16th. When this pointed reminder had no effect Hopkins paid another personal call on Arana. This interview only intensified the already bad relations between the two men. Hopkins began the interview by having the audacity to suggest that Argentina call a general convention to establish a republic, which he felt would greatly upset both England and France. Hopkins stated that such a move would also greatly increase public support of the government and "would make the ruthless Unitarians disappear from the scene," thereby strengthening Argentina's power against the Anglo-French intervention. Hopkins added that he had assurances from two agents of Corrientes that their province would lay down their arms if such a convention were called. Hopkins also stated that Paraguay, "should its Independence be recognized and a

89 Arana to Guido, March 28, 1846, loc. cit.

90 Hopkins to Arana, Buenos Aires, March 7, 1846, enclosure in Brent to Buchanan, Buenos Aires, March 31, 1846, Despatches, Argentina, Vol. 5.
Congress convened, would make no difficulty in sending to it their deputies."

Arana replied to these completely erroneous statements by rejecting all of Hopkins arguments. After several more fruitless exchanges Hopkins asked for a decision on the Paraguayan conditions for mediation. By attaching two conditions to his request he converted it into an ultimatum. He demanded that the reply be given by the 16th (this was 9th) and he told Arana that Paraguay had 15,000 troops in Corrientes which she would use against Argentina if the latter's answer was not favorable. Arana, who must have been amused at this news, replied that he was sorry not to be able to enter with him into either official or confidential explanations regarding these matters; that from the first day that Mr. Brent had presented him [Hopkins] and delivered to you the certified letter from Mr. Wise . . . at Rio de Janeiro, you had told him that he not having any acknowledge character whatever near this Gov., he [Arana] as its minister had no authorization whatever to treat upon the affairs of the mediation with any other but with the person of Brent, since he had proffered the mediation and in his person it had been accepted; that if he wished to obtain and to ask explanations regarding the propositions of Paraguay, he might do it by the channel of that gentleman and that the Gov. would feel it its duty to afford him all that he might request, in order that through this medium they might be transmitted to him.

Hopkins apparently did not understand the significance of Arana's remarks for he replied that he was a diplomatic agent of the United States and did not understand why Argentina would not recognize his public character. Arana replied by flatly rejecting any role for Hopkins in the mediation. He later revealed that
Mr. Hopkins who in the course of these last replies shewed evidently in his countenance a profound displeasure, making appear, now and then, in his lips a sardonic laugh replied to you vexed, 'since the door is shut upon me to all explanation I have nothing to do but to hold my tongue and not say a word more on this subject.'

Unfortunately Hopkins did not keep his word. Instead he left Arana and proceeded to the residence of General Rosas. He apparently felt that he could make some progress by going over Arana to Rosas. At the residence of Rosas he met the Argentine dictator's daughter Manuelita. Hopkins told her that he possessed an official diplomatic character and wanted to see her father. Manuelita responded favorably when Hopkins asked if she would arrange for an interview with her father the next day.

Hopkins returned on the next day and had an interview with Rosas but had as little success with Rosas as he had had with Arana. Rosas apparently informed Hopkins that the proper channel for his communications was through Arana and also reminded Hopkins that he had no official character since Brent was the only representative who could deal with the Argentine government. The apparent objective of Hopkins' visit was to persuade Rosas that the best way to defeat the intervention was for him to call a hemispheric council to

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91 Arana to Brent, Buenos Aires, March 12, 1846, enclosure in Ibid.
to deal with it. Rosas denounced the idea as being impractical. 92

On the same day that Hopkins had this unsuccessful interview with Rosas another interview was taking place between Brent and Arana. Arana informed Brent of the content of his interview with Hopkins on the previous day. Arana told Brent that he was certain that this indiscreet youth could not talk in such language with the approval of Brent and Wise and was undoubtedly separated from his sense and direction. Brent indicated his dissatisfaction with Hopkins' activities and asked Arana to submit his complaint in a written protest so that it could be sent to Washington. 93

This information seems to have seriously alarmed Brent. Apparently to avoid future damaging forays by Hopkins, Brent asked and obtained from Arana permission for Hopkins to participate in conversations concerning the mediation.

On March 14th Brent informed Hopkins of this and also told him that he had just received a note from Arana. He explained that the note was not yet translated but that it appeared to concern the Paraguayan question. In view of these developments Brent asked Hopkins to delay his departure beyond the 16th. 94

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92 As reported in C.J. de Moura, Brazilian Consul in Buenos Aires, to Limpio de Abreu, Buenos Aires, March 24, 1846, cited in Ymfran, expedicion, I, 77.

93 Arana to Guido, March 26, 1846, loc. cit.

settlement with Peruvian agents on the same day that the proposal be put into writing. Except oposed by the Peruvian agents, the conference with Argentina was held the next day.

There was no agreement on the key demand of Argentina and Peru for recognition between the two countries. The second note contained the following statement:

*Existence of the article which read the protocol on recognition from Argentina which read the protocol on recognition from Argentina.

The second note contained the following statement:

*Existence of the article which read the protocol on recognition from Argentina which read the protocol on recognition from Argentina.
Paraguay was for Argentine recognition of her independence. That Argentina was not prepared to accede to this demand was indicated in a note which Arana sent Guido on March 9, 1846. In this note Arana told Guido to inform Wise that Argentina would not recognize Paraguayan independence in a modo tan completo y explícito como es necesario para desvanecer los impresiones tan perjudiciales que el de V.E. ha producido en el . . . Ministro Norte americano. 97 Faced with no military threat from Paraguay, Argentina was not going to make concessions.

Hopkins realized that there was no hope for the success of the mediation even before the Argentine Government sent its March 16th note. As a parting blow Hopkins wrote a long letter to Rosas. Hopkins began this letter by explaining that he was writing as a private individual, not as a public agent. From this point Hopkins proceeded to inform Rosas that he knew the remedy for the Argentine dictator’s problems:

I know that not in the wide world have you a man as a friend, to whom you can confide, nor is there one among your own Countrymen who will speak to you what he thinks and feels . . . I want you to listen to one who dares to tell you what he feels and knows.

Hopkins then pointed out to Rosas that not only did he face grave external threats, but also serious internal problems:

Confidence is gone, public and private credit have vanished, demoralization with its thousand hideous forms has usurped the place of all public and private virtue - brother dare not speak to brother nor sister

97 Arana to Guido, Buenos Aires, March 9, 1846, quoted in E.P.L., October 10, 1846.
...to sister the dread name of Rosas, without a shudder; property is embargoed and all patriotism is paralyzed.

Hopkins proceeded to brand the Argentine executive a "despot"; the judiciary "a rotten tool of oppression", and the legislature "a syncopanctic cringing puppet to the former two." Rosas was called upon to reverse this situation and to recognize the independence of Paraguay. He pointed out that Paraguay was the most powerful Nation of the new world except the United States; that her people are more united, and the Govt. is richer, than any other State of this continent; that the sentiment of America is in favor of her and against the unjust pretensions of the Argentine Govt. . . .

According to the brash young American, Rosas should make a virtue out of a necessity because the United States was going to recognize the independence of Paraguay. Hopkins asked Rosas:

Which do you prefer? The Character of a Francis or a Santa Anna, or that of a Washington or a Bolivar? Would it be more agreeable to your last moments, when the rapid review of your life passes before you to be able to say, I have desolated my Country, impoverished it; ruined it, and gloated over the blood of my enemies; then to feel as the death chill creeps upon your spirit, that you die calm and contented, for your Country is happy and at peace, and you alone had caused it?98

Hopkins apparently had some inkling of the audacity and impudence of this letter, for he was careful to make sure that he was out of Buenos Aires by the time that Rosas would read the letter. To accomplish this even Brent was...

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deceived by Hopkins about the latter's plans. On the 16th
Hopkins informed Brent that he would stay until the 18th,
but then on the 18th Hopkins, to mislead Arana and Brent,
indicated that he would agree to a new request from Brent
that he stay on beyond this date. However, at the last
moment Hopkins informed Brent that he had changed his mind
and would sail for Rio de Janeiro that day. Then, just
before leaving, Hopkins took the letter which he had written
to Rosas and gave it to Manuelita for transmission to her
father. He sailed away knowing that his letter would not
be read until he was out of the grasp of Rosas.

Hopkins proceeded to Montevideo where he ran into two
Paraguayan agents, Bernardo Jovellanos and Atanasio Gonzalez,
who had arrived on March 14th aboard the English steamer
Eleota. Their mission represented one of the several attempts
of López to align with England and France. López had taken
the initiative in June, 1845 when he sent a communication
to Brazil and France indicating his willingness to join the
intervention. Defaudis replied in November that he did
not have authorization to enter into relations with Paraguay.

99 Hopkins to Brent, Buenos Aires, March 16, 1846; Brent
to Hopkins, Buenos Aires, March 18, 1846; Hopkins to Brent,
Buenos Aires, March 18, 1846; Hopkins to Brent, Buenos Aires,
March 18, 1846. Enclosures in Brent to Buchanan, March 31,
1846, 123. 216.

100 López to the Emperor of Brazil, Asunción, June 1,
1845; Andres Gill to Defaudis, Asunción, June 1, 1846;
but indicated that he would be willing to talk with Paraguayan diplomatic agents in Montevideo. However, the next move was made by the English. Captain Charles Hotham of Great Britain made a trip, in February of 1846, to Paraguay to attempt to get her to join the intervention. His mission was a failure because he could not meet López's demand that Britain recognize Paraguayan independence. In the meantime López had indicated to Defaudelis that he was sending González and Jovellanos to Montevideo as his confidential agents. Hotham took these two men back to Montevideo with him. López ultimately did not join the intervention because England and France would not recognize her independence. Had the two European powers been willing to meet this quid pro quo it seems likely that López could have joined them.

Hopkins did not understand that López was favorable to English and French ties. This is indicated by the fact that when he questioned the two Paraguayan agents as to the nature of their mission he accepted their explanation that they were sent as observers. Hopkins also accepted at face

101 Defaudelis to López, Montevideo, November, 1845, ibid., 28-29.
102 Chaves, Presidente López, 99.
103 Cady, Intervention, 158, 203.
104 For examples of López's favorable attitude toward England and France see LAD, January 10, to May 23, 1846.
value the Paraguayans denial of any connection between their nation and the English and French. Yet perhaps Hopkins harbored some suspicions. He told the Paraguayans that he had confidence that the American mediation would be successful. This might have been a move by Hopkins to discourage López from accepting a bid from the two European nations. Whatever Hopkins might have accomplished by these statements was dispelled when he told the Paraguayans that he considered their cause just and that it would prevail if they did not unite it with the Anglo-French intervention but adding that "between them Paraguay and Gen. Rosas America would take their Paraguay's side of the question" and "but between General Rosas and the Intervention the part of the former Rosas..." Jovellanos and González wrote to López: "No se que crer del Señor Hopkins; en ocasiones me parece que es partido de Rosas y en otras que hace la parte nuestra." López must have been further confused by a letter which Hopkins wrote to him during this same period. Hopkins told

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105 Hopkins to Brent, Montevideo, April 1, 1846, enclosure in Brent to the Secretary of State, September 6, 1846, loc. cit.


107 Ibid.

Lopez that he would be going back to Buenos Aires in a few days to attempt to mediate again, indicating that he still had hope in its success. But in the last paragraph of the note he contradicted his earlier statement by admitting that the mediation had up to that time "utterly failed," and telling Lopez to "put no farther trust or reliance upon it," hoping that Lopez would act "as if it never existed." It would appear that Hopkins was attempting to start out with a fresh slate and therefore was referring to his first mediation attempt when he admitted that it had failed and asked Lopez to forget it. This would seem to be supported by Hopkins' advice to Lopez that Rosas was more amenable in private than in public and his urging that President Lopez not make an alliance with England and France. 109

The attempted resurrection of the mediation was not the only plan which Hopkins was pursuing in Montevideo. In a letter to Wise, also dated March 27th, Hopkins revealed that he was attempting to promote an "American Congress." Hopkins told Wise that in his conversation with Rosas he became convinced "more than ever" that the time was ripe for the revival of Bolivar's plan for a general inter-American conference. Informing Wise that he had already accomplished

109 Hopkins to Lopez, Montevideo, March 27, 1846, ibid.
much towards its realization, Hopkins asked the American Minister in Brazil to persuade Brazil to accept the idea. The Congress would protest against the Anglo-French intervention, settle boundary disputes, and set up definite regulations of the rights of all to navigate the rivers of Latin America. Hopkins said that he would win over General Orbe and President López to the idea.

In this letter to Wise, Hopkins indicated that he planned to stay in Montevideo for another month. However, Hopkins suddenly changed his mind and left for Rio de Janeiro on April 1st. The reason for this sudden change in plans seems to be that Hopkins came to realize that his efforts would be of no use. It was during this period that he learned of the Argentine conditions. Seeing no hope for the mediation he declared it at an end. In a letter written on March 30th to Wise he expressed a feeling of general pessimism over the situation.

Before leaving Montevideo, however, Hopkins attempted to make the same type of dramatic exit that he had made from Buenos Aires. Hopkins asked permission of Robert M. Hamilton,

110 Hopkins to Wise, Montevideo, March 27, 1846, enclosure in Wise to Buchanan, April 29, 1846, loc. cit.
111 Ibid.
112 Hopkins to Brent, April 1, 1846, loc. cit.
113 Hopkins to Wise, Montevideo, March 30, 1846, enclosure in Wise to Buchanan, April 29, 1846, loc. cit.
the United States Consul of Montevideo, to visit the camp
of General Orobe. When asked the reason for this request
Hopkins replied that he wished to "excite the curiosity of
the people and give them something to talk about." He was
refused. 114

When Hopkins arrived in Rio de Janeiro he encountered
a very angry Mr. Wise. By this time Wise had learned of
Hopkins' activities in Argentina up to but not including
Hopkins' letter to Rosas. When Hopkins arrived Wise had
just finished a letter which he had intended to send Hopkins.
With the appearance of the latter Wise now handed it to him
directly. 115 In this letter Wise bluntly informed Hopkins
that he had no right to expect an audience with Arana and
that he was only the "bearer" of a message of mediation to
Brent.116 Wise, after allowing Hopkins to read the letter,
told Hopkins to drop his ideas of an "American Congress" and
of a second mediation, and practically ordered him back to
Washington. 117

At this point Wise was attempting to disassociate him­
self from Hopkins' activities. The content and the context
of Wise's February 11th letter destroy his argument that

114 Brent to Buchanan, Buenos Aires, April 12, 1846,

115 Wise to Hopkins, Rio de Janeiro, April 12, 1846,
enclosure in Wise to Buchanan, April 29, 1846, loc. cit.

116 Wise to Buchanan, April 29, 1846, loc. cit.

117 Wise to Brent, Rio de Janeiro, April 12, 1846,
Hopkins was only the "bearer" of a message to Brent. The utter falseness of this assertion is also demonstrated in Wise's letter of March 6, 1846 to Buchanan. In this letter Wise states that "it must be remembered that he Hopkins is duly authorized to tender that mediation. . . ." Wise later explained to Buchanan that this was a mistake. He asserted that he meant to say that Hopkins was "duly authorized to . . . satisfy him [Hopkins or Buchanan?] that Paraguay was in fact an independent nation, and was capable of maintaining her independence. . . ." This explanation was not rendered until Wise knew that the Department had disapproved of Hopkins' conduct. It would appear that throughout the entire process Wise was fully aware of the fact that Hopkins had no authorization to offer his mediation. Realizing this, he supported it in the hope that it would be successful, making it difficult for Washington to disapprove.

Wise states that Hopkins had already left Rio de Janeiro before learning that Buchanan ordered him back to the United States. This seems to be borne out by a note which

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118 Wise to Buchanan, Rio de Janeiro, March 9, 1846, Despatches, Brazil, Vol. 15, R.G. 59.

119 Wise to Buchanan, Rio de Janeiro, June 19, 1846, ibid.

120 Nicholas P. Trist, Acting Secretary of State, to Wise, Washington, April 4, 1846, Instructions, Brazil, Vol. 15, R.G. 59.

Hopkins sent to López dated April 20th. In this note Hopkins informed the Paraguayan President that he was going back to the United States to inform his government of the situation and that he still held out hope for the mediation.\(^{122}\) Hopkins, of course, had no hope in the mediation but his explanation for his return to the United States indicates that he was not aware of the fact that he had been recalled.

Buchanan’s note to Hopkins telling him to come home and disapproving of his actions was written after the Secretary of State had received Hopkins’ November 31st letter. Buchanan informed Hopkins that he had transcended his instructions. He pointed out to Hopkins that he was not invested with a diplomatic character and was instead sent out merely as a special agent to obtain information to enable the United States to determine whether it should recognize Paraguay. Buchanan told Hopkins that he had no “powers whatever to negotiate or to act in a diplomatic character.” Hopkins was informed of the Secretary of State’s “astonishment” at his offer of mediation and his commitment of the United States on the question of recognition. Buchanan then proceeded to give Hopkins a lecture on the proper conduct of a diplomatic agent:

\begin{quote}
An offer of mediation by one independent nation to settle the difficulties between two other independent nations, is a high exercise of sovereign power, involving
\end{quote}

\(^{122}\)Hopkins to López, Río de Janeiro, April 20, 1846, \textit{Ibid.}
considerations of the utmost delicacy and importance. Such a step ought not to be taken even by an accredited minister without express authority from his government. On the present occasion this unauthorized proceeding on your part may involve your country in serious difficulties.

Hopkins was apprised that he had also violated "two time honored principles which have long regulated the policy of the United States towards foreign nations:

The first is, not to interfere with other nations either in regard to their internal concerns or their controversies with each other,

And the second to oppose the intervention of foreign European powers in the affairs of the independent American nations. The League of Paraguay with Corrientes against President Rosas, whatever may have been the intention of the parties, will in fact make Paraguay the ally of Great Britain and France in their designs on the American continent. Paraguay, by pursuing this course has placed everything at hazard and has deprived the United States of the opportunity to interpose their good offices with the Argentine Government for her benefit, with any hope of success.

Buchanan did not explain how Hopkins was responsible for the Corrientes-Paraguayan alliance, but he did add that he did not intend his message to be a "harsh disapprobation" of Hopkins conduct. Hopkins was assured that Buchanan felt that he had been guided by "the best motives" and had provided much valuable information on Paraguay. One cannot help but wonder if Buchanan would have made even these remarks if he had known of Hopkins' activities after he left Paraguay.

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Buchanan's recall of Hopkins marked the end of what Henry H. Wriston calls "one of the most extraordinary chapters in the history of amateur diplomacy." Hopkins failed in the question of mediation and ultimately he also failed to secure the recognition of Paraguay's independence. Although his efforts certainly did not aid either of these projects, their failure was also due to the faults of other men. Even the most capable diplomat would have been vexed in these undertakings. The reasons for these failures lay to a considerable extent outside of Hopkins' realm of guilt, large as it was.

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CHAPTER II

THE BRENT MISSION

With the elimination of Hopkins from the mediation, Brent now had the stage to himself. One of the first problems which Brent had to face was the Argentine protest over Hopkins' letter to Rosas. The Argentine Foreign Minister termed it "disrespectful, insolent, and inconsiderate," and practically ordered Brent to appear at his office at eight o'clock the next morning.\(^1\) At this meeting Brent assured Arana that he agreed with the latter's opinion of this letter and would inform the Department of Hopkins' "most singular" conduct.\(^2\) The incident passed with no appreciable damage when Buchanan expressed to the Argentine Government his "sincere regrets" that any individual who had been intrusted by him with an agency abroad, should be guilty of "so rash and improper an act." Buchanan also expressed his hope that Hopkins' "unauthorized and highly improper"

\(^1\)Arana to Brent, Buenos Aires, March 21, 1846, enclosure in Brent to Buchanan, Buenos Aires, March 31, 1846, Despatches, Argentina, Vol. 5, R.O. 59.

\(^2\)Brent to Arana, Buenos Aires, March 25, 1846, enclosure in ibid.
conduct would not disturb relations between the United States and Argentina.\textsuperscript{3}

In the meantime Brent had decided to carry through the mediation begun so inauspiciously by Hopkins. It is difficult to determine why he undertook this task. Up to this point his slow actions seemed to indicate that he was indifferent to the mediation. Perhaps he felt that he was obligated to carry it on; he might even have felt that it had a chance for success or that a miracle would occur, for he was a devoutly religious man. William Harris, Brent's replacement as Charge in Buenos Aires, told Buchanan that Brent renewed the mediation at the request of Arana.\textsuperscript{4} However, this does not seem to have been the case for Brent indicated to Buchanan that he had resolved to carry on the mediation. Brent said that Arana had only influenced his choice of his son to bear the messages to Paraguay.\textsuperscript{5} Further proof is provided by the attitude which Argentina took towards the mediation.\textsuperscript{6}

Because of his advanced age and because he had been informed that he would soon be replaced, Brent did not attempt


\textsuperscript{4}Harris to Buchanan, Buenos Aires, July 14, 1846, Despatches, Argentina, Vol. 6, R.G. 59.

\textsuperscript{5}Brent to Buchanan, September 6, 1847, loc. cit.

\textsuperscript{6}See below, page 87.
to undertake the mission to Paraguay himself.\textsuperscript{7} Instead he sent his son George Lee Brent and Joseph Graham, the American Consul at Buenos Aires. Brent wrote two notes to López for his son and Graham to deliver. In the first he pointed out that Rosas had promised not to invade Paraguayan territory.\textsuperscript{8} In the second note Brent enclosed a copy of Hopkins' letter of April 1st to Brent. In this letter Hopkins admitted that he had acted without instructions and declared the mediation at an end. Brent explained that his delay was due to his desire to include this and other material in the communication.\textsuperscript{9}

The younger Brent and Graham left Buenos Aires on June 9th, and, after a difficult trip arrived on Paraguayan soil on August 5th. Once there they announced their arrival to the Paraguayan Government, stating that they had important messages concerning the mediation of the United States in

\begin{quote}
\textsuperscript{7}Buchanan to Brent, Washington, March 20, 1846, Instructions, Argentina, Vol. 15, R.G. 59. In this note Buchanan did not indicate his dissatisfaction with Brent's activities as a reason for his removal.

\textsuperscript{8}Brent to López, Buenos Aires, April 29, 1846, enclosure in Brent to Buchanan, September 6, 1847, \textit{loc. cit.} Even more interesting was Brent's attempt to win López over through the extensive use of Biblical phrases such as "Blessed are the Peace-Makers."

\textsuperscript{9}Brent to López, Buenos Aires, June 8, 1846 enclosure in \textit{ibid.}
the dispute between Paraguay and Argentina and that they
desired permission to proceed to Asuncion.\textsuperscript{10}

The two Americans immediately encountered the opposition
of López. The Paraguayan President was very much aware of
the apparent subservience of Brent to Rosas. He also knew
that Rosas' newspaper, \textit{La Gaceta Mercantil}, had been playing
down Brent's attempt to mediate. In addition, López knew of
the terms which Argentina had laid down and saw no hope for
a settlement.\textsuperscript{11} Therefore, the Paraguayan government inquired
of the diplomatic status of the Americans and the objective
of their mission.\textsuperscript{12}

The commissioners replied that they came only as the
messengers of Brent. Perhaps hoping to arouse the interest
of López, they mentioned that the message was not only aimed
at settling the Argentine-Paraguayan difficulties, but also
aimed at ending European intervention in the Plata region.
They also stated that they had messages which explained the
late actions of Hopkins.\textsuperscript{13}

\textsuperscript{10}The Commissioners to Andrés Gil, Guardia del Carypayti,
August 5, 1846; The Commissioners to López, Carypayti, August
5, 1846; Brent and Graham to Harris, Buenos Aires, December
7, 1846. Enclosures in Harris to Buchanan, Buenos Aires,
October 17, 1847, Despatches, Argentina, Vol. 6, R.C. 59.

\textsuperscript{11}Gil to Commissioners, Asunción, August 8, 1846.

\textsuperscript{12}E.R.L., May 23, 1846.

\textsuperscript{13}The Commissioners to Gil, Villa del Pilar, August 10,
1846, enclosure in Harris to Buchanan, October 17, 1847.
loc. cit.
López himself answered the commissioners, to indicate his intense displeasure with Brent. He asserted that Brent had been indifferent to Paraguayan interest and that he was unacceptable for any role in the mediation. He said also that the Argentine refusal to recognize Paraguayan independence made the terms unacceptable. In spite of the tirade, López then moved on to say that he was disposed to nominate a minister and to accept the mediation if, first, the conferences were held in Río de Janeiro under the auspices of Wise, and second, the Argentine Government would recognize Paraguayan independence and allow Paraguay the free use of the Río de la Plata. López told the commissioners that if they were ready to accept these conditions they could proceed to Asunción, otherwise they could consider their mission terminated.14

These conditions killed the extremely small chance that there might have been for the mediation. Rosas probably would not have accepted the exclusion of Brent if he did negotiate. In making the demand for Wise, the Paraguayan President believed that the American Minister in Brazil would accord a favorable treatment to Paraguay. López, through El Paraguayo Independiente, had praise for Wise, calling him an enlightened statesman but Brent did not fare

14 López to the Commissioners, Asunción, August 16, 1846, quoted in E.P.I., September 19, 1846.
quite as well, since he was described as an assistant to Rosas in charge of extravagances. 15

Graham and Brent felt that this note contained conditions tantamount to a denial of permission to proceed to Asuncion. If it had come from a government which had had more contact with the outside world, the commissioners explained, they would have returned to Buenos Aires:

> We felt, however, that President Lopez was influenced by ill founded prejudices ..., besides we felt a great interest in the success of our mission and a desire to see more of the country, therefore we persevered. ..., 16

The commissioners persevered by falsely informing Lopez that the Argentine conditions were not really conditions but just arguments which the government of Argentina had put forward in justification of its position. They said, in addition, that Lopez must be misinformed in his conclusions about Brent, and that, at any rate, Brent had already been replaced by William Harris. The American commissioners then added that the question of the recognition of independence would have to be dealt with later. 17

As a result of this last message Lopez allowed the Americans to journey to Asuncion. In this note to them

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15 E.P.L., August 22, 1846.

16 Brent and Graham to Harris, Buenos Aires, December 7, 1846, enclosure in Harris to Buchanan, October 17, 1847, loc. cit.

17 The Commissioners to Lopez, Villa del Pilar, August 21, 1846, enclosed in ibid.
López indicated that he was giving this permission as an act of friendship. Later however, he explained that the reason was that the last note from the two Americans was satisfactory to him in two respects: (1) that it proved that Argentina had placed no preconditions upon her acceptance of the mediation; (2) that the negotiations would be handled by Harris who he apparently felt would be more friendly to Paraguay.

The commissioners arrived in Asunción on September 1st and on the afternoon of the same day had an interview with President López, who received them with "much coldness and ceremony." López apparently did most of the talking. He was very upset because he had learned, by this time, that the United States had refused to recognize the independence of Paraguay. This was a bitter blow and he expressed his extreme dissatisfaction with this action. López then reiterated his previously stated conditions, emphasizing the issue of recognition. The commissioners replied that the question of recognition must be left open or there would be nothing to mediate. Naturally this argument made no impression upon López, but when the interview ended the

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18 López to Graham and Brent, Asunción, August 25, 1846, quoted in E.F.L., September 26, 1846.
19 E.F.L., September 26, 1846.
20 See below, page 91.
The American Association of Nurseries established a code of ethics for nurseries in 1946, and the following year, in 1947, the American Nurserymen's Association (ANA) was formed to promote the interests of nurseries. The ANA's Code of Ethics was adopted in 1948, providing a framework for professional conduct in the nursery industry.

The ANA's Code of Ethics requires members to:

1. Conduct themselves in a manner that will reflect credit upon themselves and the nursery industry.
2. Refrain from engaging in any practices that would be detrimental to the interests of the nursery industry.
3. Treat all clients with respect and fairness.
4. Maintain accurate records and accounts.
5. Ensure that all plants and materials are of high quality.

The ANA's Code of Ethics serves as a guide for nursery professionals, ensuring that the nursery industry maintains a high standard of ethical conduct and professionalism.
In the first place López already had had a similar experience with Hopkins and it does not seem likely that he would make the same mistake again within less than a year. Furthermore, López's own candid explanation seems to reject Insfrán's. López stated that although he had no confidence in the mediation he accepted it to protect Paraguay's moral position in international affairs. Then, López later admitted that he did not want to be blamed for killing the mediation.

Paraguay formally accepted the American mediation on September 15th, when López sent the Americans two notes, one for Wise and the other for Harris. In each of these notes López repeated his previously stated conditions. The commissioners told López that they would transmit these terms to Buenos Aires, but that they felt there was little hope for success because of his stipulations. Brent and Graham later confided to Harris that they felt López's terms were a "virtual declination of the mediation altogether."

When Brent and Graham arrived back in Buenos Aires they found that the reports of the Montevideo press had indeed been accurate. Not only had the United States disavowed the mediation efforts of the elder Brent, it also had announced

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25 E.P.L., September 19, 1846.
26 Ibid., October 3, 1846.
27 López to Wise, Asunción, September 15, 1846, enclosed in Wise to Buchanan, Rio de Janeiro, December 9, 1846, Despatches, Brazil, Vol. 16, R.G. 59; López to Harris, Asunción, September 15, 1846, quoted in E.P.L., October 3, 1846.
28 Graham and Brent to Harris, December 7, 1846, loc. cit.
its opposition to the recognition of Paraguay. The Polk administration had taken this step because of its analysis of the situation in the Plata region. The Argentine Minister to the United States, Carlos María Alvear, deserves much of the credit for shaping this decision. On November 1, 1845, at the very time Hopkins was still journeying to Paraguay, Alvear sent a message to Buchanan in which he argued against the United States recognition of Paraguay in terms that must have appealed to Polk's anti-British prejudices. Alvear ventured that such a move by the United States would be detrimental to Argentina because England and France also seemed to be moving toward recognition of Paraguay. Therefore if the United States recognized Paraguay she would give the appearance of siding with the English and French against Argentina. Alvear also played down the importance of Paraguay. It was, according to him, a country without mineral wealth, with a population of only several hundred thousand, and far behind the rest of South America in its level of civilization. Again playing up to American prejudices, Alvear pointed out that the probable interest of Britain in Paraguay could be attributed to the circumstance that in that country only, grows, and is naturally cultivated, the short staple cotton produced only in the United States; it being doubtless the intention to encourage this cultivation, with the view of being able to procure
in time this precious material from some other country than the American Union. 29

This presentation must have been very effective, for three days later Alvear informed his government that the United States would not recognize the independence of Paraguay. 30

Ynafrán, pointing to Buchanan’s injunction to Hopkins to conceal the nature of his mission, feels that this proves that the Secretary of State had planned a coup. He asserts that Buchanan must have wanted Hopkins to keep his mission a secret from Argentina. But Hopkins upset these plans and aroused the opposition of Argentina so that Buchanan was forced to drop his plans. 31

There are a number of considerations which make this thesis improbable. First, a careful reading of Hopkins’ instructions reveal that Buchanan wanted Hopkins to keep his mission secret so that the United States would not be committed if the circumstances were unfavorable by the time he arrived in the area. Second, Buchanan was not aware of the situation in the Plata. Therefore it seems improbable that he would have been engaged in this type of move. In fact, just the opposite seems to be true. Buchanan displayed no great interest in this situation in the Plata since he allowed dispatches to lie unanswered for long periods of time.

29 Alvear to Buchanan, New York, November 1, 1845, quoted in Manning, Correspondence, I, 300–302.
30 Alvear to Arana, New York, November 4, 1845, quoted in ibid., 361.
31 Ynafrán, expedición, I, 112.
Third, what would the United States have to gain from such a policy? Buchanan's instructions to Hopkins revealed that he knew nothing about the country. In view of this it is difficult to see any reason for him to make a move such as Insfran asserts. Finally, Buchanan advised Harris that the United States was not recognizing Paraguay purely from regard to the Argentine Republic and in consideration of the heroic struggle which it is now maintaining against the armed intervention of Great Britain and France, in the concerns of the Republics of the La Plata and its tributaries.32

However, this policy of not recognizing Paraguay was as far as Buchanan would go in aiding Argentina in her struggle against France and England. Philip Klein asserts that Buchanan "challenged the Anglo-French intervention in the war between Argentina and Paraguay accusing both nations of flagrant violations of the Monroe Doctrine and the principles of nonintervention."33 Nothing could be further from the truth. An almost entirely passive policy was adopted instead. Samuel Flagg Bemis and John Cady assert that the United States was too concerned during this period with the questions of Texas, California, and Oregon.34


fact there seems to have been a considerable amount of sentiment for the United States to assume some type of role in the Plata. M'ile's National Register, felt that the United States should somehow bring about peace and terminate the intervention.\textsuperscript{35} The New York Herald suggested that perhaps the United States should send a fleet.\textsuperscript{36} The Washington Daily Union suggested that French and English influence on the banks of Plata "should find an antagonist and a counterpoise in the public sentiment of this country."\textsuperscript{37} This sentiment, however, faded away when it became apparent that the English and French were not able to overthrow Rosas.\textsuperscript{38}

In the Senate opposition to the Anglo-French intervention was voiced in a resolution introduced by Senator William Allen of Ohio, Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations. He proposed that such interventions should bring "the prompt resistance of the United States." Calhoun expressed his great indignation at the intervention also but said that the question was

whether we should take under our guardianship the whole family of American states, and pledge ourselves to extend to them our protection against all foreign aggression.

\textsuperscript{35}M'ile's National Register, October 25, 1845.

\textsuperscript{36}New York Herald, September 12, 1845.

\textsuperscript{37}Washington Daily Union, October 9, 1845.

\textsuperscript{38}See M'ile's National Register, March 21, 1846; New York Herald, March 30, 1846; Washington Daily Union, 1847.
Had we arrived at that state of maturity when we could wisely and effectively do so? Was this to be the understood and settled policy of our Government? If so, it would become necessary for us to pursue a different course from that we have heretofore adopted. The entire energies of the Country must be concentrated and put forth to enable us to carry out this policy, if we intend that our declaration shall mean anything.

Calhoun’s arguments apparently carried the day for the resolution was referred to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, where it was tabled. 39

Buchanan had also made it clear that the United States was not going to play an active role in the Plata basin in two interviews which he had with Pakenham, the English Minister in Washington. The first occasion took place in October of 1845 when Pakenham protested the attacks in United States newspapers upon the Anglo-French intervention in the Plata. Pakenham reported that Buchanan assured him that the United States had

no intention of interfering with or opposing in any way the efforts of Her Majesty’s Govt. and the Government of France for the pacification of the two South American Republics. 40

The second interview took place when Pakenham protested the activities of Brent. Pakenham said that Buchanan promised to recall Brent. 41 By the time of this interview the

40 Pakenham to Aberdeen, Washington, October 13, 1845, quoted in Cady, Intervention, 184.
41 In recalling Brent no mention was made by Buchanan of the Charge’s actions or the reason for his recall. See Buchanan to Brent, March 20, 1846, loc. cit.
English and French had declared their blockade. The English diplomat, although noting that the United States was not abandoning its passive role, indicated that

Mr. Buchanan's language was less open and satisfactory than during our early communication on the same subject. He talked of the jealousy with which the American people viewed any European interference in the affairs of this continent, and he added that the idea began to prevail that the British and French intended to retain possession of the Island of Martin Garcia for the purpose of securing for themselves the exclusive commercial advantages in that part of the world. No such suspicion as that... was entertained by the United States Government... He had referred to it merely as a proof of the susceptibility of the American people on all such questions.42

That Buchanan's displeasure at the intervention would not lead to a change in policy was indicated in Polk's annual message to Congress in December, 1845. Polk stated:

it should be distinctly announced to the world as our settled policy that no future European colony or dominion shall... be planted or established on any part of the North American continent."

"The United States... can not in silence permit any European interference on the North American continent, and should any such interference be attempted will be ready to resist it at any and all hazards."

What real limits to the Monroe Doctrine existed for Polk is the subject of controversy. Dexter Perkins suggests that perhaps Polk was not really limiting it to North America:

42 Takenhan to Aberdeen, Washington, November 13, 1845, quoted in Gady, Intervention, 184-185.

It seems reasonable to suppose, therefore, that Polk meant to include Anglo-French action in South America in his denunciation of European policy. He knew, as his language shows, that the United States could not act on precisely the same lines in the case of a quarrel so far removed from its shores as it could in cases nearer home. As Webster had done in 1826, he drew a clear, and indeed a valuable, distinction between different geographical areas. But he never intended to limit the Monroe Doctrine to the North American continent.

