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Book Reviews

Criticism Editors

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Studies in the History of Music, ed. Egon Wellesz. London: Routledge, Kegan Paul; New York: Dover.

Vol. I (1958): *Music in Mediaeval Britain* by Frank Ll. Harrison. Pp. xix + 491. $10.00.

Vol. II (1959): *The Fugue in Beethoven's Piano Music* by John V. Cockshoot. Pp. xv + 212. $6.00.

Vol. III (1960): *William Lawes* by Murray Lefkowitz. Pp. x + 320. $10.00.

The publication of extended scholarly works in the history of music is a relatively recent occurrence. Burney and Hawkins were breaking new ground when they published their histories in the eighteenth century: their achievements in chronicling the growth of an art from the time of the ancient Greeks to their own day were truly astounding, as was the number of primary sources consulted by them for the first time. Whatever biases there may have been, whether Handelian or antiquarian, neither the fascination of the past nor partisanship for the present hindered the completion of their appointed tasks. The significant rise of historicism at the end of the eighteenth century brought with it a change in attitude, however. Just as Thomas Warton's *History of English Poetry . . . to the Commencement of the Eighteenth Century* (1774-1781) never progressed beyond the Elizabethan period, so the great music historians of the nineteenth century were held so spell-bound by the Renaissance that they never reached the Baroque. This re-discovery of the past and the ardent love it engendered must compensate for the incompleteness of the music histories of the Belgian F. J. Fétis (1869-76) and the Austrian A. W. Ambros (1862-78). For here was criticism and re-evaluation of the most exciting kind. What had appeared to Burney as the crudities of an insufficiently mature art expressed to Ambros the glories of Renaissance style. Furthermore, Ambros was able to classify this style with fine acumen into the successive stages of the so-called four Netherlandish schools (since then labelled Franco-Flemish or Burgundian).

The growing sense of historicism resulted in establishing a new kind of scholarship which produced both comprehensive histories and monographs on individual topics. The need for large-scale histories, both for reference and for study became (and still is) so pressing that, with increasing specialization, another *magnum opus* makes its appearance every generation or so. It is significant that the *New Oxford History of Music*, now in process of publication, is being administered by a team of editors who assign the individual chapters in their respective volumes to qualified contributors. But works of such extensive application are aptly complemented by the scholarly monograph which, in the history of music, is barely a century old. It was the classicist Otto Jahn who conceived the plan of writing a monograph on Mozart that was neither a biography nor a mere essay but one that would do full justice to biographical sources as well

as stylistic influences. In spite of the exhaustive treatment given their respective subjects, the historians Spitta and Jahn are neither pedantic nor impersonal. When Spitta discusses the character of a vocal treble melody in a Bach cantata (sung by a boy's not a woman's voice) and when Jahn pays tribute to the Apollonian beauty of Mozart's music, one may not always agree with their inferences, but there is no denying that these mature scholars speak out of a profound conviction.

One of the best known series in musical studies in the German-speaking countries was established under Guido Adler of the University of Vienna in 1913 and entitled *Studien zur Musikwissenschaft*. The first volume contained Egon Wellesz' brilliant monographs on Cavalli and the style of Venetian opera. Now, almost half a century later, Wellesz himself has inaugurated a similar series in the English language, entitled *Studies in the History of Music*. The first three volumes, here under review, are connected with the University of Oxford where Wellesz was Reader in Music until his recent retirement. Frank Ll. Harrison's *Music in Mediaeval Britain* is, as one might expect, the most well-considered and distinguished volume of the series so far. It fills a crying need in our library shelves, for English music before Tallis and Byrd has been scarcely explored at all, with the possible exception of Dunstable. The author has made a thorough search among the primary sources still extant and has come up with what is by far the most complete and up-to-date presentation. The book is perhaps misnamed in that it is actually a study of religious music (secular music is not taken into account), the development of which the author traces beyond the Middle Ages up to 1550. However, considering that the liturgy of the Church of England remained Latin up to the time of Henry VIII and Wolsey, and most extant sources are sacred, not secular, there are reasons of pedagogy as well as expediency for Dr. Harrison's procedure. Since the volume is primarily concerned with presenting unknown music and unknown musical procedures, there is little space allowed for critical evaluation. Still, the author deftly inserts a sentence here and a qualifying epithet there which reveal sound judgment and are welcome guides to the various degrees of excellency of the music surveyed.

