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Book Reviews

Criticism Editors

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Book Reviews


In regard to comparative literature, Claudio Guillén has suggested that studies of influence are "indispensable to the understanding of literature" and that "a series of concepts and terms" is needed to distinguish between genuine influence and "noninfluential echoes and parallelisms" (quoted from Hermerén, p. 303). Professor Hermerén has given us such a study. In fact, his remarkable book, the first of its kind, goes beyond Guillén's suggestions by providing a detailed systematic approach to studies of influence in art, literature, and comparative arts. The author's methodology is both descriptive and explicative:

It is descriptive insofar as it describes the reasons, methods, concepts, and assumptions used by critics and scholars; and it is explicative insofar as it calls attention to vagueness and ambiguity, tries to clarify concepts and distinctions, or to draw new distinctions and replace vague concepts with concepts that are less vague. (p. xiv)

Throughout his descriptive analyses of studies of influence, Professor Hermerén draws from the works of eminent scholars and critics of art and literature and tests the validity of their theories.

Because of the complexity of the book, Professor Hermerén has taken great care to organize his work with extraordinary precision. The first of the three main chapters deals with the clarification of artistic and literary influence and distinguishes among different kinds of influence; the second chapter concentrates on the necessary conditions for influence to have taken place; and the third focuses on the measurement of influence—an analysis of methods to grade the degree, strength, and size of influence. In essence, Chapter 4 is a coda, offering some conclusions and practical applications of the material studied. Each of the chapters is constructed on a section-subsection basis (1.1, 1.2, etc.), beginning with an "Introduction" which lays the groundwork for discussion and analysis and ending with a section entitled "Concluding Remarks" which serves as a summary and commentary on the heart of the chapter. The chapters are supported by pertinent illustrations of works of art, diagrams elucidating points of discussion and analysis, and useful formulas reducing concepts of influence to their basic expression.

Chapter 1 is the longest section of the book and introduces crucial distinctions among six kinds of influence; these distinctions form an essential checklist for consultation in any study of influence in art and literature. (I believe they can be applied to influence studies in music as well.) The distinctions are neatly categorized as non-artistic and artistic influence, direct and indirect influence, and positive and negative influence. Non-artistic influences are exerted by forces
outside of art and literature: travel, religion, love, social milieu, political environment, and so forth. The author cites the example of Delacroix's expedition to Morocco in 1832 as having strong influence on his paintings, *Les Femmes d'Alger*, for instance. From this viewpoint, we could point to Mendelssohn's trip to the Hebrides and his *Hebrides* overture or Chopin's sojourn at Majorca and some of his *Preludes*. The concepts of artistic, direct, and positive influences are embodied in Professor Hermerén's discussion of "genuine influence." One of the illustrations of genuine influence is the close artistic relationship between Picasso and Braque in the decade after 1908. During this time, the two artists influenced each other to such a degree that by 1911-12 it becomes difficult to distinguish the authorship of some of their works (cf. Braque's *Man With a Guitar*, 1911 and Picasso's *Accordionist*, 1911). Here we have a situation of direct artistic influence without the intrusion of an intermediary as in indirect influence. Positive influence, an attracting element, is shown in the similar composition, techniques, motifs, and styles of Picasso and Braque. Conversely, negative influence, a repelling element, inspires artists and writers to create works antithetical to other artists and writers, works which display "antithetical similarities." All of these concepts are elaborately developed with impeccable logic and germane examples. What is particularly helpful to future studies of influence is the author's list of requirements for the determination of genuine influence. Another interesting feature of this chapter is the section called "Further Distinctions." In this section, Professor Hermerén defines accurately such terms as sketch, copy, borrowing, source, paraphrase, model, allusion, and forgery. He makes them much more exact than usual definitions and places them into contexts useful to studies of influence.

The following two chapters are highly technical in their extensive use of formulas and require very careful reading. Chapter 2 emphasizes five "necessary conditions" of influence. The three *external* conditions analyzed are The Temporal Requirement A ("If X influenced the creation of Y with respect to a, then Y was made after X with respect to a"), The Requirement of Contact (direct and indirect contact between artists and writers), and The Temporal Requirement B ("If X influenced the creation of Y with respect to a, then Y with respect to a was made after C, where C is the first contact between X and the creator of Y"). The two *internal* conditions are Similarity between works and Change, whether influence exerted on a certain artist or writer has in some way transformed his creations. Each of these conditions presents many "ifs" and "buts"; however, the author patiently works them out in formulary concepts that are irreducible. For example, in dealing with Similarity, Professor Hermerén gives an effective conceptual framework for testing its presence: levels of similarity (structure, composition, symbolism, motif, etc.), extensiveness of similarity (number of levels present), exclusiveness of similarity (restriction of similarity to two works), and precision of similarity.

The third chapter presents a notable checklist of methods that can be employed in measuring the strength of influence: the size of similarities, the size of change, the extensiveness of change, the importance of change, and the duration of influence. One of the interesting approaches used is to measure the measurements of critics and scholars studying influence. In one instance, the author tackles K. L. Goodwin's discussion of Ezra Pound's influence on Yeats and Eliot, and states that Goodwin's measurement reveals
that the initial resistance to influence from Pound is greater in Yeats than
in Eliot, and that it accordingly requires more evidence to show that
Pound influenced Yeats than it requires to show that Pound influenced
Eliot. (p. 282)

There are many such discussions of critics and scholars of art and literature, and
they are instructive for future studies of influence.

Professor Hermerén has presented us with the first systematic approach to
the complex study of influence, and his book is an impressive contribution to
scholarship and criticism. It is a study that goes beyond the disciplines of art
and literature; indeed, the appeal of this work is enhanced by its interdisciplinary
caracter in that it also includes aesthetics, psychology, and philosophy as they
apply to discussions and analyses of influence. Without question, Professor
Hermerén's book will serve as an essential tool and guide for future studies of
influence in the arts.

Richard Stoding

Wayne State University


In the preface to his work, Professor Lindenberger informs us that he attempted
to formulate some ideas on the relation of literature and reality in an under-
graduate seminar he gave in 1957 at the University of California, Riverside. He
was struck, he tells us, by "both the promise of the subject and the unripeness
of my ideas." Time has changed only the latter. Now, as Avalon Foundation
Professor of Humanities in Comparative Literature and English, and chairman
of the Comparative Literature program at Stanford University, Professor Linden-
berger makes clear his readiness and ripeness are all.

The work is a significant one in many ways. While his subtitle announces what
he hopes to be his focus, he begins his preface by telling us what his work is
not: a study of the development of historical drama as a genre or a close
reading of representative great texts. Still, even in these areas, he manages to
provide valuable insights. By his focusing on major dramatists such as Shakespeare,
Corneille, Racine, Schiller, and Brecht, he manages not only to contribute some
unity to his work, but also to probe carefully into their plays from a number of
fresh, rewarding perspectives so that even a specialist can learn much—say, for
example, from his reading of Henry V in his section on "history as ceremony."
The scope of the work, moreover, is admirable in the very etymological sense,
for it extends from German, French, and English literature and criticism, to
opera, to painting and sculpture (though cursorily), to modern productions
à la Grotowski. His preface acknowledges the abundant and superior assistance
he has had in investigating these various fields.

This ambitious work is at once philosophical and easy in tone. The juxtaposi-
tion of even the epigraphs to his chapters demonstrates a seasoned thoughtfulness.
Although the work is the result of twenty years of thinking on the subject, the
approach is freshly vital, as the author happily alternates between a forcefulness and a convincingly suggestive tone. He questions himself as he labors—and the questions are not merely rhetorical or peripheral ones. The work is a seminal one, for while many have looked at literary texts to focus on the relationship of literature and reality, few have done so without being bound by limitations of either a single time or author—interested in "reality" only as it enlightened their view of a particular literary text or author's vision.

The speculative easiness, nonetheless, made me at least ultimately question the overly free organization and "conclusions" of the work. Perhaps the kind of unity and format I look for is but the hobogoblin of foolishly consistent minds, since often the very strengths of his chapters are in his tangents. The work does, after all, make a number of documented and developed points as it progresses (I follow here but the direction of the table of contents): 1) that historical dramas "afford a special opportunity to observe the transactions between imaginative literature and the world—which literature variously attempts to imitate, to attack, to influence, and to transcend," 2) that (and here for me Professor Lindenberger is especially provocative) just as historical "facts" are reinterpreted by each age, so does each age's audience "reinterpret" the values and characters of historical plays; 3) that there are characteristic dramatic shapes to historical plays—among them, the conspiracy, the tyrant, and the martyr play; 4) that history "magnifies" as tragedy, as ceremony, and as panorama; 5) that history is often a middle ground between tragedy, comedy, and other genres; 6) that these other genres such as romance and the pastoral often dramatize the boundaries of the historical world; and, 7) that historical drama attempts to approximate historical thought. While I fail to see these as a progressing and clearly directed unity (despite the transition immediately preceding each section), none of these topics is insignificant, scantily discussed, or in any way superfluous.

Finally, for me, the most significant conclusion by this distinctive mind was not so much a definite simplistic final statement concerning the relation of literature and reality, but a demonstration of the complex process whereby a work of literature by its changing relation to a changing vision of the past in a changing present remains eternally dynamic. Thus, for example, the author points to the recurring conflict in certain works of art between ahistorical (or timeless) time and the historical time which changes with each age's changing perception of it.

Neither trying simply to categorize or to be limited by historical drama, the scope of this work unites the best of literary criticism with an uncommonly philosophical view of realities. This concise book is to be savored more than once—dwelling on those sections that interest you most.