However, a number of circumstances challenge this interpretation. First, Polk repeatedly mentioned the application of the doctrine to the North American continent. Second, before delivering his message he made it clear that he was applying it to North America. In one instance he told his cabinet in the dispute over Oregon that in his first message to Congress he

would maintain all our rights, would reaffirm Monroe's ground against permitting any European power to plant or establish any new colony on the North American Continent.

Three days later he

told Col. Denton that I was strongly inclined to reaffirm Mr. Monroe's doctrine against permitting foreign colonization, at least as far as this continent was concerned.

This latter statement indicates that Polk was concerned over foreign intervention, but realized that the United States at

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that moment was not in a position to do anything about it. This seems to be borne out by Buchanan's instructions to Harris. Buchanan pointed out that the English and French actions in the Plata were violating the Monroe Doctrine, but that "existing circumstances render it impossible for the United States to take a part in the present war. . . ."

Became more specific he warned Harris against offering mediation. Buchanan reported to Aberdeen that Buchanan stated after Folk's speech that the United States had no intention of interfering in the Plata affair.

Against the background of these developments Harris left to replace Brent in Buenos Aires. On his way he stopped in Montevideo where he informed the diplomats there of the complete neutrality of the United States. He also informed the local Paraguayan diplomatic agent, whom he did not identify, that Hopkins' actions were unauthorized. However, in accordance with his instructions from Buchanan, he told the agent that the United States would recognize Paraguay when the situation improved.

Upon his arrival in Buenos Aires Harris learned for the first time of Brent's second mediation attempt, a development which he felt had not been anticipated in his

47 Buchanan to Harris, March 30, 1846, loc. cit.
48 Sady, Intervention, 186.
49 Buchanan to Harris, March 30, 1846, loc. cit.
instructions, so that he wrote back to Washington for further instructions. Buchanan replied brusquely that he had made it plain in his previous instructions that the United States absolutely refused to mediate and told Harris to make this known to all parties. He pointed out, however, that if Brent and Graham came back with López’s acceptance Harris should simply help to arrange a meeting of the representatives and “then to confine yourself to giving advice, being careful not to offend either party.” Buchanan told Harris that he should not repudiate the mediation publicly, but instead confidentially.

Harris handled the matter as instructed by the Secretary of State. When Brent and Graham presented López’s terms to Harris, he in turn confidentially showed them to Arana who allowed the mediation to die. Harris saw that this would

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50 Harris to Buchanan, Buenos Aires, June, 1846, Despatches, Argentina, Vol. 7, R.G. 59. Harris noted that the Paraguayan diplomat broke precedent by calling on him, instead of waiting for Harris, the newest minister, to call on him.

51 Buchanan to Harris, Washington, November 12, 1846, Instructions, Argentina, Vol. 15, R.G. 59. Polk wrote in his diary: “The conduct of Mr. Wise at Brazil and Mr. Brent at the Argentine Republic in interfering with the internal contests of the South American Governments, and especially in the tender of mediation of their Government was not only unauthorized, but is calculated to do much damage.” Quaife, Folk Diary, II, 155.

52 Arana to Harris, Buenos Aires, January 2, 1847, Despatches, Argentina, Vol. 7, R.G. 59.
be the result as the terms were clearly irreconcilable.\footnote{Harris to Buchanan, Buenos Aires, October, 1847, \textit{ibid.}} Harris reported that he had made several attempts to inform López that Brent was not authorized to offer mediation and that the mediation effort, at any rate, had died because the terms were irreconcilable. But as late as October, 1949, Harris indicated that he had still not managed to get his message through for some unexplained reason.\footnote{Harris to John C. Clayton, Buenos Aires, October 10, 1849, \textit{ibid.}}

It was in this anti-climatic atmosphere that both the prospect that the United States would recognize Paraguay and the hope for its unauthorized mediation came to an inglorious end. The Anglo-French intervention collapsed without the intervention of the United States.\footnote{Cady, \textit{Intervention.}} It was not until this event took place that the United States again attempted to establish relations with Paraguay. Once more Edward A. Hopkins was one of the prime movers in this development.

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CHAPTER III

THE NAVIGATION COMPANY

While in Paraguay Hopkins had had two objectives. The first was to carry out his diplomatic mission. The second was to promote his own entrepreneurial designs. In reality Hopkins was more interested in the latter, for his interest in securing the United States' recognition of Paraguay's independence and in the opening of the Plata river system to free navigation were directly related to his entrepreneurial plans.

Hopkins' dream was to introduce steam navigation on the rivers of the interior of South America. During his first visit to Paraguay he asked President López for a monopoly of steam transportation in Paraguay.\(^1\) Hopkins reported to Buchanan that there was "every prospect that an American Company, will secure the steamboat navigation in the waters of Paraguay."\(^2\) It would seem that Hopkins was once again

\(^{1}\)Brent to Wise, n.p., n.d., enclosed in Brent to Buchanan, Buenos Aires, March 31, 1846, Despatches, Brazil, Vol. 15, R.G. 59.

\(^{2}\)Hopkins to Buchanan, February, 1846, loc. cit.
over optimistic for Hopkins' later requests for this same privilege indicates that López had refused to grant his request.

Upon his return to the United States Hopkins launched a campaign designed to make Americans aware of the economic possibilities of Paraguay. He wrote letters to important politicians, including Cass and Clay; he also wrote articles in the *National Intelligencer* and in the *American Review*. In the *National Intelligencer* he focused upon one of the two themes which were to mark all of his subsequent publications. The first was the call for free navigation of the Paraguay River. By this point he viewed the English and French intervention as a means to effect this and lamented that they would pull out before opening the rivers. In direct contrast to his opinions two years before, he now stated that the English had no territorial designs but simply wanted to open the rivers to free navigation. In his article in the *American Review* Hopkins returned to his previous point stating that the United States should demand free passage on the Parana River to Paraguay. But he also mentioned his second theme; the economic potential in Paraguay, describing the "China-like wealth of Paraguay." 

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3 *National Intelligencer*, May 21, 1847.

4 Edward Augustus Hopkins, "The Republic of Paraguay; Since the death of the Dictator Francia," VI (September, 1847), 252-255.
Hopkins proposed a scheme which was a credit to his imagination. It was not to the Japanese but to the American that he could get nothing from. After his return, Hopkins proposed a scheme which was a credit to the Japanese. If this was his obsession, there is no evidence that he put it into practice. Because of circumstances, American capital might have demanded such measures before investing their money.

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Harris did not doubt that Hopkins "might not scruple to use any means within his power" to make good the pretensions of Paraguay. He repeated that Hopkins had written to the President to request that the United States Government abstain from all official connection with the united States, and that Hopkins had written to the President in Washington that Hopkins had repeated that the President was detest and patronage from the President Government to the President. Harris also asserted that Hopkins took a letter of recommendation Paraguay accept upon the Argentine territory of Paraguay. Hopkins may have been an agent for some secretaries, among which were:

"..."
the Paraguayan Special Agent in Rio de Janeiro.\(^{11}\) In response to a previous letter,\(^{12}\) in which Hopkins had proposed the establishment of a school of practical agriculture in Paraguay, Geliy indicated that he thought López would be pleased with the project. However, he went on to caution Hopkins not to expect any exclusive monopolies. Geliy also pointed out that it was not feasible to establish large industries in Paraguay, but rather Hopkins should concentrate on commercial and agriculture establishments.\(^{13}\) It would seem Hopkins had perhaps proposed certain types of establishments in his contacts with López.

Upon his return to the United States, Hopkins once more began to agitate for American recognition of Paraguay and for American economic exploitation of Paraguay. He wrote six articles in the *National Intelligencer* and one in *Hunt's Merchants' Magazine*.\(^{14}\) In these articles he continued to press for the recognition of Paraguay and to point out what

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\(^{11}\) Box, *Origins*, I, 23.

\(^{12}\) Not located by the present writer, but its contents can be deduced from Geliy's reply.


he considered to be the great economic possibilities of the interior of South America.

Hopkins' publications drew a strong rebuttal from Harris. The American Charge stated that they abound with the grossest mistakes, inaccuracies and even exaggerations. The deductions and conclusions are, for the most part, as crude and inaccurate, as that statement upon which they are founded. I can scarcely conceive of anything more uncertain and unreliable, than the writings referred to.15

Similar views were given public airing by Joseph Graham, the American Consul in Buenos Aires. Graham called the idea of trade with Paraguay "a humbug," he said that "the trade of Hamilton county [Ohio] would be worth double that of Paraguay for years to come."16

In the second half of 1849 Hopkins started out on his third voyage to Paraguay. Once more he crossed Brazil from the Atlantic Coast, entering Paraguayan territory through Encarnación. The reason behind this third trip would seem to be that Hopkins became convinced that he could not arouse the interest in Paraguay until the United States recognized Paraguay. As the United States had given no indication of this, he apparently sought to have Lopez send him to Washington for this purpose. Lopez refused to do so, saying that he

15 Harris to Clayton, October 10, 1849, loc. cit.

16 New York Herald, May 29, 1847. Similar remarks by Graham were reprinted from the New Orleans Mercury in the Washington Daily Union, June 22, 1847.
could not confirm a diplomatic mission upon a foreigner unless he had become naturalized or had rendered some important service to Paraguay. Obviously López did not feel that Hopkins met these requirements.

Hopkins did not return to the United States after this rebuff. Instead he spent the next year traveling throughout Paraguay. Upon his return from these travels he once again attempted to convince López that he should be accredited to the United States Government. To bolster his position Hopkins drew up a secret memorial in which he recounted all of his efforts on behalf of Paraguay.

Insfran alleges that this memorial persuaded López to send Hopkins to Washington. However, there seems to have been a practical reason which prompted López to make this move. This was Paraguay's diplomatic situation, which was one of de facto isolation. After the defeat of his ally Corrientes, López had sought an alliance with Brazil and had been rebuffed. He then sought an alliance with Argentina and received an even more insulting refusal. However, when the Anglo-French intervention failed the Paraguayan President was able to sign a treaty with Brazil, which was then looking for an ally against Rosas.

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17 Insfran, expedición, I, 118-120.
18 Ibid., 20.
19 Ibid., 23-25.
In spite of this alliance López felt that it was necessary to bolster his international position by securing the recognition of the United States. He also hoped to build up trade and commerce with the United States. Therefore instructions were issued to Hopkins on February 25, 1851 as Paraguay's Special Minister. López told Hopkins that the most important objective of his mission was to secure recognition. Hopkins was also, probably in view of the reason Buchanan gave for not recognizing Paraguay, to inform the United States Government of the unsuccessful attempts which Paraguay had made to settle her disputes with Argentina. Hopkins was to bolster these arguments by pointing out that the American offer of mediation and its acceptance by Argentina constituted a de facto recognition. López told Hopkins that he should point out the potential for trade between the United States and Paraguay. The Paraguayan President further indicated that he would be happy to receive a scientific expedition in Paraguay if recognition from the United States was forthcoming.

The following paragraph from the instructions is extremely interesting:

En cuanto a las repetidas explicaciones del señor Hopkins a este Gobierno por su monopolio de navegar sus aguas por buques impelidos en todo, o en partes, por el vapor, sería muy agradable al Gobierno paraguayo verle llegar al frente de esta ciudad con un vapor de

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20Chanes, Presidente López, 156.
la mejor construcción. Pero sería evidentemente impropio de este Gobierno dar de antemano semejante monopolio a un cuidado de una nación que no reconoce todavía este derecho de soberanía al Gobierno paraguayo. No obstante, reconocido este país por los Estados Unidos, si el señor arriyara, a este puerto con un buque de vapor, recibiría el monopolio por diez años, en conformidad con el decreto de 20 de Mayo de 1845 a establecer una compañía nacional bajo de bases justas y equitativas, con la seguridad de que antes de recibirse aquí noticias del resultado de su misión nadie recibiría semejante monopolio.21

In short Hopkins could have the monopoly he had sought for so long if he secured the recognition of Paraguayan independence from Washington.

However, Hopkins was not able to take advantage of this arrangement. In a letter to Mathew F. Maury he explained that

the day before I left Asuncion on my mission, political news arrived from Brazil of such a nature as to induce President López to change his determination in a single night.22

However, the news which Hopkins was then unhappy over ultimately meant that he would have a chance to operate in Paraguay. The news must have been that Brazil was aiding Justo José de Urquiza, the Governor of Entre Ríos, in his revolt against Rosas. The success of this revolt and the rise to power of Urquiza meant that Argentina would then have a president who would throw open to all nations navigation

21 López to Hopkins, Asuncion, February 25, 1851, quoted in Baez, diplomacia, II, 91-95.

22 Hopkins to Maury, Porto Alegre, Brasil, May 10, 1851, National Archives, Navy Department Records (R.G. 45), Hydrografico Office.
in the Plata system. This lead to a change in the United States' attitude toward the question of trade in the Plata which made it possible for relations to be established with Paraguay.

After his mission for Paraguay failed to materialize Hopkins returned once more to the United States. That he had not given up his hopes of returning to Paraguay with a steam navigation monopoly is indicated by a trip that he made to France and England before returning home. Although Hopkins revealed very little about this mission he indicated that he was checking on possibility of European immigration to the Plata basin. To keep his prospects of a monopoly open Hopkins also wrote to Lopez warning him of the danger of granting an English firm a monopoly of fluvial navigation.

When Hopkins returned to the United States he found that he had achieved one of his long-sought objectives. He had been appointed the American Consul in Asuncion in February, 1851, at the same time that Lopez had appointed him Special Minister to the United States. Hopkins had been working for this appointment since at least 1849. Before his third

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25 Imsfan, expedicion, I, 124.

26 Manning, Correspondence, X, 29, footnote 1.
trip to Paraguay Hopkins had written several letters to Secretary of State John Clayton asking that he be appointed Charge to Paraguay. He also received support from his father John Henry Hopkins and Senator Truman Smith. The initial effort produced no success as Clayton informed Hopkins that the President was not interested in opening relations with Paraguay at that time. This was only part of the reason. In a letter to Harris the Secretary of State said that Hopkins "must have supposed that the Department kept no records or that the antecedents in which he is so conspicuous may have perished or have been forgotten."

Hopkins had continued his campaign while he was in South America from late 1849 to the middle of 1851. He had once again gotten Truman Smith and his father to write


letters of recommendation for him. Apparently these efforts aided his appointment, for somewhat later, a letter from the State Department, signed W. H. [William Harris], said that "Mr. Hopkins was appointed upon the recommendation of Hon. Truman Smith, Hon. William Upham, and Hon. James S. Philips." Yet even with this support it does not appear that Hopkins would have been appointed if the situation in the Plata region had not changed when Urquiza defeated Rosas and threw open the Argentine rivers to foreign commerce. Up to this time Rosas had followed a restrictive policy in the use of Argentine rivers. This was justified by Rosas because of the Anglo-French intervention. Harris wrote that if the United States established relations with Paraguay it would be jeopardizing our trade with Argentina. Harris felt that this would be an ill-advised move as the United States had a considerable amount of trade with Argentina, while its trade with Paraguay was non-existent and would never amount to much. Harris's opinion was supported by a report submitted to Washington by Joseph Graham. At this report was based upon Graham's observation while he was in Paraguay it must have been


33 W.H. to James B. Bowlin, Washington, July 5, 1860, Claim Against Paraguay, Folio III.

34 Harris to Clayton, October 10, 1849, loco. cit.

35 See above, pages 105-106.
regarded as more or less authoritative. But now, with the coming of Urquiza to power, the United States began efforts to negotiate a series of commercial treaties with Argentina, Uruguay, and Paraguay. The United States was to be successful in the negotiations with the first two nations, but had to wait seven years longer to get a similar treaty with Paraguay. The activities of Hopkins contributed to this delay.

Webster had reservations about Hopkins. Even after Hopkins' appointment had been approved by the Senate Secretary of State Webster delayed giving Hopkins the commission. In March of 1852 Hopkins had an interview with Webster in which the Secretary of State asked for "certificates of his character and abilities." The elder Hopkins protested that this demand was unreasonable and pointed out that some of his sons were connected with the public press. Hopkins again had a series of letters from Senators on his behalf also sent to the Department. On his own behalf Hopkins wrote to the Department pleading for the commission, pointing out

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38 Senators Jones, James, Mungan, Cooper, Upham, Foote, Fish, Smith, Martin, Shulds, Clark to the President, Washington, March 15, 1852; William Upham and Samuel S. Phelps to Webster, Washington, July 2, 1851; Upham to Webster, Washington, April 8, 1852. Ibid.
that he wanted no salary.  

Apparently this pressure worked, for Hopkins related that Webster finally gave his approval in March or April, 1852.  

While working for his appointment Hopkins had once again been attempting to attract support for his proposed economic enterprises in Paraguay. In January, 1852 he read a paper before the American Geographical and Statistical Society of New York. Hopkins must have been at his loquacious best that evening, because as a result of his speech the society submitted a resolution to the Secretary of Navy calling for an immediate survey of the Río de la Plata to determine its usefulness to American traders, as well as for "the advancement of civilization and the promotion of the best interests of humanity." Hopkins also wrote an article in the National Intelligencer and two others in Hunt's Merchant's magazine and DeBow's Commercial Review.

39 Hopkins to Webster, New York, May 7, 1852, ibid.
40 Hopkins to Marcy, August 22, 1853, loc. cit.
Hopkins efforts now began to pay off for he found a kindred soul who was in a position to help him. This kindred soul was Samuel Greene Arnold. Arnold was a member of a rich and influential Rhode Island family. At the time of their acquaintance Arnold was the Lieutenant Governor of Rhode Island, a post to which he was re-elected in 1861 and 1862. Arnold’s interest in Latin America had been aroused during a trip in 1847-1848. Arnold said that while in the Plata region he became convinced “that in the variety of extent of its measures this region was indeed the garden of the world.” Upon his return to the United States he says that he wrote articles in the Christian Review and the North American Review. These articles came to the attention of Hopkins and soon the two men were corresponding and later had a personal interview.

Arnold was the host to Sarmiento when he visited Providence in 1865 and also lectured on South America. See “Neerology of the Rhode Island Historical Society, 1879-1880,” Proceedings of the Rhode Island Historical Society, II (1879-1880), 85-96. Arnold also wrote a number of histories: History of the Rhode Island and Providence Plantations (New York: J. Appleton & Co., 1859-1860); The Life of Patrick Henry (Auburn & Buffalo: Miller, Ortu & Mulligan, 1834); The Life of George Washington (New York: T. Hosken & G. Lane, 1840).

Arnold kept a record of his voyage which has recently been published in Spanish under the title of Viaje por America del sur, 1847-1848, trans. Maria de la Rosa, (Buenos Aires: Enrico Editores, S.A., 1951).

Affidavit of J.G. Arnold, claim against Paraguay, Folio I. It appears that Arnold wrote these articles anonymously. It would seem that the articles Arnold mentions as having written are the following: “The South American Republics,” The Christian Review, LXI (July, 1851), 321-353; “The Republic of Chile,” CLXII (October, 1851), 277-310.
The result of these contacts was the formation of the United States and Paraguay Navigation Company. Arnold appears to have been the driving force in the formation of this concern because of his wide range of contacts. Meetings preliminary to the formation of the Navigation Company were taking place as early as November 19, 1852. On January 8, 1853 they adopted Articles of Association and also made Hopkins the Company's general agent for its operations in Paraguay. Hopkins was to be guaranteed a base salary of two thousand dollars a year and a two per cent commission on the profits up to thirty thousand dollars. Once this figure was reached Hopkins was to take part of his salary in the Company's stock. The Company was granted a charter by the Rhode Island State Legislature in June, 1853. This was apparently granted through the influence of Arnold, who at that time was the Lieutenant Governor of the state; since as he said later "it was supposed I could obtain a very liberal charter from our General Assembly."

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48 Minutes of the meeting of January 8, 1853 in New York, ibid.

49 Minutes of the meeting of June 28, 1853 in Providence, ibid.

50 Affidavit of S.G. Arnold, loc. cit.
The Company was organized with a purchased capital stock issue of one hundred thousand dollars. This sum could be increased to one million dollars. The purpose of the Company was stated to be the formation of steamship lines between various ports in the Plata region and the United States for the purpose of carrying freight and mail.\(^5\) According to Arnold the men who made up the stockholders represented "as a whole a great amount of capital and almost every variety of American industry."\(^6\)

The objectives of the Company were broader than those stated in the Articles of Association. For in preparing an expedition to Paraguay the Company bought a full assortment of machinery such as a steam engine, a saw mill, cotton gins, a planting machine, a sugar mill, a brick making machine, rice hullers, and many other kinds of the latest American agricultural implements and farm machinery.\(^7\) The Company also bought a steamer which it named El Paraguay. Part of the Company's cargo was carried to South America on the Kate and Alice and the rest on the Company's own ship, which left for Paraguay a few weeks after the former on March 22, 1853.\(^8\)

\(^5\) Articles of Association, Claim Against Paraguay, Folio I.
\(^6\) Affidavit of S.G. Arnold, loc. cit.
\(^7\) Affidavit of Clement Hopkins, Claim Against Paraguay, Folio I.
\(^8\) Arnold to Marcy, Providence, November 25, 1853, ibid., Folio III.
El Paraguay never reached Paraguay. Off the coast of Brazil it began to take water and had to be abandoned. Hopkins salvaged the boat for six thousand dollars and the company eventually got over thirty-five thousand dollars from the insurer. Hopkins apparently had the cargo stored and the members of the company's staff made their way to Montevideo by various means. Hopkins was allowed to travel on a Brazilian government ship.55

In Montevideo Hopkins sought a boat to carry goods to Paraguay. On August 12th he went to Buenos Aires, where he saw the Constitution.56 The city of Buenos Aires had revolted from the rest of the Confederation and in the process had bought out Urquiza's navy, of which this ship was a unit.57 Hopkins asked the Government of Buenos Aires for use of the ship, promising to pay the expenses of a round trip voyage to Paraguay and also that the ship would be placed under the flag of the United States. Buenos Aires officials agreed to this and Hopkins took over the ship, running up the American flag, although the crew was the same Buenos Aires crew that had run the ship before.58

55 Ymsfran, expedicion, I, 130-131.
56 Graham to Marcy, Buenos Aires, September 24, 1853, Consular Despatches, Buenos Aires, Vol. 8, R.G. 59. The Spanish name for the vessel was probably El Constitución.
57 See below pages 121-123.
58 Graham to Marcy, September 24, 1853, loc. cit.
Hopkins then left for Montevideo. Upon arriving there he was told by the American Consul, A. M. Hamilton, to haul down the flag of the United States. When this Hopkins refused Hamilton appealed for help to Captain Thomas J. Page, of the U.S.S. "Waterwitch" who was in Montevideo. Page informed Hopkins that it was illegal for him to fly the flag since only ships of U.S. registry were entitled to do so. When Hopkins tried to argue that the ship was not a vessel of war, Page rejected this argument and once more told him to haul down the flag. Hopkins then countered by asking for a 48 hour reprieve which would allow him to go back to Buenos Aires. He told Page that he could get a deposition from Pendleton indicating his approval of the flying of the flag. Page reluctantly agreed, making it clear that it was only a temporary reprieve.

Back in Buenos Aires Hopkins failed to get such a deposition from Graham and Pendleton. Hopkins then proposed to the Buenos Aires officials that he fly their flag at the stern and the American flag at the fore of the ship. Graham

60 Page to Hopkins, Montevideo, August 20, 1853, ibid.
61 Hopkins to Page, Montevideo, August 20, 1853, ibid.
62 Page to Hopkins, Montevideo, August 21, 1853, ibid.
63 Hopkins to Page, Montevideo, August 21, 1853, ibid.
64 Page to Hopkins, Montevideo, August 22, 1853, ibid.
said that he had no objections to this as the American flag constituted only a signal. The Minister of Foreign Affairs then asked if the United States would be responsible if the vessel were captured. Graham replied decidedly not. Buenos Aires now turned cool to the idea.65

To take up this slack Hopkins made a trip to Entre Ríos and obtained from General Urquiza a safeconduct pass for the ship to Paraguay.66 But all of Hopkins’ efforts were to no avail, for upon his return to Buenos Aires the government of that city asked for a deposit equal to the value of the ship. Hopkins could not meet this demand. Hopkins then took what would have been the simplest solution to the problem in the first place; he bought a Uruguayan ship, the Fanny for $12,000 and departed for Asunción on September 30th.67

65 Graham to Marcy, September 24, 1853, loc. cit. It is the international custom for ships to fly their own flag at the stern while they are flying the flag of the country whose waters they are in at the fore mast.

66 Ibid.

67 Arnold to Marcy, November 30, 1853, loc. cit. Arnold came to the defense of Hopkins in this skirmish. Arnold to Marcy, Providence, November 25, 1853, Claim Against Paraguay, Folio III.
CHAPTER IV

THE PENOLETON TREATY

The appointment of Hopkins as the American Consul in Asunción was the first indication that the United States was willing to recognize Paraguay. However, Hopkins did not assume his post in Paraguay until September, 1853. In the meantime the United States opened diplomatic relations with Paraguay.

The decision of the United States to recognize Paraguay was based upon larger considerations of American interests in the entire Plata region. Once again the interests of the United States in Paraguay were secondary to Washington's interest in Southern South America. However, in contrast to situation at the time of the Anglo-French intervention, this time circumstances led to the recognition of Paraguay.

Paraguay's recognition by the United States was part of an over-all attempt on the part of the United States to negotiate treaties of commerce and navigation with Argentina, Uruguay, and Paraguay. The United States engaged in these negotiations because it had learned that the English and French were sending their agents to make treaties, which,
it was feared, would lead to English commercial ascendancy in that area.\(^1\)

Acting upon this fear Secretary of State Webster instructed Robert Sohenek, then United States Minister to Brazil, and John S. Pendleton, the United States Charge to Argentina, to negotiate commercial treaties with Argentina, Uruguay, and Paraguay. Schenek was to act in conjunction with Pendleton, although either man could negotiate on his own. Webster was under the impression that a Paraguayan agent would be found in either Buenos Aires or Rio de Janeiro with whom a treaty could be worked out. Webster then made a statement which reveals that he was not vitally concerned with the question

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\(^1\)Webster to Schenck, Washington, April 29, 1852, Instructions, Brazil, Vol. 15, R.O. 59, and Webster to Pendleton, Washington, April 28, 1852, Instructions, Argentina, Vol. 15, R.O. 59. An interesting exchange took place in Congress in August, 1852, after Hopkins had been appointed and the instructions sent to Pendleton and Schenck. Senator Hannibal Hamlin (Whig-Maine) proposed an amendment to an appropriations bill which provided for the sending of a commercial agent to explore the economic possibilities of Paraguay. This was opposed by Senator John H. Clark (Whig-Rhode Island), who said that it was not worth a man's life and that there was in Paraguay only "a few scattered miscreants, who have run away from the rest of South America." Hamlin then attempted to justify his amendment by reading a letter from the Secretary of the Treasury proposing that such a move would offset English commercial dominance. Clark was not moved: "I cannot see that we have anything to do with Paraguay. There is nothing there that you want; and you have nothing that they are able to pay for. Why, then, open this intercommunication with the extremities of the earth?" U.S., Congressional Globe, 32nd Cong., 1st Sess., 1852, XXI, Part 3, 2376-2377.
of a treaty of Paraguay: "it is not contemplated that either of you should at this juncture proceed to Paraguay for that purpose." ²

Schenck and Pendleton attempted to negotiate a treaty with Argentina in July, 1852, but were unsuccessful. The Government of Argentina did not want to enter a treaty at that time because it was in the process of formulating a new constitution. ³ The two Americans then went to Uruguay and quickly signed a treaty with that Government. ⁴

After completing this mission Schenck returned to Rio de Janeiro and Pendleton to Buenos Aires, both expecting to shortly resume their negotiations in Buenos Aires with Argentina. ⁵ However, when Pendleton returned to Buenos Aires he found conditions even more unfavorable than before. The Province of Buenos Aires had revolted against Urquiza, forcing the latter to move his headquarters to Parana, in the province of Entre Rios. In this confused situation Pendleton met Sir Charles Hotham who had been sent by his Government to negotiate treaties of trade and commerce with the Platine states. Hotham had been instructed to work closely with the French envoy.

²Ibid.

³Pendleton to Webster, Buenos Aires, July 29, 1852, Despatches, Argentina, Vol. 8, R.G. 59.

⁴Schenck to Webster, Rio de Janeiro, September 17, 1852, Despatches, Brasil, Vol. 19, R.G. 59. Schenck to Webster, Rio de Janeiro, October 14, 1852, Ibid.

⁵Pendleton to Edward Everett, Secretary of State, Parana, Entre Rios, Despatches, Argentina, Vol. 8, R.G. 59.
the Chevalier de St. George, and the American representative to obtain the free navigation of the Plata and its tributaries.\textsuperscript{6}

Hotham followed his instructions closely. One of the first indications of this was the close relationship which soon developed between Hotham and Pendleton. In fact, Pendleton seems to have followed Hotham’s advice closely in the ensuing occurrences. The first instance of this was Hotham’s persuading the American not to go immediately with the rest of the diplomatic corp to Parana, but to remain with him until the situation was clearer. When Hotham left Buenos Aires for Parana, Pendleton accepted his invitation to accompany him on board H.M.S. Locust. It was Hotham also who persuaded Pendleton to accompany him to Paraguay to sign a treaty with that State. In a communication to Everett, which was designed to justify his action, the American Charge said that Hotham had urged him "very much" to go to Paraguay. Hotham pointed out that the chances of success would be greater if a representative of the United States joined the European representatives. Pendleton agreed. Recognizing that he had no authorization to go to Paraguay, Pendleton told Everett that he felt that his actions were justified because there were no diplomatic agents of Paraguay in Montevideo or in Buenos Aires. Nor would López ever delegate a task as important as the negotiation of a treaty to a subordinate.

\textsuperscript{6}H.S. Ferns, Britain and Argentina in the Nineteenth Century (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1965), 298-299.
Pendleton also stated that if the United States was not represented in the negotiations Paraguay might feel slighted and make it difficult for the United States to conclude a treaty later.  

After writing this letter Pendleton accompanied Hotham to Asunción, where they were soon joined by St. George of France and a Mr. Carruti of Sardinia. Initial relations between Hotham and López did not go well. The first instance of trouble occurred when Paraguayan officials insisted upon inspecting the Locust. Hotham refused to accept this treatment and went down river to Parana where he wrote a letter of protest to López. López defended the action of his official but indicated that Hotham could now come to Asunción without being searched.

Once he arrived at Asunción Hotham did not seem to get along any better with López. López was now apparently angry because Hotham had referred to him as the President of Paraguay and not as the President of the Republic of Paraguay. López's anger was not placated when Hotham did not fire a slave in salute of the Paraguayan flag when it entered the port of Asunción. López was so upset at these incidents, according to the Brazilian Ambassador Pereira Leal, that he would not treat with Hotham. Therefore when Hotham presented

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7 Pendleton to Webster, Buenos Aires, October 10, 1852, Despatches, Argentina, Vol. 8, R.G. 59 and Pendleton to Everett, December 5, 1852, loc. cit.

8 Pereira Leal to Paulino, Asuncion, December 21, 1852, cited in Emírián, Expedición, 1, 149-150.
his credentials he was told that he should present them to the President's son, Francisco Solano López. However, when Botham bitterly protested the President agreed to receive him, but only on the condition that he recognize the independence of Paraguay.\(^9\) Botham paved the way for the negotiation of a treaty when he recognized Paraguayan independence on January 4, 1853.\(^10\)

In contrast to the initial difficulties of Botham, the French envoy St. George had arrived several days before the Englishman and had gotten along splendidly with López. From Corrientes he had asked and was granted permission to proceed to Asunción. Ferreira Leal also asserts that the French Chargé and his wife, Eugène and Jeanne Guillemot had smoothed the way for St. George, especially Jeanne because she had considerable influence with the López family.\(^11\)

While these events were taking place Pendleton was having troubles of his own. His problems arose from the fact that he did not possess the instructions which he needed to sign a treaty. The credentials which Schenck and Pendleton were to receive never arrived. They had carried on the negotiations in Argentina and had negotiated a treaty with Uruguay without

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\(^{9}\)Ibid: Conferences of December 26 and 30, 1852, ibid.

\(^{10}\)Andrés Riquelme, Apuntes para la historia política y diplomática del Paraguay (Asunción: Editorial Toledo, 1960), I, 64.

\(^{11}\)Conference of January 20, 1853, cited in Ynsfrán, expedición, I, 149-150.
their credentials. At first Pendleton resorted to the tactic of delay, hoping that the credentials would soon arrive. On January 10, 1853 Pendleton informed Benito Varela, Paraguayan Minister of Foreign Affairs, that he had come to deal with the general topic of American-Paraguayan relations, and more specifically with the question of a commercial treaty. He explained to Varela that he had delayed so long in contacting the Paraguayan Government because he knew that they were occupied with the reception of Rotheram and because he hoped to receive documents from Buenos Aires. President López, discerning the real reason for the delay, told Pendleton that he should inform the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of his mission when he could produce his credentials.

After waiting another month Pendleton felt that he could delay no longer. Therefore on February 15th he informed the Paraguayan Government of his dilemma. In the place of his credentials he asked the Paraguayan Government to allow him to negotiate on the basis of Webster’s April 29, 1852.

12 Schenck to Webster, September 17, 1852, loc. cit.

13 Pendleton to Varela, Asuncion, January 10, 1853, enclosure in Pendleton to Marcy, Buenos Aires, April 22, 1853, Despatches, Argentina, Vol. 8.

14 Francisco Solano López, Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs, to Pendleton, Asuncion, January 15, 1853, enclosure in Pendleton to Marcy, April 22, 1853, loc. cit.

15 Through some oversight the credentials were not sent until October 8, 1853. In this note Marcy congratulated Pendleton on the success of the mission. Marcy to Pendleton, Washington, October 8, 1853, Instructions, Argentina, Vol. 15, R.G. 59.
note to him until his credentials did arrive. Pendleton pointed out that while this would have meant that the treaty was being negotiated on an *ad referendum* basis, any treaty which an American diplomat negotiated had to be submitted to the United States Senate. 16

Although it would have seemed likely that López would have been wary on the question of instructions, he informed Pendleton that he was satisfied with his explanations. Pendleton was told that he could present his proposed treaty, but only if he would accompany it with an explicit recognition of Paraguayan independence. 17 Pendleton replied the next day indicating that the United States would recognize the independence of Paraguay and that he was preparing to submit a plan of a treaty of commerce. 18

Pendleton had been forced to reveal to López that he did not have his credentials because the British, French, American, and Sardinian representatives had agreed to submit a common treaty tend to conduct collective negotiations. They felt that unless they followed this type of action there was little likelihood of success. They agreed to adopt the proposed English treaty as the basis of negotiations because

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16 Pendleton to Francisco Solano López, Asunción, February 23, 1853, enclosure in Pendleton to Hary, April 22, 1853, *ibid.*

17 F.S. López to Pendleton, Asunción, February 23, 1853, enclosed in *ibid.*

18 Pendleton to F.S. López, Asunción, February 24, 1853, enclosed in *ibid.*
it was the most acceptable to López. López refused to negotiate with all four of the diplomats, but did agree to accept two of them as the representatives for all. The French and the British agents were then selected to "speak for the Sardinian and myself, and we all conferred together every day." If Pendleton had not acted quickly he would have been excluded from this common front.

The foreign diplomats were able to conclude treaties of commerce and navigation on March 4th, after negotiations which Pendleton described "long, laborious, and exceedingly troublesome..." Practically nothing is known of the course of the negotiations because López insisted that it be conducted verbally and would not even allow memoranda. Pendleton said that López insisted to the point of almost breaking off the negotiations on Article IV, which he wrote himself. The article called for reciprocal free trade. López undoubtedly knew of the unfavorable trade treaties which Brazil had been forced into by England and was apparently resolved to avoid a similar fate for his nation. The other

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19 Pendleton to the Secretary of State, Asunción, March 4, 1853, Despatches, Argentina, Vol. 6, R.O. 59.

