Book Reviews

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In 1934, I. A. Richards published *Coleridge on Imagination*. It was a most influential book (Richards is by any reckoning among the most influential of modern critics, and I suspect that his *Coleridge* ranks behind only *Practical Criticism* in the weight of its influence). It was also a most audacious book. In my view—admittedly a paradoxical one, which I shall not defend here—*Coleridge on Imagination* is both one of the best books on Coleridge as philosopher-critic ever written and a book that profoundly misrepresents Coleridge. Richards knew very well that his book would have such an effect. In the very beginning, with disarming candor, he announced that “I write then as a Materialist trying to interpret before you the utterances of an extreme Idealist and you, whatever you be by birth or training, Aristotelian or Platonist, Benthamite or Coleridgean, Materialist or Idealist, have to reinterpret my remarks again in your turn” (19). And later he suggested that Coleridge himself would have understood this procedure and very likely approved it: “Were Coleridge alive now, he would, I hope, be applauding and improving doctrines of the type he, as a metaphysician, thought least promising in his own day” (67). Like Kathleen Coburn, who quotes this very sentence in the informal Foreword she supplied for the Midland paperback edition, one cannot help but consent: the magnanimity of Coleridge’s mind was such that his hypothetical reaction would undoubtedly have been as Richards described it.

Nevertheless, Richards’ book was, at its very bottom, wrong; and it was radically misleading. Early in the volume he acknowledges that, in conceiving of the imagination, one may adopt one of two seeming alternatives (and these alternatives extend to one’s conception of “myth” and the whole spectrum of imaginative thinking): one may hold a projectivist view, or one may hold a realist view. That is, one may believe that the mind in its imaginative thought creates that nature “into which his own feelings, his aspirations and apprehensions, are projected” (145), or one may believe that the mind is so constituted as, in its imaginative dealing with Nature, to be capable of discovering a very Reality in or behind Nature. The first view, the projectivist, is in one form or another the staple of modern orthodoxy: it is familiar post-Kantian doctrine. The latter view is, unfortunately, much closer to being what Coleridge in fact believed (though certainly not in the grossly simple way my description suggests).

Richards repeatedly acknowledges that the “realist” view is (or was) conceivable, and that it was certainly present in S. T. C.’s mind. But the projectivist view inexorably swallows it up, as might have been predicted from the first chapter:

yet the spirit attributed to Coleridge [the sympathetic spirit remarked by John Stuart Mill] is certainly the spirit in which we must try to read the more transcendental parts of Coleridge himself. However repugnant
to our opinions they may seem, they are, I think, an indispensable introduction (from which we may disengage ourselves later) to his theory of criticism. If we wish to understand this theory, we shall be foolish if we ignore or dismiss them as moonshine. (18)

To be fair to Richards, he never quite dismisses those "transcendental parts" as mere moonshine, though on occasions it seems to have been difficult for him to maintain his restraint. But he accomplished something just as useful, and in the long run a great deal more important for modern criticism: it is quite important that we should understand it if we are to assess some of the dominant qualities and chief assumptions of much current criticism. Not, of course, that Richards or anyone else could be solely responsible for such large matters, but he has certainly been among the most active participants in the formation of the situation in which I am interested here.

We can probably see the issue most clearly by looking at Richards' penultimate chapter, "The Boundaries of the Mythical." It is important not least because it is so closely linked to the well-known final chapter, "The Bridle of Pegasus," in which Richards pursues his Coleridgean interests vigorously into those areas that form his major concerns: the vital studies of psychology, semantics, and the nature of language. In "The Boundaries of the Mythical" Richards returned again to the problem of the realist and projectivist views, one of the most crucial questions his consideration of Coleridge had raised. He quotes from the Statesman's Manual at that point where Coleridge has attempted to define "Idea." It is an "educt of the imagination actuated by the pure reason" but, more importantly, Coleridge states that the issue of whether "ideas are regulative only, according to Aristotle and Kant; or likewise constitutive, and one with the power and life of nature, according to Plato and Plotinus ... is the highest problem of philosophy, and not part of its nomenclature" (183-4). Of course Coleridge was right; this is the crux. Richards' commentary is, accordingly, crucial:

What by and in it we know is certainly not a part of philosophy's nomenclature. But what we say about it—whether we say that it is the mode of all our knowledge (ideas are regulative); or that it is what we know (ideas are constitutive)—must be said (thus abstractly) in a vocabulary. And I have tried to make the position acceptable that these rival doctrines here derive from different arrangements of our vocabularies and are only seeming alternatives, that each pressed far enough includes the other, and that the Ultimate Unabstrated and Unrepresentable View that thus results is something we are familiar and at home with in the concrete fact of the mind. [Richards' exposition is so tricky here I almost feel like availing myself of some of his specialized quotation marks.]

If this were so, the problems of criticism would no longer abut, as they so often did for Coleridge, on this problem of Reality; they would be freed for the inexhaustible inquiry into the modes of mythology and their integration "according to their relative worth and dignity" in the growth of our lives. (184)

Richards' argument here is forceful. And he is attempting to use Coleridge to further positions he had taken in his earlier work, and has continued to argue: he severs the problems raised by imagination, poetry, and ultimately those raised
by criticism, from all questions of "belief" and "reality." My reasons for suggesting that an understanding of Richards at points like this was vital to an understanding of much modern criticism should be reasonably obvious. If we accept Richards' argument, we are now, untroubled by the vexing question of reality, ready to inquire into the inexhaustible modes of mythology; if we have read Richards' earlier work, and the preface to *Coleridge*, we know that such an inquiry is more important than any merely evaluative criticism, which is always troubled precisely by those questions of belief and reality: "Most evaluative criticism is not statement or even attempted statement. It is either suasion, which is politics, or it is social communion" (xiii). I think that I will risk a hyperbolic personification and say: enter Northrop Frye (himself a hyperbolic figure). For while the view of literature presented in Frye's books may indeed grow quite directly out of his study of Blake (the same cannot be said for Frye's innumerable disciples) it must also count among its chief proximate causes the work of I. A. Richards. In Frye's criticism we have been taught that there are no definite positions to be taken in criticism, and that the study of literature cannot be founded on value judgment; that the order of literature is an order of words, and that the world of literature is that of purified and displaced human desire, lifted clear of the bondage of history. This is quite clearly not the place for either comment on or argument concerning these larger issues which I have raised in the names of Richards and Frye, but it seems worthwhile to keep them before our minds.

*Coleridge on Imagination* is in another way a most important book. It has seemed to many observers to be a crucial work in Richards' career. Often it has been pointed to as the work in which the "early Richards" dramatically shifted his ground, to be transformed into the "later Richards." If such a conversion truly took place, it usually seems to be described along these lines: for some reason, owing perhaps to his maturation and to the benign influence of Plato, Mencius, and Coleridge, Richards gradually came to distrust his own scientific schemes and positivistic formulae (I borrow these loaded terms only because they have been so frequently used). In *Coleridge on Imagination* he forsook his early usage of the statement/pseudo-statement vocabulary, and his view of poetry shifted: from one which might be called emotive or affective, to one which argued that poetry was a truly cognitive process, and that poetic language was the highest possible usage of language.

