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Implicit in the title of this study of/guide to the major collaborative works of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus* (1972; Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1983), and *A Thousand Plateaus* (1980; Minneapolis: University of Minnesota P, 1987), is a particularly vexed problem for approaching contemporary theory, both in research and in teaching: to gloss or not to gloss, i.e. to consult or assign to students secondary commentaries on the various critical discourses or to limit contacts to primary texts themselves. One often leans toward a judicious combination of the two, particularly in teaching, and for this strategy, Massumi’s study/guide will be a useful tool especially if the reader remains alert to the author’s critical presuppositions. For he follows D & G themselves in inviting the reader “to cycle back” (“you take a concept that is particularly to your liking and jump with it to its next appearance”) and thereby “to relay readers back to Deleuze and Guattari’s own writings,” but through a selective “drift,” “as much away from the ‘originals’ as toward them” (8). Indeed, Massumi concludes the opening section, entitled “Pleasures of Philosophy,” with an explicit warning: while following Deleuze’s recommendation to read *Capitalism and Schizophrenia* creatively, variably, as one would listen to a record, skipping from cut to cut, Massumi also alerts the reader to the variable functions of certain passages, the “explanatory” vs. the “highly idiosyncratic,” with the latter serving “to destroy any misguided trust the reader may place in the authority of the explanatory passages” (9). However, to supplement such “deviations,” many of the end-notes fulfill an intertextual function, guiding the reader back “to the ‘original’ Deleuze and Guattari” (9), not just *Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, but the broad corpus of their works.

Although this description of Massumi’s opening moves should indicate that he does not provide a “user’s guide” in any accommodating, overtly friendly sense, its demanding, even aggressive quality should not be construed as hostility. For example, leaving the reader to ponder the stark opening heading of the first of three chapters, “meaning is FORCE,” Massumi seems to lead the reader into a combative, critical “ring” by launching into “Round One” (the first of five “rounds” that he breaks at three points with recapitulative and explanatory “Pauses”). This strategy is quite appropriate for tracing an understanding of “meaning” as “the encounter of lines of force, each of which is actually a complex of other forces” (11). In turn, the numerous terminological shadings, expansions and continuous returns to the Deleuze-Guattari corpus suggest that Massumi’s strategy of “rounds” and “pauses” is at once combative and repetitive in the manner of a critical “Frère Jacques,” once again quite appropriate given the role in *A Thousand Plateaus* of the *ritournelle* (refrain, musical round). Moreover, Massumi’s “cyclings” help focus more clearly on the bridge in D & G’s works between the uniqueness and inherent instability of the “event” (i.e. the *separation* of meaning as “force”)—“no sooner do we have a unity than it becomes a duality, . . . [that] becomes a multiplicity . . . [that] becomes a proliferation of fissures converging in a void” (19)—and the reproducibility and consequent “domestication”
of an event, i.e. the dulling, diffracting, capturing, regularizing “action” of “power”: “Meaning is the contraction of difference and repetition in a self-expiring expression. Power is the resuscitation of meaning” (20).

Even such paradoxical and opaque formulations are useful in echoing Deleuze’s own recourse to paradox as “serious attempts to pack meaning into the smallest possible space without betraying it with simplification” (20-21). In fact, Massumi suggests that paradoxical formulations may help a “user” understand the broad strategies of D & G in Capitalism and Schizophrenia. For the paradox “does not negate, it compounds,” and thus “unity, duality, and multiplicity of meaning are not mutually contradictory,” but are rather “moments or aspects of a process . . . mutually determining, in reciprocal presupposition . . . [that] can be unraveled” (21). Thus, Anti-Oedipus and A Thousand Plateaus illustrate unity/duality/multiplicity of meaning “as levels, or ‘plateaus’” on which one can work “to emphasize that level’s connection to or separation from the others (the relation or the non),” keeping in mind the inherent instability of any level (21). Massumi describes this movement and fracture (in “Round 3”) in terms of fractals, pausing then to summarize the “slew of slippery concepts” proposed so far: falling into two sets or groupings, roughly the “semiotic” and the “speculative” (23-24), D & G’s concepts “are logical operators or heuristic devices,” that is, used without crystallization into methodology, so that each author, writing together or separately, can adapt and mix concepts in a process of “continual reinvention” (24). To show how this variability works, Massumi chooses (in “Round 4”) an institutional example, a high school, and works via D & G’s conceptual groupings to discuss the emergence of agency in relationship to the “abstract machine” and “collective assemblages” (26-28). This consideration leads directly to linguistic questions of “speech acts,” how the abstract machine “must bring a parade of bodies to stand in the same enunciative position,” e.g. the bride and groom uttering “I do” (28-30). In turn, Massumi situates the “meaning encounter” in terms of the “order-word” [le mot d’ordre], “the repetition-impulsion of the imperative function immanent to language” (31), to which our social formation make us entirely susceptible.

In yet another “pause,” Massumi states that D & G’s concept of the “virtual” is the least understood of their terms, and this apparent digression becomes quite relevant in the final “Round 5” where Massumi describes the fractal’s “unfolding,” as “a threshold leading across the synapses toward a new being [future mode, becoming], and a foundation of nonbeing [past genesis]” (36). By dint of this situation “in-between,” D & G refer to the future-past of the present as “the virtual” (36–37), and Massumi re-situates their abstract ruminations on “virtuality” and “the fractal’s realm of ‘possibility’” (137–38) within the aforementioned examples of the ordering force of language. Massumi rejects any bleak conclusion about language’s restrictive “ordering force,” emerging “ultimately joyous” since “discontinuity has the final word” and declaring that “the order-word of D & G’s philosophy is the anti-order-word of the call of the outside: listen closely for existential imperatives which, rather than limiting I and I’s realm of virtuality, take it out of bounds” (41). Hence Massumi’s advice, drawn from D & G: “Rewrite the slogan of the United States Army: dare to become all that you cannot be. Complicate, and chortle.” Yet, rather than yield to ending the chapter on an
order-word, Massumi “pauses” a final time to present seven points of difference between D & G’s theories of language and more familiar linguistic and semiotic approaches (41–46).

I have developed this opening chapter in some detail in order to give a sense of the feisty and complex, yet quite illuminating intersections between D & G’s work and through Massumi’s deviations. Like chapter 1, the second and third chapters each open with perplexing headings/quotations (“HABIT is the ballast that chains the dog to his vomit”—Samuel Beckett; “normality is the zero degree of MONSTROSITY”—Georges Canguilhem), then focus on seemingly limited “themes”: in 2, starting with the concepts of “sensation” and “syntheses,” Massumi opens his “deviations” toward such notorious concepts as “the Body-without-Organs,” “territorialization” (with its “de-” and “re-” cronies) as well as towards the distinctions “molarity”–“molecularity,” “local”–“global resonance,” culminating in an exemplary section (on the baby’s “burp” and other illustrative functions). In 3, conflicts of political relations take the fore as “becomings-other” vis-à-vis “the same” (e.g., the State apparatus, education, etc.) on multiple levels, from the “individual” to “collective” political struggles. And just as Massumi’s “deviations” are faithful to the strategies of “cycling” and “skipping” announced at the start, the textual interplay of end notes propels his analysis into expanding intertextual dimensions: extensive and detailed references to terminological usage and derivations from different works of the D & G corpus; development of terms by D & G in comparison to a diverse array of writers; numerous productive overlaps and clashes between D & G’s perspective and those in recent theories (e.g., gender politics, pp. 175–76; “post-Saussurian thinkers,” pp. 177–78; Marxist theory, pp. 188–204) and of contemporary writers (most notably, Ilya Prigogine and Isabelle Stengers, Baudrillard, François Jacob, Paul Virilio, and Toni Negri) as well as the vast intersection between D & G’s thought and Foucault’s; and useful references to extant English translations and occasional corrective measures.

In the end, following the dense study of diverse (micro-)political struggles through “becomings-other” (ch. 3), Massumi’s final section, “Still More,” offers an impressive, yet grim assessment of global capitalism’s most recent strategies of “capture” and of “postmodernity”’s failure to respond: “Becomings are everywhere in capitalism,” says Massumi, “but they are always separated from their full potential, from the thing they need most to run their course: a population free for the mutating” (140). While stating that there is no turning back from “this broader dynamic that covers the face of the earth,” Massumi leaves admittedly vague any particular course except to seize and develop this dynamism “right where we are: in the final constraint.” Thus, his calls to “action”—destroying “the last bastion of good/common sense,” “embrac[ing] our collectivity . . . [through] a global perception of the capitalist relation as the constraint that it is,” moving together “into a supermolecularity where no quasicause can follow: a collective ethics beyond good and evil. But most of all, beyond greed,” (140–41)—may leave many readers cold, or lukewarm at best. However, through his strategy of “deviation,” Massumi nonetheless articulates and (re-)cycles effectively many of the conceptual intersections that the focal works/authors themselves deploy while deliberately avoiding simplistic and programmatic “political solu-
tions." And were they (D & G or Massumi) to contradict their operative premises and propose such solutions, could we individuals hear/read them anyway? As Massumi says, in a final paradox, he (and D & G) are indeed discussing "a future [that one body] cannot envision, for the very good reason that in that future there would be no place for it—having finally become what it cannot be" (141).