**Philip Traci**

*Wayne State University*

In a good, brief introduction the editors comment on their aims in compiling this group of previously unpublished essays:

The general importance of rhetorical study to this poetry now seems thoroughly accepted. By compiling the essays in this volume the editors hope to represent the kind of work actively being done by younger scholars and to forecast by example some of the directions which this work will take in years to come. (p. 1)

In retrospect, they remark:

The tone of the collection is a contentious one. . . . If [the authors] arrive at different answers to common questions, they are united in their belief that the understanding of Renaissance poetry requires painstaking attention to intellectual and literary traditions. . . . One overriding concern, perhaps surprisingly, is with what could be termed the limits of rhetorical criticism. There is a distinct feeling that too much rhetorical criticism has been of an external and rather mechanical nature, contenting itself with glossing figures and tropes from the rhetorical handbooks or merely labeling the divisions of a poem with the parts of an oration . . . our writers direct themselves to the description of speaker's voice; to the definition of audience, both fictive and real; and . . . to the way in which the rhetoric of these poems directly involves the reader in the formulation of their meanings. Finally, we might note that rhetoric is not treated as an end, but consistently related to such humane and philosophic concerns as ethics and morality, epistemology and ontology. . . . [The] critical approach . . . is properly syncretic. (pp. 1-3)

The approaches here are indeed so syncretic that a more accurate (if less beguiling) title for the collection might have been “Rhetoric and Renaissance Poetry.” The editors note “certain imbalances and omissions (e.g., there should be more attention devoted to narrative and philosophical poetry; no essays on Jonson and on Marvell are included)” ; there are also no essays on songs or on dramatic poetry, no substantial considerations of the epigram or of verse letters (except for Daniel’s) or of Milton. (“Wyatt to Crashaw” would more accurately indicate the time span of the volume.) Yet, although not all the contributors can still be included among “younger scholars” without some stretching, the collection interestingly suggests the kinds of scholarship and criticism which a number of teachers and students who have thought about rhetoric and Renaissance poetry are doing now; it also includes some very fine essays.

The two studies with the farthest-reaching claims concerning theory are those by the editors: Waddington’s “Shakespeare’s Sonnet 15 and the Art of Memory” and Sloan’s “The Crossing of Rhetoric and Poetry in the English Renaissance.” In a “full analysis” of the sonnet, Waddington, intentionally “Playing Tuve to [Stephen] Booth’s Empson,” argues, with the particular help of Panofsky and Frances Yates, for a “Prudence tradition” (concerned with past, present, and future as considered by memory, intelligence, and foresight), as pervasive as
Martz's "meditative tradition," a tradition particularly powerful because of the "Renaissance discovery of time" (Ricardo Quinones' argument) which partly accounts for the new "extraordinary quality of 'sincerity,' a rhetoric of un-premeditated presentation." Although the level of generality and abstraction is rather high, the theoretical argument is intelligent, up-to-date, and stimulating. As for the criticism, I am not convinced by all the puns Waddington discovers, and I am not clear about his (or my) reading of the crucial eighth line of the sonnet ("And wear their brave state out of memory"). Occasionally the theory seems to distort the reading of the poem: it seems strange to argue that the concluding couplet ("And, all in war with Time for love of you, / As he takes from you, I engraft you new") "looks forward to an action not yet begun (it is, remember, only foreseen)," when the entire sonnet ("When I consider everything that grows") clearly implies a continuously repeated present action: it happens every time.

Waddington gives a good summary of Sloan's major argument: "The poets of the late sixteenth century, left by the Ramists without their very stock-in-trade, turned from rhetoric to meditational theory, in which they found sanctions to their use of passionate discourse through self-directed rhetoric, projecting a voice which the poetic audience only overheard": the modern theoretical movement seems to be from Tuve through Ong to Martz and Yates. Sloan's essay, chiefly centered on the notions of *inventio*, is again learned, stimulating—and often highly generalized. Sloan is harder on the rhetoricians than some of the anti-rhetorical critics of thirty years ago: "Poetry—at least that poetry that we admire most from the English Renaissance—depends upon persons, voices . . . , images . . . , and a growth that is as inevitable and as miraculous as human growth. Nowhere in the rhetorical theory of the time is there the slightest acknowledgement of this necessity." He can even say, "as is usually true of poets and never true of Ramists . . . ."

Where that leaves us with Henry King and John Milton (neither of whom Sloan mentions) is unclear, but perhaps by "Ramists" Sloan means only the professional writers of manuals in the sixteenth century: he later remarks, "By the middle of the seventeenth century, rhetoricians began to catch up with developments in poetry," and his comments on both Thomas Wright's *The Passions of the Minde in Generall* (1604) and Obadiah Walker's *Some Instructions Concerning the Art of Oratory* (1659) are particularly interesting. (The cause may be a praiseworthy attempt to get away from the older rhetorical jargon, but Professor Sloan, like a good many of the other writers here, tends to overwork the word "stance": it occurs eight times on pages 229-230.)

Sloan's and Waddington's essays seem chiefly concerned with what we have come to know as "intellectual history": theory concerning the sources and causes and changes in the patterns of thought and value of writers or artists from the past. The major question about the relationship between such intellectual history and the criticism of poetry concern not only the accuracy or adequacy of the theory but also how much the theory of learning helps us both to read (rather than merely classify or catalogue) poems from a period and to talk about them illuminatingly to others. If a reader thinks a historian has incorrectly or inadequately understood poems or passages which he cites as evidence, he is likely to doubt the validity of the theory; but if even the most well-substantiated and elegant theory is treated as an ultimate truth that anticipates future
problems and makes qualifications irrelevant, a reader can come to doubt its critical usefulness. Rosemond Tuve once remarked that she deeply regretted Tillyard's *Elizabethan World Picture*, since it had convinced so many students that they knew exactly what Renaissance poems said before they read them. That the problems are real and still with us may be suggested by the infrequency with which our most learned scholars turn out to be also our best critical readers. The chief critical advantage that readers who know something of Renaissance poetry and rhetoric might be expected to possess over other "intellectual historians" is that they should have become thoroughly accustomed to the notion that whenever language is used, *pace* Yeats, some sort of "audience" is assumed or created, consciously or unconsciously. While I think this is a signal advantage, that it is no guarantee of a successful solution to the basic problems may be suggested by my impression that most of the writers here experience some difficulty in moving from their theoretical concerns to useful criticism.

Since a good deal has already been done with the "deliberative" and "epideictic," John Shawcross, in "The Poet as Orator: One Phase of His Judicial Pose," turns to Aristotle's third kind of rhetoric, the "forensic," particularly to the poetic use of one "forensic" device: *distributio-recapitulatio*—"the citing of a series of specific facts or arguments followed by a summing up or restating of these same facts or arguments in brief form." Since he states that most of the major poets (Sidney, Raleigh, Southwell, Chapman, Jonson, Dryden, Campion, George Herbert, Herrick, King, Suckling, Cowley, Denham, Waller, Marvell, and Traherne, among others) did not use the device, its importance seems questionable; and I do not find that a consideration of its uses proves particularly illuminating in Shawcross's analyses of individual poems. Since "recapitulation" is such a common device in songs, dances, games, and elsewhere, one rather misses a demonstration of how it differs from those uses in its "forensic" context. In "The Humanism of Sir Thomas Wyatt," Thomas Hannen seems to try to find rhetorical patterns in the poems as evidence of Wyatt's "seriousness." He valiantly attempts to interpret almost all metrical or syntactic awkwardness as expressive and controlled. I find unconvincing his attempt to work out fictionalized alternative readings (and even stress patterns), dependent upon different expected responses from "courtiers" and "serious" readers. Leonard Nathan, like Hannen, seems to assume that life and literature were intrinsically less "complex" in the middle ages than in the sixteenth century. In "Gascoigne's 'Lullabie' and Structures in the Tudor Lyric," Nathan eliminates the Latin Hymns, Dante, Chaucer, and Scots literature from his discussion and compares relatively dull fifteenth-century English lyrics employing "enumerative" structure with Gascoigne's fine poem. (I am perplexed by his finding irony "so foreign" to the poems of Charles d'Orleans.) Michael Murrin in "The Rhetoric of Fairyland" considers the where and when of Spenser's fairy realm, the characters, the philosophical and theological implications, the discontinuities and anachronisms. Although there are many interesting observations, the method seems mechanical: "Now we must try to sift truth from hyperbole and enter the realm of psychology. The questions which we will ask, the *why* for which we will devise answers, provide the mechanism of transition." One can wonder whether such compartmentalized procedures are likely to prove helpful for understanding the experience of simultaneity immediate to the process of reading. Stylistically also
things occasionally become a bit mechanized: on pages 84-85 one finds both "euhemerist" and "euhemerized" as well as "euhemerism" twice and "euhemeristic" three times.

Anthony LaBranche's "Samuel Daniel: A Voice of Thoughtfulness" is an essentially sound, if perhaps overly-apologetic, treatment of a good and occasionally neglected poet. In assuming that "we" find Daniel lacking, LaBranche never notes how marvelously satisfying Daniel seemed to Wordsworth. Michael McCanles relates notions of the "inexpressible," hyperbole, and Kant's theory to Crashaw's practice in "The Rhetoric of the Sublime in Crashaw's Poetry." He is probably correct in stating that "all the poems discussed here operate on the assumption that the aesthetic experience of a 'sublime' transcendence of conceptualization is analogous to a trans-human religious or mystical experience"; but I doubt that "Crashaw's poetry requires (my italics) the reader to become a rhetorical critic, and to incorporate his recognition of the 'exaggeration' and 'inadequacies' of hyperbole into his understanding of the poetry itself"—unless one assumes that one must be concerned with the theory in order to respond properly to any use of hyperbole. At least Austin Warren, Mario Praz, and Robert Petersson, who have done some of the most interesting writing about Crashaw (and whom McCanles does not cite), anticipated a good number of McCanles's points without so strong a theoretical concern.