So much for the "rehabilitation" of I. A. Richards. Quite apart from any question of whether such a change of mind would have been for the good or not, there is another, and probably more important, question: did it ever happen? And this question finally brings me, in circuitous fashion, to Jerome P. Schiller's book: *I. A. Richards' Theory of Literature*. I have taken this long to get to Mr. Schiller's book because it seems to me that there is little point, at this stage of twentieth century criticism, in discussing either Richards himself or studies of Richards without some consideration of the context of his work.

Mr. Schiller has quite rightly given *Coleridge on Imagination* a prominent place in his discussion of Richards (although the difference of his perspective from my own is hinted at by the first sentence of his chapter on the book: "*Coleridge on Imagination* is a difficult book to take seriously.") His reasons for giving the book a central place are chiefly two: it is perhaps Richards' richest work, one which suggests "a coherent and valuable theory of literature" (viii); and because
"this work, written in 1932, marks the transition between his early, iconoclastic works, such as *Principles of Literary Criticism*, and his late, nondirectional works ..." (ix). I agree, at least in principle, with both of Mr. Schiller's reasons for placing *Coleridge on Imagination* at the center of his discussion.

One thing that becomes plain in the course of Mr. Schiller's book is that if there is any "change" in Richards' career, any progress from his earlier to his later works, that change is more one of manner than of substance. Mr. Schiller complains, and justly, of those who have commented on the course of Richards' criticism with only the most cursory knowledge of the nature of Richards' later work. He entitles his first chapter "Richards and the Average Critic: The Problem of Change and Continuity," and he suggests that while this "average critic"—an intelligent, but usually unsympathetic one—has probably read *Principles of Literary Criticism*, *Practical Criticism*, and *Science and Poetry*, it is also probable that he has read little of the later work—perhaps *Coleridge on Imagination*, but certainly not *Speculative Instruments*. Now I suspect that Mr. Schiller is mainly correct in these allegations. I object, however, to his imputing of iniquities to this faceless monster, the "average critic." I sympathize with his desire to write more directly on Richards than on critics of Richards. I also appreciate the difficulty which anyone must face who tries to write on so important and prolific a figure as Richards, particularly in trying to re-create the climate of opinion which surrounds Richards' work. Nevertheless, the "average critic" personification is both annoying and misleading. While the various errors and misunderstandings of Richards which Mr. Schiller singles out undoubtedly have existed and still do, his "average critic" is very little more than that familiar figure, the straw man: a handy person to have around for the sake of simplifying arguments, but otherwise not very desirable.

Nevertheless, Mr. Schiller is right in suggesting that the views that *Coleridge on Imagination* reflects a dramatic turning point, and that the "later Richards" works on the basis of quite different assumptions about language, poetry, science, and life itself from the "early Richards" will not bear much scrutiny. Like René Wellek in his essay, "On Rereading I. A. Richards" (*Southern Review*, Summer, 1967: Mr. Schiller's manuscript was written prior to Wellek's essay), Mr. Schiller is convincing in his demonstration that the basic foundation of Richards' thought has changed relatively little.

There are other good points in Mr. Schiller's book. It is not at all his purpose to defend Richards from his critics, and he does not allow Richards' stature to intimidate him. He frequently objects to the obscurity of some of Richards' language and to his habit of occasionally allowing his arguments to dwindle off into evocative but fuzzy profundities. In fairness to Richards it must be said that although he has undoubtedly been on occasion obscure, many of the obscurities Mr. Schiller complains of seem to me to have been invented by himself (I would be more inclined to complain of some of Richards' grotesque "clarifications"). At other places, Mr. Schiller points out passages in Richards which may be objected to not so much for their obscurity as for their faulty logic or downright contradictions. Many of these occur in relation to the question of evaluation in criticism, and it seems to me—as it has to many others—that Richards has never dealt adequately with the question and that, consequently, he has no real basis for asking us to believe one literary work more valuable than another, or even for asking us to believe literary experience valuable at all.
Mr. Schiller recognizes that this question is a serious problem in Richards, but he argues that there are more serious and fundamental flaws: that Richards' "theory of literature" is too narrow, not being that at all but rather a theory of poetry. Closely tied with this, Mr. Schiller feels some of Richards' more utopian views on the future of poetry to be very little less than ludicrous. Another "specific weakness" is Richards' constant failure "to separate the very diverse interests of different individuals concerned with art" (150). Mr. Schiller himself attempts to remedy Richards' weakness by discriminating those "very different individuals," and he arrives at the conclusion that we may be interested in literature as readers, critics, moralists, or aestheticians—and that it is most important to decide in what role we are reading the work. Mr. Schiller is quite reproachful toward Richards in this matter: he has not been at all clear as to "the precise nature of his theory of literature." Indeed, "it is largely in spite of Richards that I discriminated the concerns of the aesthetician from those of the critic and reader" (141).

I suppose that it would be as well for me to disqualify myself as an adequate critic of this line of thought, for it is clear that what Mr. Schiller wants of a literary critic and what I would look for are so far apart that it would be difficult for us to find a common ground. I had not been aware of it before, having gone through a reasonably thorough philosophical apprenticeship, but I suppose that I am one of those Mr. Schiller dismisses as being "unfamiliar with the provenance of an aesthetic theory" (149). I find it quite impossible, for example, to separate my activities as a "critic" from those as an "aesthetician" (if I ever rise to that height); and I suppose it is this inability which makes me very impatient with Mr. Schiller's discriminations and categories, and even more impatient with his labored and cumbersome exposition. This last is a contentious phrase, and I should perhaps omit it, since at least part of my impatience is with that side of Richards which draws those impossible charts and coins those remarkable vocabularies and quotation marks: he tempts his critics to go even further down that line than he does. And Mr. Schiller does so, right down to the last two pages of his book, where we are assured that "the feeling that considerations of truth are important in poetry results, I would say, from the critic's confusion of exclusive literature with factual utterances. Interpretation of such literature yields products as true or false as does that of factual utterance, but the value of exclusive literature lies not in these products, but in the process of interpretation. Thus considerations of truth are unimportant." And it is good to know that matter is taken care of.

In the final analysis, my real quarrel with Mr. Schiller is so fundamental that it probably cannot be resolved. I can see only the most theoretical (to use that crucial and arguable word) value in an attempt to criticize Richards with no reference to the major traditions of modern literature and criticism. As I read Mr. Schiller's book I see and admire on every page the evidence that he has studied Richards exhaustively, but I am ungrateful enough to think that is not enough. He has studied Coleridge on Imagination, but I can see no evidence that he has read Coleridge—or Arnold, or Shelley, or Eliot, or very many other people. This is undoubtedly unfair, but the matter is serious. Mr. Schiller handles matters which have been clichés in literary criticism since the Renaissance as if no one had thought of them before, and he complains of Richards' obscurity.
where a little knowledge of Richards' tradition and the authors with whom he has been concerned would have removed most of the obscurity.

