Introduction

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INTRODUCTION

Kevin Curran and James Kearney

It might seem strange to devote a collection of essays to “Shakespeare and Phenomenology” in the second decade of the twenty-first century. After all, phenomenology as a philosophical movement had its heyday in the middle of the twentieth century. But phenomenology’s demise as a major philosophical movement has enabled it to live on as the approach or method shorn of dogma that its earliest practitioners promised. Far from being a single school of thought, phenomenology now looks more like an intellectual diaspora, a galaxy of related but discreet propositions that share basic assumptions while pursuing different philosophical projects. In early modern and Shakespeare studies, we have seen a particularly robust variant of phenomenology in the past ten years in the practice of historical phenomenology. In this special issue, we attempt to build on the successes of historical phenomenology by pursuing a variety of phenomenological approaches and practices in relation to Shakespeare and the early modern. By embracing phenomenology’s remarkable intellectual diaspora, we hope to offer a new critical agenda for phenomenologically inflected reading of Shakespeare. We propose that phenomenology offers a language of speculation and inquiry dynamic enough to accommodate both historicism and theory, a common language that can speak as compellingly to questions of law, ethics, performance, and hospitality as it can to questions about feeling and sensation. Accordingly, “Shakespeare and Phenomenology” is not invested in carving out yet another subfield of Shakespeare studies. On the contrary, in this collection we are committed to opening up conversations among subfields and to imagining a common critical future.
In 2000, Bruce Smith published an influential article in *PMLA* called “Pre-modern Sexualities” in which he outlined a new critical approach called “historical phenomenology.”¹ If phenomenology as a philosophical school can be broadly characterized as the study of sense experience from the first-person point of view, then *historical* phenomenology can be characterized, more narrowly, as the study of sense experience during a specific historical past. There are two important premises at work in historical phenomenology. First, that feeling and sensing have a history. The way we feel sad is different from the way Shakespeare felt sad; the way we smell perfume is different from the way Queen Elizabeth smelled perfume. This is because the two experiences occur in distinct cultural, institutional, and discursive contexts. Having said that—and this leads to the second premise—feeling and smelling are not historical artifacts in the same way that we might argue a book, a building, or even an event is since feeling and sensing are embodied, subjective processes. They resist objectification because they are always, in part, inside us, even as they also depend upon social and material environments to occur. Historical phenomenology, therefore, embraces the dynamism and nebulousness of feeling and sensation by thinking in terms of ecologies rather than artifacts, experiences rather than objects, and by abandoning neat distinctions between persons and things. In this way, historical phenomenology has, in the decade or so since the publication of Smith’s article, offered scholars of Shakespeare and his world new ways to explore visual, tactile, aural, olfactory, and emotional dimensions of early modern culture, which might otherwise resist critical engagement.²

Historical phenomenology stands at the intersection of three disciplines: sensory history, the cultural history of emotion, and the affective turn within the social sciences. From here, it has issued targeted responses to several critical approaches that gained speed over the course of the 1990s and early 2000s. It has been invoked, for instance, to resist the material turn’s tendency to treat objects as bearers of prosthetic meaning. Instead, historical phenomenology emphasizes how meaning accrues from the way sensing bodies experienced and perceived objects.³ To cognition studies, with which it shares an interest in the nature of the mind, historical phenomenology responds with a reminder about the limitations of applying a contemporary branch of brain research to early modern texts, choosing instead to ground its inquiry in pre-modern accounts of human physiology.⁴ Thomas Wright’s oft-cited seventeenth-century description of “the passions,” for example, indicates that early moderns had very different ways of understanding things we would now speak of in either
psychological or neurological terms. “Passions,” Wright explains, “be
certain internall actes or operations of the soule, bordering upon reason
and sense, prosecuting some good thing, or flying some ill thing, causing
therewithal some alteration in the body.” Wright makes no real distinc-
tion between thinking and feeling here. He collapses the two together,
presenting human psychology as a hybrid of cognition and emotion,
something both “of the soul” and “in the body,” an experiential border-
land between “reason and sense.” This “psychophysiology,” as Gail Kern
Paster terms it, involves a wider field of experience than accounted for
in the interpretive vocabulary of cognition studies. As a vernacular habit
of thought, practitioners of historical phenomenology point out, early
modern psychophysiology also problematizes attempts to correlate Re-
naisance and Freudian models of selthood, such as Juliana Schiesari’s vi-
sion of Freud as the inheritor of the Renaissance discourse of melancholia;
Deborah Shuger’s observations about the influence of Calvinist theories of
mind on Freud’s description of the relationship between the id, ego, and
superego; or David Hillman’s linking of Freudian ego-identity and post-
Cartesian skepticism. As Gail Kern Paster, Katharine Rowe, and Mary
Floyd-Wilson explain, “psychoanalysis does not so much resemble late
seventeenth-century skepticism as adopt it in a way that increases its own
explanatory power.” “Early modern psychology,” they maintain, “only
partially shares the priority we place on inwardness, alongside very dif-
ferent conceptions of emotions as physical, environmental, and external
phenomena,” as evidenced in the work of Thomas Wright and others.

