A Quantitative Analysis Of Fear Of Retaliation In A Cooperation Model

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CHAPTER 1: Introduction

In order for the police to effectively control crime and create safe communities, they require cooperation from citizens. Crime control is not produced merely from police working alone or the community working alone. A symbiotic relationship between police and citizens puts police in the best situation to effectively control crime. With a primarily reactive policing system in the United States, it is necessary for the police to gain cooperation from citizens because so little crime is detected through proactive patrol. Thus, police need citizens to report crime that would otherwise go unnoticed. Yet, a large portion of crime still goes unnoticed. Moreover, in many communities, relations between the police are strained, resulting in low reporting and cooperation (Goldsmith, 2005).

The popularity of community-policing is, in part, a recognition of these problems. The main goal of Community-Policing is to improve the relationship between the community and the police, making the community more apt to work with the police to reduce crime. These efforts likely improve citizen’s willingness to work with the police. However, many other factors exist that influence a citizens willingness to cooperate that are beyond the control of the police. These factors must be understood if we are to improve cooperation from citizens. Without cooperation from citizens police can only control crimes that they can witness, which is a very small portion of all crime. Thus, police effectiveness significantly relies on citizen’s willingness to cooperate with the police.

Two models exist to explain willingness to cooperate with the police. The first model is the normative model, which explains that an individual is influenced by their perception of the legitimacy of the police. The second is the instrumental model, which explains that individuals make rational-choices and cooperate out of self-interest.
The normative perspective suggests that an individual’s motivations to cooperate with the police are shaped by that individual’s perception of the legitimacy of the police. Legitimacy is important to citizens because as MacCormick (2007, p. 20) stated “human beings are norm-users, whose interactions with each other depend on mutually recognizable patterns that can be articulated in terms of right versus wrong conduct, or of what one ought to do in a certain setting.” Thus, if a citizen shares the same social norms as the body that governs them, they will view them as more legitimate, and be more inclined to cooperate with the police. Citizens that view their government as legitimate will be motivated to cooperate with the police because they believe that crime is legitimately defined by their government and is worthy of punishment. Thus, citizens sharing similar normative values with their government and the police will be more willing to cooperate with the police to ensure that the laws are followed and violators are punished.

According to Tyler and his colleagues (2003), citizens who share similar social beliefs with the police will be more likely to view them as legitimate, making them feel obligated to cooperate with the police. They suggest that these normative motivations have a much stronger influence on an individual’s behavior than instrumental motivations. This means that the beliefs an individual holds are more influential at shaping her behavior than the behavior that will be most beneficial to her. This argument has a great deal of empirical support (e.g. Sunshine & Tyler, 2003) and findings contrary to this have only been seen in studies outside of the United States (Tankebe, 2009).

Alternatively, the instrumental perspective suggests that people are rational thinkers and make decisions based in their own self-interest; they will choose to do what benefits them the most and avoid what is detrimental to them. For instance, if a citizen believes that cooperating
with the police will make their neighborhood safer to live in, they will be more likely to choose
to cooperate with the police. To the contrary, if a citizen does not believe that the police will be
able to solve a crime even if the citizen provides them with information, the citizen will choose
not to cooperate. This way the citizen will not feel like she is wasting her time.

Research has primarily focused on normative motivations. While it is clear that
normative motivations influence an individual’s willingness to cooperate with the police, there is
concern that significant instrumental motivations have not been tested, or have been tested
inconsistently. Most importantly, research has failed to account for fear of retaliation in a
cooperation model. No known quantitative studies have examined the effects of fear of
retaliation on willingness to cooperate with the police, making this study among the first. Only
qualitative studies with small samples have examined the influence of fear of retaliation on
citizens’ willingness to cooperate with the police. Additionally, other instrumental motivations
such as police effectiveness, fear of crime, and victimization have been inconsistently tested in
the same model. This study will add to the literature by examining fear of retaliation in a
cooperation model while controlling for other instrumental motivations that have been shown to
be significant. Also, this study will compare the normative and instrumental models against each
other to understand which model is more salient at explaining cooperation when these
instrumental motivations are taken into account.

Thus, the purpose of this study is two-fold. First, fear of retaliation will be examined to
gain a more empirically grounded understanding of the influence that it has on an individual’s
willingness to cooperate with the police. It is hypothesized here that citizens that are more fearful
of retaliation will be less willing to cooperate with the police. Past qualitative work has
established that this hypothesis has support, however, this study will test this concept
quantitatively so we can gain a better understanding of the magnitude of this relationship while controlling for other variables that have been shown to influence willingness to cooperate with the police. Additionally, fear of retaliation may be particularly salient at explaining cooperation because the data were collected from a sample of residents in Detroit, Michigan. This is likely because fear of retaliation is more significant in urban areas like Detroit where snitching rhetoric is more prevalent and may be more influential in shaping citizens behavior. This may be because citizens in areas with high crime and disadvantage may concern themselves more with what will be of benefit to them and their neighborhood and less of other normative motivations that would be more influential in areas with differing social characteristics. Or, it could be that their normative feelings are counter to the feelings about police in non-urban areas which may be more positive. Also, fear of retaliation likely is more important to citizens in urban areas because the threat of retaliation may be greater where a street culture is prevalent, whereas a street culture may not exist in suburban and rural areas.

The second goal of this study is to test the normative and instrumental perspectives against each other. It is hypothesized here that the normative model will continue to dominate the explanation of why people cooperate with the police. However, the instrumental model will prove more salient at explaining cooperation than in past studies because of the inclusion of previously overlooked/understudied motives.
CHAPTER 2: Normative or Instrumental?

There exist two competing models for explaining people’s willingness to cooperate with the police: the normative model and the instrumental model. Both provide explanations for willingness to cooperate with the police, but differ in their assertions as to why this cooperation occurs. The normative model suggests that an individual’s moral ideas about how society is supposed to work drives her decision making, whereas the instrumental model suggests that an individual make a rational-choice when deciding whether or not to cooperate with the police, focusing on whether the tangible benefits outweigh the potential costs. Both models have some empirical support in the literature. The normative model appears to have much stronger empirical support than the instrumental model. Key motivating factors, however, are either excluded or inconsistently tested in quantitative studies of the instrumental model.

**Normative Model**

Theory proposed by Weber (1968) suggests that legitimacy is a normative belief held by citizens that the directives of a governing body should be deferred to because there is a sharing of social values between themselves and their government. This theoretical framework suggests that those who hold similar social values to that of their government view the governing body as more legitimate. This felt legitimacy pushes citizens to defer to the directives of their government in order to maintain their shared social norms. Tyler and his colleagues (2003) used this line of theory to explain why legitimacy influences citizens’ cooperation with the police. They hypothesized that those who view the police as more legitimate are more willing to cooperate with the police because the police ensure that the social values that they share with their government are maintained. Citizens who view the police as legitimate will feel obligated
to help the police perform their job. This felt obligation leads citizens to be more willing to cooperate with the police to maintain the social norms that they share with their government.