The strength of this book lies in its firm grasp of the liturgy and the various sacred institutions for which the music was composed. This knowledge is indispensable for a discussion of the style or criticism of individual works within a style. Mediaeval and Renaissance polyphony originated in the ornamentations of the solo sections of Gregorian chant which, in many cases, alternated with the singing of the choir in unison. These solo sections inspired ambitious composers to make polyphonic settings, although their soloistic character was preserved in that polyphony was rendered by a duo, trio or quartet of solo voices. The remaining portions of the chant were performed "plainly" as before, that is to say, in one line melody, and "massively," that is, by the entire choir. In order to assess these matters and to understand properly the place of polyphony in the liturgy a knowledge of the organization of the mediaeval cathedral is essential, particularly the great secular cathedrals of Notre Dame and Salisbury. The distinction between the secular cathedrals, which employed boys as well as men, and the monastic cathedrals and abbeys, which employed only monks, is important. So also is the distinction between strictly institutional music and music performed at those services which took place outside the monastic choir, either in the nave or the Lady-chapel. There are many architectural drawings in Dr.

Harrison's volume and the Lady-chapel emerges as a "locus" of great liturgical and musical importance. When the late Friedrich Ludwig (of Göttingen) discovered the great polyphonic compositions for solo voices of Perotinus Magnus, called *organa* or *clausulae*, he took them to be substitute compositions for the work of earlier composers. This "replacement" theory leaves much to be desired, and Dr. Harrison (p. 123 ff.) suggests instead that the great polyphonic *clausulae* and motets were performed in the celebration of the mass, during the ritual which followed the *Sanctus*. This hypothesis seems plausible since it sees the *clausulae* as self-sufficient compositions, extra-ritual items performed by license on especially festive occasions.

After 1400 a new kind of polyphony came into being in England (as well as in France). It was sung by the choir rather than the solo voices. This new mode of performance is evident both from the physical size of the extant manuscripts and from the characteristics of the musical style itself. The wheel came full circle in the work of Taverner (master of the choristers at Christ Church, Oxford). In a plain chant respond, the composer set the choral part of the plain chant in polyphony and left the soloists' part of the chant to be sung in plainsong. The effect was to restore the kind of contrast between choir and soloists which was originally contemplated in plainchant. This contrast had been reversed during the Gothic period in deference to the greater competence of the soloists to perform the novel and more demanding kind of music. But by the time of Henry VIII and Wolsey, the choirs of secular foundations such as Christ Church had absorbed the new art of polyphony sufficiently to become skilled performers in the polyphonic medium. Thus the craft of composition and its growth are seen in the perspective of liturgical and institutional developments.

Mr. Lefkowitz's book *William Lawes* is concerned with a minor composer of the seventeenth century. In the past, William Lawes, born 1602, has tended to be overshadowed by his older brother, Henry, but an examination of all scores extant in print or manuscript should make us reconsider this judgment. As a composer of secular songs, church music and instrumental pieces, William Lawes is both the more gifted and the more comprehensive musician; in fact, he emerges as a major English composer of the Caroline period and one who forms a not negligible link between Dowland and Campion on the one hand and Purcell on the other. Both as performer of dramatic music to the King's Men playing at the Blackfriars and as composer of expressive airs not connected with play-houses or masques, Lawes fashioned a peculiarly expressive kind of melody. His setting of Robert Herrick's poem, "Gather ye rosebuds while ye may," was reprinted about thirty times in the course of the seventeenth century, which is no mean test of popularity. Equally distinguished are his fantasias for instrumental consort which show a secure grasp of a truly instrumental idiom rather than the customary perpetuation of vocal counterpoint. To invent and shape, in the spirit of the instrument for which he was writing, was a characteristic which his brother eulogized after William's premature death in 1645: "Neither was there any instrument then in use, but he composed to it so aptly, as if he had only studied that."

William Lawes has never before been investigated in so much detail and with so generous an amount of music examples. Mr. Lefkowitz's book is likely to remain the standard work on the subject for many years to come. It is marred

slightly by excessive enthusiasm for its subject and occasionally one is aware that the author knows his Lawes very well indeed but is less familiar with contemporaneous musical developments. Still, this is a useful book and one in which the author is not afraid to attack the current critical evaluation of William Lawes. His re-assessment of Lawes's stature in the stream of English music is thoroughly justified.