The two essays which strike me as putting rhetorical (and other) theory and knowledge most excitingly to the service of fresh and illuminating criticism of specific poems are Stanley Fish's "Catechizing the Reader: Herbert's Socratic Rhetoric" and Arthur Marotti's "Donne and 'The Extasie'." They are both splendid essays and should be read by anyone seriously concerned with seventeenth-century poetry. I would guess that both will prove widely influential.

Fish's title indicates that he has given up (one hopes for good) the attempt in Self-Consuming Artifacts to contrast Socratic "dialectic" as good with "rhetoric" as bad. Fish begins here with contrasting the earlier emphasis on Herbert's "order" and "inevitability" with the more recent emphasis of Robert Montgomery, Valerie Carnes, Coburn Freer, and Helen Vendler on "vacillations," the "tentative," or the "provisional." He takes as basic to a proper reading Freer's recognition of that "uniquely Herbertian quality of order and surprise": "The problem then is to find a way of talking that neither excludes Herbert from his poems (by emphasizing their order), nor makes them crudely autobiographical (by making them all surprise)." Fish finds the solution in Chapter XXI of A Priest to the Temple, "The Parson Catechizing":

The order belongs to the Questionist-poet who knows from the beginning where he is going. The surprise belongs to the reader who is "driven" by "questions well ordered" to discover for himself "that which he knows not." Herbert's questions are not always posed directly, in the conventional grammatical form, any more than are the questions of Socrates. Like the philosopher he strikes deliberately naive poses that are calculated to draw a critical or corrective response from an interlocutor; that is, he makes assertions which function as questions because they invite the reader to supply either what is missing or what is deficient. (pp. 176-7)
Fish reads “Love-Joy” as a dialogue rather than a narrative and “The Bunch of Grapes” as working in a more complicated fashion on the catechistical model: I find both readings exciting and generally convincing. The “catechist” is an example of “sincere role-playing.” With “The Bunch of Grapes” “there is no equivocation or re-inventing if the mode of the poem is acknowledged to be rhetorical; for then the change in tone and direction one feels here marks the moment when the catechism has ended and Questionist and Answerer share a level of understanding, an understanding one has earned and the other laboured to give.” My only misgiving here concerns the sweeping claim “that Herbert consciously composed The Temple on a catechistical model.” I hope that in his forthcoming The Living Temple: Herbert and Catechizing Fish is not going to try to force all of Herbert’s poems into the model which works so well for the poems he discusses here and for many of the others. At any rate, Fish has once again suggested a fresh model for the “rhetorical” reading of Renaissance poetry.

Marotti has boldly tackled one of the most difficult and controversial poems of Donne—or of the entire English Renaissance—and the result is a tour de force. I can hardly remember an occasion since Rosemond Tuve’s early essay on Herbert’s “Sacrifice” when so much learning has been put to the use of a fresh and impressive reading of a major poem. And in some respects Marotti’s achievement may be even more impressive, since rather than exploring the working of one liturgical and iconographic tradition, he explores and uses many different traditions: Neoplatonic and Aristotelian and Christian doctrines of love and being, poetic genres and analogues, the historical situation, Donne’s biography and reputation and the habits of his social circle, rhetorical shifts and strategies that can change the “audience” within a poem (in “The Extasie” the reader is or becomes “witness, sympathizer, critic, and convert”), even Freudian criticism—all with cogency and verve and tact. Marotti’s manner can be a little sharp occasionally with his elders, but his essay is never ponderous or dull and one initially sceptical reader, at least, finds it astonishingly convincing. (A second reading helped resolve a number of my initial difficulties; I would still wish to query or qualify a few statements and to argue with the suggested reading of “The Sunne Rising.”)

Marotti sees “The Extasie” “as a rhetorically sophisticated defense of conjugal love, written originally, perhaps, as an exercise in literary imitation, but, nevertheless, rooted in Donne’s deepest personal experiences and designed for a coterie audience familiar with both his life and his art.” (Donne’s “role-playing . . . must be seen in its biographical context.”) “In Donne’s verse, the ‘purer’ Neoplatonic tradition—characterized by ‘abstract spiritual love’—flowed into the verse letters and poems to noble ladies; it found a home in the fictional amorousness that bridged, and measured, the distance between members of different classes in the social hierarchy.” In “The Extasie,” however, the reader, like “the hypothetical auditor-observer,” is assumed to be an antagonistic Neoplatonist (perhaps like the Sir Edward Herbert of “An Ode upon a Question Moved”) who “regards natural sexual urges as ‘lustful and corrupt desires,’ and marriage, therefore, as a lower form of love.” Marotti follows carefully the changes, in tense and tone as well as argument, in “Donne’s most complexly argued lyric.” In the course of the poem the reader-auditor-observer is forced to abandon his definition of love and to accept the lover’s. Marotti’s final paragraph is fine:
Treating us, paradoxically, both as sympathizers and critics, Donne uses us in “The Extasie”; we are his audience of “weake men.” Put through a process of humiliation and enlightenment, our minds are tied in knots by a dazzling display of logical and pseudo-logical reasoning and sophisticated rhetoric. . . . But Donne makes of our intellectual exhaustion an object lesson: we discover the inadequacy of our narrow conception of love and the feebleness of our discursive reason as we are brought to a truth only intuitive understanding, poetic symbolism, and intellectual paradox can reach. In the end, the poem offers us a valuable gift, a vision of incarnate, conjugal love set in a rich frame of reference that extends from the bloodstream to the heavenly spheres, from atoms to the Creator, from Plato to the seventeenth century, a love that can be treated comically as well as seriously because it is both profoundly human and wittily self-aware. “The Extasie” may be one of the “squibs” Donne kindled in his melancholy, or, in Walton’s terms, a “paradox” in which he justified his marriage in the face of the world’s “severe censures.” It may be the gesture of an extraordinarily learned and gifted love poet proving he still deserved the title in his domesticated state. But, finally, the mystery of “love revealed” in the Book of Nature and in that small volume that is the human body, is a reality that transcends the narrow worlds of literary philosophical traditions, the poet’s personal experiences, and the reader’s awareness. Donne’s genius, here, as in the best of his poems (and sermons) is his ability to let us share in the experience of discovering a large truth, and, in such a transaction, the conventional distinctions between life and art, poet and persona, reader and poem begin to dissolve. (p. 173)

I doubt that Marotti’s essay could have been written without much of the work on rhetoric during the past thirty or forty years. His essay suggests how rewarding that work can prove to be for criticism.

University of Rochester

Joseph H. Summers


George Chapman’s “sultry genius”—the phrase is C S. Lewis’s—both excites and exacerbates critics. His excellences are so frequently dimmed by murky ideas and tortuous syntax, along with a declared disregard of the general reader, that one is often hard put to ascertain exactly what he was about in his nondramatic poetry. Whether the obscurity results from an assumed posture designed to appeal to a coterie audience or from a strategy devised to justify hasty writing is a moot question. The latter, at least, provides a reasonable explanation: while Thomas Phaer boasted that he needed only twenty days on the average to translate a book of the Aeneid, Chapman could claim that he needed only a total of fifteen weeks to translate the last half of the Iliad.

Nonetheless, his stance as hieratic poet had critical sanction based on the
etymological argument of the poet as \textit{vates}, while its corollary of \textit{furor poeticus} was based not only on authority (Plato) but also on tradition (\textit{orator fit, poeta nascitur}). In the main, however, such critical sanction served as a defensive response invoked to counter the poet whippers; general belief was that one could indeed become a "maker," and Sir Philip Sidney, for one, specified the means—Arts, Imitation, Exercise. The steady production of rhetorical manuals, together with the educational practice of imitating classical models, obviously reinforced belief in a "poetical science" (Puttenham's phrase). Like other Elizabethans then, Chapman had a method at hand, but all too frequently his conception was flawed in execution.

In \textit{The Mind's Empire}, Raymond B. Waddington focuses on Chapman's nondramatic work. Attempting at the outset to establish his poetic identity (immediately enunciated as distinct from that of Donne and the Metaphysicals), he finds a consistency of critical theory in the assorted prefaces, dedications, and epistles. This rests on contempt for an audience of the many and admiration for an audience of the few (p. 5): "I rest as resolute as \textit{Seneca}, satisfying myself if but a few, if one, or if none like it." Yet a poet noted for his lucidity and common sense repeats the same \textit{topos}:

\begin{quote}
And for my part if only one allow  
The care my laboring spirits take in this,  
He is to me a theatre large enow,  
And his applause only sufficient is:  

\ldots \ldots \ldots \ldots  

But what if none? It cannot yet undo  
The love I bear unto this holy skill;  
This is the work that I was born to do,  
This is my scene, this part I must fulfill.
\end{quote}

(Samuel Daniel, \textit{Musophilus}, 567-70; 575-78)

Clearly then a Senecan motif in itself is insufficient to provide the key to Chapman's poetic identity. Yet a further suggestion may be found in the "stance of the platonic mystagogue" who chooses to conceal through allegory. Though working consciously in a public mode in adhering to generic forms (except, that is, in \textit{Ovid's Banquet of Sense}, p. 12), he adopts, it is said, an "inner form," which is symbolic and mythic, in order to structure his poetry.