Tyler and colleagues have suggested that normative-based motives are the most significant predictors of an individual’s willingness to cooperate with the police (Sunshine & Tyler, 2003). They have shown that those who perceive the police as legitimate are more willing to cooperate with the police. More specifically, the normative model suggests that if an individual has a similar social value orientation to the body that governs them, she is more likely to perceive that governing body as legitimate and, as such, is more likely to obey and to defer to the directives of that governing body. In short, when an individual both trusts the police and is willing to obey them, she believes the police are legitimate. Because of this perceived legitimacy citizens will be more likely to cooperate with the police by reporting crime and assisting in providing information that could help to solve crimes.

Many studies have examined the influence that perceptions of legitimacy have on willingness to cooperate with the police. Most have found that as perceptions of legitimacy improve, so does willingness to cooperate with the police (e.g., Sunshine & Tyler, 2003). Additionally, some research reveals that the antecedents of legitimacy have their own direct influence on cooperation. These normative motivations include procedural justice and distributive fairness. Procedural justice is the fairness of the process through which police make their decisions, and distributive fairness is when police provide the same services to all citizens regardless of circumstances (such as wealth or race). Both bolster an individual’s perception of legitimacy of the police, but also influence cooperation, independently from legitimacy. When tested in the same model as legitimacy, some studies have found these two variables to be significant (Reisig, Brattion, & Gertz, 2007; Sunshine & Tyler, 2003), while others have not
This study will test these two variables to clear up some of the inconsistent findings in prior work to better understand if they have their own direct influence on cooperation or if all of their influence flows through legitimacy.

**Instrumental Model**

The instrumental model suggests that an individual’s actions are shaped by her rational thoughts, so cooperating with the police is a calculated decision. According to this theoretical framework, an individual makes a rational choice as to whether or not she will cooperate with the police and will only do so when the benefits outweigh the costs. For example, if an individual does not believe that the police are effective, she may consider it a waste of time to go out of her way to help the police because she does not believe that it will be of benefit. Most studies find support for this model, but find these motives to be less significant than normative motives.

In prior research, police effectiveness has been the most commonly studied instrumental motive for cooperating with the police. Studies suggest that if an individual views the police as effective, then she will be more likely to cooperate with the police because she believes that spending time cooperating with the police will accomplish something. Some studies provide support, albeit weak, for this hypothesis (Bradford, 2014; Murphy & Cherney, 2011b; Tyler, Fagan, & Geller, 2014) suggesting that normative motives may dominate the explanation of why people cooperate with the police. However, it seems that there is much more to be tested regarding what shapes an individual’s rational-choice thought process when deciding whether or not to cooperate with the police.

The instrumental perspective also suggests that prior victimization, fear of crime, and fear of retaliation may influence an individual’s decision to cooperate with the police. If an individual has had prior victimization or are fearful of crime, she may be more willing to cooperate with the
police believing it could benefit her by potentially reducing her future victimization or reducing her overall fear of crime. Prior research has inconsistently tested these three motives together or the variables have only been tested a few times. This study will add to the literature by testing all of these concepts at once while also examining the influence that fear of retaliation has on willingness to cooperate with the police. Adding these variables into an instrumental model will help to further our understanding of what motivates an individual to cooperate with the police.

Latané and Darley (1970) first theorized that those who fear retaliation for reporting a crime to the police will be less willing to report that crime. They stated that if individuals believe that they will be identifiable as the persons who cooperated with the police, they will not want to cooperate out of fear that harm may be done to them. Latané and Darley provided a very concise theory that left more information that needed to be explained. Later literature that dealt with the “code of the streets” added more substance to this theoretical framework. Anderson (1999) proposed that a “code of the streets” exists in some neighborhoods that pervades the thinking of citizens and establishes a set of social norms that promote crime and vilifies the police. Rosenfeld, Jacobs, and Wright (2003) concluded that the “code of the streets” establishes that if an individual cooperates with the police, they lose all street credibility and may face retribution from other citizens in the community. Qualitative research has shown that individuals who fear retaliation for cooperating with the police are unwilling to cooperate (Carr, 2003; Jarret & Jefferson, 2004; Rosenfeld, Jacobs, & Wright, 2003). This study will be the first known quantitative study to examine the influence that fear of retaliation has on willingness to cooperate with the police.
CHAPTER 3: Literature Review

A growing body of research exists that examines what influences an individual’s willingness to cooperate with the police. Most research focuses on the respondent’s age, race, income, education, perceived legitimacy of the police, views about procedural and distributive justice, victimization experience, fear of crime, and perceived effectiveness of the police. A small number of qualitative studies have examined fear of retaliation. Each of these concepts will be discussed below.

Willingness to cooperate with the police is conceptualized in two different ways: an individual’s willingness to report crime to the police and an individual’s willingness to work with the police to solve a crime that they have knowledge about. Cooperation with the police is usually measured by asking respondents their likelihood of cooperating with the police if they had information that would help the police to solve a crime and apprehend the perpetrator. Sometimes cooperation with the police is also measured by how willing an individual is to work actively with the police to reduce crime or how willing an individual would be to testify in court.

Normative Motives

Legitimacy. Sunshine and Tyler (2003, p. 514) state that “legitimacy is a property of an authority or institution that leads people to feel that that authority or institution is entitled to be deferred to and obeyed.” Citizens that share social values with their governing body view that governing body as more legitimate, making it easier for the governing body to gain deference to its directives (Weber, 1968). This suggests that those who view the police as legitimate are more willing to cooperate with the police to ensure that the moral directives of government are being met and obeyed.
Legitimacy is often seen as having the strongest influence on an individual’s willingness to cooperate with the police and has found a great deal of support in the literature (Bradford, 2014; Hinds, 2009; Huq, Tyler, & Schulhofer, 2011; Kochel, Parks, & Mastrofski, 2011; Murphy & Cherney, 2011a; Murphy & Cherney, 2011b; Reisig, Bratton, & Gertz, 2007; Reisig, Tankebe, & Mesko, 2014; Sargeant, Murphy, & Cherney, 2013; Sunshine & Tyler, 2003; Tankebe, 2009; Tankebe, 2013; Tyler & Fagan, 2008; Tyler, Fagan, & Geller, 2014; Tyler & Jackson, 2014; Tyler, Schulhofer, & Huq, 2010). This suggests that the most effective way for the police to gain cooperation from its citizenry is to improve upon its perceived legitimacy.