The Fugue in Beethoven's Piano Music is an odd title. To this reviewer it seems dubious wisdom that a study of Beethoven's fugual technique should not properly embrace all of Beethoven's music. Does it make sense to devote a separate paragraph to the Piano Sonata in G Major, Opus 14 No. 2, First Movement, bars 70-72, but not to discuss the fugual passages in the third and ninth symphonies, let alone the first movement of the String Quartet in C Sharp Minor, Opus 131? The author discusses in great detail the piano fugue from Opus 35 but fails to give similar treatment to the fugual handling of the same theme in the Eroica Symphony. This omission is particularly strange, since the author's first chapter is not restricted to piano music but discusses the teaching of fugual technique in general from the sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries and shows a good grasp of the importance of J. J. Fux' *Gradus ad Parnassum, Vienna*, 1725. The gradual transmutation of the graceful and light music current in Vienna in the eighteenth century through the impact of the severe contrapuntal style of Johan Sebastian Bach makes a fascinating story. It was in the house of van Swieten in Vienna (formerly ambassador of the Hapsburg Court in Berlin) that Haydn, Mozart and Beethoven came to know both the splendour and the splendid potentialities of the Baroque fugue. If anything, Mr. Cockshoot underestimates the importance of van Swieten, who is mentioned only once in his discourse. On the other hand, the treatment of fugues and fugual passages in the piano works proper is both exhaustive and commendable. The analysis of the fugue from Opus 35 is facilitated by printing the entire fugue in full score, that is to say, with one stave for each of the three voices, and throughout a generous amount of musical examples, clearly printed, facilitates comprehension of the author's argument.

FREDERICK W. STERNFELD

Oxford University

The Dilemma of Being Modern: Essays on Art and Literature by J. P. Hodin. New York: The Noonday Press, 1959. Pp. 271. $5.00.

Mr. J. P. Hodin, the editor of *Quadrum: International Magazine of Modern Art*, of London, has gathered here essays which he published between 1940 and 1953 in several countries where he is at home with the language, life and art. If he never was with Kafka he "spent many hours" with Dora Dymant who was. He talked at length with Edvard Munch, James Ensor, Marc Chagall, Henry Moore, Bernard Leach. If other artists presented here were not interviewed in person, it is almost as if they were, and there are photographs of some of them.

Mr. Hodin is informed and intimate, conveying an exciting sense of seeing what is wrong with our time, and a tantalizing air of being on the verge of telling what to think about it, if not what to do. He is beyond art for art's sake.

Great artists are saints and martyrs out to save the world. He is distressed by widespread "disheartenment and nihilism." He feels that "mechanized civilization has robbed us of our innermost strength and enslaves us more and more" (p. 37).

We may agree that this is largely and dangerously true; also that hope is in turning from "greed and fear, egoism and destructive urges" to a more healthy, social and constructive outlook (p. 156). The author seems well on the way to such a view when he praises Herbert Read for carrying on the line of Ruskin and William Morris on the interrelation of art and morality, and the importance of art as the expression of everyday life. This is close to John Dewey's view of art as the clarification and completion of normal experience (in *Art As Experience*). But, along with espousing a sensible, social, and even scientific approach to art, in sections on Freud and Read, Hodin goes back on this line of sense and sanity. His hold on this direction might have been firmer if his familiarity with art, life and criticism were not practically limited to England and Europe which he takes to be not only the world but the "Modern World." He is listed as one of the foreign editors of *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism*, but is apparently without benefit of the work of its editor, Thomas Munro, especially his *Toward Science in Aesthetics*; or of the work of Dewey. These men might have enabled Hodin to keep his hold on the humanistic, scientific and social line he seemed to be establishing from Ruskin and William Morris through Freud to Read.

Instead Hodin slips into mystification and obfuscation, urging a turn from the sciences of man and nature to "the vital force in each of us" (p. 160), to Goethe's "higher knowledge (*Erkenntnis*) and intuitive understanding (*Einsicht*)" (p. 167), and even to Dr. Alexis Carrel's *Man the Unknown*. Kafka, Sartre, and Rilke are downgraded for their "disharmonious, melancholic, tragic, schizophrenic or paranoiac" view (p. 172); but with no recognition of their ability to relieve the nightmare forced upon them by their sensitivity to the dislocations of modern life; no notice of their wonderful appreciation of what still can be enjoyed and built upon in the simple everyday things and basic relationships. Instead of seeing what can be cherished and trusted in their naturalism and humanism, Hodin abandons everything naturalistic and humanistic, social or scientific, to end up praising Malraux's excitement over all that he and Goya "found equivocal, absurd, and at the same time terrifyingly fascinating in life . . . the *mysterium tremendum* before which men fear and tremble . . ." (p. 251). Finally we are urged to admire "the attempt to rediscover the world of the irrational or superhuman . . ." (p. 255).

