At a time when the so-called “death of theory” has alternately been celebrated or lamented (and compensated by the revival of academic philosophy and its barren subfields such as ethics and aesthetics), we may well be grateful that the most original and exciting Japanese theorist of our time, Kojin Karatani, is finally becoming more widely known in what we used to call the West. With the ambitiously named *Structure of World History*, indeed, Karatani’s new work arrives in English at virtually the same time as its publication in Japanese. Not only is it a new turn in his own work and preoccupations, it opens some welcome new paths for our own theoretical and political discussions, reviving a number of crucial but virtually abandoned debates and (hopefully) starting some new ones. *Structure of World History* critically rereads a number of classic texts in new perspectives, combines new uses of current theory, and reopens the traditional debates on modes of production in new and more productive directions, taking controversial political positions, as well as philosophical ones, particularly on the relationship of Immanuel Kant to Marxism; in short, not only does it revive a much-maligned approach to history (world history, the philosophy of history, etc.), it also intervenes in economics, Marxology, theory, and philosophy itself.

ANCIENT SOCIETY AND THE NEW POLITICS: FROM KANT TO MODES OF PRODUCTION

Fredric R. Jameson

Karatani’s preceding book Transcritique: On Kant and Marx (1995) had already proposed a new approach to Kant, one unusual and unexpected even in the midst of what looks like a generalized Kant revival. We are far from the days in which Jean-Paul Sartre remarked that any return to Kant always marked a regression to pre-Marxist and anti-Marxist positions (a proposition that surely retains much of its relevance). It is at least not true of Karatani, whose strategic move lies not in using Kant against Hegel and the dialectic, but rather (at least on my reading) one who invents the dialectic in the first place by way of the antinomies, thereby confirming the more traditional dialectic’s impatience with the pettiness of the law of noncontradiction and abandoning the attribution to Kant of the 1763 refutation of the existence of negativity in nature as such.

Two more interesting features of Kant emerge in the earlier book: the ideal of the world republic, which becomes central in Structure of World History; and the overcoming of the impasse of the Ding-an-sich (thing-in-itself) and the unknowability of the real by way of the figure of the parallax, an attractive astronomical conception that seems to be making its way in contemporary philosophy (for example, in Slavoj Žižek’s work) as a result of Karatani’s speculation.

For the more standard “enlightenment” view, Kant subscribed to a view of so-called transcendental realities as being fundamentally unknowable (however much we may still require them ethically). The figure of the parallax, however, suggests that we can nonetheless deduce the position and the volume of such realities, as it were, blindly and by indirect computation, even where we can never confront them directly or in some unmediated way. The shift at issue here is one from metaphysics to representationality, and it has indeed seemed to me a useful index to the difference between modernity and postmodernity: for modernity, this failure of knowledge or representation was an agonizing experience, which in literature and philosophy alike led to grandiose schemes and forms for its evasion—forms that constituted a kind of triumph over it. For postmodernity, this particular “death of god” is no longer so fraught with anguish, and the anti-representationality of the parallax has seemed to offer a new form of representation as such at the very moment of its impossibility.

But the other (non-Kantian) originality of Transcritique—and the one that led most directly to the present work—was a revision of Karl Marx that seemed to offer a new kind of political praxis—namely, the cooperative movement at the base, or dare I say in the interstices, of actually existing
capitalism. Some will remember that Lenin’s very last writings were devoted to cooperatives and to the praise of Robert Owen. Others will object that the central polemic of Capital—at least on the left and against Proudhon—was the slashing and omnipresent attack on the idea that circulation could be the central framework for understanding capital as such let alone for changing it: production, for Marx, always comes first, and new value cannot be created in circulation. The very subtitle of Structure of World History would seem to suggest that Karatani thinks otherwise, and to that effect I quote a crucial sentence from Transcritique: “While capital organizes social relations globally, the moment to overturn capital—inexorably at the same time as following it—is folded within, namely, in the process of circulation” (293). This would seem to be a serious practical issue, particularly inasmuch as the dominant ideology of our time—free-market dogma—is clearly a fundamentally circulationist one.