Legitimacy is usually comprised of two aspects: trust in the police and obligation to obey police directives. Trust in the police can be understood as an individual’s belief that the police are abiding by the laws that control their behavior and are not overstepping their authority. Those who trust the police may also believe that the police act in everyone’s best interest. Obligation to obey the police can be understood as an individual’s willingness to do what the police tell you to do so long as what the police are asking is within their authority. Many studies operationalize legitimacy as a single variable comprised of these two separate concepts, although, there are inconsistencies in how legitimacy is operationalized. Some studies (1) combine both subscales of legitimacy to make a single variable (Sunshine & Tyler 2003), (2) others split legitimacy into two separate subscales and study the effects of each subscale independently (Dirikix & Ven den Bulck, 2013), (3) while others only use one subscale or the other (Sargeant, Murphy, & Cherney, 2013). Recent literature outside of the United States has split up legitimacy into its two subscales and has found that trust in the police has a much stronger influence on willingness to cooperate with the police than obligation to obey the law (Dirikx & Ven den Bulck, 2013). Other research outside of the United State has even shown that obligation to obey the law has no significance on
willingness to cooperate with the police (Reisig, Tankebe, & Mesko, 2014). The present study will be one of few in the United States that looks at the two subscales of legitimacy separately to examine the separate effects of trust in the police and obligation to obey the law on willingness to cooperate with the police.

**Procedural justice.** Procedural justice can be understood as the process through which legal authorities make decisions and exercise their power (Sunshine & Tyler, 2003). When legal authorities are procedurally just (meaning that they follow procedural law properly and treat everyone with dignity and respect) the public views them as fair and believes that legal authorities make decisions based on the law. From this perspective, if legal authorities are procedurally fair, follow the law, and treat citizens with dignity and respect, then the public is more likely to view them as a legitimate governing body that has a right to hold power and authority.

According to Tyler and colleagues, procedural justice is the main antecedent of police legitimacy. Procedural justice has been found to be the most significant variable shaping citizens’ perceptions of police legitimacy in the United States (Tyler, 2000; Tyler, 2006; Tyler & Huo, 2002). For this reason, procedural justice is also important in shaping citizens’ willingness to cooperate with the police. If a citizen is treated fairly and with respect (procedural justice) then she is more likely to view the police as legitimate, which encourages cooperation with the police. Thus, procedural justice has an indirect effect on willingness to cooperate with the police that works through legitimacy.

In many studies, procedural justice is put into the same model with legitimacy when examining the effects it has on cooperation. Some studies have found that once legitimacy is added into the model, procedural justice loses all of its significance in predicting willingness to
cooperate with the police (Bradford, 2014; Tankebe, 2009), thus suggesting that the effects of procedural justice on cooperation with the police flow through legitimacy. Other studies, however, find that procedural justice has its own effect on cooperation, net the effects of legitimacy (Hind, 2009; Tankebe, 2013). Interestingly, a field test conducted by Mazerolle, Antrobus, Bennett, and Tyler (2013) found that direct experiences of individuals being stopped on the streets by police who were treated with respect (procedural justice) reported greater willingness to cooperate with the police because of their positive experience. Additionally, Jonathan-Zamir and Weisburd (2013) found in Israel that even under times of acute threat to national security, procedural justice is still the primary antecedent of police legitimacy. What this shows is that the way people are treated by the police matters greatly to them, across different cultures. Because it is so important to people, it may influence not only an individual’s perceptions of legitimacy of the police, but also her willingness to cooperate with them. This evidence suggesting that procedural justice is an antecedent of cooperation, net the effects of legitimacy, makes it an important variable to consider in the study. The present study will look to see if procedural justice has any influence on willingness to cooperate with the police, net the effects of legitimacy.

**Distributive justice.** Distributive justice is the concept that police spread their services equally across all groups of people. For example, distributively just policing does not provide more protection to the wealthy because they have more political influence, but instead provide the same level of service to all citizens regardless of any circumstances that can differentiate people from one another. Distributive justice is a part of the legitimacy literature and is often found as an antecedent of police legitimacy. The more citizens view the police as distributively just, the more likely they are to perceive the police as legitimate. Sarat (1977) suggests that when
citizens view officials as distributively fair, they will be more willing to support those officials and thus be more willing to cooperate with police. Prior research has found a significant relationship between distributive fairness and willingness to cooperate with the police (Reisig, Brattion, & Gertz, 2007; Sunshine & Tyler, 2003; Tankebe, 2013). Similar to the effects procedural justice has on willingness to cooperate, distributive justice may also have some direct influence on willingness to cooperate that is independent of legitimacy. Distributive fairness will be included in this study to further the current status of the research on this topic. However, it may be that the effects of distributive justice flow through legitimacy in the same way that the effects of procedural justice flow through legitimacy. For this reason, the present study will examine the influence that distributive fairness has on cooperation, net the effects of legitimacy.

**Instrumental Motives**

**Police effectiveness.** Perceived effectiveness of the police may also influences citizen’s willingness to cooperate with the police. A number of studies have looked at the influence of perceived effectiveness on cooperation. Usually, police effectiveness is defined as the ability of police to combat and control crime in a defined area. A rational-choice perspective suggests that citizens would be more willing to cooperate with the police if they are effective at controlling crime. Citizens would believe that it is in their own interest to cooperate with the police in order to protect themselves or their neighbors. If the police are perceived as ineffective, however, citizens may believe that it will not be beneficial for them to cooperate with the police because there is nothing that the police can do to help.

Many studies have looked at the influence that a citizens’ perceived effectiveness has on willingness to cooperate with the police. Some studies find that the more citizens view the police as effective, the more likely they are to cooperate (Bradford, 2014; Hinds, 2009; Huq, Tyler,
Schulhofer, 2011; Murphy & Cherney, 2011b; Reisig, Tankebe, & Mesko, 2014; Sargeant, Murphy, & Cherney, 2013; Tankebe, 2009; Tyler, Fagan, Geller, 2014). However, all of these studies, except for Tankebe (2009) found legitimacy to be more salient in predicting cooperation. The atypical findings of Tankebe (2009) may be explained from an assertion made by Sunshine and Tyler (2003, p. 522) that “during times of strife and difficulty, people become more focused on the effectiveness of the police.” This may help to explain the results from Tankebe (2009) because the study was conducted in Ghana where crime problems are more significant than in the United States. Thus according to Tyler, because of Ghana’s problems with crime, the citizenry may concern themselves more with the effectiveness of the police than with any other issue because their main concern is with lowering the extraordinarily high crime rates. These citizens concern themselves more with outcomes than with the way they are treated.

While the majority of studies find the perceived effectiveness of the police to be a statistically significant predictor of cooperation, other studies have found perceived police effectiveness to be insignificant in determining an individual’s willingness to cooperate with the police (Dirikix & Van den Bulck, 2013; Kochel, Parks, & Mastrofski, 2011). The somewhat mixed findings on police effectiveness make it an important concept to include in a study of citizen’s willingness to cooperate with the police.