The major premise of Richards' career as a critic, semanticist, and educator (Richards would say they were all the same role, and would appeal to the example of Coleridge), one which is clearly spelled out in the last chapter of his Coleridge and elsewhere, is that we have lost a homogeneous intellectual tradition and, with it, the ability to read intelligently; we have lost the skills, conscious and unconscious, by which people must communicate with each other. All of Richards' evangelistic efforts in various fields have followed from this premise. It is very ironic to read a book on Richards and to come away with the overwhelming impression that, although it has been done with diligence, intelligence, and good will, it is yet another vindication of Richards' premise.

I must not close this way. Much of what I have objected to in Mr. Schiller's book he has done not in ignorance but by design, and the only fair thing is for the reader who is seriously interested in Richards to study Mr. Schiller's book and make up his own mind. I would, however, like to make one other suggestion. Assuming that that hypothetical reader has been conscientious enough to have previously read a reasonable selection of Richards' work, he should turn to R. P. Blackmur's posthumous A Primer of Ignorance, and read not only those pages in which Blackmur speaks of Richards, but the entire series of four remarkable lectures, Anni Mirabiles, 1921-1925: Reason in the Madness of Letters; those and the late essay, ostensibly on Allen Tate, but even more on Richards and other large matters, "San Giovanni in Venere." Then this same reader should turn to Richards' late collection of essays, So Much Nearer, and read not only the passage in which he speaks of Blackmur, but the other essays as well. And here let me enter, in closing, my own fuzzy but I hope evocative profundity: then let that reader ask himself what he wants out of literary criticism and, thinking back through Richards' long, fruitful, and humane career, how close Richards has come to providing it; and whether there have been many writers in this century who have come closer.

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Marshall McLuhan frequently provides the most direct explanations of his own work. He has long insisted quite explicitly that many of his germinal insights trace to Harold Innis and in a recent Atlantic Monthly article elaborates on his relationship to Wyndham Lewis. In the Foreword to the present collection McLuhan adds further self-explanation, stating forthrightly that his study of the media "began and remains rooted" in the work of I. A. Richards, F. R. Leavis, Eliot, Pound, and Joyce, as well as in Thomas Nashe, who was the subject of his doctoral dissertation at Cambridge University.

Those who have known McLuhan since he was completing this dissertation in the later 1930's have been aware of these roots of his all along. For he has
never made a secret of what he reports here, the shock he received at Cambridge after his earlier "conventional and devoted initiation to poetry as a romantic rebellion against mechanical industry and bureaucratic stupidity." Cambridge University of the 1930's showed him, largely through the work of those just named, how poetry was not a rebellious escape but rather a mode of organizing sensibility and of adjusting to the contemporary world. "These fragments I have shored against my ruins." To lay claim to his present field of interest, McLuhan had only to extend the purlieus of "poetry" and its adjacent rhetoric to include all the media of communication—not a difficult feat for anyone who knows Aristote.

Those who denounce McLuhan today for not being sufficiently condemnatory are sometimes only reviving the romantic censoriousness he was shocked out of. His critics often seem to feel that whoever does not stand off from technology and bureaucracy far enough to throw stones at them is betraying the cause of humanity. McLuhan is aware that there is no way to stand off from technology and bureaucracy. They need criticism, but the criticism has to come from within them. The Cambridge tradition in the 1930's was itself not always aware of this: at times it could react with blind hostility to the nonliterary—technology, bureaucracy, and all the rest, including commercialism—as phenomena which were "out there," to be taken care of by amputation. But the tradition contained its own cure for this hostility in its conviction that literature was one of the modes whereby society dealt with its problems—a way of understanding society and culture, and thus technology, bureaucracy, and commerce, too, and even, ultimately, politics. This conviction, articulated or inarticulated, was one of the strengths of the Cambridge branch of the New Criticism at its best.

The New Criticism was the first mature academic criticism of English vernacular literature. At Cambridge and elsewhere it came into being in academic circles shortly after English was fully established in the 1920's as a higher academic subject for the first time in the history of the world. There was no competing Old Criticism for it to supplant, as I attempted to show some time ago in a study now part of The Barbarian Within. Earlier academic criticism had dealt almost entirely with classical Latin, Greek, or Hebrew—and not only in the English-speaking world, but everywhere in Western Europe. Vernacular literature was treated extra-academically, which meant largely in genteel, if not always gentlemanly periodicals, after hours. The implication was that vernacular literature was not quite serious. No one made his living teaching or studying it. Latin and Greek literature was serious but basically on other than purely literary grounds: it was politically or sociologically or, in the large sense, ethically serious, for Latin and Greek literature awakened young males to the great public issues of the polis and trained them in the ritual polemic of a rhetorical and dialectical education which produced statesmen and nourished Empire.

When vernacular literature moved into the universities it changed the situation far more radically than most were or are aware. With the vernacular came women (Latin had been a sex-linked language, spoken for 1200 years or more only by males, with exceptions so few as to be quite negligible) and, with women, came an irenic mode of teaching. The ritual male polemic of the dialectical and rhetorical method which had completely controlled formal education in all subjects from language through physics, theology, and medicine for some 2500 years was simply no part of a woman's world. In the old dialectical and rhetorical
world, Latin (inculcated normally with physical punishment), epic poetry, parli­
amentary debate, and war formed one ideological continuum. The new vernacular
world by contrast was the world of the mother tongue (mothers had not used
Latin since it ceased to be a vernacular in the sixth through the eighth centuries).
This was a close-in world, where ritual challenge and response languished in the
classroom. But it was a very live world, where a great many other things were
going on. When classical scholars, the only persons available at the beginning
to teach the vernaculars, brought to the study of the mother tongue the full
panoply of academic skills developed for the classics, a host of new issues made
themselves felt.

The nonliterary classical world had been for the literary scholar essentially
"background," something distant. The nonliterary vernacular world was hardly
such. It was foreground and even more: it was milieu, something around you and
in you, which became particularly immediate as academic attention worked its
way from the remote English past to include the literature of the contemporary
world and as the social sciences dealing with this world invaded academia. I. A.
Richards came to literary criticism from behaviorist psychology: for him, words
are rats in a maze, they "behave." And of course there was Freud. The result
of the new immediacy was a two-way interaction between literature and every­
thing else more intense than had ever before been known.

Here is the context for McLuhan because it is the context for Leavis, who in
so many ways was at the very center of the New Criticism. Thus Leavis' insistence on the seriousness of literature and on its immediate social and complex
moral implications (not to be confused with direct moralizing), his antipathy
for the bridge generation of English teachers, such as Quiller-Couch, who were
neither classicists nor really in the new vernacular world but unthinking and
dangerous noncritics who took literature to be no more than fun. Thus the
particular dislike for Charles Lamb shared by the Scrutiny group generally:
Lamb, Denys Thompson suggested in a Scrutiny essay on "Our Debt to Lamb," is
like "the unthinking man in the street" who associates literature with "drink,
gastronomy, and smoking." Lamb makes the literary essay the output of a "fake
personality," and sponsors poetry as "uplift."

