Book Reviews


What did the English civil wars have to do with literature? Quite a lot, according to Nigel Smith, whose new book is a remarkably thorough catalogue of the literary effects of England's mid-century turmoil. Smith's spotlight is turned less on the inky fabrications of the pen than on those of the printing press; consequently, our sense of what counts in the history of literature expands healthily—out of the coterie and into the public. The heroic work of Abraham Cowley's *Civil War* sits along with Thomas May's translation of Lucan's *Pharsalia*; analysis of these poems joins that of pamphlets like *A Discourse of Tyrants and Tyranny* (1642), in a history of republican discourse; these jostle with the transgressive Spenserian allegories of the soul, Henry More's *Psychozoa* (1642) and Joseph Beaumont's *Psyche* (1648). There is much more: Smith does not "degrade" high works of literary achievement by his side-by-side treatment of the lesser known ephemera; on the contrary, he demonstrates the imbrication at all levels of aesthetic expression with matters of historical import—crises in the realm of representation that were political and personal, social and sexual. Literary history is richer for this transaction between low and high, coterie and popular, timeless and timebound.

Writing for students of literature and of history, Smith has produced an excellent, balanced account of that ganglia known as civil war literature. T. S. Eliot blamed those knotty years (1640-1660) for producing a "dissociation of sensibility," but we find in Smith's account a literature where words possessed a power enough to arm men to kill and to console them after they had experienced defeat. Women's voices also figure as integral to the project: whether that of Dorothy Osborne reflecting in a letter on her reading a newsbook's pulse of the nation, or of Margaret Cavendish transforming the landscape lyric into a province for female authorship.

The central theses of this book—that literature was a central part of the crisis of England's civil wars, and that literature itself experienced crises of its own in response to that political turbulence—are important and innovative treatments of the dialogic conception that literature and society mutually create one another. Drawing upon the work of Mikhail Bakhtin and Michael McKeon, Smith's book is strong not for its theorizing, but for its playful yet careful description of the massive body of literature produced during the civil war years. Readers will want to come to their own conclusions about why such transformations in literature occurred; Smith provides enough evidence to show that they did.

Changes in literary production, especially the closing of the theaters and the explosion out of the printing press of new genres like the newsbook led to changes in the function of literature: new audiences, "speech communities" (13) were created. In addition, because of the massive political upheaval of the civil war, individual citizens came to see themselves and to represent their identities in new ways: to define themselves in relation to that large-scale political action as well as to search for alternatives to that public scene of horror and disappointment. With pressure from both outside (civil war) and inside (psychological responses to political and social upheaval), then, people needed literature to help tell their stories and to make
sense of the world around them. The resulting literature was a heterogeneous body, a Babel of tongues—this mix is gleefully celebrated in this book which captures the disorderliness of the period through analysis of particular genres.

Beginning with an account of the printing revolution, Smith shows how it became possible for multiple perspectives to express many differing narratives: the indeterminancy and proliferation of voices was a revolution in writing and in thinking. Newsbooks gave an enormous opening for authors to reach new audiences, and news writing produced new genres, new types of authors—Marchamont Nedham being only the most illustrious case—and much literary opportunity. Drama did not disappear after the closing of the theaters in 1642, and, following the important work of Martin Butler, Smith explores continuities as well as ruptures in the history of theatrical expression. Smith analyses how dramatic forms made their way into printed pamphlets in the forms of dramatic prose dialogues, heroic poetry, and political newsletters, and how authors responded to the closing of the public theaters by finding new forms of public expression in the printed pamphlet. Courtly genres of romance drama survived and were transformed according to new political and social needs, with pamphlet tragi-comedies like The Just General and The Loyal Lovers (both 1652) expressing simultaneously Cavalier disillusionment and fantasy. The impact of the civil war period upon drama can be seen, argues Smith, in the overtly politicized drama of the Restoration: the civil war had released politics into literary fora, and literature would never be the same again. The two ensuing sections of the book explore the consequences of such a literary transformation of the public arena.

The second section of the book, with chapters on political and religious rhetoric, both high and low, constructs a literary history of republicanism. In this section, Smith jumps away from his analytical-descriptive mode and into a thesis-arguing one. It is this second section that makes a vital contribution to an understanding of seventeenth-century literature, and will no doubt be the most controversial, since it is here that Smith makes the political stakes of the book apparent. The seventeenth century in England turned out some monoliths of political theory: Hobbes, Harrington, Filmer, for example; as well as figures of some lesser importance: Philip Hunton, Henry Parker, Charles Herle. But political thought, contends Smith, must be looked for elsewhere: and the elsewhere turns up a newly vocal people in the literature, including the pamphlets. In that literature, discontented citizens, women and soldiers made themselves part of the political life of the nation, not through formal institutions, but through their participation in public speech. In that literature, for instance, Smith shows the Levellers voicing a "discourse from below," speaking on behalf of the powerless. And in that literature, Smith shows, we can find the emergence of a republicanism more pervasive than has been previously thought. Elegantly drawing upon the findings of David Quint, David Norbrook, and Annabel Patterson, Smith importantly adds to our understanding of the civil war contexts of republicanism. A striking claim is that royalists contributed to the rise of the discourse of republicanism, constructing a spectral republicanism in their fearful imaginations.
Not only will political history be seen anew, with the tracing of a republican tradition, Smith also importantly includes the struggles over religion and religious authority in his survey, linking debates over toleration and church order to profound changes in religious expression. Such a "revolution" in religious expression took place, argues Smith, both at the level of personal self-understanding—with the emergence in literature of a radical decentered puritan consciousness—and also at the level of literary form, a shift in poetic kind. The revolutionary period, argues Smith, brought about the fall of the lyric and the rise of the religious hymn. In his attention to the hymn as a literary genre, Smith offers a powerful instance of a "revolutionary" transformation of literary genre from private to public, and he builds an important bridge between seventeenth-century "metaphysical" poetry and the genres of the eighteenth-century hymn. Historians of the period are laying ever more emphasis on the religious meaning of the civil conflict and revolution, and Smith importantly includes this revisionist approach in his study. This is an account of the literature of the period very much up to date in current historiography.

The third section of the book explores the transformation inside particular literary genres and traditions—the heroic epic, elegy, lyric, satire, landscape poetry, and history-writing—brought about by civil war upheaval. This is less a story of individuals, than of species; less a causal narrative than a lively compendium. Sometimes genres implied political positions—Smith calls elegy royalist and panegyric republican, for instance; sometimes genre was embattled, as in the case of history writing, where authors strove to seize control over political history by their literary representations of it. There is a wonderful chapter on satire, where Smith retrieves satiric genres from conservative politics. Satire may have culminated in Drydenic Anglican Tory writing in the Restoration; nonetheless, argues Smith, satire had roots in the radical Protestant tradition. Attending to civil war writing, to those "forgotten voices" (295) of dissenting satirists, Smith recovers a more diverse heritage that stretches from the Marprelates through Milton, and it is one that speaks through a populist tradition.

That wars can "do" anything at all to literature is a reversal of an intellectual history that asks what did literature "do" to make wars, or revolutions. But that wars can affect literature is hardly a remarkable claim; what is remarkable here is the range and depth of Smith's material. The civil war period produced a "war of words... more powerful, in a way more deadly, more important, than the military war" (44). Smith's book doesn't quite tell us why, but he most thoroughly shows us how, in a powerful account that will challenge readers to remap their histories of English literature and to attend to this important body of writing produced during the revolutionary period.