But I’m not personally scandalized by this heterodoxy, this heretical—and indeed traditionally heretical—displacement of Marxist orthodoxy. What interests me more is the way in which Karatani has arrived at this point (which in his formulation I hasten to say is neither anti-Marxist, post-Marxist, or indeed pre-Marxist)—namely, by way of the whole matter of modes of production, which does interest me greatly and to which I devote the rest of this discussion.

Let me briefly summarize the history of the problem, which Marx himself alludes to as follows (in the 1859 preface to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy): “In broad outline the Asiatic, ancient, feudal, and modern bourgeois modes of production [Produktionsweisen] may be designated as epochs marking progress in the economic development of society.” The syntax thereby implies that these four modes of production would be completed by a fifth—namely, that from which progress has been made or, in other words, primitive communism. Meanwhile, the very thrust of Marxism as a theory and a praxis alike suggests the need to specify a sixth mode of production, the one that closes off the series of “antagonistic forms,” as he calls them, and brings “the prehistory of human society” to an end—namely, socialism or communism. This is, however, clearly a list and not even a description, let alone a theory (or “philosophy of history” as it is contemptuously called nowadays). But what people did not know for eighty years was that Marx had indeed written a substantial account of these modes of production in his 1857 manuscript, that trial run of Capital, which we call the Grundrisse (floorplans) and which was not published until 1939.
Nonetheless, and in whatever form, it is surely this list of the fundamental structures of human society that has earned Marxism (and Hegelianism before it) the most virulent contemporary attacks on its alleged teleology and its imputed idealistic reading of the meaning of history as such. To be sure, real historical developments account for the widespread appeal of such attacks, not least the omnipresence of late capitalism (which Francis Fukuyama thought could justify the relevance of a slogan such as “the end of history”), as well as the collapse of state socialism, which seemed to invalidate Marxian teleological notions of the ways in which socialism was coming into being within capitalism itself. Scarcely irrelevant either is the contemporary emphasis on state power and its emergence (or omnipresence) in so far as that casts a different kind of light on the other end of the sequence of “modes of production”—namely, on the notion of so-called primitive communism.

But perhaps two deeper theoretical trends need to be mentioned in any discussion of this much-maligned form or genre called “universal history,” to which Karatani makes so interesting a new contribution here. On the one hand, we have to remember the fundamental tension or antagonism between the historical and the sociological or structural, and the consequent unwillingness to reduce unique historical facts or events to philosophical or theoretical frameworks or abstractions—universal history then becoming one more example of that bad thing called totalization. On the other hand, it is precisely fear of Eurocentrism and its universalism, the sense that other cultures and their histories, their specificities, are being reduced to a single matrix, that is a fantasy of Western provenance. I believe that we can locate the scandal here in geography itself, in the contingencies of our own unique globe and its spatial configurations. (They are contingent only from the historical perspective and not from the geological or astrophysical one.) Thus, universal history turns out to be an attempt to philosophize geography, to make philosophical sense out of its unique spatial folds and configurations. Thus, Hegel felt obliged, in the greatest and most scandalous of all universal histories, to find dialectical meaning in the landscapes in which his various world spirits originated, thereby giving rise to often grotesque kinds of landscape symbolism or allegory. My favorite is the moment in which he explains that, in contrast to the Nile or the Rhine, the immense rivers of the Americas—the Amazon, the Orinoco, the Mississippi—somehow express in their very overwhelming formlessness the youth and newness of the New World, as such. But surely the philosophizing of geography is still
as illicit and as scandalous as it was in Hegel’s day? I want to take as an emblem of the transformation of this situation in our own time the figure of Immanuel Wallerstein, whose own universal history is very precisely based on a philosophizing or theorization of landscape in his notions of core, semiperiphery, and periphery. To be sure, he is the inheritor or synthesizer of many contemporary trends—Fernand Braudel’s historical vision of the Mediterranean, dependency theory in Latin America, radical geography, and ecology—in this sense, he epitomizes the spatial turn in modern thought. But he also benefits from globalization or, in other words, the subsumption by capitalism of all those far reaches of the globe that once were outside the boundaries of the capitalist market system: this is to turn the reproach of Eurocentrism inside out and to grasp Europe as simply a marker for the uniquely dynamic and self-perpetuating autopoietic virus of capitalism, as such; it is also to make new research into Europe’s others possible as spaces whose ability to resist the emergence of capitalism becomes an important object of inquiry in its own right.