20 Pendleton to the Secretary of State, March 4, 1853, loc. cit.

21 Pendleton to Marcy, April 22, 1853, loc. cit.

22 Ibid.

major point of contention was over Article XVI which López again insisted upon. This called for the exchange of ratifications to take place in Asunción. López probably insisted upon this article because he liked to demonstrate to his subjects the importance of Paraguay and of Don Carlos, which were in reality one and the same thing. But beyond the specific insistence of López upon these two articles he was "exceedingly ingenious in finding pretexts upon which to pick a quarrel with us in respect to details. . . ." Pendleton felt that the reason for López's attitude was his "very strong repugnance" to dealing with foreigners. Pendleton later stated that he felt that the opposition of Brazil lay behind López's attitude. Pendleton felt that Brazil was opposing the treaty because she was attempting to establish a policy whereby the littoral states would have less to pay in duties than non-littoral states. Pendleton was correct in perceiving that Brazil was opposed to the Treaty.

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24 Pendleton to Marcy, April 22, 1853, loc. cit.
25 Ibid.
26 Ibid.
27 Ibid.
28 Pendleton to Marcy, April 22, 1853, loc. cit.
But Brazil was not opposed to a navigation treaty per se. Brazil was opposed to the granting of free navigation by treaty, but was urging López to grant it as a spontaneous act. The reason for this position by Brazil was that she feared that such a concession by Paraguay would set a precedent for free navigation on the Amazon, to which she was opposed. 29

Another reason for Brazil's opposition was that she was at this time attempting to get Paraguay to grant her free navigation up the Paraguay to her province of Matto Grosso. These attempts were frustrated by the question of a boundary settlement, which López demanded a favorable concession upon before allowing Brazil to use the Paraguay. 30 To deceive Brazil, the Paraguayan President had made a great show of pretending to take Leal into his confidence by allowing him to read correspondence and telling him that Paraguay would never make a treaty. But then, with a brutality all his own, López brusquely informed Leal that he had made a treaty. 31 Leal then countered by demanding a similar treaty for Brazil. López refused and the relations between Paraguay and Brazil deteriorated until López handed Leal his passports in August of 1853. 32 Box feels that if it had not been for

29 Insfrán, expedición, I, 148-150.


31 For an excellent summary of these dealings see Insfrán, expedición, I, 147-154.

32 Box, Orígenes, I, 27.
the bad relations between Paraguay and Brazil even before the
open break it is unlikely that the treaty would have been
negotiated. He suggests that through the negotiation of this
treaty López might have been looking for aid in its struggle
against Brazil from England. 33

As for the treaties themselves Pendleton pointed out
that they were the same except that the United States, French
and Sardinian did not contain a provision forbidding slave
trade which the English treaty contained. Pendleton said
that he rejected a slave provision because he had no instruc-
tions on the question and because of the domestic consequences
in the United States of such a provision. Pendleton also
could see "no practical object in it," adding that it was
"introduced in the English treaties in a spirit of rather
vainglorious manifestation of zeal and philanthropy. . . ." 34

Pendleton related that López was very particular about
the recognition of Paraguayan independence. It was an
occasion of

great ceremony and parade, civil and military. The flag
of each of the contracting States was saluted with
twenty one guns, immediately upon the delivery of the
written recognition by its representatives and the
Salute was returned by the English and French from their
steamers on the spot.

Because the United States did not have a ship in Paraguay
Pendleton arranged to have a salute fired in Buenos Aires.

33 Ibid., 52-53.
34 Pendleton was from Virginia.
Pendleton must have had some reservations about recognizing the independence of Paraguay, although he also must have realized that this was implicit in his instructions to negotiate a treaty. He told the Department that "formal recognition was an indispensable condition - He \[López\] would give me no treaty without it." That Pendleton's action was approved by the Department is indicated by the fact that he was never reapproached for it and by the attempt of the United States to exchange ratification of the treaty. The appointment of Hopkins had indicated the feelings of the Department, but there is no indication that Pendleton was aware of this step.

Pendleton must have had a strong sense of satisfaction because of his role in establishing relations between the United States and Paraguay. However, a number of factors were to intervene and to delay the ratification for another six years. One of the most important of these factors was Edward A. Hopkins, to whom we must once again turn our attention.

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35 Pendleton to Marcy, April 22, 1853, loc. cit.
36 See below pages 127, footnote 15.
37 Pendleton to the Secretary of State, March 4, 1853, loc. cit. Pendleton had very kind words for the other envoys, especially for Hotham, pointing out that they "have acted in the most frank and liberal spirit-Not attempting in any way to gain any particular advantage, but laboring faithfully for the general object - To Charles Hotham, however in particular - who by the liberality of his own government was provided with all the suitable conveniences and accomodations for this long, laborious and difficult expedition. . . ."
CHAPTER V

HOPKINS AGAINST LOPEZ

Seven months after Pendleton left Paraguay, Hopkins arrived to assume his dual activities of United States Consul and general agent of the Navigation Company. The arrival of Hopkins and his cohorts on October 11, 1853 was apparently warmly received by López. A twenty-one gun salute was fired. López also congratulated him [Hopkins] upon his safe arrival after an unusually long and disastrous voyage; assured him that his personal esteem and favor were as strong as they had ever been during the years of acquittance; that he doubted not the country would be greatly benefited by the enterprise in which the Company had been [illegible]; that the Government of Paraguay took a lively interest in the efforts about to be made to develop the rich resources of the country; that the favor that had been previously been shown to Mr. Hopkins personally, would be continued to the Company under his agency, that he might calculate upon the heartiest cooperation . . . of the Government.¹

Hopkins wrote that López had "shown the company every favor." According to Hopkins these favors were in conformity with the May 20, 1845 decree² "as well as constant promises

¹Affidavit of Clement E. Hopkins (brother of Edward, who accompanied him to Paraguay), Claim Against Paraguay, Folio I. It seems unlikely that López would have fired a 21 gun salute to a consul. Therefore it appears likely that Clement was exaggerating on this point, and, perhaps, on the nature of the entire reception.

²See above, page 21.
to me by President López. "3 Hopkins did nothing to discourage such special treatment. In turn, Hopkins presented President López with a handsome coach and harness for four horses and a silk Paraguayan flag made by the wives of the officers of the Company. Hopkins also presented Señora López with a valuable jeweled watch and charms, while the daughters of the President were given garden tools. 4

In spite of the favorable treatment which Hopkins alleged that the López was giving the Company,5 it appears that the Company did not prosper. A number of historians have asserted that the Company prospered from the beginning.6 Clement Hopkins stated that in several days the Company had in operation a store to which customers flocked.7 The Company also pointed out that it had in operation a cigar factory employing one hundred operatives, as well as having a steam engine and saw mills "in most profitable employ." The

3 Hopkins to Marcy, Asunción, December 27, 1853, Consular Letters, Asunción, Vol. 1, R.G. 59. Hopkins, apparently with no success, proposed that the Department present to López a gift of not over three thousand dollars. Hopkins to Everett, December 22, 1852, ibid.

4 Affidavit of Clement E. Hopkins, loc. cit.

5 Hopkins later denied that López granted any favors. See below, page 141.


7 Affidavit of Clement E. Hopkins, loc. cit.
Company asserted that they were turning out 250,000 cigars a month and anticipated that the saw mills would earn $275,000 annually. 8

Yet the evidence clearly contradicts these assertions. Hopkins himself indicated that as late as July, 1854 the saw mill was not in operation and that he was having trouble getting wood from the Paraguayan Government which held a timber monopoly. 9 Even after the saw mill was operating Hopkins indicated that many of the other machines were not being run for lack of operators. 10 Clement E. Hopkins later qualified his assertions by hedging on his earlier statements concerning the profit of the cigar operation and by admitting that the saw mill ran at near maximum speed only for several days. 11 Alexander Ferguson, who was apparently in charge of the Company's equipment, supports the point of view that the Company was not prospering. He later testified that the Company's equipment had rarely been installed. He called the planing machine a novelty 12 and said that the saw mill had been in operation only a few days by August of 1854, when the Company's operations in Paraguay were closed. He


9Hopkins to Marcy, Asunción, July 15, 1854, Company Records.

10Hopkins to José Falcon, Paraguayan Minister of Foreign Affairs, Asunción, August 16, 1854, Ibid.

11Claim against Paraguay, Journal, 134.

12Ibid., 158.
explained that this was the case because the building which housed the mill was too frail to withstand the vibrations of the mill and concluded that the mill was a "poor affair." Hopkins also unintentionally substantiated this general lack of progress in a letter to Marcy written in August, 1854. In this letter he did not claim any success for the Company, instead he pointed out that the enterprises of the Company were still in the process of getting underway. Further proof comes from the fact that in its claims against the Government of Paraguay the Company did not claim restitution on the basis of realized profits, but instead on the basis of hopes for future profits.

At the same time that the Company was not prospering, relations between López and Hopkins were deteriorating. The first indication of trouble came in January, 1854 when an American, Louis Bramberger, appeared in Asunción and declared that the Company had neither capital nor credit in the United States and would soon be bankrupt. These assertions must have raised some doubts in the ever-suspicious mind of López.

13 Ibid., 142.
15 See below, pages 269-270.
16 Inesfrán, expedicion, I, 136.
17 Daniel Ammen, an American naval officer who was in Paraguay during this time gave the following opinion of Bramberger: "From my personal intercourse with him, I should not feel disposed to place reliance upon him." Claim Against Paraguay, Journal, 133.
Hopkins to Murray, August 22, 1845, 10a, 8t. 20

A letter - hop also tried to get Kennedy to name the Remittances, but his strong defense was - much to the extremely insouciant was performed.

... and after being in bed, he was called before the Minister of Foreign Affairs and asked about a certain proposition. Hopkins wrote that he had come to Paris in the expectation of purchasing land, but then turned to matters of Henry W. Kennedy, who

De la France, 20

The Woodbine Parthenon had incorporated into a book on the Woodbine Parish had incorporated a report on the Woodbine Parish that it was not entirely unimportant. For it was Graham, who had written a highly unfavorable report on the Woodbine Parish, which was not entirely unimportant. It was not entirely unimportant. While the attack on Graham was meant to degrade the public and private character and the conduct of Joseph Graham, who had been the American consul in Buenos Aires for ten years, Hopkins said that the attack on Joseph Graham, who had been the American consul in Buenos Aires for ten years, Hopkins published in the Semi-Weekly, his oratorical paper, on other occasions followed those rather elegant ones.

... through the American "were prominent in their subscription." Hopkins published in the Semi-Weekly, his oratorical paper, on other occasions followed those rather elegant ones.
who had given Graham the information upon which he based his writings. Kennedy refused to meet both demands and left Paraguay.

Hopkins asserts that a few days later a Mr. Faccioli (an "Italian under American Protection") asked the Paraguayan President for payment for a rifle which his partner Mr. Bramberger ("a naturalized German Jew") had allegedly sold to the President's son, Bernacico. According to Hopkins, the President called Faccioli a liar and ordered him out of his office. 21

Up to this point this series of events did not seem to demonstrate a conspiratorial attitude on the part of López. None of them were directed at Americans specifically just because they were Americans and none of them touched the Company. But the next series of events clearly demonstrated that López had changed his attitude. They could not have happened if López had been determined to prevent them.

The first incident was an attack upon a Mr. Naulty, an American connected with the Company, and a Lt. Moore, of the U.S.S. Waterwitch which was then conducting scientific explorations on the Paraguayan rivers. According to the testimony of two men they were on way home at night when they noticed that they were being followed by a man who subsequently threw a stone at them which knocked Naulty down. They caught and "severely chastised" the Paraguayan,

21 Hopkins to Marcy, August 22, 1854, "loc. cit."
but when they went before a justice of the peace, he refused to allow them to place charges against the man, in spite of the "energetic demands" of Lt. Moore.22

Hopkins was quick to point out that this was not an isolated incident, but that the officers of the U.S.S. Waterwitch were frequently insulted by Paraguayans and that not one of the insulters had been arrested nor had any satisfaction been given by the Paraguayan Government. Also, Hopkins pointed out, so much wood was being stolen from the ships' stock on the Asuncion side of the Paraguay River that the crew moved it to the other side, which was frequented by the fierce Chaco Indians. This led Hopkins to make some comparisons between the relative merits of the Indian and Paraguayan level of civilization, which were not at all favorable to the latter.

Throughout these incidents Hopkins stated that he made no official protests to López. Instead, he maintained that he made repeated private requests of López to put an end to such insults and incidents. However, the next incident caused Hopkins to change this policy.

This incident was a clash between Hopkins' brother Clement and a Paraguayan soldier. Clement Hopkins' story was that

On approaching the arroyo of San Antonio I met a small troop of oxen in care of a cavalry soldier and two peons. As the oxen looked unruly I said to Madame

22Ibid.
Hopkins to Mayor, August 22, 1894, 10:40 a.m.

August 22, 1894, Company House,

Mr. J. H. Hopkins to Mayor, August 22, 1894, 10:40 a.m., for carriage for special purposes to meet a large number of persons.

In a letter to the Mayor, the various parties requested that no carriage be allowed to the Mayor in his riding areas with a whip in his hand, being very excited. Hopkins said nothing of this in relating his version of the confrontation to Maroy. Instead, he stated that he made his complaints in "quiet and respectful terms." Hopkins said nothing of this in relating his version of the confrontation to Mayor. Instead, he stated that he made his complaints in "quiet and respectful terms."

President's attitude. Alexander Pershing states: I needmonkey by the instant. Hopkins dropped his carriages.

Certainly! Let us turn out here, these boys are very excited.
that the language was more forcible than diplomatic. Hopkins informed López that

this is only the most flagrant of a long series of insults, of a secret and cowardly nature which have been directed against all the American citizens in this country for some months back, such as throwing stones in the public highways, assaulting the open windows of the Genl. Agency of the Company, ... with sand and other dangerous missiles by which the General Cashier of said Company and his family have been endangered; constant insulting shouts and cries whenever an American citizen appears, in which even the person of the undersigned has been included.

Hopkins proceeded to demand a “prompt and severe punishment” of the soldier involved in the affair with his brother.

Hopkins further demanded that the punishment should be published in the only journal of the country “which is well known to be under the entire control of the Paraguayan Government.”

José Falcon, Paraguayan Minister of Foreign Affairs, replied to Hopkins’s note by stating that he was ignorant of the acts Hopkins mentioned. Hopkins in return expressed his “greatest surprise” at the ignorance of the Paraguayan Foreign Minister. In his reply to this message Falcon

26 The General Cashier was William E. Hines, who supported Hopkins’ assertions in great detail. He said, in addition to the material contained above, that López had spies watching their every move, even to the extent of looking into their windows. Claim Against Paraguay, Journal, 44, and Difficulties with Paraguay, 74-75.

27 Hopkins to Falcon, Asunción, July 25, 1854, Claim Against Paraguay, Folio II.

28 Falcon to Hopkins, Asunción, July 27, 1854, ibid.

29 Hopkins to Falcon, Asunción, July 29, 1854, ibid.
ignored the issue which Hopkins had raised and instead focused upon Hopkins’ opposition to the Pendleton Treaty, alleging that Hopkins had “repeatedly assured the Government, that the United States would not ratify the treaty because the American Government was offended that Paraguay did not accredit a minister to the United States.” Hopkins did not deny the validity of these charges, stating that his government “does not require his judgement in its ratification.”

From this point Hopkins moved on to make the following threat:

If in not ratifying it up to the present moment, it has not taken away a portion of the rights of its citizens, neither has it deprived them of its powerful and constant protection . . .

Hopkins’ intransigence was also demonstrated when he refused a compromise from Lopez that the soldier’s punishment not be published, but instead only the order for punishment.

Lopez now took direct and overt action with a series of moves which for all practical purposes destroyed the Company and Hopkins’s position in Paraguay. Lopez made his first move on August 16th when he issued a decree annulling the sale of land at San Antonio to the Company. Lopez declared the sale illegal because it was bought from a widow who had no right to sell the land since it belonged to her

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30 Falcon to Hopkins, Asuncion, August 5, 1854, ibid.
32 Hopkins to Falcon, Asuncion, August 7, 1854, Company Records.
children. On August 25th the Government of Paraguay seized control of these lands, evicting the Company.  

By this time Lopez had already issued another decree. This one, among other things, stipulated that every industrial establishment in Paraguay would be closed within three days if a license to operate were not obtained from the Government. When Hopkins attempted to apply for such a license it was denied him because he indicated that his title was "general agent" of the Company. The Paraguayans turned down his application on the grounds that only the son of the President, Francisco Solano Lopez, could be called general in Paraguay. Other actions quickly followed. Lopez closed the cigar factory and the saw mill. Then, on September 1st Hopkins' exequator was revoked. During all of these developments Lopez was attacking Hopkins through the Semanario, calling him a smuggler and a contrabandist.

Numerous reasons have been given for the expulsion of Hopkins and the Company. Ynefran sees the expulsion as a direct result of the reaction of Hopkins to the alleged attack upon his brother: "Provooco [Hopkins] y precipito la ruina de su negocio simplemente porque era un insensato." Yet it

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35 Hopkins to Marcy, August 22, 1854, loc. cit; Mackie, Memorandum, August 18, 1858, loc. cit.
36 Ynefran, expedicion. 1, 207. Harold F. Peterson shares basically the same opinion: "By diverse indiscretions,
would appear that this incident was not the cause of the actions taken by Lopez, but rather the result of the ill-feeling that had long been brewing as evidenced by the numerous events which preceded it. In his study Insfran does not even mention these incidents. 37

Hopkins charged that the reason for his expulsion was, among other reasons, the influence of Brazil. Hopkins told Marcy that Brazil and Paraguay were once more enjoying good relations and therefore Lopez was acting under Brazilian influence. According to Hopkins the Brazilians were telling Lopez that the Americans were bent on capturing the country, while, in reality, the Brazilians were frightened over American pretensions on the Amazon. Brazil felt that if Lopez granted free navigation of her rivers the United States would use this as a precedent to press for free navigation of the Amazon. 38 Hopkins was correct in his statement that Brazil was worried over the question of navigation on the Amazon. 39 However, at this time the relations between Brazil and Paraguay were so bad that Brazil sent a fleet to Paraguay


38 Hopkins to Marcy, August 22, 1854, *loc. cit.*

39 In his first annual message to Congress (December 5, 1853) President Pierce pointed out that the United States was attempting to open navigation on the Amazon ("This great natural highway for international trade"). Richardson, *Messages*, VI, 2744.
in early 1855 to attempt to force a settlement of their disputes. 40

Hopkins suggested another reason for the break. This was a conflict in economic designs. Hopkins charged that López took action against the Company because he wanted to keep his country insignificant so that he and his family could monopolize its resources. The success of the Company threatened to upset this plan: "Our American energy astonished him." Therefore, according to Hopkins, the various actions which López took were a "Jesuitical pretext, to continue and cement the system of Doctor Francia, in making himself the only merchant." 41 Lieutenant Thomas J. Page of the U.S.S. Water Witch, by no means an admirer of Hopkins, 42 shared the same opinion. He noted, while in Paraguay, that the Government had a monopoly of all trade in native products of value, which effectively checked the spirit of private enterprise. 43

Hopkins was correct in stating that his economic ideas did not agree with those of López, but he seems to have been incorrect in his assertion that it was the prosperity of the Company which precipitated the break. The Company in fact was not that successful. Perhaps it was simply the survival

40 Lobo, Cousas diplomataes. 45-83.


42 For the role of Page in the relations between Paraguay and the United States see below, pages 155-156.

43 Page, Le Plata, 136.
of the Company which caused Lopez's reactions. However, a more plausible reason, one which clearly differentiates the economic designs of Hopkins from those of Lopez, was that Hopkins wanted to open trade with Bolivia through the Rio Pilcomayo, and with Brazil through the Parana. This explains Hopkins opposition to the treaty which Pendleton had signed. This treaty opened only the Paraguay and Parana rivers to the United States, and then only up to Asuncion and Encarnación respectively. Even before his arrival in Paraguay Hopkins had asked the Department to appoint him as special agent to Paraguay with powers to make a treaty. Once in Paraguay Hopkins had maintained his opposition to Pendleton's treaty. In his communications to Marcy, Hopkins made it clear that his Company had plans to open up trade with Brazil and Bolivia. In fact he stated that they were negotiating with a "Hamburg Company" which had a large concession in Bolivia in the hopes of carrying the Hamburg concern's immigrants to the concession. These plans were stymied, according to Hopkins, by the

44 Insfran asserts that Hopkins opposed the treaty because he had undergone a change in his opinion of Paraguay, no longer considering it worth treaty as a civilized country and desired to apply to it a system of capitulations such as were applied to the Berbers or Asiatic nations. See his expedition, I, 133. Insfran cites as his source Hopkins' letter of August 22, 1854, loco. cit., which was written after the break took place between Hopkins and Lopez. Insfran overlooks the fact that Hopkins disgust with Paraguay was expressed only after this break.

45 This provision is contained in Article II of the treaty, see Appendix A.

Paraguayan navigation restrictions. He argued that the only way to break these restrictions was for the United States to intervene, forcing Paraguay to throw open her rivers.\(^{47}\) Hopkins' plans to open Paraguayan rivers to free navigation antagonized López in two respects: (1) they led Hopkins to oppose the Pendleton treaty, (2) the plans themselves were adamantly opposed by López. In the last analysis López won:

Hopkins, a man of liberal ideas, believed that Don Carlos, after Caseros would modify his system of government, and that Paraguay would completely and openly enter the community of democratic nations. He expected greater liberties, an increase in commerce and better guarantees. \(...\) The President maintained his system unchanged, granting rights on the pretense of favors.\(^{48}\)

Perhaps there was also a question of morality involved. Alexander Ferguson testified that: "I think his [Hopkins'] conduct was scandalous, according to my ideas of morality, and shocked the people of the Country. I allude to his relations with Madame Guillemot. ..."\(^{49}\) Clement Hopkins attempted to discredit such charges, but admitted that Hopkins moved into the same house that Eugene and Jeanne resided in, although he allegedly lived in a different part of the house.\(^{50}\) Benito Varela, acting Minister of Foreign Affairs wrote:

"Madama Guillemot is the biggest scoundrel one finds among ..."


\(^{49}\) *Claim Against Paraguay*, Journal, 166.

\(^{50}\) ibid., 62.
the towdries of the slums of the city." Hopkins was obviously not in agreement when he wrote of the lady: "Madame Guillemot has ever been considered and respected in no ordinary degree by us all, as an American lady, as well as for her great refinement and many talents." However, Hopkins' activities in this respect must have had little importance when one considers the private lives of the sons of President López.

However, the general conduct of Hopkins in Paraguay did not help his cause. Ferguson stated that he was "overbearing and tyrannical. He had a swaggering bullying way with him, in all his relations in life, and his department was always overbearing and tyrannical." Lt. William L. Powell of the U.S.S. Water Witch was no kinder when he said that

Mr. Hopkins, by egotistical and presumptious conduct on his part, made himself unpopular with the people, and gained the ill-will of President López. He also denounced the government in illegible strong terms.

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51 Ysfran found this sentence written on the margin of a note concerning an insult to Jeanne, Varala to Sugune Guillemet, Asuncion, November 22, 1853, Coleccion Rio Branco, quoted in Ysfran, expedicion, I, 137.

52 Hopkins to Marcy, August 22, 1854, loc. cit. Hopkins frequently assumed that his opinion was shared by everyone else.


54 Claim Against Paraguay, Journal, 166.

55 Ibid., 177; Hopkins married Jeanne in 1859, after she obtained a divorce from her husband. Testimony of Clemente Hopkins, ibid., 53-55.
Hopkins' conduct certainly intensified his conflict with Lopez, even if it did not cause it.

Faced with the obvious attempt of Lopez to drive him out of Paraguay, Hopkins used several devices to attempt to bolster up his position. In Asuncion he had published in the *Semanario* an article of strong protest against Lopez's accusations. He also attempted to force Lieutenant Powell to accompany him in making a protest to Lopez. When Powell refused an oral request he received a note from Hopkins in which the latter informed Powell that it was an "official summons." Powell refused again stating "I have yet to learn that your position clothes you with the authority to make such a summon."58

During this period Hopkins was also pleading with Washington for aid. As his position became more and more untenable his communications became correspondingly desperate. He attacked Lopez saying that he was

stained with all those vices that are the legitimate curse of a country long under despotic sway; he governs over a debased and corrupt public sentiment, like himself freed from all religious principle or even the sense of shame.

56Ibid., Folio I, article from *El Semanario*, September 15, 1854.


58Powell to Hopkins, Asuncion, August 24, 1854, ibid.; Powell later explained that he did not trust Hopkins' judgement. See *Claim Against Paraguay*, Journal, 91.
Hopkins also offered his resignation, to take effect upon the arrival of his successor. But as the arrival of a successor would take a considerable length of time Hopkins must have been hoping that the Department would give him strong support.

After López had revoked his exequatur Hopkins' notes took on an even more urgent tone. He pleaded for help stating that "we are all left here without any protection, and exposed to the violence of a man whose rage feeds and increases upon itself." In his view far-reaching issues were involved and if Washington did not come to his aid quickly "all Americans may as well retire from the regions of the Plata." Despite his own unpopularity with López he still asked Marcy to retain him as consul in order to force upon López the sincerity of the United States.

In the meantime, the energetic American also sought help from the United States naval forces in the area. On August 13th he sent Page a letter asking him to come to Asuncion. Then on August 24th he sent Page a much more urgent message. The same day he also sent a letter to Commodore W.D. Salter,

59 Hopkins to Marcy, August 22, 1854, loc. cit.
61 Hopkins to Marcy, Asuncion, August 30, 1854, ibid.
62 Hopkins to Marcy, Asuncion, September 6, 1854, ibid.
63 Hopkins to Page, Asuncion, August 13, 1854, Claim Against Paraguay, Folio II.
commander of the Brazilian Squadron, asking for aid. Page did not receive the first of Hopkins' notes until September 1st because he was away from Asuncion exploring the Pilcomayo River.

To fully understand the role which Page played in the ensuing events we must look at the nature of his mission and his previous relations with both López and Hopkins. Both of these relationships at various times determined Page's subsequent course of action.

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64 Hopkins to Salter, Asuncion, August 24, 1854, and Hopkins to Page, Asuncion, August 24, 1854. Both in Company Records. There is no record of Salter's reply.

65 Page to James Dobben, Secretary of the Navy, September 1, 1854, Claim Against Paraguay, Folio II.
CHAPTER VI

THE U.S.S. WATER WITCH

In the midst of his growing difficulties Hopkins had appealed to Lieutenant Page of the U.S.S. Water Witch because he commanded the only United States naval ship in Paraguay. Page was sent to the Plata area to gather information on the numerous rivers there in order to advance the general cause of science and the cause of American commerce.¹

¹Instructions from John F. Kennedy, Secretary of the Navy, to Thomas J. Page, Appendix A in Page, La Plata, 567-569. Page was from Virginia and was the grandson of Virginia governors John Page and Thomas Nelson. He had been appointed a midshipman in 1827 and was engaged in United States Coastal Survey work from 1833 to 1842, gaining the special favor of Ferdinand A. Hassler, the Survey director. After serving in the Mediterranean and with the Brazilian Squadron Page was attached to the Naval Observatory and then served in the Far East. Upon his return from the Far East he proposed a survey of this area. His idea was accepted but when the scope of the survey was extended to include the Bering Sea and the North Pacific a senior officer was placed in charge. Page refused to take second rank and was subsequently assigned to the Water Witch. When the Civil War broke out he resigned from the Navy and fought for the South in several capacities. Sources: Amos Lawrence Mason, ed., Memoir and Correspondence of Charles Steedman . . . (Cambridge: Riverside Press, 1912), 129; Two Folios, one labeled "Career of Captain Thomas Jefferson Page While in the Confederate Service," the other "Thomas Jefferson Page, United States Navy," Records of the Bureau of Naval Personnel; Navy Department; National Archives, R.G. 24; Dumas Malone, ed., Dictionary of American Biography (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1934), XIV, 140-141.
Page's expedition had been regarded as scientific and therefore Washington had made no real effort to obtain the approval of the Governments whose rivers Page was to explore. Page decided that he should ask for this approval. Upon his arrival in Rio de Janeiro in April, 1853, Page asked Brazilian permission to ascend the Paraguay River into Brazilian territory. Brazil was reserved in her reply because she was worried about rumors, subsequently proven true, that the United States wanted to open the Amazon to free navigation.² Brazil feared that if it granted Page the right to traverse the Paraguay into her territory she would be setting a precedent for a similar American request on the Amazon. Therefore Brazil stipulated that Page could ascend the Paraguay into Brazilian territory, but only to the city of Albuquerque, which was above Paraguay.³

After leaving Rio de Janeiro Page had proceeded on to Buenos Aires. Page had experienced no difficulties in securing the approval of General Urquiza for the exploration or Argentine waters involved.⁴ Page had stayed a month in Buenos Aires


⁴Page to the Secretary of the Navy, Buenos Aires, May 28, 1853, Letters, etc., From Lieutenant Thomas J. Page, Exploration and Survey of the Rivers Plata, Paraguay, etc., January 6, 1853 to August 4, 1853, Letters From Officers Commanding Expeditions, Naval Records Collections Of The Office Of Naval Records and Library, Department of Navy, National Archives, R.G. 59. Hereafter cited as Exploration.
completing his preparations. Just as he was about to leave he had received a message from Robert Schenck, the American minister to Brazil, and John S. Pendleton, the American Charge in Buenos Aires, asking that he delay his departure since they might need his services. The two American diplomats thought that they needed Page’s services to carry General Urquiza to Entre Ríos. This retreat by Urquiza became necessary when the Province of Buenos Aires rose in revolt against him, making his position on the outskirts of Buenos Aires untenable, especially when he lost his fleet. The Water Witch made two trips up to Entre Ríos, the first carrying General Urquiza, and the second carrying Schenck and Pendleton.

After finishing these missions Page had continued his journey to Paraguay. At Tres Bocas he had asked permission to proceed to Asunción. Page’s request was answered affirmatively and he was provided with a pilot to accompany the Water Witch to Asunción. Page wrote that López sent out instructions a month before his arrival to supply the Water Witch with all the needed facilities and an experienced pilot.

5 Schenck and Pendleton to Page, Buenos Aires, May 28, 1853, ibid.

6 Page to James C. Dobben, Secretary of the Navy, “Inner Roads of Buenos Aires,” August 2, 1853, ibid.; Page, La Plata, 46-52. Urquiza’s fleet was lost to Buenos Aires because of bribery.

7 Page, La Plata, 64, 100, 105-106.
could see. Topaz objected to referstion beyond the
fingers and the footsteps moving to overlap the
position to proceed above the
fingers could not be considered as establishing a procedure.
and therefore the journey
seen to satisfy expectations and therefore the journey
the object of the statement, that the
was opposed to examining her the position he said that
announced as much as would make the same demand and referstion
argued that it be permitted. The above was not amendeable
and the President felt that the President's
informal Government well read and referstion with the patience of

Intelligence would read and referstion with the patience of
and advertise than he had been led to expect and a
President's position whom he described as more agreeable
by a recently from this interlace never again
an interlace with Topaz which lasted more than an hour.
weeks before the arrival of Topaz and on the same day had
had arrived in Armstrong on October 1, 1852.
limits though Page felt that he successfully countered the President’s arguments.\textsuperscript{11} Page felt that López had conceded his point when the latter issued a passport authorizing him to go as far as Bahia Negra on the Paraguay River which was in Bolivian territory.\textsuperscript{12} Page interpreted López’s permission to indicate that he could continue up the Paraguay into Brazilian territory:

The point was conceded, and I was, of course, disposed to put upon it the most latitudinous construction; that is to ascend as far as I could in an ocean steamer. I understood uniformly in my conversations with President López, and from an official paper sent me relating to this subject that I could carry our surveys throughout the limits of Paraguay north, or, indeed, beyond them, for Bahia Negra is conceded to Bolivia by both Brazil and Paraguay. From that point this President could neither direct nor check our operations. . . .\textsuperscript{13}

Acting upon this assumption Page went beyond the limits of Paraguay and up to Albuquerque. Then, as Brazil dropped her earlier restrictions, Page went past Albuquerque to the city of Corumbá.\textsuperscript{14}

Upon his return to Paraguay the American officer became aware that the Paraguayan President did not agree with his interpretation of the November 5th passport. The first intimation of this came when Page received a cool treatment from the Captain of the Port of Asunción, who informed Page

\textsuperscript{11}Page, \textit{La Plata}, 199.

\textsuperscript{12}López to Page, Asunción, November 5, 1853, enclosed in Hopkins to Marcy, December 27, 1853, \textit{loc. cit.}

\textsuperscript{13}Page, \textit{La Plata}, 139.

\textsuperscript{14}\textit{Ibid.}, 119, 199; Page to Dobbin, Corumbá, Brasil, December 1, 1853 and Page to Dobbin, Asunción, May 3, 1853, Exploration.
that López was angry because he had gone beyond the limits of Paraguay. When Page attempted to call upon President López he was told that the President was ill. However, several days later Page managed to have an interview with López. In this interview López informed Page that he had established a precedent which Brazil would press for. Page again argued that the expedition was scientific and therefore could not be used by Brazil as a precedent. Page also asserted that if López allowed him to go to the limits of Paraguay, López could not keep him from going beyond them. Page asserts that López made no rebuttal to these remarks and that within a few days the relations between the two men were once more friendly. "We are now" he said, "good friends as ever." 

After this event had passed good relations between López and Page seemed to have continued as Page carried forward the exploration of various rivers in the Plata basin. Page first learned of the difficulties between Hopkins and López in Corrientes during the middle of August, 1854. When Hopkin's plea for aid reached Page on September 1st he did not respond because he did not trust Hopkins and the relations between

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16 Page to Dobbin, Asuncion, September 25, 1854, Claim Against Paraguay, Folio II.
18 Page to Dobbin, Corrientes, Argentina, August 13, 1854, Exploration.
the two men were not good. Page had first looked upon
Hopkins with favor.19 This attitude changed, however,
when Page learned of Hopkins’ opposition to the treaty
which Pendleton had negotiated. Page informed Marcy that
he thought Hopkins’ actions deserved a severe reproach from
the Department of State.20

Hopkins had also initially regarded Page with favor21
but then adopted an attitude of hostility to Page which
matched the latter’s attitude towards him. Hopkins informed
Marcy that Page did not treat him with the “respect which
our laws require.”22 As a concrete example Hopkins pointed
out that on the Fourth of July, 1854, he refused an invitation
to visit the Water Witch because on a previous visit to the
ship he had arrived to find that there was not a boat for him.
When a boat was finally sent, Hopkins pointed out, it was
the smallest. To top all of this off Hopkins related that
he was not received with any honors. Hopkins said that
López pointedly reminded him of this incident. Hopkins also
complained that Page did not consult with him:

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19Page, "La Plata," 126. Page’s opinion of Hopkins may
have been influenced by his knowledge of Hopkins’ naval career.

20Page to Marcy, Asuncion, October 20, 1853, Despatches,

21Hopkins to Marcy, Asuncion, November 14, 1853, Con-

22Hopkins to Marcy, December 27, 1853, loc. cit.
He has managed his own affairs as if a separate American Authority resident in Paraguay without any interference from me or without his even informing me that I could be useful in the least degree. 23

Hopkins also thought that Page was wrong in the latter’s dispute with President López over the extent of his exploration, but added:

I continue to labor with the President, that our expedition should have the most brilliant result. But I consider it my duty to inform you beforehand that I have had as yet no agency whatever in any part of Lieut. Page’s conduct. . . . 24

According to Alexander Ferguson the relations between the two men were so bad that Page treated Hopkins with a “mocked disrespect and personal enmity. . . .” 25

In view of these antecedents it is not surprising that Page did not leap to the aid of Hopkins. Instead Page decided to ignore the request for aid. In a letter to the Secretary of the Navy he pointed out that:

It is my duty and shall ever be my aim, to give all and every protection to American citizens and property in foreign countries, whenever that protection may come properly and legitimately under my sphere of action.

