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Immigrant integration into host societies: the case of yemeni immigrant communities in metro detroit

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IMMIGRANT INTEGRATION INTO HOST SOCIETIES:
THE CASE OF YEMENI IMMIGRANT COMMUNITIES IN METRO DETROIT

by

SAMRA NASSER

DISSERTATION

Submitted to the Graduate School

of Wayne State University

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Advisor     Date

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I am heartily thankful to my dissertation supervisor, Dr. Frederick Pearson, whose encouragement, supervision and support from the first course that I had at Wayne State University to the preliminary phases through to the conclusion of this dissertation enabled me to develop an understanding of the subject, for which I cannot imagine a finer advisor.

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Chapter One

The Problem and its Background

1.0 Introduction

In pursuing this research, it is my intention to broaden our understanding of a unique segment of the United States’ immigrant community through testing and further developing theories on immigrant integration in a comparative context of Yemeni immigrants, and comparatively assessing those data with already published data on Lebanese-Americans in addition to sample interviews. Metropolitan Detroit has one of the world’s largest concentrations of Middle Eastern immigrants; the largest groups within the Metro Detroit Arab American community are the Lebanese Shi’a, followed by the Yemenis, both Zaidis and Sunnis, and the Sunni Palestinians (Waugh, McIrvin, Abu-Laban, & Qureshi, p. 257). This examination of a highly traditional, impermeable and oftentimes controversial sector of the Muslim and Arabic communities, will prove invaluable in our understanding of immigrant communities and their roles and adjustments in U.S. society, and of expected patterns of immigrant settlement generally in their new host societies. Additionally, governments have an interest in policies that enable new settlers to develop a sense of belonging to the wider community, participate in all aspects of social, cultural and economic life, and be confident that they are coming into a country that is able to accept their difference and value their contribution (Spoonley, Peace, Butcher, and O’Neill, 2005, p. 86). Such positive settlement outcomes benefit both the immigrant and host society, a current question of importance not only in North America but in Europe and elsewhere (Spoonley, Peace, Butcher, and O’Neill). Within immigrant communities, individuals may choose to accept (or not)
aspects of the host society’s culture; however, there are also social, political, economic and other specific challenges to integration that, if understood and overcome, could benefit the society as whole.

Additionally, although I do not conduct interviews in this study, I did base my initial hypothesis on a set of pilot interviews. This pilot study was based on my dissertation interests and it involved a convenience sample that consisted of interviewing three first-generation Yemeni-Americans who were educated and deemed as community leaders and/or active members. Of the three interviewees, two were men who emigrated from Yemen to the U.S. for educational purposes and then decided to settle here. The woman interviewee emigrated to the U.S. for marriage and settled here with her family while pursuing her education. All three of the interviewees fell within a similar middle-class income range, thus no class or educational variance in this pre-test was conducted.

The preliminary results of that study offered many insights on this community. First, despite all three interviewees having lived in the U.S. for over twenty years, they all shared a hope of returning to Yemen and expressed a shallow or weak form of acceptance by the non-Arab/non-Muslim community here in the host culture. This feeling however may have been a result of their indecisions on whether or not they would remain in the U.S. Further, all three interviewees indicated that most of their past desires to continue making a life here were weakened after the events of September 11, 2001, especially due to an increase in their first-hand experiences with “racism.” Finally, all three interviewees explained that they have not experienced struggles with their identity while living here in the U.S. However, they have noticed that the younger generations [their children and those children that they have worked with] of Yemeni-Americans have been
exceptionally susceptible to confusion in their identity being that many could not speak Arabic. This weakness in Arabic directly affected these youth and their relations with their parents, especially those parents who could not speak English, by impeding on communication between each other which oftentimes created misunderstandings and frustrations. Further, these youth were also struggling in their aims to fit into the society they grew up in while upholding the traditional values through culture and religion which their parents strongly instilled into them. Interviews were recorded, transcribed and coded using the computer program, MAXqda2.

1.1. Background of the Study

Historically, almost all Arab-Americans trace their origins to one of two large waves of immigration. The first started at the end of the 19th century, was driven by economic motives of migrants in search of work and better lives and included mostly Lebanese Christians. The second wave of Arab immigration came after the reopening of America’s gates to immigrants in 1965, and was amplified after the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. This subsequent wave was more varied than the first, this time consisting of Palestinians, Yemenis and others escaping from tyranny or violence in their home countries.

Researchers agree today that Yemenis began immigrating into the United States in the late 19th century. According to Mary Bisharat, “Yemenis made their appearance in the U.S. shortly after the opening of the Suez Canal in 1860; almost certainly a handful had come by 1890” (Bisharat, 1975, p. 203). The earliest immigrants came primarily
from the southern Yemen and the Aden protectorate, the area formally known as the
People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (or South Yemen). Their reason for emigration
was the extreme poverty of the land, worsened by British imperialism. Those migrants
from the North however, were originally very few in migration numbers due to the
isolation imposed by the local ruler Imam Yahya; this migration pattern continued up
until he was assassinated in 1948 (Bisharat, 1975, pp. 22-26). Therefore, it was not until
the 1950s, 60s and primarily the 70s, that Yemeni immigration to the U.S. peaked until
the most recent migration patterns, which consisted of the highest influx of Yemeni
immigrants beginning in the 1990s just after the reunification of the Yemens.

Most U.S. Yemeni communities were concentrated in primarily three states,
namely, New York, Michigan and California (Swanson, 1979, p. 34). In Michigan, the
automobile industry had employed numerous Yemenis settling within the Metro Detroit
area from the early 1900s, settling especially in Southeast Dearborn and Hamtramck.
According to the Detroit Arab American Study (DAAS), Yemeni-Americans today
account for 9% (est. population 15,000) of the Arab population within the Metro Detroit
region. In contrast, Lebanese-Americans account for roughly 37% of the Arab population
within Metro Detroit and initially migrated for both economic reasons and due to the
tumultuous civil war. According to the 2000 U.S. Census, approximately 30% of the
ancestry in Dearborn is Arabic. Dearborn also fares much better than Hamtramck in
terms of higher estimated median household income, indeed faring better than the
average in state of Michigan, at approximately $49,044 in 2007. Within the South end of
Dearborn however, the primarily Yemeni community is characterized as less affluent and
working class, heavily reliant on the automotive industry (just as in the Hamtramck case)
and severely impacted by the downturn in the industry. According to some of the demographics found in the DAAS, in career/job fields, Yemenis are more likely to work in the trades (43 percent, compared to a range of 7 to 17 percent for other Arabs and Chaldeans). Lebanese/Syrians have the highest proportion of those in professional occupations (29 percent compared to 5-19 percent). Further, only 3% of Yemeni-Americans were found to be business owners in comparison to Lebanese-American business owners who accounted for 21% of Metro Detroit Arab Americans. In terms of family/household size, Yemeni-Americans hold the largest families with an average of 3.8 children in comparison to Lebanese-Americans who account for 2.4 children.

Yemeni-Americans have tended to differentiate themselves from other immigrant groups as well, including their Arab-American counterparts, by their rather insular mindset regarding immigration and assimilation within their host society. For instance, according to anthropologist Nabeel Abraham, “whereas all Arab workers are considered to be economically-motivated immigrants, the immigration of each particular group, such as the Yemenis, to the U.S. is a product of a specific set of historical, political, and socio-economic circumstances. These circumstances have a bearing on the group’s perspective toward life and work in the U.S., and just as importantly, on the immigrants’ relationship to the home country (Abraham, 1977, p. 4).

Further, the Yemeni-American population contrasts with the other Muslim demographics in several ways: "less educated and less fluent in English, but more strictly religious, they hold unskilled positions and send remittances back to family in Yemen, while shunning the influences of American society" (Belton, October 2003).
1.2 Nature of the Problem

It is important to study in greater depth the extent and types of integration or segregation of the Yemeni-American community in that there has been less effort to understand the patterns and problems toward immigrant integration of Yemeni immigrants than with other Arab immigrants. In terms of origin, Yemen is a unique country to consider being that it has a strikingly diverse topography, socio-economic differences and a unique political history due to the British colonization of the south, the largely tribal far north, and the eventual, unification of the country.

I intend to examine the levels of political integration among Yemeni-American immigrants by measuring variables which would reveal patterns of their political participation (voting, participation, contributions, and membership). The literature on the integration of immigrants appears to struggle with the problem of defining the multidimensional concept of integration and measuring an appropriate outcome variable. Therefore, I will be basing the concept of integration as having a positive impact on economic success through three main channels, reflected in the three dimensions of political, social and economic integration, all of which relate to the issue of economic opportunities (Yang 1994, p. 455).

For comparison, I will also measure cultural and economic integration of Yemeni and Lebanese immigrants as a comparison to reveal and better understand their potentially contrasting levels and types of political participation. I will be examining the associations and relevant characteristics such as income, distinguishing Yemeni from Lebanese immigrants within each community. Below, I explain in detail what is meant by political, socioeconomic and cultural integration per this dissertation.
Political Integration Background

Political participation can be defined as taking part in or becoming involved in activities related to politics (Heelsum, 2002, p. 182). Integration is ultimately all about the ongoing political struggle and the challenge of blending or “fitting in,” about populations in the city and how the immigrant groups themselves may or may not be able to work the conflictual system surrounding them to their own advantage, which might possibly also include the advantage of their former country of origin (Favell & Martiniello, 1999, p. 11). Additionally, “political integration refers to the cohesiveness of the members of the political community, (Lamore, 1982, p. 169) in terms of their political values, beliefs, emotive traits, and activities” (Almond and Verba, 1965). While these can be a healthy form of identity building, in an excessive form they can also cut off and isolate the group from their fellow citizens. Although each host country somewhat reinvents its own history of nation building, the common concept of integration denotes the redefinition of national socio-political spaces to integrate new immigrants. Thus, integration implies the selective extension to non-nationals and new-nationals of legal, social, cultural and political rights and opportunities that were once the exclusive entitlements of nationals (Phalet and Swyngedouw, 2003, p. 19).

In the context of what is precisely meant by immigrant integration, I refer to the inclusion of the new population into existing social structures and to the kind and quality of linking these new populations’ experience to the existing system of civic, socioeconomic, and cultural relations. In particular, the political incorporation of immigrants as new citizens is central to theoretical reflection, political analysis and policy comparison with regard to immigrant integration (e.g. Bousetta, 1999; Favell,
2001; Jacobs, 1999, p. 18 of Phalet & Swyngedouw, 2003). With political integration, there would be a course of obtaining membership into the host society which would include citizenship, media usage, registration to vote, participation in demonstrations, signing petitions, voting, donations to or membership in political parties, involvement in political campaigns, contact with politicians, political group membership, running for political office and boycotting. Overall, “a successful or progressing integration process could be characterized as increasing similarity in living conditions and ethnic-cultural orientations between immigrants and natives, and a decrease in ethnic stratification” (Heckmann, 2003, p. 3).

**Cultural Integration Background**

*Cultural integration* occurs when immigrants come to obtain membership within the host society which would include social interactions (frequency of contacts within host country and in comparison to country of origin), friendships, rules/norms behavior, marriages, voluntary associations, language usage and proficiency (specifically of English in the US), permanent status in the host country, and intermarriages. These reflect levels of exposure to and identification with the host society. The persistence of a strong cultural identification with ones’ country of origin does not necessarily have a negative association with developing a sense of belonging to the new host society, but it does play a role in the process (Garcia, 1981, p.382). In other words, the influence of cultural attachment/practices to one’s country of origin can serve as a depressing factor for engagement in collective activities in the host society, and/or suggests a longer period of adjustment/assimilation.
**Economic Integration Background**

Moreover, with *economic integration*, there would be a course of obtaining membership status in the central institutions of the host society which would include status in the economic and labor market (employment and income levels), educational levels, and residential patterns (housing and segregation). Such information though is nothing new in the literature, which often finds high correlations between political, social and economic integration. For instance, in a fairly recent study on the integration of Turks in Germany, the researchers, Alexander Danzer & Hulya Ulku, noted that they found integration can positively impact economic success through three main channels, reflected in the three dimensions of integration (Yang, 1994): political, social and economic integration, all of which relate to the issue of economic opportunities. Additionally, the researchers suggested that in order to have significant economic success brought about by integration, some combination of all three forms of integration might be necessary and that policies aiming at integration might need to focus on all three forms of integration if the aim is to aid migrants’ economic well-being (Danzer & Ulku, 2008, p. 28).

Furthermore, in the American context, integration can entail an upward social mobility where Verba, Nie and Kim emphasize the importance of socioeconomic status in developing positive political orientations and increased levels of political participation (Verba, Nie & Kim 1972, p. 15). Also, differential residential patterns are strongly related to socioeconomic inequality, so that high proportions of immigrants’ and economic disadvantage (e.g. more unemployment, lower income levels, and inferior
quality of housing) tend to coincide in the same urban neighborhoods (Jacobs & Swyngedouw, 2000, p. 9 of Phalet & Swyngedouw, 2000).

Moreover, the assimilation thesis has its roots in the work of Gordon. According to this theory, immigrants, and recent immigrants most of all, may not be well enough assimilated to the world of work and the community to be able to get fully involved in politics (Gordon, 1964, p. 63). They adapt to their new economic environment in time, and then to the political environment, while their descendants are more entirely adapted. Thus integration or assimilation can be seen as a generationally-phased process. Reitz makes the same case in his explanation of the socioeconomic measurement of the relationship between ethnic identification and political participation (Reitz, 1980, p. 380). He argues that minority group members and new immigrants who are ineffective in the world of work are inclined to think that they are extraneous to the political process. For this reason, they are more likely to identify with their ethnic group, and less likely to participate in politics, than successful workers or successive generations. Thus, those who are high in socio-economic status feel more efficacious because of their greater economic success, and are, therefore, more likely to reject ethnic self-definitions and to become politically active (Reitz, 1980, p. 383).

In summary, a multidimensional framework is essential to helping us understand the status of immigrant integration, especially, for this dissertation, being that little is known about Yemeni-Americans’ involvement with the U.S. political system. For example, are Yemenis unevenly integrated along the various dimensions, and in comparison to the Lebanese, and can one draw conclusions about whether and why they are knowledgeable about or vitally concerned with the local or national political
system? Do they participate in community organizations? Do they seek to translate their traditions or group and national socio-political identification to the American context?

1.2 Social Significance

This research is significant because of several problems faced by immigrant societies. For instance, problems in economic integration may relate to insufficient access to quality jobs, or might reflect the lingering lack of applicable skills by the immigrant population. On the other hand, these disadvantages might also relate to their ability or interest in campaigning politically for greater recognition. The “transferable skills” of migrants are often not utilized and migrants see no alternative but to accept positions/jobs that are not at par with their actual skill level (Reitz, 2005, p. 3). Many studies have documented immigrants’ poor labor market outcomes (Borjas, 2004, website article). These outcomes are due in part to the low skills that many immigrants bring with them, and in part to immigrants’ loss of other elements of human capital (such as language and social networks) that enable individuals to make full use of their skills (Butcher and Piehl, 2005, p. 4). In addition, in many countries there is found to be a growing gap in income levels between immigrants and the native-born populations. According to the 2000 U.S. Census Bureau Statistics, the annual median earnings of immigrants are only about 75 percent those of natives. And for the most recent immigrants, median earning is only 56 percent that of natives.

Furthermore, in addition to factors such as educational levels, a key predictor of immigrant skill transferability, hence immigrants’ initial and subsequent earnings, is the source country’s level of economic development. Immigrants from countries with
economic opportunities resembling those in the U.S. tend to have earnings profiles resembling those of U.S. natives (Duleep & Dowhan, 2008, p. 46). Immigrants from economically developing countries tend to have lower initial earnings, but higher earnings growth than otherwise similar U.S. natives, although this can vary with such factors as immigrant emphasis on children’s educational attainment. Therefore, the source country’s level of economic development also appears to influence the relationship between an immigrant’s level of education and earnings growth (Duleep and Dowhan, 2008, p. 46). In the context of this study, both Yemen and Lebanon are considered as developing countries, with Yemen falling much lower on the poverty scale than Lebanon and with Yemen’s population having lower education and skill levels (Duleep and Dowhan, 2008, p. 46). Thus, it is likely that these differences will play out in their integration levels within the host society.

Further, there is the problem of immigrant-specific poverty in urban areas. The 2003 U.S. Census Bureau Current Population Survey reported that 44.4% of our nation’s immigrants live in a central city in a metropolitan area, compared to 26.9% of the native-born. For purposes of this dissertation, I will be focusing on the Yemeni-American communities living in two Michigan towns which are home to the largest Yemeni immigrant groups in the U.S. (with Dearborn being a larger percentage). Hamtramck is a small city (land area of 2.11 miles) surrounded by the city of Detroit, and is noted for its viable and affordable housing and property and for some continued industrial and business activity. This community has long been a magnet for eastern European immigrants and remains ethnically diverse, with a significant African-American population as well as recent immigrants from Europe (Bosnia), Asia (Bangladesh), and
the Middle East, with approximately 8.2% being Yemeni-Americans. According to the 2010 U.S. Census, 8,869 of Hamtramck residents said they were born outside of the U.S., and 11,250 of its residents reported speaking a language other than English at home. The median household income in 2010 was reported at $26,008 falling below the median poverty levels.1

The second region under study is the southern end of Dearborn, where the largest population of Yemeni-American immigrants resides. Dearborn fares much better than Hamtramck in terms of higher estimated median household income, faring better than the average in state of Michigan, with approximately $49,044 in 2007. Within the South end of Dearborn however, the primarily Yemeni community is characterized as working class, and heavily reliant on the automotive industry (just as in the Hamtramck case), and has had been severely impacted by the downturn in the industry.