The newly urgent insistence that literature was not an escape from experience
but a way of organizing it was not totally a Cambridge product. Its roots can
be found in classical antiquity, in the association of poetry with rhetoric. But
in the 1930's Cambridge was the locale where the approach was being worked
on with more concentration than anywhere else. The approach has since become
known all through the English-speaking world today and beyond—though outside
the English-speaking world to a far less degree than one might suppose. It
accounts for many courses in freshman English in the United States and for
some courses in American studies. In England it shows itself in the perceptive
and fecund work of Raymond Williams (Leavis-cum-Labor Party, but with
significant transformations of both) and, with further significant transformations,
in the Centre for Contemporary Studies at the University of Birmingham, where
a breakthrough has been made into a serious cultural analysis of commercial
advertising, a major field of expression largely scorned (inconsistently) and
hence neglected by early New Criticism. The world of McLuhan grows out from
here, too. In this context McLuhan's work is seen to be the same, in many
basic ways, as that of Richard Hoggart at the Birmingham Centre, and, be it said,
as that of Benjamin DeMott, who has worked and taught at Birmingham. This is why DeMott at times so excruciatingly disagrees with, or seems to disagree with, McLuhan. We are all in the same room and treading on one another's toes.

A close look at McLuhan's sensitive criticism collected in the present volume reveals its connection with this earlier New Critical world as well as the continuity of McLuhan's later thought with his earlier interests and stands here. The individual authors treated in the present essays include Joyce, Mallarmé, Dos Passos, Hopkins, Pound, Wyndham Lewis, Keats, Coleridge, Tennyson, Pope, and Poe and the themes focusing McLuhan's discussion run from the medieval ars srmocinales (grammar, rhetoric, and dialectic), through analogy (in the philosophical sense), the picturesque and other uses of landscape, to the aesthetic moment and the difference between the New England and the Southern cultural heritage. The individual studies here had appeared originally in publications such as the Sewanee Review, the University of Toronto Quarterly, the Kenyon Review, the Classical Journal, Essays in Criticism, Thought, and English Institute Essays: 1951, with the one on Pope's Dunciad, the only one from after 1953, excerpted from The Gutenberg Galaxy (1962).

Most of these studies in one way or another turn on the seriousness of literature as a means of organizing experience. For Lewis, art is patterned energy, the opposite of the death swoon. Keats' odes are not escapes from conflict but active resolutions of conflict, effected by aesthetic means and at the aesthetic level. Coleridge moves from "linear" rhetorical statement to symbolic ritual and analogical perceptions, which allow of fuller organization of experience. (The term "linear," subsequently a McLuhan favorite, is here—p. 117—credited to Joseph Barrell.) In-depth analogies are the substance of Hopkins' poems, each of which is both utterly individual and inclusive of all the rest through analogues running from external nature to God. Hopkins' thought moves within the economy of the Incarnation, which both reinforces analogical thinking and transcends it. Like Cervantes and Byron, Poe was the aristocratic rebel whose art fought against indiscriminate appetite, chaos. Joyce's sensibility turns from the spatially organized world of Newtonian science to speech, action, and a timeless present. His "trivial and quadrivial" puns connect him with the rhetorical heritage at the center of Western culture and enable him to perceive through language "the paradoxical exuberance of being." Dos Passos had at his disposal Joyce's techniques, but his sensibility was not up to Joyce's. Pound's critical prose is not impressionist effusion but compares and contrasts specific qualities with "decisive discrimination"—"discrimination" was a highly approbatory term in Leavis' Cambridge.

McLuhan treats landscape in connection with cubism. Tennyson had the eye of a movie cameraman but lacked cubist techniques. The symbolists turned to interior landscapes, which they composed as a page in a modern newspaper, juxtaposing items which have no assignable relationship to one another except that they have occurred at the same time. The "same time" for the symbolists was the aesthetic moment, which organized on a field in the interior consciousness items otherwise unrelated. The connection with cubist dismantling and rearrangement of structure is patent, as is also the connection with McLuhan's own later "mosaic" presentation of material, already practiced in The Mechanical Bride (1951) and both practiced and labeled in The Gutenberg Galaxy (1962).

In one of the latest essays here (1953), on "Joyce, Mallarmé, and the Press,"
McLuhan elaborates on the press as effecting a reorganization of sensibility. At this point the connections between the author's present concern with the media and Leavis' Cambridge become perhaps most clear. But his judgment of the popular press is more from the inside, more benign, and ultimately more fecund than that of Q. D. Leavis in *Fiction and the Reading Public* (1932).

In three or four or more of the essays here it is also quite apparent how McLuhan's concern with the media of communication today grew out of his preoccupation with the arts of communication in classical antiquity, the Middle Ages, and the Renaissance—grammar, rhetoric, and dialectic or logic. He finds the difference between the South and New England to parallel the difference between rhetoric and logic, between the Sophists' practical rhetoric (the South) on the one hand and the Socratic-Platonic-Aristotelian "philosophy" on the other (New England), between patristic and scholastic thought, between Renaissance humanism and scholasticism, between the Hutchins-Adler great books programs (for the activist encyclopedic understanding of the practical rhetorician engaged in the affairs of the *polis*) and the "scientific" education which prepared "liberals" for abstract, less activist thinking. Details of its application may be disputable, but the dyad being worked with here is an old one—ultimately that of the active versus the contemplative life—and it can be used to polarize much of the human lifeworld.

McLuhan's interest in rhetoric and to a lesser extent in dialectic which these essays make plain connects more with the United States than with Cambridge or any other place in Europe or perhaps even in Canada. To this day most of the work on the history of rhetoric is still done by Americans, who in their extreme commitment to literacy have been far enough removed from the old rhetorical or oratorical culture underlying European education to find its phenomena intriguing. With some few distinguished exceptions, Continental scholars have remained innocent of this American scholarship, and those British scholars who have become aware of it have often reacted negatively and defensively. In a well-known 1949 *Kenyon Review* article on "The Places and the Figures" I. A. Richards undertook to dismiss the history of rhetoric in the name of psychological theory, and the late C. S. Lewis in his *English Literature in the Sixteenth Century excluding Drama* (1954), after a dythyrambic avowal of the utterly dominant importance of the rhetorical tradition not only in literature but in the whole of Western culture, states that he nevertheless cannot treat the subject in his history and drops it there, with little indication that he even knew what recent scholarship in the field had done.

To a significant extent this scholarship concerning the history of rhetoric and dialectic has been not only an American but even more particularly a Midwestern specialty, with centers at the Universities of Chicago (where Perry Miller came from to Harvard), Illinois, Wisconsin, Michigan, and St. Louis University, and considerable reinforcement from the University of Toronto. McLuhan taught at St. Louis University from 1937 to 1944, before and after he completed his dissertation and received his Ph.D. at Cambridge. It was an interesting era at the oldest university west of the Mississippi, which McLuhan himself reflects on in his recent *Atlantic* article on Wyndham Lewis. Concern with rhetoric and dialectic in particular was fortified by a keen philosophical concern with problems of knowledge, noetic and sensory.