At any rate, I will argue that Karatani’s assimilation of Wallerstein endows his new version of universal history with a relevance and a plausibility that the older, more purely cultural syntheses could never have. In particular, this new global framework lends his treatment of culture—here concentrated in the emphasis on religion (and on world religions)—a unique opportunity to rethink much of our cultural past, as well.

Karatani’s place in all this, however, will no doubt be exacerbated, not merely by his revival of the modes of production debate in general, but also by his seemingly idealistic revival of Kant’s appeal to a world republic that could alone secure universal peace.

Late capitalism, which already has of course its own not at all Utopian world market, has not encouraged “one-world” fantasies of the type so current after World War II. But it might all have been otherwise: in a forgotten yet unforgettable exercise in counterfactual history, Arnold J. Toynbee sketched out what might have happened had Megalexandros not died so young and been able to pursue his restless Homeric vision to the pillars of Hercules and perhaps, in a second attempt, persuaded his soldiers to venture down the Silk Road. Then, a new multicultural world empire might have ensued, with its two official languages—Greek and Persian—its offerings to the Olympians (in the welcome absence of the bloodthirsty monotheisms), and its peaceful rule by the Alexander XXXVII of the present day. He does not say
whether that empire would have known capitalism: whether, to use Wallenstein’s language, it would eventually have undergone a mutation from world empire to world system; but it is a question scarcely addressed by Kant either, and one that once again demonstrates the vanity of purely political speculations when devoid of economic considerations, such as the swelling reserve army of the unemployed, the closing of the frontier (otherwise called “the falling rate of profit”), and the incessant emergence of new forms of “primitive accumulation” within the apparently mature, completed system whose new features some have already begun to theorize. At any rate, pre-Alexandrian Greece is there to remind us that multiple states always mean warfare, something that does not necessarily guarantee its absence from the universal empire as such.

As for the other end of the historical spectrum, in Marx’s own lifetime, the omitted mode—namely, primitive communism—was suddenly brought to unexpected life by an American, Lewis Henry Morgan, in his 1877 book Ancient Society, which Claude Lévi-Strauss hailed as the foundational act of anthropology, as such, with its extensive account of that complex, yet at that time altogether unsuspected, form of social organization called the kinship system. Marx devoted the final years of his life to exploring this newly discovered continent of human social organization in his so-called Anthropological Notebooks, which Engels wrote up in his 1888 classic “The Family, Private Property and the State,” the latter then, for another fifty years or more, standing as the fundamental statement of Marxist orthodoxy on history and the modes of production, as such. The problem is that this work does not square with the description Marx made in the Grundrisse, and Morgan’s extraordinary celebration of the Iroquois gens as the most perfect human society so far in history does not quite fit into Marx’s list, save as a kind of second state of so-called primitive communism (the first one being the Paleolithic life of hunters and gatherers). In effect, Morgan’s and Engels’ encomia to this “military democracy” of the Iroquois sets our problem off in a new direction—namely, that of the problem of the emergence of the state and of state power—which will now deflect the economic problematic of the original Marxian “modes of production” as we shall see in a moment.