1.3 Purpose and Scope of the Study

In this proposed project, I intend to extend our understanding of Yemeni immigrants’ attitudes or behavior toward integration, and particularly political integration into American society by exploring the case of Yemeni-Americans in both Dearborn and Hamtramck, comparatively and in relation to Lebanese-Americans in the same region. Although the predictors of political integration vary by immigrant group, studies of political integration have focused primarily on the determinants of naturalization and differences in citizenship acquisition across different nationalities (Ports & Moro, 1985; Liang, 1994; Yang, 1994). There are typical similarities in the literature on this subject

1 U.S. Census: Hamtramck, Michigan. Census 2010 Demographic Profile Highlights
with most empirical studies utilizing a host of factors, such as income, education, and length of exposure (Ports & Rumbaed, 1996; Jason and Rosenzweig, 1990). By exploring the literature on the prevailing historical patterns of political, social and economic integration for immigrants, I will be analyzing whether or not and why these patterns are different for Yemeni immigrants and among Yemenis themselves, and if so, what factors account for these difference.

The immigrant integration model is based on the studies of J.W. Berry’s theory of integration, which states that “if immigrants wish to maintain their original cultural identity and are interested in interacting with host community members at the same time, the resulting acculturation strategy is integration” (Berry, 1974, p. 80, See Figure 1). The ways in which immigrants search to find their place in a ‘new’ society have been classified by Berry in a clear schema which has been used by many scholars in the field of cultural intergroup relationships. I am utilizing the concept of integration as it differs from assimilation. Berry (1990, 2001) and some other migration theorists (Grillo, 1998; Faist, 2000; and Nauck, 2001, p. 26 of Remennick, 2003) describe assimilation as the total and irreversible dissolution of the minority group into the majority. Integration, on the other hand, implies that the minority group preserves its cultural foundation while developing further adaptive features of identity, abilities, networks, participation and so forth. In other words, assimilation is a complete transition from an old culture to a new one, whereas integration usually emerges in a form of bi (or multi)-culturalism, including bilingualism (Remennick, 2003, p. 27). Integrative strategy implies a dual cultural competence, flexibility, and an effective situation switch between the two cultures (Berry, 1990; Nauck, 2001). Two elements are crucial for this kind of adaptation of immigrants:
the newcomers' need to maintain their original culture and their desire to have relationships with members of the dominant group in society (Berry, 1980; Berry, Poortinga, Segall, & Dasen, 1992, p. 6 in Berry, 1997). The combination of these factors results in four adaptive strategies: integration, assimilation, separation and marginalization. I will categorize the dominant patterns for Yemeni-Americans as contrasted to Lebanese-Americans in order to understand the effects of income disparities, culture, and political positions found in theories on immigrant integration, which will be reviewed later in this dissertation.

*Operationalizing Integration*

In order to operationalize and explain integration, I will be looking at both demographic measures which may or may not reflect or impact integration, such as income and educational attainment, as well as dimensional and sequential integration measures such as residential patterns, civic participation and cultural measures such as norms/values, language use, exogamy, and socialization patterns. Thus, with integration being the best form of immigrant assimilation into the host society, I am utilizing the following classification by Berry to predict that Lebanese immigrants would fit into the integrated or assimilated categories, while Yemeni immigrants would likely fit into the marginalized category.
Figure 1. Berry’s four-fold classification model

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<td>YES</td>
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<td>Is it considered to be of value to maintain relationships with other groups?</td>
<td>YES</td>
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The concept of integration is problematic. In the immigration/incorporation discourse integration has quite often been understood as an individual property. This approach has been popularized by social psychologists (among others, John Berry) that have operationalized integration in terms of participation in mainstream society in the public (economic, political, educational) sphere but maintaining traditional language and values in the private sphere. (As we have seen other acculturative options or strategies according to this theory are assimilation, separation and marginalization). For example, integration = [home/family life separation] culture of origin + [public life assimilation] culture of settlement. Integration as a functional specialization is probably the most realistic option for millions of immigrants, sojourners, and other people participating in intercultural exchanges. It is much easier to have one culture dominant in one life domain and the other culture dominant in remaining activities, than to assume complete biculturalism (Boski, 2006, p. 148). Yemeni-American attitudes toward integration as
well as predicted independent variables affecting integration will be obtained from
demographic studies as well as data retrieved through the DAAS which identify the role
of social factors such as education, gender, marriage, age, language use, income,
education, among other demographics, as well as behavioral measures such as contacts
with the former country of origin. Additionally, my research will analyze the role of
economic factors, such as socioeconomic status and its impact on whether Yemeni-
American families participate in political or other community processes. I will also
examine other contextual factors, such as the degree of maintained links to the country of
origin that might accelerate or retard integrative processes. This research is based on a set
of expectations derived from literature regarding factors accelerating or retarding
integration (as opposed to assimilation or isolation) as well as my assumptions from the
Yemeni experience that higher income levels readily translate into, and result from,
greater levels of integration; whether this impact is a result of greater interaction with
other communities or higher levels of education or business transactions will be
determined.
Chapter Two

Review of Literature

Integration Theory

One set of factors potentially affecting integration patterns are the traditions and practices immigrants bring with them. In terms of integration patterns, at one time, research showed that immigrants gradually achieve full social and economic integration the longer they stay in the country. Research on previous immigrant generations suggests that although they may maintain transnational contact when they first arrive, this contact steadily diminishes as they take root in the new country and have increased access to local social support (Fong, Cao, & Chen, 2007, p. 6). In recent years, however, the transnational perspective, which emerged as an alternative explanation of the immigrant adaptation process and in view of new global communications and travel technology, has argued that transnational contacts are widespread among recent immigrants. As they part from the former home society, immigrants might retain or reject past practices, though they will likely be influenced by them at least to an extent over the generations (Foner, 1997, p. 970).

Literature Findings on Predictions of Integration

Depending on which group of migrants one is studying and/or which areas of interest, the literature on the determinants of immigrant integration offer a variety of ranges within the political, economic and cultural context. A recent report entitled: "Assimilation Tomorrow: How America’s Immigrants Will Integrate by 2030," by demographer Dowell Myers (a Professor in the School of Policy, Planning, and Development at the University of Southern California) and John Pitkin (President of Analysis and Forecasting, Inc., in
Cambridge, Massachusetts) conducted research based on Census data and a large number of migrants that arrived in the U.S. during the 1990s. The report found that the key indicators of integration included, home ownership, citizenship and income. The majority of previous studies on the determinants of immigrant integration has predominantly focused on structural (mainly economic and educational) integration and has increasingly focused on the second generation (Aparicio 2007; Meurs, Pailhe, and Simon 2006; Portes and Hao 2004; Simon 2003, p. 3 of Fokemma & de Haas, 2011). However, relatively less empirical research has focused on the determinants of socio-cultural integration of migrants and among recently arrived first-generation (i.e., foreign-born) migrants in particular. An improved understanding of the determinants of socio-cultural integration is important for our understanding of immigrant integration at large. First of all, structural (economic) and socio-cultural integration into mainstream society are often closely related and tend to reinforce each other (Dagevos, 2001, p. 287). This is demonstrated by immigrant or ethnic minority groups such as the Chinese where economic integration goes along with high maintenance of a strong group identity and resistance against assimilation (Fokkema & Haas, 2011, p. 3). The other way around, immigrant groups may experience “downward” assimilation into the mainstream (native) lower class cultures while underachieving in education and in the job market (Portes, 2007, p. 87). Micro-empirical research has yielded valuable insights into the importance of human capital factors (i.e., education, skills, work experience), as well as age and length of stay in the receiving countries, in affecting the integration of immigrants and their children (Cheswick & Miller, 2001; Curl & Vermilion, 2003, p. 2). In addition, macro level (i.e., social, economic, cultural and political) characteristics of origin societies as well as partly
related individual migration motives have been increasingly recognized as important
determinants of immigrant integration.

Background on Yemeni and Lebanese Migrants

Although this dissertation does not have the required data to critically analyze the
distinctions of the Yemeni and Lebanese communities within their respected countries of
origin, in an attempt to consider if those distinctions and perceptions of each other impact
how they settle and integrate into their host societies, it would be beneficial to gain some
understanding of those differences to explore the ethnicity component in this dissertation.
In comparison to other Arab groups, Yemeni culture at least in the Middle East,
seemingly has not been drastically altered in adapting to westernization and
globalization. Being that the Yemeni community is primarily a tribal society, with the
exception of Aden, local connections and local identities remain key to a Yemenis’
political and social orientation. In Yemen, “the lack of financial and technical
wherewithal to deliver essential services to more than 18 million people scattered over a
vast terrain perpetuates a vicious cycle of poverty” (Carapico, 2007, p. 188). Private
investment capital remains scanty, sacred, and small scale, while the terms of structural
adjustment have raised the costs of investment and reduced the level of consumption”
(Carapico, 2007, p. 188).

Furthermore, the former South Yemen had a history of British occupation (in the
port city of Aden), an envied location on the Arabian Gulf and the Red Sea which
allowed for heavy trading with East Asia and Africa, and finally, a Marxist government
which unified gender roles economically, politically and socially. On the other hand,
former North Yemen has consisted of primarily a tribal, agrarian society isolated from the
world and even its neighbor to the south. Throughout much of Yemen, dress, food and socialization are closely associated within tribal circles, with Aden, a former British colony in the south being the exception. Aden’s geographically strategic advantage in being a port and one that was significant on a major trading route has played a considerable part in the progression of its population, which has factored into creating a more cosmopolitan society as opposed to the enclosed North. In fact, southern Yemen as a whole had a vastly different political history than northern Yemen.

Unlike many other parts of the country, throughout its history as an international port, Aden has been part of regional, intercontinental and global movements of people and commodities; this position was further strengthened during the late 1950s – in the height of colonial times – when Aden became the third busiest port in the world (Dahlgren, 2008, p. 201). Although both regions experienced the relationship between colonialism and Islam, the distinction of southern Yemen’s past as a British colony followed by its Marxist revolution pertain to expectations about immigrant integration. To elaborate, during the period between the British withdrawal from South Yemen in 1967 and Yemeni unification in 1990, South Yemen had adopted a “scientific socialism” (Moline, 1998, p. 94). Their rules on family law explicitly called for the equality of men and women; polygamy became prohibited along with unilateral divorce by males. Divorce proceedings only took place within courts of civil law (Moline, 1998, p. 94). Also in contrast to Northern Yemen, immigrants to the U.S. with urban backgrounds came exclusively from Aden migrating in smaller numbers with higher levels of education and skills (Abraham, 1977, p. 117). Further, in terms of where these Yemeni immigrants settled within Michigan, Adenis tended to avoid the ghetto-like residential
concentrations of their rural countrymen in favor of residential dispersion throughout low- and middle-income suburbs within the downriver Michigan region [not Dearborn and Hamtramck] (Abraham, 1977, p. 118).

**Distinctions among the Lebanese Immigrant Community**

In the case of Lebanese immigrants, while initial groups, both Muslim and Christian, came to the Southeast Michigan region and beyond in the U.S. for jobs and family reunion, major disruptive events occurred over the period 1975 to 1990 and drove a renewed immigrant wave: civil war, Arab-Israeli conflicts in Lebanon, Israeli invasions of Lebanon in 1978 and 1982, war against Israeli occupation of Southern Lebanon, inter- and intra-communal wars, etc. All these factors combined to create internal displacement of people, disruption of economic activities and insecurity; as a result, a large number of people emigrated from Lebanon drawn from all communities and from different economic occupations (Tabard, 2009, p. 8). Thus, beginning in 1975 and continuing until 1991, a period in which one third of Lebanon’s population emigrated, Lebanese Shi’a displaced by their country’s civil war arrived in Dearborn and settled in large numbers both in the South end area and in East Dearborn, around Warren Street, while Christian refugees from this period tended, like the Palestinian Christians, to settle to the west, in Farmington Hills, Westland, and Livonia’ (Belton, 2003).

The residential patterns of the Lebanese in Metro Detroit can be noticeably distinguished on the basis of religion and scale of residential concentration, with the Muslims densely populating a western suburb and the Lebanese Christians widely dispersed over a number of eastern suburbs (Abraham & Shryock, 2000, p. 518). Splits within the diverse Arab-American community also shape life in Dearborn, though these
divisions are not those of Middle East antagonisms rewritten in concentrated form on the layout of Dearborn (Abraham, 2000, p. 53). The devastating conclusion of Lebanon’s civil war in the late '80s with harsh intra-Christian and intra-Muslim fighting created a large wave of emigrants, especially Christians giving up on the future of Lebanon. Moreover, the post-war exodus, with the increasing departure of Christian (especially Marinate) communities, has fragmented the Lebanese Diaspora into communalism, which in turn assumes the form of ethnicities in the host society (Humphrey, 2004, p. 14).

Additionally, “Lebanon has been one of the most troubled sites for sectarian divisions in the Arab world, but sectarianism never really took hold in southeast Michigan with the same virulence it did in Lebanon during the civil war” (Signal, 1997, website). Though relations between Christians and Muslims ebbed and flowed with the various stages of the war in Lebanon, most of those who escaped the war tried actively to leave behind the political and communal differences that had caused so much turmoil. Taking up residence in a foreign society known for its upward mobility opportunities, and worries about how Arabs might be treated in a non-Arab society, often allows previously warring factions at least to set aside their differences in the new land.

Rather, "clearer divisions in the Arab American community exist along class lines and degrees of cultural assimilation" (Signal, 1997, website). Indeed there are marked differences of economic attainment between Yemeni and Lebanese immigrants. For instance, according to a study by Kristine Ajrouch and Amaney Jamal, “Lebanese/Syrians were more likely to identify as white compared to Yemenis and Iraqis (Ajrouch & Jamal, 2007, p. 873). They went on to note that “the Lebanese/Syrians were historically instrumental in securing a white identity for themselves as they gained
economic success in the New World" (Ajrouch & Jamal, 2007, p. 873). Having achieved a white identity that coincides with those economic interests and one that does not conflict with their phenotype nor political identities in the region, it may be that Lebanese/Syrians are less likely to perceive themselves as a minority compared to Iraqis and Yemeni participants (Ajrouch & Jamal, 2007, p. 873). In sum, such concepts of identity would seem to denote an essential part of social life, specifically for immigrant groups, pointing to a focal element of incorporation to the host country and a take off point from which they might launch their political participation.

Further, although this study will not delve into an analysis of urban versus rural differences in its impact on immigrant integration, an understanding of the distinctions among these communities as illustrated below, would be useful in furthering this research in the future. Thus, in analyzing the role of urban versus rural backgrounds in levels of immigrant integration, due to distinct differences in their geographical, economic, historical, cultural, and political backgrounds, northern Yemeni-Americans and southern Yemeni-Americans have assimilated at varying degrees into U.S. society, with first generation southern Yemeni-Americans reportedly being more open to integration than their more rural and traditional first generation northern counterparts (Abraham, 1977, p. 116). Immigrants with urban backgrounds come exclusively from the South Yemeni city of Aden, while Lebanese with urban experience come mainly from Beirut but also from some other significant towns (Abraham, 1977, p. 116). Additionally, in comparison to their northern Yemeni counterparts who consist of a rural origin coming from middle and small land-owning peasant families, Adenis are a relatively smaller group and had
worked as skilled laborers, technicians, merchants, teachers, and government functionaries (Abraham, 1977, p. 117).

In comparison, as previously noted, the residential patterns of Lebanese-Americans, as in Lebanon, were clearly demarcated on the basis of religion and degree of residential concentration, with the Muslims densely populating a western suburb and the Lebanese Christians widely dispersed over a number of eastern suburbs (Abraham, 1977, p. 97). Yemeni immigrants, at least in their initial phases and to a large extent since, tended to reside near their place of employment, allowing them to walk to work. For example, the two residential settlements of Michigan that account for the bulk of the Yemeni population are the Southend in Dearborn located around the Ford River Rouge Complex and the Chrysler Eldon Avenue Complex located in Hamtramck (Abraham, 1977, p. 97).

The dynamics of ethnic relations also are significant to an understanding of these immigrant communities. The earliest immigrants arriving from Lebanon settled into patterns to which subsequent immigrants essentially adjusted. Lebanon, like northern Yemen, is a mountainous area with significant geo-cultural north-south distinctions, and geography has a strong influence on culture. The Lebanese state has always been weak, while religious, kinship and regional groups have had significant sovereignty; sometimes they coexist, sometimes they are in conflict. But these religio-ethnic groups have had general territorial bases and although many of their members have migrated to cities such as Beirut, they have a general territorial base in the cities as well (Salloum, 2002). The groups are decidedly endogamous, meaning there is great pressure to marry within the group, which in turn, affects the shared dynamics of the group because those who try to
marry outside, most specifically women, may have to endure negative effects. The highly endogamous and somewhat stratified religious ethnic groups of Lebanon created some of the settlement patterns and the interaction patterns for groups in the U.S. (Salloum, 2002). The pattern of immigration is similarly imperative. For example, according to Salloum, Lebanese immigrants formed large communities, which gave relatives a place to come (Salloum, 2002). Additionally, in 1982, during the war in which Israel attacked Beirut and invaded south Lebanon, large numbers of immigrants arrived in the established Dearborn area kinship communities (Salloum, 2002).