**Fear of crime.** In a rational-choice instrumental model of cooperation with police, when deciding whether or not to cooperate with the police, an individual will weigh the costs and benefits of doing so. A rational-choice instrumental model suggests that those who fear crime more would be more willing to cooperate with the police because the police could help to abate the problem they fear. Only one study thus far has examined the effects of fear of crime in a cooperation model. Tyler, Fagan, and Geller (2014) found that fear of crime was a significant
predictor of willingness to cooperate with the police. Their results showed that the more individuals were fearful of crime in their neighborhoods, the more likely they were to cooperate with the police, which is consistent with a rational choice model. The present study will add to the literature by examining the effect that fear of crime has on an individual’s willingness to cooperate with the police.

**Victimization.** A rational-choice instrumental model also suggests that an individual who has been victimized would be more likely to cooperate with the police for their own personal benefit. Crime victims may see cooperating with the police as a way to reduce their likelihood of further victimization. In an international study of citizens from Ghana, Tankebe (2009) found a weak relationship between victimization and willingness to cooperate with the police, with those who had been victimized being more likely to cooperate with the police. Additionally Kochel, Parks, and Mastrokski (2011) found that among a sample of citizens from Trinidad and Tobago, victimization had an insignificant influence on willingness to cooperate with the police. The present study will add to the literature by examining the effects that victimization has in the United States context and also by adding evidence to past inconsistent findings.

**Fear of retaliation.** Clayman and Skinns (2012) suggest that citizens who fear retaliation for cooperating with the police rationally decide whether or not they should do so; when an individual views the perceived risks as outweighing the perceived benefits, then that individual will choose not to cooperate with the police. This is consistent with Latané and Darley (1970) who stated that those who fear retaliation for cooperating with the police will try to minimize risk to themselves by avoiding cooperating or not cooperating with police. Literature on the “code of the streets” suggests that this may be especially prevalent in high crime urban neighborhoods.
In an exploratory study of twenty offenders Rosenfeld, Jacobs, and Wright (2003) found very little willingness to cooperate with the police. Much of this was shaped by the “street code” that suggests cooperating with the police is wrong, and because the offenders reported that there would be retribution if they cooperated with the police. Only under very particular circumstances—involvement of a family member—would they involve themselves in cooperating with the police. Additionally, Whitman and Davis (2007) found that often times youth would report that their friends were unwilling to report crimes to the police because they feared harm if they did so. In another international exploratory study, Clayman and Skinns (2012) found that youth in London who feared retaliation were not willing to cooperate with the police. Only with guaranteed anonymity would they be willing to cooperate with the police. Thus, initial exploratory research has found evidence suggesting that some people may be unwilling to cooperate with the police because they fear retaliation. More research on this topic is needed to understand how fear of retaliation impacts willingness to cooperate with the police. The present study will add to the literature by being the first quantitative study examining how an individual’s fear of retaliation influences their willingness to cooperate with the police.

Demographics

Age has been shown most consistently to influence an individual’s likelihood of cooperating with the police (Hinds, 2009; Huq, Tyler, & Schulhofer, 2011; Murphy & Cherney, 2011a; Murphy & Cherney 2011b; Sargeant, Murphy, & Cherney, 2013; Sunshine & Tyler, 2003; Tankebe, 2013; Tyler & Jackson, 2014). This relationship always suggests that the younger the individual, the less likely that she is to cooperate with the police. In addition, race has also been found with some consistency to have an influence on an individual’s likelihood to cooperate with the police (Reisig, Bratton, & Gertz, 2007; Sargeant, Murphy, & Cherney, 2013,
Sunshine & Tyler, 2003; Tankebe 2013; Tyler & Jackson, 2014). In these studies, minority citizens are less willing to cooperate with the police. In some studies, income has also been shown to influence an individual’s willingness to cooperate with the police. These studies show that as an individual’s income increases, so does her willingness to cooperate with the police (Huq, Tyler, & Schulhofer, 2011; Murphy & Cherney, 2011a; Murphy & Cherney, 2011b; Sargeant, Murphy, & Cherney, 2013; Tankebe, 2013; Tyler & Jackson, 2014). Sex has been found in a couple of studies to influence willingness to cooperate with the police with males being less willing to cooperate with the police (Reisig, Bratton, & Gertz, 2007; Sargeant, Murphy, & Cherney, 2013) Lastly, education was shown in one study to influence willingness to cooperate with police with those who are more educated being more likely to cooperate with the police (Sargeant, Murphy, & Cherney, 2013). It will be important in the present study to control for all of these variables in the model.

**Hypotheses**

The purpose of this study is to answer two questions. First, does fear of retaliation influence an individual’s willingness to cooperate with the police? Second, will normative motivations continue to be more salient at explaining an individual’s willingness to cooperate with the police?

Hypothesis 1: Individuals that fear retaliation for cooperating with the police will be less willing to do so.

Hypothesis 2: Normative motivations will be more salient at explaining an individual’s willingness to cooperate with the police than instrumental motivations.
CHAPTER 4: Methodology

The data used in this study are secondary data. The data were collected in three steps from three different neighborhoods in Detroit, Michigan in 2009. In the first step, neighborhood clusters were stratified by sociodemographic and structural factors using population and housing data from the 2000 decennial census (Summary File 3, U.S. Census Bureau, 2002). In the second step, the researchers identified contiguous clusters of census block groups that were relatively homogenous with respect to socioeconomic (e.g., poverty, unemployment) and structural (e.g., family structure, education) factors. From this, three neighborhoods (Brightmoor, Grandmont, and Rosedale Park) were selected so that there would be one low, one medium, and one highly disadvantaged neighborhood. Twenty-five people, 16 WSU students and 9 Detroit community members, were hired and trained to serve as interviewers for the study. Researchers conducted door-to-door, in-person interviews because this was deemed as the most effective means of collecting reliable data because of concerns about literacy of citizens. Data collection was carefully monitored to ensure between 10 and 20 households were surveyed in each block group and that the distribution of selected houses appeared even within each block group. Interviewers were told to approach every house on the designated routes that look inhabited and allowed access to the front door (i.e., not blocked by locked fence, no trespassing signs, or aggressive dogs). All participants were eighteen years or older. The final sample size was N = 408.

Dependent Variable

The dependent variable was willingness to cooperate with the police which measured participants’ likelihood of cooperating with the police under certain circumstances. Willingness to cooperate with the police was an index created from three items that were measured on a Likert scale (1 = very unlikely, 2 = somewhat unlikely, 3 = unlikely, 4 = likely, 5 = somewhat
likely, and 6 = very likely). The three questions asked participants to respond about the likelihood that they would: “Call the police to report a crime or suspicious activity occurring in your neighborhood,” “Help the police to find someone suspected of committing a crime (providing them with information),” and “Be a witness in court.”