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Sharon Achinstein
In 1979, *The Norton Anthology of English Literature* described Jane Austen as "the only important author who, untouched by the political, intellectual, and artistic revolutions of her age, stayed serenely within the culture and the literary traditions of the neoclassic past" (19). Fourteen years later, the most recent edition (1993) does not deny that statement, but merely equivocates: now, Austen "is the only important author who seems to be untouched" by those revolutions (16, my emphasis). Despite this equivocation from one major textual foundation of American undergraduate teaching, the emerging consensus among Austen scholars is that they cannot remain and, on the whole, no longer do remain untouched by the evidence that Austen was not serene, that she did not stay within the neoclassic past, and that she was influenced by politics—no "seeming" about it. Though coming to different conclusions, careful scholarship (Duckworth, Butler, Kirkham, Johnson, etc.) has uncovered Austen's connections to the political and literary issues of the 1790's. Now, Roger Sales's new book, *Jane Austen and Representations of Regency England*, extends (but does not attempt to replace) her historical connections from the 1790's to the Regency itself in his discussions of the letters, *Mansfield Park*, *Emma*, *Persuasion*, and *Sanditon*. Although Sales's projected audience is the undergraduate reader, this is a well written, carefully researched study that both the student and the scholar will find illuminating.

Victorian and modern readers have often missed or misunderstood Austen's complex relationship to the Regency. Asserting that Austen is "a more openly Condition-of-England writer than is generally recognised," (xxi) Sales's goal is to place her Regency novels "within a more obviously material and politicised social history" (xviii). Examining both early and modern evaluations of her, he uncovers "Austen's changing cultural status" (xiv). He first surveys the Austen family's deification of her as a domestic angel in the house, and although this is not, of course, a new story, the thoroughness with which he historically contextualizes those biographies' agendas—in short, a total renovation of her character—makes for an engaging narrative, especially for the undergraduate reader. Demonstrating that the biographies are inscriptions of history, he carefully contextualizes their biases within the framework of their ambivalence toward Regency values, and specifically their trepidation that she evinces traces of Regency coarseness in her letters (James Edward Austen-Leigh suppressed her references to such unspeakables as "fleas, naked Cupids, and bad breath" [10]). He then turns to the contemporary deification of Austen in modern Britain (specifically in popular culture), analyzing how both Austen and the Regency have now, ironically, become affirmative transferential templates for what defines "Englishness." Indeed, one writer he quotes claims that because Chawton "is the sort of house that every civilised man in England now covets,' Austen could not possibly have been unhappy there" (12).

Sales sees the letters as an important literary text and a historical source for the period and refuses to dwell merely on what is missing (i.e. the alleged annihilation of the most significant letters). Not only do the existing letters provide information about the Regency, but they also reveal the Re-
ergency's influence on Austen. Skeptical of psychoanalytic explanations that look for camouflaged meaning, Sales finds that the "impatient" and sometimes "abusive" (34, 35) tone in the letters arises out of the historical conditions and economic pressures under which they were written. Thus, the letters are not a celebration of the self because letters of this period constituted a public sphere, more like newspapers than private documents (33); and their highly theatrical qualities reveal an "open-ended, or continuous Regency drama" (45). From a feminist point of view, he argues that "social situations that she did not control" forced her to be abusive, (43) and acting "both the imperious playwright and the star performer... she often gained this power over her characters by abusing them when they were on stage and then by... contemptuously dismissing them... from her regal presence" (45-46). This last point of view, though historically contextualized in an arresting way, is perhaps, less subtly argued than are his discussions of the novels, where he finds Austen continually changing her narrative "countenance."

Indeed, one strength of this book is his overall opinion of Austen as an author who continuously "keeps and loses her countenance" (31)—alternatively, this book could have been titled "The Varying and Contradictory Countenances of Austen and Regency England." What he means by this is that she is a writer who does not offer a fixed, conservative position on any one debate, but instead creates texts that are "open, genuinely dialogic and unresolved" (145). He shows how Austen "celebrates confusion and secrecy in the very act of exposing and condemning them" (144); presenting at least two countenances in any given text (155), she "play[s] an intricate game with [her] readers," putting them in "contradictory position[s]" (165). Although these quotations are taken from his chapter on *Emma*, they seem to me to characterize his overall assessment of Austen's narrative stance. The historical documentation, the detailed close readings and a materialist/feminist outlook make this approach to Austen extremely convincing.

The analyses of the novels will prove useful for undergraduates and scholars alike. The readings are fresh, partly because of the historical context and partly because he often focuses on minor—and male—characters whom critics have neglected. The analyses and descriptions, however, are so thick, that I cannot do justice to them, and at times the information, though interesting, seems distracting in its abundance. However, I want to highlight a few examples from the informative and inviting parallels he draws between the novels and such Regency themes as the dandy, invalidism, leisure, the theater, and the rising professional.

Sales shows how Austen—alternatively disparaging and enthralled—explores the cultural phenomenon of the Regency sportsman, the Regency dandy, Beau Brummel, and the dandyish Prince Regent himself through certain male characters, namely Tom Bertram, Henry Crawford, Frank Churchill, and Sir Walter. For example, Sales reveals that Tom Bertram is a kind of minor Prince Regent who threatens the constitution of the estate (nation) and, like the Prince of Wales, tries to incorporate into his rule attitudes gathered at watering places—he is a cross-dressing, male-oriented, "lord of misrule" (101) who traverses boundaries of gender and class.
We learn that Austen, sharply aware of war and topical events, has indeed taken us on a “tour” of Portsmouth’s “stations” of war in *Mansfield Park*: Sales explains what most modern readers would not know, but nineteenth-century readers would have: that the Garrison Chapel was “covered with monuments erected to the memory of those who died in the Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars” (113) and that the ships at Spithead, which Fanny and Henry view “would have been used to hold French prisoners-of-war” (114). Austen thus deploys these settings ironically in *Mansfield Park* as a “theatrical set” for Henry Crawford’s strategic “attacks” on Fanny (111). Sales suggests that Austen’s depiction of Henry “parading around the docks”—a veritable “Napoleon of the domestic battlefield”—“seems to raise the question of whether the war might have been conducted more successfully if England had indeed expected every man to do his duty” (111, 112-13).

He reveals that she explores such issues as the uncertain social status of the rising professional classes and the topical issue of female rule. For example, in a fascinating close reading of the scene in *Emma* where Frank sees Mr. Perry riding by on his horse and asks what has become of the apothecary’s ambition of setting up his carriage, Sales demonstrates that Austen was drawing from debates in Parliament “which hinged on whether the apothecary was to be a tradesman on a horse, or a professional man who used a carriage for daytime visits” (152). And in *Persuasion*, we learn that her inquiry into the question of “who will, and who deserves to, win the peace after the ending to the Napoleonic Wars” (171) also involves allusions to the topical issue of female rule, a notion advanced during the Regency period to thwart the power of the Prince of Wales. Anne’s capability thus shimmers with historical resonance: she (like Queen Charlotte) is the one who should, but is not allowed to, govern the estate/nation.

In closing, after studying this book, very few readers could contend that Austen was “untouched” or even “seemed” to be untouched by her age. Sales imparts how widely informed Austen was about politics and topical events, he enables us to recognize the deft way she incorporates current events into her narratives, and his scholarship opens up the novels in flexible and wide-ranging ways.