In terms of a comparison among the Lebanese and Yemeni-American diasporas, Lebanese communities tended to form enclaves or, if scattered in residential patterns to form civic associations linked to their home areas, such as Bint Jubail and Tibnine, with thousands of members often residing in close proximity in the Detroit area, while Yemenis came in a pattern termed “recurrent” migration, meaning they come for a few years, go back to Yemen, then come again (Salloum, 2002). Further, in contrast to Lebanese family migrations, many of the Yemeni immigrants have been single men.

By the 1920s, when Ford built his auto plants in the city, the good salaries offered to prospective employees enticed a large number of Syrian-Lebanese and later Yemenis to his plants in the Detroit suburb of Highland Park and later to southeast Dearborn (Salloum, 2002). According to Patrick Belton, “unaccompanied Yemeni males had been migrating to Dearborn since the beginning of Arab immigration, but in the mid-1970s they began to arrive in larger numbers” (Belton, 2003). Less educated and less fluent in English than other Muslim immigrants, including Lebanese, these Yemeni migrants tended to hold unskilled positions in Dearborn and send remittances to their families in
Yemen. Rather than bring their families to Dearborn, they themselves returned to Yemen—recurrently and, with time, many returned permanently. More strictly religious than many of the other groups, the Yemenis tend to reject what they regard as the corruptive pressures of American society. "They concentrated in the South end of Dearborn with other Yemenis, with the result that the neighborhood now shows the influence of the Yemeni countryside in dress, its absence of women from public spaces, and the centering of male social life around the neighborhood’s coffeehouses" (Belton, 2003).

In the literature, return migration or repatriation is often used as an indicator of sojourning or lack of commitment to the host country, but data for this measure are rarely accessible (Archdeacon, Bodnar, and Caroli, in Yang 1999, p. 64). Clearly, sojourners tend to retain home-country allegiance, to rent homes, and to return to the country of origin one day. In contrast, settlers are inclined to become citizens of the adopted country, to purchase their own houses, and to stay there for the rest of their lives. Thus, the Yemeni-American first generation immigrant patterns are seemingly quite similar to the settler versus sojourner patterns in immigration.

Such an area of research is significant in that there has been less effort to understand the patterns and problems regarding immigrant integration of more socially isolated immigrant groups, such as Yemeni immigrants as compared with other Arab and non-Arab immigrants. Yemen has a history of creating an identity wherein it intended to set itself apart from its Arab neighbors [this pattern may have carried over to Yemeni expatriate communities as well]. To elaborate, Yemeni nationalism was distinct from the rest of the Arab world in the fact that it positioned itself as being part of the Arab world
but also in opposition to other Arab states and peoples. According to Fred Halliday, two significant factors played a role in this identity: (1) Yemeni nationalism embraced the country’s pre-Islamic civilizations, much unlike its neighboring Arab countries in the Gulf, though not unlike Egypt (Halliday, 1997, p 34). What other Muslim countries have deemed a time of “ignorance,” Yemen has highlighted its pre-Islamic history as an example of the contrasts that took place between what was happening in Yemen and what was taking place elsewhere in the less settled areas of the Arabian Peninsula; (2) Yemeni nationalism was not only directed against British and Ottoman colonialism, but it has also been directed against Saudi Arabia and its treatment of Yemenis beginning in the 1920s and early 30s during the oil boom and the ongoing political, including border, disputes between the two states (Halliday, 1997, p. 35). This sense of contrast with other Arab states was further compounded by the experience of the Egyptian military presence in Yemen during the 1960s (Halliday, 1997, pp. 34-5).

Whether such a background for immigrants from this region has any substantial and lingering effects on Yemeni-American integration is still unknown. However, there has been some literature on the Yemeni immigrant community that connects Yemenis who reside in Yemen and those who emigrate. For instance, it may be important to note that Yemenis are, for the most part, racially and ethnically homogeneous (Held & Cummings 1989, p. 155). This ethnic homogeneity has enabled the Yemenis in diaspora to preserve their identity as an ethnic community rather than a religious one (Warner and Wittner, 1998, p. 247). This is understandable, since ethno-linguistic differentiations that characterize other communities do not exist among Yemenis; as Carla Makhlouf discovered, although the study was an examination of Northern Yemeni society within
Yemen, “Yemenis have little interaction with non-Yemenis and for political, economic, and religious reasons, Yemen has been historically a most isolated society” (Makhlouf, 1979, p. 14).

Nevertheless, information is needed on patterns of successful immigrant integration, such as the factors that impact integration and the services used or needed by immigrants to facilitate the process. Contrasting Yemeni with the Lebanese diaspora, one notes the Lebanese division by clans and sects within Islam as well as Muslim-Christian divides. When they first began inhabiting the Dearborn area, Christian immigrants from present-day Lebanon settled in the eastern parts of the city, while the Lebanese Shi’a Muslims settled closer to Ford Motor Company areas of the city, being that a great majority of them worked for the auto manufacturer (Haddad & Smith 1994, p. 126). Furthermore, in terms of these immigrant groups choosing particular occupations, such as commercial and merchant enterprises, which in turn allowed them to interact with other groups, the Lebanese immigrants were found to be closely similar to Palestinian-Jordanian and Syrian immigrant groups, whereby approximately one-fourth of the community now hold managerial and professional occupations while another one-fourth work in industrial and construction jobs, either in the skilled trades or in semi-skilled functions (Abraham & Shryock, 2000, p. 84). In contrast, the Yemenis remain heavily concentrated in the manufacturing industry, predominately in the lesser-skilled occupations rather than the trades and overrepresented in service occupations, largely food preparation in eating and drinking establishments (Abraham & Shryock, 2000, p. 84).
Within immigrant communities, individuals presumably make choices about the degree to which they can accept or participate in the host society’s culture; and thus, we need to know more about the circumstances of such choices as well as the challenges to integration that, if understood and overcome, could benefit the society as a whole. Learning more, particularly in a comparative cross-national context, about the processes and conditions of immigrant absorption and integration will allow for more enlightened public policies relating to health care, housing, employment and educational issues in host countries. Good immigration policies permit the shift from the impending economic and social prospect of immigration to recognizing tangible economic and social benefits for the country.

Additionally significant, early Yemeni immigrants, from the 1960s through the 70s, can be distinguished from their Arab immigrant counterparts by the fact that they came to the U.S. mostly without their families and made periodic trips back to Yemen which strengthened their ties to their home country. Thus, the net result of these distinguishing characteristics is that Yemenis to a greater degree than any other single Arab group expected to attain social mobility and gratification in their native country, and not so much in the U.S. (Abraham, 1977, p. 4) As stated by Georgory Orfalea, “there really is no Arab group comparable to the Yemenis, 90 percent of whom were unaccompanied young males, semi-literate or illiterate; with little knowledge of English most have not taken root here and shuttle back and forth on jumbo planes to Yemen, buying homes and land back there (Orfalea, 1988, p.181).

It should be noted, however, that Orfalea wrote his book in 1988 when the majority of Yemeni immigrants were male. For Lebanese immigrants, young men also
were the first to emigrate followed by young women and later wives and entire families, however, this was only the case with the earliest immigrants from Lebanon (Hajar & Jones, 2000). During the 1990s, an increasing number of Yemeni families also immigrated to the U.S. either accompanying their husbands, fathers or brothers or following them after the men had settled with employment and housing. Further, it is possible that immigration was no longer considered as short-term, which could be a result of the worsening economic and political status of Yemen which experienced severe economic issues with the unification of the country followed by a civil war in 1994.

Nonetheless, immigrant families often experience generational conflict between adults who want their children to practice traditional ways and the young who are eager to join the mainstream by casting off what they see as archaic habits and customs (Ajrouch, 2000, p. 449). What may be found to be unique among the Yemeni community, being that many of the immigrants were considered as initially sojourner status, is that persons of later generations (i.e., second, third, or later) reported significantly greater adoption of American cultural practices compared to sojourners and immigrants (Amer, 2005, p. 173).

Further, although the data is not ample enough to show for variations in the patterns of residence among the two communities and its impact on their integration levels, it is useful to understand some of the distinctions of how these groups have settled. This background if utilized in future studies, may or may not be significant in verifying patterns of integration, however for this dissertation, there may be a connection in the cultural integration aspect between their territorial settlement based on religion (for Lebanese), kinship and geography and their levels of cultural integration, which include:
their strength of ties to their country or origin; language usage; marriage to someone of Arab background; and frequency of return visits.

Thus, the literature reveals that Yemeni immigration patterns have differed from the Lebanese in that Lebanese immigrants are mostly highly educated and thus, they have a tendency to detach themselves from other immigrant groups by accentuating their similarities to the mainstream, quite unlike the Yemeni community. However, this leaves us with unanswered questions regarding the evolution of immigrant integration involving these groups over time. Therefore, there is reason to consider whether the pattern of Yemeni non-integration has changed to correspond more to other Arab cultural groups and families. For future research, I am interested in exploring the connections between the economic and political conditions in the country of origin, Yemen, and the patterns of integration for first and second generation Yemeni-Americans. In other words, what is the impact, if any, of Yemen’s political and socioeconomic status on whether or not these first generation Yemeni-Americans choose to settle permanently in the U.S. or have intentions of a temporary stay and an eventual return to Yemen? A similar line in inquiry can look for effects of Lebanon’s periodic upheavals and warfare on immigrant integration patterns abroad. However, based on the current availability of data on these two communities, the following literature research for this current study will consider why some groups within a nominal culture (Yemenis and Lebanese) integrate into new host societies after immigration more rapidly than others. Thus, it will be an analysis on the correlation between the slower rates of immigrant integration, especially participatory political integration, among Yemeni-Americans and its connections to the economic and
cultural conditions within this community, with a comparative analysis of Lebanese-Americans.

Relevant Literature for Ethnicity and Political Participation

What is ethnicity and how and why does it matter for political participation? Previous research has shown that the participatory discrepancy of Asian-Americans for instance cannot be explained with socio-demographic and group perception variables. Assuming the analysis of an emergent list of scholars who consider ethnicity as a developing trend, my study offers multidimensional measures of ethnicity for two immigrant groups from similar and dissimilar backgrounds. The prevailing literature ranging from studies of differences among Anglo-Whites, African-Americans, and Latino voting turnout and other electoral or non-electoral behaviors often emphasizes the defining impact of socioeconomic status (SES), especially education (Verba and Nie, 1972; Wolfinger and Rosenstone, 1980; Nie et al., 1988; Bobo and Gilliam, 1990; Conway, 1991; Verba et al., 1991). In studies conducted on blacks, Mexican-Americans, and whites in Austin, Texas, ethnicity proved important in distinguishing levels of voluntary association membership, a significant variable used in DAAS and utilized in my political activism component (Williams, Babchuk, and Johnson, 1973, p. 637). Further, in studies using ethnicity as the key dependent variable, when used in conjunction with socioeconomic status and age, they can explain differences in political participation (Antunes & Gaitz, 1975, p. 1198).

Both the practical and the theoretical perspectives motivate the following questions: First, do the members of the different groups, Yemeni and Lebanese, differ in the amount and type of their participatory activity? Second, do any differences that are
found reflect ethnicity directly, or are they an indirect product of ethnicity (perhaps through group-based mobilization), [or the effect of differences on Berry’s scales] or are they simply the result of a random correlation between ethnicity and other factors (such as socioeconomic characteristics)? Third, how much activity might one expect to see in the future under different scenarios of demographic and political change? In which ways does ethnicity influence political participation at the individual level?

In exploring the literature, several authors have identified ethnicity as an important source of political participation. Further, ethnicity is often shown to have a greater effect than socioeconomic status on levels of participant political culture (Nelson, 1979, p. 1024). As we will see in my analysis, however, this finding is antithetical to my findings on the analysis of Yemeni and Lebanese-American groups from the DAAS. Among the best-known works on the subject are those of Greeley (1974) and Wilson and Banfield (1965, 1971). Using Verba's and Nie's data, Greeley maintains that ethnicity is "a meaningful predictor of political participation in American society" and that "its impact does not go away when social class is held constant" (Greeley, 1974, p. 170). In other words, it is resources (or social capital), not race or ethnicity, that determine who takes part in American political life. Having located the basis of variations in political activity among Latinos, African-Americans and Anglo-Whites in disparities in their politically pertinent resources, Verba, Schlotzman, Brady and Nie note that race and ethnicity matter essentially for participation in two different ways in the fact that language and religious denomination and practice - are intimately connected to group identity (Verba, Schlotzman, Brady & Nie, 1995, p. 494). Further, the authors found that differences in education, income and occupation associated with race and ethnicity that
help to account for participatory differences do not define an ethnic group, while religion and language, however, are social characteristics that go to the heart of the meaning of ethnicity (Verba, Schlotzman, Brady and Nie, 1995, p. 494). Finally, Berry’s theory of integration affirms that ethnicity matters in that, in an effort to integrate, immigrants would retain their culture of origin while adapting to the new culture. Thus "identity would consist of the equivalent concept of having a bicultural or integrated identity: feeling that one is both part of an ethnic group and part of the larger society, which in turn would directly result in further integration" (Berry & Sam, 1997, p. 317).

Ethnicity in terms of immigrant research is a broad topic covering several issues, such as transnationalism and factors within the immigrants’ home countries that may range from socio-economic status to geography to history to population settings. I have found that the literature on the topic of Yemeni-Americans in any respect is extremely sparse. In regards to the literature found under the topic of assimilation and transnationalism, there is some relevant material to be found. However, the material only explains the cultural background of Yemenis and Yemeni-Americans and the geographical, economic, historical, and political factors which have led to their emigration to the U.S. Further, the literature found does offer insights as to why Yemeni-Americans are considered to be so resistant to assimilation into mainstream American society. Nonetheless, in identifying what the literature lacks, in terms of my research question, no empirical research has yet been done on the more recent generations of Yemeni-Americans and whether or not this community’s stance of assimilation has changed. Although the DAAS does not delve deeply into analysis of transnational issues, some of the survey questions given, which I
have utilized in my Arab Cultural Index, will shed some light on Yemeni levels of transnationalism as compared to Lebanese levels.

Transnationalism

Some research on transnationalism will be important in the analysis of Yemeni-Americans and their emigration and degrees of assimilation in an effort to distinguish the elements which familiarize these migrants with their newer society and their possibly altered feelings toward their country of origin (Portes 1999, Faist 2000a; Faist 2000b). Transnationalism is a "global phenomenon". It takes into account the context of globalization and economic uncertainty that facilitates the construction of world-wide networks. Its institutionalization requires a coordination of activities based most of the time on common references - objective or subjective - and common interest among members; a coordination of resources, information, technology and sites of social power across national borders for political, cultural, economic purposes. “Transnationalization has far-reaching consequences in how we think about immigrant adaptation, global civil society, communities, culture, and citizenship” (Faist, 2000, p. 190). Furthermore, as nations are increasingly penetrated by global forces, losing their autonomy if not their sovereignty, the initiative in world politics has arguably passed to ‘epistemic communities’ defined by ‘common worldviews, purposes, interests and praxis’ (Rudolph and Piscatori, 1997, p. 2).

A host of studies demonstrate how mobilization by immigrants or minorities has tipped the balance in favor of the country of origin from the platform of a diaspora’s host country (Ellis & Kahn, 1998, p. 473). At the grass-roots level, economic transnationalism offers an alternative to some immigrants and their home country
counterparts against low-wage dead-end jobs; political transnationalism gives them voice that they otherwise would not have; and cultural transnationalism allows them to reaffirm their own self-worth and transmit valued traditions to their young (Portes, 1999, p. 469). Further, “transnational ties cut through these factors and make migrants as engaged in homeland politics as refugees, settled migrants as active as newly arrived, and well-integrated migrants as active as those with a weaker foothold in the new country of settlement” (Ostergaard-Nielsen, 2003, p. 760-786). Based on Berry’s conception of integration however, such forms of acculturation run negatively against the successful integration of immigrants into the host society, being that full integration cannot not be made as transnationalism favors connection to the country of origin rather than having the recognition and acceptance of a multicultural society. To Berry, integrated individuals are individuals who want to maintain their identity with home culture, but also want to take on some characteristics of the new culture.