VAN METER AMES

University of Cincinnati

Dark Conceit: The Making of Allegory by Edwin Honig. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1959. Pp. xii + 210. $4.50.

This book on allegory suggests that the "prejudices" against it among modern writers and critics are not well founded. To Professor Honig modern opinion seems to take a narrow view and to judge allegory mainly by "debased examples." His purpose is to rehabilitate the form as an "indispensable instrument of thought

and belief . . . a fundamental way of thinking about man and the universe" (p. 7), and above all as a form of literature. Far from being a simple inflexible literary form allegory appears to Mr. Honig capable of great variety and complexity. In suggesting that we take a "broader view" of the subject, he would have us not limit allegory to works based upon simple didactic personification, or to works in which the allegory is continuous. His authors include not only Dante, Spenser, and Bunyan, but, more especially, Swift, Melville, Hawthorne, and Kafka. Poe, James, Lawrence, and Joyce also appear at times as exhibiting an "essentially symbolic or allegorical approach" (p. 52). His writers, united by a "common ground of symbolic intent," make allegory seem to become almost synonymous with "symbolic fiction." But Mr. Honig believes that symbolism as a literary term has become so diffuse in meaning (including "nothing less than all verbal utterance") that "the term allegory fits the fictional procedure more accurately" (p. 5).

Mr. Honig finds in Coleridge "a principal source of the modern opposition to the concept of allegory" (p. 44), since Coleridge associated allegory with the mechanical, the self-conscious, and the fanciful, in contrast to the organic and the imaginative. In discussing Coleridge's concept of the imagination Mr. Honig suggests very interestingly that it "reformulates the medieval belief [in the formal and functional truth of objective reality]," but does so "with a different emphasis, giving, as it were, a centripetal instead of a centrifugal direction" (p. 49). But to Mr. Honig Coleridge seems to identify the aim of art with the artist's "expression of personality rather than with the mimetic principle of art as an imitation of nature and life" (p. 47), and this leads in the end, he suggests, to "art for art's sake." Mr. Honig rejects Coleridge's criticism of allegory. In fact a recurrent burden in the argument of the book is that meaning in allegory is not necessarily preconceived and mechanically illustrated, but often is rich and complex, growing and developing directly out of the concrete embodiment of the work. The quotations from Coleridge may have the undue advantage of appealing to our modern "prejudices," but it is difficult to deny their cogency, even after reading Mr. Honig's criticism which places them in the context of the Romantic tradition.

But the modern dissatisfaction with the concept of allegory reflects ultimately, Mr. Honig suggests, a dissatisfaction with the idea that art should express beliefs and purposes, not merely the individual experience of the artist. Modern "ideals" offer the same high possibilities of literary embodiment as did the medieval Christian ideals for integrating individual and cultural consciousness (pp. 181-182). The ambivalence in the modern attitude toward the irrational—fascinated as well as repelled, but not glorifying it like the Romantics—seems to Mr. Honig "typically suited to the method and purpose of allegory. . . . From the beginning, allegory has offered the rational consciousness a way of regulating imaginative materials that otherwise appear confounded by contradictions and bristling with destructive implications" (p. 53).

Allegory seems to Mr. Honig, therefore, to serve "more comprehensively than the other tropes [metaphor, irony, symbol] in structuring the design of fiction." The advantage is not limited to its schematic structure. Allegory is, Mr. Honig believes, the "literary type that engages, more fully than any other, the symbolic uses of literature." See in his wider perspective the "practices of allegory" may be observed in the workings of epic, satire, pastoral (p. 54).

When Mr. Honig goes on to examine several "typical constructs of allegorical narration," the reader is impressed by the subtleties and complexities of the meanings he unfolds, but one is uncertain what these analyses prove about the allegorical method. It is not always clear that he is, in fact, discussing allegory, and not something else brought in by his "broader view" of the subject. A standard by which Mr. Honig often measures the success of an allegorical work seems not unlike Coleridge's standard, applicable to any literary work, of its organic unity and wholeness. "Fiction and allegory must be simultaneous, a single creation. Both together must assert an integrated vision of reality; and this creative authority must be sustained within the work, not by an appeal to any body of doctrine outside of it" (p. 93). The allegorist's "reality comes into existence and comes to mean something at the same time. . . . The meanings grow naturally out of each action in the narrative. . . . The more complex a writer's grasp of psycho-physical relationships, the richer the work is likely to be" (p. 114). The reader may wonder if the author is speaking of allegory as such, or of the relation of image and idea in any successful literary work.