These three questions were taken directly from Sunshine and Tyler (2003). An exploratory factor analysis (EFA) was run on these three items to determine if they loaded onto one factor. EFA showed that the three items loaded onto a single factor which explains 69.07% of the variance. The factor loadings for the items ranged from 0.648 to 0.870 (Cronbach’s $\alpha = 0.78$). Factors scores were saved to create the measure of cooperation used in subsequent analyses. Higher scores on this variable indicate a greater willingness to cooperate with the police (alpha reliability = 0.78). Standardized loadings and the eigen value for the single factor solution can be seen in Table 1.

Table 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EFA of Willingness to Cooperate With Police</th>
<th>Standardized Loadings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cooperation with police</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Call police</td>
<td>0.648</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Help police</td>
<td>0.870</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Witness in court</td>
<td>0.704</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eigen value = 2.09</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Variance = 69.71</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Independent Variables

Demographics. Demographic variables that were shown in past work to be significant in regards to willingness to cooperate with the police were examined here. These variables included gender, age, race, marital status, income, education, and home owner/renter. Gender was a dichotomous variable and was coded as 0 = male and 1 = female. Age was recorded as a continuous variable and was recorded in number of years. Race was coded as a dummy variable with 0 = non-African American, 1 = African American. For the variable race, the non-African American category was comprised of all races other than African American. The race variable was collapsed because there was very little variation in race besides African American and Caucasian (1.5% American Indian or Native Alaskan, 11.5% White or Caucasian, and 2.5% other). Marital status was also coded as a dummy variable so that 0 = not married, 1 = married. Income was a categorical variable and was composed of twelve categories where 1 = less than $10,000, 2 = $10,000-$14,999, 3 = $15,000-$19,999, 4 = $20,000-$24,999, 5 = $25,000-$29,999, 6 = $30,000-$34,999, 7 = $35,000-$39,999, 8 = $40,000-$44,999, 9 = $45,000-$49,999, 10 = $50,000-$54,999, 11 = $55,000-$59,999, 12 = $60,000 or greater. Education was also a categorical variable and was comprised of six categories where 1 = less than high school diploma, 2 = high school diploma, 3 = some college, 4 = associate degree, 5 = bachelor degree, 6 = graduate school. Lastly, rent was a dichotomous variable and was coded as 0 = renter and 1 = owner.

Trust in police. Trust was created from four items. Each of the items that created the trust variable were measured on a four-point Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = agree, and 4 = strongly agree). The items were drawn from Sunshine and Tyler (2003). The questions asked participants to respond to their level of agreement to the following questions:
“People’s basic rights are well protected by the police in your neighborhood,” “The police can be trusted to make decisions that are right for the people in your neighborhood,” “The police in your neighborhood are generally honest,” and “Most police officers in your neighborhood do their job well.”

Cases that were missing responses to either one or two of the four items were replaced with the median of each individual variable. Cases that were missing responses for three or all of the items were excluded from the analysis ($N = 393$). EFA indicated that the four items loaded onto one factor well and explained 68.66% of the variance. The factor loadings were high, ranging from 0.737 to 0.807 (Cronbach’s $\alpha = 0.85$). Factors were saved to create the measure of trust used in this study. High scores on the index indicate more trust in the police. Standardized loadings and eigen value can be seen in Table 2.

A fifth question that asked participants to respond to their level of agreement with “the police in your neighborhood have too much power” was anticipated to be included in the factor based on a previous analysis from a sample of New Yorkers conducted by Sunshine and Tyler (2003). However, the fifth item was excluded here because the EFA results indicated that it would not load onto the trust factor. This suggests that the item was not consistent with the concept of trust measured by the other four items.
Table 2
EFA of Trust in Police

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Standardized Loadings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Trust</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rights protected</td>
<td>0.737</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police trusted</td>
<td>0.807</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police are honest</td>
<td>0.768</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do good job</td>
<td>0.744</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Eigen value</strong></td>
<td><strong>2.75</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Variance</strong></td>
<td><strong>68.66</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Obey police.** The variable, obligation to obey the police, was created from a single item which was measured on a four-point Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = agree, and 4 = strongly agree). Participants were asked to report their level of agreement with “You should do what police tell you to do, even when you disagree with their decision.” This item, along with two other questions were taken from Sunshine and Tyler (2003), but unlike their study, the items would not load onto a single factor here. The two other two items that were not included in this analysis asked participants to respond to their level of agreement with: “You should accept the decisions made by the police, even if you think they are wrong,” and “It would be difficult for you to break the law and keep your self-respect.” The item that was kept to indicate obligation to obey police was chosen because it appeared substantively to be most related to what was being measured. Higher responses to the item indicate more willingness to obey the police.

**Perceived retaliation.** The variable, perceived retaliation, was measured by a single item on a four-point Likert scale (1 = very unlikely, 2 = unlikely, 3 = likely, and 4 = very likely). The
question asked respondents to indicate the likelihood that “Someone who reports a crime to the police in your neighborhood will be treated badly by neighbors.” Higher scores on this item indicate that an individual perceived a higher likelihood of negative consequences for reporting a crime.

**Known retaliation.** The variable, known retaliation, was a dichotomous variable coded 0 = no and 1 = yes. This item asked participants if they had ever heard of anyone from their neighborhood being harmed because that individual had reported a crime.

**Fairness of police.** Distributive fairness was a summative index comprised of two variables that were modestly correlated. The items were measured on a Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = agree, and 4 = strongly agree). Participants were asked to respond to their level of agreement to “Police officers enforce the law consistently when dealing with all people” and “People receive the outcomes they deserve under the law when they deal with the police.”

Cases that were missing responses to one of the two items were replaced with the median. Cases that had both responses missing for both items did not get missing replacement (N=396). Responses to these two items were significantly correlated (Spearman’s rho = 0.444, p < 0.05) and were internally consistent (Chronbach’s α = 0.62). Four items were originally intended to comprise this variable because they created a single factor in Sunshine and Tyler (2003) but would not load onto one factor in this data set. The two most highly correlated items were used to create the index here because they were also the two most closely related items at face value. The two items that were not used were “The police do not provide the same quality of services to people living in all areas of the city” and “The police provide better services to the wealthy.”
**Effectiveness of the police.** Police effectiveness was a summative index comprised of two variables that were moderately correlated (Spearman’s rho = 0.565, \( p < 0.05 \)). The two items were measured on a Likert scale (1 = never, 2 = sometimes, 3 = often, and 4 = very frequently). These two items were pulled from Brunson (2007) and participants were asked if they felt that “The police respond quickly to calls” and “The police work hard to solve crimes in the neighborhood.” Cases that were missing one of the responses were replaced using the median. Cases that were missing responses to both items were excluded from the analysis. The two items were internally consistent (Cronbach’s \( \alpha = 0.70 \)).