Many Yemeni- and Lebanese-American families maneuver in a well-established transnational social field, with citizenship rights, property, ongoing economic activities, thick kinship ties, and family practices that link their daily life here with relationships and activities in Yemen or Lebanon. Hermans and Kempen have called for alternative ways of thinking about immigrant identity (Hermans & Kempen, 1998, p. 1117). They argue that in a period of increasing globalization, the rapid creation of multinational citizens, the formation of diasporic communities, massive flows of transmigration and border crossings, acculturation becomes increasingly complicated (Hermans & Kempen, 1998, p. 1117). Rather than thinking of immigrants as moving in a linear trajectory from culture A to culture B, Hermans and Kempen suggest that we should think of

In comparison, just as the Yemeni-American immigrants, Lebanese immigrants most often consist of an extended family that constitutes the fundamental foundation of Lebanese society and provides the key support to which family members turn in times of need. ‘The extended family is the main source of networks for social, economic, and political survival of the individual and the clan, and, consequently, of Lebanon’ (Joseph, 1993, pp. 478-479). These networks were and continue to be vital in linking Lebanese residents with their transnational emigrants and vice versa by helping in sponsoring new emigrants and in facilitating their lives in the receiving countries. However, just as with the Yemeni immigrant case, the most valuable tangible output of these networks is the immense monetary transfer that the emigrants send back to their families in Lebanon (Hourani, 2007, p. 5).

For some, immigrants’ ties to the country of origin might diminish their political interest and participation in the new state, but the literature seems to indicate a greater likelihood that ties and participation abroad would spur greater participation in the U.S. as well, in defending ethnic and group interests and perceived welfare. However, the implications of this viewpoint for Berry’s model, is that such a result is possible, yet ideally the most successful form of immigrant integration into the host society would involve participation in both the receiving society’s culture as well as the culture of origin in a proportional manner. However, one could also assume that migrants’ continuing transnational involvement goes hand in hand with integration (Berry & Sam, 1996, p. 19).
Transnational practices take the form of remittances to relatives remaining in the home country, of repeated trips to the country of origin, or of sending one’s children to schools or after school programs established and run by immigrants with the explicit purpose of maintaining the real or assumed original culture of the migrants. These are social practices that create or maintain links between former identities and new societies among immigrants and their descendants. In this way, we see the formation of transnational ethnic worlds (Werbner, 1999, p. 17), transnational social fields (Guarnizo & Smith, 1998), or transnational social spaces (Faist, 1999, p. 2). By engaging in transnational practices ethnic minorities often distinguish themselves from the majority population. In short, ‘transnationalism’ covers a social context or a network dominated by practices which connect two or more national contexts, with the effect that an ambivalent relationship to both the former home country and the current host country may arise (Rudolph & Piscatori, 1997, p. 471 and, p. 463).

**Political Participation and Integration**

Political participation is seen as a function of ethnic differences, cultural, and economic integration. The impact of ethnicity on political participation was chosen because participation is a very broad domain that includes not only socio-economic and political participation but also access to culture. Various studies found numerous circumstances and conditions which affected the political participation of immigrant groups. However, most have emphasized the importance of socioeconomic status in developing positive political orientations and increased levels of political participation.

Below, I will be further organizing the literature and study methodology according to three main predictors: 1) Yemeni- versus- Lebanese comparison: To
consider whether or not there are ethnicity differences between Yemeni and Lebanese immigrants in determining levels of political participation; 2) Cultural Integration: To consider whether and if so how, cultural integration, meaning how immigrants come to obtain membership the host society which would include social interactions (frequency of contacts within host country and in comparison to country of origin), friendships, rules/norms behavior, marriages, voluntary associations, language usage and proficiency (specifically of English in the US), permanent status in the host country, and intermarriages affects political participation and test how differences in cultural integration between the Lebanese and Yemeni immigrant communities account for any observed ethnic differences in political participation; and 3) To consider the role of economic integration (socioeconomic status) on political participation in these two communities.

It is essential to understand what is meant by and what accounts for political participation, including its foundations in past and present research. Customary accounts of political participation usually concentrated on the individual characteristics that differentiate participants from non-participants, for instance through ranks of income levels and degrees of education. Martiniello understands political participation as “the active dimension of citizenship” (Martiniello, 2005, p. 5). In his interpretation, it relates to the various ways in which individuals take part in the management of the collective affairs of a given political community and comprises “less conventional types of political activities such as protests, demonstrations, sit-ins, hunger strikes, boycotts, etc.” (Martiniello, 2005, p. 5).
Some authors in the literature go further is explicating exactly what they define as activities that are incorporated as political participation. For instance, Verba and Nie exclude from their understanding of political participation the following: 1) ceremonial or support participation (because they are not aimed at influencing political decisions); 2) attitudes (evidently not predictably associated with action); 3) participation in schools, family, jobs, voluntary associations etc., whereby only “legal and legitimate” modes are considered, excluding most forms of political protest (Verba & Nie, 1972, p. 23). Further, in a comparable way Parry et al. overtly indicated what they do not include in their conceptualization of political participation: 1) behavior not aimed at influencing public representatives (e.g., going to an office to receive welfare benefits); 2) participation in the workplace; 3) show of interest in politics; 4) display of attitudes to support the functioning of democracy; and 5) readiness or willingness to take action (Verba & Nie 1972, Parry, Moyser & Day 1992, Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1995). The traditional definition of political participation involves a range of essential activities actually carried out by individuals outside of their employment remit, the intention of which is to sway a political decision (Verba & Nie 1972, Parry, Moyser & Day 1992, Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1995). The last point has been gradually extended to include activities such as protests (viz., Occupy Wall Street), which on occasion attempt to influence political opinion rather than decisions taken by government agents, or such as political consumption aimed at company activities (Anduiza, Cantijoch, & Gallego, 2009, p. 884).

In political integration, it may be significant to distinguish between local versus national versus international political participation of the immigrant groups. One area of
this dissertation will consider whether there is more or less local and national political participation among Yemeni- and Lebanese-Americans. Steven Rosenstone and John Hansen argued that ‘involvement in organizations promotes political participation by making people susceptible to mobilization whereby, politically, organizations stand between national and local political leaders and ordinary citizens’ (Rosenstone & Hansen, 1993, p. 87).

For many Arab-Americans, the Arab-Israeli War also denoted the establishment of their social, political and cultural marginalization. The Arab-Israeli War of 1967 specifically instigated the shift towards a rising ethno-political consciousness among members of the Arab-American community (Abraham 1989; Suleiman and Abu-Laban 1989). Not only did the war signify the U.S.’s confirmed alliance with Israel, but it gave Arab-Americans their first taste of exclusion from a role in the political process (Suleiman, 1989, p. 13). This period also entailed the beginning of a war, waged by the U.S. media, against Arabs at home and in the Diaspora which has distorted the meaning of the term Arab and further complicated Arab-American identity (Naber, 2000, p. 41). However, some current research has shown that the effects of the September 11th backlash against the Arab and Muslim communities, has triggered a resurgence of political participation among the communities. The horrific events of September 11th, 2001 broadened Arab-American political influence beyond traditional areas of Arab-American settlement, but also within them. “New Arab-Americans were mobilized as part of the broader Arab-American voting public in the suburban and ex-urban locations we studied, but Arab-Americans gained voting power relative to the general population in the largest cities” (Gimpel, 2007, p.347).
Thus, when analyzing the levels of political participation among Yemeni and Lebanese immigrants, one must not only consider those that are actively involved in political organizations but also the role of foreign policy and how it is played out within the mass media in terms of its effects on how politically active these immigrants become and in which ways. The majority of recent Lebanese immigrants arrived in the U.S. after the 1980s as a direct consequence of the political crisis in Lebanon. Further, the Lebanese civil war between 1975 and 1990 displaced many people around the world and forced them to seek refuge in countries like the United States and Canada (Stephan, 2009, pp. 148-9). These immigrants were not necessarily motivated “by political choice but simply because there is nowhere else to go” (Christison, 1989, 111). The continuous political instability and economic hardship in Lebanon are responsible for the continuous Lebanese immigration to the United States and elsewhere despite the mistreatment of post 9-11 immigrants in these host countries (Martin, 2004).

**Political Activism**

Political Activism varies in much of the literature. Each study uses different variations of what they would consider as the factors which make up political activism, sometimes including activism both in the new host and old home country. For instance, Guarnizo’s 2002 study on transnationalism, utilized the following factors: member of home country political party; give money to home country political party; take part in home country political campaigns/rallies (Guarnizo, 2002, p. 286). Also, other studies have gone further to include factors such as: reads newspapers from country of origin, keeps in touch with politics in country of origin, member of political party in country of origin, participates in demonstrations related to country of origin (Snel, Engbersen and...
Leerkes, 2006, p. 289). Additionally, other aspects within the literature which make up political activism are: collections of signatures, complaints to politicians and strikes (Berger, Galonska, & Koopsmans, 2004, p. 500).

In summary, Guarnizo, Portes, and Haller have organized political activism for immigrants based on transnational electoral participation which includes membership in a political party in the country of origin, monetary contributions to these parties, and active involvement in political campaigns in the polity of origin, followed by transnational non-electoral politics which includes membership in a hometown civic association, monetary contributions to civic projects in the community of origin, and regular membership in charity organizations sponsoring projects in the home country (Guarnizo, Portes, & Haller, 2003, p. 1223). However, generally much of the literature is in agreement on the overall description of political activism to include: voting, registration to vote, giving campaign money, working on campaigns, and protesting in the new host state (Brady, Verba, and Schlozman, 1995, p. 156), which is utilized in this dissertation. Although this dissertation will only consider forms of political participation that occur in the host country, however, future studies considering migrants’ participation in politics abroad would be useful to demonstrate the rebound effects on ones’ participation in the country of new residence.

Measuring Effects on Political Participation

This dissertation will focus on political participation as a primary outcome (i.e. dependent variable). Political participation will be measured using three indicators including: 1) self-reported registration to vote, 2) self-reported voting in the 2000 presidential election, and 3) an index of political activism incorporating the sum total of
four self-reported political activities: signing a petition; contributing money;
calling/writing a government official; protesting. Measurement of political integration,
therefore, will consist of registration to vote and if the immigrant had voted. Further, a
political activism model will be created which will consist of: 1) signing a petition; 2)
contributing money; 3) calling/writing a government official; and 4) protesting.

I am predicting three main effects on political integration, the main one is through
ethnicity and cultural characteristics, the other two are cultural integration (cross-cultural
associations) and economic integration (occupational mixing) in American society; then I
will conduct multivariate analysis to see if the relationships are affected by the
confounding factors. Ethnicity will be measured using self-reported country of origin of
respondents born outside the U.S., or self-reported country of origin of parents and
grandparents of respondents reporting being born in the U.S. To this end, paternal
lineage will be used to classify respondents as Yemenis or Lebanese. Cultural integration
is measured using an additive scale of indicators intended to measure respondents’ level
of acculturation with the host country. Acculturation is operationalized using three
domains that include citizenship, identification with Arab culture and Arabic and English
language usage. Indicators in these three domains are coded so that higher values indicate
higher levels of U.S cultural integration. Further, economic integration will be measured
using four indicators of economic achievement including: home ownership, employment
status and type, education and income. Lastly, my multivariate models will account for a
series of factors that have been shown to affect the level of political participation
including age, respondents’ marital status, gender, party identification, generational
length of residence in U.S., and ideology which consists of an individual’s political and
social outlook ranging from very conservative, moderately conservative, middle-of-the-road, moderately liberal, or very liberal.

An important element of the theoretical model is the role that cultural and economic integration play in moderating ethnic differences in political participation. Due to time and funding constraints, this project will be a purely quantitative study utilizing the DAAS data, which is the largest study conducted in Southeast Michigan of Arab-Americans. No additional surveys will be attempted. Political Participation is the Dependent Variable. The study could be considered as “groundbreaking” in that there have been no studies exploring in depth the Yemeni community’s political participation and more specifically exploring how this community’s levels of acculturation and economic achievement (integration vs. biculturalism) affect their political activity in the U.S. Further, modeling this work as an intra-Arab comparison (Yemeni/Lebanese), adds to the importance. By comparing the Yemeni and the Lebanese community, a much more diverse, acculturated [also integrated rather than bicultural in Berry’s terms] and economically established segment of the Arab-American community, I intend to bring forward these differences and try to explain them. I believe that there is a definite gap in ethno-cultural studies on these two groups, which this work will help to fill with regard to intra-ethnic differences in political participation.

**Political Participation and Ethnicity**

**Aim 1:** To consider whether or not there are ethnic differences between Yemeni and Lebanese immigrants in determining levels of political participation.

**H1:** I propose that *Lebanese respondents have higher rates of political participation compared to those originating from Yemen.* In working from the assumption that the
Lebanese respondents are more integrated than the Yemeni respondents, thus based off of Berry's model of integration, the more one is integrated, the more one is likely to participate. This expectation is derived from the theory that integration can be one of the linkages between objective group conditions and political action where resources accumulated by one's ethnic origin, education, income, and occupation are translated into skills and attitudes facilitating involvement in political activities (Pei-te Lien, 1994; Berry). Therefore, ethnicity would have an impact on political participation of ethnic groups, in this case favoring the Lebanese group over the Yemenis in terms of higher rates of political participation.

**Analytic approach:** First, prevalence rates of voting registration and voting, and mean levels of political activism will be calculated to examine and test differences between the two ethnic groups. Additionally, multivariate modeling of the three outcomes of interest (Dependent Variables): registration to vote, voting, and political activism will be done. I will use logistic regressions in the case of dichotomous measures (i.e. registration to vote & voting), and count models (more specifically a model based on a Poisson distribution) to account for political activism. My multivariate analysis is aimed to determine whether and how the relationship between ethnicity and political participation is moderated by confounding factors (i.e. age, marital status, sex, party ideology, and ideology). In the next phase of my analysis, I will look at where economic and cultural levels come in.
**Political Participation and Cultural Integration**

**Relevant Literature:**

Cultural integration refers to the cognitive, behavioral, and attitudinal changes experienced as migrants acquire the core competencies of the host culture and society.\(^2\) It places the individual’s personal identification within the social system and determines whether they continue to identify with their native culture or, rather, see themselves as a part of the host society (Bosswick and Heckmann, 2006, p. 10). Just as in Berry’s model, this does not necessarily mean that immigrants should choose one culture over the other (host culture versus home culture); rather it is a complimentary fusion of the two cultures which would allow the immigrant to hold onto his or her background in addition to adapting into the host society. This form of cultural integration involves having a knowledge of the host country language and cultural standards which allows them to adapt to a new way of life and opens possibilities of participation (in this case, political) in the host culture. Such adaptation associates higher rates of immigrants in social networks of the host society, including but not limited to friendships, partnerships, marriages, and membership in voluntary organizations (Bosswick and Heckmann, 2006, p. 10).

Based on the literature, cultural integration of immigrants may be significant at the level of the public policy sphere through, for instance, the way the immigrants identify and participate in the host country political process. To begin, John Garcia’s study on Mexican migrants to the U.S. found five socio-cultural factors that were identified which often affects the integration process. The first factor was language use

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and proficiency, which in an economic sense, greater levels of English language facility improve one's occupational status and earnings (Tienda and Niedart, 1980, p. 378); in other words, levels of English language proficiency and Spanish were found to be critical factors in political participation. The next factor relates to cultural traditions, customs, and lifestyles which can disconnect the migrant from achieving a strong sense of belonging to the host society. Cross-pressures to maintain group solidarity as preferences (Arce, 1977; Garcia, 1982, p. 378) serve as adaptive responses to a new social system; yet, group solidarity is weakened by social contacts which are a feature of modern life (Borrie, 1957, p. 45). Finally, the last set of factors relates to experiential developments resulting from exposure to American society, which would include: length of residence in the U.S.; education in the U.S.; intermarriage; and naturalization status (Garcia, 1982, p. 388).

There is however a clear gap in the literature focusing on the social or cultural integration of immigrants which possibly has to do with the intricacies involved in operationalizing such concepts. Where measures of assimilation and/or integration are used, they are typically utilized as independent variables to calculate immigrant earnings (Kalbach, Hardwick, Vintila & Kalbach, 2002; Kalbach & Kalbach, 1995; 1999; Isajiw, Sev’er & Dreidger, 1993; Breton, Isajiw, Kalbach & Reitz, 1990; Boyd, Goyder, Jones, McRoberts, Pineo & Porter, 1985). In fact, in many studies of assimilation and integration, the response variable is “income” or “socio-economic status;” therefore, implied is the theory that economic equality with the native-born is required for immigrant integration. However, this assumption has not been tested; it is therefore not known if economic success in fact predicts, or is even associated with, acculturation
(Walters, Phythian, and Anicef, 2007, p. 40). This concept will be analyzed in the third hypothesis which proposes that economic integration will explain the relationship between both ethnicity and cultural integration and political participation.

Further, empirical research illustrates that structural and cultural dimensions of integration are strongly correlated. In a study done on migrants within the Netherlands, it was shown that migrants with good social positions (i.e. high education, stable job) commonly also have more informal contact with native Dutch people and more frequently support ‘modern’ ideas and values than other migrants (Dagevos, 2001; Odé, 2002, as cited in Snel, E., Engerbersen, G., & Leerkes, A., 2006). In other words, migrants’ strong transnational involvement and integration into the host country do not rule each other out (Portes, Haller, & Guarnizo, 2002, p. 281). On the other hand, this may differ according to class: ‘Those [immigrants] who have income, education, and language skills are more likely to be able to choose transnational activism, while those with less social and cultural capital are more likely to be forced into it’ (Levitt, 2003, p.183). For underprivileged migrant groups rather, continuing transnational identifications and retaining the customs of the home country may impede adequate incorporation into the host country (Joppke & Morawska 2003; Levitt 2003; Morawska 2003). In short, through the literature, it is difficult to extract the exact variables and connections between cultural integration and political participation of migrants; however, when linked with economic factors, the patterns and effects of culture on political participation appear to be much more visible.