Yet, before 1939 (or perhaps we should say, before 1953, when the Grundrisse became more widely available), the principal object of debate and contestation was the concept of an Asiatic mode of production, which Marx does indeed briefly touch on in Capital and which specifies a stagnant, virtually
unchanging world of isolated villages capped by the rule of the despot to whom all land belongs and who is supported by an imperial bureaucracy without a traditional nobility or aristocracy. Perry Anderson, in a destructive and fairly definitive historical review, has demonstrated the origin, via Hegel, of this stereotype in Montesquieu, who based it on the Ottoman Empire, buttressed by imperfect travel narratives on Moghul India. We may ignore the East/West prejudice of the term Asiatic; and indeed more recent scholarship—most notably that of Maurice Godelier—has revived this concept for other parts of the world, most notably the Inca Empire. The problem with removing this particular mode of production from the active list is that in that case you are left with nothing but feudalism as far as the eye can see. Feudalism, then, like the petty bourgeoisie, becomes one of the most tiresome of orthodox Marxian stereotypes. It should be noted that one of the most interesting problems involved in Marx’s original excursus lies in the multiple ways in which he links the various “modes” to one another, suggesting alternate thematic links that turn this seemingly chronological (or diachronic) list into a multidimensional constellation of forms. Thus, the unity of primitive communism is in Marx paired with the Asiatic mode in a Hegelian fashion: each one incarnates the One of the society without individualism; only the one or unity of the primitive village is now projected outward and upward into the one of the despot who is in that Hegelian sense the only individual, the only concrete subject in that social formation. On the other hand, the self-sufficiency of the isolated village can also be seen to migrate alternately into the form of the Greek city-state or the more rural isolation of the Germanic village—from which then feudalism seemingly arises. Both of these outcomes remain Hegelian in their opposition of universality and particularity; but where in the earlier version, the identification of village and despot fails to produce the individuality of its multiple subjects, the distance between universal and particularity in the German, and later the feudal, form leads to an individuality that will reach its fullest realization only in the social atomization of capitalism. Still, its multiple centers must take the path of an antagonism towards each other, and paradoxically Karatani sees the structural and well-nigh eternal warfare between them as yet another kind of Hegelian reciprocity. Marx thereby already grasps war as an integral and structural creature of primitive communism and not merely some external accident, which is a discovery that Pierre Clastres and, in his different way, René Girard both thought supplied ammunition against Marx.
Yet, the despot himself returns, as we shall see, and becomes a figure for state power, a function retained in Karatani’s work, who views the state as essentially a matter of the looting and plundering of the foreign or nomadic conqueror from whom the state evolves (modern taxes being a civilized form of such plunder or tribute).

In the postwar period, and after the publication of the *Grundrisse* and its exposition of the very concept of the mode of production, a new set of debates emerges. In the immediate postwar, which can be said to extend up to the failure of the 1960s, let’s say around 1975, we have a Utopian celebration of primitive communism, as Lévi-Strauss derives it from Jean-Jacques Rousseau: I am extremely happy to find a discussion here, in Karatani’s work, of that great Utopian classic that is Marshall Sahlins’s *Stone Age Economics* (1972), supplemented by the inevitable structuralist adopted classic, Marcel Mauss’s book on the gift. But this Utopian moment is itself a reflex of the obsession with the state and with the emergence of state power, which can easily take a negative turn after 1968, as it ultimately does in Michel Foucault’s work and in the various anarchist fixations with power as such, which both politically and theoretically serve to distract us from the fundamentally economic problem of capitalism as Marx diagnosed it. The Utopian upward slope of the period before the state is then matched with the triumph of the state by a decidedly dystopian downward path into the innumerable apocalyptic scenarios with which mass culture today is peopled, or unpeopled, as you prefer.

Meanwhile, at least until recently, the matter of socialism or communism as a mode of production has vanished from theoretical view, as seemingly has the Utopian nature of primitive societies, just as both social formations seem to have vanished from real life and from the actually existing (dare I say, dystopian) world of globalized capitalism.

But it is here that Karatani’s book takes an interesting turn, and that Kant returns in unexpected form, precisely as the theorist of a new form of globalization in his famous essay on universal peace and the world republic. Here he meets the Marx of the world market—that outer limit of capitalism which is its most fundamental and destructive contradiction—and Wallerstein, whose replacement of the Asiatic mode as the world empire with capitalism as the world system has, as I’ve already said, done so much to invent a radical geography for a Marxism in which it was only implicit, and only anticipated in a fragmentary way in Lenin’s theory of imperialism.

Now let me summarize what I take to be the originalities of Karatani’s synthesis—first of all,
a modification in the object of our study, which was once called a “mode of production.” The standard Marxian, and also structural Marxian, schema of this object was a system of levels: first the level of the base or infrastructure and then the level of the superstructures. The latter were multiple and could be identified as the ideological, religious or philosophical superstructure, the juridical superstructure, the political superstructure (assuming that you position politics as a superstructure), and so forth. The former—the base—is essentially made up of two levels: that of the relations of production (classes, for example, property relations) and that of the forces of production (technology and productivity).