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In a book described by the author himself as “odd” (ix), Patrick J. Keane presents two arguments whose questionable intrinsic worth is balanced by a wealth of excellent and useful historical scholarship. The first section of the book addresses the question of why Coleridge, a staunch abolitionist, ignored Robinson Crusoe’s role as a slave trader when annotating Defoe’s novel, and instead called Crusoe a representative “Everyman.” The difficulty of the question is increased in a detailed account of Coleridge’s, Defoe’s, and
Crusoe's complex relation to slave trading, which emphasizes Coleridge's consistent abolitionism despite his decreasing egalitarianism and Defoe's lack of irony toward Crusoe, an account which leads inevitably to the conclusion that "Coleridge's attitudes toward slavery and the slave trade were, from radical beginning to conservative end, antipodal to those of Robinson Crusoe" (96). Keane attributes Coleridge's silence to the fact that he read Robinson Crusoe as a work of "pure imagination," whose hero is, like Coleridge's own Mariner, a passive denizen of a "happy nightmare," and who is "thus, perhaps, incapable of being a moral agent" (128). In this "willing if selective suspension of the 'moral' category" (162), Coleridge denies the truth of both his own sharp differences from Crusoe/Defoe and the very non-Defoean moral of egalitarian love in his own self-proclaimed work of pure imagination, The Rime of the Ancient Mariner.

The second part of the book performs the opposed but complementary task of historicizing this poem that, with a few notable exceptions going back to William Empson in the 1960's, has resisted political readings, even by the new generation of historical critics. Keane builds his case on Coleridge's oscillation between political activism as an anti-Pitt journalist and his avowed retreat from politics during the volatile period of 1797-98, when objections to the Pitt government's oppressive measures in England suddenly gave way to general support for the anti-French campaign after Napoleon's invasion of Switzerland in early 1798, and as Coleridge planned to flee to Germany with the Wordsworths. Depending on verbal and thematic echoes in Coleridge's other writings in this period, Keane connects the murder of the albatross to the destruction of liberty, the Mariner's becalmed ship to Coleridge's political inactivity, and the sinking of the ship to the potential failure of Pitt's government, "both a consummation devoutly to be wished and a national convulsion to be dreaded" (268). The image of the "dungeon grate" in the approach of the spectre-ship bearing Death and Life-in-Death is associated with Coleridge's fears of imprisonment for sedition, and the blessing of the water-snakes that begins the Mariner's recovery is seen as a capitulation, an acceptance of Pitt and his government "as chastening elements in God's grand providential design" (351). In an appendix, Keane contrasts this capitulation with Prometheus's revocation of the curse on Jupiter in Shelley's Prometheus Unbound in order to suggest (with help from Yeats) that while Shelley is able to combine regenerative love with defiance toward tyranny, Coleridge, lacking in 1798 Shelley's faith that Jupiter-like tyrants will in fact fall, capitulates to what he had earlier attacked as tyranny, for reasons of both religious faith and political expediency.

Despite what this bald summary suggests, Keane takes pains to avoid simply allegorizing the Rime, noting that in his reading the albatross is connected to both liberty and slavery, and that the Pittite ship is captained by the Coleridgean mariner. He spends a great deal of time situating his argument between M. H. Abrams's liberal intellectual history and the new-historical revision of deconstruction practiced by Jerome McGann, Marjorie Levinson, Alan Liu, and others. His crucial divergence from the "more accusatory New Historicists" is that he sees himself as identifying "unconscious intrusions" of politics into poetry rather than the "deliberate exclusion of the political dimension" that the Romantic Ideology is claimed by McGann's disciples to foster
This unfashionably sympathetic approach has the advantage of producing a carefully nuanced reading: unlike Alan Liu’s Wordsworth, in *Wordsworth: The Sense of History* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1989), Keane’s Coleridge oscillates between political engagement and quietistic retreat, rather than simply repressing political history. Coleridge’s unconscious guilt is thus interestingly contradictory: he is guilty for his failure to continue in his youthful egalitarianism and for his political retreat under the threat of domestic repression by Pitt’s government, but also for the possibility that his early enthusiasm for the French Revolution was a betrayal of what he later saw as a more fundamental theological and personal liberty.

Despite the balanced approach enabled by Keane’s middle-ground position, however, his lengthy effort to theorize it is often unconvincing even to a sympathetic reader, although it does provide a useful and very up-to-date summary of many of the issues in the “culture wars.” Some of this is necessary, since Keane’s emphasis on absences in Coleridge and his effort to historicize the poetry differ in subtle ways from currently dominant methods, and since, unfortunately, his unabashed liberalism is now a minority voice, but he will undoubtedly be cast as either preaching to the choir or betraying the effort to unmask the high romantic argument. Keane recognizes the difference between the subtleties of Derrida, de Man, and McGann on the one hand and the reductive arguments of many of their disciples on the other hand, but he tends to define himself against the shriller voices in deconstruction and New Historicism, often reducing deconstruction to figurative subversion of discursive meaning and Romantic New Historicism to one-sided exposures of political quietism.

Keane’s general argument about the *Rime* is convincing, even if he often hangs far too much on a few isolated images in the poem. The detail with which he traces the events in England and in Coleridge’s life in 1797-98 makes it impossible any longer to think of this tale of guilt, oppression and flight, written by a beleaguered political journalist about to flee to Germany, as apolitical. Many of Keane’s conclusions have been anticipated, as he generously acknowledges; in fact, this book is particularly valuable as an exhaustive and balanced survey of over fifty years of theoretically diverse criticism on this poem. His argument about Coleridge’s annotation of Defoe is far less satisfying, except as a thorough account of Coleridge’s and Defoe’s attitudes toward slavery. He admits that this book might be seen as “an absurd and self-indulgent exercise, written at inordinate length” (5), and while I would not go quite that far, his treatment of Coleridge’s annotation of Defoe does show how difficult it is, especially for an author whose historical sympathies lie more with the presences uncovered by M. H. Abrams than the absences exposed by Levinson, Liu, and others, to construct a sustained argument based on what someone does not say. Instead of an argument, the first section of the book often presents a digressive proliferation of examples and tangential historical information.

At 376 pages of text, this book is indeed “written at inordinate length,” and despite Keane’s long association with the University of Missouri Press, which has published three of his previous books, one would have hoped that the press might have exerted more editorial control. There are a total of five separate prefatory, introductory or context-setting sections, totalling about
121 pages. Thus by the time we get to his detailed discussion of the Rime, Keane has repeated the argument and some of the evidence so often that it is difficult to stay alert for new material in what is ultimately the best section of the book. The extensive summary of previous scholarship is useful on its own, if often distracting to Keane’s argument, but the long summary of modern retellings of Robinson Crusoe, which Keane admits is “an extension of what is already an excursus,” serves no apparent purpose, despite his plea that it “adheres to [his] main theme” (108). If one stays with the author through the discussion of Coleridge’s poem, however, admiring the breadth of the scholarship during his digressions and ignoring his lapses into self-indulgence and arbitrary association (as when he slyly likens Coleridge’s capitulation to Pitt and Providence to “the pseudoreligious confidence of some contemporary academic Marxists” [328]), Coleridge’s Submerged Politics sheds valuable light on the complex relationship between Coleridge’s political and aesthetic lives.

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David P. Haney


The spatial metaphors, fallen and outside, which appear in the titles of these two books locate their shared interest in the constituting of subjectivities, particularly gendered subjectivities, very much at the heart as well as in all the limbs of Victorian culture. Anderson’s book thoughtfully explores the philosophical tensions between idealism and materialism which she contends are crucial to the emergence of “the self,” much as we continue to imagine it. Yet even in this formative moment the sense of the self produces fear of that self’s instability or potential for “fallenness.” Michie, in a uniquely readerly study, focuses more particularly on the interplay of gender with other discourses which constrained or discounted the woman writer.