Based on the literature, cultural integration of immigrants may be significant at the level of the public policy sphere through, for instance, the way the immigrants
identify and participate in the host country political process. This area is significant in understanding integration in that as meeting within the political process and deciding together the future of society is a sign of a high level of social inclusion and cultural acceptance, access to culture may improve the individual’s ability to understand other cultures and function in both their own as well as foreign cultures. It may also promote the understanding that inter-cultural exchanges enhance social cohesion.

**Aim 2: To consider whether and how cultural integration and more specifically ethnic differences in cultural integration affect political participation.**

**H2: Cultural integration is positively linked to political participation. I also propose that cultural integration will have an attenuating effect on the previously examined relationship between ethnicity and political participation.** This hypothesis was based on previous research which has shown the connection between language proficiency, which impacted economic levels, which then impacted political participation (Garcia) which I utilize in the Arab Cultural Identification Index which tests language usage and its meaningfulness in affecting integration. The other variable which this hypothesis was based on was the participation in Arab cultural events which has been shown to disconnect the migrant from achieving a strong sense of belonging to the host society (Garcia, 1987, p. 388). The third variable tested in the Arab Cultural Identification Index examined related to other forms of exposure to American society, which would include intermarriage; and naturalization status (Garcia, 1987, p. 388) which I utilized to fit with and test the variables of citizenship and the importance of marriage to someone of Arabic background. Finally, for my fourth measure of cultural integration, I utilized the variable which measures the strength of ties with the country of origin through the frequency of
return visits there. The frequency declines over the years, but is also a function of income, such that the longer immigrants have been settled the more money they are likely to be able to spend on visits if that is what they wish (Banton, National Integration in France and Britain, 2001, p. 161).

**Analytic Approach:** The bivariate relationship between cultural integration and each measure of political participation will be examined. Multivariate analysis will expand the multivariate models tested in H1 to account for cultural integration and test: 1) the relationship between cultural integration and political participation controlling for model covariates and 2) the attenuating effect that cultural integration has on the relationship between ethnicity and political participation.

**Political Participation and Economic Integration**

**Relevant Literature:**

As indicated earlier in this dissertation, much of the literature on immigrant political participation focuses on the link between economic integration and cultural integration. More so, Verba and Nie emphasize the importance of socioeconomic status in developing positive political orientations and increased levels of political participation (Verba & Nie, 1972, p. 201). Further, the assimilation thesis has its roots in the work of Gordon (1964); according to this theory, immigrants, and recent immigrants most of all, may not be well enough assimilated to the world of work and the community to become fully involved in politics. They adapt to their new economic environment in time, and then to the political environment, while their descendants are more entirely adapted. Thus integration or assimilation can be seen as a generationally-phased process. Reitz makes the same case in his explanation of the socioeconomic measurement of the relationship
between ethnic identification and political participation (Reitz, 1980, p. 380). Further, a number of theoretical orientations suggest determining how much of the observed variation in participation among ethnic groups can be accounted for by variation in background socioeconomic and demographic characteristics across the groups. For instance, the DAAS included several questions about respondents' socioeconomic characteristics. Chief among these variables are education and income (Campbell, Converse, Miller, & Stokes, 1960, p. 469; Verba & Nie, 1972 p. 97; Wolfinger & Rosenstone, 1980, p. 25). Baglioni for instance, suggests that successful economic integration is a necessary (though not sufficient) step for socio-cultural integration (Baglioni, 1964, p. 126). For example, immigrants who arrive to their destination country with more economic resources, particularly in the form of human capital, are thought to experience more rapid assimilation than those with fewer resources (Djajic, 2003, p. 831). This link between economic success and assimilation is so pervasive that researchers, it would seem, have taken for granted that cultural and economic assimilation are inextricably linked, if not one and the same (Porter, 1965, pp. 460-462).

It is worth mentioning here that the Chaldean American community’s residential patterns within Metro Detroit consisted of residing inside of Detroit in affordable housing until their purchase of local liquor stores became increasingly successful to allow them to move to surrounding wealthier suburbs. Although Chaldeans are associated with being Arab-Americans and hold many similarities among them, such as their independent business ventures, knowledge of the Arabic language and roots from Iraq, they have worked to create their own distinct and recognizable communities while associating with
the values of other cultural groups of the same income levels (Sengstock, 1982, pp. 7 - 11).

The cultural and economic differences between the two ethnic groups, Yemenis and Lebanese are a compelling reason to study their political behavior. A connection between political participation and civic integration and empathy for the host country is worthwhile mentioning. One of my findings as described in the methodology chapter, concerning economic success as the ultimate moderating factor for political participation, could be used to argue that western democratic involvement is less a function of ethnic/cultural origin and more a function of economics. That is to say that, despite the fact that the bivariate analyses showed participation differences between the Lebanese and the Yemenis, once you engage in counterfactual thinking (by adjusting or controlling for economic achievement) you find that the situation would have been different (the two groups' participation patterns are not statistically distinguishable) had the two groups had similar economic achievement levels. This finding as shown across all three political participation outcomes, as described in my methods/results chapter, and is illustrated in the multivariable complete adjusted models. Though the latter is not a new finding, in my case it could be made more specific to groups that some researchers, in the literature on Arabs and the Middle East, argue to be inherently (i.e. culturally and so on) undemocratic and incompatible or unwilling to accept the western liberal creed. Further results as presented in the methodology, show that economic integration in terms of home ownership and business ownership leads to a higher level of political participation and to a higher likelihood of political engagement, which is in line with the literature. Studies of the economic and social integration of immigrants have analyzed immigrants’ earnings
and employment opportunities in relation to those of the native-born and how immigrants’ education, occupational mobility, as well as English-language ability change with the passage of time in the U.S. (Borjas, 1999; Stevens, 1992; Portes & MacLeod, 1999; Espenshade & Fu, 1997; Lopez, 1999 as cited in Ramakrishnan & Espenshade, 2001, p. 870). Additionally, studies of political integration have focused primarily on the determinants of naturalization and differences in citizenship acquisition across different nationalities (Portes & Mozo, 1985, pp. 37-39 & Yang, 1994, p. 449). Hence, stable multivariate statistical results based on large samples are needed to determine whether many of the common-sense explanations of the naturalization process are erroneous or plausible propositions. Moreover, past research has given less attention to the influence of larger social contexts in the country of origin and the country of destination in the naturalization process. Specifically, most previous studies have tended to overlook the effects of country of origin characteristics on immigrants' propensity to naturalize (Yang, 1994, pg. 449). “Scholars of immigrant incorporation have paid considerably less attention to voting and other forms of political participation that occur after naturalization” (Ramakrishnan & Espenshade, 2001, p. 870). Illegal aliens would be expected to integrate less because of their illegal status, however for the most part; Yemeni and Lebanese immigrants are legal.

Indeed it is highly probable that Yemen-Americans’ attachment to their motherland and their hopes of someday returning there has hampered their ability to fully integrate into their host country's social systems, as is true of other country of origin-oriented immigrant groups. Yemeni-Americans, reveal inclinations that would exemplify them as both voluntary and involuntary minorities; voluntary in that they emigrate for
economic reasons. However, Yemen is one of the world’s poorest countries due to an unstable economy and no significant economy-boosting exports. As a result, many Yemenis find it necessary to emigrate in search of better jobs and consistent incomes for the families they leave behind. It is this search for prosperity and "the American dream" that many Yemeni-Americans feel makes them true Americans; thus the desire to shirk the minority status.

Moreover, economic and political conditions in Yemen play a critical role in determining integration patterns of first generation Yemeni-American immigrants. Also true of other immigrant-generating societies, a lower standard of living in Yemen compared to that of the U.S. encourages their inclination for settlement in the U.S. due to the higher cost of return. For instance, ‘chief among the circumstances that have driven Yemenis from their native lands are: poverty, political and social oppression, colonialism and war’ (Abraham, p. 3). In addition, the unstable political environment in Yemen also encourages the permanent integration or permanent residence without much integration of Yemeni-Americans. This is not true of Lebanese-Americans who have consciously worked to achieve a white identity which coincides with their economic interests and one that does not conflict with their phenotype nor political identities back home, thus they are less likely to perceive themselves as a minority compared to Iraqi and Yemeni migrants (Ajrouch, 2007, p. 873). Because the decision to obtain citizenship depends on cultural, economic, and political assimilation, naturalization is probably a composite measure of the immigrants' permanent settlement. In addition to being a measure of economic attainment and social class standing, home ownership in the host country can be an economic barometer of roots-taking because it normally represents a long-term
commitment to the adopted country.

Aim 3: To consider the role of economic integration of immigrants on their political participation.

**H3:** Economic integration will be positively related to political participation, i.e., the more immigrants’ work brings them into inter-ethnic contact the greater will be their political participation in their new society. Furthermore, I propose that economic integration will explain the relationship between both ethnicity and cultural integration and political participation. This expectation is derived from Verba and Nie’s theory that emphasizes the importance of socioeconomic status in developing positive political orientations and increased levels of political participation (Verba & Nie, 1972, p. 152). Verba and Nie were among the first to explicate this model as an explanation of mass political behavior: individuals with high levels of socioeconomic resources (e.g., education and income) are more likely to adopt psychological orientations that motivate their participation in the political system. Numerous studies have confirmed their finding that citizens with higher levels of education, income, and occupational status tend to vote more, contact more, organize more, and campaign more than do those with lower status (Verba & Nie, 1972, p. 155). Most studies that confirm the SES model have mostly utilized samples of non-Hispanics, and it would be assumed that socioeconomic status works similarly across ethnic groups. However, there has been some empirical evidence illustrating mixed results. Lien (1994a, 1994b, p. 254), for example, finds that education is significantly related to participation among Mexican-Americans, but not for Asian-Americans, while Dawson, Brown, and Allen find that education and income are only occasionally related to participation among African-Americans (Dawson, Brown, &
Allen, 1990, p. 96). Additionally, the socioeconomic status model that I used is tested using two standard demographic indicators: Education and Income. Thus, it would be of interest to evaluate the impact of socioeconomic status in determining its impact on the political participation of Yemeni and Lebanese-Americans in an effort to consider whether or not this ethnic community varies from other ethnic groups in the U.S., as well as if it demonstrates any differences among the subgroup themselves.

**Analytic Approach:** The bivariate relationship between economic integration and each measure of political participation will be examined. Multivariate analysis will expand the multivariate models tested in H3 to account for economic integration and test: 1) the relationship between economic integration and political participation controlling for model covariates and 2) the attenuating effect that economic integration has on the relationship between ethnicity and political participation.
Chapter Three
Methods and Data Analysis

3.1 Analytical Methods

I will use data from the Detroit Arab American Study (DAAS, 2003) to examine key dimensions of integration and their relationship with political participation (Baker, W., Stockton, R., Howell, S., Jamal, A., Lin, A., Shryock, A., Tessler, M., 2003). Yemeni respondents will be compared to their Lebanese counterpart to highlight shared and differentiating factors associated with variation in the two groups’ response patterns and degrees of integration. The Lebanese group is chosen as the reference group because of common Muslim orientations (though mostly Shi’a among Lebanese), and contrasting educational and income levels and length of stay being that the Lebanese-American community is much more established and comparably better off economically than the Yemeni community. Comparatively assessing the data on Lebanese-Americans, a group with high levels of attributed integration provides an area of research that is significant in that there has been relatively little effort to understand the varied patterns and problems of immigrant integration even within established cultural categories such as “Arab.” I expect Yemeni-Americans overall to be less integrated and less politically active than their Lebanese-American counterparts. The reasons for these differences are likely to be explained by cultural and economic differences. Study findings will inform the understanding of ethnicity and American politics in general, and will shed light on intra-Arab ethnic differences in particular providing preliminary answers relating to how two culturally and economically divergent groups adjust and adapt to the American political environment.
The concept of integration is conceptually problematic. In the immigration/incorporation discourse, integration has quite often been understood as an individual property. This approach has been popularized by social psychologists (among others, John Berry) that have operationalized integration in terms of participation in mainstream society in the economic (educational) sphere but maintaining traditional language and values in the private sphere. I intend to examine the levels of political integration among Yemeni- and Lebanese-American immigrants by investigating a series of indicators probing participants’ political participation. More specifically, I will look at self-reports of voting registration, presidential voting, petition signing, monetary contribution, contacts with government officials, and engagement in protests. To examine cultural and economic integration, which are treated as predictor variables, I will analyze indicators of social acculturation and economic achievement. To study the former, I will look at questions probing respondents’ social and cultural norms, and behavior. To analyze the latter, I will look at socioeconomic measures including income, educational attainment, employment status and home ownership.

The study analysis will be done using data from the DAAS. The DAAS is a companion survey to the 2003 Detroit Area Study (DAS), and includes a representative sample of the adult Arab and Chaldean population aged 18 and older residing in households in the three-county Detroit metropolitan area (n = 1000). The DAAS is based on a dual-frame sample design. The joint structure for the 2003 DAAS probability sample design consists of two component parts: 1) an area probability frame used to choose area segments from Census tracts in which 10% of more of persons were self-classified as of Arab- or Chaldean- American ancestry in the 2000 Census; and 2) a list frame for
selecting housing units from mailing and membership lists of 13 Arab- and Chaldean-American organizations (Baker, Stockton, Howell, Jamal, Lin, Shryock & Tessler, 2003). Further, the area probability sample component of the DAAS is based on a conventional three stage sample design, a principal stage sample of area segment units followed by a second stage sample of housing units within area segments and random selection of one eligible adult respondent in households with one or more eligible persons. The geographic domain for the area probability component of the DAAS design consisted of the 60 Census tracts in Wayne, Oakland, and Macomb counties in which at least 10% of the 2000 U.S. Census population self-identified as Arab- or Chaldean-American. These tracts included 49% of the total population of self-identified Arab- and Chaldean-Americans in the three-county area in 2000. It should be noted that once the sample populations needed for this dissertation were extracted from the DAAS, there will be some hazards in relying on fewer cases, which is explained in additional detail in the limitations section of this dissertation.

The DAAS provides a unique look at Arab Americans living in the Detroit metropolitan area following the September 11, 2001 terror attacks on the United States. The data account for respondent information and opinions on their experiences since the September 11th attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, however, with more emphasis being placed on questions of social trust, confidence in institutions, intercultural relationships, local social capital, and attachments to transnational

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3 DAAS recruited a variety of interviewers, most from the Arab and Chaldean communities. Almost all were bilingual. They were recruited and trained by the Institute of Social Research's Survey Research Team. All were pledged to confidentiality. The training sessions went on for two days. Each person who was interviewed was asked if they wanted a bilingual interviewer. There is an item in the survey that tells the percent who did. More often they did the interview in English but switched back and forth. They were also asked if they wanted a female interviewer, which some did. DAAS accommodated those requests (often on the site since typically interviewers went out in teams).
communities, respondent characteristics, and community needs. Some of the examples of the issues addressed in the data included analyses that ranged from respondents’ frequency of religious participation, their level of political activism, their level of interaction with people outside of their cultural, racial, and ethnic groups (a measure of social integration), and the quality of the social and political institutions in their area. The DAAS also surveyed components of background information which included the variables: birth country, citizenship status, citizenship status of spouse, education, home ownership status, household income, language spoken in the home (if not English), marital status, number of children (under 18) in the household, parents’ countries of birth and citizenship status political affiliation, total number of people living in the household, voter registration status, whether the respondent ever served in the United States Armed Forces, and the year of immigration, if not born in the United States. In utilizing this survey’s data, my study will incorporate appropriate statistical analyses, featuring regression models.

3.2 Subpopulation of Interest

Given the study’s focus, all analytical work was restricted to the two ethnic groups of interest. In order to determine from the DAAS results, who were Lebanese and who were Yemeni, I used the values from the groupings which were based on responses to a series of questions probing: 1) the respondents’ country of birth; 2) their parents’ (i.e. mother and father) country of birth; and 3) their grandparents’ (both maternal and parental) country of birth. Individuals were considered Lebanese if they reported being born in Lebanon, or if they answered “Lebanon” to any of the following questions: 1) in
what country was your mother born? 2) in what country was her mother born? 3) in what country was your father born? and 4) in what country was his father born? Consequently, and individual was coded as Yemeni if they reported being born in Yemen or if they answered Yemeni to any one of the above stated questions. The resulting subpopulation included 292 respondents, with 221 classified as Lebanese-Americans and the rest (i.e. n=71) as Yemeni-Americans.