But he made it clear that these conditions did not apply to the case of Hopkins: “If Mr. Hopkins expects to involve me and the Water Witch in the disgraceful affair between the Government of Paraguay and himself, he deludes himself with


24 Hopkins to Marcy, December 27, 1853, loc. cit.

25 Notes of Alexander Ferguson, Claim Against Paraguay, Folio 1.
very false hopes." Page frankly suspected that the whole incident was concocted by Hopkins to save himself because the Company was failing. 26

Nevertheless, Page reversed his stand soon after this letter was written and took the Water Witch up to Asuncion. The reason for Page's change of mind was a letter which he had received from Lt. Powell 27 informing him that the situation had become more dangerous and that his presence was necessary in Asuncion. 28

Page arrived in Asuncion on September 20th and on the following day called upon President López. The Paraguayan President received Page courteously and expressed himself as having been outraged by the remarks, the communications, and the conduct of Mr. Hopkins and Mr. Morales. 29 López said that things had gone to such lengths that he would never permit Mr. Hopkins to do business in Paraguay. Page inquired if the other Americans could not be allowed to carry on the business. López replied affirmatively that his objections were confined to Hopkins and Morales, but that the others would receive every protection. 30

26Page, to Dobbin, Corrientes, September 1, 1854, Claim Against Paraguay, Folio II.
27Lt. Powell had been left in charge of building a small steamer, especially designed for river travel. See Page to Dobbin, September 25, 1854, loc. cit.
28Ibid.
29Manuel Morales was a Cuban who had been in charge of the cigar factory, and according to Page made some "very imprudent and ridiculous remarks." Ibid.
30Ibid; Page, La Plata, 271.
On the next day a committee, composed of Hopkins and three employees of the Company, chosen at a meeting at Hopkins' house the day before, called upon Page to see what he was going to do. Unfortunately Hopkins did most of the talking. Page said that Hopkins "required or demanded of me to join him in a protest to this Government. . . ." Page added: "His tone and manner were in his usual style of presumption, and I promptly informed him that his request and demand would not be granted." Page said that he felt that no good would come from an empty gesture. He then went on to tell Hopkins that he and the other Americans could find a sanctuary on the Water Witch.  

Hopkins made it clear that he held López responsible for the damages to the Company and looked to the United States for the repayment. However, he indicated that he wanted to leave Paraguay and to take the effects and the employees of the Company with him, but that he feared that no captain would allow him on board for fear of retribution from López. Page replied that he would look into the matter and try to get Hopkins a ship, and that if this did not work out he would take Hopkins and the Company's employees out on the Water Witch.  

Although there is no record of Hopkins voicing his disapproval of Page's suggestion, he called another meeting of
the Americans at which, with Hopkins chairing, a resolution was passed condemning Page as "cowardly in the extreme" for not giving all the assistance in his power and demanding satisfaction for the wrongs and insults done to the Company and individuals. Hopkins followed this up with a communication to William Trousdale, by then the United States Minister to Brazil, in which he said that Page has thrown even President Lopez far into the shade, by his treacherous and disgraceful conduct towards us. We have in vain sought for redress from him. He is the complete tool of Lopez, and our hearts must bleed yet a while longer, until from Washington will come our defense.

He has refused every demand of mine and our fellow-citizens, for redress, and confines himself to assisting us out of the country.

On the same day he wrote to Commodore Salter of the Brazilian Squadron that if Page is not speedily recalled from these waters, which he has disgraced by his presence, our national reputation, already so deeply lowered, will [illegible] far again South American to find a place in which to hide itself.

Hopkins also complained that Page would do nothing to secure satisfaction for the Americans and confined himself to removing them from the country.

Page, in the meantime, had called upon Lopez and asked that the Paraguayan President allow a ship to take Hopkins

34 Notes from Alexander Ferguson, loc. cit.
35 Hopkins to Trousdale, Asunción, September 26, 1854, enclosure in Trousdale to Marcy, Río de Janeiro, November 27, 1854. Despatches, Brazil, Vol. 21, R.G. 59.
36 Hopkins to W.D. Salter, Asunción, September 26, 1854, Company Records.
out. Lopez said that he would arrange it so that a merchant ship would be available. When Page asked Lopez what forms the Company had to comply with, he was told that there were none. Hopkins was to present his passports, along with a permit for the Company's effects and merchandise, and to pay the export duties on such articles of Paraguay as are the products of the Company.37

Page called on the Captain of the Port, who agreed to obtain, and the next day, did obtain a merchant vessel for the Americans.38 No sooner had these arrangements been completed on the 27th of September than Manuel Morales came to Page to tell him that he had been threatened with violence by the Chief of Police.39 Page once again called on the President, reminding him of the assurances he had given and "informing him . . . in decided but courteous language, that my duty obliged me to watch over the rights of American citizens wherever I should meet them abroad." Page says that Lopez summoned the Chief of Police who denied making threats against Morales, but indicated that he was displeased with Morales because he had failed to take down the Company sign on the cigar factory. Page offered to send one of the members of the crew to do it. Lopez hesitantly agreed and

37 Page to Dobbin, September 24, 1854, loc. cit.; Page, La Plata, 271-272.
38 Ibid.
39 Page to Dobbin, Asunción, September 29, 1854, Claim Against Paraguay, Folio II.
gave assurances that the Americans would be able to depart.  

In spite of the assurances of Lopez, when Page returned to the Water Witch he received a note from Hopkins informing him that the Collector of the Port had refused to allow the removal of the property of the Company unless Hopkins surrendered the deed to the land at San Antonio. No longer trusting the spoken word of Lopez, Page dispatched a written communication to Jose Falcon, the Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs, protesting the actions of Paraguay and warning that he would take the Americans off in the Water Witch, if Paraguay did not cease in placing obstacles in the way.  

Falcon refused to accept this communication, ostensibly because it was not in Spanish, although he had accepted previous communications from Page and Hopkins in English. Page felt that he now had no recourse but to take the Americans out on board the Water Witch. Therefore Page told the captain of the port that he would leave on noon of the next day (the 29th) with the Americans and their effects. Page also requested Hopkins to make one more attempt to get

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41 Page to Dobbin, September 24, 1854, loc. cit.
42 Page to Falcon, Asuncion, September 28, 1854, Exploration.
43 Page would not allow his Paraguayan translators to translate his notes because he felt that they always softened the intent of the messages. Page to Dobbin, September 29, 1854, loc. cit.
passports, and to their surprise the passports were granted. Page said that it "can only be attributed to the apprehension... that if the property of the Company were not despatched, it might involve the consequence of Paraguay losing her entire naval force..." Page related that, after consultation with his officers, they had decided to capture the entire Paraguayan navy of five schooners and one brig, if Paraguay would not allow the Company to its effects out. Thus, on September 29th the Americans loaded their moveable effects on the Water Witch and left Asuncion without incident. However, at Tres Bocas a tense situation developed, as related by Page:

On reaching Tres Bocas we observed an unusual array of soldiers, armament, ranging from two to six guns, all doubly manned, and ready, as the President had said, to "salute or fight." The vessels were moored so close to the bank that a plank from each would have enabled the personnel of the marine to make an excursion into the interior at the shortest possible notice. On the deck of the flag ship... stood my old friend the "Admiral." Salutes would have been dangerous; for from the evident state of hostile preparation, the first flash of one of their guns might have been returned by a fire from our howitzer, without delay or explanation. We passed slowly and in silence; many a soul on the Water Witch devoutly hoping, perhaps, that some brave don of Paraguay would provoke a fight.

Without further incident Page and his passengers arrived at Corrientes on October 15th. From this location Page

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44 Page to Dobbin, Corrientes, October 2, 1854, Claim Against Paraguay, Folio II. Ferguson says that Page threatened to bombard Asuncion. Notes from Alexander Ferguson, loc. cit. Page said that Lopez feared that he would do this, but that he had no such intention. Page, La Plata, 275-279.

informed Marcy of his actions and justified them by pointing out that he had become involved because of the duty devolving upon her, 

in the protection of the persons and property of American citizens; the Government of Paraguay is still pursuing a system of insult and injury, notwithstanding I had assured it of the consequences which would eventually result from such a course.46 

During this period Page received a communication which once more forced him to have contact with Lopez. This communication was a dispatch from Marcy instructing Page to exchange with Paraguay the ratification of the treaty which Pendleton had signed.47 It was impossible for the Water Witch to return to Asunción because Lopez had published a decree prohibiting all foreign vessels of war from Paraguayan rivers.48 Therefore Page sent a Lt. Murdaugh by commercial steamer to Asunción to inform the Paraguayan Government of his mission and to arrange for the exchange of the ratifications.49 Jose Falcon, the Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs, rejected Page’s note, again on the grounds 

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48 Falcon to Marcy, Asuncion, October 3, 1854, quoted in Manning, Correspondence, X, 141-142. Cecilio Báez feels that this decree was aimed at Brazil, which was assembling a fleet for use against Paraguay at this time. See his Resumen, 101.

that it was not in Spanish, adding his "astonishment that you persevere in your determination to annoy me."\(^50\)

Page was incensed by this curt note. He informed Maroy that his note constituted a national insult and called for a small fleet to show American force. In his opinion this would gain the proper ends, while conciliation would only embolden Paraguay and further lower United States prestige:

There are some Governments, with which peaceable and friendly relations, it is well known can be maintained, only by an exhibition of sufficient force, and a determination to submit to no indignity.

To back up his position Page said that he was under no obligation to communicate with the Paraguayan Government in Spanish and besides he had only one member of his staff, a clerk, who had any knowledge of Spanish, and his knowledge was imperfect. Finally Page asked Maroy to let him return to Paraguayan waters in the Water Witch, or better, allow him to have the U.S.S. Bainbridge from the Brazilian Squadron to accompany the Water Witch. Page was sure that such a force would be sufficient to secure an exchange of the ratifications.\(^51\)

\(^50\) Falcón to Page, Asunción, October 12, 1854, enclosure in ibid. According to Santos Barbosa, the Brazilian Minister in Asunción, Paraguay expected the arrival of a new United States consul at any moment, authorized to carry out the treaty ratifications. López also feared that the United States might attempt to take the Water Witch to Asunción, which Paraguay would oppose, but was willing to offer the use of one of its ships. Santos Barbosa to the Imperial Chancellor, Asunción, October 12, 1854, quoted in Insfran, expedición, I, 209-210.

\(^51\) Page to Maroy, October 17, 1854, loc. cit.
However, in view of the energetic defensive measures which López was taking, the success of such an endeavor appeared highly unlikely.\textsuperscript{52}

In late December, 1854, the Water Witch left Corrientes and went downriver to Montevideo, and then in January, 1854, it returned to Corrientes. On January 31st Page left Corrientes on a small steamer, especially designed to navigate small rivers, to explore the Río Salado. Page left the newly arrived Lt. William N. Jeffers in charge of the Water Witch. Jeffers was instructed by Page to ascend the Parana River as far as the Island of Apipe, where Jeffers was to ascertain the nature of the rapids found there. As this was a trip of only about one hundred miles Page expected the mission to be quickly accomplished and did not anticipate any difficulties.\textsuperscript{53}

But difficulties did occur and again with Paraguay. On February 1, 1855 the Water Witch was exploring up the Parana in keeping with Page's orders. The territory on both sides of the Parana below the mouth of the Paraguay was, and is, Argentine territory. But for some distance above the mouth of the Paraguay, the territory on the north side of the Parana was Paraguayan and the southern side Argentine. About four miles above the junctures of the two rivers the Paraguayanas

\textsuperscript{52}Insfrán, \textit{expedición}, I, 210–211.

\textsuperscript{53}Page, \textit{La Plata}, 303.
had constructed a fort which they named Itapiru. As the
*Nater Witch* neared this fort the trouble began.

According to the American version, put forward by
Jeffers and strongly supported by Page and James Peden,
the United States Minister to Argentina, the *Nater Witch*
attempted to take a channel near the Argentine side of the
river but ran aground. While the *Nater Witch's* crew was
struggling to free herself a canoe came out from the Paraguayan
fort and offered Jeffers a note, which he declined because
it was in Spanish which he could not read. After freeing
herself, the *Nater Witch* took a channel near the Paraguayan
side of the river, which ran right under the guns of the fort.
As they approached the fort they were hailed by a person whom
Jeffers said they learned later was an admiral. However,
they did not pay any attention to this man because they could
not understand him. At this point, according to Jeffers, two
blank shots and then a live one was fired, the last killing
the helmsman. The *Nater Witch* returned the fire and ran
above the fort. But fearing that they would run aground
they were forced to go back down the river past the fort,
once again under fire.⁵⁴

The Paraguayan version of this incident differed con-
siderably from Jeffers'. According to the Paraguayans they
made no move until the *Nater Witch* took the channel directly

⁵⁴Jeffers to Page, Corrientes, February 2, 1855, enclosure
in Peden to Marcy, Buenos Aires, February 10, 1855, Despatches,
Argentina, Vol. 9, R.G. 59.
by the fort. Whereupon they dispatched an officer to tell the commander of the Water Witch that he could not use the channel because of an October 3, 1854 decree of López, closing the rivers of Paraguay to all ships of war or vessels involved in explorations. The Paraguayans asserted that Jeffers took a copy of this decree

and then threw it contemptuously at the officer, telling him that he had nothing to do with commandant of Itapiru or with any other Paraguayan, and that he was going to ascend without troubling himself about such a decree.

At this point, continues the Paraguayan version, they fired three "unshotted guns," as warning shots. They contend that the three shots were greeted by loud shouts of laughter from the Water Witch in ridicule of the Paraguayan batteries. The Paraguayan commander then ordered the Water Witch to anchor three times, but his orders were ignored. Finally, the Paraguayans fired a shot across the bow as a warning, but the Water Witch fired back and a general exchange of gunfire followed. The Paraguayans asserted that the Water Witch was disabled by the gunfire from the fort, and was carried back downstream by the current.55

Page immediately accepted the Jeffers version of the incident, pointing out also that the United States had the right to navigate the river because of the agreement Urquiza and Page had made:

The Water Witch was in an act of exploring a river which is the common boundary between these two countries;

55Falcon to Marcy, Asuncion, February 4, 1855, quoted in Manning, Correspondence, X, 150-153.
The rights of each to navigate this river, up to the limit of the Province of Corrientes has never been questioned by either; and I had never heard that Paraguay presumed to exercise the power of preventing its navigation. 56

Peden seconded this position:

The United States had whatever rights the Argentine Government could convey, and the rule is clear, I think, that international law gives to the nations inhabiting the opposite shores the right to use the whole river or bay for the purposes of trade, navigation, or passage. 57

But the question of guilt involves more than just a theoretical discussion of international law. A large degree of the blame seems to lie upon the shoulders of Lt. Jeffers. In view of the measures which the Paraguayans had made to contact him, his failure to make a serious effort to ascertain the content of the note seems inadmissible. This seems especially true because of the already-existing bad relations between the Americans and Lopez, which had resulted in the October 3rd decree. Jeffers seems to have been unduly pugnacious, perhaps as a result of the state of relations and also because he, like Page, and perhaps under the influence of Page's thinking, completely underestimated the strength of the Paraguayans. Also, he seemed to have been expecting trouble. A crewman reported that after Jeffers refused the Paraguayan note, "Mr. Jeffers, being resolved in case of opposition to force a passage, issued orders to prepare for

56 Page to Dobbins, Parana River, February 5, 1855, enclosure in Peden to Marcy, February 10, 1855, loc. cit.

57 Ibid.
action, shells and shrapnel were filled and then men beat to quarters. 58

It seems that Page must also share a large degree of the blame. In view of the October 3rd decree it would have seemed the better part of discretion for Page to have avoided any contact with Paraguayan waters while relations with Paraguay were at such a delicate state regardless of whatever technical rights the United States had to navigate the Parana. In view of the larger diplomatic picture at the time this would have, indeed, appeared imperative. For at this time Brazil had assembled a large fleet on the Paraguay River just below Paraguay, with which it appeared she was going to attempt to force a passage up to Asunción and perhaps attack Paraguay, or force its way through to her province of Matto Grasso. 59 Page, however, ignored the political realities of the situation, or appeared not to be cognizant of the political aspects of his voyage, 60 for he noted the


60 "Díase lo que se diga de la repentina de Page como oficial de Marina, no cabe duda de que no era un Maquiavelo. Poco entendido en materia tecnica diplomatica..." Harold F. Peterson, "Urquiza y el enredo Paraguayo-Norteamericano," Segundo Congreso Internacional de Historia de America, IV (1933), 322. The same opinion of Page is shared by Daniel Ammen, who served under Page: "The Captain of the Water Witch was entirely a gentleman, but, so far as my opinion is of value, was not well fitted to command such an expedition." See Ammen, The Old Navy and The New (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott, 1891), 289.
presence of the Brazilian fleet but saw no connection between it and the *Water Witch* incident. He chose to look at the incident as part of a personal vendetta with Lopez. He felt that if he had not split his crew the incident would not have taken place. He pointed out that for a day or two before the departure of the small river steamer from Corrientes, a Paraguayan boat had been hovering about Corrientes, and that as he steamed off in the small steamer Pilcomayo the Paraguayan passed close by and then pulled rapidly up the river. His analysis was that "she was doubtless a spy, and gave immediate information as to the division of our party."  

In the previous year and a half, the two endeavors which it was believed would improve relations between Paraguay and the United States, Hopkins' mission and the *Water Witch* expedition, had led to a serious deterioration of relations, rather than improvement. Neither side was blameless in these matters. The consequences of these incidents were ultimately to have serious repercussions.

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62 Ibid., 303.
CHAPTER VII

THE FITZPATRICK MISSION

As a result of the Water Witch incident and the expulsion of Hopkins from Paraguay, Secretary of State Marcy was subjected from pressure from several sources to take action against Paraguay. The heaviest pressure came from the persons connected with the Company. They had begun their campaign even before the Water Witch incident had taken place. The first to make a plea to Marcy was Hopkins. On December 7, 1854 he wrote to the Secretary of State from Rio de Janeiro informing him that all of the governments in the region agreed with his contention that the United States should take quick and decisive action against López. He lamented that it was only his fellow Americans in the region who doubted the strength of the Company's case and renewed his attacks upon Page.1 Hopkins followed this letter up with another dated December 29, 1854.2 On January

1Hopkins to Marcy, Rio de Janeiro, December 7, 1854, Company Records. Hopkins was reportedly thinking of kidnapping López and replacing him with someone more favorable to the Company. See Chaves, Presidente López, 217.

2Hopkins to Marcy, Providence, Rhode Island, December 29, 1854, Claim Against Paraguay, Folio III.
The amount and the details of the accompany statement are

The company sent two additional communications to back

The company went on to

Except through the arm of the American Government

Great pleasure, pleading that it had no means of recourse

Great detail to demonstrate the validity of the charge

The company went into

The President of the

The President of the

I have taken the greatest care of the action of the government
the company’s losses at $400,000. Therefore, he argued that

he was further interested in the

extent and nature of the damage to the property. The company’s

inability to proceed with the

is due to the damage sustained by the property, and the

company is not

in a position to

proceed.

He also pointed out that the government

response of Secretary of State, Harry

was subject to change. By approximately not now within

profit. They are further pointed out that there is information

of commercial value and unreported

interest on the cash on hand of the company and

expectation was worth $100,000 and that the machinery lost on a second

production and equipment needed by paper in Pennsylvania

They stated that the

expected, supported a somewhat more specific breakdown of

on Pennsylvania and around and about getting, the company’s

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a revision of the Company’s claim must be downward. Marcy also took the point of view that López’s actions were aimed at Hopkins personally and not at the Company, asserting that Hopkins should have let someone else take over the operation in Paraguay.  

Gallup attempted to counter the assertions of Marcy though a number of arguments. First, he pointed out that in his opinion the communications from Paraguay conclusively proved the guilt of Paraguay. Second, he stated that the guilt of Paraguay would be established by a commission (the representatives of the Company had said nothing previously about a commission) and the Company would provide detailed proof at that time. Gallup also indicated that many of the Company’s records were still in South America, but that López had admitted their validity and that of those which the Company did not have in its possession. Third, Gallup explained the discrepancy between the Company’s figures and those of Hopkins by pointing out that Hopkins did not know of additional expenditures by the Company. Gallup ignored the issue of López’s actions being aimed only at Hopkins.  

However, within two weeks the Company sent another letter to Marcy in which it qualified its earlier position.

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8 Gallup to Marcy, Providence, March 14, 1853 4, Claim Against Paraguay, Folio I.
on the question of proof by promising to send more evidence if the Department so desired. It also asked Marcy not to connect Hopkins' "shortcomings as consul" with the case of the Company.9

Sometime after this note was written Gallup and Arnold went to Washington where they "obtained assurances which so far as words go, were satisfactory, that the matter should be adjusted in accordance with our views." Their hopes were raised higher when they learned a few weeks later of the Water Witch incident. They felt that it strengthened their claim by proving that López was not activated in his action simply from a dislike of Hopkins but rather from "enmity to the American nation."10 The representatives of the Company seemed to believe that the State Department accepted their point of view when it asked the Company to withdraw its previous claim and to submit a new one.11

While the representatives of the Company were seeking indemnification from Paraguay for their losses, Lieutenant Page was seeking revenge for the "attack" upon the Water Witch and the other insults which he believed he had received from López. At first Page appealed to the Commander of the Brazilian Squadron, Flag Officer W. D. Salter, to take

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10 Minutes of the Annual Meetings of the stockholders, meeting of December 12, 1855, p. 34, Company Records.

11 Ibid; Gallup to the Secretary of State, Providence, May 25, 1855, Claim Against Paraguay, Folio I.
measures to "knock down" Itapiru. Salter, after consulting with James Foden, the American Minister to Argentina, refused to take any action until he heard from Washington. Page then asked for two additional guns for the Water Witch, claiming that he needed them for defensive purposes in his further exploration of Paraguayan rivers. Salter, apparently suspicious of Page's motives, refused and told Page that "there are other fields for the expedition, and you had better not try to return to that part of the river until instructions are received from home."  

Page now changed his tactic and asked Salter if the latter would send the U.S.S. Germantown up to Corrientes where she would be in a position to take action against Paraguay if such orders were forthcoming from Washington. There is no record as to Salter's reply, but it is safe to assume that it was negative as the Germantown was not dispatched to Corrientes.

Having failed to elicit any type of action from Salter in this matter Page submitted a thinly veiled appeal.

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12 Page, La Plata, 314. One Page after stating that he wanted the guns for defensive purposes Page admits that he wanted them for use against the Paraguayan fort: "... the fort of Itapiru ought to have been knocked down, and I would have pledged my life in the effort." Ibid., 315.

13 Page to Salter, Buenos Aires, April 12, 1855, Exploration.

14 Page felt that Salter should not have consulted with Foden: "The obligations and duties of a United States legation and squadron are not blended, neither can they possibly conflict. ... Each is alone answerable to the government for a proper performance of its respective duties." See Page, La Plata, 315.
over Salter's head to the Secretary of the Navy James Dobbin:

I cannot but express my deep regret that the Commodore should not have availed himself of the abundant means, at this time at his disposal, of avenging the outrage, which has been perpetrated upon the American flag...15

Page's point of view was supported by Peden, who on several occasions urged the sending of a naval force to Paraguay,16 although he squelched a notion of some United States sailors to spike cannons which were being sent to Paraguay.17

Contrary to the expectations of the leaders of the Company, the Secretary of State did not take forceful action against Paraguay. The doubts which Marcy expressed about the validity of the Company's claims were not changed by the Water Witch incident, for Marcy felt that the latter incident was due to the faults of Jeffers. Marcy recorded these opinions on the back of a note which he received from the Paraguayan Government informing him of their version of the Water Witch incident after a conversation with an Edward Palmer:

Edward Palmer was on board as Hospital Steward and his account confirms the accuracy of most of the

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15 Page to Dobbin, Buenos Aires, April 16, 1855, Exploration.

16 Peden to Marcy, Buenos Aires, February 10, 1855, April 6, 1855 and April 20, 1855, Despatches, Argentina, Vol. 9, R.G. 59.

17 Peden to Marcy, April 20, 1855, loc. cit.
Palmer's opinion also shaped Marcy's thinking on the Water Witch incident. Marcy wrote that the conduct of the Water Witch was "wrong and the attack upon her he believes justifiable - In respect to the accuracy of his act., agrees with that within The Paraguayan June 20. W.L.M."\(^{18}\)

There may have been other factors which helped to shape Marcy's decision. One possibility is that Marcy may have been aware of a note which Buenaventura Decoud, the Paraguayan Consul General in Buenos Aires, sent to Louis Hamberger, who was soon to be appointed as the United States Consul in Asuncion. In this letter Decoud states that

"wishes very much to cultivate friendly relations with that the Government of the United States and tried its best to favor the North Americans, but unfortunately, ... the Paraguayans have had to do with men like Hopkins and the Capt. of the Water Witch. ... ."\(^{19}\)

As Hamberger sent Marcy a copy of this letter on June 4th from New York City it appears likely that the Secretary of State read it before he even talked with Palmer. Regardless of whether it arrived before or after the conversation.

\(^{18}\)Falcon to Marcy, Asuncion, February 4, 1855, quoted in Manning, Correspondence, X, 152-153.

with Palmer it must have lent support to his testimony.

A second possibility may have been that Marcy had received unfavorable reports through the newspapers. On January 15, 1855 the *New York Herald* printed a letter from Washington, dated January 12, 1855, and signed "LOOKER ON."

It contained the following comments on Hopkins:

A great many complaints about his conduct have, from time to time, reached the department, but as his consulship was of no value, little notice was taken of them. The passengers who went out with him, and the mechanics and engineers who came back speak very decidedly against him.\(^\text{20}\)

The *National Intelligencer* also reprinted a letter from the *New York Evening Post* which related what was very close to Page's version of the *Water Witch* incident but added that the conduct of "our countrymen is not beyond the realm of censure.\(^\text{21}\)

The first indication which Marcy gave that he would not take some type of forceful action against Paraguay came when Louis Bamberger was appointed to take over as United States Consul in Asunción. He was appointed on May 31, 1855 and took up his position on December 1st of the same year.\(^\text{22}\) López felt that the appointment of Bamberger was an indication that the United States disapproved of the

\(^{20}\) *New York Herald*, January 15, 1855.

\(^{21}\) *National Intelligencer*, April 13, 1855.

\(^{22}\) Manning, *Correspondence*, X, 163.
actions of Hopkins and the conduct of Jeffers in the Water Witch incident. Gallup and Arnold reported to the stockholders of the Company:

The appointment of any man as consul to Paraguay we consider as improper under the circumstances while that of the individual in question is a direct insult to ourselves. We cannot look upon this act as other than a most unfavorable indication for ourselves, of the disposition of the present Administration.

Gallup and Arnold were correct in their assessment of Marcy's attitude, for Company was not able to get the Secretary of State to consider their claim for another year, in spite of various communications the Company sent to Washington. The Company was able to secure a hearing once more because it enlisted the aid of Senator Philip Allen of Rhode Island. It would appear that it managed to obtain the assistance of Allen because the Company had made a foray into arena of national Democratic politics. This seems to be the meaning of a sentence in a letter which Allen wrote to Gallup: "You could not have voted in a better cause than you did at the Cincinnati Convention. It will give me pleasure to attend to any business you may have in this city." The reference is probably to the

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24 Annual meeting of the stockholders, December 12, 1855, loc. cit.
25 Ibid.
26 Allen to Gallup, Washington, June 26, 1855, Claim Against Paraguay, Folio III.
Democratic National Convention where it appears that Gallup, as a delegate from New York,\(^27\) rendered Allen or his political allies some sort of political aid.

On June 26 Allen had an interview with Marcy on the question of the Company's claims. Allen reported to Gallup that Marcy expressed his "sincere wish to have your claims settled as soon as possible." Allen also related that Marcy said that Richard Fitzpatrick would be sent as a special agent to Paraguay to take up the question of the Company's claims within several weeks.\(^28\)

After receiving this information Gallup wrote to Marcy asking for a confirmation and also inquiring as to the nature of Fitzpatrick's instructions.\(^29\) Marcy replied that the case of the Company would be prepared "just as you prepared it for the use of this Department."\(^30\) However, Marcy cautioned Gallup that "other steps cannot be authorized until we know

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\(^27\)National Intelligencer, June 3, 1854.

\(^28\)Allen to Gallup, June 26, 1856, loc. cit.

\(^29\)Gallup to the Secretary of State, n.p., June 30, 1856, Claim Against Paraguay, Folio I.

\(^30\)Marcy's reference is not clear. Perhaps he was referring to the information submitted by the Company in 1855. There is also evidence that Gallup was in Washington during this period. Gallup later wrote that he had several interviews with Marcy, who at first was somewhat prejudiced against the Company, but later expressed himself "satisfied that a great outrage had been committed . . . and that he should make a demand upon his government for indemnity." Gallup to Charles S. Bradley, Providence, July 8, 1857, ibid., Folio I. Perhaps Gallup submitted the case of the Company during these interviews.
what views Paraguay will take of it. That Government ought to be heard before decisive measures are determined upon.  

In a communication to Feden Marcy indicated that Fitzpatrick’s mission would deal not only with the claims of the Company, but also would attempt to exchange ratifications of the Pendleton treaty and ask for satisfactory explanations concerning the Water Witch affair. Marcy informed Feden that if an adequate explanation on the last subject were not forthcoming from Paraguay the United States "will demand adequate satisfaction for the injury and insult." In this dispatch it appears that Marcy was no longer of the opinion that the attack upon the Water Witch was justified. Yet in the instructions which Marcy gave Fitzpatrick three weeks later he dropped all mention of the Water Witch incident. The only possible reference to this incident was contained in a letter which Marcy wrote to Vazquez, the Paraguayan Foreign Minister in which he explained that Fitzpatrick was to confer "in regard to all matters touching the mutual interests and relations of our respective Governments." Perhaps Marcy did this because he felt that it would hinder the achievement of the other two objectives, the exchange

33 Marcy to Vazquez, Washington, August 5, 1856, quoted in the National Intelligencer, March 23, 1857.
of the treaty ratifications and the claims of the Company. He also may have switched back to his original position that the United States was wrong in the Water Witch affair.

Whatever the reason may have been for dropping the demand for a satisfactory explanation of the Water Witch incident, Marcy instructed Fitzpatrick to achieve the exchange of the ratifications before taking up the Company's claims. If, however, the exchange of the ratifications was not achieved he was still to present the claims of the Company.  

Marcy apparently gave these instructions because he felt that exchange of the ratifications would be hindered if the Company's claims were presented at the same time. Marcy did not want the Company's claims and the exchange of the ratifications to become intertwined. However, this is what happened.

Upon his arrival in Paraguay in November of 1856 Fitzpatrick delivered to Vázquez two notes. One was the August 6th letter of Marcy and the other was a note which purported to be Fitzpatrick's instructions, while only mentioning that he was to secure the exchange of the treaty ratifications. Vázquez in reply pointed out that the instructions limited Fitzpatrick to the question of exchanging

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the ratifications while Marcy's letter of August 6th indicated that he was to take up all matters of interest between the two governments. Vazquez then went on to place the negotiations on a level which Marcy had apparently hoped to avoid. Vazquez stipulated that the United States would have to make amends for the Water Witch incident and renounce the claims of the Company if it expected to secure the exchange of the ratifications of the 1853 treaty.

In this difficult position Fitzpatrick replied that his "only object" was to exchange the ratifications and that after this was accomplished he would consider his mission completed.

Vazquez then informed Fitzpatrick that he would not exchange the ratifications because of amendments which the United States Senate had made in the treaty. He declared his willingness to negotiate a new treaty, but once again insisted that all pending questions would have to be settled first. Fitzpatrick ignored the idea of negotiating a new

36 Vazquez to Fitzpatrick, Asunción, November 8, 1856, ibid., 46-47.
37 Fitzpatrick to Vazquez, Asunción, November 10, 1856, ibid., 47-48.
38 The Senate had made over 20 changes in the treaty. These were, however, of a minor nature, involving the substitution of the United States of America for inaccurate citations such as the North American Republic. See Appendix A.
39 Vazquez to Fitzpatrick, Asunción, November 15, 1856, Senate Documents, 1856-1857, 48-49.
treaty and tried to explain that the amendments "are merely corrections and not alterations. ..." Vázquez curtly reiterated his previous position and announced that he was "closing this correspondence."*

Thus Fitzpatrick's mission ended in failure. He was unable to secure the treaty ratifications and did not even have an opportunity to bring up the claims of the Company. The failure of this mission led to the sending of another American diplomat three years later. This diplomat was to have clearer instructions and a naval force behind him.

Why did Paraguay reject Fitzpatrick's attempts to secure the objectives of his mission? The amendments which the United States Senate made in the 1853 treaty were certainly not the reason, for they were all of an extremely minor nature. The real reason seems to lie in the fact that López felt that by putting pressure on the United States he would have that government drop the Company's claims and the demand for an explanation of the Water Witch incident. He interpreted the sending of Hamberger to Asunción to replace Hopkins as a tacit American disclaimer of Hopkins and Page. Therefore, he probably felt that by threatening to refuse to exchange the treaty ratifications he could have his way.

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40 Fitzpatrick to Vázquez, Asunción, November 18, 1856, ibid., 49-50.
41 Vázquez to Fitzpatrick, Asunción, November 26, 1856, ibid., 50.
42 See above, page 183.
He was willing to risk the ratification of the treaty because it meant nothing to him anyway.

Some of the blame must also be placed upon Marcy. His instructions to Fitzpatrick and his letter to Vázquez were contradictory. They pointed to a hidden objective (the claims of the Company) which the Paraguayans were not slow in picking up. Also Marcy should have communicated the position of the United States on the Water Witch and Hopkins affairs to Paraguay in explicit terms. Perhaps this was not possible, for Marcy does not seem to have clarified the American position on these questions in his own mind.
The issues between the Government of Paraguay and that of the United States did not receive public mention in the United States for almost a year after the failure of the Fitzpatrick mission. But then, when they were resurrected by the United States, it was in so dramatic a fashion that it demonstrated a marked change in the attitude of the United States towards Paraguay.

This transformation was announced in President Buchanan's first annual message to Congress on December 8, 1857. Buchanan declared that there were three reasons for the current impasse in American-Paraguayan relations. First, Paraguay had refused to exchange the treaty ratifications because of the Senate amendments. Second, Paraguay had attacked the Water Witch, an action which Buchanan considered "unjustifiable" and "calling for satisfaction from the Paraguayan Government." Third, the treatment of the Company by the Paraguayan Government, which the President termed "insulting and Arbitrary" requiring "redress." To break the impasse Buchanan made the following request:

A demand for these purposes will be made in a firm but conciliatory spirit. This will the more
probably be granted if the Executive shall have
the authority to use other means in the event of
a refusal. This is accordingly recommended.¹

Several explanations have been offered for this switch
from ordinary diplomatic methods to the use of diplomacy
backed by the threat of force. Max Pablo Insfran offers
one possible explanation:

Without admitting a serious error in the initial
evaluation of Hopkins' abilities, Buchanan could not
abandon him in this offense [Recalde] and it is clear
that a politician of his [Buchanan's] stature does not
admit his errors.²

However, this does not appear to have been a reason, for
Buchanan does not seem to have ever been blamed for the
failure of Hopkins' first mission, although part of the
blame undoubtedly did rest upon his shoulders.

Another explanation has been offered by Charles A.
Washburne, who served as the United States Minister to
Paraguay during the 1860's. He contends that the raising
of a force to send against Paraguay was a Southern conspiracy
designed to withdraw from the Northern forts arms and muni-
tions, "thus leaving them improvident with arms whenever
the plans for the Great Rebellion should be matured."
Washburne insists that Buchanan, unaware of the Southern
plans, "was only wax in their hands." However, he continues,
Cass was motivated by the question of national honor.³ One

¹Richardson, Messages, VI, 2980.
²Insfran, expedition, II, 17.
³Washburne, Paraguay, I, 378-379.
fault with this explanation lies in the fact that no evidence has ever been uncovered to support it.

Buchanan later asserted that the "honor, as well as the interest of the Country, demanded satisfaction." This may have been a contributing factor in the formulation of Buchanan's decision. However, it is difficult to comprehend how a number of incidents between the United States and the remote, obscure, as well as unimportant, country of Paraguay justified the sending of a large naval force to the shores of that nation.

Philip Klein, while believing that national honor played an important role in shaping Buchanan's decision also asserts that

the show against Paraguay was put on for a wider audience; its real theme was that the United States had the will and the power to enforce the Monroe Doctrine.5

Here again there is no evidence, other than Klein's undocumented statement, to support this assertion. Buchanan never made this claim himself. The various instructions issued in relation to the mission do not indicate any support for this contention.

4Moore, Works of Buchanan, XII, 242.
5Klein, Buchanan, 324.
Klein does, however, point out that Buchanan hoped to divert the attention of the American people from their domestic problems by such foreign adventures as would raise the United States to the first rank among the powers of the world, and in so doing renew the flagging spirit of national pride and patriotism.²

He also indicates that

Buchanan viewed the panic, Kansas and the Mormon War as unfortunate interruptions of his main administrative program. It was in the realm of foreign affairs that he proposed especially to engage the interest and attention of the nation.⁷

Klein does not indicate that Buchanan considered Paraguay as an incident designed to take the mind of the American people off of their sectional controversies. Yet perhaps the President did view it in this light. It would have provided an excellent opportunity for the application of such a policy. Paraguay was considered small and harmless, therefore the risks in such a move could not have been considered very great.