Underpinning historical phenomenology’s particular qualms with
particular critical claims is a more general dissatisfaction with dualism, a
worldview typically traced back to Descartes, who, in his mature philo-
osophy, made rigid distinctions between mind and body, mental and physi-
cal, thinking and feeling. In addition to having a formative influence on
disciplines ranging from post-Enlightenment epistemology to modern
science, Cartesian dualism has cast a long shadow over post-War liter-
ary criticism, which for all its variety displays a common resistance to
feeling and passion in favor of the rational, the systematic, and the social.
Saussurean linguistics demanded that we abandon the volatility of indi-
vidual speech to develop a generalized account of the formal mechanics
of language. Post-structuralism scoffed at the idea of beauty, maintaining
that all things, beauty included, are socially constructed. New Histori-
cism bracketed the possibility of an affective bond with the past to focus
on the material practices that make the past irretrievably alien. Bruce
Smith has mourned this state of affairs in criticism: “Theatrical phenom-
ena versus social facts, appearance versus reality, imaginative joy versus
rational analysis: must we choose between these binaries? Why can’t we embrace both?” “What,” he asks, “happens to sensations, feelings, emotions, aesthetic pleasure?” Smith’s historical phenomenology models ways to achieve this dual embrace. He opens The Acoustic World of Early Modern England (1999), for instance, by considering a single sound, [oː], and the multiple ways in which it might be understood:

(1) as a physical act, as something you have done with your body; (2) as a sensory experience, as something you have heard; (3) as an act of communication, as something you have projected into the world around you; and (4) as a political performance, as something you have done because of other people, if not in this particular case with other people, for other people, and to other people.

In Smith’s The Key of Green (2009), “green” serves as a similar kind of test case: “Is color a physical property of objects?” Smith asks, “Or a sensation of light-sensitive nerves? Or a combination of both?” [oː] and “green,” like the passions that Thomas Wright describes, problematize dialectical thinking. They are not things; they are relationships. They trouble the boundary between intrinsic and extrinsic, subject and object, individual and social, marking a horizon beyond which Cartesian dualism loses its explanatory and epistemological power.

The critical project of historical phenomenology is built on a foundation of basic concepts developed by the Big Three of twentieth-century phenomenology: Edmund Husserl, Martin Heidegger, and Maurice Merleau-Ponty. Husserl challenged the notion that human consciousness resided in a closed, autonomous, and immaterial mental space. Consciousness, Husserl argued, was always directed toward an object of some sort. Consciousness was always consciousness of something or other. The life of the mind could not, therefore, be discussed in terms distinct from the material world. Heidegger extended Husserl’s ideas into the realm of ontology, insisting that being should really be thought of as a relationship of being (Seinverhältnis), as “being with and towards Others.” Conscious existence, in other words, is not about individual minds, but transactions within scenes of sociality, what Heidegger called a with-world (Mitwelt). Like Husserl and Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty develops his arguments from the simple assumption that “the world is ‘already there’ before reflection begins.” Man does not think the world. Rather, “man is in the world, and only in the world does he know himself.” The value of phenomenology for Merleau-Ponty was that it seemed to
have “united extreme subjectivism and extreme objectivism” in a way particularly useful for his project of “reaching a direct and primitive contact with the world, and endowing that contact with a philosophical status.” Historical phenomenology has aligned itself explicitly with these founding phenomenological insights while also drawing on a number of other twentieth-century philosophers whose work in various ways challenges dualism, including Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, Donna Haraway, Niklas Luhmann, Jean-François Lyotard, and Michel Serres. What makes historical phenomenology different from the work of Husserl, Heidegger, and Merleau-Ponty is that, true to its name, it is historical.