3.3 Outcomes of Interest

Three main outcomes pertaining to political integration were considered. First, registering to vote was measured dichotomously (0=No; 1=Yes) using respondents’ answers to a question probing whether they are currently registered to vote. Second, voting was also measured dichotomously (0=No; 1=Yes) based on participants’ response to a question examining whether they have voted in the last presidential election. Third, political activism was measured as a composite additive score of four indicators probing whether respondents incorporated into the model participated in the following political activities: 1) signed petition, measured by the DAAS question: Have you ever signed a petition? 2) contributed money for a political cause or candidate, measured by the DAAS question: Since January 2000, have you contributed money to any organization that supported political candidates? 3) called/wrote a government official, measured by the DAAS question: In the past 12 months, have you called or written a government official to express your opinion on a political issue?; and 4) protested, measured by the DAAS question: In the past 12 months, have you taken part in a protest, march, or demonstration about any social or political issue? Individual indicators were coded
dichotomously (0=No; 1=Yes) and the resulting range for the additive activism score was 0-4.

3.4 Predictors and Controls

Three main predictors were of interest to this study: 1) ethnicity, 2) cultural integration, and 3) economic integration. First, Ethnicity was equated to country of origin and measured dichotomously (0=Lebanese; 1=Yemeni). Second, Cultural Integration was measured using an Arab Cultural Identification index based on the survey questions probing the following information: 1) citizenship, 2) Arabic language usage and meaningfulness, 3) the importance of marriage to someone of Arabic background; 4) importance of participation in Arab cultural events; and 5) frequency of visits to the country of origin. Individual scale items were coded so that higher values indicate higher Arab identification. I argue that a respondent who registers high on this Arab Cultural Identification index will correspondingly have lower levels of cultural integration within the host country. It should also be noted that analytic work for the voting outcome is conditioned (i.e. restricted to the subpopulation of) on registering to vote because only those registered to vote can vote. However, given the literature, the use of citizenship was highlighted as an important indicator of acculturation and political involvement in the host country.

Third, Economic Integration as an index was operationalized using four variables including: 1) home ownership, 2) education, 3) income and 4) employment. Home ownership was measured dichotomously (0=rent; 1=own) using a question probing whether the respondent or his/her family own or rent the place where they live now.
Education was measured as a categorical variable (less than high school; some high school; some college or more) by recoding respondents answers about the highest grade of school or degree that they completed. Income was measured using ten categories intervals based on a question probing a respondent’s income group that includes: Income being treated as a continuous variable in the analytical models. Recodes were based on information gathered from several questions including 1) whether respondent was currently doing any work for pay, 2) whether a respondent was working part-time or full time, and 3) whether a respondent’s job involved self-employment or employment by someone.

Five control variables were also accounted for in my analysis. First, Age in years was included as a continuous measure. Second, respondent party identification was coded as a three category variable reflecting whether a respondent identified as a Republican, a Democrat, or an Independent. Third, marital status was coded dichotomously (0=not married; 1=married). Fourth, gender was also measured dichotomously. Finally, ideology was measured using a question gauging how a respondent would describe his/her political and social outlook. Five response categories were registered for this indicator including very conservative, moderately conservative, middle-of-the-road, moderately liberal, or very liberal.

\[4\] This is important because marriage assumes more economic maturity. One needs to achieve a certain level of economic independence to start a family. Additionally, married individuals tend to be a bit more conservative, and have more stable roots in the community in which they reside. All these reasons would lead one to believe that they are more likely to participate in politics.
3.4 Data Analysis

My data analysis was conducted in three steps. First, I used univariate analysis including means (when continuous) and frequency tabulations (if categorical) to examine the distributions of all the indicators used in this study. The resulting descriptive statistics are included in Table 1. Second, I used bivariate analysis, including correlations (when continuous) and cross-tabulations (if categorical) to examine unadjusted relationships between the main outcomes and predictors of interest. The objective of bivariate analysis is also to identify subgroup differences on the political participation measures. This was primarily intended to test for substantive and statistical variations in political participation, and cultural and economic integration between the two ethnic groups.

Additionally, bivariate analysis was conducted to examine the relationships between political participation and cultural and economic integration. Unpaired-samples t-tests were used to examine statistically significant means differences for continuous variables, and Pearson's chi-squared tests were used to test for overall statistical independence between categorical variables. Mean levels and bivariate frequencies in addition to p-values resulting from the statistical tests are presented in Table 2. Third, I used multivariable regression to examine the relationship between the outcomes of interest and my main predictors controlling for covariates to account for possible confounding effects. Finally, logistic regression models were used with dichotomous outcomes (i.e. registering to vote and voting), and Poisson regression was used with the political activism score to account for the count nature of the resulting indicator. The variables: registering to vote and vote were analyzed as dichotomous being that for those
not registered to vote cannot vote, therefore, all the analysis for the voting variable were conditioned on respondents indicating registering to vote.

Logit regression models allow me to “explore how each explanatory variable affects the probability of the event occurring.”

To facilitate interpretation, model estimates will be presented as odds ratios and will include the corresponding 95% confidence intervals (Table 6). The odds ratios help to avoid non-intuitive log-odds interpretations resulting from standard logit model coefficient estimate and rather focus on the change in the odds of the occurrence of an event (i.e. outcome=1) that is associated with a unit change in explanatory variable under consideration. To further facilitate interpretation, predicted probabilities for the main predictors of interest will be calculated and graphed. In short, because I am using dichotomous variables and I have a data set with binomial outcomes, and if I want to model my data as having logistic errors, and the predictors as having linear effect on the outcome, I therefore model the dichotomous outcomes by using the log odds.

Poisson regression uses the probability function of the Poisson distribution to model the rate of occurrence of an outcome conditional on a series of predictors and covariates. Incidence rate ratios and their corresponding 95% confidence intervals are presented in Table 6. To further facilitate interpretation predicted rates of counts will be calculated and graphed.

---


3.5 Results

3.5.1 Univariate results

Univariate descriptive statistics for the study controls and predictors are presented in Table 1. An overwhelming majority of the included respondents were married
(76.7%). The study sample was equally divided between males and females.\(^8\) Close to two-fifths of respondents indicated being Independent or having no party preference (57.5%), while a quarter identified themselves as Democrats (26.9%), and the remaining as Republicans (15.5%). A plurality of respondents (45%) identified as having a very conservative or conservative political and ideology, and only close to 1 in 7 reported having a Liberal ideology (15.63%). Finally, the average age in the study sample was about 42 years.

Most of the study respondents were of Lebanese descent (79.5%), with the rest meeting my classification criteria as being of Yemeni descent.\(^9\) The distribution of the cultural integration indicator was fairly normal ranging from a minimum score of 2 to a maximum of 35. The average cultural integration score was 15.95 (SE=0.38). Close to half of the respondents indicated having a high school education or less, and about a quarter reported having a college degree or more (24.8%). Study respondents were equally likely to be poor and well to do with close to 30% indicating a household income of less than $20,000 and similar prevalence reporting an income of $75,000 or more. Home ownership was highly prevalent with only 1 in 5 respondents indicating renting or otherwise (19.38%). Finally, close to a third of the study sample specified not working as their employment status, and 12.5% indicated being retired. Business ownership was relatively high at 16%, with the rest of the sample respondents (40%) indicating being employed by someone else.

---

\(^8\) Interviewers were trained and interviews were conducted in a face-to-face format.  
\(^9\) Here the sampling mechanism is supposed to generate prevalence rates that represent the community. The Lebanese population in the tri-county area is much larger than the Yemeni population, and that is reflected in the sample composition.
### Table 1. Univariate Descriptive Statistics of Predictors and Controls

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Lebanese</th>
<th>Yemenis</th>
<th>Sig-Test</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Control Variables</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Married</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>23.31</td>
<td>24.07</td>
<td>15.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>329</td>
<td>76.69</td>
<td>75.93</td>
<td>84.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sex</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>206</td>
<td>48.7</td>
<td>52.04</td>
<td>32.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>217</td>
<td>51.3</td>
<td>47.96</td>
<td>67.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Party ID</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>15.53</td>
<td>18.39</td>
<td>3.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democrat</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>26.94</td>
<td>27.10</td>
<td>24.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>237</td>
<td>57.52</td>
<td>54.52</td>
<td>71.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ideology</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very Conservative</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>17.79</td>
<td>15.19</td>
<td>30.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderately Conservative</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>27.16</td>
<td>26.90</td>
<td>29.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle of the Road/Something Else</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>39.42</td>
<td>40.51</td>
<td>32.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderately Liberal</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>11.54</td>
<td>12.66</td>
<td>6.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very Liberal</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>4.09</td>
<td>4.75</td>
<td>1.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Age</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>41.88</td>
<td>43.29</td>
<td>36.10</td>
<td>P&lt;0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ethnicity</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanese</td>
<td>324</td>
<td>79.41</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemenis</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>20.59</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cultural Integration</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>P&lt;0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>15.95</td>
<td>16.08</td>
<td>13.43</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Economic Indicators</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Education</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LT HS</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>27.4</td>
<td>23.53</td>
<td>49.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HS</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>21.08</td>
<td>18.89</td>
<td>28.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some College</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>26.7</td>
<td>29.72</td>
<td>15.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College or more</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>24.82</td>
<td>27.86</td>
<td>6.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Income</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LESS THAN $10,000</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>12.94</td>
<td>12.13</td>
<td>17.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$10,000 - 14,999</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>8.89</td>
<td>7.35</td>
<td>16.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$15,000 - 19,999</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>6.74</td>
<td>5.88</td>
<td>10.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$20,000 - 29,999</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>13.75</td>
<td>10.29</td>
<td>26.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$30,000 - 49,999</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>14.56</td>
<td>16.18</td>
<td>8.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$50,000 - 74,999</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>12.94</td>
<td>13.60</td>
<td>8.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$75,000- 99,999</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>9.43</td>
<td>10.29</td>
<td>3.75</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Descriptive statistics for the study outcomes are presented in Table 2. About two thirds of the respondents were registered to vote. Among those registered to vote 72% reported having voted in the last presidential election. As expected, lower prevalence rates were registered for the considered political activism indicators. About a quarter indicated having signed a petition, 12.5% contributed money to a political cause or a political candidate, about 1 in 10 respondents reported calling or writing a government official, and a similar percentage of respondents indicated having participated in a political protest. When political activism was examined as a scale, about two thirds were coded as having no political activism, and 17.5% having only one activity. The prevalence rate was less than 1% at the highest level of activism (4 political activities).
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics for Study Outcomes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outcome</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Registered to vote</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>36.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>63.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Did you vote</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>28.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>194</td>
<td>71.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Signed a petition</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>320</td>
<td>74.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>25.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contributed money</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>372</td>
<td>87.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>12.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Called or written a government official</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>382</td>
<td>89.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>10.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participated in a Political protest</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>380</td>
<td>89.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>10.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Participation Scale</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Activity</td>
<td>281</td>
<td>66.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Activity</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>17.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Activities</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>8.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Activities</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>7.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Activities</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.71</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3.5.2 Bivariate statistics

At the bivariate level of this dissertation's analysis, Lebanese respondents were more likely to participate in politics compared to Yemenis. This finding was consistent across all the examined measures, with the exception of protest reports (Table 2). Lebanese respondents were twice as likely to be registered to vote, close to 35% more likely to report voting, and two and a half times more likely to have signed a petition. Differences were especially marked with monetary contributions and communication
with politicians with Lebanese respondents being more than 4 times more likely to report having engaged in the activity relative to Yemenis.

Table 3. Bivariate association between political participation and ethnicity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political Participation Indicators</th>
<th>Lebanese</th>
<th></th>
<th>Yemenis</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Registered to vote</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>222</td>
<td>68.94</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>34.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>31.06</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>65.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>322</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voting</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>73.87</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>55.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>26.13</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>44.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>222</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ever signed a petition</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>27.24</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>235</td>
<td>72.76</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>89.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>323</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contributed money</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>14.69</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>273</td>
<td>85.31</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>96.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>320</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Called/Written government official</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>286</td>
<td>89.1</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>97.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>321</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protest</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>9.32</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>12.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>292</td>
<td>90.68</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>87.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>322</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Political participation was also related to cultural integration (Table 4). Higher levels of cultural integration [measurements included: citizenship; Arabic language usage and meaningfulness; the importance of marriage to someone of Arabic background; the importance of participation in Arab cultural events; and frequency of
visits to the country of origin] were uncovered with every political measure considered, with the exception of political protest. Average cultural scores were 40% higher among the registered to vote, 17% higher among voters, 50% higher among those reporting having signed a petition, 26% higher among monetary contributors, and 45% higher for those reporting communication with government officials. In short, my aims were to look at differences between ethnic groups and to see if those differences would be modified by factors other than ethnicity. In my work thus far I have provided bivariate evidence showing no differences between the two groups. They basically both protest at the same rate. Given this, any analytic work on political protest for instance, would assume no difference between the two ethnic groups.

Table 4. Bivariate association between political participation and cultural integration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Cultural Integration (Range=0-34)</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>SE</th>
<th>Test</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Registering to vote</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>P&lt;0.01</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>17.3</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voting</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>P&lt;0.01</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>18.1</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Signed a petition</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>P&lt;0.01</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>20.5</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contributed money</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>P&lt;0.01</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>18.8</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Called or written government official</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>P&lt;0.01</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>21.4</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protest</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
All of the economic measures in this study were statistically associated with the political participation indicators, again except for protest. As expected, a higher economic classification (irrespective of the measure) led to a higher propensity of engagement in politics. This was largely consistent with the exception of protest where statistical significance was not attained in relation to home ownership and employment status. Detailed results and tests of significance are presented in Table 5.

**Table 5. Bivariate association between political participation and economic achievement**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Economic Indicators</th>
<th>Rent or Other</th>
<th>Own a Home</th>
<th>Test</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Home Ownership</strong></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Voting</strong></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>20.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>5.82</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Registering to vote</strong></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>54</td>
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<td>26</td>
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<td>3.77</td>
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<td>80</td>
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<td>2.38</td>
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<td>15.22</td>
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**Income**

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<td>5.76</td>
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### 3.5.3 Multivariable Models

The regression analyses were done in four stages to incrementally account for the moderation effects introduced by added model covariates. First, unadjusted models included the main predictor of interest (ethnicity). Second, the models were adjusted to account for the control variables. Third, cultural integration was introduced into the model. Finally, the economic integration indicators were added. Models results are shown in Table 6.

The two ethnic groups showed persistent differences across all three considered outcomes when the unadjusted (i.e. univariate) models were considered. The odds ratios for Yemenis registering to vote were 76% lower compared to the Lebanese group. These odds ratios were 56% lower when voting was considered. Finally, being Yemeni decreased the incidence of political participation by 53% relative to being Lebanese.
Accounting for the control variables partially moderated the effects of ethnicity on the considered outcomes. The moderation effects were especially noticeable with registering to vote where accounting for the covariates led to a 41% increase compared to the unadjusted odds. Thus, the results of this analysis show that despite the indicated moderations, Yemenis remained distinctly less likely to be politically engaged compared to the Lebanese group. These results remained consistent across all three considered outcomes.