This book makes great demands on the reader who would follow its thought. Its prose is often more obscure and less inviting than the poetic epigraphs which precede most of the chapters. In the closing paragraph, as at the beginning of several chapters, Mr. Honig invokes the aid of Wallace Stevens. The idea of allegory may be, he says, quoting Stevens, "'a name for something that could never be named' and actually should 'bear no name' other than 'inconceivable idea' existing 'in the difficulty of what is to be.'" One appreciates the reality and value of such feelings in certain contexts, but it is not a feeling with which one likes to conclude a work of criticism.

ALEXANDER SACKTON

The University of Texas

Anna Livia Plurabelle: The Making of a Chapter, ed. Fred H. Higginson. Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1960. Pp. 111. $3.75.

The *Anna Livia Plurabelle* section of *Finnegans Wake* (I. viii) is the most famous example of Joyce's ultimate artistic aims and achievements. Now a standard anthology piece, this lyrical evocation of Joyce's river-like heroine is familiar to many readers who know nothing of the *Wake* as a whole. When *Finnegans Wake* was still a nameless "Work in Progress" the early published texts of *Anna Livia* served as a touchstone to Joyce's mysterious creation, and since the publication of the *Wake* the episode has been the subject of more commentary than any other section. Joyce himself encouraged this emphasis on *Anna Livia*; he considered the episode's fluid language a triumph and vindication for all his radical experiments in musical form. "The stream is now rising to flood point," he boasted while recasting the episode, "but I find she can carry almost anything." Joyce's careful and elaborate revisions of *Anna Livia* testify to his fondness for the episode; one of the first sections of the *Wake* to be conceived, *Anna Livia* went through more than twenty distinct stages of revision between its inception in 1923 and the publication of the *Wake* in 1939. It appeared in more printed

versions than any other episode, and its complex history reflects in detail the development of Joyce's artistic methods.

Because the growth of *Anna Livia* reveals so much about the nature of Joyce's final work, all those interested in the tendencies of modern literature should welcome Fred H. Higginson's record of the episode's evolution. Using the early published versions and the voluminous *Finnegans Wake* MSS (now in the British Museum), Professor Higginson has enabled the reader to trace the history of *Anna Livia* through every stage of composition. He has reduced the complicated and often bewildering materials to six basic texts, ranging from the earliest draft (1923) to the 1930 Faber and Faber edition (which is very close to the final version). Thus the reader who has a general interest in Joyce's methods can grasp the episode's development by simply reading the six basic texts; for those who have a more detailed interest Professor Higginson has provided an ingenious system of brackets and textual notes which enables the scholar to reconstruct each stage in the growth of the episode. The entire book is a model of compact and sensible editorial work. Professor Higginson has simplified the process of composition so that it can be easily followed, yet at the same time he has retained a complete record of the episode's evolution. There is also a useful and unpretentious Introduction which discusses the episode's design and the character of Joyce's revision. The only objection one might make concerns Professor Higginson's description of the various manuscripts and typescripts used in the edition; this complicated Editorial Note might have been better presented in diagrammatic, rather than narrative, form.

The successive texts of *Anna Livia* assembled by Professor Higginson make fascinating reading, even for those who are unfamiliar with the *Wake* as a whole. In order to demonstrate the utility of this edition, and the kind of illumination it sheds on Joyce's art, one need only trace the history of a single passage. Early in the first complete draft of the episode (dating from the autumn of 1923) we find the following passage, in which the two washerwomen gossiping on the banks of the river Liffey speak of Anna Livia's "rhyme" (a version of the "letter" discussed in *Finnegans Wake* I. v. and partially revealed in the closing episode).

> And what about the rhyme she made! O that! Tell me that! I'm dying down off my feet until I hear Anna Livia's rhyme. I can see that. I can see you are. How does it go? Listen now. This is the rhyme Anna Livia made

During the next few months Joyce labored over the text of *Anna Livia*, and by March of 1924 this brief passage had been enriched by a reference to the nineteenth-century Irish poet Denis Florence MacCarthy.