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From the alarm clock a spherical shock wave traveling at Mach 1 starts growing outward, spreading and spreading till it hits the wall. Some of the energy it carries causes the curtains over the window to heat up from the friction of the onslaught. . . .

—David Bodanis, The Secret House (11)

Sound burns, consum(mat)ing language. The 1987 French edition of Feu la Cendre includes a cassette tape upon which Jacques Derrida, author, and Carole Boquet read the written text, the "polylogue": "What is involved in this phonographic act? Here's an interpretation, one among others" (25). The English edition, from University of Nebraska and translated (an unenviable task, the crucible for any critic) by Ned Lukacher, is Cinders. There is no cassette.

Thus sound is fleeting; only its effects remain. Shattered glass infuses Derrida's writing, from the Klang of Hegel, the bell that names the origin of history, to the Kristallnacht that rings in the Holocaust. The sound marks the space of a burning.

And from that burning, there are cinders.

For Derrida, the issue of cinders stems from a curious phrase inserted into the acknowledgements of Dissemination: "il y a là cendre." Cinders there are. Là cendre: there cinder. La cendre: the cinder. The ear catches no distinction (just as with Derrida's now notorious differance): position or non-position seem the same. The sound, or lack thereof, imposes meaning on the word, burns it in an attempt to get at the proper name, the presence, the object: cinder. Derrida has discussed this problem many times. So what makes Cinders any different?

The texts in question are Derrida's own, fragments about the burning of language from Dissemination, Glas, and The Postcard. Derrida is in essence having a conversation with himself, about a conversation he once had with himself, the only evidence of whose passing are cinders. And so Cinders is a crossroads where the memories of Derrida's discourses meet.

Memory, the concept of memory, slips through Cinders, as it might in a more "conventional" literary work. Derrida is writing a monodrama: one
voice, and many voices. A modern *Maud* about loss and death and the love
of language:

> Catch not my breath, O clamorous heart,
> Let not my tongue be a thrall to my eye,
> For I must tell her before we part,
> I must tell her, or die. (Tennyson, *Maud* XVI)

—But the urn of language is so fragile. It crumbles and immediately
you blow into the dust of words which are the cinder itself. And if you
entrust it to paper, it is all the better to inflame you with, my dear, you
will eat yourself up immediately. (Derrida, 53)

Breath is the key: Tennyson must speak; he must give the words the
breadth and substance of action. For Derrida, breath, speech, causes the cin­
der to disseminate. *Mon enfant*: my child, my dear. The cinder is both male
and female: “He (but perhaps it is she, *la cinder*) perhaps knows what he
thus wished to set on fire, to celebrate, to ignite with praise in the secret of
the sentence, perhaps they still know it” (50–51). Immature as well, it is the
origin reinscribed in miniature, following Hegel’s model of historical dis­
course.

But the object of that pronoun “he” (and “she” for that matter) remains un­
clear. Language? Derrida? Who is speaking? The author steps outside himself
to examine these fragments, treating his own discourse as if it were false
(note the suggestion of Gide): “But the counterfeiter can lie, he’s lying. I am
almost sure of it, from experience” (51). The voices—but perhaps it is one
voice, over time—crucify one another.

I have brought up the issue of time here, suggesting Hegel: the progression
of Derrida’s discourse from solid, traditional critique (à la *Dissemination*) to
his more recent, “difficult” work in *Glas* and *Cinders*. Indeed, this is how Der­
rida is usually read, and perhaps I have made too much of the crucial distinc­
tion between past and present here, that *there* was once a Derrida who wrote
(or said) “Cinders there are,” and now, *here* is a Derrida who speaks into a
tape recorder, types on a page, about the cinder, here and there. Different
voices: different typesetting, facing pages, other languages (the French text
runs alongside the translation in this edition, finally). But all one voice, right?
All *Derrida*, the proper name.

But, finally, who is Derrida? *Cinders* explores the question implicitly, even
from its initial line: “More than 15 years ago a phrase came to me” (21). *Une phrase m’est venue*. Someone is there: Derrida, a central position, around
which the cinder drifts. But there is less to this center than first appears, for
as quickly as he (note that we still insist on the personal pronoun—it is Der­
rida writing, isn’t it? But which Derrida?) brings it up, he dismisses it: “She,
the phrase, had always lived alone” (21). No center.

To compound the problem: two texts in *Cinders* proper. Assuming, again,
that the “prologue” is an authoritative “before speaking,” the sound that initi­
ates all other action, like Hegel’s Klang, or the rush of wind/breath as the
prologue burns to become the text(s) proper, *Cinders*. Further, if Derrida
wrote the prologue, let the fire alight, then who wrote the initial
“Animadversion,” severed (castrated, as Freud might say) from *Dissemination*?
And who crossed it with a response—"it was as though you had signed with these words" (31)—in which the speaker becomes an unwilling listener, not an author? Derrida separates from Derrida.

As usual, Derrida (whoever he is) recognizes his fragmentation, at least in part: "I am a cinder signal, I recall something or someone of whom I will say nothing but this rough sketch obviously in order to say that nothing will have to annul what is said in its saying, to give it to the fire, to destroy it in the flame, and not otherwise. No cinder without fire" (35–37). This Derrida recognizes the difficulty, the schizophrenic play of voices, that he is Derridas. To borrow from Deleuze and Guattari for a moment, one might say that Cinders operates as a philosophical desiring-machine. Indeed, philosophy in general is a desiring-machine whose attempted production is Truth, but traditionally, the process is Hegelian (and Oedipal): Truth is our father, and the text is a pale, linguistic miniature. Even Derrida’s initial texts up until now may be said to have suffered from this paranoid linearity in that he relied on the Canon of philosophy and literature to make his argument (of course, this does not denigrate the canon itself, which Derrida has spent considerable time defending of late—I am only criticizing the way the canon, however we define it, has been used). The voice he must rely upon is always outside himself: Hegel, Heidegger, Genet, Plato.

But in Cinders, this linearity is undermined by Derrida’s conversation with himself. The paranoid voice, lined up in sinister fashion on the left-hand pages, trapped in quotes and nervous italics, faces the schizophrenic, almost poetic, fragmentation that in some sense recognizes its own collapse: “In this sentence I see the tomb of a tomb, the monument of an impossible tomb— forbidden, like the memory of a cenotaph, deprived of the patience of mourning, denied the slow decompositon that shelters, locates, hospitalizes itself in you while you eat the pieces (he did not want to eat the piece but was forced to)” (53–55). In this way, Derrida cannibalizes his own texts, consumes them before they burn away. Language and death remain inside the ring (the loop, hence le loup, the wolf of Little Red Riding Hood) of Being. But there is no clear indication of where one Derrida ends and the other begins. For philosophy to work, one requires the Voice of the Father, followed by the voice of the text, but here the two voices are both more and less than two. Without the cassette, no voice can be heard (Zero), although we believe that there is one author-voice, Derrida (One). The facing texts indicate two voices, but are these the same as that of the prologue (Three)? And the fragmentary style, which crisscrosses the subject of cinders in often oblique ways (Infinity)?

Cinders offers a crucial glimpse into the philosophic process, in which Derrida has been engaged with increasing self-consciousness (and I think—I hope—it is at least safe to say that) since the publication of his first major works in 1967. Does Cinders mark more than a crossroads, but a turning point in his work, a prelude to a deeper exploration of Derrida’s own project? This, like the cinders themselves, remains to be seen.

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Michael Pinsky
Many recent critics have historicized Shakespeare studies by exploring how his works and his image have been used in later periods, not only in productions but also in scholarship, pedagogy, poems, novels, and popular culture. Of all these critics, Peter Erickson gives the most sustained attention to contemporary America’s Shakespeares, to the roles of race and gender in literary responses, and to the politics of the current struggle over the canon and the literary curriculum. In its first half, *Rewriting Shakespeare, Rewriting Ourselves* examines issues of gender, class, and nationality in Shakespearean poems and plays, but its major contribution comes in the second half where it discusses the contestation of Shakespeare by Maya Angelou, Gloria Naylor, and Lynne Cheney, and the way in which Adrienne Rich’s allusions to Shakespeare over her career increasingly emphasize his limitations.