Table 6a Logistic Regression
Registering to Vote

<table>
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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Unadjusted Model</th>
<th>Adjusted Model</th>
<th>Adjusted Model with Acculturation</th>
<th>Adjusted Model with Acculturation and Economic Integration</th>
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<td>--</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>--</td>
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<td>Yemeni</td>
<td>0.24***</td>
<td>0.15-0.40</td>
<td>0.42***</td>
<td>0.24-0.75</td>
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</tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Economic Integration</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Home Ownership</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Own Business</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Education</strong></td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>College or more</td>
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</tr>
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### Table 6b  Logistic Regression

**Voting**

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<th>Unadjusted Model</th>
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<th>Adjusted Model with Acculturation</th>
<th>Adjusted Model with Acculturation and Economic Integration</th>
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<td>OR²</td>
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<td>1.00 --</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemeni</td>
<td>0.44** 0.20-0.96</td>
<td>0.43* 0.17-1.09</td>
<td>0.39*** 0.21-0.72</td>
<td>0.63 0.2-1.95</td>
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</tr>
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</tr>
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<td>Less than high school</td>
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| Age in Years                   | 1.03*** 1.01-1.05 | 1.03*** 1.01-1.05 | 1.03** 1.01-1.06 |
| Marital Status                 |                  |                |                                 |                                                          |                  |                |                  |                |
| Not married                    | 1.00 --           |                |                                 |                                                          |                  |                |                  |                |
| Married                        | 0.91 0.51-1.62    | 1.89 0.84-4.27  | 1.56 0.75-3.26                 |                                                          |                  |                |                  |                |
| Sex                            |                  |                |                                 |                                                          |                  |                |                  |                |
| Female                         | 1.00 --           |                |                                 |                                                          |                  |                |                  |                |
| Male                           | 0.75 0.46-1.21    | 1.69 0.86-3.35  | 0.50** 0.25-1                   |                                                          |                  |                |                  |                |
| Party ID                       |                  |                |                                 |                                                          |                  |                |                  |                |
| Republican                     | 1.00 --           |                |                                 |                                                          |                  |                |                  |                |
| Democrat                       | 0.24*** 0.09-0.69 | 0.68 0.23-2.03  | 0.36* 0.11-1.19                 |                                                          |                  |                |                  |                |
| Independent                    | 0.13*** 0.05-0.35 | 0.26*** 0.10-0.69| 0.27** 0.09-0.82                |                                                          |                  |                |                  |                |
| Social Ideology                | 1.2 0.95-1.51     | 1.17 0.86-1.58  | 0.97 0.72-1.31                  |                                                          |                  |                |                  |                |

---

| a Odds Ratio                   |                  |                |                                 |                                                          |                  |                |                  |                |
| b Incidence Rate Ratio         |                  |                |                                 |                                                          |                  |                |                  |                |

***P<0.01
**P<0.05
*P<0.10
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<th>Main Predictor</th>
<th>Unadjusted Model</th>
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<td><strong>Cultural Integration</strong></td>
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Table 6c  Poisson Regression
Political Activism

\(^a\) Odds Ratio
\(^b\) Incidence Rate Ratio
***P<0.01
**P<0.05
*P<0.10
Unemployed  5.33***  2.29-12.44
Retired  1.90**  1.1-3.26
Employed  2.47***  1.37-4.44

**Education**

Less than high school  
High  2.70**  1.21-6.04
school
Some college  4.67***  2.13-10.24
College or more  4.98***  2.25-11.03

**Income**

Less than high school  
High  1.23***  1.14-1.33
school
Some college  2.70**  1.21-6.04
College or more  4.67***  2.13-10.24

**Control Variables**

Age in Years  
1.00  0.99-1.01
0.99  0.99-1.00
0.99  0.98-1.01

Marital Status

Not married  
1.00  --
Married  0.61**  0.45-0.84
       0.68**  0.49-0.95
       0.86  0.6-1.23

Sex

Female  
1.00  --
Male  1.38**  1.04-1.83
       1.24  0.93-1.65
       0.79  0.58-1.09

Party ID

Republican  
1.00  --
Democrat  0.44***  0.30-0.63
       0.48***  0.33-0.70
       0.63**  0.42-0.94
Independent  0.30***  0.21-0.43
       0.31***  0.22-0.45
       0.52***  0.35-0.76

Social Ideology

a Odds Ratio
b Incidence Rate Ratio
***P<0.01
**P<0.05
*P<0.10

1.22***  1.07-1.40
1.18**  1.03-1.35
1.15*  0.98-1.35

_Covariates_

Among the included covariates, age and party ID were significantly associated with being registered to vote. Age presented a positive association with each extra year leading to a 3% increase in the odds of being registered. Both reporting to be a Democrat and an Independent decreased the odds of being registered to vote relative to being Republican by 76% and 87% respectively. Age was also positively associated with the
odds of voting with each year leading to a 4% increase. Being male also increased the odds of voting relative to being female, however, the association was only marginally statistically significant (P<0.10). Lastly, being Independent decreased the odds of voting by 75% compared to being Republican [See above]. When political activism was considered, marital status, sex, party ID and ideology presented statistically significant associations with the expected incidence. Being married decreased the incidence ratio\textsuperscript{10} by about 39% compared to non-married respondents, while being male increased the incidence of activism by close to 38%. Democrats and Independents each had lower incidence of activism compared to Republicans. Finally, reporting a more liberal ideology was associated with a higher incidence of activism.

Introducing \textit{cultural integration} completely moderated the statistical difference in voting registration between Yemenis and Lebanese. As shown in my model, cultural integration was not significantly associated with registering to vote. Additionally, accounting for cultural integration erased the statistical distinction between Democrats and Republicans. However, including cultural integration in the voting model accentuated the differences between the Yemenis and the Lebanese further decreasing the odds of voting among the former group. Additionally, cultural integration, conforming to expectations, was positively associated with the odds of voting among both groups. Interestingly enough, I found that accounting for cultural integration also accentuated the differences between Democrats and Independents relative to Republicans with both groups presenting increasingly lower odds of voting (72% and 85% respectively). In

\textsuperscript{10} Hardin and Hilbe (2007, p. 218).
short, cultural integration was also associated with an increased incidence of reported political activism: signing a petition; contributing money; calling/writing a government official; and protesting. These cultural effects were independent of ethnic differences. The latter remained statistically significant even after controlling for the cultural variables.

Nevertheless, it was the moderating effects of adding the economic integration indicators that were especially noticeable. In other words, what this result has basically shown is that the higher your economic status (irrespective of who you are), that is associated with more political participation. With the exception of registering to vote where marginal significance for cultural integration was registered, doing so rendered the associations between both ethnicity and cultural integration and the outcomes of interest statistically insignificant. Only higher education, specifically “college or more,” presented a consistent positive effect on registration to vote and voting among both groups. Employment (being retired, employed, and owning a business) and higher education (all levels) were associated with increased incidence of voting. Regarding the other forms of political participation (political activism), generated lower prevalence rates with only about a quarter of the interviewees indicating having ever signed a petition, 12.5% contributing money to a political cause or a political candidate, about 1 in 10 respondents reported calling or writing a government official, and a similar percentage

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11 It should be noted that in addition to the models in this dissertation, I had created an additional two tables to account for the education variable and its significance in political integration and cultural integration treated as individual indicators and its impact on political integration. However, the tables did not reveal anything unexpected or that would add insight to the aims of the dissertation, although they can be useful for future research in this area.
of respondents indicated having participated in a political protest. When political activism was examined as a scale, about two thirds were coded as having no political activism, and 17.5% having only one activity. Accounting for the economic indicators highlighted the effects of being male on registering to vote, and completely negated any statistically significant effects of party ID on the odds of voting and of marital status on the incidence of political activism.

Graphs of significant associations in the final models are presented in Figures 2 and 3 below. These graphs provide a clearer interpretation of the relationship between a significant predictor and the probability of event occurrence. More specifically, the expected probability of a “success” (i.e. registering to vote, or voting) relative to values of a significant predictor are presented in the case of the Logit models. Finally, the probabilities of engagement at each activism level (range 0-4) relative to the values of significant predictors are presented in the case of the Poisson models.
Figure 3. Predicted probability of registering to vote and voting by selected significant predictors. Predictions are based on the Adjusted Model with Acculturation and Economic Integration Presented in Table 6

(a) Graphed results are based on the registering to vote model; (b) Graphed results are based on the voting model
Figure 4. Predicted probability of activism levels. Predictions are based on the Adjusted Model with Acculturation and Economic Integration Presented in Table 6
Chapter Four

Discussion

4.1 Summary of Results

This final chapter of the dissertation restates the research problem and reviews the major methods used in the dissertation. The major sections of this chapter summarize the results and discuss their implications. While no especially surprising results were found between the Yemenis and Lebanese at the univariate level, the bivariate level results of the cultural integration model showed that when asked about participating in Arab culture, responses were very high, with the Lebanese group classifying that category as very important. This was surprising because the Lebanese group was more established economically and had higher levels of integration in almost all of the other categories, including citizenship; and yet they rated significantly higher in terms of feeling strongly in participating in Arab culture than the Yemenis. However, it should be noted that such significant results for the ethnicity analysis were not found to stand the test once the covariates were accounted in the bivariate analysis. In other words, in the bivariate analysis, once I started using hypotheticals (which included correlations (when continuous) and cross-tabulations (if categorical) to examine unadjusted relationships (between the main outcomes and predictors of interest) and accounting for other variables, the picture changed completely. Here it was found there was no inherent difference in the structure of my two groups. This finding was also verified by the ethnicity literature which finds that different ethnic backgrounds do lead to differences in political behavior, however, the Yemeni and Lebanese groups follow the same American model in terms of integration leading to higher rates of political participation. In short,
the two groups behave differently (as I had initially assumed) but only until I account for economic and cultural values and that although the Lebanese and Yemeni groups vote and participate at different rates as a whole, once the economic and cultural variables are accounted for however, these differences disappear.

Further, within the bivariate analysis, the finding that economic achievement, or economic integration, was the underlying reason for increased amounts of voting and political participation among the Yemenis and Lebanese, just as in the case of the literature, illustrated that there was no fundamental distinction between these two immigrant groups and others as they progress in U.S. society. In short, at the bivariate level, there are some differences between Yemeni and Lebanese participation patterns, but that difference is not inherent to ethnicity and cultural integration and thus, does not explain the entirety of the relationship between ethnicity and political integration. In brief, economic achievement, or economic integration, was found to be the underlying reason for increased amounts of voting and political participation among the Yemenis and Lebanese. Such a finding is significant, as contrary to many stereotypes and assumptions, once socioeconomic status is controlled for; Yemeni immigrants participate at similar rates with other immigrant groups. Such stereotypes range from depictions of Yemenis in Hollywood movies, such as the film, Rules of Engagement, as terrorists and uncivilized, to misperceptions of Yemenis among Arab-Americans as being backwards, uneducated and simplistic.

Finally, at the multivariable level, what was found when I accounted for cultural integration within my unadjusted and adjusted models in, was that the relationship between ethnicity among the Yemenis and Lebanese and registering to vote disappeared;
however with the variable, voting, some significance in the model was found as Yemenis remained less likely to vote than Lebanese, thus cultural integration was positively associated with voting only. However, once again, the results of the study, illustrated that in terms of political participation among Yemenis and Lebanese, in registering to vote, Yemenis were found to be less likely to register to vote than Lebanese, but these were simply trends or sample results being that they were not significant enough to apply to Yemeni and Lebanese groups on a national scale. In summary, although the assumed differences among Yemenis and Lebanese were verified in the univariate and bivariate models, conversely, in the end, once all indicators were adjusted for, the only significant difference among the two groups was found in economic integration levels. In other words, the findings indicate that if both Lebanese and Yemenis had similar economic population characteristics, the effects of ethnic origin would not be important in explaining their participation levels. Such findings were surprising being that it was assumed the model's results would illustrate a picture where a clear distinction would be drawn between Lebanese and Yemeni immigrants in all three integration areas.

4.2 Results and Hypotheses

In my first of three hypotheses, in exploring the links between political participation and ethnicity, my aim was to consider whether or not there are in fact, ethnic differences between Yemeni and Lebanese immigrants in determining levels of political participation. I assumed that the Lebanese respondents would have higher rates of political participation compared to those originating from Yemen, and that was the case in the bivariate comparisons. As my literature review has shown, studies on this
topic have varied in terms of how much of an effect ethnicity has on the political participation of ethnic groups. And in conducting my study, it is understandable why such conclusions have differed being that when I studied the two ethnic groups at the univariate and bivariate levels, ethnicity did in fact seem to impact rates of political participation. However, just as in my study, the literature also illustrated that above and beyond ethnicity, the socioeconomic status of the immigrant group was the strongest indicator of rates of political participation within the host society. Therefore, at the univariate and bivariate levels, my first hypothesis based on ethnicity predicting that Lebanese respondents would have higher rates of political participation compared to the Yemeni respondents was confirmed in the “unadjusted model” at the bivariate level, that irrespective of political characteristics, Yemeni-Americans are much less likely to vote than Lebanese-Americans. However, once all of the political, economic, and cultural variables were accounted for in the “adjusted model,” the ethnicity effect was not found to be statistically significant and therefore, must be rejected.

The second hypothesis explores whether and how cultural integration and more specifically, ethnic differences in cultural integration affect political participation. I argued that cultural integration was positively linked to political participation. I also proposed that cultural integration will have an attenuating effect on the previously examined relationship between ethnicity and political participation. In the literature within this area, the cultural integration of immigrants may be significant at the level of the public policy sphere through, for instance, in the way the immigrants identify and participate in the host country political process. The literature also revealed the differences among researchers in how to operationalize cultural integration, many of
which went beyond the control variables that I had used in my study: language usage, importance of Arabic language usage, participation in Arab culture, marriage to someone of Arab descent, and frequency of visits to the country of origin. The use of the cultural integration variable in my model eliminated any significant difference in voting rates between the Yemenis and Lebanese. However, adding the cultural integration variable to analyze registration to vote among the two groups did decrease the levels of voting among Yemenis, which was in line with my hypothesis.

The third and final hypothesis, which explores the role of economic integration of immigrants on political participation, proposed that economic integration would be positively related to political participation; in other words, that economic integration in the form of home ownership, employment status and type, education and income would moderate the relationship between both ethnicity and cultural integration and political participation. As stated in my literature review, the majority of ethnic studies in the realm of political participation emphasize the importance of socioeconomic status in developing positive political orientations and increased levels of political participation. Therefore, being that my findings here have not added to the findings already in the literature, when taking into account Berry's model of varied forms of social involvement, which notes that socio-cultural adaptation may be characterized as developing friendships, establishing social networks, and becoming productive in terms of educational or employment objectives (Berry, 2003, pp. 17-37; Castro, 2003, p. 16), some distinctions are then found among the literature and my findings. Much of the reasoning behind this notion is that immigrant communities must first adapt to their new economic environment in time, which then translates to their increased activity in the
political environment; thus integration or assimilation can be seen as a generationally-phased process. Additionally, much of the literature on immigrant political integration focuses on the link between economic integration and cultural integration or socioeconomic integration. However, as my dissertation results have shown, the cultural aspect of immigrants’ integration, consisting of variables such as frequency of contacts within host country and in comparison to country of origin), friendships, rules/norms behavior, marriages, voluntary associations, language usage and proficiency (specifically of English in the U.S.), is statistically insignificant when measuring rates of political participation among Yemeni and Lebanese-American groups.

Variables within the economic integration model such as levels of income and employment all showed significant relationships with levels of political participation. This finding along with the results regarding the relationship between home ownership for the categories of voting, registering to vote and signing a petition, indicate that levels of political participation between the renters and owners were significant. This finding was also in line with the literature which emphasized the importance of socioeconomic status in developing positive political orientations and increased levels of political participation. Thus, this finding among Yemeni and Lebanese-Americans did not veer from the literature, as it would be assumed those who own a home as opposed to those who rent would more than likely feel a commitment to their new society and want to invest in a future within it. The literature also illustrated that differential residential patterns are strongly related to socioeconomic inequality, so that high proportions of immigrants and economic disadvantage (e.g. more unemployment, lower income levels, and inferior quality of housing) tend to coincide in the same urban neighborhoods (Jacobs
& Swyngedouw, 2000, p. 9). Thus, I was able to find a significant relationship between economic integration and political participation and accept the hypothesis.

4.3 Significance of Results

My study could be considered as “groundbreaking” in that there have been no studies solely exploring the Yemeni community political participation and more specifically exploring how this community’s levels of acculturation and economic achievement (integration) affect their political activity in the U.S. Further, I believe that establishing this work as an intra-Arab comparison, adds to the importance of the work considering, what I believe to be an under-emphasized and understudied diversity within the Arab community in the U.S. By comparing the Yemeni and the Lebanese communities, a much more diverse, acculturated and economically established segment of the Arab-American community, I intended to demonstrate these differences and try to explain them. I believe that there is a definite gap in intra-ethnic studies (particularly among Arab sub-ethnicities), and specifically concerning Yemeni-Americans and I hope that my work will help fill some of this void with regard to intra-ethnic differences in political participation.

My aims for conducting this study were with the intention of broadening our understanding of this apparently unique segment of the United States’ immigrant community through testing and further developing theories on immigrant integration in a comparative context of Yemeni immigrants and comparatively with Lebanese-Americans, a group with high levels of attributed integration. Such an area of research is significant in that there has been relatively little effort to understand the varied patterns
and problems of immigrant integration even within established cultural categories such as “Arab.”

The results of my study were significant in several areas. Firstly, when accounting for cultural integration in my adjusted model for acculturation, it did not remove the relationship between ethnicity and political participation as it was found that the more culturally integrated you are the more likely to be politically active. Although the model’s results that the higher the levels of cultural integration, the more the Yemeni and Lebanese groups participate in politics was not different than what research had found among other ethnic communities, however, my assumption was that there would be a distinct difference when studying the often isolated and traditional Yemeni community. The study had also shown that, not unlike other ethnic communities, once the economic variables were added, as were illustrated in the graphs, cultural integration was found to be statistically insignificant. Secondly, for economic integration, once it was accounted for at the multivariable level, the only four variables that mattered in terms of registration to vote among these two groups were: Income, Age, being a Female and being an Independent in Party ideology and the effects of ethnicity went away.

4.4 Analysis and Recommendations

The DAAS was conducted as a result of the war on terrorism despite the topic being almost too sensitive to fully grasp the depth of the community’s position on transnationalist activities; it was deemed as essential in providing researchers and policy makers with increased knowledge on the significance of this community and how to use such data resources to improve their living environments and societies.
This study leads to further questions on how and why the Yemeni immigrant community's economic standing makes it less integrated than other immigrant groups, namely a more established Arab community, Lebanese-Americans; there are several plausible explanations concerning their behavior. First, there is the argument of "place versus culture," in which there is an ethnic residential concentration of Yemeni immigrants as noted in the literature in primarily two areas of Metro Detroit, Southeast Dearborn and Hamtramck. It is known from the literature that proximity to other co-ethnics has weak effects on voting participation and this was found to be the case across immigrant generations (Ramakrishnana & Espenshade, 2001, p. 891). Place of residence can also modify the relationship between acculturation and duration of residence. Living in an ethnic enclave may hinder social integration into the host country irrespective of years of residence, with subsequent effects on expected outcomes (Mouanoutoua, Brown, Cappelletty, & Levine, 1991, pp. 512-513). Therefore, such living arrangements may hinder Yemeni-Americans' economic opportunities resulting in their marginalization as opposed to their integration, as Berry describes in his studies. The Yemeni migrant community, specifically the Northern Yemenis, tend to reside near their place of employment, allowing them to walk to work. To compare within the Yemeni community, as the literature has shown, Southern Yemenis, or Adenis, tend instead to live scattered about within a broader geographical setting, or throughout the downriver region (Abraham & Shryock, 2000, p. 118). These residential differences may indeed be impacting integration patterns among Yemeni migrant communities and if we can integrate such a population, then anyone can integrate and since everything is going
global which is directly affecting how communities work, these integration efforts should be globalized and integrated on a community scale.