> And what about the rhyme she made! O that! Tell me that while I'm lathering hell out of Denis Florence MacCarthy's combies. I'm dying down off my feet until I hear Anna Livia's rhyme! I can see that, I see you are. How does it go? Listen now. Are you listening? Yes, yes! Indeed I am! Listen now. Listen in:

This version establishes a basic "narrative" which was not substantially altered throughout the complex process of revision. Joyce's first step in writing the *Wake*'s episodes was to sketch in the "narrative" outlines—then, with a funda-

mental pattern before him, he began to "thicken" the text. The nature of this "thickening" process was usually dictated by the character of the episode's subject, for it was Joyce's aim to make the form of each episode "expressive" of its content. Thus in *Anna Livia Plurabelle*, where the heroine is associated with the river Liffey and all the world's rivers, Joyce sought to make his language as "river-like" as possible. This "expressive" intent can be discerned in our passage by mid-1925:

> And what was the wyerye rhyme she made! O that! Tell me that while I'm lathering hell out of Denis Florence MacCarthy's combies. I'm dying down off my iodine feet until I hear Anna Livia's cushingloo! I can see that, I see you are. How does it go? Listen now. Are you listening? Yes, yes! Indeed I am! Listen now. Listen in:

Here the "rhyme" has become a "wyerye" one, combining "weary" with the names of two rivers, the Wye and the Rye. The "watery" nature of the passage is also strengthened by the insertion of "iodine." These changes reflect Joyce's obsessive desire to transform the language of *Anna Livia Plurabelle* into the language of all rivers. The chief method for accomplishing this intent was the insertion of river-names and allusions: there is not a single river-name in the first draft of the episode, while the final version contains well over six hundred. The accumulation of these river-names occurred mainly in the intermediate stages of composition, where the "expressive" intent dominated Joyce's work on the episode.

The tendency of these intermediate revisions is clearly evident in a later (1927-28) version of our passage:

> And what was the wyerye rima she made! O that! Tell me the trent of it while I'm lathering hail out of Denis Florence MacCarthy's combies. I'm dying down off my iodine feet until I hear Anna Livia's cushingloo! I can see that, I see you are. How does it tummel? Listen now. Are you listening? Yes, yes! Idneed I am! Tarn your ore ouse. Essonne inne.

By this version "rhyme" has become the Italian "rima," "hell" has been altered to "hail," the "Id" has appeared in "indeed," and two more river-names have been introduced: the Trent and the Tummel. More spectacularly, the innocuous ending of the earlier version ("Listen now. Listen in:") has become "Tarn your ore ouse. Esonne inne." Although the voice of the washerwoman is still audible in this transformed ending ("Turn your ear here. Listen in.") the emphasis is now on the water-allusions—a "tarn," the Ouse rivers of England, the Esonne river of France, the Inn river of central Europe, and the Öre Sound of Denmark ("öre" is also the Danish for "ear," and Joyce originally wrote "ear," only changing it to "ore" when the functional word-play became evident).

The "expressive" intent is even more obvious in the 1930 version of the passage:

> And what was the wyerye rima she made! Odet! Odet! Tell me the trent of it while I'm lathering hail out of Denis Florence MacCarthy's combies. Rise it, flut ye, pian piena! I'm dying down off my iodine feet until I lerryn Anna Livia's cushingloo! I can see that, I see you are. How does it tummel? Listen now. Are you listening? Yes, yes! Idneed I am! Tarn your ore ouse. Esonne inne.

Here we have three more additions. "Odet! Odet!" fuses the original meaning ("O that!") with "ode," "Odette," and the Oder river. "Rise it, flut ye, pian piena!" combines the Italian word for "flood" (*piena*), a type of vessel (flute), and a Russian river (the Piana) with two musical references: the flute, and the Italian admonition *pian piano* ("softly, gently"). "Lerryn" suggests, among other things, the French river Lers. With these additions the second major period of revision comes to an end; by 1930 Joyce had endowed the text of *Anna Livia* with as many river-allusions as it could bear. His final work on *Anna Livia* was aimed at strengthening the episode's connections with other parts of the *Wake*. It was to this end that Joyce, in his last revision of our passage, inserted the following jingle after "Anna Livia's cushingloo," thus producing the final version found on pp. 200-201 of *Finnegans Wake*:

> that was writ by one and rede by two and trouved by a poule in the parco!