The longest (and perhaps the murkiest) chapter is devoted to interpreting \textit{The Shadow of Night}, perhaps the murkiest of the poems. Here Chapman is to be seen as imitating not the form but the "spirit" of the \textit{Orphic Hymns}. (p. 49) A threefold manifestation of Luna, Diana, and Hecate, united in Cynthia, supplies a narrative structure for the corresponding planes of allegorical activity, which, in turn, have three manifestations—philosophic, political, and poetic. (p. 51) Despite the neat formulation and the lengthy exegesis, the conceptual element remains essentially dark. Is this an instance of flawed execution or of the poet's suiting his manner to his matter?

\textit{Ovid's Banquet of Sense} (1595), the subject of the fourth chapter, is a much better though still daunting poem which has occasioned much debate. Here Waddington begins with two forthright assertions: Chapman was publicly taking sides against the vogue for erotic Ovidian poems "seemingly epitomized for him
by *Venus and Adonis*” and he was darkly proclaiming “his allegiance to the Ovid of the allegorized *Metamorphoses.*” Hard evidence for the first assertion, however, is non-existent. Evidence for the second rests on Waddington’s conviction that “the moralist and philosopher associated with the *Metamorphoses* literally was a different person from the *praecceptor amoris* associated with the *Ars Amatoria* and the *Amores.*” But this purported fission of the Elizabethans’ favorite Latin poet into “moralist and philosopher” (later called the “true” Ovid) and “praecceptor amoris” will not do even if the notion were to be restricted to Chapman’s small volume published during the height of the vogue for erotic poetry. Among its commendatory sonnets are two by John Davies (the rakish lawyer of the Middle Temple who was to gull the excesses of the sonneteers penning their “piteous groans”). In one of these he acknowledges Ovid as indeed the first “praecceptor amoris” (“Love’s first gentle master”); now, however, it is Chapman himself—thanks to the favor of Venus—who is the second:

She makes (in thee) the spirit of Ovid move,
And calls thee second Master of her love.

The resulting suggestion that the volume was designed as a “single conception” should thus perhaps be taken as a simplification in behalf of a thesis. In addition to the longish epyllion (117 stanzas), it contains ten sonnets collectively entitled *A Coronet for His Mistress Philosophy*; these are accepted by Waddington as providing a philosophic alternative to Ovid’s *Banquet.* In addition, there are two amatory poems which have been assigned not to Chapman but to his friend Richard Stapleton, as Waddington acknowledges in a note. His theory should perhaps be re-considered on pragmatic grounds: in introducing the vogue of the epyllion in 1589, Thomas Lodge also found it necessary to eke out his small volume containing *Glaucus and Scylla* with a complaint, a satire, and sundry sweet sonnets. Requirements of publication by impecunious poets (and Chapman was to be twice imprisoned for debt) did not always allow for such niceties as single conceptions (even by single poets).

To stress his notion, Waddington makes much of the emblem on the title page (a bent stick in water with the defiant motto from Persius—“Quis legat hac? Nemo Hercule, Nemo vel duo vel nemo”) and he cites lines from Henry Peacham’s book of emblems (1612) to explain the picture. Two of these in fact, gloss not only Chapman’s poem but also the ideas of some of his critics:

So soon the sense deceiv’d doth judge amiss
And fools will blame, whereas none error is.

Waddington’s view (following Frank Kermode) is that *Ovid’s Banquet* delineates not a transmogrification of sensory experience but a “sensual debauch” which we are to believe is then philosophically countered by the inclusion of the ten sonnets. Yet Waddington also affirms that the poem is “constructed to permit two differing perspectives on the action and interpretations of the meaning” though, to be sure, they are not “equally valid.” We are thus confronted with a poetic construct that is based on Platonic or neo-Platonic theories, conventions of perspective and illusionistic representation, optical theory, alchemical symbolism, Hermetic doctrine, solar myth, philosophic considerations of the senses,
(p. 141) and, finally, numerology. Despite the possibility of these diametrically opposed interpretations, we are, nonetheless, to believe that it lays "fair claim" to being an "absolute" poem in Chapman's terms. Yet we are also to believe that its abrupt ending is "a trick, a cheat, the pornographer's conspiratorial wink designed to convey to the gullible the illusion that, were it not for the need to outwit the vigilant censor, he would be getting something really titillating and not merely this tame stuff." (p. 135) Can this be true? Can such an ending be compatible with Chapman's purported "customary moral stance?" (p. 131) Or are we perhaps to accept it as akin to Marston's notorious epyllion, The Metamorphosis of Pygmalion's Image (1598), which was, according to its author, only a "dissembling shift"?

To reach his conclusions, Waddington ignores the variety of literary attitudes and stances available to the poets of the 1590's; in addition, it seems to me, he also overreads the text. Ovid's Banquet is called a "perspective poem" (a kind, admittedly, permitting "the deception of the unwary"); yet in Waddington's discussion the term shifts from its application to optics proper to that of trick perspective pictures and then to a metaphoric "right" perspective. The issue of trick perspective centers on the fountain, which from afar looks like a heavy, weeping Niobe but from nearby is seen as neither weeping, heavy, nor a woman. Confusing the metaphorical with the literal, Waddington states that such trick perspectives can only be "rightly" viewed from a distance. Yet in addition to the lines from Peacham cited above acknowledging the potential for sense distortion, he cites from Richard II where to distinguish perspective forms is, quite specifically, to see "awry," whereas "rightly [i.e., actually] gazed upon,/ [They] show nothing but confusion." (II.i.18-24) In Waddington's view "trick" perspective thus becomes synonymous with a morally "right" perspective.

His overreading relates to what can only be called "submerged" references. For example, the lines beginning "Whereat his wit assumed fiery wings" (st. 15) and "Methinks they [the notes of Corinna's song] raise me from the heavy ground /And move me swimming in the yielding air" (st. 28) are taken to refer to Phaeton and Icarus (pp. 132, 138, interpretations initially set forth by J. P. Meyers, Jr.) The reference to Prometheus (st. 38) is accepted as portraying not the "artist-creator" but "the thief punished for stealing fire from the sun." Yet the stress of the simile is on inspiring "manly life" in "lumps of earth," even in the 1970's scarcely a negative one. The impact of Corinna's loveliness on Ovid is described in an admittedly submerged reference (since Chapman glosses it) to Actaeon: "A sight taught magic his deep mystery,/Quicker in danger than Diana's eye." (st. 41) But, as the poet of the Metamorphoses and the Tristia says, Actaeon was punished, so fate would have it ("sic illum fata ferebant," Met. 3. 176), for an unintentional (not an "unlucky," p. 59) offence ("inscius Actaeon vidit sine veste Dianam," Tristia, 2. 105), and thus the simile functions to underscore the lightning immediacy of beauty's impact on the viewer rather than as an "admonitory" inference that "Ovid should not act like Actaeon" or that Corinna "does not act like Diana."

In addition to overreadings, there are misreadings. The poem admittedly opens with "a depiction of natural generative process, of the masculine sun with its generative heat fertilizing earth to create life," but it then shifts, Waddington says, to "the artificial, the sterile, the nonliving in the garden with its fountain
and statuary.” (p. 137) However one interprets the symbolism of the statuary, Niobe, whether viewed from near or afar, is a fountain pouring forth water to provide a bathing spot for Corinna. And that spot is a “soft enflowered bank” luxuriantly displaying a diversity of living plants (23 specified within two stanzas), ranging from nightshade to enamel’d pansies “us’d at Nuptials still.” Like Donne’s “pregnant bank” in “The Ecstasy,” such a depiction scarcely suggests the sterile, the non-living.

By taking such submerged references, together with such explicit ones as Corinna styled a “Roman Phoebe,” as strictly “admonitory,” we are to accept that Ovid has “preversely” made Corinna a sun goddess: “Her sight, his sun.” Yet this is the conventional metaphor of love poetry which Chapman rendered most effectively in translating Musaeus—“And [Leander] breath’d insatiate of the absent Sun.” We are to accept Ovid as “a Niobe”—passive, feminine, but nonetheless presumptuous though we are never told why it is that he addresses a prayer to the goddess of nuptial rites (stt. 46-48) before venturing to look on Corinna. We are furthermore to accept that Chapman’s scheme of the senses (auditus, olfactus, visus, gustus, tactus) is arranged in a descending order (though the position of visus, despite its less prestigious position, can be justified as a “thematic” center). Still, Ovid’s apostrophe to touch as “King of the King of Senses” (st. 107) was to be repeated in 1599 by Drayton, also a literary neo-Platonist at times, in his sonnet “To the Senses” where touch is called “King of Senses greater than the rest.” Faced with these poetic and intellectual inconsistencies, the reader must conclude that he has not yet been provided with a satisfactory clue to Chapman’s poem.

Primed by Waddington’s thesis of a dichotomized Latin poet, we are not surprised to find in continuing Hero and Leander, Chapman (though the second “praeceptor amoris” in the eyes of a contemporary) set about presenting the “correct” kind of Ovidian love story “by modulating from the Amores to the Metamorphoses.” (p. 156) The continuation, we are to believe, lays claim to “epic stature” not because Chapman, as he himself says (V. 495-96), delays the tragic ending through the insertion of digressions but because he has infused the epyllion with Pythagorean philosophy and numerological symbolism, As has long been recognized, and as Waddington acknowledges, Chapman offers the appeal of civil order in place of Marlovian ardor.