As suggested by her subtitle, Anderson’s purpose is to show how the fallen woman is, in a sense, one symptom or figure of a far-reaching, ever-changing, often contradictory discourse of fallenness. The fallen woman gains a powerful hold on the social imagination because “depictions of prostitutes and fallen women in Victorian culture typically dramatize predilections of agency and uncertainties about the nature of selfhood, character, and agency” and because the rhetoric of fallenness represents “sexually compromised women as lacking the autonomy and coherence of the normative masculine subject” (1).

Anderson’s study densely intertwines several strands of argument. She
maintains that as the language of fallenness transmuted into an aestheticized and gender-coded narrative, the contrast in the representation between the fallen and unfallen created the effect, the conventions and style of characterization, that came to be called realism. Though I oversimplify the complex working out of this claim, the radical instability and failure of autonomy and self-control that mark the fallen women and proliferate into the more pervasive, abstract state of being, "fallenness," create a contrast with particularized, motivated characters in the text so that the latter appear to be fully formed, coherent selves. Anderson explains, "the fallen woman appears as both hyperdetermined and disturbingly 'false' (painted, melodramatic, histrionic); this portrayal in turn creates an effect of greater verisimilitude around the nonfallen" (10). This opposition would seem to isolate and set aside fallen "others"; however, Anderson asserts that, to the contrary, the very discourses of fallenness that attempted to account for the fallen woman led to unanswerable questions about the nature of identity and selfhood. In particular, mid-Victorian debates about the causes of prostitution such as the urban environment, poverty, the loss of moral or religious guidance, and the failure of self-control exposed fundamental contradictions in theories of character. These contradictions tore at the belief that character—literary or otherwise—could be cultivated, sustained, or recovered through any simple act of will.

In "Mid-Victorian Conceptions of Character, Agency and Reform: Social Science and the 'Great Social Evil,'" a fascinating early chapter, Anderson lays the socio-historical and rhetorical groundwork for the studies of texts by Charles Dickens, Elizabeth Gaskell, D. G. Rossetti, and Elizabeth Barrett Browning that follow. One of Anderson's objectives is to argue that far more gets displaced onto the rhetoric of fallenness than sexual transgression alone. Therefore, she begins by sorting through the incompatibilities between the philosophical traditions of materialism and idealism on which both conceptions of character and reformers' strategies for restoring fallen women's characters depended. She traces Mill's struggles to piece together a version of selfhood and agency from the idealism of Coleridge and Carlyle and the materialism of the Utilitarians; in his unsatisfying solution, the doctrine of philosophical necessity, she discerns his attempt to cut "through the Gordian knot of necessity by asserting that although our characters are determined by circumstances, we ourselves are able to influence those very circumstances that determine us" (25). Mill's desire for moral agency, for the ability to change one's character, leads him to the conception of a self in conflict, a character that exists and a will that desires to modify that character. As Anderson observes, "Mill generates a split self, one part free, one part made" (33). If the self cannot be self-disciplined, Anderson continues, one is "driven by forces that exceed rational consciousness, whether these be external circumstances or internal promptings" (37). In other words, the self is lost, or fallen. Because ideal masculinity was assumed to possess the faculties of rational control and decisive action while femininity was associated with passivity and subservience, femininity inclines women to fallenness and, moreover, fallenness is represented as the antithesis to masculinity. Even more threateningly, "fallenness displaces threats to autonomy and discrete identity, to cherished forms of masculine selfhood. Fallenness, with its insistent em-
phasis on a self driven or fractured by external forces, challenges the very possibility of a self-regulated moral existence” (41).

That most fallen of women, the prostitute, poses additonal problems. In careful, rigorous readings of journalistic and sociological nineteenth-century studies of prostitution, Anderson elaborates how the figure of the prostitute eroded fantasies of self-regulation: the untenable slipperiness of the prostitute’s social or subject position made it impossible to fix her as a victim of society, a spectacle of vice for society, or, most ominously, as a spectator helplessly, self-consciously watching herself fall again and again. The polluting power of her representation as well her self-presentation led social critics to rail against prostitutes in public but, also, to cast the discursive net of fallenness over other degenerate influences from actresses to theatricals to opera to vaudeville. Ultimately, Anderson argues, the prostitute and, by extension, the kinds of fragmented selfhood and social and literary forms that fall in the representational shadow of fallenness are excluded from sympathy and the potential for reform by self-regulation: “the paradigm of subjectivity more generally informing the rhetoric of fallenness itself precludes any conception of sympathetic recognition, insofar as it constructs fallenness along the model of a single subject fractured or driven by systematic forces” (65).

The readings of Dombey and Son, Mary Barton, Ruth, “Jenny,” and Aurora Leigh, and other literary and non-literary texts that comprise the following chapters offer ample evidence of the disturbing distortions of femininity and fiction as they succumb to the rhetoric of fallenness.

The subtle mutation of philosophical arguments over idealism and materialism into assertions about aesthetics and gender also takes prominent place in Elsie Michie’s Outside the Pale: Cultural Exclusion, Gender Difference and the Victorian Woman Writer. Working across the nineteenth century, Michie weaves her argument from strands of public debates about superficially disparate topics—the changing conceptions of art from creation to production, the inflection of masculinity by class differences and the assertion of masculinity through property ownership, the increasingly shrill insistence on British racial superiority by imperialists, and the heightened attention to sexual discrimination against women who sought access to culture and education. One of the great accomplishments which feminist historians and theorists of varied camps have collaboratively achieved has been to show the many interconnected economic, sociological, psychological, and linguistic guises that resistance to women writers assumed in the Victorian period. Michie nudges this project further in two directions. First, she argues that post-structuralist approaches often lead to a dead end by depicting ideological differences as endlessly vacillating, offering little hope of resolution or at least change so that all dreams of agency appear futile. Second, therefore, she locates agency in women writers’ exploitation of multiple discourses, which may not immediately seem to be discourses specifically about gender, and which therefore allowed at least some nineteenth-century women to represent gender, particularly masculinities, in what Michie sees as active refusal or rewriting of discourses that marginalized and discredited femininity and by extension the woman writer. Michie describes this strategy in her introduction: “I have attempted in my analyses always to keep two structuring forces in view: both the particular definition of femininity which positioned each of the women
writers discussed, and another discourse, political, economic, or colonial, which was interconnected with that model of gender difference. This double focus may unsettle the reader since, like the view of the optical illusion, we are more comfortable when we see either one clear image or the other and the overall picture makes sense” (13). Michie’s double focus leads to intriguing arguments for the ways in which, discursively, a writer can circumvent standards and standard bearers. Also, as does Anderson’s study, Michie’s chapters themselves resist generic constraints, scrutinizing personal diaries and letters, journalism, and political, philosophical and economic treatises as well as novels by Mary Shelley, Charles Dickens, Elizabeth Gaskell, Charlotte and Emily Bronte, and George Eliot.

Though these two studies both concentrate attention upon the discourses that constructed the Victorian prostitute, their theoretical approaches diverge. Anderson specifically distinguishes between the rhetorical figuring of fallenness and the social history of living prostitutes; Michie’s emphasis on individual writers and their particular circumstances sometimes calls into question assumptions of the post-structuralists she cites. While critics nervous about biographical claims might raise eyebrows, I found refreshing the movement of chapters back and forth between women writers’ personal relationships with men clearly positioned as authorities in their lives and the public discourses around the topics that dominated the chapters—material production, stereotypes of Irishness or prostitution, Arnoldian culture, and menstruation. Self-consciously rehearsing the dangers of claiming to recover the “personal,” the particular, or the historical incident as existing somehow outside discourse, Michie is nevertheless willing to read public discourses through private relationships. This approach deftly turns seemingly private conflicts into illuminating moments of insight—abstract, cultural shifts Michie calls Victorian symbolic logic. (This approach, in tandem with Michie’s graceful style, also bestows a wonderful reading experience.)