**Quality of treatment from police.** Perceived quality of treatment by the police was a summative index comprised of two variables that were moderately correlated (Spearman’s rho = 0.596). The items were measured on a Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = agree, and 4 = strongly agree). The items were pulled from Sunshine and Tyler (2003) and participants were asked to respond to their level of agreement with “Police officers treat everyone in your neighborhood with dignity and respect” and “Police officers take the time to listen to people. Cases that were missing one of the responses were replaced using the median. Cases that were missing responses to both items were excluded from analysis (N=390). The two items were internally consistent (Cronbach’s \( \alpha = 0.75 \)).

**Quality of decision making by police.** Perceived quality of decision making by the police was also a summative index comprised of two variables that were moderately correlated (Spearman’s rho = 0.572). The items were measured on a Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = agree, and 4 = strongly agree). The items were taken from Sunshine and Tyler (2003) and participants were asked to respond to their level of agreement with “Police officers make their decisions based upon facts, not their personal biases and opinions” and “Police
officers give honest explanations for their actions to the people they deal with.’’ Cases that were missing one of the responses were replaced using the median. Cases that were missing responses to both items were excluded from the analysis ($N = 381$). The two items were internally consistent (Cronbach’s $\alpha = 0.75$).

**Fear of crime.** Fear of crime was an index created from three items. All questions were measured on a Likert scale. One question was measured using the responses (1 = very safe, 2 = safe, 3 = unsafe, and 4 = very unsafe) and asked participants “How safe is your neighborhood at night?” The other two questions were measured using responses (1 = never, 2 = rarely, 3 = often, and 4 = very often) and asked participants “How much do you worry about getting physically attacked or assaulted in your neighborhood?” and “How much do you worry about someone breaking into your house while someone is home?”

Cases that had one missing response were replaced with the median and cases that had either two or all of the responses missing were excluded from the analysis ($N = 408$). EFA indicated that the three variables loaded well onto one factor and explained 67.43% of the variance. Factors ranged from 0.645 to 0.795. Factor scores were saved to create the indicator for fear of crime. Higher scores on this scale indicated that participants were less fearful of crime in their neighborhood (Cronbach’s $\alpha = 0.76$). Standardized loadings and eigen value can be seen in Table 3.
Table 3
EFA of Fear of Crime

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Standardized Loadings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Fear of Crime</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neighborhood safety</td>
<td>0.645</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physical attack</td>
<td>0.709</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burglary</td>
<td>0.795</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Eigen value = 2.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Variance = 67.43</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Victimization.** Lastly, victimization was measured as a dichotomous variable consisting of three different questions indicating whether the respondent had been a victim of crime. Respondents were asked whether in the past year they had been a victim of burglary, theft, or assault. Those who responded “yes” to one or more of the questions were coded 1. Participants who responded no to all three questions were coded 0.
CHAPTER 5: Results

From a sample of 408 participants, 53.9% of the participants were female. The average age of the respondent was 44.2 years old. Just over one-third of the sample was married (34.2%). The vast majority of the sample was African American (84.5%). Of the sample, 30.1% of participants had some sort of college education, even if they had not graduated from college. Of the sample, 30.8% of the population made over $40,000 last year, however, just over a quarter of participants made less than $10,000 last year. Table 4 reports the descriptive statistics from every variable in the study.
Ordinary Least Squares Regression (OLS) was used to test the hypotheses in this study. OLS was used for two reasons. First, this technique allows for the determination of the relative effect that each independent variable has on the dependent variable. Second, this technique ensures that any influence that an independent variable has on another variable is not caused by any other variable in the model. One threat to the validity of the results from a regression model is the existence of multicollinearity (Hutcheson & Sofronniou, 1999). The existence of
multicollinearity is a threat to the reliability of the regression parameters and does not allow for accurate interpretation of results.

Table 5 presents the bivariate analysis for all the variables in the regression model. Researchers suggest that correlations greater than 0.70 are a cause for concern (Hutcheson & Sofronniou, 1999). As can be seen from Table 5, the correlation between the variables quality of treatment by the police and trust in the police are correlated at 0.74 raising concern that multicollinearity exists. This issue will be revisited with regression diagnostic. As can been seen from table 5 the variables race, marriage, rent, willingness to obey the police, known retaliation, and quality of decision making by the police were all weakly correlated with willingness to cooperate with the police. These correlations suggest that non-African Americans, married people, home owners, those who are willing to obey the police, those who know that retaliation has happened, and those who have perceive that the police make good decisions are all more willing to cooperate with the police. Additionally, as can be seen in table 5 the variables education, age, income, trust in the police, perceived retaliation, and quality of treatment by the police all had a moderately weak correlation with willingness to cooperate with the police. These correlations suggest that the more education, the older, higher earners, those who trust the police, those who do not fear retaliation, and those who perceive that the police treat citizens well are all more likely to cooperate with the police.
Table 5
Bivariate Correlation Matrix

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<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
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<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
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<td>1</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<td>2. Gender</td>
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<td>3. Age</td>
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<tr>
<td>4. Race</td>
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<tr>
<td>5. Marriage</td>
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<td>-0.07</td>
<td>0.23*</td>
<td>-0.11*</td>
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<td>6. Education</td>
<td>0.37*</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.15*</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
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<tr>
<td>7. Income</td>
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<td>-0.07</td>
<td>0.15*</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.36*</td>
<td>0.52*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Rent</td>
<td>0.22*</td>
<td>-0.09</td>
<td>0.21*</td>
<td>-0.13*</td>
<td>0.14*</td>
<td>0.25*</td>
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<tr>
<td>9. Trust</td>
<td>0.36*</td>
<td>-0.06</td>
<td>0.33*</td>
<td>-0.09</td>
<td>0.23*</td>
<td>0.20*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Obey</td>
<td>0.11*</td>
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<td>0.07</td>
<td>-0.08</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Perceived Retaliation</td>
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<td>-0.18*</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>-0.11*</td>
<td>-0.27*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Known Retaliation</td>
<td>-0.12*</td>
<td>-0.06</td>
<td>-0.19*</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>-0.12*</td>
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<tr>
<td>13. Fairness</td>
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<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td>-0.18*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Effectiveness</td>
<td>0.11*</td>
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<td>0.14*</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.15*</td>
<td>0.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Treatment</td>
<td>0.32*</td>
<td>-0.06</td>
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<td>0.24*</td>
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<tr>
<td>16. Decision</td>
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<td>-0.08</td>
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<td>-0.02</td>
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Note *p<0.05
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<td>2. Gender</td>
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<td>3. Age</td>
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<td>11. Perceived Retaliation</td>
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<td>-0.22*</td>
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<tr>
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*Note* *p*<0.05
Table 5 Cont.