Yet to ignore the underlying tensions in Chapman’s two superior poetic productions is to miss, it seems to me, the ways in which he is particularly Elizabethan. Just as beauty seems to promise eternity (st. 51) in Ovid’s Banquet so does love in Hero and Leander (III. 231-32). In the course of composing his non-dramatic (and dramatic) works, Chapman’s fitful genius played fitfully with a variety of ideas and stances, and it is in acknowledging the impact of the sensible (or real) world in conflict with the conceptual (or ideal) that he seems most Elizabethan.

A final word about the book as text: the author unhappily has seen fit to retain Renaissance typographical conventions and abbreviations without awareness of Renaissance practice. Thus we find such non-historical examples as Iustification, Hymnos and “he makes ye fountaine ye eye of the round Arbor.” Graduate students, if not literate readers, deserve better.

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Elizabeth Story Donno

The reader who is familiar with much criticism of Antony and Cleopatra will quickly recognize the intelligence, sensitivity, and liveliness in Janet Adelman's The Common Liar. The scholar at work on the play will surely read Adelman's book and will find in appropriate journals critical reviews that place it in relation to other studies. But the non-specializing critic, even though tempted by his interest in this play may be unlikely to read a book on a single play. What qualities, approaches, or perspectives are likely to cause such a critic to give the book the careful attention it deserves? Must the author have a provocative and original thesis? How much insight can we derive, for example, from Leslie Fiedler's assertion at the first meeting of the Shakespeare Association of America that the ideal portrayer of Cleopatra would be Mick Jagger? For a popular classical work like Antony and Cleopatra, it may well surprise us when we notice that there has never been a single critical-scholarly interpretation (such as Bradley's Shakespearean Tragedy) nor a single production (such as Olivier's Richard III) that has become a touchstone or even part of a shared universe of discourse against which later treatments will usually be compared. Despite the two challenging and spectacular title roles, despite exciting performances by Peggy Ashcroft, Zoe Caldwell, and Janet Suzman in the past 25 years, there have been relatively few efforts by directors to fill this gap. On the other hand, during the same period, we have been deluged with books, sections of books, and articles. Even the most intelligently responsive treatment of the play therefore is likely to seem less original than it is, to impress us more for its ability to formulate and to synthesize than for providing unprecedented insights. Adelman emphasizes alternative critical methods and meanings of the play. Unlike Fiedler, she tends to subordinate into her final chapter and footnotes her more provocative claims—such as her not fully convincing discussion, based on Philip Slater's The Glory of Hera, of the dissolution of boundaries and the bisexuality of the play.

Many will read The Common Liar with pleasure for its play of mind and for its extremely apt phrasing of recognized critical issues. Even the author's magisterial, tersely efficient footnotes summarizing the disagreements of prominent critics over controversial or problematic issues in the play can—up to a point—provide unusually enjoyable reading.

But of greater potential interest to the critic are the problems that Professor Adelman's introduction promises to explore. She writes very well about opposing pressures upon the audience and about one's general sense of changes in focus and tone. Following Paul Alpers, Stanley Fish, Norman Rabkin, and Stephen Booth, she promises to study the "complex and highly determined shaping of an audience's responses" which is "more immediate and overt" in staged drama than on the printed page, for which it has been more carefully studied. The introduction carefully places the drama in a context of critical thought today:

One of the mysteries of intellectual history is that an explanation [or an attempt to define meaning] which seems wholly adequate to one generation will seem wholly inadequate to the next. . . . Critical explanations in terms of character, theme, and image have all had their day; now only a combination of these with minute structural analysis seems entirely satisfying. (1)
After a sparkling, if often controversial, discussion of ways in which for several of Shakespeare’s plays “the relationship of character to symbolic design shifts continually; the interplay may determine the meaning at any given moment,” Adelman focuses upon the ways in which her play teaches us “how to see it [in] . . . several ways at once . . . [with] several contradictory meanings”:

Antony and Cleopatra insists that we take the lovers simultaneously as very mortal characters and as gigantic semidivine figures. In this play, more than in any other, Shakespeare does not choose to suit the words to the action, the action to the words. . . . Which do we believe? This crisis in belief . . . is absolutely central to Antony and Cleopatra. It is built into the presentation of character, the dramatic structure and even the poetic texture: for hyperbole, the characteristic verbal mode, appeals precisely to our belief in what we know to be impossible. . . . I shall therefore be particularly concerned with the means by which Shakespeare assures both our uncertainty and our final hesitant leap to faith. (12)

Adelman divides her essay into three long chapters, the abbreviated titles of which clearly suggest the thrust of her argument: 1) Infinite Variety: Uncertainty and Judgment; 2) The Common Liar: Tradition as Source; and 3) Nature’s Piece ‘gainst Fancy: Poetry and the Structure of Belief; these are followed by a brief conclusion and by three short appendices that consider Plutarch, Marlowe’s Dido, and Cleopatra’s blackness.

For this reader, the first chapter sets such a high standard for aptly describing basic qualities of the play that the later chapters prove somewhat disappointing. The author quickly establishes her position:

The critical history of Antony and Cleopatra can be seen largely as a series of attempts to assess the motives of the protagonists and to arbitrate between the claims of Egypt and Rome. But the search for certainty often encounters the stumbling block of the play itself: at almost every turn, there are significant lapses in our knowledge of the inner state of the principal characters, and we cannot judge what we do not know. The characters themselves tell us that they do not know one another, that their judgments are fallible. . . . The play demands that we make judgments even as it frustrates our ability to judge rationally. This frustration is not an end in itself: it forces us to participate in the experience of the play and ultimately to make the same leap of faith that the lovers make. In this sense, our uncertainty is an essential feature of the play. (14)

After such an opening paragraph, what should come next? If the reader is substantially convinced, what further proof, how many examples does he need? Although one might desire some slight adjustments in formulation, some greater precision in comparison, surely the writer had deftly asserted her primary argument. For the unconvinced reader, what sort of evidence can bring about a change? It has seemed worth-while to quote at such length because, it seems to me, the sharpness of this example and these questions it unintentionally poses combine to cause the main difficulty for the strategy of the writer.

The author never quite fulfills her promise to study the “minute-by-minute responses” to the “temporal dramatic structure.” Although she does offer excel-
lent insights about broad changes of focus and perspective, she never really ad-
dresses herself to clear examples of the detailed changes and variations implied
by “minute-by-minute.” Nor does she carefully explore why within a play with
the structure she describes, particular actions and interpretations come at the
specific moments they do. This problem of course has been much more suscep-
tible to adequate analysis in works with more traditional plots in which char-
acter determines action, and action determines character.

Adelman writes very perceptively in distinguishing different sorts of charac-
terization—fully realized or opaque, credibly motivated or impersonal—and par-
ticularly in distinguishing the “aura of mystery” as it varies from play to play.
We may choose to disbelieve the reasons Hamlet gives for not killing Claudius
at prayer; or we may feel that we have not been told the whole truth, but
we know what the hero believes and “we are informed at this critical moment
of the process of Hamlet’s mind. . . . If an aura of mystery persists, it is perhaps
because the literary figure . . . creates so absolute an illusion of reality that he
breeds all the mysteries of character which we find in real life. A fully realized
character like Hamlet will necessarily appear mysterious at some moments pre-
cisely insofar as he is fully realized.” (17) Once again Adelman’s phrases are
resonant and provocative, but hardly precise.

Iago engenders mysteries of another sort. His frequent early soliloquies may
mislead us, for “motivation is almost wholly irrelevant after the initial move
is made. We become more interested in watching the diabolical principle at
work . . . than in the character and his inconsistent motivation.” Cordelia and
Iago “can afford to be opaque; . . . mysteries of motivation simply evaporate
insofar as they take their places as parts of a symbolic action.” (18-19) Such
analyses hopefully supplement the more general distinctions made by Dame
Helen Gardner that the pace of one’s experience in the theatre makes appropriate
motivation more limited than that fit for one’s more leisurely reading of a novel.

Adelman argues that although Antony and Cleopatra becomes a more unified
and explicable whole if “read as a lyric poem or an allegory to which questions
of character are largely irrelevant, . . . to explain character away, and with it
the unanswerable questions, is in this instance to explain the play away for the
whole play can be seen as a series of attempts on the parts of the characters
to understand and judge each other and themselves.” (19) Such analyses return
neatly to the author’s conception of the many relevant perspectives of the play,
“The search is interminable not because the questions are wrong, but because
the answers are not given.” More specifically she asks, does Cleopatra too “dis-
cover that Antony is good only when he is gone? In the end, this uncertainty
implicates us as well as the characters. . . . But in this play, not even skepticism
is a secure position. Enobarbus shows us that.”

Adelman further argues that, atypically for tragedy, in Antony and Cleopatra,
“we participate in the experience of the commentators more often than in the
experience of the lovers.” (40) And again, unlike our responses to Shakespeare’s
other tragedies, the effects of which partly “depend on our ability to see through
the protagonist’s eyes, even when we see possibilities unacknowledged by him, . . .
in Antony and Cleopatra, the exclusivity of the protagonists’ vision never becomes
part of our experience; we are given competing visions throughout.” (45) Finally,
“we are forced to judge and shown the folly of judging at the same time: our
double responses are an essential part of the play.” (39) One cannot expect any writer continually to provide fresh insights about a single play. Yet it should be constructive to ponder why such a good book fails to fulfill the promise of its introduction and first chapter. Perhaps it is inevitable, because a writer so thoroughly immersed in the text of a play must quote more familiar as well as less recognized examples. Even so, one may question the strategy of listing so many examples of each analogy or category. While such a list may convince the reader who is relatively unfamiliar with the play and its critics, it does tend to lose the vigor and sparkle found earlier in the book.