The chapter “‘My Story as My Own Property’: Gaskell, Dickens, and the Rhetoric of Prostitution,” for example, looks at the editorial and increasingly tense personal relationship that developed when Gaskell wrote for Dickens’s *Household Words*. While both of these writers worked closely with former prostitutes, Michie argues that their very different ideas about how to “reform” these women shaped each writer’s attitude toward Gaskell’s professional status as a writer. Dickens promoted an emigration scheme: Gaskell argued for re-integration of fallen women into their communities. Well aware that in the eyes of many readers she was contaminated by her own sympathetic fictional accounts of fallen women, including prostitutes, Gaskell welcomed *Household Words* as a kind of half-way house in which to bolster her own reputation, Michie suggests. However, Dickens and Gaskell’s relationship soured when she grew tired of what she saw as Dickens’s unfair exploitation of her anonymous stories. Michie characterizes Dickens’s use of women’s fiction as analogous to his insistence that prostitutes who entered his and Angela Burdett Coutts’s actual refuge, Urania House, tell their stories to one of the male directors. Moreover, Michie surmises that this tendency of Victorian male reformers to structure and interpret the female prostitute’s experience led to Dickens’s configuration of Gaskell as “the deviant one and him as the patient one who must control or restrain her deviance” (96) when
she resisted his editorial changes or deadlines. This drama is also played out in differences between the two writers’ fictional representations of fallen women, and Michie sees Gaskell’s depiction of Esther in *Mary Barton* and of the main character in *Ruth* as fusions of the dichotomies between health/contagion and purity/dirt into a resistant femininity challenging not just Dickens and not just fantasies about prostitutes but the social formations of femininity which made life maddening for a woman who was a writer.

I focus on this chapter because it suggests how usefully these two studies can be read together: in other chapters Michie complicates previous analyses of the influence of gender on the production and circulation of the Victorian novel and offers her own distinctive account of women writers’ constitution of agency in the face of their exclusion from the marketplace, the networks of publication, the territory defined as art, and even the Victorian concept of culture. As Michie points out, “The problem with the late Victorian concept of culture is, as this essay has repeatedly demonstrated, that while it purports to be open to all, it must, in fact, always define a territory that it excludes” (171). Michie’s book provides an enlightening topography of that territory and of the inroads women writers made into it.

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Teresa Mangum

*Writing After War: American War Fiction from Realism to Postmodernism* by John Limon. New York: Oxford University Press, 1994, Pp. 248. $39.95 (cloth); $16.95 (paper).

John Limon opens *Writing After War* with the confession that he has never seen combat. His experience of war derives exclusively from literature. In this fact, he resembles the American tradition he analyzes, since it overflows with the experiences of noncombatants. Irving’s *Rip Van Winkle* dozes through the Revolutionary War, Howells and James shirk the Civil War, Fitzgerald misses the Great War, Malamud’s *Roy Hobbs* vanishes into oblivion for fifteen years, long enough to avoid World War II. The blank years of Nabokov’s *Lolita*, the interlude called “Dolorès Disparue,” ignore the Korean War. “American novelists,” Limon asserts, “or rather those who define or represent literary periods, keep missing war, which is a first approximation of how war determines American literary history” (7-8).

The same statement might apply to Limon’s study. Innocent of battle, he asks, “What is war?” The answers are various and sometimes contradictory, as if he were trying to see through the literary object to catch a glimpse of the real thing. If narrative happens whenever one object partially blocks the view of another, as Bersani and Dutoit theorize, then *Writing After War* tells the story of how literature blocks the perception of war, how literature somehow “misses” it. This story is both an admission that literature has failed to see war and a nostalgic longing for the one reality it cannot represent.

Limon bases his analysis of American war fiction on two different theoretical premises. I call them “theoretical” because they describe conditions that obtain between war and writing in terms of their essential and unique na-
tures and not in terms of historical vagaries involving intentions and accidents connected to nations, peoples, and persons. The first premise posits an analogy between writing and war: “representation if anything is closer to war than to, for instance, peace, since what is representation but aesthetic violence done to reality? War may sometimes be beautiful, but beauty is always bellicose. Writing is war” (3). The analogy is familiar: recent critical theory has made a business of tracking down the bellicosity of everything formerly thought to be beautiful, especially literature. In general, it describes words as violence done to things. In particular, it describes writing as an alienating structure that subjects human beings. This formulation makes inevitable the parallel between warfare and writing because both represent the writer as powerless: “To imagine war, imagine war imagining you,” Limon decrees. “If war is the subject, we are its object. Who is writing? Hell is writing”(58).

But the analogy pays a price. It blocks the encounter between war and writing. If writing is war, where is the room to maneuver, the differential, by which writing might encounter war? Does war lay waste to writing? Does writing tame warfare? I assume here that war tends toward disorder and writing toward order—not, of course, a certain assumption on the current scene. In short, where are the diversity and uniqueness of writing on war to be located in such an argument? It is perhaps no coincidence that the majority of novels in this study can hardly be called “war fiction.”

Limon’s second premise relies on a different tactic. He argues that literature substitutes other objects for war, often striving to beautify it. The novelists who miss the major conflicts of their times write something other than war fiction. They produce the defining works of certain genres and historical periods: romance, realism, modernism, postmodernism. In this sense, war makes literary history possible, being the object that literature defers. Literature becomes itself by mistranslating warfare into its own proper history. Howells’s literary realism emerges by replacing the conflict of the Civil War with the journalistic debates over realism fought during the labor wars of the 80s. American modernism makes of the Great War a Great Style, disposing of the pre-eminence of content and enthroning an imperial form. “To say that modernists are imperialistic,” Limon claims, “is to say that there is something bellicose about their use of style” (89). For example, according to Limon, Faulkner fulfills his stylistic ambitions only when he stops writing war fiction: “the facts of polluted horizontal life in World War I trenches are converted by Faulkner into the impure elements of his style” (124). Finally, American postwar writers postmodernize combat writing: they are so traumatized by the historical fact of World War II that they are unable to envision a place free of war, and this trauma becomes itself a new battlefield, an interior, psychological wasteland comparable to the torn landscape of the Second World War. In other words, according to Limon, literature substitutes something else for the violence it cannot or does not want to see, while simultaneously imagining this violence as the ultimate reality by which its lamentable and artificial gestures will be judged.

Limon tends to prefer the more satisfying premise that war is hell and that literature beautifies it. This premise is not without its problems, but it does enable his best insights. On the one hand, the premise is problematic because
its conclusions are not so different in the final analysis from those produced by the analogy between war and writing. Here it is not a question of the similarity of war and writing but of their enormous difference. Yet the encounter remains unproductive because war is the one object that literature cannot represent and remain itself. The only way to write about war is not to write about it. Literature once more proves inadequate to the task of representing warfare. The attempt to provide a minimal narration of war, Limon concludes, "is tantamount to replacing one object of fascination with another, guarded secrecy with a mystified eloquence" (7).