The most rigorous and consequent Althusserians—Barry Hindess and Paul Hirst—then defined a mode of production as specific articulation of these two levels upon each other. There are as many different modes of production, according to them, as there are distinct forms of such articulation—the crucial question thereby emerging as to what exactly an articulation is and what you mean by “to articulate.”

Karatani has at any rate replaced this system with another, more striking, but perhaps equally structural one—namely, Jacques Lacan’s Borromean knots, in which three circles are inseparably intertwined. For capitalism, he insists that these three circles are to be identified as the State, the Nation, and Capitalism as the law of value or commodity exchange. Now the question addressed to the older paradigm was always what the ultimately determining level is, and the short answer, as far as Marxism was concerned, was always the economic: production, or, in other words, the base. But remember that, given the dual nature of the base, this ultimately determining instance could always be ambiguously inflected, either toward the forces of production, in which case you come up with technological determinism (the industrial revolution and so forth) or one of relations (which might most often be the social classes, but which could slip off into these or that idealist or culturalist deviation).

In Karatani’s work, it is not possible to evade the economic circles: attention to the state then also secures the political questions, the questions of power, but here a problem arises: for the mode of production that precedes state power—primitive communism—what fills this role, what constitutes this particular circle? Or does the Borromean scheme not yet exist at that point? As for the third circle, the Nation, its equivalent in the older modes is clear enough; beginning with the kinship system, it is what secures the existence of the community, whether imagined or not. In certain systems, two of these three dimensions get
identified with each other, and we have the Nation-State. Is it possible to imagine a system in which the place of community is conceived as being vaster than the Nation, as such? Is this then the role of Kant’s world republic, of an association of nations or a supranational entity of some sort (one that is neither a Wallersteinian world-empire nor that capitalist world-system we call globalization)? It is with this question that the book ends.

However, we must now observe that Karatani’s tripartite scheme is shadowed by a fourth term, sometimes here identified as religion. Clearly, in the present state of things, where militant or fundamentalist religion has replaced the secular parties as the only active, violent force for revolutionary change, it is altogether fitting for religion to take its place in the analysis, functioning as what I would more generally term ideology—that is, the driving superstructural force for legitimation of the various modes of production. But, clearly enough, religion is something a little more concrete and existential, a little more collective and social, than some mere philosophical value. To see where this fits, we need to retrace our steps and review again the sequence of the modes of production as Karatani outlines them, and also to grasp why he should wish to substitute the term “exchange” for “production” in the formula while always insisting that exchange here means not only capitalist circulation but a larger, more all-encompassing economic category—an emphasis Marx argues tirelessly against in his polemics against Proudhon and the latter’s version of associationist anarchism. And in that respect, of course, Karatani does reveal himself to be fully as much a follower of Proudhon as of Marx himself.

As I’ve said, Karatani’s history follows a traditional sequence: societies before power (clan or tribal societies, primitive communism); power societies, in which the state exists; and finally capitalism as a society organized not so much around power relations as around economic and monetary categories. But, over each of these forms presides what we may call a mode of extraction (if you don’t like the word “exchange”). Primitive communism is the world of Marcel Mauss’s gift, of what Karatani calls reciprocity or pooling (it has several forms, but we omit those); in power societies, often constructed on the basis of conquest, distribution takes the form of plunder and looting (Republicans would, I think, welcome this notion of the state and its taxation as a form of plunder and theft); capitalism is then organized grosso modo as what we can call commodity exchange. Now it is clear that just as the structuralists liked to
specify the individual social formations as combinations of several modes of production all at once, so also Karatani conceives of the persistence of earlier kinds of social relations or modes of exchange in this sense of social interaction within later stages. Thus, the mode of reciprocity persists at some deeper, more repressed level within power society and then the capitalist one, whereas power itself clearly persists within capitalism’s more purely economic arrangements. Here Karatani develops a new concept of historical repetition in order to conceptualize such returns of the repressed, very often detectable in the emergence, or shall we say eruption, of the great universal religions (among which I take it he includes Marxism or communism itself).