The second essay, “The Common Liar,” draws helpful conclusions about the diversity of traditional opinions toward Octavius and Cleopatra. Less convincing is Adelman’s claim that Shakespeare achieves the uncertainty at the heart of his play “by ignoring the relatively clear explication of motivation in his sources.” Aren’t the motives of his four main characters usually quite clear for any given action—even though the characters themselves may fluctuate and others may misunderstand them? This chapter includes sophisticated treatment of sources (studied affectively rather than generically), of images, of emblems, and of iconography. These sections, less taut than the first essay, continue to make valuable observations when the author insists, as her point of departure, that Shakespeare could count on the audience to know not only the story itself but also traditional interpretations of it [so that] the conflict of interpretation that the audience brings to the theatre becomes part of the play.” The bulk of this chapter discusses analogues with Dido and Aeneas and with Venus and Adonis. In the appendix that expands on this chapter, Adelman notes that both Marlowe and Shakespeare, “test the assertive power of language” and that both “deliberately emphasize the discrepancy between words and action.” The author seems best when discussing the fluidity of categories and of “perspectives which we have since lost,” the relevance of different myths “not mutually exclusive,” and the use of cosmic analogy as “occasionally relevant.” She summarizes effectively, “Iconography and mythography can never serve as a definition of meaning. . . . They can provide a context for the play; they can identify those images which the original audience might have felt to be particularly significant and to suggest the range of signification.”

Although the third and final essay poses fascinating and relevant problems: “Skepticism and Belief,” “Poetic Process as Poetic Theme,” and “The Structure of Assent,” these suffer from foreshadowing in the preceding pages. The author does provide gems of interpretation, particularly when describing changing rhythms of response, in showing how essential are strains upon our credulity, and in arguing that we go from extremes of skepticism to extremes of assent with no mid-point. She shows particularly well Shakespeare’s use of juxtaposition as earlier she had clearly described sequences of presentational contrasts available only in the theatre. Less well integrated are the discussions of other writers, as were those of Spenser in the preceding chapter. She convincingly shows that the spectator, like Cleopatra, first mocks and later asserts the truth (often the Romans only mock). Cleopatra’s hyperbolic portrait of Antony, for example, can be verified only by surviving the test of mockery. Finally, we believe, she argues, because, “Love and grace must overflow . . . [while] the man of measure, . . . we suspect has no self to lose” Adelman argues that any transcendence in the
play is achieved only by immersion in the realm of nature. Toward the end of the play, we more often tend to accept the lovers' evaluation of themselves. After many short scenes, we rest in the longer, more leisurely final scene, which is virtually Cleopatra's from beginning to end. Finally, for Adelman, *Antony and Cleopatra* stands between romance and tragedy. In works of those more traditional genres, both the poetry and the action are in accord. In *Antony and Cleopatra* "poetry and action conflict; each makes its own assertions and each has its own validity." Ultimately the play, with Cleopatra, imagines an Antony we can neither believe nor disbelieve—a balance essential to the play. Fittingly, the author briefly concludes with a series of modest appeals that subordinate the critic to the play. She quotes Maynard Mack and George Meredith that those who are "hot for certainties in his own life" should turn to other plays and to other authors.

In this review, I have carefully avoided the comparisons of Adelman's book with other studies of *Antony and Cleopatra* that would be necessary to substantiate my own conclusion: for the reader who is sympathetic to the stances of Mack and Fish—mixed with a soupçon of experience in the theatre—*The Common Liar* offers the best extended introduction to the play, one that skillfully combines the study of unresolvable but resonant theoretical problems with a careful devoted reading of the text.

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The principal strength of Margaret Anne Doody's book, *A Natural Passion: A Study of the Novels of Samuel Richardson*, lies in her sensitive explications of individual passages. Her eclectic approach through world view, theme, sources, and image patterns lends itself especially well to the technique of explication. Furthermore, such set pieces of explication are skillfully turned to respond to trends in Richardsonian criticism. To offset the inevitable fragmentation of such an approach, Ms. Doody focuses on the recurrent theme of love as a "natural passion" and argues convincingly for the complex and variegated nature of Richardson's vision of love throughout his career. Dryden, in *Tyrannick Love*, expresses the diverse manifestations of love in terms which she finds also appropriate to Richardson: "Love various minds does variously inspire." The natural passion may take shape variously as *eros*, *philia*, or *agape* in each separate work or even within the same work and will, consequently, dictate a new form for each work.

Richardson's first novel, *Pamela*, concentrates primarily on the earthiest phase of love and is appropriately embodied as pastoral comedy. Rather than viewing *Pamela* as an unconsciously ironic parody of flesh-pink innocence, Ms. Doody sees the novel as a unique fusion of low-life comedy and elevated pastoral ro-
mance. Unlike her counterparts in the early eighteenth-century seduction/rape and courtship tales, Pamela is a child of Nature whose sound instincts, healthy appetite, colloquial diction, and native cunning make her letters a refreshingly new contribution to the familiar, rhetorically ornate, epistolary novel detailing the battle of the sexes. Neither is she the lovely shepherdess of pastoral romance whose sensibility, piety, and elegant rusticity fall into place as soon as her hidden aristocratic birth is revealed. Instead Richardson intentionally allows both Pamela and the adolescent Mr. B to reveal the humor in themselves. For example, in her terror and admiration of him, Mr. B is metamorphosed into Colonel Charteris, the malign and sadistic rapist familiar to contemporary readers. Mr. B's inept bungling in the two bedroom assaults then becomes not so much Richardson's fault as his genius, because it shows the real nature of the situation as well as Pamela's comic over-reaction to it simultaneously. Just as the cows later become phallic bulls and the fishpond deep waters, so Pamela again converts Mr. B's adolescent petulance and sulkiness into despotic ire without so much as a second thought for the natural psychological effects of her rejection of him.

The imagery of the novel underscores the earthiness of their relationship. Pamela is a gardener and an angler. Her hands are covered with mould when she plants the bean sprouts to disguise her garden correspondence. Her favorite flower is the humble sunflower in preference to the noble rose or lily. This section of Doody's analysis is particularly well done, with just enough examples to support her claims without becoming a catalogue. Also good is the set piece describing the fishing scene with Mrs. Jewkes, when Pamela, seeing the cruel play of the fish on her line, compares it to Mr. B's sadistic and Satanic sport with herself. Ms. Doody chooses this particular image out of a wide variety of nature imagery for extended analysis, because of its traditional significance as an erotic and religious emblem which suggests (1) that woman's beauty is a bait to ensnare the heart of man and (2) that the devil angles for man's soul. The traditional significance would be quickly recognized by Richardson's contemporaries although the impact may be lost to modern readers without an effort at historical reconstruction. Richardson's adaptation of the emblem carries additional force because it foreshadows Mr. B's relenting towards his victim in Pamela's sympathy for and releasing of the poor, hooked fish. Significantly, when he does relent, the novel shifts from an emphasis on comedy to one on pastoral with a rich and almost enamelled fabric or romantic and idealized nature imagery. "The glimpse of glorified rural life, with its implications of natural beauty, peace, and love, provides a fitting ending to the story of a rustic heroine and (despite his rank) a rustic hero. The mock-pastoral comedy unusual, amusing, sometimes grotesque, now shades into the traditional pastoral comedy, whose object, like that of the romances of Sidney and Shakespeare, is to pass beyond the 'scornful tickling' of laughter and provide delight." Her explanation of the change in form is well-grounded in the examples and explication.

A definition of love as a natural passion arises rather clearly out of her discussion of Pamela. Emotion and love are part of the entire harmonious natural cycle. Social custom is at fault, not natural instinct. The virtuous and pious servant girl may become a lady without being born into the aristocracy. Love in Pamela is Richardson's simplest and most forthright example of the natural passion. The continuation of Pamela diverges slightly from this vision of love;
here civilized life is “the life of nature at its best.” Doody shows solid common sense in not touting the continuation as a success, although she deals with it at some length. As a response to inferior imitations, it serves the purpose of carrying Pamela into high life and of meeting adverse criticism of the lasciviousness of the first volume. More importantly, despite the novel’s obvious bowdlerization, plotlessness, and sermonizing, Richardson experiments with other modes of narration and adopts more dramatic techniques and allusions.

In Clarissa, the natural passion takes a different form. Rather than an erotic, earthy release of instinct and emotion, Clarissa and Lovelace both seek a resolution in the world of the spirit; the imagination creates for them both something more real and vitally important than anything available within the confines of the natural world. For Clarissa, the demands of society and self are inherently incompatible. The role of obedient child, which conventional morality upholds, would violate Clarissa’s integrity, as she quickly discovers when the Harlowes attempt to force Solmes upon her. Her conflict with Lovelace releases within her, not the anticipated sexuality buried beneath repressive social convention, but the ardent desire for the freedom to act as an individual. For Clarissa, love properly understood is God. For Lovelace, on the other hand, love properly understood is self. Despite the fact that he rapes Clarissa, his erotic pleasure is relatively unimportant in comparison to his lust for power. He imagines himself the tyrant to her victim and finds himself inexplicably frustrated when she refuses to behave as a victim and acknowledge herself subjugated.

The themes, sources, and imagery in the novel are all carefully correlated by Doody to this treatment of the natural passion. The major tragic theme of the tyrant and victim carries greater force because of its adaptation of dramatic sources. In comparison to the tyrant-rakes of Restoration drama, of which Lovelace demonstrates an intimate knowledge, his adroitness and cynicism align him with the witty rakes of comedy and his hybris with the tyrant-heroes of tragedy. Posed as the author of the History of Robert Lovelace and Clarissa Harlowe, he delights in the strategems, disguises, and buffoonery of the comic rake at the same time that he rivals the will to absolute power of the tyrant-hero. Feeling the superiority of masculine comedy to feminine tragedy, feeling indeed that comedy includes and subordinates tragedy, Lovelace fails to consider that an action of Clarissa’s could dictate the mode and outcome of his play.