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<td>0.68*</td>
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<td>-0.03</td>
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</table>

Note *p<0.05
Table 6

**OLS Regressions Results**

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</thead>
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<td>0.076</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.009(0.09)</td>
<td>0.173***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Race</td>
<td>-0.141(0.01)</td>
<td>-0.053</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marriage</td>
<td>-0.077(0.13)</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>0.134(0.04)</td>
<td>0.216***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>0.012(0.02)</td>
<td>0.057</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rent</td>
<td>-0.094(0.10)</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust</td>
<td>0.274(0.08)</td>
<td>0.276***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Obey</td>
<td>0.067(0.07)</td>
<td>0.048</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perceived Retaliation</td>
<td>-0.145(0.05)</td>
<td>-0.145**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Known Retaliation</td>
<td>0.028(0.15)</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fairness</td>
<td>-0.038(0.05)</td>
<td>-0.045</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effectiveness</td>
<td>-0.047(0.03)</td>
<td>-0.082</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treatment</td>
<td>0.061(0.06)</td>
<td>0.081</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decision</td>
<td>-0.026(0.06)</td>
<td>-0.034</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fear</td>
<td>0.041(0.05)</td>
<td>0.039</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victim</td>
<td>0.175(0.09)</td>
<td>0.091</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(constant)</td>
<td>-0.527(0.46)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

R² = 0.320

N = 357

*Note* *p*<0.05; **p*<0.01; ***p*<0.001
According to Chatterjee, Hadi, and Price (2000), multicollinearity is not an issue so long as variance inflation factors are not greater than ten. Upon examination of the collinearity diagnostics, the concern regarding multicollinearity from a high correlation in the bivariate correlation matrix between quality of treatment (VIF = 2.91) by the police and trust (VIF = 3.05) in the police is under the threshold of ten suggesting multicollinearity is not an issue.

Table 6 presents the results from the OLS regression of the hypothesized model. As is consistent with prior research, age ($\beta = 0.173$) was found to have a significant impact on willingness to cooperate with the police, controlling for all other variables. Those who are younger show less willingness to cooperate with the police. Additionally, education ($\beta = 0.216$) was found to have a statistically significant influence on cooperation with police. As education increased, so did willingness to cooperate with the police. None of the other demographic variables were significantly related to cooperation in the regression analyses.

Next, as is consistent with Tyler’s normative model, trust in the police ($\beta = 0.276$) shows the most significant relationship with willingness to cooperate with the police. Interestingly, because the concept of police legitimacy was broken up into its two subscales, trust and obligation to obey, the results from this study show that obligation to obey the police is not significant but trust is. This finding is consistent with previous research that has separated these two concepts (Dirikx & Ven den Bulck, 2013, Tankebe, 2013).

Inconsistent with prior research, the instrumental motivation, police effectiveness, did not significantly ($\beta = -0.145$) influence cooperation with the police. However, an individual’s perceived fear of retaliation significantly influenced their willingness to cooperate with the police. If residents believed retaliation was likely for cooperating with the police, they were less likely to cooperate. Interestingly, whether or not an individual had actually heard of someone
who had been harmed for cooperating with the police did not influence their own willingness to cooperate with the police. Contrary to previous work, procedural justice factors, fear of crime, and victimization did not significantly influence cooperation.
CHAPTER 6: Discussion and Conclusion

The purpose of this study was to examine the influences on an individuals’ willingness to cooperate with the police. This study tested the normative and instrumental explanations for cooperation with the police, with a particular focus on the influence that fear of retaliation has on willingness to cooperate with the police.

The findings suggest that age, education, trust in the police, and fear of retaliation are all significantly related to willingness to cooperate with the police. The findings suggest that as age increases, willingness to cooperate with the police also increases. These findings are consistent with other study’s findings on age (Hinds, 2009; Huq, Tyler, & Schulhofer, 2011; Murphy & Cherney, 2011a; Murphy & Cherney 2011b; Sargeant, Murphy, & Cherney, 2013; Sunshine & Tyler, 2003; Tankebe, 2013; Tyler & Jackson, 2014). Also, the findings here suggest that the more formally educated an individual, the more willing she will be to cooperate with the police. This finding is also consistent with past work (Sargeant, Murphy, & Cherney, 2013).

Originally, Sunshine and Tyler (2003) conceptualized legitimacy of the police as being comprised of two subscales, trust in the police and obligation to obey the police. Their work and others have repeatedly created one index of legitimacy using items that pertain to both subscales of legitimacy. However, recent work in the cooperation literature has broken legitimacy up into its two subscales to examine the relative effect of trust in the police and obligation to obey the police. As was done in Dirikx and Ven den Bulck (2013), this study examined trust in the police and obligation to obey the police separately in the regression model. The normative motivation, trust in the police, was shown here to influence willingness to cooperate with the police. The more an individual trusted the police, the more willing they were to cooperate with the police. Interestingly, obligation to obey the police did not significantly predict willingness to cooperate.
This is consistent with past work that has only found trust in the police to be significant (Dirikx & Ven den Bulck, 2013). This may suggest that in previous research it is actually trust in the police that influences cooperation and not the concept legitimacy.

Procedural justice was not significantly related to cooperation. Past work has suggested that the influence of procedural justice flows through legitimacy (Bradford, 2014; Tankebe, 2009). They have shown this by creating multiple models of cooperation and adding variables in each subsequent model, in a path analysis fashion. These two studies found that when procedural justice was added to their models before legitimacy, it was significant, but once legitimacy was subsequently added, procedural justice would lose its significance. This suggests that the influence of procedural justice on cooperation flows through legitimacy (or trust in this model).

In addition to trust being the only normative motivation found to be significant, fear of retaliation was the only instrumental motivation to significantly influence cooperation. Those who were more fearful of retaliation for cooperating with the police were less willing to do so, supporting the main hypothesis of this study. This lends further support to the qualitative research showing that an individual’s willingness to cooperate with the police is influenced, in part, by their fear of retaliation. Unfortunately, this study does not tell us anything about what sort of retaliation citizens fear. Rosenfeld, Jacobs, and Wright (2003) found that citizens fear both physical harm and harm to their reputation. In their interviews, the researchers found that citizens were fearfull of what would happen to their reputation if they were to cooperate with the police. They also found that there was fear about physical harm that they would put themselves at risk for if they cooperated with the police. Further research is necessary to better understand what sorts of harm it is that citizens fear the most.
Surprisingly, knowing of instances where retaliation was carried out on an individual that a respondent knew did not influence a respondent’s willingness to cooperate with the police. This suggests that it is actually an individual’s perceived risk that shapes their behavior, rather than their actual experiences. This suggests that to improve cooperation with the police it would be most beneficial to reduce citizen’s perceived risk of retaliation rather than attempting to reduce actual retaliatory events, which may be more perceived than real because only 10.4% of the respondents indicated that they knew of an actual retaliatory event.