One of the active intellectual influences at the University was Bernard J.
Muller-Thym, who with McLuhan is included by Richard Kostelanetz in his recent *Master Minds*. After receiving his bachelor's degree from Rockhurst College, Muller-Thym had done his M.A. in philosophy at St. Louis University, writing his master's thesis there in Latin just for kicks. (Although he was a layman, he took the courses in philosophy given for the Jesuit scholastics, with textbooks and lectures and disputations and examinations in Latin.) His University of Toronto doctoral dissertation on *The Establishment of the University of Being in the Doctrine of Meister Eckharts of Hochheim* was immediately published in 1939 in the Monograph Series of the Institute of Mediaeval Studies, with a preface by Etienne Gilson. After serving in the Navy in World War II, Muller-Thym became and has remained a management consultant, lecturing on management at Columbia University and M.I.T. and being celebrated in *Esquire* and other places equally unlikely for his highly original work in this field.

In the strongly anti-Cartesian climate where an existentialist "*St. Louis Thomism*" was winning over old-fashioned Suarezianism even on the faculty, interest in the problem of knowledge entailed a large-scale and sophisticated attention to sensory perception, although I do not recall anyone's using the specific term "sensorium" as such. Muller-Thym in particular was concerned with philosophical and psychological interpretation of sensory activity. The *Fleur de Lis*, the University literary magazine, in which he regularly did sophisticated music reviews, in November, 1938, published an article of his undertaking to show that in listening to music the object of specifically intellectual aesthetic contemplation was the movement in one's own senses, which he likened to discourse. The article became such a *cause célèbre* that the *Fleur de Lis* republished it in May, 1940. (Muller-Thym himself was a first-rate violinist, and his wife Mary a first-rate pianist, the daughter of a symphony conductor.)

His 1942 *Modern Schoolman* article, "Of History as a Calculus Whose Term is Science," equally celebrated, advertised his concern with problems of knowledge on another front. So did his vigorous attack on Mortimer Adler in the *Fleur de Lis*. Muller-Thym accused Adler of treating philosophy at the University of Chicago too abstractly and independently of history and of philosophizing about the movies in *Art and Prudence* in a way which was both *a priori* and exterior to the medium.

The study of the ways and conditions of knowing, sensory and intellectual, had of course been particularly urgent in philosophy since Kant or, if one wishes, Descartes. In the St. Louis University milieu it was rendered more acute by a long-standing quarrel of neoscholastics with Descartes and Kant, sharpened by Gilson's historico-philosophical work in Paris and Toronto and by other Continental European philosophy and given body by the large number of students in the philosophy courses, which, unlike the theology courses, were required even of non-Catholic undergraduates as central to liberal education even apart from religious commitment. In a variety of ways this interest in problems of knowledge reveals itself in the since published work of a large number of students and faculty members besides Muller-Thym at St. Louis University around McLuhan's incumbency there, such as Robert Henle, now President of Georgetown University, whose central philosophic interests have been largely epistemology, William Van Roo, later Professor of Theology at the Gregorian University in Rome, Charles Leo Sweeney, now Professor of Philosophy at the Creighton University, and in my own work, as I suppose.

Against this background McLuhan's thought and style of teaching stood out
in high but congenial relief. He was an omnivorous reader and vigorous interactor, then as now, and one of his principal assumptions in his teaching was the relevance of everything to everything, an assumption which helps account for his interest in James Joyce and which was abetted by the Cambridge insistence on literature as quintessential relevance. The assumption included of course a strong sense of the relevance of past to present and of present to past. McLuhan's own doctoral dissertation subject, Thomas Nashe, had led him directly into the Renaissance, but his contact with the past was strengthened permanently at St. Louis University. A certain first-hand knowledge of classical, medieval, and Renaissance texts was taken for granted in this University milieu, being made possible in great part through the massive, communal command of Latin possessed by the hundreds of Jesuit students and several score Jesuit faculty members who formed a small but distinctive part of the St. Louis University world. The more than twelve million pages of Vatican Library manuscripts now at St. Louis University came there in the early 1950's, but the milieu was ready for them and the medieval historian who conceived the idea of this collection, Lowrie J. Daly, was a graduate student at the University in McLuhan's time. In this situation it was impossible for McLuhan not to improve his grasp of history and philosophy and theology simultaneously. No wonder that in this present collection of essays he can, for example, drop a reference (p. 12) to materia signata without batting an eye.

McLuhan himself was contributing massively and permanently to the University's ongoing work, most of all in making known a teaching style which saw literature as continuous with everything else. The influence of Cambridge which is so evident in the present essays was obvious here in St. Louis. In the Fleur de Lis McLuhan published an article on "The Cambridge English School" and related pieces. He propelled others toward Cambridge, notably (Eugene) Marius Bewley, who had begun his undergraduate work at Rockhurst College, too, and had come to St. Louis University to finish it, and who was already publishing in the Fleur de Lis poetry and articles which included a judicious reappraisal of Tennyson à la Richards and Leavis. Bewley went on to Cambridge University for his doctorate.

The Department of English at St. Louis University was in fact quite a Cambridge stronghold, so that it was far less than an accident that McLuhan came there. Father Francis J. Yealy, the historian of the oldest permanent Missouri settlement, his home town of St. Genevieve, and now Professor Emeritus of English at the University, had earned one of the first Ph.D.'s in English ever awarded at Cambridge, where, curiously enough, one of the readers for his dissertation had been a fellow Missourian but non-Cantabrigian, T. S. Eliot. The late William Hugh McCabe, subsequently President of Rockhurst College but until 1940 Chairman of the St. Louis University Department of English, was also a Cambridge Ph.D. in English (Renaissance) with first-hand familiarity with Richards' and Leavis' work. Father McCabe was the one who had brought McLuhan from Cambridge to St. Louis. In the Department of Classical Languages the late Francis A. Preuss was a Cambridge man, of earlier vintage.

The Cambridge tradition which McLuhan is at pains to avow in his Foreword emerges in these essays as Cambridge true enough, all the more because it is continuous in McLuhan's own total milieu and mind with much else, not all of which by any means has been accounted for in this present account of mine. It is a tribute to Cambridge that McLuhan came away from Cambridge with more than
Cambridge had to give. When you read back over the criticism of the 1940's and 1950's, you find his to be some of the most rewarding. It is both more widely knowledgeable and more immediate than what you are likely to find elsewhere.

WALTER J. ONG, S. J.

Saint Louis University


These five volumes are among the first to be published jointly by the University of Toronto Press and the Geneva-based Institut et Musée Voltaire. These initial volumes are under the general direction of the dean of eighteenth century researchers, Theodore Besterman. They will eventually form part of the new complete works of Voltaire now being assembled by scholars throughout the world.