Erickson is especially well-placed to do this work because of his double specialization in Shakespeare and Afro-American literature. In his introduction, which like the whole book provides a useful map and genealogy of related work, Erickson positions himself as a feminist critic influenced by new historicism, cultural materialism (especially Stuart Hall’s work on ideology), and new criticism in the sense of close reading (especially as developed by Harry Berger).

Like Raymond Williams, from whom he takes an epigraph, Erickson is interested in engagement with established culture to show “where a really reactionary social consciousness is being continually reproduced,” but Erickson also studies how, in imaginative literature, some writers who are differently located from Shakespeare with regard not only to gender, nation, and historical period but also with regard to feminist/sexual and racial/ethnic politics can respond to Shakespeare from an independent perspective. Lynne Cheney’s use of Shakespeare in her NEH report *Humanities in America* serves as one of Erickson’s contemporary examples of the reproduction of reactionary social consciousness. Cheney uses Maya Angelou’s line “I know that Shakespeare was a black woman” to argue that the humanities, and by implication the traditional Anglo-American literary canon, deal with universal truths that transcend class, race, and gender. Analyzing attitudes toward literary tradition in the rest of the report and the rest of Angelou’s works, Erickson shows the contrast between Cheney’s attempt to maintain a unified, harmonious canon and Angelou’s sense of tension between her love of Shakespeare and her love of black culture.

Another excellent chapter analyzes Gloria Naylor’s more sustained and systematic negotiations with Shakespeare. Naylor’s first and second novels, *The Women of Brewster Place* and *Linden Hills*, both involve the myth of the black Shakespeare, and Erickson also shows some ways that *Women of Brewster Place* rewrites *A Midsummer Night’s Dream*, a play that several of the characters attend, with significant differences to mark the inadequacy of its kind of comic vision for Naylor’s world. He argues that *Mama Day* provides a critical analysis of George’s attachment to Shakespeare, and especially to *Lear*, and also shows how the novel rewrites *The Tempest* by the presentation of its title character, a black female magician originally named Miranda, who dominates the island that is the novel’s location for black Southern culture.
In his chapter on Adrienne Rich, Erickson studies the changing, often parallel representations of Shakespeare and her father in Rich’s poetry and prose. “After Dark,” for example, “reaffirms and perpetuates the authority of King Lear’s father-daughter dynamic, in which the daughter’s love constitutes self-sacrifice” (153). Her later work consciously challenges literary as well as familial and social tradition. Rich takes “the daughter’s point of view, thus making Shakespeare’s limits understood and actively felt as limitations” (164).

Erickson’s final chapter considers his own location as a male feminist critic, going “through the lengthy, intimate process of articulating the differences that separate [him] from Shakespeare” (169) as a way of locating his own cultural responsibilities. He sets forth a fair-minded methodology for political criticism that many readers may find useful: categories of race and gender “do not have fixed meanings that can be mechanically read off from the author’s identity as though works came pre-coded, already read. . . . The meanings of the works cannot be known in advance; assumptions, perceptions, and values with regard to race and gender are established in the specific context of detailed interpretation of particular works” (168). He concludes by formulating “a model of culture that is both strongly multicultural and common” (172) without being universal: “If, by virtue of the ideal of common culture, I have access to the entire range of literature, this access is not unrestricted, as though all barriers dissolve in the magical realm of literature. Rather, the access that literature gives heightens the reader’s own cultural difference. . . . The deep heart’s core of literary experience involves the engagement with one’s cultural specificity, including its political ramifications” (172).

In the Renaissance section of the book, Erickson himself is concerned to make Shakespeare’s limits understood and actively felt as limitations. He discusses various Shakespearean works largely in relation to the cultural images of two conflicting figures—Queen Elizabeth and, less discussed in earlier new historicist criticism, the Earl of Essex, who led an unsuccessful rebellion in 1599. Starting with Venus and Adonis and The Rape of Lucrece, which circulated in an aristocratic milieu, Erickson draws on Mervyn James’s analysis of the Essex subculture, arguing that its “cult of heroic masculinity constituted an alternative source of energy and meaning to the cult of Elizabeth” (40). In these two poems, Erickson argues, different aspects of Elizabeth’s image are contained. Venus, the powerful older female, “evokes Elizabeth’s control” (41), and this helps account for the poem’s alarm and defensive joking. Lucrece, chaste like the “Virgin Queen,” is raped, and by her suicide she “calls men to their duty without usurping their authority” (49). In both poems, women compete unsuccessfully with worlds of male violence—the hunt and war. Erickson argues against taking these poems to show Shakespeare’s interest in and sympathy for women; rather he sees them as “successive explorations in managing the emotion of sympathy which is associated with women” (51).

The two plays that Erickson discusses include one where “female power undercuts male heroism” (60)—All’s Well that Ends Well—and one in which “the drastic curtailment of female authority gratifies the male imagination” (86)—Hamlet. He argues against a romanticized exaggeration of Shakespeare’s cross-gender identification in the first play, and also against romanti-
Erickson critiques both the older humanist claims of Shakespeare’s universality and more recent claims about Shakespeare’s cross-gender identification, sometimes associated with a post-structuralist emphasis on instability of gender. His approach leads to very perceptive analyses of the ways in which recent women writers evoke Shakespeare’s plots to differentiate their vision from his, as well as to important consideration of the places of Shakespeare and of black women writers in contemporary American society. The complexity of black women writers’ work, how *Mama Day*, for example, relates to the work of Paule Marshall as well as to Shakespeare, is an important part of his point. Occasionally his formulations might seem too simple. When he says, “When...I read a work by a black woman author, I become more aware of my whiteness and maleness” (172), I wonder if this negates the possibility of identifications that cut across gender and racial lines—such as activist, skeptic, or orphan—yet indeed these positions, like those of class and sexual orientation, would all be inflected differently for a white man than for a black woman.

In the Renaissance section of the book, Erickson is convincing about the relevance of the Essex cult, and his view that Shakespeare is ambivalent about both Essex and Elizabeth is persuasive. Yet after reading Curtis Breet’s work on Elizabeth’s political repression, I am uncomfortable about the degree to which Erickson’s feminism here consists in reading Shakespeare’s works as patriarchal fantasies directed against a woman who could well have been resented for more than patriarchal reasons. It is almost as if women in 1980s British film were discussed in terms of sexist abuse of Margaret Thatcher—a possibility, but a limiting one. Erickson makes the quite reasonable point, still necessary to argue against the bardolaters of Cheney’s type, that “Shakespeare’s work does not represent every point of view, but only a subset of positions” (28) within Renaissance culture, but sometimes he does seem to make the subset of positions too small. Is all the gender conflict documented in David Underdown’s article “The Taming of the Scold” in *Order and Disorder in Early Modern England* to be seen as the result of resentment of Elizabeth? Analogously, while he allows for the possibility of a homoerotic reading of *Venus and Adonis* his emphasis is almost entirely on Adonis’s embarrassment in relation to Venus’s power as representative of Elizabeth’s. By contrast, Bruce Smith’s recent *Homosexual Desire in Shakespeare’s England* places the poem in a Renaissance group of “bisexual fantasies” that deal with “the ambiguities of sexual desire in English Renaissance culture” (136).

Erickson’s work is most exciting when he shows what writers and ideas usually kept in different categories have to say to each other. He shows how Naylor and Rich decenter Shakespeare as they use him in their work; he compares Rich with T. S. Eliot and Harold Bloom as well as with Virginia Woolf in their views of literary tradition. Too many other Shakespeare critics speak only to others who have their own approach, or at best only to other Shakespeare critics; Erickson articulates his beliefs in ways that many others will agree with, for readers outside the field of Shakespeare studies, and even—
for those outside English studies who are concerned about what a common culture might still mean in a multicultural society.

University of Pittsburgh

Marianne Novy

_Medicine and Shakespeare in the English Renaissance_ by F. David Hoeniger.

_Medicine and Shakespeare in the English Renaissance_ is a study of medical traditions in and literary conventions of Shakespeare’s plays. The more than four hundred medical references in Shakespearean drama attest to the bard’s uncanny knowledge of, attention to, and curiosity about the human body in health and disease. F. David Hoeniger explores the milieu of medicine as an integrant of social context, and deploys Shakespeare’s ideas about medicine to illustrate modes of inquiry particular to the English Renaissance.