On the other hand, the hypothesis that literature transfigures war sparks Limon's most original ideas. His ambition is "to explore, describe, diagnose, and taxonomize . . . all such transfigurations" (7). Most of these transfigurations are beautifications of war. "Art," Limon argues, "has war offer art this bargain: make me beautiful, and I will make you historical. Or: grant me immortality of form, and I will lend you, as the supreme source of this content, death and time" (25). Since the measure of beauty is often human, literature gives aesthetic form to the melee of warfare by emblematizing it as the duel. From Homer onward, literature stabilizes combat to dramatic effect, channeling the terror of its random and violent encounters into the bravado of two adversaries facing one another in a display of character. That violence builds character or makes one a man, rather than killing people, is of course a commonplace justification for warfare, but the aesthetic component of this moral is rarely seen. "Whenever there is a duel," Limon persuasively concludes, "there is the temptation of a metaphorical connection of war with style itself" (99).

Literature, then, diverts the violence of combat into stable representations of human effort and exertion. Limon argues in a series of striking interpretations that sports, competition, and hunting take the place of the ultimate blood sport of warfare. Hemingway's attention to boxing, bullfighting, and fishing reveals his desire for diversion, but what he desired most was diversion from war. The fiction of the Korean and Vietnam eras sublimates warfare in monstrous depictions of play. Thus, the "sports novel" arises as a genre by aestheticizing the violence of war, transforming it into a murderous game. Malamud's *The Natural* includes more brutal misfortune (snapped spines, broken skulls, and gunplay) than major league baseball could suffer in decades. "There is too much bloodshed," Limon notes, "for anyone to assume that baseball is the entire subject" (164). Similarly, Shainberg's *One on One* seems to ignore the Vietnam War, preferring to transfer the individualist ideology of the duel to the basketball court. And yet when references to Vietnam appear in the novel's last chapter, they reveal the historical limit defining both the necessity and impossibility of individuality. Finally, Updike's *Rabbit Redux* wants Rabbit's past basketball stardom to comment on the present reality of Vietnam, but the metaphor breaks down, perhaps because the Vietnam era understands that metaphor enables more than criticizes violence.

The progress of *Writing After War* traces literature's failure to represent the violence of combat, spanning from the early metaphors of duels and games to the collapse of metaphor in the sports novel. The more literature embraces beautiful belligerence, the more it seems to express its own ineptitude before
war. As a result Limon's book never conveys what literature knows about war. In the place of knowledge is confusion, in the place of feelings, blockage. Perhaps this is because Limon never saw combat. Or perhaps confusion and blockage are the inevitable effects of trying to write about war. Whatever the case, readers, like Limon himself, will be left trying to imagine the violent reality that literature puts in the service of its own metaphors. "At the near end of this epoch," Limon summarizes his argument, "the most admired literature has so lost the world as to resemble a technology for sacrificing it. . . . That is only to assert that literature as play, as beautiful contingency in the fields of fate, seeks to resemble what threatens it infinitely" (182).

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Tobin Siebers


On the heels of Darwin, nineteenth-century social scientists began applying the tenets of heritability to all manner of natural phenomena, leading in some cases to unexpected, culturally-influenced and scientifically preposterous conclusions. One of the most intriguing and quixotic applications of Darwinian theory began with breeding experiments on a now-extinct South African zebroid, the quagga, and ended with the formulation of a bogus theory of genetic transmission—"telegony." This theory of "tainted generation" so galvanized scientific and literary circles that it found its way back into works by Darwin and other leading intellectuals of the time.

The bizarre story of the quagga is also the point of departure for Nancy A. Harrowitz's study of the interrelations between anti-Semitism and misogyny at the turn of the century. Moving from the actual quagga to the beast's metaphorization as a sign of uncontrolled difference and tainted heredity, Harrowitz's work explores how two Italian writers, Cesare Lombroso (1835-1909) and Matilde Serao (1856-1927) thematized their own marginalization. Each had occasion to write about both Jews and women, and Harrowitz posits that each manifested subtle betrayals of self-identity—Lombroso as a Jew who disparaged his correligionists and Serao as a newspaper publisher and author who campaigned against women's rights.

In 1893, Lombroso, already a leading criminologist and author of the seminal study Criminal Man (L'uomo delinquente), co-authored a treatise called The Female Offender (La donna delinquente, la prostituta e la donna normale). In it, Lombroso (the principal author) states that the "blind observation of the facts" (19) led him to conclude that women are essentially criminal and immoral, childlike, inferior to men, and capable of greater cruelty. He states, "It is clear that from that innocuous semicriminaloid that is the normal woman, a born-criminal would emerge who is more terrible than any male delinquent" (31). Criminality and sex were also closely intertwined in Lombroso's view, wherein "female offenders," prostitutes and "normal women" repre-
sented three points on the continuum of female development. As Harrowitz comments, “Lombroso makes it clear that the most typical female ‘crime’ is prostitution. The idea that prostitution is criminal behavior is, of course, problematic, but the fact that Lombroso views it as unequivocally so, and that in his analysis prostitution is the female version of crime and all women are latent criminals, makes it likely that it is really women’s sexuality that is on trial” (32-33). Harrowitz also asserts that—his professed “ironclad logic of facts” notwithstanding—what Lombroso “discovered” about women had much less to do with empirical science (even the pseudo-science of anthropometry, which he had at one time endorsed) than with hearsay evidence gleaned from Bible stories, novels, and contemporary aphorism.

Lombroso’s methodological contradictions (including his methodological use of contradiction) led Harrowitz to explore his juxtaposition of women, passion, menstrual blood and the atavistic call of women’s intrinsic criminal nature. This admixture of atavism and constitutionality resurfaced the following year in Lombroso’s Antisemitism e le scienze moderne (Anti-Semitism and the Modern Sciences, 1894). Commissioned as a rebuttal of anti-Semitic prejudices, it instead reveals much about Lombroso’s own ambivalent attitudes toward Judaism—and about himself. As Harrowitz states, “[it] is not an apologia; rather it is a thinly shrouded pretext for attack on different grounds than the ones used by the racialist theorists” (41). In fact, Harrowitz ably shows that the pseudo-genetically-derived theories current at the time were eschewed by Lombroso in favor of his own grounds for reproaching modern Jews: namely, their attachment to reprehensibly atavistic customs (circumcision, ritual baths, phylacteries, matzohs, etc.) and their simultaneous embodiment of the worst defects of modernity. Lombroso concluded that the Jews themselves were responsible for the prejudice against them. Harrowitz explains, “Lombroso’s objections to Jewish practices are based largely on the perception of these practices, in other words, [on] the ways in which cultural and religious difference is made visible and tangible. It is not the writing of the Torah he criticizes, or the role of this text in Judaism, but the fact that these writings are contained within a physical object that can be seen [phylacteries], that marks difference, and that can be ridiculed because of this” (46).

Although Lombroso’s views here may appear vituperous, they should also be seen in the context of the nineteenth-century movement to reform Judaism (evident in Germany, for example, in the person of Rabbi Abraham Geiger and in the Wissenschaft des Judenthums). Many religious Jews at the time also argued against phylacteries and other traditional Jewish rituals, precisely to ameliorate Jewish-Christian relations. Harrowitz omits this historical genealogy in favor of the cultural and psychological analysis provided by Sander Gilman’s Jewish Self-Hatred. In fact, Harrowitz reads the atheistic, Jewish-born Lombroso’s anti-Semitism as a manifestation of self-hatred, or at least “self-denial.” She follows this line of research in a chapter on “Portraits in Self-Abnegation,” dealing with Lombroso, cultural anthropologist Franz Boas, and social theorist Otto Weininger.