Another possible reason was the pressure which the Company was applying upon the Administration. Since July, of 1857, the Company had once more been laying before the Secretary of State a number of communications urging that the United States take action on its behalf.⁸ This campaign

⁶Ibid., 314.
⁷Ibid., 317.
was brought to a climax in a memorial which the Company submitted in September. In this memorial the Company stated that it had its own means to rectify their claim against Paraguay, but preferred to work through the Government.\(^9\)

The Company linked its claim with the Water Witch affair by pointing out that a naval blockade would vindicate both the national honor of the United States and secure the claims of the Company.\(^10\)

The report of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations suggested still another explanation: the potential for trade in the Plata. The Committee's report indicated that the United States should take forceful action in the dispute with Paraguay as a means of protecting and encouraging American trade in that region. This was deemed necessary because of the European nations had penetrated the rivers of that area "with ships-of-war, and are now possessed of the larger portion of their commerce."\(^11\)

Acting upon the recommendation of the President, the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations reported out, on February 9, 1958, a resolution authorizing the President "to adopt such measures and use such force as, in his judgement, may be necessary and advisable in the event of

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\(^9\)The Company did not indicate what its "own means" were.

\(^10\)"The Supplementary Memorial of the United States and Paraguayan Navigation Company," Providence, September 24, 1857, Claim Against Paraguay, Folio III.

\(^11\)Ibid., 5.
a refusal of just satisfaction by the Government of Paraguay." On April 21st James M. Mason, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, asked for and received the consent of the Senate to have the resolution be considered as a joint resolution. Senator Allen of Rhode Island supported the resolution, saying nothing about the Water Witch or the failure to exchange the treaty ratifications, but that the men of the Company were "of the highest character." Stephen A. Douglas rose to say that he fully concurred with the resolution.

However, it ran into the opposition of Jacob Collamer of Vermont and Stephen R. Mallory of Florida, who opposed the resolution on constitutional grounds. Collamer said that it was not constitutional because the use of force would lead to war and only Congress could declare war. Mallory, opposing on a more mundane level, said that the United States was overestimating the amount of trade which would result from an agreement with Paraguay, and that at any rate this was an inappropriate manner in which to attempt to start peaceful relations. He also stated that some of the blame was upon the United States and that this resolution was also a stab-in-the-back as Paraguay was about to go to war with Argentina.

12Ibid., 5.
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The sentence "he should have...", which suggests that the article may have started with a different sentence.

In this case, the sentence "he should have...", which suggests that the article may have started with a different sentence.
The Senate resolution was submitted to the House of Representatives on May 6th, 1999.

The Senate resolution was then passed by a simple majority vote.

The original resolution was not voted on in the original position. It was switched several times of the Senate and also to change seems to be that the Democratic leadership managed to turn down the amendment to 2%. The resolution for this change of force. The Senate now reveresed the earlier vote.

The House could not conduct its full debate unless broke by the President of the amendment on the grounds that the President on the next day morning had the vote reviewed and agreed. However, when it was passed by a vote of 21 to 19. The committee's amendment finally came to a vote on May 15th, 1999.

wanted to "take up business." He wanted to "take up business." He wanted to "take up business." He wanted to "take up business."
constitutional arguments were repeated, but after a brief debate the resolution was passed. On June 1st it was submitted to the President, who signed it on the next day.

The Company was active in assuring that the measure was passed. The Company had apparently managed to obtain the support of Stephen Douglas, for a letter was later written to him thanking him for his "influence in the Senate in behalf of our claim. . . ." Further evidence comes from a statement which Charles Bradley of the Company made later that the Company had spent a lot of money ("mucho plata") to secure the passage of the resolution.

The efforts of the Government of the United States now turned to the raising of a fleet. The force was finally composed of 16 ships carrying 1,449 sailors and 291 marines.

20 Ibid., Part 3, 2546-2547.
21 Ibid., 2578.
22 Ibid., 2629.
23 Resolution passed at a meeting of the stockholders on August 26, 1860, Company Records.
24 Conversation between Pedro Fernández (Sam Ward) and Charles Bradley, quoted in Yseman, expedition, II, 195.
Of the 16 ships ten were steamers from private firms.\textsuperscript{26} The total cost of buying these ships and outfitting them was estimated by the Secretary of Navy, Isaac Toucey, at $466,256.\textsuperscript{27}

This naval force was placed under the command of Commodore William B. Shubrick, who had established a distinguished record in the War of 1812 and the Mexican War.\textsuperscript{28} He had, at one point in his career, been a shipmate of James Fenimore Cooper, with whom he maintained a lifelong friendship. He was described as a capable officer with good manners and a fine appearance.\textsuperscript{29}

While the Government had been struggling to create a fleet, it had also been attempting to reduce the size of the claim of the Company. The Company had taken the initiative by sending the Secretary of State a series of memorials. In these memorials it had indicated that it did not seek just the value of its property in Paraguay, but that it also expected compensation for the time and labor involved in attempting to get redress, as well as for insult and injury. Its officers also made it clear that they expected compensation for anticipated profits. However, the Company did not supply facts and figures to back up its claims.\textsuperscript{30}

\textsuperscript{26}Ibid., 114.
\textsuperscript{27}Ibid., 144.
\textsuperscript{28}Folio, William B. Shubrick, Department of Navy, Records of the Bureau of Naval Personnel, R.C. 59.
\textsuperscript{30}The Company to Cass, Providence, August 7, 1858, Claim Against Paraguay, Folio III.
Because of this scarcity of figures by the Company Cass asked Arnold for detailed claims of the Company and also inquired as to what would be the lowest amount that the Company would accept. He said that since it was obvious that the question would be settled through compromise, the Company should be moderate in its demands. The Company at first refused to moderate its position, in fact it restated it in very strong terms.

However, behind this exchange of correspondence Charles Bradley was engaged in private conversations with the Secretary of State. Bradley had reported that Cass favored heavy reclaims, and had also arranged a meeting between Bradley and James B. Bowlin of Missouri, who had been selected by Buchanan as the Commissioner to Paraguay. Bradley reported in this interview that they had reached an agreement on the maximum and minimum claims of the Company.

31 Cass to Arnold, Washington, September 22, 1858, ibid., Folio I.
32 Ibid.; The Company to Cass, Providence, n.d; "To The Honorable Lewis Cass, Secretary of State, The Supplementary Argument of the United States and Paraguay Navigation Company," September 24, 1857; Bradley to Cass, September 27, 1858, ibid., Folio III.
34 Bradley to Gentlemen, Washington, October 1, 1858, Carrington Papers.
As indicated, James B. Bowlin of Missouri was appointed Special Commissioner to Paraguay on September 9, 1858. In his appointment was then confirmed by the Senate on January 13, 1859. In Bowlin’s instructions Cass told him to demand an apology for the attack upon the water Witch and for the rude and offensive manner in which Page’s and Fitzpatrick’s attempts to exchange ratifications were repulsed. He was also to demand an indemnification of not less than $5,000 for the family of the dead seaman. About four-fifths of Bowlin’s instructions were concerned with these matters.

The remainder was devoted to the claims of the Company. On behalf of the latter Bowlin was instructed to demand “a suitable indemnification . . . for their losses and damages in consequence of the treatment of the servants of that Company by the Paraguayan Government.” Cass then went on to explain what he meant by a “suitable indemnification.” He stated that the original claim of the Company was $935,000. Included in this sum was the “alleged” value of the property and rights of the Company, “which seem to be estimated, for the most part, by a consideration of the profits which they had yielded and were likely to yield, rather than by their absolute value in the open market.” That Cass had reservations about this sum is indicated by his statement.

36 Ibid., 37.
that "Such a mode of valuation leaves room . . . for a wide difference of opinion . . . ." Nevertheless, Cass pointed to what he believed to be the prosperity of the Company and said that the "actual capital which they have invested and lost . . . would be a most inadequate measure, therefore, of their real damages." He said that the actual loss was $25,489.63 according to the Company's treasurer and on this amount Cass had no doubt that Paraguay would make good. By adding to this a reasonable amount for the profits the Company had already made and the increased value of the property he felt that $500,000 would be a reasonable figure for a settlement. If the Government of Paraguay would not make such a deal Bowlin was to inform Lopez that the Company wanted to turn the question over to a commission, before which the Company would demand the full $935,000. Such a commission would be composed, it was suggested, of three commissioners. Paraguay and the United States would select one commissioners apiece, while the third would be selected by the diplomatic representative of either Germany or Russia in Washington. Cass informed Bowlin that in case he was able to settle the claims without a commission, "An indispensable preliminary, . . . will, of course, be an acknowledgment on the part of the Paraguayan government of its liability to the Company."

Bowlin was instructed to resort to force if Paraguay refused to settle her disputes with the United States. In
such case he was to inform Paraguay that it would be charged with the expenses incurred by the American Naval action. 37

In addition to these communications from the Department of State, Bowlin also received several letters from the Company. In these the Company indicated that it was in agreement with the instructions issued by the Department. However, the Company did indicate that it had "serious objections to any commission, especially to ascertain any matter upon which our government are fully satisfied." 38 The Company was thus thinking of reaching an agreement without resorting to a commission, perhaps, by attempting to make a deal with President Lopez, to allow the Company property to be restored in return for allowing Lopez to share in the profits. In one note the Company advised Bowlin that patent rights might be granted to the Company under another name, which might be more acceptable to Lopez, "for the corporate title of our invaluable charter can be easily changed and President Lopez might become a proprietor of certain portions of its stock." 39 In another note the Company informed Bowlin that it had prepared a paper suggesting a mode of settling our claim for them by their restoration to us and allowing President Lopez


38 The Company to Bowlin, New York, October 15, 1858, Claim Against Paraguay, Folio III. Marked "Private and Confidential."

to share them and in consideration of his payment of
the amount of our investment and of the damages sug-
gested by the government.

In this case it would seem that the Company wanted $500,000
in indemnification plus the right to continue operating,
even if Lopez were made a partner.

Bowlin's confusion was further increased just before
he left for Paraguay when representatives of the Company
called upon him and informed him that any arrangement
satisfactory to the United States Government was satisfactory
to the Company. The Company's agents further indicated to
Bowlin that they would send him a note which would give the
American Commissioner a discretionary power to act on their
behalf. Bowlin encouraged this plan, but was very disappointed
when the letter was received by him and opened at sea after
leaving New York. Instead of giving the discretionary power
which the Company had indicated, the letter simply repeated
all of the Company's arguments against Paraguay in very
forceful language. 40

Several American newspapers had given the expedition
preparation rather extensive coverage. Most of these
newspapers supported the expedition because they felt that
it would have the beneficial result of increasing the
influence of the United States in that region of the world
and would also assure freedom of commerce for American
businessmen. The New York Times took this position in spite

of the fact that it came to accept the Paraguayan version of the Water Witch incident and felt that the claim of the Company originated in the misconduct of Hopkins and was "promoted as a speculative attempt to obtain indemnity through our Government for losses incurred in the course of ordinary mercantile transactions." The New York Herald had no reservations at all about the justness of the cause and announced that the sending of the expedition is one of the most important naval demonstrations that has ever been made by this country; it will have a great and lasting effect upon the measure of our influence abroad as any that has followed from the past achievements of our gallant little navy.

The same paper applauded the appointment of Bowlin: "if we may judge by the harsh style of diplomacy he adopted in New Granada, there will be very little palaver in the Paraguay River." The Washington Daily Union echoes these statements.

In contrast to these papers the New York Tribune and the National Intelligencer had reservations about the undertaking. The former, noting rumors of a war between Brazil and Paraguay, declared that if an expedition were sent the United States would be playing "second fiddle

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41 New York Times, November 25, 1858.
42 Ibid., September 13, 1858.
43 New York Herald, September 29, 1858.
44 Ibid., October 4, 1858. See also the issues of May 6 and 18, July 31, August 2, September 29, October 4, December 13, 20 and 31, 1856.
45 Washington Daily Union, December 9 and 10, 1857, April 24 and 28, October 2, 7, 19, and December 7, 1858.
to a fourth-rate power like Brazil against such a feeble state as Paraguay. The National Intelligencer praised the expedition as the "most formidable in our history," but felt that the dispute should have been settled through ordinary diplomatic channels, since the United States was in the wrong in the Water Witch incident.

It is interesting to note that all of these newspapers felt that the matter would be settled peacefully.

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46 New York Tribune, April 23, 1858. See also the issues of April 24, August 6, and September 4, 1858.

47 National Intelligencer, November 11, 1858.

48 Ibid., October 4, 1858.

49 Ibid.; January 26, 1859; Washington Daily Union, August 24, 1858; New York Herald, December 31, 1858; New York Times, November 16, 1858. The New York Tribune did not explicitly state that it expected a peaceful settlement, but it played down the whole affair. For instance see its issue of December 9, 1858.
CHAPTER IX

THE BOWLIN MISSION

The anticipated arrival of the United States naval force caused great alarm among the Platine states. Richard X. Meade, the United States Minister to Brazil, informed Washington that:

Great excitement prevailed on the subject of our expedition against Paraguay. The papers teemed with unfriendly comments, warning all the nations as to our supposed designs.\(^1\)

It was generally believed that the United States was using its controversy with Paraguay to impose its dominance, in one form or another, over the Plata region.\(^2\) The Montevidean paper *El Correo de la Plata* asserted that a secret understanding existed against both Paraguay and the Argentine Confederation.\(^3\) Other papers warned of the dangers of United States filibusters, a fear which the Uruguayan Government also shared.\(^4\)

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\(^1\) Meade to Cass, Rio de Janeiro, December 10, 1858, Dispatches, Brazil, Vol. 25, R.G. 59.

\(^2\) The reaction of the Plata Newspapers to the American expedition is summarized in Juan F. Perez Acosta, *Visia Fraternidad* (Buenos Aires: n.p., 1939), 12-14.

\(^3\) *El Correo de la Plata*, October 30, 1848, enclosure in H. Robinson, Acting Consul in Montevideo, to the Consular Letters, Montevideo, Vol. 9.


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The United States attempted to allay these fears in several ways. One method was to instruct its diplomats in the region of the Plata to explain to the governments to which they were accredited the purpose of the expedition. The diplomats were to point out that the United States, in spite of sending a naval expedition, still maintained a friendly disposition towards Paraguay and would resort to the use of force only if Bowlin's peaceful overtures were rejected by Paraguay. President Buchanan attempted to bolster this impression in his annual message to Congress in December, 1858, after the fleet had sailed. He then explained that if Bowlin was not successful in making a peaceful arrangement with Paraguay, the United States would have no alternative but to use force. However, he added, that it was his "earnest desire" to avoid this alternative.

Upon his arrival in Montevideo on December 17, 1858 Bowlin also realized that he had to quiet these fears, especially those in the mind of President López. To accomplish this objective Bowlin was determined not to do anything which would further arouse the suspicions of López. Therefore he resolved that he would attempt to take only the Fulton up to Asunción, stationing the Meteor Witch part way up the river so that it could act as the communications vessel. The rest

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5 Caso to Meade, Washington, September 1, 1858, Instructions, Brazil, Vol. 15, R.G. 59; John Appleton, Acting Secretary of State, to Benjamin C. Yancey, United States Minister in Argentina, Washington, August 26, 1858, Instructions, Argentina, Vol. 15, R.G. 59.

6 Richardson, Messages, VII, 3050-3051.
of the fleet, Bowlin explained, would be left at Corrientes, so as "to awaken no apprehensions . . . that the mission is anything but a peaceful and friendly one." If Paraguay objected to the Fulton ascending the Paraguay River, as Bowlin thought likely, the American Commissioner was determined to go to Asuncion by private vessel or any other form of transportation which would meet the approval of the Paraguayan Government. Bowlin explained his reasoning to Secretary of State Cass in the following passage:

I am resolved to have no controversy with them on so immaterial a point. . . . A courteous yielding in such unimportant points, will disarm them, of their allegation against us, that we are merely seeking a quarrel, with ulterior motives, and do not desire peaceful and friendly relations with them.

As long as the matter is in my hands I shall be for pursuing a most courteous course toward them in everything I feel that their weakness enables us to do so, without the slightest compromise of dignity of honor. 7

Bowlin pursued this policy of demonstrating the peaceful intentions of the United States in an interview with the President of Uruguay, Gabriel A. Pereira. The Uruguayan President offered the mediation of his Government, adding that Lopez had already accepted such an offer. 8 In reply Bowlin took the opportunity to assure the Uruguayan President that the mission was not one of conquest, nor sent out solely

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8 There is no record that Uruguay had offered its mediation, or that Lopez had accepted it.
to aid Hopkins. He did this, he said "for they seem to know, no one else in these transactions." He stressed the point that the national insult to the United States was the real reason for the dispatch of the expedition, not the claims of the Company which he viewed as a "mere incident growing out of a general adjustment of differences." Bowlin indicated to the Uruguayan officials that he could not accept their mediation because the issue between his Government and that of Paraguay was a question of national honor. However, he did express his gratitude when the President of Uruguay stated that he would inform the Paraguayan Government of the "liberal" position of the United States.9

Bowlin explained to Cass that the real reason for his declining this offer of mediation was his fear that it would evolve into a joint mediation of Uruguay, Brazil, and Argentina. In such an undertaking Bowlin feared that Uruguay and Brazil would vote against the United States, leaving only Argentina on the American side.10 Bowlin's fears seem to have been unfounded in two respects. First, he apparently confused mediation with arbitration, feeling that the mediators would come to a conclusion which the United States would be bound to accept. Second, there was no prospect of a joint mediation at this time. Uruguay had proposed just

9 Bowlin to Cass, December 29, 1858, loc. cit.
10 Bowlin to Cass, Parana River, January 16, 1859, Despatches, Paraguay, Vol. 1
such a project to Brazil but the latter state had demonstrated no interest.\textsuperscript{11}

The references which Bowlin made in this interview to the claims of the Company demonstrate the doubts he held on the validity of these claims. Bowlin felt that they were the major obstacle to a settlement with Paraguay and was not favorably disposed towards them. At this time Bowlin was suspicious of the claims of the Company on rather narrow grounds, although this attitude was to become more broadly based later. Bowlin was angry with the Company because it had given him no new latitude in its last communication to him, when instead the Company reiterated its demand for the full $9,39,000. Bowlin felt that this communication greatly hindered his chances of success, labeling this act by the Company as "evil."\textsuperscript{12} Bowlin correctly perceived that López would concede all the issues to the United States except that of the Company’s claims, so that if an armed confrontation occurred the United States would have to fight on the basis of the unpopular and questionable claims of the Company.\textsuperscript{13}

Soon after rejecting the Uruguayan offer of mediation Bowlin was confronted with a similar offer from the Argentine Confederation. Even before the arrival of the American Commissioner the Vice President of the Confederation, \textit{loc. cit.}

\textsuperscript{11} Insfrán, expedición, II, 83-84.

\textsuperscript{12} Bowlin to Cass, Paraná, Argentina, February 16, 1859, Despatches, Paraguay, Vol. 1, R.G. 59.

\textsuperscript{13} Bowlin to Cass, December 20, 1858, \textit{loc. cit.}
Salvador Maria del Caril, had raised the question with Benjamin C. Yancey, the United States Minister. Del Caril spoke in terms of a joint mediation, with Brazil and Uruguay joining Argentina, but admitted to Yancey that he had not secured the cooperation of the other nations. Yancey stated that he felt such a mediation would be rejected by Bowlin, but promised to attempt to arrange an interview between the President of the Argentine Confederation, Jose Justo de Urquiza, and Bowlin.  

De Espil asserts that Urquiza desired to take an active part in the dispute between Paraguay and the United States because of his friendship with John Pendleton, the former United States Charge in Buenos Aires, who had arranged Urquiza's flight from Buenos Aires in 1853. However, there seem to be a number of more practical reasons which explain Urquiza's motives. Ramon J. Carcano has suggested two reasons: (1) Urquiza, by playing the role of peacemaker, hoped to obtain the respect and sympathy of the European and the American nations "as the champion of peace among the La Plata nations," (2) Urquiza hoped to gain the friendship and gratitude of President Lopez so as to make him more amenable to a boundary settlement and also to obtain his aid in the campaign.

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14 Yancey to Cass, Parana, December 15, 1858, Despatches, Argentina, Vol. 13, R.G. 59; same, January 6, 1859, ibid.

15 Courtney Letts De Espil, "John Pendleton and His Friendship with Urquiza," Americas, XXXIII (February, 1953), 164.
which Urquiza wanted to launch against the Province of Buenos Aires, then maintaining itself as a unit independent of Urquiza's government.16

It seems that Urquiza was also attempting to gain the friendship of the United States. From his diplomatic post in Paris the great Argentine political thinker, Juan Bautista Alberdi was urging such a policy.17 On a more concrete level Mariano A. Pelliza suggests that Urquiza might have been looking for help from the United States in his project of building a navy for use against Buenos Aires.18 This point of view is supported by the contents of a note which José de Bunchenthal, whom Bowlin described as a "rich banker" and a "sort of political broker," received from Urquiza and showed to Bowlin while the latter was still in Montevideo. In this note Urquiza indicated a willingness to promote a peaceful settlement through his personal intervention with López or through mediation. Urquiza went on to point out what he expected in return from the United States:

I esteem it quite possible to obtain a Convention and doubtless if obtained it were will be possible to hope for some aid on the part of the United States.


to the government in terminating the question of national dignity [Buenos Aires], if it were no other than of its sympathies in a war so just, so necessary to the prosperity of these countries and to the development of the commercial interests of friendly nations. If so the American nation would have contributed an act which would establish its influence in this continent and serve as a basis to the great American fraternity.

Bowlin turned down the offer of help from Urquiza, saying that the United States would pursue a policy of strict neutrality in the struggles of the Plata.

Bowlin's refusal of this offer did not end the role of Urquiza in settling the dispute between the United States and Paraguay, in fact it was only the beginning. For on his way up the Parana River to Paraguay the American Commissioner stopped at the Parana, the capital of the Argentine Confederation. Here Bowlin had a personal interview with the President of the Argentine Confederation, who had arrived the day before (the ninth of January), after having traveled 180 miles in two days with the intent of seeing the American Commissioner.

On the day of Bowlin's arrival, January 10th, an important interview took place between the American diplomat and the Argentine President. Urquiza once more offered the joint mediation of Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay. This

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19 Urquiza to Buschenthal, San Jose, December 13, 1858, enclosure in Bowlin to Cass, December 29, 1858, loc. cit.

20 Ibid.


time Urquiza did not mention the question of American sympathy or support as he had in his letter to Kusseinthal, apparently feeling that this was the reason for Bowlin's rejection of his first offer. However, Bowlin rejected this offer using the same argument which he had used in Montevideo, that of national honor, even though his real reason was his fear of a joint mediation. At this point Urquiza offered his good offices unilaterally and Bowlin accepted. Bowlin never explained why he made this decision. Perhaps he felt that Urquiza could keep Lopez calmed and prevent rash actions by the Paraguayan President. Perhaps he felt that he could not refuse the good offices because Argentina might not be favorably disposed towards the United States if an armed confrontation took place. On the other hand, Bowlin's acceptance of his offer must have caused deep satisfaction for Urquiza. For now he could play individually the role of the peacemaker and therefore be in a much better position to press his demands upon Paraguay as his reward.

Although Bowlin did accept the offer of good offices, he refused Urquiza's request that the United States naval force be kept below Corrientes. He argued that five of the

23 Perez Acosta quotes Urquiza as saying that Bowlin rejected the joint mediation on the grounds that he was not authorized to accept it. See his Vieja Fraternidad, 19-20.

24 Bowlin to Cass, January 16, 1859, loc. cit.

American ships were already above Parana, a move necessitated by the expected drop in the depth of the river. Urquiza apparently made this request because López protested against the Argentine allowance of the United States force use of the river and to buy coal.

Around the middle of January Bowlin left Parana for Asuncion. On the way he was passed by the boat bearing General Urquiza, who was speeding ahead to implement his good offices.

Urquiza arrived in Asuncion on January 16th and immediately set about pursuing two objectives: (1) to prepare the way for a peaceful settlement between the United States and Paraguay; (2) to secure a military alliance and a boundary settlement between his own nation and Paraguay, which would secure the aid of Paraguay against Buenos Aires. Perhaps it was no more than logical that Urquiza was more zealous in pursuit of the second objective than of the first.

Already in September of 1858 Urquiza had attempted to gain Paraguayan consent for a joint Argentine-Brazilian-Paraguayan alliance directed against Buenos Aires. López

26 Bowlin to Cass, January 16, 1859, loc. cit. These exchanges, in addition to the fact that Cass did not anticipate this question, seem to disprove Washburne's assertion that it was Cass who ordered Bowlin to keep the fleet in the background. See Washburne's Paraguay, I, 380-381.


28 Bowlin to Cass, January 16, 1859, loc. cit.
in American Expeditionary Force.

I, 379, ordered to meet, several August 30th, and

loged to come a few months after, October 19th, 1918, and

of the United States had been brought by the presence of the United States.

or may have been notified that I will, however, only do not appear to be mentioned.

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letters received in the latter part of December. Letter shared the

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such a letter as that which I can and offered the mediation to

the latter unless to Argentina. Appreciably it was to void

controversy between the United States and Paraguay could render

point outlined was reached with the prospect that an armed

opposition to the North American convention. As this

but wanted the peace nation to declare the peace in

American threat he was not disposed to speak of treaties

treaty. Letter also added that in face of the North

Argentina until the General Paraguay a reasonable boundary

Argentina. Therefore, however, he would not make an alliance with

a wide alliance. Reselling instead a different alliance with

had, however, indicated that he was not interested in such
decided to see the American before proceeding to the meeting with López. It was at this point that Urquiza had the before-mentioned interview with Bowlin. Bowlin's acceptance of Urquiza's good offices, therefore fitted neatly into Urquiza's plan. Bowlin gave no indication of being aware of these circumstances.

On January 17th Urquiza had his first interview with López. The Paraguayan President manifested his resolution "to defend his honor and that of Paraguay" and "that if the invaders annihilated one army, he would raise another and make the ultimate sacrifice to avoid humiliation." Julio Victorica writes that López was disposed to resort to force because he realized that if the Americans were powerful in the river, they did not have sufficient land troops and, above all, the United States was on the eve of a great civil war between the North and South.

However, López asked Urquiza if he was disposed to mediate. Urquiza replied affirmatively and proceeded to explain the demands of the United States to López. The Argentine President pointed out that there were three issues.

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31Diario Del Brigadier General Tomas Guido durante su mision al Paraguay (1858-1859), "Revista de derecho, historia, y letras, VI (1900), 488-489. Hereafter cited as "Diario del Guido."

32Ibid., 496. This second point is certainly debatable since the certainty of a civil war was not that clear to López, or to anyone else, in 1858-1859.

33Julio Victorica, "Los Estados Unidos, el Paraguay, y la mediacion Argentina de 1859, "Revista de derecho, historia y letras, VI (1900), 393-394. Hereafter cited as Victorica, "mediacion Argentina."
First, the United States would demand an apology for the attack upon the Water Witch. Urquiza stated that there was no chance for his mediation upon this point because the United States considered it a question of national honor. Second, the United States demanded the exchange of the ratifications of the 1853 treaty, especially its provision ensuring American access to free navigation on the Pilcomayo River. Urquiza said that he would not mediate on this question because he was not aware of the antecedents for the demand of free navigation on the Pilcomayo. Third, the United States demanded indemnification for the Navigation Company and for the family of the seaman who was killed in the Water Witch affair. Urquiza informed López that this problem did not seem to offer serious difficulties "but in any case, he would make strong efforts to conciliate all the questions in dispute." Apparently to gain the confidence of López, the Argentine President declared that if he obeyed his natural impulses he would fight the intervention, but that as President of the Confederation he must seek peace.

Bowlin later informed Cass that the efforts of Urquiza in Paraguay during the week before the arrival of the American Commissioner convinced López of the ruin that would come with hostilities and the advantages of an

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34 "Diario del Cuido," VI, 496-498. The reference to the Pilcomayo by Urquiza was erroneous, for the United States was interested only in the free navigation of the Parana and Paraguay Rivers.
honorable peace. Yet this statement seems questionable. In the first place Urquiza's discussion of the issues revealed that he expected no difficulties and envisioned the use of his good offices only in the event of a disagreement over the pecuniary claims. This would seem to indicate that he was not as seriously alarmed about the situation as he indicated, but instead came to Paraguay primarily to pursue his own objectives. A second indication that the preliminary role of Urquiza was not as important as Bowlin thought is that after the initial meeting of Urquiza and López the question of a possible conflict with the United States was not taken up again. In his diary Guido makes it clear that in the period between the 17th and the 24th of January, the day when Bowlin arrived, Urquiza was not attempting to soothe López, but instead was unsuccessfully attempting to secure a military alliance from Paraguay which would have been directed at Buenos Aires. Guido records that Urquiza was so upset over the opposition of López to an alliance that he resolved to leave on the 25th of January, if Bowlin had not arrived by then. This statement, if true, indicates that Urquiza was much more interested in the alliance than concerned over the dispute between the United States and Paraguay.

36Diario del Guido," VI, 499-503.
37Ibid., 502.
Bowlin did arrive on January 24th and was in a much better frame of mind than Urquiza. Even before leaving Montevideo he felt that the prospects for a peaceful settlement were good if he could open negotiations before López made any hostile moves. This belief was reinforced on his trip up to Paraguay.

In the first place the only trouble which Bowlin had encountered in ascending the waters of the Paraguay River to Asunción, were natural and not Paraguayan. The Fulton ran aground four times, once for four days and the other three times for a total of one half day’s delay. On the other hand, the Government of Paraguay raised no difficulties although matters became somewhat tense as the Fulton approached the Paraguayan fort of Humaitá. However, when the Americans asked permission to ascend to Asunción they were courteously given it. Also, the Captain of the Fort at Asunción brought them the welcome of the government and offered any aid which they might need.

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38 Bowlin to Cass, December 20, 1858, loc. cit.
41 Shubrick gives a fuller explanation which demonstrates the tenseness of the situation.
"At 2 P.M., we approached the formidable defenses at Humaitá—as we had not been able to ascertain, with any degree of certainty, the kind of reception that awaited us at this post of the State of Paraguay, I deemed it only prudent to be prepared to reply to any act of aggression that might be offered to the flag of the United States— I therefore
Another factor which persuaded Bowlin that a peaceful settlement could be made was the failure of Paraguay's campaign to arouse her neighbors to come to her aid. As early as February of 1853 Lopez had been loudly trumpeting his case throughout the Plata basin through his paper \textit{El Semanario}.\footnote{Lopez had also intimated directly to Argentina directed Lieutenant Commanding Almy to beat quarters but to be very careful to guard against the accidental discharge of a gun, in order that if any collision should take place, we might be able to show clearly that it did not commence with us.}

As we approached the first battery, we were hailed, but the distance being too great to permit of our understanding what was said, and the current being very rapid I directed an anchor to be let go, and sent two officers of my staff \ldots onshore to explain who we were. The boat returned in a very few minutes, and the Report of my aid \ldots details his satisfactory interview with General Gonzalez, the commanding officer at Asumption.

\ldots although, on our approach, the soldiers about the batteries, appeared to be going to their stations, I saw no indication of preparation - to fire on us. Their preparations seemed to be like ours, dictated by prudence to be prepared for contingencies.\footnote{Shubrick to Toucey, Asumption, January 25, 1859, Paraguay Expedition, 46-48.}

\textit{El Semanario}. Copies of this paper can be found only in diverse sources. Translations of \textit{El Semanario} for February 27 and March 6, 1858 are located in Claim Against Paraguay, Folio I. Other copies of this paper which demonstrate Lopez's campaign are found in the following sources: March 3, April 14, May 10, and December 11, 1858, enclosures in William H. Hudson, United States Consul at Buenos Aires, to the Secretary of State, Consular Despatches, Buenos Aires, Vol. 9, R.G. 59; \textit{National Intelligencer}, February 28, 1859; \textit{New York Herald}, January 29, 1859; Faden to Secretary of State, Buenos Aires, May 1, 1858, Despatches, Argentina, Vol. 13, R.G. 59.
that the neighbors should rise up against the American expedition. Bowlin called such moves "shrewd", but added:

I think the cry wolf is at an end - The Government of Paraguay, has so long trampled upon the rights of neighboring States and so abused their citizens in her power, that she has aroused a spirit of common hatred to her . . . and forfeited all claim to their sympathy in her hour of trial and tribulation - I do not think, she can arouse their sympathies, or awaken their fears.

A third reason for Bowlin's optimism was that he was not impressed with the military buildup of Lopes, in spite of the indications which Lopez gave of his readiness to fight. Victorica reported that Urquiza, in his conversations with Lopez noted that the latter was not as alarmed as one would have supposed. Lopez informed the Brazilian consul in Asuncion, that the arrival of the North Americans, far from being a calamity, gave him a chance to test his army.

Bowlin was not moved by these statements nor by the reports which he received that Lopez was arming rapidly. First of all he said that the reports on this subject were so contradictory that it was impossible to make any sense out of them. But more revealing is his attitude, which was one of no great concern as to the validity of the reports. Perhaps this attitude arose from his appraisal of the ability

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43Chaves, President Lopez, 270.
44Bowlin to Cass, December 20, 1858, loc. cit.
45Victorica, "mediacion Argentina," VI, 393.
46Chaves, President Lopez, 263.
of Paraguay to defend herself. He noted, for instance, that many of the Paraguayan forts had been flooded by an unusually high rise of the river. He commented: "This all looks favorable to a peace arrangement." He also pointed out that the Paraguayan army had never been tested under fire.

Bowlin's position and attitude was best summarized in a letter which he wrote to Cass, which indicates that he felt that if he could reach López before the latter committed an act of open hostility the affair could be settled in a peaceful manner:

Whatever may be said of preparation and disposition on the part of López to resist, yet I am satisfied from all I learn that he will manifest no such disposition when he comes to know, and understand the extent of our demand, which I am satisfied has been greatly exaggerated to him through the swaggering boasting of those who flatter themselves that the expedition was gotten up for their special benefit — I allude to the Company's Agent here (Hopkins) and his employees.

Bowlin's opinions were further buttressed when he received a report from an unnamed source that López had not levied new troops since 1855.

A fourth possible reason for Bowlin's optimism was his belief that Brazil was working for a peaceful solution of the dispute. Bowlin noted the mysterious departure of Joaquim T. do Amaral, the Brazilian Minister to Montevideo,


48 Bowlin to Cass, January 3, 1859, 100. Cit.

For Paraguay, and informed Cass that he learned that his visit was to impress upon Lopes, the importance and almost absolute necessity of settling our difficulties without a resort to force. Indeed that he was commissioned from his Government, to say to Lopes that he must make a treaty on the best terms he could; and that if he was embarrassed for funds the Brazilian Government would advance him what was necessary.

Upon his arrival in Asunción Bowlin sent a message in English to Lopes announcing the general purpose of his mission. Perhaps recalling Page's difficulties, Bowlin instructed his secretary Sam Ward, who delivered the message, to translate it into Spanish if Paraguay would not accept the note in English. However, Paraguay accepted the English note.

On the evening of the same day Bowlin paid a visit to General Urquiza. Bowlin found the Argentine President "enthusiastically cordial" and optimistic. Urquiza requested Bowlin to avoid creating any difficulties, to which the American readily agreed. Although Bowlin did not mention it in his correspondence, Guido adds that Bowlin once

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50 Amaral had been instructed to proceed to Asunción without revealing the object of his mission, which was to offer unilateral mediation. See Ynefrán, expedición, II, 83.


52 Ibid.

53 Ibid.
more indicated that he envisioned the use of Urquiza's good offices only in settling the claims of the Company. 54

On January 26th Bowlin, Commodore Shubrick and the crew of the Fulton were presented to President López. In his presentation speech Bowlin spoke in general terms of the solidarity of the nations of the hemisphere and of his hopes for a peaceful settlement. Bowlin explained to Cass that this was not the speech which he had composed before arriving at Asuncion, in which he said that he put forward the American grievance "Courteously, but forcibly."

Bowlin adopted the milder speech because of his reception in Paraguay. 55 López replied to Bowlin's speech by stating that he had great confidence that the difficulties would be settled in "a frank, loyal, friendly, and satisfactory manner." However, the most promising aspect of this reception was not the words of the Paraguayan President, but the manner in which he received the Americans: "standing and uncovered." 56

54 "Diario del Guido," VI, 503-504.