Medical praxis in Shakespeare’s England was versatile, original and energetic. His was an epoch of discovery and innovation during which Britain co-opted the Italian system of medical education [(for a history of early English medicine I recommend _The Medical Revolution in the Seventeenth Century_, ed. Roger French and Andrew Wear (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1989), and Nancy Siraisi’s _Medieval and Early Renaissance Medicine. An Introduction to Knowledge and Practice_ (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990)]. Medics in Shakespeare’s London were a feuding, contentious lot. Licensed physicians, surgeons and apothecaries competed with unlicensed midwives, ecclesiastical practitioners and astrological healers. In 1518 London established a College of Physicians of the type common in Italy. The Physician’s guild was aristocratic, insular, and obsessed with protecting itself against surgeons and unaccredited practitioners. The alliance was entrenched in courtly politics, slow to consolidate its position in London and contributed little toward medical scholarship until the 1580’s. English surgeons were more effective. The guild of barbers and surgeons, chartered in 1492, was learned and proficient. Renaissance surgeons set up apprenticeships, taught anatomy and wrote vernacular texts. Apothecaries were originally part of the Grocer’s guild. Aligned with gardeners and botanists, they imported drugs and plants from the New World and sold them in grocery stores. In 1585 apothecaries formed a guild, and by 1618 completed a national pharmacopoeia.

Physicians, surgeons and apothecaries were only part of the medical fray in Shakespeare’s day. Midwives operated at the fringe of official medicine under the auspices of the church (Hoeniger finds ten passages about midwives in _Richard III_, _Henry VII_, and _The Winter’s Tale_). Sacerdotal control of midwives allowed the church to prevent abortion, establish paternity, and assure that parturition was not supervised by magicians (42). Ecclesiastical medical doctrine was important since many disorders were of supernatural origin, thus, beyond the sway of secular remedy. Churchmen, such as Friar Lawrence in _Romeo and Juliet_, administered herbal remedies (252). Religious orders founded the three major hospitals of Shakespeare’s London: St. Bartholomew’s Hospital, St. Thomas Hospital for the poor, and Bethlehem hospital for the insane (alluded to in _King Lear_ and _2 Henry VI_).
Medical books written in English began to appear in public bookstalls in London in the early sixteenth-century, some of which were elaborate, such as Gerard's 1597 *Herball*, with 1464 pages of text and 1800 woodcuts (H. S. Bennett *English Books and Readers 1603–1640: Being a History of the Book Trade in the Reigns of James I and Charles I* [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970], 140–49). Doctors disputed the propriety of colloquial medical texts. Faultfinders thought that medical metier was discredited when written in the vernacular, and were loath to reveal therapeutic secrets to the vulgar. Many 'Englished' medical books were addressed to women and indigents, such as *The Charitable Physician*, and *The Haven of Health, The English-man's Treasure*. Plague manuals like Francis Hering's *Certaine rules, directions or advertisements for this time of pestilential contagion* were best sellers during London's epidemics of 1603 and 1625.

Hoeniger shows that Shakespeare had ample access to vernacular medical texts, including Pliny the Elder's encyclopedic *Natural History*, Thomas Gale's textbook of Surgery (*An enchiridion of chirurgerie*), Dr. John Bannister's *Historie of Man*, Dr. William Clowes's treatises on treatment of wounds based on Ambrose Paré's anatomy and Sir Thomas Elyot's *The castel of helth* (35–36). Thomas Nashe's *The Unfortunate Traveller* (1594), a “picaresque novel Shakespeare could hardly have missed” (39), was a source of information about epidemics. Shakespeare knew at least two physicians; his son in law, Dr. John Hall, who may have taken care of Shakespeare during his fatal illness in 1616, and Dr. Thomas Lodge, who wrote a book about the 1603 plague epidemic, and was the author of a pastoral novel, *Rosalynde* (1590), the source of *As You Like It* (52–53).

Most of the doctors in Shakespeare's plays are serious, upright characters. Treated with deference are the two physicians in *Macbeth* (the English king's doctor and Macbeth's Scottish family doctor who appears during the sleep-walking scene), Cerimon in *Pericles*, Helena's father in *All's Well That Ends Well*, Cordelia's doctor in *King Lear*, Cornelius in *Cymbeline*, and Sir William Butts in *Henry VIII*. Dr. Caius (*Merry Wives of Windsor*) and Pinch (*The Comedy of Errors*), Shakespeare's only comical doctors, are stock humbug figures —amusingly greedy, witless, and verbose (54–67).

The debate in Shakespeare's time between Galenists and Paracelsians is roughly equivalent to that of allopathic and homeopathic physicians in nineteenth-century America. Galenists espoused Hippocratic therapeutics of contraries, and the Paracelsian pharmacopeia was like that prescribed by the homeopathic physician of Hawthorne's *Rappaccini's Daughter*. Hoeniger explains how Shakespeare refers to rival prescriptive powers of the two schools of medical thought in *All's Well That Ends Well* (124). Galen's treatise of psychosomatic medicine, *On the Passions*, supports the anatomical origins of dreams in *Romeo and Juliet* and *A Midsummer's Night's Dreams* and memory in *Macbeth* (159–61). Galenic precepts identify the seat of lust in *Measure For Measure*, melancholy in *Macbeth*, anger in *Richard II*, *King John*, and 3 *Henry VI*, grief in *King Lear* and love in *The Merchant of Venice, Twelfth Night*, and *The Tempest* (172–75). The effect of liver failure is revealed in *King Lear*, *Hamlet* and *The Merchant of Venice* (133–34) and disorders of the spleen are described in *Measure For Measure, Julius Caesar*, and *Troilus and Cressida* (142–43; 177–78) Paracelsian alchemy is mentioned in *King John, Hamlet,*
Othello, and Romeo and Juliet (124), and is the key to understanding why Duncan has golden blood (125–26). The gall bladder is assigned a psychiatric role in King John, Richard III, and King Lear (125–26). Menenius’s fable of the mutiny of the belly in Coriolanus is a bewildering precis of Galenic maladroit anatomy.

Plague, boils, and epilepsy were attributed to supernatural causes. Shakespeare alludes to the metaphysical etiology of epilepsy in King Lear and Julius Caesar. Othello’s collapse, followed by Iago’s triumphant, “my medicine, work,” is the only seizure presented on stage (203). Allusions to miasma and pestilence, two preternatural contagions, appear in Twelfth Night, Richard II, and Timon of Athens. Diseases caused by magic appear in Love’s Labour’s Lost and Troilus and Cressida (214).

Diseases of natural origin in Shakespeare’s plays include scrofula (the King’s Evil or struma, which means goiter), fistula, gout, pox, hypochondria, melancholy and pleurisy (275–86). Syphilis, or “the pox,” is Shakespeare’s favorite disorder. Hospitals for the treatment of syphilis, called spital-houses or spittles, are found in Timon of Athens and Henry V (25). The venereal etiology of the lesion had been known since John of Gaunt died of pox 1399 with, “putrification of the genital member due to the performance of carnal congress with women” (Susan Sontag, Illness as Metaphor [New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1978], 43), and Leonardo da Vinci had depicted what is clearly syphilis in his 1493 anatomical drawings. Shakespeare had syphilis in mind in the acrid discussion between the clown and Hamlet beside the grave for drowned Ophelia (perhaps the only Shakespearean medical reference not on Hoeniger’s index):

Hamlet: How long will a man lie i’ the earth ere he rot?

First Clown: Faith, if he not be rotten before he die—as we have many pocty corses now-a-days, that will scarce hold the laying in . . .

Hoeniger says, “By Shakespeare’s time the several chief stages in the development of syphilis were widely familiar, and the French physician Femel had distinguished its symptoms from those of gonorrhea” (220 This is arguable. The earliest attempt to distinguish syphilis and smallpox was Martin Lister’s 1694 Dissertation on the Pox. The two disorders were not discriminated until Edward Jenner (1749–1823) showed that inoculation with cowpox would assure immunity against smallpox, but had no effect on syphilis. Jenner also described and illustrated the defiling marks, discolored ulcers, raised pustules, variegated blisters, maculated blotches, eruptive papules, and umbilicated tumors of smallpox, syphilis and cowpox. Syphilis and gonorrhea were thought to be same disease as late as 1793 when John Hunter, the renowned Scottish surgeon, died of syphilis after inoculating himself with the urethral discharge of a patient with syphilis and gonorrhoea. The two venereal diseases were not clearly distinguished until the gonococcus microorganism was cultured in 1879, and a serological test for syphilis discovered in 1913.