Bruce Smith explains, “[T]he work of Merleau-Ponty and other phenomenological critics of the 1950s and ’60s was universalizing in its assumptions about how the human body knows what it knows.” By contrast, Smith’s work mobilizes “a version of phenomenology [that] attempts to be historically relative and politically aware.” Gail Kern Paster, likewise, consistently highlights “important historical differences in the understanding of the passions between then and now.”

The success of Smith, Paster, Floyd-Wilson, Rowe, and others in situating phenomenology’s universalizing insights securely within a historicist idiom is one of the great intellectual feats of recent Shakespeare studies. It has armed the field with a new critical vocabulary for talking about feeling and emotion and has altered drastically received assumptions about what can be recovered from the past. So, where do we go from here? What new trajectories might be charted for phenomenology, and to what end for Shakespeare studies?

Heretical Phenomenology

The success of historical phenomenology suggests the potential viability of a turn to phenomenology more broadly construed, but to what would we be turning? In his monograph on the thought of Edmund Husserl, Paul Ricoeur suggests that phenomenology can be defined as “the sum of Husserl’s work and the heresies issuing from it.” Here Ricoeur emphasizes both the centrality of Husserl’s thought to the phenomenological project and the remarkable intellectual diaspora that leads outward from Husserl to figures ranging from Heidegger to Levinas, from Scheler to Merleau-Ponty, from Arendt to Derrida and Habermas and Ricoeur himself. And this remarkable diaspora continues: versions of the phenomenological project have more recently been taken up by analytical philosophy and cognitive science. Viewed from a certain perspective, the centrifugal force
of phenomenological thought is unsurprising. Famously, phenomenology brackets *noumena*—things in themselves—in order to attend to *phenomena*: things as appearances, things as apprehended by the subject. And the *phenomena* to which phenomenology might turn its attention are infinite, as numerous as the objects of human perception and cognition. Everything from coffeemakers and citrus smells to language and mathematical concepts, from friendship and politics to the experience of grief and love and boredom, is fair game for phenomenology. Moreover, phenomenologists from Husserl forward have defined phenomenology as a practice or method rather than a set of doctrines or precepts. And, as a practice that simply endeavors to describe experience as given, phenomenology is fundamentally open-ended and heterodox.

In this special issue, we embrace the infinite variety that the heterodox practice of phenomenology affords. We read a phenomenological Shakespeare “with” or alongside other discourses, topics, and approaches. Some of our contributors extend the project of historical phenomenology by attending to the history of the body and the senses in relation to law, theater, or religion. Some embrace phenomenology’s attempt to describe the dynamic relation of subject and object by essaying Shakespearean drama’s orchestration of mind and matter, people and things. Some look to the genealogy of modern phenomenology and attempt to address the way crucial precursors like Hegel and Aristotle might shape our understanding of a phenomenological approach to Shakespearean theater. Some address surprising destinations of the phenomenological diaspora in theology and ethics. What brings these disparate approaches together is a conviction that Shakespearean theater (constituted by the cognitive, the affective, the social, the material) is a performative arena friendly to phenomenological ideas and approaches. And, indeed, the philosophical project of phenomenology—the attempt to describe the experience of the world from the perspective of a being in and of the world—is not unlike the artistic project of the theater.

Above we mentioned the potentially infinite objects of phenomenological inquiry, but it is important to note that these things in and of themselves are not the focus of phenomenology; the phenomenologist approaches the dynamic relation between the human subject and the world of which that subject is always part and participant. Moreover, phenomenology is interested not only in the subject as the necessary lens that apprehends the knowable world but also in the fact that the apprehending subject is always situated within a scene that necessarily involves other people, other things. Phenomenology, then, has an affinity with the theater’s attempt to stage for its audiences minds and bodies and artifacts in dynamic relation, situations
and actions that evoke a world into which characters and spectators and readers alike are thrown. The point is not—or not simply—that the phenomenological attempt to describe human experience as it is given is somehow proximate to the theatrical attempt to evoke a lived-in world for the audience to enter and inhabit, critique and reflect upon. Rather, the point is that both phenomenology and theater are practices that offer a replica or simulacrum of human experience in an attempt to take up creatively what is given in experience. Both phenomenological description and theatrical dramatization—whether the goal is analysis or entertainment—depend on a suspension or bracketing of the world of experience, a framing of the object at hand, to see some aspect of that experiential world in some sort of exaggerated or reduced or clarified form.