55 "But the courtesy & alacrity which have met us since we entered the Paraguay river, the extremely moderate force and preparations visible at the fort of Humaita and the great anxiety of my co-adjustor Gen. Urquiza, that an observance of polite forms should confirm his previous assurance, that we came as peaceful Gentlemen and Soldiers asking redress and satisfaction. All these considerations led me to restrain my address within the bounds of courtesy and etiquette..." Bowlin to Cass, January 25, 1859, loc. cit. Bowlin also submitted the speech to Urquiza for his approval prior to his delivery of it. See "Diario del Guido," VI, 505.

56 Yancey to Cass, February 4, 1859, loc. cit.
On January 27th Bowlin laid before Nicolas Vazquez, the Paraguayan Foreign Minister, the following demands: (1) an apology for the attack upon the Water Witch; (2) an indemnity of ten thousand dollars to the widow of the seaman killed in the above incident, (3) an apology for the manner in which Paraguay refused to exchange the treaty ratifications with Page, (4) the ratification of this treaty, (5) indemnification for the Navigation Company. 57

On January 28th Lopez indicated to Guido his pleasure with the American terms: "we are in agreement on the means of acceptance, fully saving the honor of the Paraguayan Government". 58 Lopez indicated that he was so pleased that he was thinking of paying for the entire education of the son of the dead seaman. Guido left Lopez convinced that the difficulties were practically settled. 59

An interview took place between Lopez and Bowlin on January 29th. There is no record of what was discussed, and Bowlin, in his usual terse manner, did not even mention this interview in his communications to the Department of State. Sam Ward, Bowlin's secretary, mentions its occurrence but does not offer information upon what was discussed. 60

57 "Diario del Guido," VI, 508.
58 Ibid., 509.
59 Ibid., 509-510.
60 New York Times, April 23, 1859, supplement. Ward did not reveal his identity in these letters which he wrote to this paper. However, they contain much information which only someone intimately connected with the negotiations would have access to. Insfran also believes that the writer of these letters was Ward. See his expedicion, II, 167.
However, an indication was given when Lopez informed Guido the next day that he and Bowlin had arrived at a “causai arreglo.” Guido does not mention what the points of dispute were, but the only topic of controversy which was mentioned up to that time was the claim of the Navigation Company. This topic had been taken up on January 29th, the same day as the interview between Bowlin and Lopez. Urquiza sent his secretary, Eduardo Victoriano, to discuss the claims of the Navigation Company, apparently in the implementation of his good offices. According to Guido, Ward told Victoriano that the claim of the Navigation Company was one million dollars, but that they were willing to settle for two-hundred and fifty-four thousand dollars, or the submission of the case to arbitration. Lopez refused to make the minimal settlement, rejecting the validity of the Navigation Company’s claim. A second conference on the same day between Ward and Victoriano did not bring the matter any closer to a solution, as Ward revised his earlier statement of a settlement figure from $250,000 to $500,000.

Faced with this situation Guido and Urquiza tried to work out a solution to this problem. However, the next incident to arise did not concern the claims of the Navigation Company.

62 Ibid., 34-35.
63 Ibid: Lopez later said that Urquiza offered to lend Paraguay the money to pay off the claims. Lopez refused. Lopez to Jose Berges, Paraguayan Commissioner before the Arbitration Commission, Asuncion, August 20, 1860, quoted in Inafran, expedicion, II, 204-207.
Company, but instead statements which López had made in *El Semanario*. López expressed his dissatisfaction with Bowlin's failure to send a copy of his presentation speech prior to its delivery, or after the presentation. Urquiza was upset by López's remarks which as he interpreted as revealing confidences between himself and Bowlin. When López paid a visit to Urquiza on the 30th of January the latter made his displeasure known. Guido relates that López gave satisfactory explanations and confidence was restored between the two men.

Guido makes no mention of a discussion of the Navigation Company's claims. However, it appears that this topic was covered. Ward, writing in a teasing manner, said that from certain indications of active intercourse between his Urquiza's dwelling and that of the Commissioner, and the repeated visits of the former's Secretary to the Cabildo or Presidential Palace, and from a state visit of two hours previously paid in the afternoon by President López to General Urquiza, I am led to believe that there was a good deal of negotiation going on.

Guido indicates that the point of contention was again the claims of the Navigation Company. Apparently in the course of these negotiations López had accepted the idea of an arbitration commission to settle the question with the Navigation Company. For Guido reveals that the point of

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64 *El Semanario*, January 29, 1859, enclosed in Shuttrick to Tousey, February 1, 1859, Paraguay Expedition.

65 "Diario del Guido," VII, 36.

dispute now was López's demand that the arbitration proceedings take place in Asunción, not in Washington as Cass had stipulated in his instruction. On the morning of January 31st Bowlin had a four hour conference with López. Ward mentions this conference but does not disclose the topics discussed. However, it seems safe to assume that they discussed the Company claims without resolving the problem. This seems to be borne out in conversations which Urquiza had with Francisco Solano López and his father the President on the afternoon of the same day. The former paid a visit to Urquiza at two o'clock. Urquiza attempted to impress upon him the dire consequences which would result from his father's present course. At five o'clock the elder López also paid a visit and after a very heated discussion he acceded to Urquiza's arguments for a treaty, but asserted that he was doing this only because of his friendship with Urquiza.

Urquiza informed Bowlin of the result of this interview and the two of them set about working out a convention which would be acceptable to López. At 10:30 that same evening Víctorica presented the terms to López. Guido states that López did not have to reflect upon the terms, indicating that he was fully aware of the contents of the convention.

67 "Diario del Guido," VII, 36.
69 "Diario del Guido," VII, 36-38.
However, at 12 o'clock Victoria returned with the news that López had rejected the arrangement. 70 Ynsfrán gives the following reason for López's reversal:

Arbitration was for him [López] a mechanism he vaguely understood, something remote and foreign, that escaped his personal control, his powers of immediate manipulation. 71

This unexpected development angered Urquiza who saw the reaction of López as the breaking of a solemn personal promise, serious enough to lead to grave consequences. 72

The next move was made by López, who at 6:30 the next morning called Guido to the Palace for an interview. Upon his arrival Guido found that the Brazilian Minister Amaral had also been invited. López explained to the two diplomats that he could not accept the arrangement proposed to him the previous evening because the treaty of commerce and navigation gave the United States full permission to explore the coasts, rivers and affluents of Paraguay and because he wanted the arbitration to take place in Asunción. 73 López then asked Guido and Amaral if they would not attend a meeting which he was to have that day, explaining that Urquiza could not attend and he desired their presence as witnesses. 74

70Ibid., 38.
71Ynsfrán, expedición, II, 142.
72"Diario del Guido," VII, 39.
73Ibid., 39.
74J.J. de Amaral to Silva Paranhos, Brazilian Foreign Minister, Asunción, February 10, 1859, cited in Ynsfrán, expedición, II, 139.
By making this request Lopez was touching upon a delicate situation: the resentment of Amaral at being excluded from the negotiations. Amaral had originally been instructed to offer the unilateral mediation of Brazil, while concealing the purpose of his mission. When Urquiza arrived to implement his good offices, an event not foreseen by the Brazilian Government, Amaral had no instructions to cooperate with the Argentine President. However, when Amaral did receive authorization Urquiza refused his overtures. Urquiza turned Amaral down because of Brazil's secretiveness about her unilateral mediation, and because Brazil had refused to sign a treaty with Argentina which would have been directed toward the subjugation of Buenos Aires.

Brazil had also been making overtures of the United States. On December 27, 1858, Brazil had informed the United States that its good offices were available through the person of Amaral. The United States Minister in Brazil, Richard K. Meade, replied in noncommittal terms, thereby expressing his satisfaction at the offer. Amaral renewed this offer even before Bowlin disembarked at Asuncion. Amaral, however, offered his mediation, which Bowlin refused on the grounds

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75 See above, pages 224-225.
76 Insfrán, expedición, 11, 132-135.
77 José Maria do Silva Paranhos to Richard K. Meade, Rio de Janeiro, December 27, 1858; Meade to Paranhos, Rio de Janeiro, December 29, 1858, enclosed in Meade to Cass, Rio de Janeiro, January 6, 1859, Despatches, Brazil, Vol. 25, R.C. 23.
that his instructions did not authorize him to do this. However, Bowlin informed Amaral that he "would feel grateful for his kindly offices, and that whatever friendly influence which he might exert . . . would be highly appreciated. . . ." 78 However, Bowlin's reply did not admit a role in the negotiations to Amaral, perhaps because of the opposition of Urquiza.

Support is given to this suggestion by Amaral's reply to López's request that he attend the meeting with Bowlin. Amaral in refusing this request, pointed out that Urquiza had excluded him from the negotiations. He pointed out that he did not want to disturb the negotiations through separate actions. Nor did he want to place himself or his government in an unpleasant position. For these reasons he asked López to allow him to withdraw from the proceedings, while adding that if the negotiations of Urquiza were not successful he would do all in his power to ward off a break between Paraguay and the United States. 79 Guido was incensed with Amaral's remarks and countered by pointing out that Bowlin did not desire a joint mediation and by attacking the secrecy with which Brazil had concealed her attempt at unilateral mediation. Guido also refused to attend the conference with Bowlin on

78 Bowlin to Cass, January 25, 1859, loc. cit.
79 Amaral to Faranhos, February 10, 1859, loc. cit.
the rather interesting grounds that only Urquiza could act as the mediator. 80

Why did López make this request, which further aggravated an already tense situation? Insfran feels that he did it innocently and implies that López was not aware of the antagonism between Amaral and Urquiza. 81 Guido, who believed that Amaral was behind López’s rejection of the agreement on the previous evening, felt that López wanted to include Amaral in the negotiations so that Paraguay could get a more favorable settlement. 82 Both of these theories seem impausible. Insfran’s assertion would lay upon López an innocence, or rather ignorance, of the political situation in the Plata which he did not possess. Also it is impossible to believe that López had not learned of this antagonism in Asuncion, especially through his policy of using informers. Guido’s analysis of López’s motivation does not seem consistent with the subject of the interview. If López and Amaral were working together for the inclusion of the latter in the negotiations, why did Amaral turn down López’s request? Also, Amaral’s own version of the end of the conference does not support Guido’s position. Amaral stated that López “thanked

80 “Diario del Guido,” VII, 39-41. Guido subsequently did not accompany Urquiza to the conference, but not for the reason which he gave to López. He stated that he did not go so as to not further fan the ire of Amaral. Ibid., 41.

81 Insfran, expedición, II, 131.

him and said that if it was necessary he would turn to him.\(^{83}\) This statement does not indicate any serious regrets on the part of López because Amaral was not included in the negotiations. If López was really seeking to have Amaral included in the negotiations it does not seem likely that he would have introduced the subject to Guido, but instead to Bowlin and/or Urquiza. Perhaps the motivation for López's actions was the desire to mollify Amaral and the Brazilian Government.

Contrary to López's statement that Urquiza could not attend the conference that morning, the Argentine President did take part in it. Guido asserts that Urquiza was especially anxious to secure an agreement because Bowlin had indicated that if a settlement was not secured that day he would resort to the use of force.\(^{84}\) Very little is known of this conference. Sam Ward described it as "at times stormy", but indicates that Urquiza was able to calm López down.\(^{85}\) However, Guido supplies us with the information that the result of the conference was a three point agreement. It was agreed to exchange the ratifications of the 1853 treaty with the amendments of the United States Senate and the United States could resume its exploratory voyages in Paraguayan Rivers; second, that Paraguay would offer explanations for the

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\(^{83}\) Amaral to Faranhos, February 10, 1859, loc. cit.

\(^{84}\) "Diario del Guido," VII, 42. At no time did Bowlin indicate that he made such a statement. Nor does it seem likely that he ever did, for Bowlin was aware of the highly vulnerable position of the American Forces if hostilities broke out. Bowlin to Cass, February 16, 1859, loc. cit.

\(^{85}\) New York Times, April 23, 1859, supplement.
water Witch affair and for the rejections of the various
United States attempts to exchange the treaty ratification;
third, it was agreed to establish an arbitration commission
to handle the question of the Navigation Company’s claims. 86

a different version of the process by which an agreement was
reached. He agrees with Guido that Benjamin Victorica had a
conference from 10 p.m. to 2 a.m. of January 31, February 1.
But he says that López backed off the next morning sending a
message informing Urquiza of such. Victorica did not come
back same night with the refusal. “Urquiza, que en ese
momento celebraba en un almuerzo con toda su comitiva la paz
alcanzada después de tantas esfuerzos, no pudo contenerse y
en presencia del enviado de López prorrumpio en tales amenazas
y hasta injurias contra el presidente paraguayo, que los
testigos de esa escena estaban asombrados, no habiendo visto
nunca en un estado de irritación mayor. Dijo, entre otras
cosas peores, que inmediatamente saldría del Paraguay para volver
en seguida con el ejercito argentino y hacerle sentir a López
el empuje de su lanza, etc., est. Así despacho el emisario
que, aterrado, poco a poco había retrocedido hasta colocarse
cerca de la puerta de salida.

No había pasado media hora después de esa escena, cuando
alguien se presentó almayado anunciando que se veía venir un
grup de gente armada a caballo en dirección a la casa. El
general Urquiza pidió sus pistolas, las puso en los bolsillos
y sin decir una palabra continuó paseándose iracundo a los
largo del salón.

Era el presidente López que llegaba con su escolta de
corazaeros. La entrevista se inició mal, por que a las primeras
palabras de López pretendiendo fundar sus observaciones al
arreglo, Urquiza le interrumpió diciéndole que era inútil
seguir hablando del asunto, pues no estaba dispuesto a sufrir
un nuevo desaire. Si como hombre, dijo, no estoy acostumbrado
a soportarlas, mucho menos lo sufrir como presidente de la
Confederación.

—No me amenace, señor Presidente, le replicó López.
—No se trata de amenaza, señor, sino de persuadir en
el terreno de que no me es permitido salir. Después de comunicar
a los comisionados americanos el arreglo convenido, no es
lícito exigirme que desempeñe el papel que el señor Presidente
me señala.

En ese tono siguió por un momento la conversación, hasta
que López desistió en absoluto de sus nuevas pretensiones, y
a las frases entre-cortadas y reticentes, sucedieron los
apretones de mano y las recíprocas expansiones. La Paz estaba
hecha y así se publicó inmediatamente, recibiéndose la noticia
Feeling that the peace was secured, Urquiza left Asunción for Argentina at four o'clock on the same day. However, after Urquiza left López attempted to get further concessions from Bowlin. Perhaps he felt that this would be easier to achieve without Urquiza around. At any rate on February 3rd López told Guido that he intended to propose that the arbitration commission could not grant a decision of over 250,000 dollars. He asked Guido to approach Bowlin on this matter. 87

But before this came to a head another incident occurred. On February 4th, after a comparison of the treaties the Paraguayan President accepted all but the expiration of the time limit for ratification. Bowlin caught this and asked Guido to intervene with López to get the Paraguayan President to drop this opposition. After a conference with López, Guido was able to get the consent of the Paraguayan President, and work began on the final copies of the treaty. 88 It appears that López had no real concern about the question of the time

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87 "Diario del Guido," VII, 45.
88 Ibid., 46-47.
limit, at least he never expressed any before or after this incident. Therefore, it is difficult to explain why he acted in this manner. One possible reason is that he did it out of pure pique, and this would not have been the first time he took action for such a reason. Second, in view of the request which he had made to Guido to see how Bowlin felt about limiting the arbitration commission to 250,000 dollars, perhaps he was trying to bargain with Bowlin. He might have felt that he could exchange an agreement to accept the time limit for an agreement to hold down the sum of the award of the commission. In any case he would have been giving up nothing for a concession which he wanted badly.

At any rate when Lopez and Bowlin met on the 5th of February, the Paraguayan President disowned the previously agreed upon conditions, with the statement: "the agreement is of no value." He then went on to make a demand that the convention be dropped in return for his payment of $250,000 to the Company. Bowlin refused, and after a fruitless debate left the President with no hope for arriving at an agreement. On the same day Sam Ward, came to see Guido and asked him to intervene with Lopez to secure the ratification of the agreement, by making Bowlin's position known. Ward asked Guido to inform Lopez that Bowlin was favorably inclined

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89 Ibid., 46-47.
90 "Diario del Guido," VII, 47.
towards the President and that the arbitration of the
commission would work to the benefit of Paraguay because
it would give Paraguay an opportunity to present her case.
Ward went on to request that Guido tell Lopez that Bowlin
did not believe that the Government of Paraguay owed the
Navigation Company even $250,000. Ward also recorded Bowlin
as saying that if the matter came up before arbitration
"the first and most ardent lawyer that he would have on
his side" would be Bowlin, who, in order to defend his conduct
in this matter, would combat the exaggerations of the Company's
claims. Ward added that Commodore Shubrick agreed with
Bowlin and offered to recommend to Lopez the name of one
of the outstanding lawyers in the United States to argue
the Paraguayan case. At three that afternoon Guido passed
on these confidences to Lopez. They apparently had a positive
effect for the Paraguayan President dropped his opposition
to the agreement.91

However, Lopez had not ended his trouble-making. He
next raised difficulties over the note of explanations.
Guido records that he wrote the note upon the request of
Lopez and showed it to Ward who declared it acceptable.
However, on February 8th when the notes were formally
delivered they contained changes, especially with regard
to the Water Witch incident, which Ward said were unacceptable.

91 Ibid., 47-50.
Lopez backed down, the next day accepting the American corrections.92

Apparently the corrections constituted a restoration of the original note, for it bore the date of the original note, February 6, 1859. In this note, signed by Vazquez but undoubtedly written by Lopez, the Paraguayan Government explained that it had not accepted the communications from Page concerning the exchange of treaty ratifications because of Page's insistence in continuing his relation with it in a language not acceptable at that time to the foreign office of Paraguay. As for its treatment of Fitzpatrick the Paraguayan Government said that it ought to be attributed entirely to the carelessness of the representative of the United States and not to the representative of Paraguay, as Fitzpatrick indicated in his note of November 18, 1856. Besides, the note continued, Paraguay had offered to negotiate a new treaty with the proper United States representative.

The *Water Witch* incident was handled in the following manner:

The conflict with the *Water Witch* took place in a frontier of the Republic, far from the immediate control of the government, which could not foresee such incidents, nor stop those underway. The incident resulted from the fidelity of the military commander to a general order, without hostile and offensive intent toward any friendly flag. The generality of that disposition, the previous order, and the vigor of military discipline, sufficiently explain the incident. The government has been the first in deploring it.93

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92 *bid.*, 51-52. Guido does not mention the nature of these exchanges.

On the afternoon of the same day, February 9th, Bowlin and Vazquez signed the treaty and the arbitration convention. Bowlin said that the ratification, was heralded with unbounded joy at Asuncion, both by the Government and people—the latter giving vent to their feelings in torch light processions, serenades and illuminations, whilst officials sought to do me every honor. 

The next day Bowlin took leave of Lopez. On this occasion, after Bowlin made a very complimentary speech, Shubrick had a 21 gun salute fired, a move that was "received with great satisfaction" by Lopez. Then, the Americans departed from Asuncion.

Why was Bowlin successful in achieving this settlement? Several explanations have been given. It has been widely asserted that it was really the threat of the use of the naval force against Lopez which made the agreement possible.

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96 Shubrick to Toucey, Corrientes, February 16, 1859, Paraguay Expedition, 60.

However, the ability of the American naval force to conduct successful military operations at that time and in that place is open to grave doubt. One factor which would have greatly reduced its capabilities was geographic. If the United States had engaged in hostilities it would have had to depend almost exclusively on naval operations in the Paraguay River because it had available only 291 marines. With such a small force land operations were out of the question. Also, the United States would have had to maintain a communications route of almost one thousand miles down the Paraguay and Parana Rivers. The United States could expect no help from the neighboring nations if a conflict did occur, since "the whole valley of the La Plata would have united against us, and we would have had to fight every inch of our way for twelve hundred miles. . . ."

Operations on these rivers would have been extremely difficult. Shubrick described the ascent of the Fulton up the Parana as "tedious and difficult." He later explained that the

navigation of the Parana is rendered very difficult, owing to the shifting of the sand by the force of the current, and the consequent formation of new channels and the closing up of old ones.

98 See below, pages 198-199.
99 Shubrick to Toucey, February 16, 1859.
100 Shubrick to Toucey, Rosario, January 4, 1859, Paraguay Expedition, 34-37.
101 Shubrick to Toucey, Corrientes, January 19, 1859, ibid., 40-44.
Shubrick indicated that the same statements applied to the navigation of the Paraguay River. The Commodore also complained that this situation was aggravated by the scarcity of good pilots. If hostilities would have occurred this situation would have been intensified as the other nations in the region would not have allowed their pilots to guide the United States ships.

The strong current of the rivers was an important factor against the United States force. It made sailing vessels practically useless, because they could make only very slow time against the strong currents. This would have rendered almost half of the United States force ineffective.

Thus, there seems to be room for serious doubt as to the ability of United States force to overcome these obstacles in a confrontation with Paraguayan forces. Nonetheless, Commodore Shubrick was apparently pleased with the preparations of his force:

I found that the men, both seamen and marines, with proper officers, had been drilled in all maneuvers that would be required in active service on the shore.

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102 Shubrick to Toucey, Asunción, January 25, 1859; Ibid., 46-48.
103 Ibid., 43.
He adds: "They would have completed successfully with any force that could have been brought against them by the State of Paraguay."  

However, Shubrick contradicted himself in his correspondence with the Navy Department. For instance his ordnance officer pointed out that the

Ordinance Stores are deficient in power, shell, grape and canister; in shell and fuses for bombarding; in small arms, and in ammunition for them and for howitzers.

Shells of greater explosive force for bombarding and canister might have been of great service in attacking forts, but there are none at all for the great guns.

Ward was of the opinion that the ammunition of the fleet would not have lasted for more than two days. The New York Tribune asserted that an investigation showed that the ammunition would have lasted only seven hours in rapid firing.

The serviceability of the steamers which were purchased from commercial firms was also attacked. The New York Commercial Advertiser said that they were "too weak" and that "the general objections to their serviceableness as men of war can never be removed." The New York Tribune was even more harsh in its condemnation of the steamers. It labeled

105 Shubrick to Touscy, February 16, 1859, loc. cit.
106 Catesby R. Jones, Ordinance Officer of Paraguayan Expedition, to Shubrick, February 28, 1859, Paraguay Expedition.
109 Quoted in the National Intelligencer, August 29, 1859.
them "canal boats," and added that they "were a constant subject of ridicule everywhere, and it is well known to all professional men that a single Minnie ball might have disabled any one of them..." Substance is given to these charges by commanders of four of the ships. The officers in charge of the Metacomet and Chapin declared their ships unseaworthy, while the commanders of the Atalanta and Memphis declared that their converted merchant ships were unfit as men of war.

The New York Herald raised another question when it attacked the capability of the force by asserting that only four or five of the ships were capable of ascending the shallow Paraguay River. On the basis of this argument it labelled the expedition "entirely inadequate and inefficient" and stated that if an engagement took place "our force would be beaten." Shubrick wrote that foreign officers expressed surprise that the United States should attempt to take vessels of such a deep draft up the river, pointing out that it had not been attempted before.

The most important question is not what the real status of the American force was, but López's estimation of it.

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111 Expenses of the Paraguayan Expedition, 85-93, 112-113.
112 New York Herald, February 26, 1859.
113 Shubrick to Tousey, January 19, 1859, loc. cit.
Unfortunately, there is no evidence to this question. However, in view of the extensive spy apparatus that Lopez usually employed, it seems highly unlikely that Lopez was not aware of the weakness of the United States force. Lopez was certainly aware of the fact that the United States could undertake no campaigns on land and perhaps believed that Civil War was imminent in the United States. In view of all of these factors the argument that the Naval force coerced Lopez into a settlement is not sufficient in and of itself. It no doubt had a sobering influence on the Paraguayan President and in this way was a factor which contributed to the settlement but not the sole factor.

We must instead look to other factors. One would have to be the influence of Urquiza as the mediator. Bowlin told Cass that Urquiza "very materially accelerated the result of my negotiations and . . . smoothed many of the asperities which lay in the way of a friendly understanding. . . ." Becoming more concrete Bowlin said that in the week that Urquiza was in Asuncion before his arrival Urquiza was able to convince Lopez of the ruin which would come with hostilities and the advantages of an honorable peace. Amaral also felt that Urquiza's mediation and his personal influence upon Lopez was undoubtedly the most important factor contributing to the settlement.

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114 Victorica, "mediación Argentina," VI, 393-394.
115 Bowlin to Cass, February 17, 1859, ibid.
By filling the actual physical role of mediator Urquiza undoubtedly played a very important role. Yet it would appear that Urquiza also provided a way for López to give in without losing face. Throughout the negotiations López would give an appearance of adamant opposition to a point until Urquiza, or Guido representing him, would intercede. Then López would give way, not only on the basis of the arguments which Urquiza presented, but as an act of friendship towards Urquiza. By this technique López could give in on an issue, by not appearing to give in to the American position, but instead because of considerations of personal friendship for Urquiza.

But the conduct of the American Commissioner must not be overlooked in explaining the success of his mission. Washburne wrote that Bowlin's "experience as a stump orator in the west was not of the kind to render him a formidable antagonist to one brought up in the schools of the Jesuits." Steedman wrote that Bowlin "lacks both dignity and refinement, although in other respects he is a very good man." Regardless of what the others may have thought of him Bowlin did a very creditable job. In the first place he avoided the pitfalls of the treacherous situation in the Río de la Plata.

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118 Washburne, Paraguay, I, 379.
119 Mason, Memoir ... Steedman, 200.
by refusing to accept Urquiza's oblique offer. Eventually Urquiza did mediate, but without gaining any prior commitments from the United States. Second, the personal sincerity of Bowlin and the correspondence between his words and his acts gained him the trust of those with whom he dealt, apparently even López, which was no mean accomplishment.

As a diplomat Bowlin never lost sight of the larger objective of his mission, and was willing to bend his instructions. In the case of the Paraguayan explanations Bowlin did more than bend his instructions, he broke them. He had been instructed to demand apologies for these incidents from the Paraguayan Government, but instead he accepted the Paraguayan note which approached being an apology only on the Water Witch incident and gave what could be considered unsatisfactory explanations on the other points. Bowlin apparently was not willing to jeopardize the rest of the settlement by insisting upon this point.

Another instance of Bowlin's violation of his instructions was the convention which he signed on the question of the claims of the Navigation Company. This convention called for the appointment of two commissioners, one by Paraguay and one by the United States to arbitrate the claim. If they could not reach a decision they were to submit the question to the arbitration of the Russian or Prussian Ambassador in

120 See above, page 202.
121 See above, page 240.
This was in accordance with his instructions, but Bowlin did violate his instructions when he did not obtain from Paraguay an explicit recognition of its guilt. Article I of the treaty states that the Government of Paraguay “bids itself for the responsibility which may result from the decree of the commissioners.” The use of the word may in this article does not indicate any prior admission of guilt on the part of Paraguay, but instead indicates that the question of guilt would be established by the commission as well as the sum that might be granted to the navigation company. Articles II and V of the convention have the same intent. Article II stipulates that the arbitration commission was to determine “the amount of reclamation to which the said company may be entitled. Article V reads:

The government of Paraguay hereby binds itself to pay to the government of the United States of America . . . for the amount for which the two commissioners, concurring or by the umpire, shall declare it responsible to the said company.


123 See above, page 202.

124 Miller, Treaties, 260–261. My emphasis.

125 Ibid., 261–262.

126 Ibid., 263. For the Spanish version of the treaty see Bax, Historia diplomática, II, 99–100.
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his stitches were just what Home wanted to see. Afterall, the appointment
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Bowman might well have dropped the instructions.
Samuel Gridley Howe and wrote the *Battle Hymn of the Republic*. After his father's death Sam unsuccessfully tried his hand at banking, but as one person put it, "He had outstanding talents when it came to spending money, rather than earning or conserving it."  

In the period after the Civil War Sam Ward was to become a famous lobbyist in Washington. Hamilton Fish called Ward "the king of the lobby." Henry Adams referred to Ward in the following manner:

Few figures on the Paris stage were more entertaining and dramatic than old Sam Ward, who knew more of life than all the department of the Government together, including the Senate and Smithsonian.  

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129 Louise Hall Tharp, *Three Saints and a Sinner* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1956), passim. The "Saints" are Ward's three sisters; Sam is the "Sinner." Hereafter cited as *Three Saints*.  
131 Allan Nevins, *Hamilton Fish; the inner history of the Grant administration* (New York: Dodd, Mead, & Company, 1936), 571.  
However, at the time of his appointment by Bowlin in New York, Ward was in desperate financial straits. He had gone to California during the gold rush and had made a fortune in various enterprises, apparently also going into the hotel business:

...the hotel was not exactly prissy. There were girls of all sorts and Sam was broadminded in the Parisian sense. His hotel was a big success while it lasted. Sam's prosperity was wiped out in a San Francisco fire. By late 1857 Ward was reduced to asking his friend Longfellow and his sister Julia for money. Quite possibly the $1500 salary was the reason for Ward's acceptance of the appointment as Bowlin's secretary.

There is no evidence as to when or how Ward and López began discussions on their agreement. It is apparent, however, that Ward was on familiar terms with various Paraguayan officials, including the President, by the time that he left Paraguay. This is revealed in correspondence.

133Tharp, Three Saints, 152.
134Ibid., 152-180, passim.
136Perhaps Ward received an additional $500 which Cass stipulated as compensation for an interpreter, for Ward filled this capacity also. See Cass to Bowlin, Washington, October 6, 1855, Instruction, Paraguay, Vol. 1, R.G. 59.
which passed between Ward and Lopez after the former had left Paraguay. In his letters to Lopez Ward assumes an air of familiarity which must have been bred in previous contacts. Also, Lopez at various times in the correspondence refers to "su amigo Don. B" and to "su amigo Vazquez." The arrangement is also contained in the correspondence of President Lopez. Ward was to use his influence to secure the ratification of the treaty and the convention, and secondly, to have the decision of the arbitration commission

137 In this correspondence Lopez assumed the pseudonyms of Nicolas Perez, and Ward that of Pedro Fernandez. Part of this correspondence was first located in the National Archives of Paraguay in Asuncion by Perez Acosta and reproduced in his Carlos Antonio Lopez, "Obras Maxima," Labor Administrativa y Constructiva (Asuncion: Editorial Guaraní, 1948), 431-358. Hereafter cited as Lopez. Acosta believed that Fernandez was Ward because of "su redacion y estilo que no poseia espanol. . . ." Ibid., 432-433. Ynsfran uncovered more of this correspondence in the Colecao Visconde do Rio-Branco, in Rio de Janeiro. He subsequently reproduced it in his Expedicion, II, 195-200. See Ynsfran's "Sam Ward's Bargain with President Lopez of Paraguay," Hispanic American Historical Review, XXXIV (August, 1954), 323-324. Hereafter cited as "Bargain."

138 Perez to Fernandez, Asuncion, April 20, 1859, quoted in Perez Acosta, Lopez, 443. The reference here is to the President's son Bernoces.

139 Perez to Fernandez, Asuncion, August 20, 1859, ibid., 455. The reference here is to the Paraguayan Foreign Minister Nicolas Vasquez.
reduced to the smallest possible sum. For his efforts in the first cause Ward was to receive a flat sum, which later turned out to be $10,000. On the second question Ward was to receive 2 per cent on any reduction of the Company's claim under $500,000.140

Insfran feels that the secret bargain worked out between Ward and López was essential in persuading López to accept the arbitration convention, and therefore to the success of the entire negotiations.141

As a result of these proceedings the Company was at last to get a chance to press its claims and a potentially dangerous crisis in Paraguayan-United States relations passed, a crisis which should never have arisen.

140Fernandez to Perez, Montevideo, March 8, 1859, Ibid; López to Jose Berjus, Asuncion, March 13, 1860, quoted in Insfran, expedicion, II, 201-203; Vasquez to Bergus, Asuncion, October 8, 1859, quoted in Ibid., 213-215.

141Insfran, "Bargain," 322-323.
President Buchanan announced the peaceful termination of the Bowlin mission in his third annual message to Congress on December 19, 1859. He informed Congress that the appearance of so large a force, fitted out in such a prompt manner, in the far-distant waters of the La Plata, and the admirable conduct of the officers and men employed in it, have had a happy effect in favor of our country throughout all that remote portion of the world.\(^1\)

On the same day the President submitted the treaty to the Senate and the convention to both the Senate and the House.\(^2\)

While Congress considered these matters both the Navigation Company and the Government of Paraguay were engaging in active campaigns to bolster their positions before the upcoming arbitration commission. The most strenuous efforts being made on behalf of Paraguay by Sam Ward. One of Ward's biggest problems was to counteract the activities of Edward Hopkins. Ward first became aware of the activities of Hopkins while passing through Buenos Aires, where Hopkins was residing at that time. Ward informed López that Hopkins was

\(^1\)Richardson, Messages, VII, 3091.

\(^2\)Ibid., 3108-3109.
publicly attacking the treaty and the convention, charging that there was no guarantee that Paraguay would send a commissioner to the arbitration proceedings. Ward felt that the best policy for him to adopt at this time was one of silence. He explained to López that there were two reasons for his adopting this policy: (1) "it is wise to hide your best cards until the game begins," (2) "in order not to attract attention to Ward." Ward urged López to weaken Hopkins' campaign by allowing Lt. Page to resume his explorations of Paraguay's rivers, which Hopkins stated that López would not allow. López followed Ward's advice.

Ward also suggested to López the desirability of preventing Hopkins' return to the United States where he could aid the cause of the Navigation Company. As a means to accomplish this end he pointed out that Bowlin had suggested that it would be very easy for López to buy off Hopkins. However, López refused to entertain this suggestion saying that it was contrary to his honor and the brilliant cause that he defended.

Upon his arrival in New York in May, 1859 Ward discovered that Hopkins had managed to have a number of letters printed

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4. Pérez to Fernández, Asunción, August 20, 1859, ibid., 454-455.

5. Fernández to Pérez, Montevideo, March 8, 1859, ibid., 439-442.

6. Pérez to Fernández, Asunción, April 20, 1859, ibid., 443.
in the New York Times. Ward informed López that the editor of this paper had promised not to print additional letters from Hopkins and that the President of the Navigation Company had written to Hopkins ordering him to cease his publications. Ward also told López that he was launching a counter-offensive of his own. First of all, he revealed that he was working on translations of El Semanario which he hoped to have published in the newspapers. He added that he was also writing a book in which López would find himself painted "with strokes and features other than those in the book of Captain Page and the books of the adventurer."  

In these letters to López the ever active Ward asserted that he was optimistic about the chances of Paraguay before the arbitration commission. There seem to have been several grounds for this feeling. First he noted that Buchanan "was eminently satisfied with the settlement." He also felt that the cause of the Navigation Company was losing ground, although he cautioned López that the Paraguayan Commissioner should come with a full purse. A second

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7 See the New York Times, April 21, 22, and May 24, 1859. These letters demonstrate that Hopkins had lost none of his ability to use the invective. In the letter of April 21 he spoke of the "puerile duplicity" of Buchanan and of the "egregious folly of his puddingheaded envoy."  


9 Ibid. My translation.  

10 Ibid.
reason for Ward's optimism was his belief that the officers of the naval expedition would defend the cause of Paraguay against the claims of the Navigation Company. Third, Ward informed Lopez that he was a friend of the Russian Ambassador, noting the Ambassador was a "spendthrift and I will have to renew my friendship with him." In view of this favorable situation Ward advised Lopez against any actions which might upset it. He urged Lopez to deal lightly with James Canstatt an Englishman who Lopez charged with conspiring to assassinate him, noting that the mother of this man had asked for Bowlin's intervention. Perhaps Ward felt that Lopez's release of the man would make American opinion even more favorable towards Paraguay. Ward also advised Lopez to send the Paraguayan Commissioner to the United States upon a commercial ship for the following reason:

In the first case you can imagine that public opinion and a friendly government, when a power demonstrates such great wealth and expenditures with such prodigality, will believe it ought not to quibble over adjustments with a small and weak company, almost broken up by its undertakings in Paraguay. It is always a good policy not to create sympathy for your adversary.