The chapter on Renaissance medical treatment appraises herbs and natural medicaments, bloodletting by venesection, cupping or leeches, clysters (enemas and emetics), hot baths (the sweating cure for venereal disease), drugs (narcotics and poisons) and music. Examples of Renaissance therapeutics in
Shakespeare’s plays are Hippocratic blood letting in *Timon of Athens* and *Richard II*, and Paracelsian alchemy in *Romeo and Juliet* (246–47). We learn that hemlock is mentioned three times in the plays (253–54), that poison in the ear is, indeed, quickly fatal, (255), and that civit used by Benedict to attract Beatrice is from the anal gland of a cat (257). Cerimon uses music to heal Thaisa’s death-like post-partem hysteria in *Pericles* (269–72), and meliorating melodies are in *King Lear*, *The Tempest*, and *Richard II* (268–69). Helena, a physician’s daughter with origins in a novella by Boccaccio (288), diagnoses and treats the King’s fistula in *All’s Well that Ends Well* (294–99).

Hoeniger claims that, “medical diagnoses of internal complaints were based chiefly and often only on three kinds of data: the patient’s face, pulse and urine” since doctors had neither stethoscope or clinical thermometer (229–30). While it is true that Laennec did not contrive the stethoscope until 1819, Galileo invented a device in the 1590s for measuring bodily temperature. The contrivance was used in Italy and known to Elizabethan physicians.

Hoeniger’s broad sweep is evident in his treatment of seventeenth century ideas about mania and hysteria, and biblical (Herod and Nebuchadnezzar) and Medieval (Merlin) perceptions of anger and madness (312–21). He agrees with Coleridge that Lear’s is a case of insanity of the aged, perhaps akin (although Hoeniger does not say so) to Alzheimer’s disease. Lear’s derangement erupts in Act III, but disordered thinking is apparent in the opening scene (310–12). Lear is a “burned melancholic,” whose anger is manifest by mournfulness rather than choler, which a Jacobean audience would understand to mean that although mad from the start, Lear is responsible for his actions. Lear’s dispiritedness (Hamlet is another burned melancholic) arises from excess yellow bile not purged by the spleen, which, when mixed with too much black bile leads to “farting melancholy,” manifest by fixed ideas, mania and flatulence (328), a disorder ill-suited for the stage.

Hoeniger says, “By Shakespeare’s time the scientific approach to pathology was followed not merely by most of the medical profession, but also had the support of the majority of the educated classes, including the bishops of the Anglican church . . .” (195). Renaissance medicine is not as homogeneous as Hoeniger suggests. Multivalent Renaissance medicine was a teeming flux, a cacophony of guilds, clerics and quacks. Besides, there was no “scientific approach to pathology” until postmortem examination became the cornerstone of English medicine at Guy’s hospital in the early nineteenth-century.


*Medicine and Shakespeare in the English Renaissance* does not delve into imagery of the grotesque body, and elides Rabelaisian celebrations of expectoration, vomiting, flatulence, mictruation and defection. Renaissance medical practice was, in part, a carnivalesque mockery celebrating the triumph of dis-
ease over health, death over life. The physician was a composite of the noble figure present at procreation and demise, and the charlatan, proclaiming preposterous cure-alls, and hawking bogus drugs.

Shakespeare’s access to London’s medical ferment allows us to scrutinize from within the plays some of the issues that preoccupied the English Renaissance. The plays are a link between Renaissance medicine and Renaissance aesthetics, a vast and interrelated field of knowledge tied to the social and political economy of the age. Medicine in Shakespeare’s time was based on dissonant traditions and heterogeneous practices. It was neither a unitary way of understanding health and disease, nor a codified method of procedure. Nonetheless, Renaissance medicine offered hypotheses about the etiology and prevention of disease, and was a basis of therapy. Physicians, surgeons, and apothecaries, as well as unorthodox, unsanctioned and heretical practitioners, functioned with separate codes and symbols for the body. Each used language to make disease decipherable, to prescribe interventions and to predict outcomes. As Robert Burton explained in the *Anatomy of Melancholy* (1621) language created a body of knowledge and a corps of practitioners: “the form of health is contained in the Physician’s mind” (Robert Burton, *The Anatomy of Melancholy*, ed. A. R. Shilleto, 3 vols. [1893, reprint, London: G. Bell, 1913, 2; 21]). Renaissance medicine is not a body of defunct knowledge and cabalistic techniques for curing ills; it is part of how people defined and recognized themselves.

Doctors had a privileged position within different instances of power on Shakespeare’s stage, a prestige out of proportion to their therapeutic effectiveness. The distance between doctor and patient ennobled medical practice during the Renaissance. The gaze of the doctor was directed from the ailing patient toward the cosmos, denoting a link between medical and metaphysical discourse. Shakespeare’s scene at the sickbed had a deployment and placement that disappeared with the birth of the clinic in the eighteenth-century, when, as Foucault says, Bichet “opens up a few corpses.”

The “and” of Hoeniger’s title is an important word. It warns both literary scholars not familiar with medical history and physicians not versed in literary theory. Versatility is required to learn how medicine is represented on the Renaissance stage. Shakespeare’s thinking on the matter is remarkable given the potency of medical conceptions based more on imagination than science. The wonder of medicine in the bard’s time is redoubled by its diagnostic cobbles and therapeutic blunders, a composite of fact and fancy. Learning about Shakespeare’s concern and confusion about health and disease changes how we understand the interaction of the drama with its historical moment. Shakespeare’s arcane medical discourse overlaps a boundary where literary “truth” and scientific “error” are effaced and constructed.

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In 1988 the Actors Theatre of Louisville focused their “Classics in Context” series on Victorian drama. Their choice of productions suggests the variety, multiple appeals, and vitality of the nineteenth-century English stage. A delightful production of W. S. Gilbert’s wicked comedy Engaged (discussed by both Jenkins and Booth), an authentically produced Peter Pan (except for the heresy of a husky young man playing Peter), and a poignant adaptation of scenes from Henry Mayhew’s London Labour and the London Poor carried the audiences from social realism to fantasy to self-conscious, sophisticated wit. The continued vitality of this theatre suggests that the two books under review here should reach a wider reading audience than professional theatre historians and, indeed, both seem intended as intelligent introductions to the Victorian “classics” and their “contexts.” In the process, The Making of Victorian Drama and Theatre in the Victorian Age illustrate the interdependence of interdisciplinary projects: each book read in isolation offers only a partial view of its subject although that partial view is often fascinating.

Jenkins’ study offers us a systematic study of important Victorian dramatists whose selection implicitly determines which dramatists are the “classic” ones. But, of course, this premise is ambiguous. How is “classic” to be understood? Is a classic dramatist or drama one representative of the times or of particular cultural concerns? Jenkins’ selection of Edward Bulwer Lytton, Tom Robertson, W. S. Gilbert, Henry Arthur Jones, Arthur Wing Pinero, Oscar Wilde, and George Bernard Shaw answers both yes and no to this question. Lytton, Robertson, Jones, and Pinero are certainly representative in that they reflected and shaped the taste of their audiences. Pinero and Jones’s problem plays succeeded because they created an illusion of daring while still affirming the conventions of their audience who could feel they were risking something but come away with their bourgeois assumptions intact. Jenkins does a good job of distinguishing between Jones and Pinero, who are too often seen as identical in their concerns. Chapters 5 and 6 place Jones and Pinero in light of their attempt to make serious modern English drama; Jones in particular saw his plays as literature, publishing all of them, and in The Renascence of English Drama (1895) arguing for the aesthetic importance of contemporary English drama. Jenkins sees Jones as “trapped” by his middle-class upbringing, evident in his antagonism to Ibsen. In contrast, Pinero adapted his dramatic technique in response to Ibsen, “discarding soliloquies, minimizing asides, and concentrating on his powers of characterization” (172). But neither playwright could follow Ibsen’s stark social realism. Their attempts to deal with Ibsenesque issues, particularly the status of women, resulted in plays such as Jones’s Michael and His Lost Angel and Pinero’s The Notorious Mrs. Ebbsmith which wrench themselves out of structure and character in order to preserve conventional pieties about sexual purity. This distortion itself reflects the 1880s and 1890s, a point Jenkins does not adequately develop.
The unconscious compromise which perverts both dramatic structure and characterization has kept Jones and Pinero from becoming "enduring" classics. Of these playwrights only Shaw and Wilde—and of Wilde only *The Importance of Being Ernest*—qualify as classics in this sense. Bulwer Lytton's pictorialism and pseudo-Shakespearean prose, while characteristic of the mid-nineteenth century endeavor to write traditional tragedy, looks backward and too often seems parodic of itself. But so few of Shaw's plays were actually produced during the nineteenth-century that typing him as a "Victorian" dramatist seems an endeavor to validate dramatists such as Lytton by associating him with one accepted by the academy.