The first two volumes of the correspondence contain some 730 letters written between December 1704 and December 1729. Mr. Besterman observes in his excellent introduction that most of these letters are from Voltaire to various correspondents, but also include letters to Voltaire, or others from third parties in which Voltaire figures rather prominently. Readers should note that in the critical apparatus attached to individual letters, the term holograph is used to refer to documents in Voltaire's own handwriting.

Those who have had the opportunity of using the 107 volume Voltaire correspondence, also edited by Mr. Besterman, will be pleased to learn that this new edition contains many entries not found in the previous series. This will spare researchers the trouble of going through the various volumes of the Studies on Voltaire and the Eighteenth Century, where many of these new letters first appeared. The editor also asserts that a great deal of textual emendations have been made possible as a result of discoveries made by dix-huitièmesistes and published in monograph form in the above mentioned periodical.

There are several other improvements which have been wrought in this new edition. The use of the very attractive Fournier type instead of the somewhat florid Baskerville type, will permit a reduction in size from the bulky 107 tomes to a much more manageable 50. In this new series, Mr. Besterman informs us that nine tenths of the entire correspondence will be printed from manuscripts. A third feature is the inclusion of over one hundred pages of appendices which present for the first time the wills and inventories of Voltaire's father as well as those of his mistress and co-worker, Mme du Châtelet. While undoubtedly of great historical interest this latter section can hardly command the same attention as the letters themselves. Some of the actuarial statistics provided in those inventories would challenge the most competent bookkeepers.

The major improvement, however, concerns the nature of the texts of the
letters. Mr. Besterman, in his justification for the new edition, is severely critical of previous collections, particularly the Moland, which has traditionally served as the definitive text for Voltaire researchers. The Moland edition, asserts the editor, "does not contain a single letter printed quite accurately, while half of it contains substantial defects." Mr. Besterman is, despite his criticism, charitably inclined to excuse many of Moland's inaccuracies on the basis of insufficient manuscript materials. A glance at the manuscript sources listed by Mr. Besterman indicates some of the problems which Moland must have faced. There are 113 such sources cited and they refer to institutions and individuals in England, France, Germany, Switzerland, Italy, the United States, Sweden, Russia and Poland. In this regard one notes with curiosity the abbreviation "pc" furnished by Mr. Besterman to identify an instance "where the owner has refused permission to publish his name."

The new edition of the Voltaire correspondence represents a monumental scholarly achievement but it also complicates Voltaire research more than ever. Heretofore scholars who were quoting Voltaire's letters found it necessary merely to write Best. plus the number of the letter in question. With the appearance of the University of Toronto edition it will now be de rigueur to differentiate the two series. Mr. Besterman himself recommends adopting the following formula, Best. D. plus the letter number. The progress of learning does have its drawbacks.

Volumes 81 and 82, also edited personally by Mr. Besterman, consist of the Voltaire notebooks. They show evidence of the same meticulous critical and bibliographical techniques as those employed in the correspondence. In a twenty-two page introduction, Mr. Besterman presents an exhaustive analysis of the history of the notebooks and the various editions they have undergone. This includes tracing the origins of the Leningrad, Cambridge, Saint-Fargeau, Pierpont Morgan, Yale, Paris, Piccini and fragment versions of those notebooks. In addition to the problems involved in collating the various manuscripts, Mr. Besterman also experienced difficulties in transposing the text. "Voltaire, though highly fastidious about the presentation of his work in print," he writes, "was when writing even more careless than most of his contemporaries in matters of spelling, punctuation, the use of capitals, and the like. Here, moreover, he is in his dressing-gown, dashing off notes which were not intended to be seen by eyes other than his own. They were struck off rapidly, carelessly, thoughts tumbling over each other, often left unfinished, unarranged, with abrupt transitions and frequent interpretations, all done at intervals which were often considerable..."

An excellent example of this disorganized potpourri is seen in Cambridge notebook, the first text in the edition. Aside from the fact that much of the material is in Voltaire's literate but awkward English, the subject matter is so varied that there is little cohesiveness. Voltaire darts from the royal exchange to Dryden and Pope, thence to Charles II and the Quakers. From there he moves on to Germany, France and Ovid—all within the space of three pages.

Two other observations should be made about this edition of the notebooks. There is an extremely fine index of 75 pages which makes for quick and handy reference. Annotations on the text itself are kept to a bare minimum. This is perhaps unfortunate because some of the more recondite references could be elucidated.

La philosophie de l'histoire, Voltaire's acerbic look at the Judaeo-Christian tradition, constitutes volume 59 in the complete works. It is edited by J. H.
Brumfitt and appeared in its initial form in the Studies on Voltaire and the Eighteenth Century.

In addition to this carefully edited text, complete with variorum, the author has also provided over one hundred pages of introduction and commentary. Here he shows that La philosophie de l'histoire "is not and never has been, a reliable and authoritative work for the study of ancient history. Yet the student of 18th century ideas and of the development of historiographical thought will find in it many of Voltaire's most fruitful and influential speculations."

The main thrust of Brumfitt's thesis is that Voltaire's essay was a kind of contra Bossuet, an attempt to discredit the historical view that all human progress has been tied up with God's special relationship to the Jews. In his efforts to refute this idea or perhaps to displace it, Voltaire strives to portray ancient Jews and Judaism in a most unfavourable light. He therefore stresses examples of barbarism and cruelty in the Old Testament without giving any consideration whatsoever to his anachronistic imposition of 18th century moral standards on pre-Christian Palestinian society.

Brumfitt has an excellent analysis of the spiritual climate in which Voltaire composed his diatribe. The latter shows the influence of men as different as dom Calmet, Samuel Bochart, Huet, Rollin, Warburton and du Fresnoy. It is ironic, moreover, that Voltaire drew much of his information about the Hebrew Bible from dom Augustin Calmet, one of the French Catholic Biblical scholars whom Voltaire looked upon as the quintessence of ecclesiastical obscurantism.

Perhaps the best feature of Brumfitt's introduction is the treatment of the refutations penned by Voltaire's critics. Gueneé's Lettres de quelques juifs . . . is shown to contradict Voltaire successfully in many areas. Brumfitt also quotes Grimm's criticism of Voltaire's historical myopia. He felt that devoting so much space to the Jews, even in negating their providential legacy, lent an orthodox colouration to the essay.

The one sector in which this edition falls down is in the author's treatment of Voltaire's hostility to the Jews. Brumfitt plays down the idea that Voltaire was an anti-Semite. He subscribes to the traditional view that the attack against Jews and Judaism was a part of his strategy to undermine the validity of the Judaeo-Christian tradition. By attacking Hebrew Scripture, so the theory goes, Voltaire could, with impunity, strike at the very roots of Christendom. This, of course, is an hypothesis, which has been challenged most vigorously by several scholars, notably Arthur Hertzberg in his French Enlightenment and the Jews (New York, 1968). The latter believes that Voltaire was motivated by deep, almost atavistic feelings of hostility towards Jews qua Jews because he could not liberate himself from ancient prejudices widely shared even by people who were remote from religious orthodoxy. I can understand why Brumfitt may not choose to accept this interpretation but I think his essay is seriously deficient in not examining the viewpoints of people like Hertzberg and Poliakov. This lacuna is all the more regretable in that the image of the Jews looms large not only in this work but in the whole corpus of Voltaire's literary works. After all, there are some critics that suggest that Voltaire transformed the religious anti-Semitism of the medieval world into the secular variety of our own age. To neglect this question or to dismiss it cursorily is most inappropriate.