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11 Fernández to Pérez, March 8, 1859, loc. cit.
12 Ibid. My translation.
13 Warren, Paraguay, 189-190. Lopez ultimately released Canstatt, but apparently because of English pressure.
14 Fernández to Pérez, March 8, 1859, loc. cit.
15 Fernández to Pérez, May 24, 1859, loc. cit. My translation.
While Ward was engaging in these activities López appointed José Bergez as the Paraguayan Commissioner. The Paraguayan President had originally planned to send his son Benigno, but turned to Bergez. The reason for this was that López's health had declined and he wanted his son to help him in governing Paraguay. Cecilio Baez describes Bergez as "a man of distinguished appearance, suave manner and a spirit of equanimity - personal qualities that were conciliatory." Bergez was an experienced diplomat who was often entrusted by López with delicate diplomatic duties. Bergez arrived in London in December, 1859 where he met Ward who had been visiting his family in Europe. Together they traveled across the Atlantic arriving in New York near the end of January, 1860. On March 7 Bergez exchanged the treaty ratifications with Cass and on the next day presented his credentials to Buchanan.

During this period Bergez also appointed James Sandeville Carlyle to defend the cause of Paraguay before the still-to-be-instituted arbitration Commission. The appointment of

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16 Vázquez to Bergez, Asunción, October 8, 1859, quoted in Ysafrán, expedición, II, 213-215.
17 Ibid., 178.
18 Baez, Historia diplomática, II, 77.
19 Zubizarreta, Cien vidas paraguayas, 91.
20 López to Bergez, Asunción, February 15, 1859, quoted in Ysafrán, expedición, II, 179; Bergez to Vázquez, Washington, March 21, 1860, quoted in ibid.
21 Ibid.
Carlisle had long been desired by Ward and was an excellent choice. Carlisle knew both French and Spanish and had acted at various times as legal counsel for the British, Costa Rican, Colombian, and Spanish diplomatic representatives in Washington. He was frequently consulted by all the Latin American legations and was the standing legal adviser to the British legation.

Berges obtained from Cass a table for Carlisle to work at in the State Department. As a result of his research in the records of the Department Carlisle became convinced that he could build a solid defense of Paraguay's position. Carlisle's optimism was shared by Berges. He informed López that public opinion was very favorable to President López; the company is classified by the public with the name of the sharks of Providence, and are looked upon as a group of audacious swindlers.

The press which before insulted the Paraguayan people, and especially its government, have ceased, to publish articles favorable to Paraguay. One hears our voice, and the company is silent. A good share of this is due to Fernández, who has good relations with the President, with many officials, and influential persons in the capital, and New York. He is ingratiating, active and enterprising.

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22Fernández to Pérez, April 20, 1859, loc. cit.
Fernández to Pérez, March 8, 1859, loc. cit.


While the Paraguayan position was being bolstered the Navigation Company was also working to strengthen its case. One of its plans of action was to contact Ward. The first contact came soon after Ward had arrived back from Paraguay in May, 1859. Ward informed López that an agent of the Company invited him to a conference in Providence with the directors of the Company in order to discuss the possibility of a settlement before the arbitration commission was convened. Ward thought that the Navigation Company would be willing to send him to Paraguay to complete such a settlement. Ward was approached by the Company again in January, 1860, just after he arrived in New York from London, after crossing the Atlantic with Berges. In this conversation with the Company's agent, Charles Bradley, the topic of a settlement was once more broached. Bradley and Ward then fell into a dispute over the validity of the claims of the Company. Then, reports Ward, the following exchange took place:

Bradley: But, we are not here, I as the lawyer of the Company, and you as friend of both parties, to discuss the pros and the cons of these questions. Are you free to work for us?

Ward: I am free to do all possible to arrive at a just and honorable arrangement, which is honorable to the Paraguayan Government, to the Company, and to myself.

Bradley: This is no answer, I want to employ you in our interest and to pay you a healthy percentage commission on that which you would help us achieve.

26 Fernández to Pérez, May 24, 1859, loc. cit.
Ward: I appreciate the proposition, which arrives a little late. Before involving myself seriously in this question I want to know what you expect of me.

Bradley: I will speak to you with frankness. We have secret notices from Paraguay, whose origin we cannot describe, that President López is ready to pay $700,000 pesos in indemnity, rather than to submit to the arbitration of a Commission.

Ward: This information is not only impossible, but infamous, it being possible only to discuss the reolamotion on the base of the sum asked by Mr. Bowlin as the minimum of the Company.

At this point Bradley asserted that the Company had much proof, but when Ward rejected this argument Bradley asserted that the Company was sure of obtaining "un Comisionado amigo nuestro" and that if the question went before a third party they would also be sure of a favorable opinion. Ward was not impressed by this argument but added that if the Company was willing to settle for $100,000 to $150,000 an agreement could be reached. Ward records that Bradley was not interested in this amount, wherupon Ward told him to go back to Providence to inform the Company of the absurdity of its ideas.27

This failure of the Company to buy off Ward did not leave it without hope. The reason for this was that the

27 Conversation between Fernández and Bradley, quoted in ibid., II, 195-200. My translation. In offering $100,000 to the Company, Ward was acting in accordance with instructions which López gave to Berges. López to Berges, Asunción, September 26, 1860, quoted in ibid., 207-208.
Company had enlisted the services of John Appleton in the State Department.

Berges reported that Appleton was running the Department of State, with Cass playing no real role. He pointed out that Appleton was the chief support of the Company, a fact which he felt should not be minimized. Berges revealed that his friends were attempting to have Appleton appointed Minister to Switzerland, and he thought that they would succeed. Berges optimism on this point was unwarranted, however, for Appleton was one of the lawyers who represented the Company before the arbitration commission.

While this maneuvering was taking place the treaty and convention were approved by Congress and signed by the President. Ward assured Lopez before the treaty was ratified that his friends would get the treaty and convention passed. However, Insfran correctly points out that

In view of the willingness of the American government to ratify the treaty and the convention, one is inclined to think that the ratification was spontaneously effected, that is, without the assistance of any intermediary. Nevertheless, Sam Ward pocketed an aggregate of $10,000 as if the ratification were due to his "professional" effort.

28 Berges to F.S. Lopez, May 20, 1860, loc. cit.
31 Lopez to Berges, May 20, 1860, loc. cit.
Buchanan appointed Cave Johnson of Tennesse as the American commissioner in the arbitration proceedings. Johnson had long been a figure in the Democratic Party. He served numerous terms in the House, was Postmaster General under Polk, and later became an ardent supporter of Buchanan, being credited with swinging Tennesse to the Buchanan. As a lawyer he is pictured as having "abilities of a high order," and "of sound and vigorous though not brilliant parts. . . ." The man appointed as the secretary of the arbitration commission was none other than Sam Ward. The procedure whereby Ward maneuvered his appointment is not clear. Insfran, although he does not explain how Ward managed his appointment, feels that it must have been accomplished without the company knowing that Ward was a secret agent of Paraguay, for otherwise it, and especially Appleton in the State Department, would have blocked his appointment. This is in keeping with Insfran's thesis that Ward successfully concealed his connections with López not only in this appointment, but

35Caldwell, Sketches, 189.
36Insfran, expedicion, II, 169, 181.
also throughout the proceedings and even after the decision of the arbitration commission. 37

Yet this thesis appears to be weak on two grounds. First, it still does not answer the vital question of how Ward received his appointment. Second, and more important, evidence available indicates that the deal between Lopez and Ward was known or at least suspected. One slight indication is the remark which Bowlin made to Ward to the effect that it would be easy for Lopez to buy Hopkins. 38 It seems unlikely that Bowlin would have made such a comment unless he had some inkling of the arrangement between Ward and Lopez. It is possible that Bowlin might have made this remark in an off-handed manner, or that Ward might have invented it to buttress his recommendation. But the evidence that Bowlin must have known that there was some sort of an arrangement is supported by the fact that in one of his letters to Ward, President Lopez mentioned an enclosed letter which he wanted Ward to send to Bowlin. 39 If Bowlin was not aware of the deal up to this time he must have become suspicious upon learning that Ward was engaged in correspondence with Lopez.

Further evidence is supplied in the conversations which Ward had with the representations of the Navigation Company.

38 Fernandez to Perez, March 8, 1859, loc. cit.
39 Perez to Fernandez, Asuncion, March 30, 1859, quoted in Acosta, Lopez, 452. The author does not reprint the letter to Bowlin, nor indicates that he found a copy of it.
The fact that they approached him as soon as he returned to the United States would seem to indicate that they suspected something. A further indication that the representatives of the Company suspected him of having a contact with López is indicated by their intimation that they would consider sending Ward to Asunción to work out an arrangement with López. The interview which Ward had with Charles Bradley affords further proof. In this conversation Bradley asked Ward how well he knew Berge and Ward replied that he knew him well as they had just made an ocean voyage together, referring to their crossing of the Atlantic. This intimate connection between Berge and Ward could not have escaped the attention of the representatives of the Company. Also the attempt of Bradley to solicit the services of Ward for the Navigation Company, in view of these antecedents, appear to have been an attempt to buy him away from López. It also seems unlikely that Ward’s vigorous campaign against the Company through lobbying and newspaper articles could have eluded the view of the Company’s agents. The fact seems to be that the Company thought that they had bought Ward and that Ward was not completely truthful in his letters.

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40 Fernández to Perez, May 25, 1859, loc. cit.
41 For the text of the conversation see Infrán, expedición, II, 195-200, especially 195.
42 This suspicion must have been confirmed when Carlisle, Berge, and Ward attended parties at the White House as a threesome. Carlisle to Berge, Washington, n.d., cited in Infrán, expedición, II, 180.
with Lopez. It seems that instead of refusing Bradley's overtures, as he reported to Lopez, Ward accepted them and made a trip to Providence. In the Edward P. Carrington Papers, in the Rhode Island Historical Society there is a telegram from a "G.C. Ward" to Samuel G. Mason, an official of the Company, dated June 6, 1860. The telegram says "meet me at depot this evening at half past seven." This, of course, could have been a different Ward, or it could have been Sam Ward using "G.C." to disguise his identity. Proof that it was Sam Ward and that he had made a deal with the Navigation Company is indicated in a letter which Samuel Greene Arnold, the President of the Navigation Company, wrote to S.G. Mason less than two weeks later. In this letter Arnold tells Mason that "Ward must be brought back again to our interest." This letter not only indicates that Ward had made a deal, but that he had backed off from it, or he never intended to keep it and the Company had just discovered this fact. Perhaps the latter was the case. For this letter was written on June 19, 1860 and Ward had been appointed to the arbitration commission on June 8th. Therefore, it seems likely that Ward might have gone through the motions of making a deal with the Company so that it

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44 S.G. Arnold to S.G. Mason, Newport, June 19, 1860, ibid.
would have no objections to his appointment as the secretary of the arbitration commission.  \(^{46}\)

The arbitration commission formally convened on June 22, 1860 when the commissioners presented their credentials.  \(^{47}\)

At the second meeting of the commission Appleton presented the opening statement for the Navigation Company. Appleton asserted that the men who formed the Company were induced to engage in the enterprise by the vast and undeveloped resources of Paraguay and of the neighboring areas. It was asserted also that they were also stimulated by the special inducements held out by the public decrees and laws of the Republic of Paraguay, which invited foreigners to develop her resources by the offer of grants or privileges in the form of patent rights for a term of years for all who would first introduce into Paraguay any implements or processes of manufacture not before used there.

As proof of these charges Appleton filed with the commission a copy of the laws in question and also a letter from Juan Geliy, who the Company identified as the Paraguayan Secretary of State at the time that the letter was written in 1845. This letter was to Hopkins, apparently in response to a previous letter from him, in which it was suggested that

\(^{46}\) It appears that Ward was also working to insure his appointment through his contacts with the White House, which he apparently gained through Carlisle. Carlisle to Berges, n.d., loc. cit. In a letter dated March 6, 1860, Ward added this postscript: "I dined with old Buchanan Friday," quoted in Elliott, Uncle Sam, 455. Elliott does not indicate to whom the letter was sent.

\(^{47}\) Claim Against Paraguay, Journal, 1-17.
the American desired to establish a school of practical agriculture in Paraguay. Gelly expressed his opinion, in this letter to Hopkins, that López would regard such an undertaking with favor. At the same time Gelly expressed the opinion that a request which Hopkins had made for a monopoly over certain types of agricultural production would not be granted. Gelly pointed out that the decree of May 20, 1845 did not grant such a right. However, he added, that if Hopkins' introduced into the country machines or new means of manufacture which it did not already possess the decree would grant a monopoly for at least ten years.

After dealing with the inducements to the Company, Appleton turned his attention to the actual claims of the Company. Appleton asserted that although the Company's undertaking had only begun when it was terminated, its actual expenditures, with interest, amounted to $402,520.37. Appleton stated that the expenditures were chiefly for the steamers and the other vessels sent to Paraguay, for machinery, for land and buildings purchased and for wages paid to the employees of the Company. A portion of the losses, however, added Appleton arose from the sale of the Company's bonds at less than a par value, a loss which Paraguay was responsible for because its suppression of the Company depressed the value of the bonds.

In addition to these expenses the Company made a claim for indemnity for intelligence, investigation, time, enterprise, risk and anxiety, pointing out that these things went
into the make-up of the actual investment of the Company. Appleton admitted that the amount of this branch of the claim would be difficult to specify, leaving its determination to the discretion of the commission.

Another aspect of the Company’s claims arose from the loss of its patent rights for having first introduced into Paraguay certain machines and processes of manufacture. The Company asserted that if López had not broken up their enterprise the cigar factory would have made a profit of $236,080.00 per year, and thus, $2,368,080.00 for ten years. The Company also estimated that it would have made on its sawmill $34,725 per annum and $347,250 for ten years. Likewise it claimed a potential profit on its brick machine of $32,000 per annum or $320,000 for ten years. The Company also claimed to have introduced the first steam engine into Paraguay. Appleton pointed out that he was citing these examples as illustrations of the justness of the Company’s claims and would leave the determination of the amount of their value to the discretion of the commission.

It was submitted, however, that the award of the commission should exceed the sum of a million dollars.48

The third meeting of the commission was devoted to the presentation of Paraguay’s case by Carlisle. Carlisle denied that any wrong had been done by Paraguay to the Company. He denied that the Company had acquired any rights of patent or monopoly under the laws of Paraguay, pointing out that the

48 Ibid., 17-18.
Company had not applied for patents as it was required to do under the laws. Carlisle admitted that Gelly's letter was genuine, but denied that he was ever secretary of state, and that the only office which he ever held was that of special commissioner to Brazil. Carlisle pointed out that the letter was private and besides Gelly stated that monopolies would not be granted to Hopkins.

Carlisle also denied that the Agent of the Company had been expelled from Paraguay, or that its business was interrupted or disturbed otherwise than in due execution of the laws of the land, to which the claimants were subject. On the other hand he asserted that Paraguay had granted extraordinary favors to the Company until they could no longer be continued with disgrace.

Carlisle also insisted that if the commission were to find Paraguay liable the amount of damages should be based upon clear and distinct proofs. He argued that no prospective, conjectural or speculative damages should be allowed, nor could Paraguay be charged with damages for outlays made in the United States which never came within the territory of Paraguay. Carlisle charged that the two largest claims against Paraguay were for the two vessels which were wrecked and the machinery on them, which never came within the territory of Paraguay. Nor could Carlisle understand how Paraguay could be held responsible for the losses incurred by the sale of the Company's bonds below their par value. Carlisle also rejected the Company's claim for compensation for anxiety, intelligence, etc.
Carlisle went on to inform the Commission that he would demonstrate that Hopkins had borrowed $10,000 from Paraguay which he did not pay back. Carlisle also charged that the lands which figured so largely in the claim of the Company had been procured upon a void title for the price of $70 to $80. He said that he would also prove that the cigar factory was of insignificant value, that the sawmill never paid its expenses, and that the whole enterprise could never have realized the enormous profits that the Company claimed.\(^{49}\)

After the presentation of the opening arguments the commission heard witnesses and received other evidence from the two parties. This process lasted until July 18th.\(^{50}\) On July 27th the commissioners reached an agreement on the award, but did not announce it until August 13th, the intervening period being used by Johnson to write his opinion and report.\(^{51}\) On August 13th the commissioners announced that the Navigation Company have not proved or established any right to damages upon their said claim, against the government of the Republic of Paraguay; and that upon the proofs aforesaid, the said government is not responsible to the said Company, in any damages, or pecuniary compensation, whatever, in all the premises.\(^{52}\)

\(^{49}\)Ibid., 18-30.

\(^{50}\)Ibid., 30-183.

\(^{51}\)Ibid., 137.

\(^{52}\)Ibid.
Charles Washburne later charged that Johnson refused to sanction the claim of the Company because he was prejudiced against everything that originated in New England and because he was dependent upon Ward "for all information on the Country, laws, customs, and operations of the Lopez government." John Bassett Moore refutes this charge saying that it is not "anything else than an inadvertent repetition of groundless insinuations originally disseminated by interested parties."

Insfran, although aware of Ward's secret connections, feels that this opinion is essentially correct:

In the records there is no trace that Sam Ward led the way to the outcome of the proceedings. We cannot deny, of course, that he must have taken advantage of every chance to drive a wedge cunningly for his patron. But neither the ratification of the treaty and the convention nor the award of the commissioners may be ascribed to his personal scheming. Rather, the conclusion seems to be that Sam Ward was simply lucky. The Paraguayan Case was stronger than he thought, and he benefited by it. A happy combination of factors which he certainly did not create, helped him to justify his fee: L 1,000 for the ratification, plus, in all likelihood, $10,000 or 2 per cent on the $500,000 demanded by the Rhode Island company, but rejected by the joint commission.

The fact that the Company, and certainly Appleton, suspected Ward's connections with Lopez must have rendered effective efforts by him virtually impossible.

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53 Washburne, Paraguay, I, 375.
The reason for the award, as Moore and Insfrán agree, was that Johnson independently made up his mind that the Company was not justified in its claims. It was a weak claim. Witnesses for the Company were vague on specific amounts of money, and the Company did not back up its claims with itemized bills. Also Johnson's questioning of the witnesses revealed that many of the expenses had nothing to do with the Company's losses in Paraguay. At the same time Carlisle's intensive and sharp questioning revealed many inconsistencies in the testimony of the Company's witnesses and also that they were testifying on topics about which they had no concrete knowledge.

Johnson's opinion demonstrated that he was definitely won over to the side of Paraguay by the testimony which he heard. He labeled the Company's claim for anticipated profits an "extravagant calculation." He also pointed out that he could not accept the Company's claim for indemnification for its land because it could produce no titles. Johnson also stated that the records of the Company were inadequate, except to demonstrate that the Company was attempting to get Paraguay to pay all of its expenses from the origin of the Company up to the present day. Johnson further stated that López was not responsible for the loss of the Company's ships and that the Paraguayan President did not grant the Company special privileges. The American commissioner said that the only plausible case which the Company made was that its business was wrongfully broken up. But here, he noted, the
evidence was based upon Hopkins’ correspondence. Johnson did not feel that this was reliable evidence because this correspondence

all bear the impress of his own peculiar character and mind, and are little calculated to have weight before any tribunal of a judicial character; indeed, it may be truly said that upon a critical examination they furnish strong internal evidence against the justice or validity of the claim.56

Johnson obviously had studied the case very closely before making up his own mind.

Johnson’s reference to Hopkins brings up the question of why Hopkins did not appear before the commission. Samuel Greene Arnold, the President of the Company, testified that he had sent Hopkins, who was in London, 6 100 to come to Washington, but that Hopkins declared that he was detained with business.57 The New York Times printed a story on this and said that Hopkins had taken the money to pay off old debts and returned to Buenos Aires.58 One cannot help but feel that the inability or refusal of Hopkins to appear before the commission was an advantage for the Company.

However, the dispute between the Company and Paraguay did not end with Johnson’s opinion, and Hopkins was once more to play a role in the proceedings.


57Claim Against Paraguay, Journal, 121.

CHAPTER XI

THE AFTERMATH

The decision of the commissioners aroused varying reactions. It did not mark the end of the controversy, but instead initiated a new phase of activity by the Navigation Company, which would attempt to procure indemnification from the government of Paraguay for another thirty years. However, in these attempts the Company was never again to have the forceful support of Washington that it had had earlier. Instead, the United States government confined its activities on behalf of the Company to purely diplomatic overtures, and even these were not carried out with great determination.

Favorable reactions to the decision of the commissioners were expressed in several quarters. Daniel Ammen, who had been in Paraguay with Page at the time of the Company's expulsion, later called the award a just one. ¹ Bowlin, also obviously pleased by the result of the commission's efforts wrote to López: "I gave my word to your Excellency that

you had nothing to fear in submitting these matters to the justice of my countrymen, and now, I believe, after the result, that I have fulfilled my promise.\textsuperscript{2}

The reaction of two newspapers was also favorable. In fact the \textit{New York Times} had displayed an open hostility to the claims of the Company throughout the arbitration proceedings. It attacked Appleton by pointing out that he was connected with the State Department at the same time he was preparing the defense for the Navigation Company.\textsuperscript{3} The \textit{Times} wrongly asserted two weeks later that its revelation had forced Appleton to resign as an attorney for the Navigation Company.\textsuperscript{4} It ridiculed the claims of the Company by stating that the rebuttal of Carlisle to these claims "will afford an amusing history of Yankee operations abroad."\textsuperscript{5} This paper also charged that the real investment of the Company in Paraguay amounted to only $5,000.\textsuperscript{6} This campaign led to a rebuttal from "Americas" in a letter to the editor of the

\textsuperscript{2}Bowlin to Lopez, St. Louis, August 17, 1860, quoted in Insfrán, \textit{expedición}, II, 189. My translation. The \textit{New York Tribune} of April 22, 1859 ran the following story: "We can state on undoubted authority that Commissioner Bowlin returns to the United States impressed with the idea that the Government has been grossly deceived by Mr. Hopkins. . . ." It continued by asserting that Bowlin had said that he "would not believe a single word spoken by the Consul on diplomatic matters. . . ."


\textsuperscript{4}\textit{Ibid}., July 13, 1860.

\textsuperscript{5}\textit{Ibid}., July 9, 1860.

\textsuperscript{6}\textit{Ibid}., July 17, 1860.
New York Tribune in which the results of both the Bowlin mission and the arbitration commission were termed "ridiculous", asserting that if justice was to be done the decision of the commission had to be set aside. Another letter to the editor of the New York Times from a "Justitia" charged that the newspaper's correspondent in Washington knew information available only to someone inside the commission. In spite of this charge the New York Times continued to wage its fight against the claim of the Company. On August 13th it printed the following:

At all events, the opinion gains ground that the fishiness of the claim has been most satisfactorily proven. The administration fears ridicule, for never did so big a mountain produce so small a mouse.

When the decision of the commissioners was announced this paper ran an editorial which stated that the Company's case was "its own refutation," while strongly supporting Cave Johnson's position. It also revealed that Johnson had informed Buchanan on July 27th of his decision. According to the paper Buchanan had indicated his belief that the claim of the company was just, to which Johnson reportedly replied: "That was because you had not examined it. No honest man can examine that claim and approve it for one dollar."

8New York Times, August 18, 1860. It is entirely likely that the supplier of this information or, perhaps, the correspondent himself, was Ward, who had been a correspondent for this same paper while on the expedition.
9Ibid., August 13, 1860.
10Ibid., August 16, 1860.
11Ibid., August 14, 1860.
The New York Herald also had no sympathy for the Navigation Company:

The fact of an American commissioner deciding not only against the pecuniary claims and exaggerated grievances of his own countrymen, but doing full justice to the conduct of a ruler whom we had humiliated and forced to submit to this inquiry, will go farther to convince them of the honesty and fairness of our disposition towards them than all the assurances that can be conveyed through a diplomatic medium.\(^2\)

Charles S. Bradley of the Navigation Company, of course, did not share this opinion. He immediately protested the commission's decision to Buchanan, arguing that the commission had exceeded its jurisdiction and that Paraguay had already admitted its guilt; the commission was simply to determine the amount of the claim.\(^3\)

Buchanan apparently shared Bradley's point of view. Cass, in a letter written a year before, had informed Bradley that the convention with Paraguay does not admit of a doubt of the fact that there are just claims against that government on the part of the United States and Paraguay Navigation Company.\(^4\)

Buchanan reportedly felt that Carlisle had cast a spell upon Johnson and indicated that he was not satisfied with the decision in a conversation with Carlisle at the White House during a reception for the Prince of Wales, the future Edward

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\(^{13}\) Bradley to the President of the United States, n.p., August 14, 1860, Claim Against Paraguay, Folio I.

\(^{14}\) Cass to Bradley, Washington, June 3, 1859, *ibid*.

VII. According to Carlisle’s report of this incident the President placed his hand upon Carlisle’s shoulder and announced to him that he was going to obtain for him another “princely honorary”. In reply to Carlisle’s query as to who it might be, Buchanan replied that he was referring to Lopez. When Carlisle replied that the question was closed the President said “you will see, you will see”.16

Buchanan demonstrated his intentions on February 12, 1861 when he sent a message to the Senate which kept the controversy alive. Why Buchanan made this move is not readily apparent, but perhaps he was reacting to criticism of the expeditionary force, especially of its cost. Buchanan appears to have been sensitive to such criticism, for in his annual message to Congress in December 1859 he stated that the entire expenses of the expedition were met out of the ordinary appropriations for the Navy, except for the $289,000 spent on the purchase of the seven commercial steamers, which, he quickly added, were worth more than their cost and that they were in useful employ in the naval service.17 However, this statement was seemingly contradicted by the Secretary of the Navy, Issac Toucey, who said that it was impossible to give an exact

17Richardson, Messages, VII, 3091.
statement of the total expenses of the expedition, but estimated the cost at $486,256.57. In his message to the Senate Buchanan charged that the commissioners had exceeded their authority, and pointed to the various articles of the convention which he felt substantiated his point of view. First, he pointed out that in Article I Paraguay "binds itself for the responsibility in favor of the United States and Paraguayan Navigation Company, which may result from the decree of the Commissioners . . . ." In contradicting himself then, Buchanan pointed out that Bowlin's instructions said that any prerequisite to an agreement would have to be an Paraguayan admission of liability.

Buchanan did the same thing with Article II:

The first paragraph of this second article clearly specifies the object of the Convention. This was not to ascertain whether the claim was just, to enforce which we had sent a fleet to Paraguay, but to constitute a commission to "determine", not the existence, but the "amount" of said reclaimsions." The final paragraph provides that "the two commissioners named in said manner shall meet in the city of Washington to inspect, adjust, and determine the amount of the claims of the above mentioned company upon sufficient proofs of the charges and defenses of the contending parties." By the fifth article the Government of Paraguay "binds itself to pay to the Government of the United States . . . the amount for which the two commissioners concerning, or by the umpire shall declare it responsible to the said Company."

The act of Congress of May 16, 1860, employs the same language that is used in the convention, "to investigate, adjust, and determine the amount" of the claims against Paraguay. Congress, not doubting that an award would be made in favor of the company for

18*Expenses*, 2, 144.
some certain amount of damages, in the sixth section of the act referred to provides that the money paid out of the Treasury for the expenses of the commission "shall be retained by the United States out of the money" (not any money) "that may, pursuant to the terms of said convention, be received from Paraguay."

Buchanan then went on to disagree specifically with the Commissioners interpretation of their instructions:

...the commissioners have felt themselves competent to decide that they could go behind the action of the legislative and executive branches of this Government and determine that there was no justice to the original claim. A Commissioner of Paraguay might have been a proper person to act merely in assessing the amount of damages when an arbiter had been proved to decide between him and the commissioner on the part of the United States, but to have authorized him to decide upon the original justice of the claim against his own Government would have been a novelty.

But Buchanan made it clear that he was not attacking Johnson personally: "The American commissioner is as pure and honest a man as I have ever known, but I think he took a wrong view of his powers under the convention." In view of these arguments Buchanan submitted the whole matter to the consideration of the Senate. 19

Johnson, in his report had anticipated this point of view. He argued that the Commission, in order to render a just decision even as to the question of amount, was required to examine the foundation of each item. He pointed out that in the convention no particular ground of claim was specified as having been admitted, but Paraguay was to be responsible for whatever the Commission should decide. Johnson then asked, if it was to be assumed that all the

19 Richardson, Messages, VII, 3195–3197.
claims of the Company were to be allowed. Johnson answered
his own question by saying that the convention did not say,
but left it to the Commission to reach a result according
to its provisions, which the commissioners did to reach a
just decision. Therefore, argued, Johnson, it obligated
the commissioners "to determine between 0 and the highest
amount possible. . . ." Even assuming it to be true, that
the convention confined the commission to the question of
amount, it did not, said Johnson, require them to assess
damages if in their opinion none had been suffered. 20

The Senate was not anxious to become involved in the
affair. Buchanan's message was referred to the Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations. 21 On March 14, 1861,
Senator Sumner moved that his committee be discharged from
further consideration of it. At this point Senator Hale
raised a point of order, that as the message was not reported
during the session at which it was received, it was not to
be regarded as before the committee at current session, but
as on the files of the Senate. This point was sustained
and the Secretary of the Senate was directed to lay a copy
of the message before the President. 22

Therefore, when the Lincoln administration took office
it found that the matter had once again been thrust back

21 Moore, Arbitrations, II, 1540.
upon the President. With the inauguration of the new President the Company once more resumed its drive to have the government take up its claims. The Company sent two memorials to Washington, one to the Senate and one to the President. In these memorials the Company discussed at length the history of the claim and asked for the United States to take action on the grounds that Johnson had exceeded his instructions.

Apparently in response to these pressures the United States once more aroused itself to action on the claims of the Company. This occurred when Charles Ames Washburne was appointed as United States Minister to Paraguay. Seward informed Washburne that the "present Executive takes the same view of the subject as the Buchanan Administration" and instructed the Minister to bring the matter up at the proper time. These vague instructions seem to indicate that Seward was too concerned with the problems of the Civil War to give any real consideration to the question.

23 Memorial to the Senate of the United States, by the American Claimants against Paraguay. This memorial is signed by Samuel G. Arnold but is not dated. However, the reference in the memorial to the "late President" indicates that it was sent after Buchanan had left office. See page one of the memorial.

24 Memorial to the President of the United States, by the American Claimants against Paraguay. This memorial was signed by twenty-two members of the Company.

Washburne arrived in Asuncion on November 14, 1861, determined to pursue the claim of the Company zealously. This determination had apparently been inspired by the Company. Washburne revealed that he had met with the representatives of the Company before leaving for Paraguay, and that these men had convinced him of the justness of their claim. To facilitate the settlement the Company had authorized James B. Bond to act as its agent. Washburne stated that the Company took it for granted that López would not force the United States to send another expedition, but would rather grant an amount of compensation which would satisfy the Company.

If the Company representatives did take this point of view they were in for a rude shock, for Paraguay was adamantly opposed to opening the case once again. This became abundantly clear on November 23, 1861 when Washburne presented his...
credentials. It was López who brought up the question, pointing to it as a hindrance to good relations between the United States and Paraguay. López spoke of Hopkins as an "infamous character" and said that all the trouble had been caused by him. The Paraguayan President then informed Washburne that the question was closed even though he had received no official notification from the United States. 30

On December 30, 1861, Washburne addressed the first of the many notes he was to send concerning the claim of the Company. In this note Washburne asked Francisco Sánchez, the Paraguayan Foreign Minister, to discuss "long pending questions." 31 When Sánchez replied that he was ignorant of any such questions 32 Washburne bluntly stated that the United States did not accept the verdict of the arbitration commission. 33 Sánchez did not reply to Washburne's latest note for over two weeks and then inquired if Washburne had been sent out as a special agent or as a resident minister. 34 Washburne apparently decided to ignore this insult for he replied on the same day that he was taking up the matter.

30 Washburne to Seward, Asuncion, November 28, 1861, Despatches, Paraguay, Vol. I, R.G. 59. The date on this dispatch is obviously a mistake.

31 Washburne to Sánchez, Asunción, December 30, 1861, ibid.

32 Sánchez to Washburne, Asuncion, January 4, 1862, ibid.

33 Washburne to Sánchez, Asuncion, January 11, 1862, ibid.

34 Sánchez to Washburne, Asuncion, January 28, 1862, ibid.
as part of his general duties and expressed the desire that López act quickly on the question.  

López did not take immediate action. Washburne informed Seward that the course of Paraguay was "annoying, evasive, and trifling, and is adopted for the sole purpose, I am convinced, of delay." Washburne explained that the policy of delay had been adopted by López because the latest dispatches from Europe indicated that the United States would soon be at war with England. However, Washburne was not pessimistic over this news, for he indicated that he had information that the South would soon be crushed and then Paraguay would be forced to make a treaty. Apparently he felt that the sending of a fleet after the termination of the Civil War would accomplish this goal: "I am fully persuaded that nothing can be obtained except through fear that another expedition would be sent." Washburne also asked the Department for instructions as to the path he should follow if his efforts failed, pointing out that in the meantime he would continue to press the issue, telling Paraguay that any delay on its part implied disrespect towards the United States.  

On February 10th Washburne once again approached the Paraguayan Government on the question of the Company’s claims.  

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35 Washburne to Sánchez, Asunción, January 28, 1862, ibid.  
36 Washburne to Seward, Asunción, February 5, 1862, ibid.  
37 Washburne to Sánchez, Asunción, February 10, 1862, ibid.
Sanchez replied curtly that Paraguay considered the matter closed. On the same day Washburne sent an equally curt note in which he said that

my government assumes that that question is still open and refuses to regard the opinion of a commission or another question never referred to it, as of any weight or binding force.

From here on activity in the matter dwindled as Washburne awaited instructions. However, on May 16th Washburne sent Sanchez a note. In the meantime Washburne had received instructions from Seward in which the latter told Washburne to explain to Paraguay that the United States had not given Paraguay any earlier notice on its rejection of the commission's award because of the change of the administrations and the beginning of the Civil War. He also informed Washburne that if the Senate at the present session did not take action the President would act in accordance with his own wishes as to a course of action. In the note of May 16th Washburne relayed the contents of the note to Sanchez.

About a month later Sanchez replied that the United States explanation did not satisfy the government of Paraguay and

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38 Sanchez to Washburne, Asuncion, February 18, 1862, ibid.
39 Washburne to Sanchez, Asuncion, February 18, 1862, Notes, Paraguay, R.G. 59.
was not in conformity with the arbitration commission's
definite decision.  

When Carlos Antonio López died in September of 1862
and was succeeded by his son, Francisco Solano López,
Washburne was hopeful of a change in the Paraguayan attitude
towards the Company's claims. Although the younger López
expressed in very strong terms his desire for friendly and
more intimate relations with the United States, he also said
that he hoped that the United States would not reopen the
question. Washburne told Seward that in view of the situa-
tion in the United States and López's noncommittal attitude,
it might be best to drop the motion for a while, because
pressure might arouse opposition in Lopez.  

Washburne did not know that events were occurring in
the United States which precluded any action on the part of
the United States. On March 5, 1862 Lincoln had asked the
Senate for its advice as to the final acquiescence in or
rejection of the award of the arbitration commission.  

On March 12, 1862 he followed this up by submitting a memorial
on the case and the agreement, with extracts from Bowlin's
correspondence. According to Lincoln "these extracts show
that President López offered and expected to pay a large sum

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42. Sanchez to Washburne, Asunción, June 14, 1862, Notes, Paraguay, R.G. 59.
44. Richardson, Messages, VII, 3268-3269.
the United States had not dropped the matter unconditionally.

Sanctions and hopes articulated that they were defused because
would send a diplomatic agent to Washington. However, both
wanted closer ties with the United States and said that he
expression towards the United States, articulated that he
PreparedStatement continued to be abandoned with Fraternity
when Washington carried out the Instruction.

Para on government.

The President's message seemed intended to
when the Senate adjourned without taking action upon

and accompanied it with documents. The
the President submitted a report from the Secretary of State
in response to a resolution of the Senate of May 29, 1965,
on June 4, 1965.
The claims of the Company now lay dormant for almost 8 years. They were introduced again in 1870 when the Company submitted another memorial to the Senate and two to the President. In the memorial to the Senate the Company suggested that there had been collaboration between Ward and Johnson, Secretary of State Hamilton Fish, noting that Paraguay was prostrate after her horrible defeat in the Paraguayan War, said that under "these circumstances it may be regarded as hopeless to expect the Paraguayan Government to be willing to entertain anew the claims. . . ."  