As with the earlier novel, Pamela, the courtship and seduction novels popularized by the lady-novelists are an important source for Clarissa. The epistolary mode of narration, the use of a female confidante, the theme of filial obedience in opposition to love, the motifs of midnight surprises, evil houses, feminine recriminations, locked doors and keys, sententia and false maxims are all adapted by Richardson in Clarissa. Perhaps the most striking adaptation is Richardson’s transformation of the language about love into the language of love. The range of emotions is indicated more fully, the importance of the erotic is treated more seriously, and the conventional dialectic of love is made more dramatic.

Deathbed literature of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries also adds its mark to Clarissa. Contradicting the view that Richardson descended into pathos and morbidity in the extended deathbed scenes, Ms. Doody feels that the use of this rich devotional literature sharpens the theme of the “importance of the individual life, conscience, and consciousness.” Richardson’s emphasis on the
individual psychic life aligns him with both Christianity and Romanticism. Belton, Clarissa, and Mrs. Sinclair all reveal their spiritual state in their deathbed scenes just as John Pomfret's *A Prospect of Death*, Uvedale's *The Death-Bed Display'd*, and Taylor's *Holy Living and Dying* maintain. The late repentant, the saint, and the sinner appear side by side. Belton's dying wish to be nothing after death is both a traditional sign of despair and an extremely apt dramatization of his rejection of individual consciousness, a main theme of Richardson's novel. Mrs. Sinclair is already in Hell; the prostitutes surrounding her deathbed are images of death and judgment whose vanity only imperfectly disguises disease and decay. She herself is incapable of repentance and clings frantically to life. Clarissa, of course, is an example of holy dying. Her repentance comes from love rather than fear. Her mysterious illness is like her excellence—something which the world cannot sustain. Her mood at the end is serene and tranquil; her last vision is one of hope. Lovelace's deathbed scene is deliberately ambiguous. Ending as it does with his last cry to Clarissa, his vision may be either his plaintiff or his defenant, a reproach or a saving grace. Such an ending enhances the complexity of the novel's moral vision.

Finally, the spatial and visual imagery strongly suggest confinement and imprisonment as a corollary to the moral theme of individual consciousness. Rather than present a detailed description of the lay-out and contents of a room or house, Richardson uses space to suggest the expansions and contractions of the individual's psyche in its process of development. Harlowe Place, with all its worldly glamour, its double sitting room and its elaborate garden, is a prison to Clarissa confined as she is by her father's adamantine will. Clarissa's coffin, on the other hand, is her door into infinity and the perfection of her own will. Throughout the novel, doors, rooms, accentuate Clarissa's struggle to maintain her integrity against a succession of assaults from parents, friends, and Lovelace. The visual imagery is, however, richly elaborated—particularly imagery modeled upon the visual arts. Emblems, statuary, paintings and prints are carefully interwoven into the basic texture of the novel. To Richardson's contemporaries the resonance of this visual imagery would be rich indeed. Two of the more striking images which Ms. Doody chooses show Lovelace as a cartoonist who retreats from the serious implications of his material into self-defensive satire and caricature. The extended comparison of Clarissa to a naive girl at the fair who is riding the "One-go-up the Other-go-down picture-of-the-world vehicle" is just such an instance of Lovelace as a cartoonist. He transforms the pursuit of fortune into the pursuit of sex in order to gloss over his treatment of Clarissa by shifting the responsibility of her predicament onto herself alone. The overall composition as well as the individual details are strongly reminiscent of popular prints by contemporary artists. One such Dutch print, *The Actions and Designs of the World go round as if in a Mill* is included along with the illustrations to capture the effect of such an image on Richardson's public. Similarly, Lovelace's descriptions of a family group's funeral monument to parody his future connubial bliss and later of Dame Elizabeth Carteret's monument which presents a cherub guiding the earthbound soul to heaven to parody Clarissa's spiritual assistance to Belford both show his natural propensity to transform an emblem into a cartoon.
Although thorough and interesting on the patterns of spatial and visual imagery in *Clarissa*, Ms. Doody's overly narrow selection from the many and diverse patterns of imagery in the novel does not rise to the high level of her descriptions of the sources. There is some attempt to indicate a broader range of imagery in *Clarissa* in her comparison to image patterns in *Sir Charles Grandison* in the final chapter dealing with that novel, but is not really adequate particularly considering the large body of existing criticism on Lovelace's characterization. The omission would not be so serious if it did not result in a second problem—a lack of sufficient development for her generalizations on Lovelace's characterization. To see him as a cartoonist who uses humor in self-defense is good as far as it goes. But to see him as capable (in however limited a way and with whatever qualifications) of redemption is much better. The selection devoted to this point at Lovelace's death is tantalizingly good and deserves to be connected up with passing observations on his complexity and ambiguity—observations unfortunately cut short to discuss Clarissa. A broader scrutiny of the image patterns would better sustain a reading of Lovelace's complexity. Indeed even the picture of the world as fair, the image of Death the Wooer, the references to funeral monuments which are all cited by Doody to explore Lovelace's patterns of visual imagery also have manic-depressive ambivalence between love and power, salvation and damnation, self-defense and self-abasement, features which are characteristic of and perhaps more evident in Lovelace's other patterns of imagery and allusions (e.g., military, royal, historical, animal, natural, childhood, and game imagery and allusion).

Richardson's last novel, *Sir Charles Grandison*, is a significant departure from his earlier work. Because it is based on popular Latitudinarianism rather than the asceticism of the seventeenth century manifest in *Clarissa* or the earthy pastoral romance in *Pamela*, the treatment of love as a natural passion is both more open and more optimistic. In direct contrast to the claustrophobia and human perversity of Harlowe Place in *Clarissa*, Grandison Hall is a second Eden and Sir Charles a model of virtue, a complete Christian gentleman, whose fencing skill is sufficient to reject any second Eve's poisoned apple. Pastoral romance and tragedy are superceded by domestic comedy in which two heroines rival each other in virtues, in which the hero never falls below his own high standards, in which libertines become harmless fops and coquettes model wives, and in which the social harmony cemented by scores of marriages is aptly imaged in music and dance.

The sources for *Sir Charles Grandison*, stage comedy and the courtship novel, enhance the aura of optimism which envelops Sir Charles, Harriet, and even the potentially tragic Clementina—indeed the entire dramatis personae. Because of Sir Charles' rigid adherence to filial obedience, purity, faith, and benevolence making him essentially a static character and because of Clementina's moral battle between love and duty being so long-delayed in the chain of narration, Harriet as primary narrator and as acutely suffering lover becomes the main focus of the novel. Her position as "the girl on the point of choice" is exactly that of the stage heroine of dramatic comedy. The range of minor characters seems deliberately composed to emphasize her position. The fops, the witlings, even the rakes who surround her are type characters. Charlotte, too, is typical of the witty coquette whose heart is led by her head, much like Congreve's Millamant.
Indeed there is almost a textbook on love to be culled from Grandison Hall and Selby-house with Harriet and Sir Charles as the representative noble pair. Harriet's characterization, however, owes more to the courtship novel. Her introspectiveness contrasts to Charlotte's gaiety. Her sufferings contrast to earlier heroines' successes. Ms. Doody sees her role as narrative focus as directly traceable to the new tradition of the courtship novel: “The writers of courtship novels had shown how a female could be presented as the observing centre of interest in social situations which are not lurid or sensational (as in the seduction tales) but governed by a refined and subtle code of moral behaviour.” Furthermore, the nature of human relationships in courtship and marriage becomes a major device for achieving thematic unity in the courtship novel.

According to Doody, Richardson succeeds where a lot of the courtship novelists fail in rendering the human complexity of marital ethics. Charlotte's urge to dominate men is a direct outcome of her father's tyranny and is never presented as wholly evil. Even Harriet also sacrifices punctilio in owning her love to the Grandison sisters long before she knows that it is or ever will be returned. Because Sir Charles is as close as man come to human perfection, the more fortunate Harriet can consider him honestly as “lord and master.” Clementina, too, is forced to face the reality of her own powerful sexuality before her mental illness can be cured; indeed her unconventional flight to England to visit the newly married pair is presented as the final, necessary step in her process of maturation, which will eventually lead to her fulfillment.

The harmony of the comic feast is also manifested in the finer detail of the novel. Houses and clothes are not so much disguises as revelations of the owners' characters. Clementina puts on new clothes to signal her returning health. Harriet wears a masquerade costume which suggests the artificiality of the London society in which she was wrongly introduced. Selby-house is pictured in little by its old-fashioned cedar-parlour and rural elegance. The portrait gallery and elegant grounds accurately render the grandeur of Grandison Hall. All reinforce the idea that appearances and reality are not finally at odds as they were in Clarissa. Even the animal imagery which was used to suggest the violence and perversity of the will power in Clarissa is here domesticated. Charlotte may compare her wrangles with her new husband over her pregnancy to the ritual behavior of nesting birds, but her comparison is nevertheless gentle in its mockery. The major figure in the image pattern of the novel is, however, music. The young and inexperienced Harriet begins “all harmony” with a selection, “The Discreet Lover,” approving love as tender inclination rather than passion, but she is to suffer much through passion before all is harmony for her again. The Grandisons struck as “such a family harmony,” both ladies are skilled musicians, and all are familiar with Handel's Alexander's Feast, a constant leit-motif in the novel. Harriet's choice of a love song from this work for her performance is a tacit declaration of love. As Doody points out “Music suggests the joy of comedy, of love ending in marriage, and also the ‘friendly contrariety’ of the passions.”