So now we can better understand where religion fits in Karatani’s scheme and how a fourth term might emerge from his scheme without any accompanying specific mode of production to ground it. The universal religion in general marks the return, the repetition, the eruption, or repressed force of reciprocity into systems organized to replace it (with power and domination or with unequal distribution and exploitation). It is generally transmitted by great prophecy and takes on an ethical or moralizing form (even though its metaphysical or superstitious figuration in reality carries a radically different and more concrete type of social relationship within it).

The premise here is, on the one hand, the proposition that each social system includes a mechanism to ward off and preempt its own dissolution, a kind of self-preservation or immune response that neutralizes the effects of potential revolutionary change. Thus, the later modes of social organization have had somehow to disable such mechanisms in order to supersede their predecessors: repetition and the return of the repressed then mark moments in which—for good or ill, it should be noted—one of those older layers then, for whatever structural reason or on whatever uniquely propitious conjunction, comes back to life.

The cooperative scheme, reciprocity, pooling, and their various equivalents in contemporary times seem to Karatani to represent such a return of the repressed. At any rate, this antagonistic layering of the social archaeology can usefully be compared to Bloch’s nonsynchronous synchronicity in a new and fruitful way; and indeed it seems to me that the political uses of the new Utopian movement are both drawn on here and enhanced by this conception of the deep social, which, far from being anthropomorphic, in fact suggests that our representations of the individual and the subjective or psychic are in fact enabled by a social objectivity from which they draw their figuration (as with
Sigmund Freud’s archaeological accounts of the unconscious. Social being comes first, and existential experience draws on its possibilities for its own self-understanding (in much the same way, I would argue, as the discoveries of science are enabled in their very structure by new forms of the organization of social life).

Thus, Karatani’s work concludes with immediate, and surely immensely controversial, proposals for a new and concrete politics for the present day and our current situation. Those will no doubt receive further attention of a critical or exegetical nature. But I should like to close with a more general remark on the value for us of such speculations on modes of production long extinct and surely belonging to a history that no longer concerns us. Indeed, Hindess and Hirst, in that most rigorous of all monuments to Althusserian scientific thinking (Precapitalist Modes of Production, 1975), conclude in their painstaking interrogation of the various concepts of modes of production that not only is this concept not historical, but even that “the study of history is not only scientifically but also politically valueless.” As over against their Master, who called for a new “science of history,” they observe that “it is the notion of a Marxist history, of a Marxism confined within the conditions of the historian’s practice, which is the contradictory enterprise....

The object of history, the past, no matter how it is conceived, cannot affect present conditions. Historical events do not exist and can have no material effectivity in the present.” This astonishing conclusion, which in fact spells the end of the entire Althusserian enterprise (and appropriately results in the authors’ renunciation of Marxism, as such), is admirably predicated on the insistence that Marxism, if it is to be anything, must be part of a political and not merely epistemological praxis. And their stumbling block was, to be sure, the failure of the theory of modes of production to conceptualize transition, or in other words a revolution that could lead from one system to another, radically different one. They’re right, and we should continue to work on that.

But before Hindess and Hirst reached that sorry point in their rigorous argumentation—either unfinished business or outright renunciation—earlier in their book, they had achieved a rather remarkable description of primitive communism as a mode of production (a determinate articulation, you will remember of the forces and the relations of production), thus integrating Marx and Morgan. They thereby demonstrate the way in which, in what they call complex redistribution, the relations of production (the kinship system) articulates the forces of production (or a certain stage of productive
metabolism with the earth). The political level, the level of power, the level of the state, as such, is omitted from this interaction between the two essential levels, and the possibility of a comparable “withering away of the state” is projected into the concept of socialism or communism, as well.

But I prefer to end on another note, which might well tempt us to juxtapose Karatani’s practical conclusions with rather different but related ones. I therefore conclude with the peroration of Lewis Henry Morgan’s Ancient Society, in which that blood brother of the Iroquois and enthusiastic admirer of the Paris Commune, evoking “the next higher plane of society to which experience, intelligence and knowledge are already tending,” cries, “It will be a revival, in higher form, of the liberty, equality and fraternity of the ancient gentes.”

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NOTES

7. Ibid., 312.