The second part of the book deals with Matilde Serao, specifically in relation to three of her “love” novels, Cuore infermo, Addio amore!, and its sequel, Castigo. Harrowitz avers that current interest in Serao resides almost exclu-
sively with “feminist scholars reexamining the work of women writers and their place in the canon” (82). While some see Serao as having “hidden ‘feminist’ tendencies,” Harrowitz places her in a category “as yet not fully articulated or discussed by critics: that of a woman who is highly disparaging of her own gender, who like Lombroso and Weininger takes a problematic distance from her own identity” (82). Indeed, Harrowitz says, “I contend that Serao, as a woman writer, adopts what can be characterized as a patriarchal point of view toward woman while at the same time problematizing her marginalized status” (84).

Serao’s central motif in these three novels, and Harrowitz’s primary locus of analysis, is the theme of passion: passion as the intersection of the physical and the psychic, a harbinger of love, madness and infirmity. “Passion is expressed through illness,” Harrowitz states, “and this malady is very specifically gendered” (91). In a clever sequence, she shows how “passion,” in both its erotic and theological acceptations, is displaced through christological stigmata onto Serao’s suffering heroines. Indeed, Anna, the heroine of Addio amore!, bleeds from the hands.

Serao’s view of marginalized women is “played off against” the additionally marginalized and scapegoated figure of the Jew in works like the verista short story, “Telegrafi dello Stato” (State Telegraph Office) and in the 1913 novel La mano tagliata (The Truncated Hand). This second work, in particular, gives Harrowitz the opportunity to investigate the conflict between race, religion and culture. Following the plot turns of this detective caper/love novel set within the international Jewish set, Harrowitz delineates Serao’s cultural assumptions and anti-Semitic stereotypes, stopping just short of associating the novel with the then-current falsehoods crystalized in The Protocols of the Elders of Zion (see especially Serao’s description of the wealthy, villainous Jewish protagonist, Marcus Henner). Harrowitz instead associates the novel with Serao’s own travel writings about Palestine, Eco’s semiotic discussions of detective fiction, and Gilman’s critiques of pathology and difference, and Jewish self-hatred.

Were Lombroso and Serao anti-Semites and misogynists? Did they betray their own self-identities, either religious or gender-based? All indications in this book seem to point to the affirmative, though Harrowitz stops just short of saying so. Some quibbling is unavoidable: tantalizing mention is made of various groups (“a certain group of Florentine intellectuals,” “some Jewish writers,” etc.), including an intriguingly-named false Messiah, Chesojub, though no details are provided; the book could have benefitted from an introduction, rather than beginning in medias res; and most important, Lombroso’s tendency toward “methodological contradiction” occasionally influences Harrowitz’s approach where one would have instead preferred unambiguous conclusions. Nonetheless, this introductory study of interlinking prejudice in Lombroso and Serao, written in a punchy style, not without traces of humor and linguistic high jinks, and fertile with compelling theories, is a good starting point for future work on the “logic of indifference.” Additionally, the reader’s interest is unlikely to flag in a book peppered with scattered appearances by Havelock Ellis, Bram Stoker, Mary Shelley, James
Joyce, Elias Canetti, Anita Bryant, Phyllis Schlafly and Andrea Dworkin, among others.

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Eloquent Obsessions: Writing Cultural Criticism, edited by Marianna Torgovnick. Durham Duke University Press. Pp. 292. $49.95 (cloth); $17.95 (paper).

The sub-title of Eloquent Obsessions, "Writing Cultural Criticism," raises more questions about the book than it answers. The sub-title has something of a how-to ring to it—like Plumbing-Made-Easy or Twelve-Steps-to-Better-Macrame, as if the book were styling itself as a handy primer. Yet this collection of thirteen essays is neither a guidebook in method nor a survey of the field, unlike another recent anthology that does seek to define approaches, Wild Orchids and Trotsky (1993), edited by Mark Edmundson, one of the contributors to Eloquent Obsessions. An initial impression of Eloquent Obsessions is that of a heady randomness, a bracing variety, from accounts of personal intellectual history to more conventional critical forays, from lively autobiography to trenchant polemic. It is, perhaps, only on second thought, once that impression of randomness settles into a more legibly systematic pattern, that the book's real significance begins to emerge. Although contributors to Eloquent Obsessions routinely treat "cultural criticism" as a redemptively amorphous category—its very openness permitting the hoped-for diversity—a fairly stable conception of just what constitutes "cultural criticism," finally, unifies these essays.

The dust-jacket copy places the anthology in "a tradition of cultural criticism established by writers such as Samuel Johnson, Zora Neale Hurston, Edmund Wilson, Hannah Arendt, or Raymond Williams. . . ." In an accompanying blurb, Morris Dickstein heralds the book as a "marker of the momentous shift away from academic theorizing to a more public, more accessible" criticism by "younger" writers who have "rediscovered the personal voice." This self-definition may well draw a reader up short. Was, then, the "theorizing" of Raymond Williams not "academic"? Are we, then, distinguishing the smoking-jacketed, man-of-letters Wilson, purveying bookchat in the New Yorker, from the stuffy pedant of Patriotic Gore? Just what "established" "tradition" are we talking about here? Clearly, the rhetoric surrounding the book's project is that of "rediscovery," of a return to anterior dispositions, requiring the disavowal of egg-headed obscurantism and the recuperation of what, to judge from the line-up above (a condensed version of a longer but equally antic list of precursors the editor recites in the introduction), looks a little like a Great-Tradition with slight progressive modification—even the loftily DWM Dr. Johnson is not, in this context, beyond redemption.

In her introduction to the collection, Marianna Torgovnick asserts the experiential basis of the collected pieces, again by contrasting them with what she contemptuously constructs as standard academic practices. As against a generalized body of academic writing implicitly labeled irrelevant, Torgov-
nick counterposes these essays as exemplary of “passion” and “conviction”: “Writing cultural criticism involves not wild or strange obsessions, but eloquent ones—examined, reasoned, persuasive and shaped” (1). Some form of demonology is at work here: Whose obsessions, if not these, are “wild” or “strange”? Those, say, of the spectral figure Gerald Graff conjures up in his essay, an academic drudge scribbling away on a dissertation about the passive voice in Old Icelandic (211)? But no, the problem with academic writing is that it lacks such passion, as in this characterization of academic style by Torgovnick: “The coolness, the aloofness (dare I say the tedium?) . . .” (2).

An academic pedant of the type this volume pointedly excommunicates might point out that such opposition of the “personal” and the “academic” relies upon a repression of some of the institutional forces that determine much contemporary critical writing. By her account, Torgovnick’s contributors have pursued their eloquent obsessions not because they had to produce something in order to get tenure, but because they were driven to do so by convictions and passions that transcended careerist aspirations. At the same time, interestingly, a number of the essays locate themselves in a central tradition of academic cultural criticism by examining, precisely, the relation between institutions and the kinds of cultural representations they produce. For example, Nancy K. Miller’s “Decades” traces the academic institutionalization of feminism from the 1960s to the 1990s, examining shifting assumptions of feminist writing and changes attendant upon this process in women’s personal status in the academy. Like Torgovnick, Miller too draws upon a rhetoric of the “personal”: “I sometimes long for the conviction we had then that changing the language counted for something” (38). But she presents the institutionalization of women’s studies as a historical process of social and ideological legitimation: “. . . [I]t seemed to me . . . that the rise of feminist scholarship as an institutional force derived at least in part from the sense of self-, but finally, collective-authorization that ‘working on women’ provided” (41). Other essays examine institutions such as the museum, as in Henry Sayre’s “Pursuing Authenticity” and Aldona Jonaitis and Richard Inglis’s “Power, History, and Authenticity”; the university, as in Gerald Graff’s “Academic Writing and the Uses of Bad Publicity” or Mark Edmundson’s “Ideology, Energy and Cultural Criticism”; or more locally, the National Geographic Society, as in Jane Collins and Catherine Lutz’s “Becoming America’s Lens on the World.” In each of these cases, the writer addresses in some way the institution’s role in shaping representation. As Jonaitis and Inglis argue, “Museums themselves . . . significantly influence the message offered by their exhibits” (162). Such claims will not come as news to readers of, say, Cultural Critique or Representations, and these essays tend to define “cultural criticism” in unsurprising ways: it is interdisciplinary; it addresses texts in their cultural contexts, or takes the culture itself as a text for analysis; it adopts the rhetoric of critical theory to make its points. However critical some of these essays may be of academic discourse, they appear to see their project as growing out of and participating in that discourse rather than supplanting or opposing it.