One of Husserl’s maxims is that phenomenology is an attempt to recover “things themselves.” Phenomenology provides a way to address material culture, to attend to the things of the early modern world, without losing sight of the fact that there is no intelligible object world divorced from the subject. Many of our essays offer ways to think or rethink the interpenetration of self and world, the dialectic of mind and matter. In “Macbeth’s Martlets: Shakespearean Phenomenologies of Hospitality,” for instance, Julia Reinhard Lupton contends that hospitality is simultaneously “a theater of persons and a theater of things,” a dramatic action or series of actions that proffers the dynamic relation between a host of objects and “the provisional persons who tend them.” Teasing out the multiple significances of a rich passage in Macbeth, Lupton engages in a phenomenological analysis that illuminates the social theater of hospitality. Lupton observes—following Hannah Arendt—the continuum between dramatic action and political or social action, finding in Macbeth an engagement with the ways in which “affective labor, self-disclosing risks, and creaturely dependencies” are “disclosed by hospitality events.”

The relation of subject to object also underpins James Knapp’s essay concerning the phenomenality of images on the Shakespearean stage: “Static and Transformative Images in Shakespeare’s Dramatic Art.” Deploying the work of Emmanuel Levinas, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and Jean–Luc Marion, Knapp finds that the Shakespearean image, properly apprehended, leads not to knowledge or mastery but to revelation, a revelation that is a function of our “openness” to “the call” of the image. Central to Knapp’s argument is the insight that phenomenology and theater are not simply visually oriented but particularly oriented toward the image experienced in time. On the Shakespearean stage, the temporal and nonstatic image escapes simple comprehension and opens out to an experience of, or encounter with, something immaterial. In his essay
“Feeling Criminal in Macbeth,” Kevin Curran follows Lupton in tackling Macbeth, here from the perspective of law rather than hospitality. Offering Macbeth as a case study in the ways in which law might offer “a field for phenomenological speculation,” Curran observes that the murder of Duncan is a “sensible crime,” that is, a crime “born of the senses and experienced as sensation.” Curran contends that the famous dagger scene not only presents “criminality as a dynamic relationship between ideas, objects, and bodies” but also “offers a particularly compelling example of phenomenological thinking instantiated in theatrical terms.”

Curran’s essay points us toward the ways in which historical phenomenology speaks to the history of embodied experience. A few essays in the collection extend the project of historical phenomenology by attending to the necessarily embodied experience of the theater. In “‘The Eye of Man Hath Not Heard’: Shakespeare, Synaesthesia, and Post-Reformation Phenomenology,” Jennifer Waldron adopts Aristotelian theories of “synaesthesia,” or “sensing-with,” as models for theatrical experience grounded in the senses. For Waldron, Aristotelian synaesthesia or “joint perception” offers an understanding of self-awareness particularly appropriate to the communal and intersubjective experience of theater. Taking up a curious moment in Shakespeare’s A Midsummer Night’s Dream, Waldron challenges the current consensus with regard to post-Reformation conceptions of embodied experience, arguing that early Protestant views of the body resisted disenchantment. And, in Waldron’s phenomenologically inflected account, Reformation postures toward the body and the senses not only insisted on “the body as a special kind of object in the world” but necessarily “informed the experience of theatergoing in early modern England.” Michael Witmore’s contribution to the collection, “Shakespeare, Sensation, and Renaissance Existentialism,” also addresses Aristotelian conceptions of embodied experience and Aristotelian synaesthesia. The key term for Witmore’s essay is the so-called common sense, an Aristotelian concept that refers to that capacity to sense that one is sensing; for instance, one not only sees or touches an object but knows that one is engaged in the act of seeing or touching. For Witmore, the ultimate quarry here is the lived experience of the theater, which never simply produces emotions or feeling but “the fact of feeling that one feels.” Tracking key moments in some of Shakespeare’s late plays, Witmore posits that the experience of the “common sense” or “inner touch” helps explain not only “the kind of distribution of sense and sensation that is the theater’s stock in trade” but also the “communal and involving experience” of theater as shared pleasure.