Doody's claims for Sir Charles Grandison's status as a neglected masterpiece are polemically inflated. The argument here is the weakest in the entire study. It would have been much better to admit, as Doody did earlier with the continuation of Pamela, the superficiality of the world view which can on the one hand, poignantly render the human desecration of a selfish and tyrannical father over
two dependent daughters, and, on the other hand, praise the brother's unthinking acceptance of conventional obedience to a parent as an excuse for his failure to intervene in his sisters' support. To compound further the moral ambivalence, Richardson praises Harriet's equally unthinking acceptance of conventional propriety in her censure of the sisters' rebellion as less nice than the brother's obedience. To explain away such inconsistencies by disclosing on the static role of Charles as a paradigm of Latitudinarianism, as Allestree's complete gentleman and Steele's Christian hero, is special pleading. Harriet may be the focus both of narration and of emotional resonance in the novel, but she is not sufficient to unify it. Comic typing of character and plot may enhance her role in contrast to the remaining dramatis personae and may in large part explain the openness and optimism in the novel, but they can not make up for Richardson's failure to internalize his representative Christian gentleman's spiritual and emotional life until well into the Clementina section of the novel. The insight into a complex human being, body, mind, and soul, which bends and breaks convention in Pamela and Clarissa, making these works of enduring interest is strangely crippled in Sir Charles Grandison. The sources in conduct book, fiction, and stage and the patterns of imagery are well described, but they cannot in themselves vivify the novel. Indeed, Doody's attempts to anticipate and rebut adverse criticism clearly show her sensitivity to the basic problem of unity and the thoroughness of her scholarship, but they are not finally convincing. Nevertheless her observations on individual passages are extremely fine and could direct a reader unfamiliar with the novel to the more successful parts.

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The Literatures of India, An Introduction by Edward C. Dimock, Jr., et al.

This work is an attempt of the Chicago school in South Asian studies to present a critical introduction to Indian literature. The volume proposes to provide a generalized view both for the newcomer as well as for the initiate through brief discussions of specific aspects of the literature of the Indian subcontinent. Material is considered here by topic rather than historically or by language grouping. It is overall a highly satisfactory book that is unusual in its valuable substantive material for all levels of interest and knowledge.

The six scholars who participated in this volume made their contributions in varying degrees according to the desirability of including material from their areas of particular expertise. Thus three of the authors participated in limited degree: Roadarmel (modern Hindi literature), Naim (Urdu ghazal) and Ramanujan (aesthetics and South Indian lyric poetry). The other three, Dimock, Gerow and van Buitenen, have written on a number of areas and are credited with the major share of this book's success.

A volume of 250 pages can hardly be expected to cover Indian literature in great depth. The title of the work is in itself quite a presumption. In fact the
tactic of discussing very specific points for anywhere from two to twenty pages is extremely effective.

The introduction attempts a brief historical overview of the initial stages in the development of Indian literature. A survey of language development is also offered as well as a paragraph or so on each language and its literary beginnings. These fifty pages are valuable for the novice. The five chapters that follow the introduction are the meat of this critical introduction to Indian literature and presumably the reason for putting out such a volume. They are followed by Gerow's chapter on "The persistence of classical aesthetic categories in contemporary Indian literature," Roadarmel's chapter on "The modern Hindi short story and modern Hindi criticism," and a three page epilogue by Gerow on "The modern film."

The five middle chapters are divided by genre: the epic, classical drama, poetics, the lyric, and story literature. The earliest Indian literature, that of the Vedic period, is regarded as of little influence in later developments and so is ignored to make room for other topics.

In contrast to the literary histories that have passed for literary criticism in India in the twentieth century, these chapters are only somewhat concerned with plot recapitulations and not at all with authors' biographies. Rather, in the chapter on the epic, van Buitenen discusses the formation of the Mahabharata and the Ramayana from different literary strands and the influence of the epics on later literature. The chapter on drama goes into the environment in which drama developed and its staging as well as brief introductions to three famous and representative classical dramas.

Ramanujan and Gerow's brief chapter on poetics is an extremely valuable part of this book. While there is no shortage of material on classical aesthetic theory, it is a subject often made incomprehensible to the layman by ambiguity and esoteric terminology. Here the authors in specific reference to drama and stanzaic poetry present a clear view of classical criticism. A further introduction to the later dhvani school enlarges the scope of the discussion to cover medieval and bhakti (devotional) literature.

The chapter on the lyric is one in which the authors have divided the material by language to give separate approaches to Sanskrit, Bengali, Kannada, Tamil, and Urdu lyric poetry. Involving the talents of four scholars who are excellent in their fields, this chapter is perhaps the most informative for those already involved in this area but who of course can not be expected to be conversant with the several other literatures. Many of the translations and the thinking that have gone into Dimock's Bengali contribution and Ramanujan's Kannada and Tamil sections have been taken from earlier published works. Naim's "Ghazal and taghazzul" speaks not only to the form itself and its analysis but the author addresses himself as well to the interconnection between poetry and history, poet and politics.

This volume deals basically with India's traditional literature. The authors

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have chosen to do so presumably for the intrinsic value in that literature as well as for the continuing influence of the traditional literature in twentieth-century life and for its influence on literature written during this century. Roadarmel's chapter on "The modern Hindi short story and modern Hindi criticism" is the only section truly devoted to modern literature. Roadarmel also avoids the pitfall of plot and author discussions and quotes occasionally from Hindi critics. The Hindi literary criticism scene is a morass of personality and political conflicts reliant on classical values, Western values, and the intoning of endless historical facts and plot comparisons. Roadarmel has thus done well to not involve himself any deeper in the critical mire. Instead he touches briefly on trends in short fiction and their differences during the past few decades and gives an overview of a modern literature that is certainly needed to try to balance the vast weight of traditional material in this volume. In fact this section alone can not accomplish that balance but then neither does the book claim that such a balance is desirable, necessary or proposed.

This is a well done work for the reasons that I enumerated at the start of this review: a broad view for the beginning reader, intelligent discussions of specific points for the advanced reader, and significant substantive reference to the literature itself throughout. There have been other surveys of Indian literature in English in recent time, particularly in India. None of the others has in any way attempted to treat the material critically. The technique here employed of small, specific discussions has proved more than justified in its effectiveness as a tool for learning and instructing virtually every level of interested reader.

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Man Ray was the only American Dadaist in the years 1910-1925, and he became an expatriate. Stuart Davis created a Colonial Cubism, but no one created a Domestic Dada. Prospecting for the Dada seam in Williams, Cummings, Crane, Demuth, Stella, and Dove is not rewarding work. "Although the central attitudes in his essays were proto-Dada..." "Although his values obviously approximated those of Dada..." "Although the content is reminiscent of Dada values..." "The Little Red Wheelbarrow" becomes a readymade.

Hart Crane wrote to a friend in 1921: "I cannot figure out just what Dadaism is beyond an insane jumble of the four winds, the six senses, and plum pudding." The little magazinists of The Soil, Contact, Broom, and Secession spent a decade boxing with shadows in Plato's cave. They responded to the hearsay of Dada, not the works. Professor Tashjian hardly notices Duchamp's oeuvre for 1915-1923 (most of which was created in New York) and why should he? The little magazinists hardly noticed it either. Is it entirely beside the point that Williams
spelled Duchamp Du Champs? The little magazinists debated anti-art and art as if they were clerics debating the body and soul. Their opinions make a mighty stale biscuit.

Swiss Dada was often anti-art for the sake of art, as if the Devil were God’s best witness. Duchamp was shrewder. The Bicycle Wheel is “ananistic,” and the Large Glass was “unfinished” in 1923. Like the door in Duchamp’s apartment which served two doorways and therefore was always open when it was closed, Duchamp’s Dada implies a perpetual openness. The Americans, hell-bent on their Americanness, hardly ever noticed. Demuth and Morton Schamberg learned to paint the machine but not its Dada soul, its sexed ghost. Dove americanized the assemblage. Cummings peed on a burning set of Racine, a strained flourish. Professor Tashjian is a good scholar of a poor moment.

In fact, he is a very good scholar. He has digested the secondary sources of the American avant-grade (periodicals, newspapers, catalogues, letters), and his notes are a regular trove of detail and quotation. Here, for instance, is Williams on the daffy Dada Baronness Elsa von Freytag-Loringhoven:

High into the air the old lady bounced herself, turning and turning head over heels in the dawn and at noon as at night till dripping with holy nectar from the stars, naked as the all-holy sun himself, she mocked the dull Americans.

The lesser problem is that the notes are often more pungent than the text, as if Professor Tashjian were deliberately banishing the cakes and ale. One would have preferred a less solemn, a more contrary, tone for a book on Dada. The larger problem is that as a critic Professor Tashjian is only conventionally intelligent. His readings of Kora in Hell, The Bridge, and Him—to take him at his best—are neither profound nor inspired. Nor, at bottom, do they engage his ostensible subject, the “relationship” between Dada and American art. How could they engage it, when at the bottom of these books that subject does not exist?

In The Guardian for March 1925 Gorham Munson praised Robert Coady as a “skyscraper primitive”—hence that misbegotten phrase—who, had he not died young (like Apollinaire!), “would have become a leader for Young America.” Young America came of Middle Age, and Dada became Pop. Duchamp became its patron saint, and Andy Warhol its Apollinaire. Duchamp had waited. “His finest work,” said H. P. Roché, “is his use of time.”

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