Lastly, the normative motivation, trust, continued to be most significantly related to cooperation, supporting the hypothesis that normative motivations are more important than instrumental motivations. Thus, the most effective way to improve cooperation rates is to make citizens more trustful of the police. The procedural justice literature suggests that this can be done through fair policing practices (Tyler & Huo, 2002). Even though normative motivations were found to be more salient at explaining cooperation, fear of retaliation also significantly predicted willingness to cooperate. Clayman and Skinns (2012) found that some citizens would cooperate with the police if complete anonymity could be promised. In cases where there is only one witness to a crime it may be obvious who cooperated with police, but in cases where the person who cooperated cannot be identified, police can benefit from promises of complete anonymity. Because the data were collected in Detroit, where a “code of the streets” likely influences citizens’ behavior, the significance of fear of retaliation may be inflated compared to other communities. This may be because the code of the streets pervades the normative values of these individuals. Their normative values support a lack of cooperation with the police and outcasts those who work with the police. The police are vilified in these communities, which is unlike feelings about the police in other areas, which is why fear of retaliation is likely more
significant in Detroit than other suburban and rural areas where a “code of the streets” does not exist. Further research is needed to better understand the significance of fear of retaliation in non-urban environments where a code of the streets is less prevalent or non-existent. This is necessary too, because the qualitative work done on this topic has also been conducted mostly in urban settings.

Interestingly, research suggests that during times of strife and difficulty, citizens may concern themselves more with instrumental motivations such as police performance and effectiveness, and less with normative motivations like citizens’ rights and process (Deutsch, 1990; Nagata, 1993; Sullivan, Piereson, & Marcus, 1982). In an area like Detroit, with high crime and difficult living situations, one may assume that Detroit citizens may concerns themselves more with instrumental motivation for cooperating with the police. Even in a city with slow or no police response (Bialik, 2013), this study suggests that this is not the case. This may be because American ideals about procedural processes and citizens’ rights are so pervasive that citizens are more concerned about this and less about actual outcomes.

**Limitations**

The findings of this study should be approached with some caution. First, the data are cross-sectional. One could suggest that attitudes measured in this study may not predict behavior at a later time. It cannot be assumed that attitudes represented in this survey will shape an individual’s actual behavior and predict her willingness to cooperate with the police. However, Tyler and Fagan (2008) found through the examination of panel data that attitudes about cooperation in the first wave of their survey did predict behavior in the second wave of data collection. This would suggest that the attitudes examined in this study may shape actual behavior.
Also, because the data were only collected from Detroit residents, the study lacks generalizability to the country as a whole. In addition, differences in culture norms between cities or even neighborhoods may shape behavior in Detroit differently than it does in other large urban cities or neighborhoods within those cities, making it non-generalizable to other large urban areas. Also, it is likely that studies in suburban and rural cities would show different findings. Fear of retaliation may not influence willingness to cooperate with the police in suburban and rural areas because culture norms and police responses/protection vary in those areas, so citizens do not fear retaliation for cooperating with the police. More research is needed to better understand how fear of retaliation influences cooperation with the police in these areas.

The method used for data collection also limited the data. The sampling design was a convenience sample of residents in three selected neighborhoods. Therefore, the results may not be generalizable to the entire population of Detroit residents, nor may it even be generalizable to residents in the three communities. While attempts were made to monitor sample selection as it was in progress to allow for a geographically distributed “representation” of the community, the sampling design is not a representative sample. Hence it suffers from the typical weaknesses of convenience samples. Further, data were only collected from homes, leaving out the homeless who are important in understanding of willingness to cooperate with the police because it is likely that they witness crime that occurs on the streets which they may not be able to report. Also, the sampling instrument may have limited the validity of the data. Some variables in the model were created from single survey items. It is more ideal to construct variables out of multiple items on a questionnaire to create more valid and reliable variable.

Another limitation is the results of this study cannot be applied to youth, only adults. Unfortunately, data were only collected from individuals over the age of eighteen. This left out
youth, who are the most likely to come into contact with the police (Murphy, 2015). Also, youth may be the age group most entwined with the code of the streets which can negatively influence their willingness to cooperate with the police. Thus, youth may be the most important age group to understand what influences their willingness to cooperate with the police if we want to improve rates of cooperation. Practitioners could benefit from research that examines what influences youth’s willingness to cooperate with the police.

Lastly, variables that may influence an individual’s normative feelings about the police were missing from this study. Dirikx and Van den Bulck (2014) found in a sample of Flemish youth that media exposure to programming about the police influences their willingness to cooperate with the police both directly and indirectly. They suggested that the indirect influence is through the impact that these programs have on a youth’s perception of legitimacy of the policy. No known studies have replicated these findings in the United States, but, it is an important variable worthy of study in the United States context.

Conclusion

For the police to be effective, they must be able to gain cooperation from citizens so that citizens actively report crime and provide information that they have about crime. Without active cooperation from the citizenry, police will be much less effective. This is especially true in a society that curtails the powers of the police to ensure that they do not infringe upon the rights of citizens. Police have the ability to discover very little crime through active patrol, so they must rely on citizens to report the rest. Thus, to improve the rates of cooperation with the police we must fully understand what influences an individual to cooperate with the police or what deters them from cooperating.
This study has shown that fear of retaliation negatively influences citizens’ reporting behavior. Only with the promise of complete anonymity will some citizens be willing to cooperate with the police. So, to improve cooperation, the police must be able to convincingly protect the identity of those who work with them. Also, citizens that trust the police will be more willing to cooperate with them. To this point, research suggests that procedural justice and distributive fairness are the most effective means of bolstering trust in the police. The findings of this study suggest that these are the two methods through which police in Detroit can increase cooperation from citizens.
REFERENCES


ABSTRACT

A QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OF FEAR OF RETALIATION IN A COOPERATION MODEL

by

JORDAN PAPP

May 2015

Advisor: Dr. Brad Smith
Major: Criminal Justice
Degree: Master of Science

Past qualitative research has shown that fear of retaliation influences an individual’s willingness to cooperate with the police. The purpose of this study was to quantitatively examine the influence that fear of retaliation has on a citizen’s willingness to cooperate with the police. This study also examined both normative and instrumental motivations for cooperating with the police to understand which motivations are more salient at explaining willingness to cooperate with the police. Data for this study were collected from 408 Detroit homes in 2009 from three different neighborhoods where homes were selected randomly from those neighborhoods. Results indicate that the instrumental motivation, fear of retaliation, influences an individual’s willingness to cooperate with the police. However, even more salient was the normative motivation, trust in the police, which showed that citizens who are more trustful of the police will be more willing to cooperate with them.
AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL STATEMENT

After graduating from Wayne State University in May of 2015 I will begin my Ph.D. at the University of Cincinnati in August. There, I plan to focus my studies on the corrections system. Particularly, I would like to research the influence that being a corrections officer has on one’s family life. Upon completion of my Ph.D. (seeming as I finish) I would ultimately like to end up with a tenure-track position at a research university.