The disparity in reputation between Lytton and Shaw stems from a shift in the nature of "drama" at the end of the century, a shift reflected in Jenkins' methodology. He studies these plays as literary texts, ignoring, for the most part, acting styles and production. Such isolation of the text is too rarefied for a drama which was nothing if not aimed at representation. That is, as Nina Auerbach points out in *Private Theatricals* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990), the essence of Victorian theatricality was a visual display of the "self," such as the monumental presence of Macready's Richelieu or Irving's Mathias in *The Bells*. The visual code of gesture, costume, even facial expression was as important as the words, evidenced by the popularity of pantomime and melodrama for all classes. This fact accounts for the real struggle of Robertson, Jones, and Pinero to make the drama, not the production the thing. Jenkins' account of Lytton's *Richelieu* illustrates the incompleteness of a purely literary approach. In Act 5, the seemingly defeated Richelieu undergoes a rebirth as Louis XIII begs him to "live!/If not for me—for France!" Jenkins discusses only the Cardinal's rhetoric, dismissing the transformation as simply "the Cardinal becomes himself once more" (53). But as contemporary accounts of the production make very clear, Macready's meticulous visual regeneration, not his words, gave the scene its point and power. His "restless fingers" playing wanly, his "vacant" face, and listless posture are those of a dying man when Louis' plea causes him to rise from his chair, renewed in vigor and power [see Denis Salter, "William Charles Macready's Richelieu" in *When They Weren't Doing Shakespeare*, ed. Judith Fisher and Stephen Watt (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1989), 55-58].

Concentration on only story and text misrepresents the play, which was incomplete without Macready's acting (and, in fact was written and re-written by Lytton precisely for Macready and under his tutelage). Jenkins' literary approach works better with Shaw's "discussion plays" which mark the separation of "drama" from "theatre." Jenkins points out that publishing his plays with full notes "opened doors for other writers with knowledge and experience to pass beyond the established literature of the Victorian theater. And Shaw had freed his own texts from managers' commercial interests, actors' limitations, and audiences' ingrained prejudices" (263). Shaw's publication and the resulting discursiveness of his plays sidestepped the pressures that made Victorian theatre what it was: the play existing as acted not as read. Jenkins' literary approach thus examines all the playwrights by a narrow scope really only suited for Shavian drama.

The thesis uniting the discussions, that the drama focuses on the "Woman Question," while certainly appropriate, is not thoroughly developed either in
the analysis or allusions to the social context. For instance, Chapter 1 places the progress of woman’s rights in “the late eighties” when “women began to rebel against man’s stifling patronage” (p. 9). This oversimplification ignores the consolidation of feminist activities starting in the 1850s: the activities of people such as Barbara Leigh Smith Bodichon, Bessie Parkes, and Harriet Taylor; the Victoria Press (est. 1860), the Married Woman’s Property Act in 1857; and the publication of J. S. Mill’s “The Subjection of Women” in 1869. Such simplification characterizes much of Jenkins’s “context.” He attributes much more influence to the Royal family than they actually possessed; he himself says they went to the plays only after they were successful. However, such emphasis fits Jenkins’ overall stress on West End Theatre, his omission of melodrama and pantomime, and his underlying argument, apparent in his title, that drama “progressed” during this century.

Michael Booth disabuses precisely this notion of progress, rejecting the view of the nineteenth-century theatre “as climbing slowly out of a swamp of mob rule and working-class domination in the earlier part of the century to reach an eminence of profound Victorian decorum and middle-class and fashionable patronage” (9). Jenkins’ thesis that the drama “progressed” depends upon such a social development because the “realistic” and “serious” plays by professional dramatists are those which he sees meeting the world and need of the middle classes: Robertson’s “cup-and-saucer” parlor plays and the “problem” plays of the last two decades of the century. Booth counters this thesis in his panorama of the world of the theatre; his book explores the “contexts” of Jenkins’ “classics.” Theatre in the Victorian Age is an excellent introduction to the social background of the theatre and to “major fields of specifically theatrical endeavour—management, stage and auditorium design, production, acting and the job of the actor” (xiii). Its breadth and detail define “theatre,” as a working community of actors, managers, technicians who respond to their own traditions and the desires of a variegated public. Booth’s multifaceted picture, which presents what goes on behind (and underneath) the stage as well as in the front office, subordinates the “drama” to financial pressure, technical strategies, and daily life. Chapter 1 offers a particularly good analysis of larger forces, such as industrial development, which shaped the theatre, the development of the railway, for instance, extending the influence of the London stage by facilitating touring repertory companies. Linking the general periods of success and failure of theatre to larger economic health, not the taste of a few individuals (eg. 27–28) rewrites the history of the “drama” as the fortunes of a business, a more accurate if less romantic way of seeing nineteenth-century theatre.

Booth opens by stressing the importance and neglect of the East End theatre and theatregoers, arguing that the schism between popular entertainment and mainstream drama was a fin de siècle phenomenon. Although Jones and Pinero were strictly West End, pantomime, melodrama, and extravaganza were common to all classes. More universal than types of drama, however, were the conventions of management, acting, and production. While acting style and plays became more “natural” or tended to mute their emotional extravagance, the technical elements of the theatre remained remarkably consistent, even conservative, in comparison to the European stage (78–80). Specific commentary on the East End dies out in chapters 4 & 5—we do not
learn much about what develops there at the end of the century when West End is turning toward "society" and problem dramas. Perhaps this omission is due to the development of music hall which is arguably beyond the scope of the book.

While the clarity and detail of Theatre in the Victorian Age make it appropriate for an introduction, it is almost too schematic. The detailed discussions within each section—"Management," "Playhouse and production," "The actor," "Dramatists and the drama"—stand as isolated compendia of information. The lack of synthesis among chapter sections and between chapters fragments the data, making it difficult to envision how all the elements conspired to construct a performance. Such compartmentalization is thus both a help and a hindrance to a novice reader. Similar veering away from the audience is also noticeable in the absence of explanatory illustrations of, for example, the lighting set-up and limelight box in the technical sections of "Playhouse and production." And, to really function as an introduction, Theatre in the Victorian Age needs more definitions of key terms such as "legitimate" drama (148–50, 154), "sensation drama" (154), and "problem play" (177). In fact, Booth's discussion of the genres of the Victorian drama, always a sticky topic, doesn't really clarify the subject. He basically defines all English drama as melodrama and yet discusses melodrama as a distinct genre. Much of chapter 5 reiterates Booth's Prefaces to English Drama. While the prefaces are essential examinations of the problems of genre study in nineteenth-century drama, the condensed account in the present book blurs distinctions between genres that Victorians saw fairly clearly.

Certainly the strengths of Theatre in the Victorian Age, including a good basic bibliography, outweigh any weaknesses. I recommend this as a standard introductory text for the mechanics of the theatre. While it is not particularly illuminating about acting style, actors, or plays, read with Jenkins, the Revels History of English Drama, and other studies such as George Taylor's Players and Performers in the Victorian Theater (Manchester, 1989), Theater in the Victorian Age offers an essential guide to a complete picture of the nineteenth-century stage.

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Other Women: The Writing of Class, Race, and Gender, 1832–1898 by Anita Levy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991). 174 pp. $35.00 (cloth); $9.95 (paper).

The text/context approach to literature that has become a staple of cultural criticism frames Anita Levy's intelligent and informative study of Victorian discourses on the imbrication of class, race, and gender. Although the publisher's jacket places this book in the double category of "women's studies/literature," Other Women dislodges Victorian fiction as the textual zenith and instead inserts a reading of Wuthering Heights within a detailed account of nineteenth-century British texts of sociology, anthropology, and psychology. Levy argues that these Victorian discourses, including domestic fiction, pro-
duce a generic female person, an implicitly middle class-specific model, against which “improperly gendered other women”—namely lower-class prostitutes, colonial “primitive” women of Africa and Asia, and madwomen—are measured.

The effect of these collaborative representations of “improperly gendered” women is to shore up middle-class power by constituting standards that legitimize bourgeois culture: “As the political identity of these other women was subordinated to a class- and culture-specific norm, a new definition of what it meant to be human and female emerged” (5). In other words, Levy claims, these Victorian human sciences attempt to manage “disruptive” populations by locating social problems with the aberrant or “improperly gendered” (according to class-specific notions) woman; this containment strategy, in turn, “erased social, cultural, and economic difference” (107). The uncontrolled female body, rather than an inequitable economic system, bears the responsibility for any social unrest.