Phenomenology is, of course, not merely something that can be deployed to think historically or about history but a phenomenon with its
own particular history. Two of our essays take up what we might call the
prehistory of phenomenology before its twentieth-century manifestation.
In “Hegel’s Inverted World, Cleopatra, and the Logic of the Crocodile,”
Jennifer Bates attends to the dialectical progression from “understand-
ing” to “life” in Hegel’s *Phenomenology of Spirit* in order to illuminate the
tautologies, inversions, and contradictions that characterize Shakespeare’s
*Antony and Cleopatra*. For Hegel, contradiction is “the principle of all self-
movement,” and, in Bates’s argument, it is in contradiction and the sublation
of contradiction that Antony and especially Cleopatra express an Hegelian
freedom and approach the indomitability of Hegel’s conception of “life.”
An Hegelian *avant la lettre*, Shakespeare embraces a Cleopatran “bio-logic”
of self-conscious contradiction, creating in *Antony and Cleopatra* “an experi-
ence of self-conscious, ‘living’ theatre.” Paul Kottman’s “No Greater Powers
Than We Can Contradict” observes that our understanding of modernity
is shaped by particular notions of the tragic that can be traced back to the
thought of Schelling and Hegel. Elaborating on Schelling’s understanding
of the relation of tragedy to human freedom and self-determination, Hegel
develops a theory of tragedy in which the tragic works to illuminate rifts
and fissures in social life; in a properly tragic progression of events, indi-
vidual acts bring suffering to the social realm but also expose fundamental
fault lines in the way we live together. Through a discussion of *Romeo and
Juliet*, Kottman shows how Shakespearean tragedy challenges Hegelian
notions of the tragic insofar as Shakespeare finds the source of tragedy not
in some external impediment or threat to human freedom but in “the im-
possibility of separating the subjective experience of freedom from an un-
freedom internal to it and constitutive of it.”

Phenomenology has loomed larger in the critical terrain in recent years
due to the “theological turn” in phenomenological studies, a turn related to
the recovery of ethics and religion in both continental philosophy and liter-
ary studies. The “turn to religion” in Shakespeare studies is, of course, allied
with these larger movements in critical thought, and the final two essays in
the collection take up the ethical and the religious in discussions of *King Lear*
and *Henry VIII (All Is True)*. In “‘This is above all strangeness’: King Lear,
Ethics, and the Phenomenology of Recognition,” James Kearney pursues
the device of *anagnorisis* or recognition in a phenomenological context in
order to think through the ways in which *King Lear* stages ethical encoun-
ters. Turning to the thought of Emmanuel Levinas and Maurice Blanchot,
he reads Shakespeare’s play in relation to the phenomenological tradition’s
struggle to grasp the phenomenon of the other person. In Kearney’s argu-
ment, Shakespeare “deploys the romance figure of Poor Tom as a kind of
ethical catalyst in the play, forcing Lear and Gloucester to wrestle both with
the fact of human abjection and with the phenomenological opacity of the other person.” Ken Jackson—whose influential review essay brought attention to the “religious turn” in early modern studies—reminds us of what is at stake in phenomenology’s “theological turn” in his essay “All Is True—Unless You Decide in Advance What Is Not.” Arguing against a return to phenomenology that would ignore that which is philosophically other, including and especially religious experience, Jackson turns to Marion’s notion of the “saturated phenomenon,” which attempts to describe the sheer excess of what is phenomenologically given. Finding traces of “saturated phenomena” in key scenes of Henry VIII (All Is True), Jackson suggests that in this play Shakespeare asks us to embrace the most radical directive of phenomenology: to accept “‘all’ that is given as ‘true.’”

This collection of essays seeks to illustrate how a phenomenological approach opens Shakespearean theater out to a host of possible conversations, exchanges, and insights. We have chosen the “Phenomenology and . . .” model (“Phenomenology and Sensation,” “Phenomenology and Law,” “Phenomenology and Hospitality”) precisely to demonstrate the range of possibilities opened up by a phenomenological approach. A collection entitled “Shakespeare and Phenomenology” might suggest something narrowly defined and esoteric: a narrow strain of philosophy pressed into the service of a subset of Shakespeare studies. It might suggest another insular subfield taking its place alongside a host of other sub-fields in what some have lamented is an increasingly fragmented landscape in early modern studies. On the contrary, we emphasize phenomenology as a practice or approach that can help different trends within the dynamic and robust field of Shakespeare studies speak to each other. Phenomenology broadly construed can become a common language that helps us theorize both material culture and performance studies, theater history and the discourses of the body, cognitive science and environmental criticism. At stake in reading Shakespeare phenomenologically is the opening up to theory of approaches that have been undertheorized and the opening out toward a common language of approaches that have been reluctant to speak to one another. Our hope is that the essays in this collection suggest the infinite variety that a phenomenological approach to Shakespeare yields.

NOTES
2. Representative examples include Mary Floyd-Wilson, English Ethnicity and Race in Early Modern Drama (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003); Elizabeth D. Harvey,


6. Paster, *Humoring the Body*.


12. Ibid.