Arnold Ages

University of Waterloo
Despite the fact that literary relations between North and South America have existed for nearly two centuries, so little criticism has been devoted to the subject that the present collection of essays almost deserves to be called a pioneer work. The literatures of the two continents passed through similar, but by no means identical, phases as they developed from colonial to independent status. During this process of growth, venturesome spirits in each culture showed sparks of interest in literary movements of the other, but these innovating minds have been rare and their productions remote from the mainstream of their native literatures.

The first Anglo-American to write on the literature of Spanish America was the Massachusetts printer Isaiah Thomas, who devoted eleven pages of bibliographical comment to the productions of this area, chiefly Mexico and Peru, in his History of Printing in America (Worcester, Massachusetts, 1810). Harry Bernstein has pointed out in his Making of an Inter-American Mind (Gainesville, 1961) that Joseph Dennie in the Port Folio in 1801 "introduced its readers to the classic poetic epic of the Conquest of Chile: Alonso de Ercilla's La Araucana," but this cannot be counted as a massive contribution to inter-American literary relations since Ercilla was Spanish and his poem belongs primarily to Peninsular literature. The first South American author to show significant influence from the United States was the Chilean journalist Camilo Henríquez, who drew heavily upon Thomas Paine in his own essays and who also paid tribute to Benjamin Franklin. Henríquez it was who first called in print for the independence of Chile, and he did so in an essay in his La Aurora de Chile, 4 June 1812, based largely on Paine's Common Sense. Henríquez was interested in all aspects of North American journalism and even referred to Isaiah Thomas's History of Printing in an essay "Sobre las causas del engrandecimiento de algunos estados."

In the first half of the nineteenth century, a Cuban journalist Domingo Del Monte wrote a "Bosquejo intelectual de los Estados Unidos." An acquaintance of the North American diplomat and educator, Alexander H. Everett, he also supplied the latter with various materials concerning Hispanic culture which Everett used in his literary articles in the North American Review and elsewhere. Since these early days of inter-American communication, there have been several serious critics in each hemisphere interested in interpreting the other, but there has been virtually no scholarship devoted to this important area of comparative literature.

Professor Balseiro in the present collection of essays treats part of the early history of literary interrelations between the two continents in his second chapter, bearing the same title as the book itself, "The Americas Look at Each Other." Unfortunately this chapter contains only twenty pages, whereas the subject deserves ten or a hundred times that many. The author's first chapter, devoted to somewhat far-fetched parallels between Lord Byron and Simón Bolívar, obviously concerns relations with Europe and does not strictly belong in a collection dedicated to "the Culture and Life of the Americas." The remaining eleven chapters, heavily weighted in favor of the twentieth century, treat Latin-American figures exclusively and reflect a Latin point of view. They could be more
properly presented under the rubric "Spanish Americans look at each other and at the United States" than under the actual title of the book. There are appreciative chapters on the Venezuelan poet and educator, Andres Bello; on two little-known Puerto Rican patriots, Eugenio María de Hostos and Luis Muñoz Rivera; and on a well-known Cuban patriot, José Marti. The latter wrote seventeen volumes on North America in keeping with his principle that "to know the literature of different nations is the best way to free oneself from bondage to any single literary tradition." Two chapters are devoted to Rubén Dario, known as a severe critic of the United States, and a related one follows on "Political Trends in Hispanic American Literature" in which the theme of anti-Yankeeism is dominant. Among the most lively accounts are personal sketches of Gabriela Mistral and Alfonso Reyes, the latter an acquaintance of the author. There is even a chapter devoted to the Brazilian musician Heitor Villa-Lobos and another to the music and song of the pampas.

With due respect to the high purpose and innovating spirit of Professor Balseiro, one must admit that the important themes of inter-American cultural relations which are suggested in this collection are not actually developed in any thorough or systematic way. The true value of the book consists in the author's personality, eloquence, and occasional brilliant insights.

A. OWEN ALDRIDGE

University of Illinois, Urbana


As an indispensable reference and a valuable reassessment of the extensive periodical criticism of the romantic movement, Professor Hayden's book is most welcome and will be consulted as a standard source in this area. Of primary importance are the sections on the historical background of the British reviewing periodicals, their attitudes, policies, and practices, and the comprehensive appendix cataloging major and minor periodicals. A conclusive and up-to-date compilation of this information has been sorely needed. In addition, it is the necessary context for the central portion of this study which examines and evaluates reviews of the works of twelve important writers, including Wordsworth, Coleridge, Byron, Shelley, Keats, Hazlitt, and Scott. Thus, Hayden provides us with both a thorough survey of the reviewing practices and a more accurate view of the contemporary critical reception of each writer.

Clearly, Hayden's work affirms that we can no longer be preoccupied with the excesses of the romantic periodicals and their reviewers. The field was not monopolized by the Edinburgh Review, the Quarterly Review, and Blackwood's, although they had the greatest circulation and influence. Moreover, the dominant point of view of the criticism cannot be characterized as conservative or reactionary. In the secondary periodicals, many of the reviewers were intellectually liberal with progressive tastes well-disposed to the new literature. In the representative selections he presents, Hayden corrects the oversimplified view that the critics lacked discernment and did little more than attack, insult, and misjudge the romantic poets we now consider great. Keats's reception in particular emerges
as more favorable, and less destructive in terms of general practices, than previously described. In all, we can see that the periodicals contained much valuable critical commentary which deserves the thorough and even-handed appraisal Hayden strives to make.

Yet his approach to the criticism tends to minimize discussion of critical theory—the means by which the reviewers arrived at their judgments—to concentrate on the validity of these judgments in the eyes of posterity. While Hayden's method, which sets up today's consensus as a basis for evaluating the particular judgments of the reviewers, certainly results in more balanced and equitable estimates of the criticism, it does not highlight the standards and values used by the reviewers nor the extent to which they maintained continuity with established principles or modified them. Hayden's description of the uneven course of Wordsworth's reception exemplifies the limitations of this method, for we find only partial descriptions and little explanation of the crux of the controversy between Wordsworth and his reviewers—namely, the conflict of traditional principles and conventional values with newly-evolving literary theory and standards of taste.

But, while we may debate the implications of Hayden's approach or his particular interpretations of reviews, these instances do not diminish the degree of objectivity he achieves in his patient evaluations of the criticism. Moreover, his informative and useful scholarship, bringing together the available information concerning the periodicals and a check-list of the contemporary reviews, will be of value to all those investigating romantic periodical criticism.