How does this idea of the “proper” (read: middle-class) domestic woman bolster bourgeois cultural hegemony? How does the category of gender displace or mask political strife and injustice? Levy provides illustrations from her cast of Victorian discourses. According to sociological studies of the cholera epidemic of the 1830s, for instance, the inept household management of the “improperly domesticated woman”—rather than the squalid living and working conditions of the laboring poor whose cheap toil upholsters England’s industrial boom—is cited as the source of deplorable morals and unsanitary habits that lead to disease. An example of Victorian anthropology, John McLennan’s 1865 Primitive Marriage specifies female promiscuity and kinship through women as features of inferior races, a formulation used to excoriate the unruly lower classes among whom prostitutes and fatherless homes abound. Admittedly, all this Victorian social theorizing that effectively outlaws a welfare state and the “deserving poor” woman has an eerie contemporary echo in the so-called “decline of family values.” And psychology participates in this work of naturalizing, on the one hand, a class-specific notion of feminine domesticity, and proscribing, on the other, any deviation from this standard. Its construction of a dangerously desiring female whose excessive passions do not conform to the selfless devotion of the middle-class ideal of a domestic angel internalizes the origins of social disruptions and aberrations attributed to improperly “sexed” women.

As for fiction, Levy invokes Nancy Armstrong’s argument in Desire and Domestic Fiction by claiming that domestic novels collaborate in this cultural hegemony by providing “modern readers with the materials for representing their desires to themselves, and in doing so, they place limitations on how and what to desire” (18). Like the human science discourses that receive the bulk of Levy’s critical attention, fictional narratives offer a blueprint for domesticating female desire, for curbing unruly passions and behaviors through the inevitable ascendency of the domestic heroine. Thus, Catherine Earnshaw of “I am Heathcliff” fame, where Heathcliff is aligned with racial and class otherness, is a paragon of the improperly gendered woman, while her daughter Catherine Linton provides a storybook lesson on the successful domestication of female desire.

More significant, Levy positions fiction within a field of intersecting dis-
courses so that fiction and nonfiction form one "dialogic discourse," an ensemble of "interlocking" texts that champion a class-specific cultural project. In this way, Levy emphasizes her intention to dismantle the text/context approach to literary studies that underwrites new historicism, cultural studies, and materialist feminism. To this end, Other Women is divided into chapters with titles including: "Sociology: Disorder in the House of the Poor," "Anthropology: The Family of Man," "Domestic Fictions in the Household: Wuthering Heights," and "Psychology: The Other Woman and the Other Within."

Yet despite the punning plural of "Domestic Fictions," the chapter on Victorian literature addresses only one novel in depth. Indeed, the entire book makes only fleeting reference, usually consigned to endnotes, to other Victorian novels, while discursive accounts from sociology, anthropology, and psychology insightfully punctuate the discussion of Wuthering Heights. Corroding off "fiction" from "nonfiction," while liberally interspersing illustrations from the human sciences discourses throughout different chapters, does not break down the fiction/nonfiction distinction. Rather, Levy's practice structurally isolates the novel in her otherwise comprehensive survey. Curiously, the rhetorical force of this organization reinforces the very opposition Levy proposes to undo. Given her professional alignment with the discipline of literature, perhaps Levy overreaches her aim to make fiction part of a dialogic ensemble and instead focuses more on the 'other' discourses; this weighted attention reverses the dichotomy and makes fiction the segregated, marginalized, 'other' language of Other Women. In spite of this formal separation, Levy maintains that domestic fiction crystallizes and validates these interlocking theories on the "other woman" by replicating them in "everyday"—that is, narrative—language.

Quite frequently, as she carefully marches through Victorian texts on disease, poverty, crosscultural sexual customs, and insanity, Levy produces an engrossing account of the strategic deployment of the "improperly gendered" woman. It is a testimony to Levy's forthright, albeit sometimes parochial, analysis that many examples from Victorian novels of connections between the aberrant "other woman" and class and race inferiority come to mind. There's Stephen Blackpool's underclass wife in Hard Times, who is not dignified with a proper name but is qualified as a "demon" and a "wretch" as well as a "self-made outcast." The narrative emphatically indicts this woman, both an alcoholic and a prostitute, with responsibility for the abject conditions of Stephen's impoverished homelife, while the inequitable economic system of industrial capitalism and punitive Victorian welfare programs remain unscathed. And a brilliant chain of passages in Daniel Deronda links Gwendolen Harleth Grandcourt's marital bondage and her attempts at insubordination to the 1865 Jamaican uprising of blacks, an insurrection brutally squelched by British colonialist Captain Eyre. Whether fictional narratives self-consciously or ironically conjoin class, race, and gender subordination is a question that Levy bypasses in her discussion of Wuthering Heights where Emily Bronte's text simply reproduces the writer's own ideological inscription in a widespread cultural project to promote middle-class domestic power.

Levy's dogged retrieval of material conditions at every analytical turn, where class in the last Althusserian instance provides the interpretive key,
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veers toward economic determinism. The consistency of her argument notwithstanding, "the crucial role of class" (56) relegates this category as the most meaningful, the one which gains sway over gender and race, for starters. Accordingly, Victorian anthropology supports the ideological hegemony of the middle class over the working class through the implicit and explicit connections drawn between "primitives" or colonial subjects and women, on the one hand, and workers, on the other. Levy asserts that "only by dissolving the formal boundaries between text and text and between texts and contexts can one ever hope to discover the way gender is an instrument of class" (61). One might reverse the question and investigate ways in which class is an instrument of gender, for example. If Levy wishes to destabilize a disciplinary hierarchy of texts and discourses, her argument inevitably endorses a ranking of social categories with class perched squarely at the top.

I also wonder what motivates the shift Levy traces from the economic to the sexual realm in the work of Victorian middle-class experts. The effect of this transposition disguises class interest, but what cultural processes put it in place? How were these middle-class professionals funded? How widely were these texts read and by whom? According to Levy’s thesis, economic chauvinism explains this Victorian cultural agenda to naturalize bourgeois femininity and the ideology of separate spheres, and to ‘otherize’ any woman deviating from this standard. Rather than attending to the contradictions and contestations of this “cultural project,” a term Levy uses to imply a coordinated, deliberate effort, her argument unfolds a coherent front of middle-class hegemony. Consequently, sociology, anthropology, domestic fiction, and psychology erect a united, impenetrable wall of discourses that seems to admit no resistance or challenge, as if only proponents and beneficiaries of bourgeois capitalism have the ability to shape cultural attitudes or effect social change.

Despite these hesitations, Anita Levy’s study takes up a crucial topic; her analysis of an impressive selection of texts provocatively positions a range of writings on an increasingly detailed Victorian cultural map. Other Women rigorously explores the discursive angles of the ideological work of class, race, and gender, and contributes considerably to the widening bookshelf, including Mary Poovey’s Uneven Developments and Nancy Armstrong’s Desire and Domestic Fiction, on Victorian cultural criticism of interest to literary critics, historians, cultural theorists, and feminists alike.

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Thomas C. Grey's *The Wallace Stevens Case: Law and the Practice of Poetry*, Mark Halliday's *Stevens and the Interpersonal*, and James Longenbach's *Wallace Stevens: The Plain Sense of Things* all share a similar purpose: to advance our understanding of Stevens's work by exploring his poetry from perspectives that are not singularly aesthetic or literary. While Grey reads Stevens's poetry with a lawyer's eye, focusing on its connections to legal theory and to the law and literature movement, Halliday brings a certain moral perspective to his readings so he can take Stevens to task for ignoring or repressing the importance of the "interpersonal" in human affairs. And Longenbach's book—by far the most complete and satisfying of the three—reads Stevens's entire career, carefully teasing out the historical contexts for not only the poems themselves but also—and more significantly—for the silent times in which Stevens wrote no poetry at all. These silences provoke Longenbach's inquiry, and his explanations of them in terms of Stevens's development as a lawyer and of his subtle awareness of the historical events and the ideological and political debates of the day lead to a new and rich portrait of a writer and thinker for whom the problems of distinguishing between the poetic and the political, or between the private vacation of aesthetic pleasure and the public vocation of real work in the world, called forth a lifetime of effort. Thus each book, in its own way, is concerned not only with the vocational and aesthetic contexts out of which Stevens's work emerges, but also, and more importantly, with the social function of his poetry and with the ways in which it can be seen to intervene—or, in Halliday's case, to fail to intervene—in a world of legal, moral, and political issues.