In this addition the "expressive" aim is still evident: "poule" is a reminder of "pool," and "parco" suggests the Pardo river of Brazil. However, the main purpose of the insertion is to connect Anna Livia's "rhyme" with the letter which was "writ by one" (ALP), "rede by two" (Shem and Shaun), and found by a hen in the Park (see *FW* 93-94, 104 ff.). Thus Joyce's final elaboration of the passage, like most of his late revisions, was part of an attempt to sew the *Wake* together from the inside.

With the development of this short passage in mind, we are now in a position to assess the nature of Joyce's revisions and their value to a reader of the *Wake*. First it must be acknowledged that there is nothing but disappointment in store for those readers who would use the early versions as a "skeleton key" to the *Wake*'s meaning. True, the basic "narrative" movement of a passage is often clearer in the early versions than in the finished text; but it is also true that this basic "narrative" is usually flat and dull, having only a tangential relation to the real life of the *Wake*. For better or for worse, the life of *Finnegans Wake* lies on the surface, in the countless analogies and word-fusions which were the result of Joyce's painstaking revisions. In his search for simultaneity of effect Joyce transformed the original "narrative" units into something rich and strange, and consequently the drafts of *Finnegans Wake* will yield little but frustration to those readers who ransack them in search of "clues" to the work's meaning. No clues are needed, for the conventional "meaning" can be (and has been by many critics) simply and convincingly stated. But there is another dimension of the *Wake* which is far more important, and here the revisions are often a useful guide. To borrow Professor Higginson's phrase, *Finnegans Wake* is a book of "synthetic becoming," and the process of reading the *Wake*, the process of grasping the analogies and word-play, corresponds to the process Joyce followed in making the book. To read the *Wake* properly is, in a sense, to re-enact the process of composition, and therefore a study of the book's evolution can sharpen our perceptions and initiate us into the special techniques of reading demanded by Joyce's baffling creation.

But Professor Higginson's record of *Anna Livia*'s evolution provides more than a lesson in "How to Read"; it is also a laboratory for those who are interested

in the creative imagination, and it illuminates much that has happened in our literature during the past fifty years. For in his last work Joyce pushed many of the methods and assumptions of modern literature to their logical extremes, thereby focusing our attention on general problems which extend beyond the complexities of his own language. *Finnegans Wake* culminates two generations of *symboliste* experiment, and is our literature's most ambitious attempt to approximate the "condition of music." Thus Professor Higginson's edition provides a basis for judging not only the defects and virtues of Joyce's final achievement, but also the defects and virtues of certain aesthetic assumptions which underlie much of modern literature.

WALTON LITZ

Princeton University

Reflections on a Literary Revolution by Graham Hough. Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1960. Pp. vi + 128. $2.95.

While it is impossible to read Graham Hough's criticism without respect, it has also become increasingly difficult to read it without misgivings regarding its directions and now, even, its position. Since his first book, *The Last Romantics*, he has been continually less able to follow his own perceptions wherever they might lead him, and has sought, instead, security in dogmatic placebos. Now, in *Reflections on a Literary Revolution*, he argues that because twentieth-century literature "was not the vehicle of a great spiritual force," it is sterile and self-destructive.

Fundamentally, he insists upon three propositions: first, that "Imagist ideas are at the center of the characteristic poetic procedures of our time"; second, that the Pound-Eliot mode epitomizes the tenets of Imagism, and so embodies the vital poetry of "modernism"; and third, that because of the special emphases of Imagist theory, our poets have alienated their audience by abandoning the "ordinary modes of rational communication." We can consider these claims in turn. Because all are entailed rather by Hough's assumptions than by the facts of the matter, all simplify and hence falsify the tendencies of twentieth-century literature.

Hough defines the "image" as the symbol stripped of its transcendentalism, and made opaque by a "defiant insistence on the surface of things, and an insistence that the surface of things is all." Imagism therefore projects a reality in which neither feelings nor ideas have a place, a world of exteriors. Modern literature, Hough laments, has as a result degenerated into formal experiment and technical innovation. Pound's ideogram, Joyce's epiphany, Eliot's objective correlative, the *Cantos*, *Finnegans Wake*, *The Waste Land*—these are the eponyms of modernism, all traceable, in esse, to Imagism. Because of their emphasis upon the hard and clear detail, and therefore upon technique, the Imagists (Hough contends) left no legacy to the future, but only autonomous examples of "inimitable and unrepeatable" innovations.

Surely, however, the rendition of surfaces for their own sake has been neither the primary nor the most fruitful impulse of this century. To be sure, W. C.