The vast majority of the literature on immigrant integration analyzes the impact of some levels of cultural integration and has shown that it has an effect on increased political participation for ethnic groups. However, my findings have shown that this does not tell the complete story as economic integration is of primary importance in integration patterns, also strongly illustrated in such literature. Such findings in combination with more localized attributes of the Yemeni-American community which have not been thoroughly researched nor understood, heed the importance of understanding this community and altering its current trend of being an alienated/isolated community within the U.S. The few studies that have been done on Yemeni immigrants in the U.S. illustrate integration trends more in line with the European model of integration wherein European countries generally do identify themselves as multinational in contrast to the American model which supposedly culminates in almost complete integration by the second generation of immigrants. However, in reality, if we are to compare Yemeni migrants with the largest Muslim migrants to Europe, the Turks, settled largely in Germany, and the Moroccans, settled largely in France, both groups entered Europe in the 1960s and early 1970s as a predominantly male population of low-skilled workers, just as the case with the Yemeni migrants to the U.S. And also the integration of the Turks and Moroccans was, and still is, often thought to be highly

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12 Based on the European integration model, in considering France, which has one of the largest Muslim communities in Europe most of whom hail from Northern Africa, immigrant integration was an inherent part of the nation following the French Revolution whereby national integration as a whole was viewed as political: members of the national society are integrated by individual citizenship, following a universalist view of the citizen” (Schnapper, Krief and Peignard, 1998, 27).
problematic. In essence, if conforming to the research, most have noted that the groups would be considered as part of the formation of an underclass and seem to satisfy Portes’ conditions for downward assimilation\textsuperscript{13}

Therefore, it is imperative that there is a deeper understanding of this segment of our population in an effort to reduce ignorance and fear and to allow for greater integration and acceptance. As noted in the literature, government has an interest in policies that enable new settlers to develop a sense of belonging to the wider community, participate in all aspects of social, cultural and economic life, and be confident that they are coming into a country that is able to accept their difference and value their contribution (Spoonley, Peace, Butcher, & O’Neill, 2005, p. 86). Such positive settlement outcomes benefit both the immigrant and host society, a current question of importance not only in North America but in Europe and elsewhere (Spoonley, Peace, Butcher, & O’Neill, 2005, p. 86). These results are also important for discussions on immigrant incorporation. As we have seen, the political incorporation of immigrants into their new country of residence is to a certain extent inevitable because immigrants’ individual efforts will often lead them to integrate through the labor market and through other economic and social institutions, ultimately providing them with the resources and motivations to become politically involved. A lack of political integration can lead to the creation of a voiceless, alienated and racially defined underclass, which can have a variety of consequences and might ultimately lead to increased racial tensions or other forms of conflict (Kymlicka, 2002, p. 359). By encouraging political involvement among immigrants they can make their voices heard constructively which would in turn,

\textsuperscript{13} Immigrant groups may experience “downward” assimilation into the mainstream (native) lower class cultures while underachieving in education and in the job market (Portes, 2007).
improve their own identification with the adopted new society. Furthermore, promoting inclusion in the political system is likely to generate recognition of the authority of that system, which then results in higher levels of confidence and fulfillment within the democratic process. Thus, within immigrant communities, individuals may choose to accept (or not) aspects of the host society’s culture; however, there are also social, political, economic and other specific challenges to integration that, if understood and overcome, could benefit the society as whole.

4.5 Limitations

There are however, some limitations found in the methodological and analytical implications for the Detroit Arab-American Study. Firstly, there were limitations due to the sample of the population. For instance, DAAS would have been better served if the sample was a national sample because there are specifics in the sample selected within the constraints of the tri-county area of Metro Detroit. For example, Lebanese in California or North Dakota will be different than Lebanese in Detroit as those Lebanese or Yemenis who reside in regions with smaller Arab-American communities or not within any at all, would not have the enclave mentality particular to the Metro Detroit area, therefore those Arab-Americans are forced to acculturate. Thus, my statements are contingent to the nature of my study, however, in the future; with additional time and funding, the study can be improved by enlarging the studied sample as well as retrieving data from other more varied communities.

Secondly, in terms of the methodology, not all important and relevant questions pertaining to transnational involvement could be included in the survey instrument.
Furthermore, respect for the apprehensions and sensitivities of the Arab-American community, as well as the “protection of human subjects” requirements of the University of Michigan’s Behavioral Sciences Institutional Review Board, also restricted the questions that could be asked about a variety of subjects. In terms of the topic of transnationalism, in analyzing the context of the war on terrorism, the topic was almost too sensitive to fully grasp the depth of the community’s position on transnationalist activities. Thus, for example, it was unfeasible to ask about sending funds to the Arab Middle East, including funds going to charities as well as to family and friends. As a result, questions on transnationalism were primarily restricted to the importance of visiting family and friends in the Middle East, rather than whether and how often they made such visits to the Middle East. Therefore, transnationalism within the community should be analyzed by considering a range of questions that probe transnational activities through areas such as communication. In summary, these limitations should be taken into consideration when analyzing the findings in the report.

Additionally, it should be recalled that the DAAS data is set in a particular historical moment, one marked by the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and the subsequent U.S. “war on terrorism.” Further, while the special character of this period may have an impact on Americans’ outlook generally, it has particular significance for Arab-Americans, due to the apparent ethnicity of the suspected terrorists on September 11th in congruence with the mass media’s delineation of this group as well as Islam, and perhaps most especially for transnationalism among Arab-Americans. This means, as noted earlier, that patterns and relationships reported here may or may not obtain in more
“normal” times, during periods when Arab-Americans face fewer barriers\textsuperscript{14} to interaction with the Arab Middle East and fewer questions are raised about their loyalty to the United States. This, too, is an empirical question to be investigated in the future, for which the present study again provides baseline data.

Finally, this study relied solely on the data from the DAAS, which as noted above has its limitations. It was my hope and intention to use the DAAS in combination with my own qualitative survey of the Yemeni and Lebanese Metro Detroit population in order to enhance the ethnology aspect of the study, however, due to the lack of sufficient time and funding, such an expanded project can be accomplished in a future study.

4.6 Future Studies

The ethnicity-centered literature had its own limitations when applied to this particular study. Due to the limited amount of literature on the Arab-American population, most specifically the Yemeni population; it was necessary to borrow from the literature of studies involving ethnicity analyses on larger ethnic groups, such as Latin Americans and Asian-Americans. Although there is some literature to be found on Lebanese and Yemenis, as presented in this study’s literature review, it is not as comprehensive as the other segments of the U.S. population. Thus, in utilizing literature based on other ethnicities much of this study was based on borrowing from groups whose full correspondence with the Arab experience might be questioned. However, this study

\textsuperscript{14} The U.S. Government has increasingly scrutinized Arab-American ties to the Arab Middle East in the Post-9/11 period and has sought to disrupt networks of transnational interaction, particularly but not exclusively those relating to financial transfers. \textit{Detroit News}, August 16, 2006.
is a start and the paradigm may be enlarged in future studies that may use this particular study as a springboard.

*Impacts on the Second-Generation of Immigrant and Sojourner Families*

One particularly important area of potential research in line with cultural integration within migrant studies is the essential issue of generational differences and sojourner and/or settler status. Generational differences in this study will be extremely significant and pertinent. For instance, in my pilot study on this issue, several interviewees noted that the degree of integration for the younger generation of Yemeni-Americans depended on how old the youth were when they emigrated to the U.S. or if they were born here. As Orellana, Thorne, Lam & Chee note, “family migration processes in many different ways are shaped by sociopolitical circumstances, global economic conditions, available resources, and cultural practices, and beliefs; without firm roots in the country of origin, children often come to identify with their new homeland in ways that parents may not” (Orellana, Thorne, Lam & Chee, 2004, p. 2). Additionally, I have not found relevant research that considers the economic and political connections that the Yemeni expatriate community holds with their country of origin and its role in their assimilation in the U.S.

Finally, there is no research to be found which considers the distinct differences between Yemeni-Americans from the southern and northern regions of Yemen and their levels of assimilation here in the U.S. However, in regards to Lebanese immigrants and distinctions in their levels of assimilation within the U.S., according to Kristine J. Ajrouch and Abdi M. Kusow, “religious affiliation is an important organizing mechanism in Lebanon, and a major component of one’s political and social identity” (Ajrouch &
Further, religion and sect have to be designated on all legal identifications, regardless of personal wishes and these processes also produce a stratification system based on religious affiliation, with Christians historically occupying the highest levels, followed by Sunni Muslims, and last the Shi’a Muslims (Salibi, 1988, pp. 235-235). Also, the Shi’a of southern Lebanon have occupied the lowest end of the social strata and possessed the least amount of power and privilege (Ajami, 1986, p. 137). Therefore, their low position within the Lebanese social order, in addition to the civil war in the late 1970s and 1980s, concurrently further suppressed and marginalized the Shi’a which in turn, provoked their vast immigration movements.

In terms of the research incorporating an analysis of second-generation immigrants, traditional theories of immigrant integration consider assimilation to be a linear process, whereby the economic and social conditions of individuals and ethnic groups improve over each succeeding generation (Ramakrishnan & Espenshade, 2001, p. 870). Over the past decade, several studies have challenged the applicability of “straight-line” theories of immigrant adaptation to the “new” second generation (Gans, 1992; Portes and Zhou, 1993; Rumbaut, 1997; Zhou, 1997).15 Many of the revisionist perspectives present a model of “segmented assimilation” in which different group characteristics (such as, for e.g., generational patterns, social and economic conditions, linguistic and cultural barriers) and modes of incorporation lead to diverse outcomes that can include second generation declines (Ramakrishnan & Espenshade, 2001, pp. 871-873). In short, traditional theories of political participation have examined the effects of individual resources, social incorporation, and political mobilization on such integration

15 Given that economic downturn the future opportunities of all younger generations in the U.S. may not be as robust as their forebears, and hence might affect generational integration for immigrant families.
aspects as voter turnout. Additionally, comparisons are usually only made among natural and foreign-born citizens; therefore separating out the second generation provides some additional significant insights on the development of political incorporation among immigrants. Moving to a new culture can carry difficulties and challenges for sojourner family members (Sluzki, 1979, p. 383) as they have to deal not only with the attainment of a new language but with dissimilar cultural values, beliefs, and customs.

It is not difficult to discern the relationship between the strong ideals and loyalty held to by Yemenis for their religion and secondly, for their culture as the crux of their identity. Their desire to sustain such parts of their identity protected them when they are far from Yemen, but this may have been true for other immigrant groups in U.S. history as well. For purposes of future studies within this area, I would focus on Yemeni-Americans, with consideration of sojourner families to consist of families who intend to relocate to Yemen and may have stayed in the host society longer than they had initially intended, most likely due to economic or war-related issues. I would assume the second and third generations of these sojourner families, however, would not remain as sojourners and eventually would become native, which can be studied in a future expansion of this dissertation. Thus, immigrant and sojourner children alike are more likely to adapt more rapidly to new cultural values, behaviors, and communication styles, etc. so that they will be accepted and included within peer relationships at school (Maria Beatriz Torres, 2001, p. 37). However, some communities might exercise deliberate efforts to keep children from blending with outsider groups, and might retard their integration. One would want to evaluate this for a reputedly semi-isolated community such as the Yemenis.
For those Yemeni-Americans’ whose outlook concerning migration is perceived as being only temporary, loyalty to their background and culture is likely to be easily achievable. However, it would seem only natural that immigrants’ children and their children’s children and so forth, would not be as steadfast with older beliefs and thus, adaptation and acculturation will occur. Indeed one can also conceive of immigrant children, perhaps of the later generations, becoming more nationalistic for the country of origin than their upward striving parents. Such questions about the parent-child relationship among immigrant families will likely be found among the Yemeni-American families, leading perhaps to communication breakdowns within the family. Moreover, as it is with most immigrant families, furthering their children’s education and language abilities is an important component in their integration into their host society.

Recent scholarship has suggested that the societal integration of today's new second generation is likely to be “segmented and to take various pathways to adulthood, depending on a variety of conditions and contexts, vulnerabilities and resources” (Gans, 1992; Portes & Zhou, 1993; cf. Abramson, 1981 as cited in Rumbaut, 1994, p. 753). According to Yunjoo Park, sojourner families resided in the U.S. temporarily “for extended periods (three to seven years) and encountered a complex set of issues with regard to children's language and culture development, children's identity development, and relationships within the family as parents dealt with balancing bilingualism and biculturalism” (Park, 2005, p. vii). In regards to this dissertation, the general acculturation literature has shown clearly that most immigrants prefer integration that is, retaining their culture of origin while adapting to the new culture (Berry & Sam, 1997, p. 431). With reference to identity, the equivalent concept is having a bicultural or
integrated identity: feeling that one is both part of an ethnic group and part of the larger society (Phinney, 2001, p. 495). Therefore, the likelihood of identity integration is connected to parental ethnic socialization, social status, and parent-child relationships. The children's ethnic self-identities strongly tend to mirror the perceptions of their parents' (and especially their mother's) own ethnic self-identities, as if they were reflections in an ethnic looking-glass (Rumbaut, 2005, p. 790).

Moreover, sojourner families will ultimately be subsumed in a dual culture shock: the first shock will come in their efforts to adapt to their new host culture; the second shock will come when (if) they return to their native country and attempt to readapt to their home culture (Sueda & Wiseman, 1991, p. 652). Indeed, I would expect that if immigrant family structures are considered sojourners, then parental characteristics and the quality of parent-child relationships should have significant negative effects on the integration levels of second generation children of sojourner immigrants. Thus, it is expected that future research will offer insight on adaptations among first generation Yemeni-Americans and their children and whether or not it differs from immigrant communities emigrating from other regions of the Arab world to the United States.
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ABSTRACT

IMMIGRANT INTEGRATION INTO HOST SOCIETIES: 
THE CASE OF YEMENI IMMIGRANT COMMUNITIES IN METRO DETROIT

by

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Major: Political Science

Degree: Doctor of Philosophy

This study is intended to extend our understanding of immigrant political integration by analyzing Yemeni immigrants’ attitudes toward integration into North American society, exploring the case of Yemeni-Americans, a group reputedly resistant to integration, in both Dearborn and Hamtramck, Michigan, and comparatively assessing those data with already published data on Lebanese-Americans, retrieved from the U.S. Census Bureau and the Detroit Arab American Study (DAAS). Relying on an existing theoretical framework on immigrant integration based on sociological and cognitive approaches and my own theoretical model on transnational dimensions related to political, economic, and cultural integration, I will examine a series of hypotheses against the quantitative data from DAAS with the extracted subpopulations of Yemeni and Lebanese populations in Dearborn and Hamtramck. Specifically, I hypothesize that Yemeni-Americans overall will be less integrated than their Lebanese-American counterparts. The reasons for these differences are likely to be explained by cultural and
economic differences ranging from ethnic orientations to the country of origin, social demographics, language orientation, to political stances.

For the data collection, I will utilize the data from the DAAS to explore the general attitudes on key dimensions of integration, focusing especially on political participation, as well as factors associated with reluctance toward integration. Yemeni data will be compared to Lebanese counterpart data to highlight reasons for varied patterns and degrees of integration among segments of the Arab-American community.

I expect to find that Yemeni-Americans are less integrated than their Lebanese-American counterparts. The reasons for these differences are likely to relate to a series of variables which include income and educational levels, length of stay in the Detroit area, and extent of U.S. language and degree of continued attachment to the country of origin. The implications from the research will address how and at what rates Yemeni immigrants in comparison to Lebanese immigrants, at various economic levels, adjust and participate politically and culturally most readily in their new host societies. This analysis will offer insight into expected variations in immigrant integration among Arab-Americans.
AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL STATEMENT

My interests in pursuing a doctorate started growing at the onset of the first Persian Gulf War in 1990-1991. Prior to that war, I had imagined that I would be attending medical school to become an Obstetrician. However, the nightly heated political discussions with my father over dinner triggered a strong interest in world politics, particularly within the Middle East and impassioned me enough to read extensively on the subject and forego any desire to study medicine. That passion and interest never subsided, however, in connection to that interest, was the lifelong interest I have had in experiencing a life among Yemeni Americans. Going back as far as I can remember, I have observed and questioned how Yemenis behave amongst each other and how they have impacted myself and this interest ranged from their style of dress, their dialects, their food, their habits to their perceptions of culture, religion and their lives here in the States. It has been a pleasure of mine to begin this journey of research and it is my hope to continue on to answer many of the questions I have had and continue to have regarding this interesting community.