For Grey, this social function is found in the pragmatism that connects Stevens's poetry to the practice of law and to legal theory. Situating Stevens with respect to the opposing understandings of the law either as the site of rhetorical and ideological justification or as the scientific, coercive application of positive rules, Grey finds in the poetry the advocacy of a pragmatic middle way mediating between "positivistic and instrumentalist conceptions of law on the one hand, and, on the other, idealist legal theories that identify law with the aspiration to justice, and see legal ideas as partly constitutive of social reality." Stevens is for him a "unique spokesman for that philosophical middle way that in modern thought has come to be called pragmatism," and his poetry, "to the extent it speaks to central issues of legal theory . . . is not irrelevant to social and political concerns." Thus Grey sees Stevens as a "kind of therapist for the habitual and institutional rigidities of binary thought," and for him nobody needs this kind of therapy more than practitioners of the law.

That there is a strong pragmatist streak in Stevens comes as no real surprise to readers of his poetry: as Grey himself notes, Richard Poirier and Frank Lentricchia, among others, have previously explored this Stevensian motif and its connections to the Deweyian and Jamesian tradition. Grey's emphasis on this one aspect of Stevens's poetry leads him at times to some fairly programmatic discussions of poems that he approaches only in order to show how they articulate a pragmatist vision. This single-mindedness allows him to range freely throughout Stevens's canon and to discuss pieces of various poems without being too concerned for historical or even literary-historical context. This marks the book's limitation, but it also signals its strength,
for in seeing Stevens as a legal philosopher and by transforming the traditional reality/imagination dialectic of his poetry into legal terms, Grey is able to demonstrate convincingly that Stevens has something practical to say to readers who are not poets or literature professors. The qualified assertions we have come to associate with Stevens’s poetry become, for Grey, pragmatic and perspectivist reactions to the incompleteness of either romantic idealism or positivistic realism, and thus to the limitations of the legal theories associated with these extreme positions. It is important for Grey that Stevens was both a poet and a lawyer, a writer who, by having a foot in both arenas, helps to “overcome unhappy stereotypes of soullessly philistine lawyers and socially marginal humanists.” The social and legal function of Stevens’s poetry resides for Grey in its pragmatist rejection of such conceptual oppositions, in its analysis of the situational and contextual basis of judgment, and in its cautious considerations of the unstable distinctions habitually used to separate idealism from positivism. Grey sees in this caution Stevens’s profound engagement with questions of the law and of judgment, and his book shows us a way in which reading Stevens can shed a practical, helpful, and pragmatic light on those questions.

For Halliday, on the other hand, Stevens seems to embody the stereotype of the “socially marginal humanist,” and he approaches the poet’s work from a certain moral perspective lacking, he feels, in traditional Stevens scholarship. What provokes Halliday is what he sees as an “important puzzle”—“how can greatness coincide with such determined avoidance of interpersonal reality?”—and in his book he analyzes the ways in which Stevens avoids, distorts, and represses this aspect of human life, and seeks to account for this radical omission. Stevens’s omission of the interpersonal shows up most clearly, for Halliday in his poems dealing—or not dealing—with the suffering of others, with women and heterosexual love, and with the solitary self, which, according to Halliday, Stevens wants to believe in as the sole site of “an ample, good life.” This “profound concern for the intactness of his self” has, for Halliday, a morally pernicious corollary that manifests itself in Stevens’s poetry by “a profound aversion to the demands of interpersonal relations” and by the implication that “the absence of distinct other persons is not only undetrimental to this good life but essentially unimportant, if not indeed beneficial.” What Halliday finds both most seductive and most unsettling about Stevens’s poetry is its “vacation spirit,” its “implicit invitation [to the reader] to abandon interpersonal responsibility” in favor of the “insidious comfortableness” of the holiday. In his longest chapter, which comprises more than forty percent of the entire book, Halliday explores the only interpersonal relation that seems to matter to Stevens—the relation with the reader—and isolates seven features of the poetry that produce the “illusion” that “Stevens likes and cares about his reader not just as reader but as person.” Each of these features, ranging from the way Stevens speaks for us to the ways in which, like a “favorite uncle,” he encourages a “holiday from responsibility,” turns out to be dangerously beguiling in eliding the demands of the interpersonal. Although Halliday admires Stevens’s technical skills, he is quite put off by what he takes to be his irresponsible elisions and by the moral failure he discloses by comparing Stevens to more interpersonally alert and responsible poets like Hardy and Dickinson.
But what Halliday sees as Stevens’s irresponsibility can, from another perspective, be seen as an obsessive responsibility to the irreducible otherness of the other and to the interpersonal nature of a human being to which the experience of the real presence of another as other is fundamental. Halliday is frustrated by the caution and reticence with which Stevens approaches the question of the other and poetic representations of the other. He writes, for example, that “there is something frustrating about an analysis that essentially demonstrates an absence,” and describes “The World as Meditation” as an example of a poem in which contact with the other is dismissed: in which, that is, “Stevens evades the mystery of the togetherness of two persons.” And yet it is precisely the “mystery” of a certain “togetherness,” the mystery as mystery of two persons who remain separate and two—whose difference matters because it is not gatherable into a single identity or unifying experience; whose contact is their difference-conserving non-contact—that Stevens does not evade in this poem, but solicits with care and love. Who is more responsible to this mystery? This is a question for a longer essay, but here it may be sufficient to point out that a contemporary discourse on “responsibility” and the “interpersonal” could profit from an encounter with the work of Levinas and Derrida on these issues. Halliday argues that Stevens is “unwilling to contemplate [the] vividly consequential separateness between people,” but I would suggest that a poem like “The World as Meditation” is precisely this kind of contemplation, one that responds to and is responsible for a radical separateness whose consequences are obliterated by metaphors of “contact” or meeting-as-gathering. Stevens’s poetry may invite us to take a holiday from a certain habitual concept of responsibility, but it does so in order gain some leverage on the insidious comfortableness of that concept and to solicit another—a less comfortable because less calculable, and therefore more infinite—responsibility.

Longenbach closes the introduction to his book with Stevens’s lament that “he could not count himself among the ‘people [who] always know exactly what they think,’” but instead of stopping here, he goes on to explore Stevens’s cautious affirmation of a certain “strength in uncertainty” and the effects of this strength on both his poetry and his politics. Unlike the books of Grey and Halliday, which are quite limited in scope and very focused upon a single theme in Stevens, Longenbach’s Wallace Stevens: The Plain Sense of Things is a thoughtful, complete, and carefully researched examination of Stevens’s entire career: and not only of his poetical career, but also of his career as a lawyer, which for Longenbach is inseparable from the poetry. Where others have stressed Stevens’s double life—and the certainty of the border separating his poetic vacation from his legal vocation—Longenbach offers an insightful and necessary correction that contextualizes Stevens’s poetic career and demonstrates his active awareness of and engagement in the political and ideological debates of his time, such as “the fate of American liberalism, the rise of communism, the rights of women, the pressures of nationalism,” and, most instructively, “the endless debate over the relationship of literature to the political actions these debates foster,” a debate that for Stevens can be brought to an end neither in the name of the naive realism of a vulgar Marxism nor in the imaginings of a detached aestheticism. Indeed, as Longenbach shows by stressing his encounters with actual events, Ste-
yens's strength as a poet derives partly from "his keen awareness of the dangers [and, I might add, of a certain inevitability] of aestheticizing experience" and from a career devoted to exploring the "shadowy relationship of poetry and politics," an exploration that, for Longenbach, constitutes the "social function of [his] poetry" and is connected to his fear of the "political ramifications of certainty" and his "distrust of dogmatism." The ambiguity and reticence that might, from a dogmatically realist perspective, seem irresponsible in Stevens are for Longenbach the demonstration of a kind of political strength and engagement that takes ideas—and their real consequences—seriously.

Longenbach does an excellent job of reading Stevens's poetry in the context of contemporary political and ideological debates and of elaborating the ways in which his vocational desires—for professional and economic security—are intimately connected to his poetic production and to the two major silences that mark the history of that production. In particular, Longenbach convincingly demonstrates that Stevens is from the beginning a war poet, and that it is his thinking about war and poetry—about the "need to distinguish between the poems of war and the physical reality of war" and "about the difficulty of maintaining that distinction"—that dramatizes both poetry's power and its weakness, and that faces directly the tense and inconclusive opposition between the public and the private. In its close attention to the details of historical context, Longenbach's book will, I think, become a classic of Stevens criticism, one providing not only a coherent argument for the political and social importance of Stevens's work, but also a carefully nuanced portrait of the events and debates in which that work takes (its) place. With this book, Longenbach has made an important contribution to our thinking about Wallace Stevens.

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