Williams and others claim to investigate "no ideas but in things"; Hart Crane argued in his essay on "Modern Poetry" that the poet must "absorb the machine"; and Hemingway works on the surface of dry, cheerless fact. But in every case, the artist's concern is not with the surface itself, but with his absorption of what is *in* things; or, as Hemingway put it, with "the sequence of motion and fact which made the emotion." It is with the inner self which the surface may evoke and thus bring into being. Not until recently, in the novels of Alain Robbe-Grillet (for instance, in *La Voyeur*), has the idea of *profondeur* been questioned and surfaces rendered, as Grillet says, "without trying to pentrate them, since there is nothing inside." While the literature of *le parti-pris des choses*, then, may be Imagist doctrine *in extremis*, the two are certainly not identical. At its best, the one distills quintessences—"wie selber die Dinge niemals innig meinten zu sein," Rilke phrased it—while the other simply reconstructs the exteriority and independence of objects as demonstrations of acute observation. Twentieth-century conditions have enormously expanded our sensitivity to exteriors, in art as well as in life; only that criticism will be valuable which differentiates between the *uses* made of this sensibility by various poets.

I take it that thereby we might distinguish several basic modes among modern poets. Only their common effort to maintain a sense of the individuated ego against collective pressures unites our poets. As we can now see, Eliot and Pound defined the ego through the culture, or more precisely the historical continuity, which alone (they believed) might give it meaning. Only by surrendering himself to some form more valuable than his own personality—namely Tradition—could the poet assert and assess his own value. A simple case of this is "Animula," whose final line imposes an order, and therefore an ironic kind of excellence, upon otherwise futile lives. Both *The Waste Land* and the *Cantos* likewise depend for their effect upon a contraction of time and space in which images signifying an ordered tradition are experienced simultaneously with the fragmentary surfaces of a chaotic, valueless present. Since the exterior principle of this poetry is incoherence, the annotations become, as synchronous clarifications, a necessary part of the structure; Gide, for instance, originally intended to incorporate his *Journal des Faux-Monnayeurs* into the novel itself; Joyce provided a guide to *Ulysses* by proxy. And Pound wrote of the *Cantos* in 1939: "Wait till I get 'em written and then if it don't show I will start exegesis." The poet has become, in Arnold's sense, the man of culture as his only way of remaining man.

But of course there have been other, quite different, ways of *using* the image. Poets as dissimilar as Marianne Moore and Dylan Thomas, for example, delimit the self by the discrepancy between image and form. Characteristically, Miss Moore stresses the perfection of her form by carefully pointing out the unimportance of her subject matter; and Thomas, arguing that "the more subjective a poem, the clearer its verse line," emphasized his inward order through his outward violence. Williams, the early Stevens, and Theodore Roethke define the ego by what it can perceive; what is "in things," ultimately, is the self which through them can explore its own becomingness. Conrad Aiken, too, has attempted to reveal the poet-person in the "crystal" moment when his ego can find its means of expression. For all of these poets surfaces are transparent openings to a self defined not by the order in which it can be placed, but by the order which it can make.

Hough's misunderstanding of the nature and uses of communication in poetry derives from the attitude of critical realism which he assumes. He is at his best in exposing the defects of contemporary analytical and historical criticism. But his strictures divide him against himself; he surrenders the historical awareness which enriched his own first book and attempts to argue as if he were "an intelligent person who [not only] knows nothing about twentieth-century poetry," but is also "innocent of the spirit of our age." Armed with his chimerical naïveté, he argues that the "natural community of understanding between poet and reader has been lost." How, from his tabula rasa, could he decide otherwise? For art, as Erich Kahler has wisely observed, "advances along the foremost front of what can be expressed." And as our awareness of reality increases, our art must become more subtle—and therefore, in Hough's sense, less "real." New penetrations by the human and natural sciences into the nature of existence—the discovery of physicists, for example, that motion is indeterminable, that time flows inequably —have invalidated our "common sense" reality. Physics may discover, but art alone can make a new sense of reality a part of our consciousness—and only by creating a deeper mode of expression for it. Now, as always, art leads in the evolution of human awareness, in man's capacity to feel, perceive, and understand. The poet literally *creates* our reality for us: in arranging his words he arranges our world. Those, like Hough, who pander art to the "common reader," who advocate literary nationalism, and decry "empty" technique, would effect, in short, the annihilation of man himself, by removing the only means whereby he can evolve. As for them, we have been there. Our poetry will take us where we are going.

JAY MARTIN

Yale University