This refusal did not deter the Company for long. Early in 1872 Arnold was in Washington having conversations with Grant and Fish. It was apparently in connection with these conversations that Arnold submitted a brief to the Department in which he charged that an officer of the commission was bribed by the Paraguayan government. This time the Company received a somewhat more favorable response from Fish. He directed John L. Stevens, the United States Minister to Uruguay and Paraguay, to make certain inquiries concerning the claims.

51 The Company to Hamilton Fish, Providence, June, 1870, Miscellaneous Letters, June, 1870, Part II, R.G. 59. The memorials are enclosed with the letter.


53 Report of Samuel Arnold to the meeting of the stockholders of the Company, March 5, 1872, Company Records.

54 Brief of the Claim Against Paraguay, by S. G. Arnold, Carrington Papers.
of the Company and to attempt to gain access to Paraguay's records on the affair. Apparently nothing resulted from these instructions to Stevens, or at least there is no record of the Company until 1885.

In this year Edward A. Hopkins once more entered the picture. It was Hopkins who was responsible for the Company's attempt to press their claim once more. The stockholders of the Company authorized Hopkins to attempt to get a settlement of their old claims. Hopkins was to receive a half of the settlement as his payment. Hopkins informed Secretary of State Bayard of the Company's action and asked that the claims be reopened. He also asked Bayard that he be allowed to accompany John Bacon, the United States Charge at Montevideo, to Asuncion. Bayard instructed Bacon to ask Paraguay to reopen the claim, but in his letter to Hopkins informing him of this action the Secretary of State ignored Hopkins' request that he be allowed to accompany Bacon to Asuncion.

56 Meeting of the stockholders, December 7, 1885, Company Records.
57 Annual meeting of the stockholders, December 9, 1885, Ibid.
Bacon informed the Paraguayan Government of his instructions on February 18, 1886, pointing out that Hopkins had said that he would accept a reasonable settlement, even a settlement in which the payment would be made in land. Bacon reported that he had received a favorable reply from Decoud and planned to take the first available steamer to Asuncion. However, when Bacon arrived in Asuncion he found Decoud disposed to reopen the award for three reasons: (1) the Paraguayan records had been destroyed during the Paraguayan War, (2) the United States had allowed the claim to lie dormant for so long, (3) the claim was so large. In spite of his lack of success Bacon was optimistic because he felt that a land settlement could be worked out.

In October of the same year Bacon sent Decoud a detailed history of the Company's claims, but announced that he would take no additional action without further instructions.

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61 Bacon to Jose S. Decoud, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Montevideo, February 18, 1886, Despatches, Paraguay, Vol. 5, R.O. 59. Bacon revealed that he had had a conference with Hopkins in Montevideo and had suggested a land settlement with Paraguay because this nation could not afford a financial settlement. Bacon to Bayard, Montevideo, February 27, 1886, ibid.

62 Bacon to Bayard, Montevideo, April 25, 1886, ibid.

63 Decoud to Bacon, Asuncion, April 13, 1886, enclosure in ibid. In this reply Decoud expressed the desire to have verbal conferences ("Conferencias verbales") with Bacon on the subject.

64 Bacon to Bayard, Montevideo, May 20, 1886, ibid., Vol. 6.

65 Bacon to Decoud, Montevideo, October 3, 1886, enclosure in Bacon to Bayard, Montevideo, October 7, 1886, ibid.
Instructions from Bayard were not forthcoming, so Bacon decided to proceed to Asunción once more. He revealed to Bayard that he was acting upon the advice of Hopkins who informed him that the Paraguayan Minister of Foreign Affairs was prepared to dispose of the claim. On this trip Bacon achieved a larger degree of success. Paraguay promised to pay Hopkins $90,000. However, this agreement was killed in the Paraguayan House by one vote for several reasons: (1) the revival of the old opposition to the "Hopkins claims", (2) the settlement became a domestic political issue, (3) and the dissatisfaction of Paraguay with the contents of a box of jewels which the United States returned, that had been placed in the custody of Washburne during the Paraguayan War by Paraguayans who feared that their property would be confiscated. A year later Bacon was able to work out another arrangement, but this time it failed to pass the Paraguayan Senate. Again the reason for its failure lie with Paraguayan domestic politics; it was a presidential election year.

This was the last serious attempt on the part of the United States with regard to the claims of the Navigation

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66 Bacon to Bayard, Montevideo, July 20, 1887, ibid.
67 Bacon to Bayard, Asunción, August 19, 1887, ibid.
68 Bacon to Bayard, Montevideo, October 19, 1887, ibid.
69 Bacon to Bayard, Montevideo, November 30, 1887, ibid.
Company. The controversy now dropped out of sight. Forty-five years of intermittent activity by both the Company and the United States had yielded little. And that which did result was not good. For the affairs of the Navigation Company in Paraguay had served needlessly to embroil relations between Paraguay and the United States. By the time this controversy and those of the treaty exchanges and the Water Witch were either settled or dropped the United States had as little interest in Paraguay as it had in the 1840's. Only Hopkins still retained his interest in Paraguay; that is if his interest is indicated by an 1888 speech when he said: "Paraguay, the Martyr! is slowly rising from the ashes."\(^70\) But even Hopkins outlived the claim of the Company by only three years.\(^71\)


\(^71\) Hopkins died on June 10, 1891. See the Dictionary of American Biography, IX, 208–209.
A Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between the Governments of the United States of North America, and the Republic of Paraguay, concluded and signed in the City of Assumption, the Capital of the Republic of Paraguay, on the Fourth day of March, in the year of our Lord One thousand eight hundred and fifty three.  

In the name of the most holy Trinity.

The Governments of the two Republics of the North American Union [United States of America] and of Paraguay in South America, being mutually disposed to cherish more intimate relations and intercourse than those which have heretofore subsisted between them, and believing it to be of mutual advantage to adjust the conditions of such relations by signing a Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation; for that object have nominated their respective Plenipotentiaries, that is to say:

His Excellency the President of the United States [of America] has nominated John S. Pendleton, Charge d’Affaires of the United States [of America] near the Government of the Argentine Confederation;

And His Excellency the President of the Republic of Paraguay has nominated the Paraguayan Citizen, Francisco Solario Lopez, Brigadier General in Chief of the National Army;

Who after having communicated competent authorities have agreed upon, and concluded the following Articles.

Article I

There shall be perfect peace and sincere friendship between the Government of the United States [of America] and the Government of the Republic of Paraguay, and between the Governments of the United States of North America and the Government of Paraguay.

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1 The words or phrases enclosed in brackets are the corrections made in the treaty by the United States Senate.

the citizens of both States without exception of persons or of places. The high contracting parties shall use their best endeavors that this friendship and good understanding may be constantly and perpetually maintained.

Article II

The Republic of Paraguay in the exercise of the sovereign right which pertains to her concedes to the Merchant flag of the citizens of the United States [of American] the free navigation of the River Paraguay, as far as Assumption the Capital of the Republic, and of the right-side of the Parana, from where it belongs to her as far as the City of Encarnacion. They shall be at liberty, with their ships and cargoes, freely and securely to come to, and to leave all the places and ports which are already mentioned, to remain and reside in any part of the said territories, hire houses and warehouses and trade in all kinds of produce, manufactures and merchandize of lawful commerce subject to the usages and established customs of the country. They may discharge the whole or part of their cargoes at the ports of Filar, and where commerce with other nations may be permitted, or proceed with the whole or part of their cargo to the port of Assumption, according as the Captain, owner, or other duly authorized person shall deem expedient.

In the same manner shall be treated and considered such Paraguayan citizens as may arrive at the ports of the United States [of America] with cargoes in Paraguayan or North American vessels. [or Vessels of the United States of America]

Article III

The two high contracting parties hereby agree, that any favor, privilege or immunity whatever, in matters of commerce or navigation which either contracting party has actually granted, or may here-after grant to the citizens or subjects of any other State, shall extend, in identity of cases and circumstances to the citizens of the other contracting party, gratuitously, if the concession in favor of that other State shall have been gratuitous, or in return for all equivalent compensation, if the concession shall have been conditional.

Article IV

No other or higher duties shall be imposed on the importation or exportation of any article of the growth,
produce or manufacture of the two contracting states, than are or shall be payable on the like article being the growth, produce or manufacture of any other foreign country. No prohibition shall be imposed upon the importation or exportation of any article of the growth, produce or manufacture of the territories of either of the two contracting parties into the territories of the other, which shall not equally extend to the importation or exportation of similar articles to the territories of any other nation.

Article V

No other or higher duties or charges on account of tonnage, light or harbour dues, pilotage salvage in case of damage or shipwreck or any other local charges, shall be imposed in any of the ports of the territories of the Republic of Paraguay or North American vessels [of the United States of America] than those payable in the same ports by Paraguayan vessels, nor in the ports of the territories of the United States of America on Paraguayan vessels than shall be payable in the same ports by North American vessels [of the United States of America].

Article VI

The same duties shall be paid upon the importation and exportation of any article which is or may be legally importable or exportable into the dominions of the United States [of America] and into those of Paraguay, whether such importation or exportation be made in North American vessels [of the United States of America] or Paraguayan vessels.

Article VII

All vessels which according to the laws of the United States [of America] are to be deemed North American vessels, [of the United States of America] and all vessels which according to the laws of Paraguay are to be deemed Paraguayan vessels, shall, for the purposes of this Treaty be deemed North American vessels [of the United States of America] and Paraguayan vessels, respectively.
In whatever respects to the posture of the parts, the Jettin,

Article IX

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goods and effects, the succession to personal estates by will or otherwise, and the disposal of personal property of every sort and denomination by sale, donation, exchange or testament, or in any other manner whatsoever; as also with regard to the administration of justice, the citizens of each contracting party shall enjoy in the territories of the other, the same privileges, liberties and rights, as native citizens; and shall not be charged, in any of these respects, with any other or higher imposts or duties than those which are or may be paid by native citizens; subject always to the local laws and regulations of such territories.

In the event of any citizen of either of the two contracting parties dying without will or Testament, in the territories of the other contracting party, the Consul General, Consul or Vice Consul of the Nation to which the deceased may belong, or in his absence, the Representative of such Consul General, Consul or Vice Consul, shall, so far as the laws of each country will permit, take charge of the property which the deceased may have left, for the benefit of his lawful heirs and creditors, until an executor or administrator be named by the said Consul General, Consul or by Consul or his Representative.

**Article XI**

The citizens of the United States [of America] residing in the territories of the Republic of Paraguay, and the citizens of the Republic of Paraguay residing in the United States [of America] shall be exempted from all compulsory military service whatsoever, whether by sea or land, and from all forced loans, or military exactions or requisitions; and they shall not be compelled to pay any charges, requisitions or taxes, other or higher than those that are or may be paid by native citizens.

**Article XII**

It shall be free for each of the two contracting parties to appoint Consuls for the protection of trade, to reside in the territories of the other party; but before any Consul shall act as such, he shall, in the usual form, be approved and admitted by the Government to which he is sent; and either of the two contracting parties may except from the residence of Consuls, such particular places as either of them may judge fit to be excepted. The Diplomatic Agents and Consuls of the United States [of America] in the territories of the Republic of Paraguay,
shall enjoy whatever privileges, exemptions and immunities, are or may be there granted to the Diplomatic Agents and Consuls of any other nation whatever; and in like manner, the Diplomatic Agents and Consuls of the Republic of Paraguay in the United States [of America] shall enjoy whatever privileges, exemptions and immunities, are or may be there granted to Agents of any other nation whatever.

Article XIII

For the better security of commerce between the citizens of the United States [of America] the citizens of the Republic of Paraguay, it is agreed, that if, at any time, any interruption of friendly intercourse, or any rupture should unfortunately take place between the two contracting parties, the citizens of either of the said contracting parties who may be established in the territories of the other, in the exercise of any trade or special employment, shall have the privilege of remaining and continuing such trade or employment therein without any manner of interruption in full enjoyment of their liberty and property, as long as they behave peaceably and commit no offence against the laws; and their goods and effects of whatever description they may be, whether in their own custody or entrusted to individuals or to the State, shall not be liable to seizure or sequestration, or to any other charges or demands than those which may be made upon the like effects or property belonging to native citizens. If, however, they prefer to leave the country, they shall be allowed the time they may require to liquidate their accounts and dispose of their property, and a safe conduct shall be given them to embark at the ports which they shall themselves select. Consequently, in the case referred to of a rupture, the public funds of the contracting states shall never be confiscated, sequestered or detained.

Article XIV

The citizens of either of the two contracting parties, residing in the territories of the other, shall enjoy, in regard to their houses, persons and properties, the protection of the Government, in as full and ample a manner as native citizens.

In like manner, the citizens of each contracting party shall enjoy in the territories of the other, full liberty of conscience and shall not be molested on account of their religious belief; and such of those citizens as may die in the territories of the other party, shall be buried in the
public cemeteries or in places appointed for the purpose
with suitable decorum and respect.

The citizens of the United States [of America] residing
within the territories of the Republic of Paraguay, shall
be at liberty to exercise in private and in their own dwell-
ings, or within the dwellings or offices of the Consuls or
Vice Consuls of the United States [of America] their religious
rites, services and worship, and to assemble therein for
that purpose without hindrance or molestation.

Article XV

The present Treaty shall be in force during six years,
counted from the day of the exchange of the Ratifications;
and further until it be] and if a year before the expiration
of that term; neither the one nor the other contracting party
should announce, by an official declaration, its intention
to put an end to the effect of the said Treaty, it shall
continue for a year longer, so that in this case it shall
cease to be binding at the expiration of seven years, counted
from the above mentioned day of the exchange of the Ratifications.

The Paraguayan Government shall be at liberty to address
to the Government of the United States, or to its Representative
in the Republic of Paraguay, the official declaration agreed
upon in this article.

Article XVI

The present Treaty shall be ratified by His Excellency
the President of the United States of [North] America, and
by His Excellency the President of the Republic of Paraguay,
and the Ratifications shall be exchanged at Assumption,
the Capital of the Republic of Paraguay within the term of
Fifteen [twenty four] months from this date, or earlier if
possible.

In witness whereof, the respective Plenipotentiaries
have signed it and affixed thereto their seals.

Done at Assumption this Fourth day of March in the year
of our Lord One thousand eight hundred and fifty three.

John Pendleton Francisco S. Lopez
APPENDIX B

TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP, COMMERCE, AND NAVIGATION

Concluded February 4, 1859; ratification advised by the Senate February 27, 1860; ratified by the President March 7, 1860; ratifications exchanged March 7, 1860; proclaimed March 12, 1860.

In the name of the Most Holy Trinity.

The Governments of the two Republics, the United States of America and of Paraguay in South America, being mutually disposed to cherish more intimate relations and intercourse than those which have heretofore subsisted between them, and believing it to be of mutual advantage to adjust the conditions of such relations by signing a "treaty of friendship, commerce, and navigation," for that object have nominated their respective Plenipotentiaries, that is to say:

His Excellency the President of the United States of America has nominated James B. Bowlin, a Special Commissioner of the United States of America at Assumption, and His Excellency the President of the Republic of Paraguay has nominated the Paraguayan citizen, Nicolas Vasquez, Secretary of State and Minister of Foreign Relations of the Republic of Paraguay.

Who, after having communicated competent authorities, have agreed upon and concluded the following articles:

Article I

There shall be perfect peace and sincere friendship between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of Paraguay, and between the citizens of both States, and without exception of persons or places. The high contracting parties shall use their best endeavors that this friendship and good understanding may be constantly and perpetually maintained.

Article II

The Republic of Paraguay, in the exercise of the sovereign right which pertains to her, concedes to the merchant flag of the citizens of the United States of America the free navigation of the river Paraguay as far as the dominions of the Empire of Brazil, and of the right side of the Parana throughout all its course belonging to the Republic, subject to police and fiscal regulations of the Supreme Government of the Republic, in conformity with its concessions to the commerce of friendly nations. They shall be at liberty with their ships and cargoes, freely and securely to come to and to leave all the places and ports which are already mentioned; to remain and reside in any part of the said territories; hire houses and warehouses, and trade in all kinds of produce, manufactures, and merchandize of lawful commerce, subject to the usages and established customs of the country. They may discharge the whole or a part of their cargoes at the ports of Pilar, and where commerce with other nations may be permitted, or proceed with the whole or part of their cargo to the port of Assumption, according as the captain, owner, or other duly authorized person shall deem expedient.

In the same manner shall be treated and considered such Paraguayan citizens as may arrive at the ports of the United States of America with cargoes in Paraguayan vessels, or vessels of the United States of America.

Article III

The two high contracting parties hereby agree that any favor, privilege, or immunity whatever, in matters of commerce or navigation, which either contracting party has actually granted, or may hereafter grant, to the citizens or subjects of any other State, shall extend, in identity of cases and circumstances, to the citizens of the other contracting party, gratuitously, if the concession in favor of that other State shall have been gratuitous, or in return for an equivalent compensation, if the concession shall have been conditional.

Article IV

No other or higher duties shall be imposed on the importation or exportation of any article of the growth, produce, or manufacture of the two contracting States than are or shall be payable on the like article being the growth, produce, or manufacture of any other foreign country. No prohibition shall be imposed upon the importation or exportation of any
article of the growth, produce, or manufacture of the territories of either of the two contracting parties into the territories of the other, which shall not equally extend to the importation or exportation of similar articles to the territories of any other nation.

Article V

No other or higher duties or charges on account of tonnage, light, or harbor dues, pilotage, salvage in case of damage or shipwreck, or any other local charges, shall be imposed in any of the ports of the territories of the Republic of Paraguay on vessels of the United States of America than those payable in the same ports by Paraguayan vessels, nor in the ports of the territories of the United States of America on Paraguayan vessels, than shall be payable in the same ports by vessels of the United States of America.

Article VI

The same duties shall be paid upon the importation and exportation of any article which is or may be legally importable or exportable into the dominions of the United States of America and into those of Paraguay, whether such importation or exportation be made in vessels of the United States of America or in Paraguayan vessels.

Article VII

All vessels which, according to the laws of the United States of America, are to be deemed vessels of the United States of America, and all vessels which, according to the laws of Paraguay, are to be deemed Paraguayan vessels, shall, for the purposes of this treaty, be deemed vessels of the United States of America and Paraguayan vessels, respectively.

Article VIII

Citizens of the United States of America shall pay, in the territories of the Republic of Paraguay, the same import and export duties which are established or may be established hereafter for Paraguayan citizens. In the same manner the latter shall pay, in the United States of America, the duties which are established or may hereafter be established for citizens of the United States of America.
Article IX

All merchants, commanders of ships, and other, the citizens of each country, respectively, shall have full liberty, in all the territories of the other, to manage their own affairs themselves, or to commit them to the management of whomever they please, as agent, broker, factor, or interpreter; and they shall not be obliged to employ any other persons than those employed by natives, nor to pay to such persons as they shall think fit to employ any higher salary or remuneration than such as is paid in like cases by natives.

The citizens of the United States of America in the territories of Paraguay, and the citizens of Paraguay in the United States of America, shall enjoy the same full liberty which is now or may hereafter be enjoyed by natives of each country, respectively, to buy from and sell to whom they like all articles of lawful commerce, and to fix the prices thereof as they shall see good, without being affected by any monopoly, contract, or exclusive privilege of sale or purchase, subject, however, to the general ordinary contributions or imposts established by law.

The citizens of either of the two contracting parties in the territories of the other shall enjoy full and perfect protection for their persons and property, and shall have free and open access to the courts of justice for the prosecution and defence of their just rights; they shall enjoy, in this respect, the same rights and privileges as native citizens; and they shall be at liberty to employ, in all causes, the advocates, attorneys, or agents, of whatever description, whom they may think proper.

Article X

In whatever relates to the police of the ports, the lading or unlading of ships, the warehousing and safety of merchandise, goods, and effects, the succession to personal estates by will or otherwise, and the disposal of personal property of every sort and denomination by sale, donation, exchange, or testament, or in any other manner whatsoever, as also with regard to the administration of justice, the citizens of each contracting party shall enjoy, in the territories of the other, the same privileges, liberties, and rights as native citizens, and shall not be charged, in any of these respects, with any other or higher imposts or duties than those which are or may be paid by native citizens, subject always to the local laws and regulations of such territories.

In the event of any citizen of either of the two contracting parties dying without will or testament in the territory
of the other contracting party, the Consul-General, Consul, or Vice-Consul, of the nation to which the deceased may belong, or, in his absence, the representative of such Consul-General, Consul, or Vice-Consul, shall, so far as the laws of each country will permit, take charge of the property which the deceased may have left, for the benefit of his lawful heirs and creditors, until an executor or administrator be named by the said Consul-General, Consul or Vice-Consul, or his representative.

Article XI

The citizens of the United States of America residing in the territories of the Republic of Paraguay, and the citizens of the Republic of Paraguay residing in the United States of America, shall be exempted from all compulsory military service whatsoever, whether by sea or land, and from all forced loans or military exactions or requisitions; and they shall not be compelled to pay any charges, requisition, or taxes other or higher than those that are or may be paid by native citizens.

Article XII

It shall be free for each of the two contracting parties to appoint Consuls for the protection of trade to reside in the territories of the other party; but before any Consul shall act as such, he shall, in the usual form, be approved and admitted by the Government to which he is sent; and either of the two contracting parties may except from the residence of Consuls such particular places as either of them may judge fit to be excepted.

The Diplomatic Agents and Consuls of the United States of America in the territories of the Republic of Paraguay, shall enjoy whatever privileges, exemptions, and immunities are or may be there granted to the Diplomatic Agents and Consuls of any other nation whatever; and, in like manner, the Diplomatic Agents and Consuls of the Republic of Paraguay in the United States of America shall enjoy whatever privileges, exemptions, and immunities are or may be there granted to agents of any other nation whatever.

Article XIII

For the better security of commerce between the citizens of the United States of America and the citizens of the Republic of Paraguay, it is agreed that if at any time any
interruption of friendly intercourse or any rupture should unfortunately take place between the two contracting parties, the citizens of either of the said contracting parties, who may be established in the territories of the other in the exercise of any trade or special employment, shall have the privilege of remaining and continuing such trade or employment therein without any manner of interruption, in full enjoyment of their liberty and property, as long as they behave peaceably and commit no offense against the laws; and their goods and effects, of whatever description they may be, whether in their own custody or intrusted to individuals or to the State, shall not be liable to seizure or sequestration, or to any other charges or demands than those which may be made upon the like effects or property belonging to native citizens. If, however, they prefer to leave the country, they shall be allowed the time they may require to liquidate their accounts and dispose of their property, and a safe conduct shall be given them to embark at the port which they shall themselves select. Consequently, in the case referred to of a rupture, the public funds of the contracting States shall never be confiscated, sequestered, or detained.

Article XIV

The citizens of either of the two contracting parties residing in the territories of the other shall enjoy, in regard to their houses, persons, and properties, the protection of the Government in as full and ample a manner as native citizens.

In like manner the citizens of each contracting party shall enjoy in the territories of the other, full liberty of conscience, and shall not be molested on account of their religious belief; and such of those citizens as may die in the territories of the other party shall be buried in the public cemeteries, or in places appointed for the purpose, with suitable decorum and respect.

The citizens of the United States of America residing within the territories of the Republic of Paraguay shall be at liberty to exercise, in private and in their own dwellings, or within the dwellings or offices of the Consuls or Vice-Consuls of the United States of America, their religious rights, services, and worship, and to assemble therein for that purpose without hindrance or molestation.
Article XV

The present treaty shall be in force during ten years, counted from the day of the exchange of the ratifications; and, further, until the end of twelve months after the Government of the United States of America on the one part, or the Government of Paraguay on the other, shall have given notice of its intention to terminate the same.

The Paraguayan Government shall be at liberty to address to the Government of the United States of America, or to its representative in the Republic of Paraguay, the official declaration agreed upon in this article.

Article XVI

The present treaty shall be ratified by His Excellency the President of the United States of America within the term of fifteen months, or earlier if possible, and by His Excellency the President of the Republic of Paraguay within twelve days from this date, and the ratifications shall be exchanged in Washington.

In witness whereof the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed it, and affixed thereto their seals.

Done at Assumption this fourth day of February, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and fifty-nine.

[Seal] [Seal]

James B. Bowlin
Nicolas Vasquez
CLAIMS CONVENTION 4

Concluded February 4, 1859; ratification advised by the Senate February 16, 1860; ratified by the President March 7, 1860; ratifications exchanged March 7, 1860; proclaimed March 12, 1860.

His Excellency the President of the United States of America, and His Excellency the President of the Republic of Paraguay, desiring to remove every cause that might interfere with the good understanding and harmony, for a time so unhappily interrupted, between the two nations, and now so happily restored, and which it is so much for their interest to maintain; and desiring for this purpose to come to a definite understanding, equally just and honorable to both nations, as to the mode of settling a pending question of the said claims of the "United States and Paraguay Navigation Company"—a company composed of citizens of the United States—against the Government of Paraguay, have agreed to refer the same to a special and respectable commission, to be organized and regulated by the convention hereby established between the two high contracting parties; and for this purpose they have appointed and conferred full powers, respectively, to wit:

His Excellency the President of the United States of America upon James B. Bowlin, a Special Commissioner of the said United States of America, specifically charged and empowered for this purpose; and His Excellency the President of the Republic of Paraguay upon Senor Nicholas Vasquez, Secretary of State and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the said Republic of Paraguay;

Who, after exchanging their full powers, which were found in good and proper form, agreed upon the following articles:

4Yid., 1962-1964

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Article I

The Government of the Republic of Paraguay binds itself for the responsibility in favor of the "United States and Paraguay Navigation Company," which may result from the decree of commissioners, who, it is agreed, shall be appointed as follows:

Article II

The two high contracting parties, appreciating the difficulty of agreeing upon the amount of the reclamations to which the said company may be entitled, and being convinced that a commission is the only equitable and honorable method by which the two countries can arrive at a perfect understanding thereof, hereby covenant to adjust them accordingly by a loyal commission. To determine the amount of said reclamations, it is, therefore, agreed to constitute such a commission, whose decision shall be binding, in the following manner:

The Government of the United States of America shall appoint one Commissioner, and the Government of Paraguay shall appoint another; and these two, in case of disagreement, shall appoint a third, said appointment to devolve upon a person of loyalty and impartiality, with the condition that in case of difference between the Commissioners in the choice of an Umpire, the diplomatic representatives of Russia and Prussia, accredited to the Government of the United States of America, at the city of Washington, may select such Umpire.

The two Commissioners named in the said manner shall meet in the city of Washington, to investigate, adjust, and determine the amount of the claims of the above-mentioned company, upon sufficient proofs of the charges and defences of the contending parties.

Article III

The said Commissioners, before entering upon their duties, shall take an oath before some judge of the United States of America that they will fairly and impartially investigate the said claims, and a just decision thereupon render, to the best of their judgment and ability.

Article IV

The said Commissioners shall assemble, within one year after the ratification of the "treaty of friendship, commerce,"
and navigation" this day celebrated at the city of Assumption between the two high contracting parties, at the city of Washington, in the United States of America, and shall continue in session for a period not exceeding three months, within which, if they come to an agreement, their decision shall be proclaimed; and in case of disagreement, they shall proceed to the appointment of an Umpire as already agreed.

Article V

The Government of Paraguay hereby binds itself to pay to the Government of the United States of America, in the city of Assumption, Paraguay, thirty days after presentation to the Government of the Republic, the draft which that of the United States of America shall issue for the amount for which the two Commissioners concurring, or by the Umpire, shall declare it responsible to the said company.

Article VI

Each of the high contracting parties shall compensate the Commissioner it may appoint the sum of money he may stipulate for his services, either by installments or at the expiration of his task. In case of the appointment of an Umpire, the amount of his remuneration shall be equally borne by both contracting parties.

Article VII

The present convention shall be ratified within fifteen months, or earlier if possible, by the Government of the United States of America, and by the President of the Republic of Paraguay within twelve days from this date. The exchange of ratifications shall take place in the city of Washington.

In faith of which, and in virtue of our full powers, we have signed the present convention in English and Spanish and have thereunto set our respective seals.

Done at Assumption, this fourth day of February, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and fifty-nine, being the eighty-third year of the Independence of the United States of America, and the forty-seventh of that of Paraguay.

[Seals]

James B. Bowlin
Nicolas Vasquez
APPENDIX D

LOPEZ'S INSTRUCTIONS TO HOPKINS

Long live the Republic of Paraguay! Independence or Death! 5

Asunción, February 25, 1851,
42nd year of the liberty of the
United Provinces of the Río de la
Plata, and the 39th year of
National Independence.

Instructions given by the undersigned President of the
Republic of Paraguay to Edward Hopkins, citizen of the United
States, to guide him in the special commission that has been
conferred upon him on this date near the American Government.

Bearing in mind that the American, Edward Augustus Hopkins
in 1845, in his character as special agent of the United
States near this Government assured it that the American
Government desired to see a diplomatic agent of Paraguay
in the United States at the next session of Congress, and
that there was not the least doubt that Paraguay's independence
would at that time be recognized by that enlightened body the
United States Senate; and considering Mr. Hopkins qualified
for a special commission in the Court of Washington by his
ability and personal merit, as well as for the good reputation
that he enjoys in this country Paraguay, having navigated
many of the rivers of the Republic, enabling him to provide the
most accurate and impartial information to the American Govern-
ment on the commercial relations of Paraguay, its elements
and great opportunity for future industrial development, her
resources, vigor, and established rights meriting the prompt
recognition of her national independence, as well as her good
disposition, advantages, and natural gratitude toward those
governments that immediately interested themselves in the

5Quoted in Cecilio Báez, Historia diplomática del Paraguay
recognition and the prosperity of this country; I have nominated him Special Minister of the Republic of Paraguay near the Government of the United States in the belief that all of his acts under this important commission will correspond to the confidence of this Government and to the interest which he has demonstrated for the well-being and prosperity of this country as early as the time of his special commission in 1845. On this date I supply him with credentials and the following instructions.

Upon arriving at the City of Washington Mr. Hopkins will lose no time in frankly explaining the earnest desires of the Paraguayan people for the continued peace and prosperity of the American Confederation, and their gratitude for the good will which it has shown for the fate of this country in the previously mentioned special commission of 1845, although, unfortunately, it has produced no results up to the present.

He will faithfully inform the American Government of the history of the mediation of the agents of the United States in the Río de la Plata in 1846, and of all that this Government did to facilitate the success of that mediation, which, unfortunately, was without effect.

He will formally announce the Paraguayan national declaration of independence by a national congress of a thousand deputies in October, 1813, which was ratified and put into formal execution by the Extraordinary General Congress of November 25, 1843. He will recall that this Government hastened to communicate this declaration to the United States in 1843. He will observe that the Paraguayan nationality is the first in South America, and that it is recognized by many European and American nations.

The causes for this declaration of independence are so victoriously demonstrated in the well-known history of South America in the past forty-eight years that a reference to them would be superfluous. But if the American Government desires more information concerning this matter Mr. Hopkins may present the qualifications and rights of this Republic for recognition, as well as the proofs of its actual independence, adding that she has enjoyed it peacefully since her separation from Spain. He will point out that the vital interests of this country in peace and commerce depend upon her recognition.

In making this exposition he will also inform His Excellency, the President of the United States, of the complete lack of foundation of the claims of the Government of Buenos Aires that this Republic is a part of the Argentine Confederation. This Government continually hinders commerce and has done incalculable damage for many years by her arbitrary acts.

He will give an exact account of all of the efforts thus made to arrive at an agreement which is honorable and mutually advantageous for both countries, and point out that all its friendly propositions have been greeted only with contempt.
Still unanswered is the important note of this Government, dated October 16, 1849, to the Government of Buenos Aires, for the last time inviting it to friendly negotiations on just, fair, and reasonable bases, and of common interest to both nations. This contempt, without precedent, has not been the least that the Republic of Paraguay has suffered from the implacable enemy of her national independence.

On all proper occasions he will assure H.E., the President, and his cabinet that neither this Government nor its people have ever vacillated in their declaration of independence. Without the slightest aid from Argentina, and in spite of all the difficulties and privations resulting from the blockades that the fierce and hostile spirit of Governor Rosas has imposed upon Paraguay, this Country has persevered in its resolution and national pronouncement to be free, and this has always been respected by her neighbors.

He will give the most positive promises that it is the unanimous resolution of this Government and of the Congress to uphold the national cry, Republic or Death!

He can observe at the same time that the American Government, on offering the mediation of the United States to the Republic of Paraguay, and Rosas, in accepting it, has already indirectly recognized the independence of Paraguay, since by international a mediation can not be offered nor accepted among two competent parts of the same state. At least it has recognized Paraguay's right to look for justice concerning its independence, and Governor Rosas, with his acceptance of the mediation, has given to other nations the desire to recognize Paraguay, a valid option against which no one can protest without making itself the object of the ridicule of the world.

After these frank explanations he will take the first favorable opportunity to request, with firmness and respect, the recognition of the independence of this Republic. He will insist with delicacy and prudence, on the fulfillment of the positive promises of the American Government contained in the notes of the Special Agent of the United States to this Government during his mission to Paraguay as authorized by his instructions.

He will also clearly demonstrate the powerful influence that Paraguay, recognized by a great commercial nation, will exercise on the final agreement of the two hostile countries in the Río de la Plata, as well as by the fact that they are the only peaceful people in this part of the world, by her central position, the growing number of her inhabitants, the abundance and variety of her natural products, greater than all the other Platine Countries, because it has a firm and solid government, that has learned to energetically uphold the national dignity in spite of the alien intrigues of the Government of Buenos Aires and the sad example of civil war and anarchy, that have not cracked the barriers of Paraguay in the forty-two years of its liberty.
If these explanations have a good effect, which is so earnestly desired, Mr. Hopkins will assure the American Government of how happy this Republic will be to receive here a minister of a proper rank to open commercial negotiations, and he will explain the reasons why it is more advantageous for this Government to treat in this Capital than in the city of Washington.

He will carefully inform the American Government:
1. Of the importance of Paraguayan commerce and of the products of the United States that can be claimed in exchange.
2. The population and resources of Paraguay.
3. The principles upon which this Republic demands the navigation of the Parana.
4. The impossibility of any commercial navigational arrangement with these countries keeping the question in its present state much longer. He will also relate the active preparations of South America to resist by arms the pretensions and insults of the Government of Rosas.

He will present, with dignity, the sincere love for peace that characterizes the Paraguayan People who have been for long years, and under the painful difficulties of her isolated situation, in preparation for the ultimate recourse. Yet it has not ceased to show its desire to avoid the opening of war, since this could not be prejudicial to its independence and national sovereignty.

He will take special care to attempt to ascertain the actions and operations of the Argentine Ministers in the Courts of Washington, England and France; and you will inform this Government in detail of the proposals, offers, and maneuvers of Governor Rosas against the Independence of Paraguay.

5. He will represent the real crisis of Paraguay, isolated by the referred to blockade and by the cruel necessity of maintaining armies on her frontiers, expecting the invasion of the forces of Buenos Aires.

He will dedicate himself with efficiency and all the means at his disposal to the important object of creating agreement, harmony, and good understanding in the interests of both Governments. He will especially direct his efforts to the revival of that interest that the American people had previously shown in favor of her sister republics.

It is recommended that Mr. Hopkins maintain a cordial frankness and perfect friendship with the Minister of H.M., the Emperor of Brazil in Washington, so that they may work together in useful combination, on the understanding that this Government will communicate to that of Janiero the objects of the present mission.

As to the repeated requests of Mr. Hopkins for a monopoly of the Navigation of its waters for boats, powered completely, or in part, by steam, it will be very pleasing to the Government of Paraguay to see him arrive before this
City with a steamship of the best construction. But it would be plainly improper for this Government to grant beforehand such a monopoly to a citizen of a nation that still does not recognize the sovereignty of the Government of Paraguay. Nevertheless, if the United States recognizes the independence of this Country, and if Mr. Hopkins arrives at this port with a steamship, he will receive the monopoly for ten years, in conformity with the decree of May 20, 1845, to establish a national company upon just and equitable basis, with the understanding that no one else will receive a like monopoly until the result of his mission is known here.

Considering the complete ignorance of the world concerning the interior of South America, especially of its fluvial advantages, mineral and plant products, and, finally, of all the beneficial provisions the Providence offers to man for his well-being. He can inform H.E., the President of the United States, that Government of Paraguay will receive with pleasure a nautical and scientific expedition, and that it will delight in rendering all the aid that it can, with the object of its success in return for a copy of the observations and discoveries for deposit in the archives of the Government.

In this manner that nation which has distinguished itself so much in the most distant seas, will give to the world much useful information that can not be easily measured, and will aid the cause of civilization, and peace and commerce in South America beyond measure.


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