NATHANIEL TEICH

University of Oregon


This is an uneven, biased, and splendid book. Mr. Shikes admits that his book "was written and edited from a liberal point of view" (p. xxviii), hence the absence of conservative attacks upon middle and lower class abuses. The protest art that interests Mr. Shikes "is social or political criticism of specific ways of life, institutions, conditions, or circumstances" (p. xxv). These conditions and circumstances, however, exclude such common targets of satire as social fads, fashions, and modes.

In Chapter Five, "The English Artist as Social or Political Critic," the illustrations are concerned almost exclusively with politics or the professions. This emphasis is misleading, since many prints by eighteenth-century graphic artists were devoted to social criticism of another order; for example, Isaac Cruikshank's St. James and St. Giles, which depicts ironically similar modes of extorting money among the socially elite and the socially outcast. Most prints did not go far beyond mockery of current fads, whether dandiacal dress or high-fashion hairdos. Also, though attacks by Rowlandson and others against the medical profession often designated crude abuses, they could also be short-sighted and reactionary, as in Gillray's amazingly energetic The Cow-Pock.
Nonetheless, given Mr. Shikes' declared bias, it is not worthwhile to object to the selections that he has made, since they are all interesting and worth having gathered together. However, it is worthwhile to object to the text, which, at times, gives the impression of having been editorially reduced at the expense of organization and smoothness. The text trembles between biographical and historical presentation. Biographical information of Gericault is not really necessary, nor is so much of Breugel's life important to our appreciation of his work. On the other hand, allusions to Käthe Kollwitz's life do help us to understand the works presented here, just as some reference to George Cruikshank's victory over alcoholism would have been appropriate in mentioning his *The Drunkard's Children*.

Mr. Shikes usually explains the most important details in the prints. To one unfamiliar with the fact that Louis-Philippe was frequently portrayed as a pear, Daumier's *Ab! His! Ab! His!* would be quite puzzling. But even more explanations of details would occasionally be welcome. It would be useful, if not essential, to know that Hogarth's *The Bench* portrays such notables as Chief Justice Wills and Lord Chancellor Bathurst.

Transitions are too often awkward and abrupt in a card-catalog fashion, especially in the early chapters which cover larger historical periods, themselves presented at times in embarrassingly over-simplified summaries. Descriptions of artistic techniques are gracelessly dropped into the flow of an otherwise predominately historical text.

And Mr. Shikes is inclined to repeat an observation too often. Early in the book, he indicates how apt engravings were as a medium for widespread distribution of critical comment. He repeats this sentiment in various ways and for various media to the point of distortion, as when he declares that lithography "came just in time to play a key role in the democratic revolution" (p. 144).

The final impression one receives of the text is that it was written more to accommodate the illustrations than to illuminate them. And yet this oddly conglomerate text is at times as evocative as the pictures. We learn more, perhaps, about Thomas Theodore Heine, from one memorable remark than from a capsule biography. Heine, fleeing from the Nazis, was interrogated by the Gestapo in Oslo. "Were you a Socialist or a Communist in Germany?" they asked. 'Impressionist,' Heine replied" (p. 269). Intriguing histories are suggested in hurried summaries. Mr. Shikes writes of Félix Vallotton that "as he devoted himself more and more to serious painting, his interest in the social struggle waned. For awhile he was a Nabi—a fanatical prophet—but with touches of realism and irony, and ultimately this naturalized Parisian of Swiss Huguenot extraction achieved a measure of success with nudes and landscapes painted with a hard, dry style" (p. 226). This clipped account of Vallotton's career suggests a life interesting for its mixture of the poetic and the banal.

But for its true material, the illustrations, this book is a bargain and a delight. Its 405 plates are distinctly reproduced on fine paper and the book itself is handsomely designed and bound. The illustrations may confidently be considered art, rather than propaganda, and most are by acknowledged masters like Callot, Goya, and Daumier. Both familiar and little-known, the number of outstanding prints is surprising. The first print in the book is the famous *The Letter Q* by Master E.S., and Hans Holbein the Younger's impression of Luther, *Hercules Germainicus*, introduces the second chapter. Boardman Robinson's *Nast-
like *The System Investigates Itself* (p. 332) is an uncommonly successful union of sharp social comment and skillful comic mockery. Félicien Rops' *Order Reigns in Warsaw* and Otto Dix's overpowering *Wounded* present two different but equally striking views of war.

It is to Mr. Shikes' credit that he includes a selection from George Cruikshank's *The Drunkard's Children*, a series that deserves more attention than it has received. The eighth plate of this series, in which "the destitute, 'gin-mad' daughter leaps to her death" (p. 93), presents the girl as a plummeting white-and-black smear against the crushing mass of a bridge's dark arch. Through the arch a full moon shines, streaked by the dark clouds. The stained moon repeats the motif of the falling girl pictorially, but suggests as well the moral disfigurement that has driven the girl to suicide.

But by placing Cruikshank with the graphic artists of the eighteenth century, Mr. Shikes implies an absence of critical drawings and etchings in the nineteenth century, though many book illustrations—among them Cruikshank's and Hablot K. Brown's for Dickens' novels, or Gustave Doré's drawings of London scenes—are as powerful and socially significant as those appearing in this collection.

Just as Cruikshank produced fine works that may be viewed as social criticism yet was not primarily a social critic, so most of the artists included in Mr. Shikes' collection were not principally social critics. Félicien Rops, whom James Huneker called "a man of genius, one of the greatest lithographers of his century," and a "perverse idealist," was notorious for his pornographic plates and given to mischievous satire more than serious social criticism.

But it is easy to carp about small things. We may wonder why Mr. Shikes refers to an anonymous medieval artist as "this fifteenth-century David Low" (p. 10), and to Grandville as "the David Low of the early 1830's" (p. 154), while not considering Low worth a mention in his own right. We may wonder why, in view of the space devoted to Goya, Mr. Shikes does not examine the "Goyescas" of Lebrun and Shahn. But these are little things, and the book, above all, wants to lift us above little things to great human issues as they are manifested in "intrinsically interesting" art (p. xxiii).

Although Mr. Shikes chose not to select works presenting "man's general spiritual malaise or discontent with his own psyche, or general statements of man's fate" (p. xxv), what emerges from the histories and works of the artists he has chosen is precisely the broader humanistic concern of men like Dürer, Goya, Daumier, or Barlach. In most cases, the artists included in this book, like Théophile-Alexandre Steinlen, "lacked any formal philosophy" (p. 227). They were perhaps closer to Roualt's desire for "the righting of wrongs not through political action, but through redemption and regeneration" (p. 250), than to Thomas Nast's badgering of the Tweed gang. Although Mr. Shikes' obvious desire to see artists include social content in their art colors his selection, this splendid assemblage of prints transcends any such limiting stricture. And although Mr. Shikes may state that "the most successful protest art is that which communicates to the reader with contemporaneity, with immediacy, and with visual images that are undeniably of this particular time" (p. 393), happily his book is evidence that, to the contrary, the most successful protest art is that which communicates to the reader with the immediacy of what is timeless in man's suffering and perception.

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