But those essays, at least to judge from Torgovnick’s introduction and the book’s apparent self-definition, are not what this book is finally about. The essays that form something like the core of the book are Miller’s, Alice
Yeager Kaplan's "The American Stranger," Cathy N. Davidson's "Tatami Room," and Torgovnick's own piece, "The Politics of the 'We.'" When in the introduction Torgovnick enjoins the reader to "listen to the voices in and behind the essays" (4), these are the essays, rather than the collection's more impersonal, conventionally academic pieces, to which she is manifestly referring. If the book really does herald "the momentous shift from academic theorizing," these are the pieces that will put it on the cult-crit map. What they have in common is an autobiographical structure, a commitment to the local and the specific, and a speculative though observation-bound approach. Kaplan's treatment of the reception-history of Camus's The Stranger in the United States, for instance, proffers as chief evidence interviews with people Kaplan knows. Torgovnick's essay on the use of "we" in public discourse places her graduate school encounters with Lionel Trilling against her status as an Italian American woman outside Trilling's "we." Especially in the latter case, the implication is that a repression of personal circumstance, of contingencies of self-hood, produces skewed cultural history. According to Torgovnick, Trilling's "we" "betray the spirit of the first-person at both levels": "It offers the bribe of authority and tradition, and the security of belonging—but at the cost of losing touch with the 'I' behind the 'we.'" It establishes false alliances that cover up the writer's sense of isolation or pain. It coerces and assumes agreement of the 'you' it addresses. And it masks the multifaceted complexity of group identities" (264). Yet, despite the assimilationist leveling of Trilling's "we," masking the specificity even of Trilling's own Jewish identity, Torgovnick cannot reject Trilling as a model for writing cultural criticism because his admirably "public voice" had "the ability to make educated people...care about phenomena like Austen's Mansfield Park and the nature of the modern self" (269). Torgovnick does not, regrettably, take up the relation between that "public voice" and the problematic "we": Is such quest for a "public voice" in some way dependent on repression of cultural difference?

The implication that the political is personal, in a neat reversal of the counterculture slogan, has informed much recent criticism which attempts to integrate post-structuralist critique of subjectivity with questions of identity-politics the former might have been supposed to obviate. What is disturbing about Eloquent Obsessions is the extent to which these terms are posited in either/or conditions: Either you're consigned to the study reading Foucault or you're out in the streets raising consciousness—"making a difference," as Torgovnick declaims in an unwitting echo of Nancy Reagan's war-on-drugs bluster. Just say no to theory, is the apparent idea—for indeed, this volume finds, in the end, that it can construct the "personal" as the province of local observation and specified-thenceforth-recovered subjectivities only by insulating it from an opposed and encroaching domain—that of the general, the universal, the abstract, the theoretical. Thus, in the introduction, Torgovnick ridicules post-structuralism by assembling a little gallery of straw-people whose dis-passionate, conviction-less, in-eloquent obsessions give rise to all that knee-jerk tedium Torgovnick doesn't like having to read: "Asked 'Why are you writing on this topic?' writers in this volume would be unlikely to respond: because Foucault showed its importance in systems of domination and control; because it's a hot topic right now; because I need to write some-
thing . . .” (1). Elsewhere in the volume, Alice Yeager Kaplan seeks to rescue Camus from his subjection to the generality of theory at the hands of Julia Kristeva, via a reinstatement of previously denied specificity: “It doesn’t matter, [Kristeva] writes, that Meursault killed an Arab—it could have been anyone. Meursault, not the Arab, is the figure of foreignness in her reading. But if the identity of Meursault’s victim doesn’t matter, L’Etranger is in danger of becoming a symbolic monument to foreignness, without the political specificity that race and class convey” (11). Mark Edmundson’s essay critiques appropriations of the concept of “ideology” in cultural criticism, arguing for the installation of a “pragmatic Marxism” that would have no need of such airy concepts:

A pragmatic Marxism might, to point to one specific possibility, have the effect of producing fewer well-armored theorists and more Christopher Hitchens-type intellectual journalists . . . [Hitchens] has read history, and in particular American history; has versed himself in nonglamorous sorts of matters, like the committee protocols of our legislature and our national political parties; writes extremely well, with a large range of literary reference; and has a gift for getting mad not about Capitalism and Exploitation and Repression, but about S&L crooks, Bush’s “tilt” toward Iraq . . . (228-29)

One need not note the peculiar dynamic by which “ideology” comes to function in Edmundson’s essay as a code word for theory-as-such to see how the praise of Hitchens reveals in a kind of negative dialectic all that, for Edmundson, theory fails to do: read history, verse itself in nonglamorous such-and-such, write well, or get mad. Here again, as in Kaplan, the preferred mode—that of Edmundson’s Harper’s colleague Hitchens—is valued for its greater specificity, trading in “specific events, current issues” instead of the windy abstractions of “high theory” (229). (But have I missed something? Are the “S&L crooks” not related somehow to Capitalism?)

Even the essays in the book not engaged in a kind of fervent disavowal of theory-as-such often arrive at conclusions that, it is implied, theory-as-such would not have permitted them to draw. Sayre’s “Pursuing Authenticity” is an interesting example. One of the more conventionally academic essays in the book, Sayre’s piece on contemporary art begins with a move characteristic of a 1980s academic style that might have dismissed Cathy Davidson’s essay, say, as “belles-lettres”; he chides another critic for theoretical imprecision: “Gablick’s uncritical use of the word ‘authentic’ is, in part, what I want to consider here” (106). The essay traces the theoretical status of the “authentic” by way of a round-up of the Usual Suspects—Barthes, Benjamin, Hal Foster, Houston Baker. Not surprisingly, the “authentic” is judged in inviable concept. But Sayre ends, in a maneuver more in keeping with the rest of the book, with a gesture of recovery. If theory denies us the category of “authenticity,” we can still perhaps continue to celebrate the testamentary uses of representation by countering authenticity with a term theory has not yet discredited: “The act of creation, of personal expression, is no longer an originary act—that is, a first instance; its is, rather, exemplary—worth saving, worth repeating. It has the authority of evidence . . .” (125). Jane Tompkins’s
piece on *Dances with Wolves* and *Iron John* similarly addresses a topic to which theory-as-such might not be hospitable: *feelings*, specifically men’s feelings. Where “high theory” would likely produce readings of these texts as insidious reinforcements of the patriarchy they claim to modify (which, I hasten to add, is what they are), Tompkins, from some point blissfully beyond theory, declares them “new myths for men to live by” that “deserve our attention and respect because they offer men in our society new ways to heal their unacknowledged suffering” (98).

*Does* this book signal “the momentous shift” from “academic theorizing”? Certainly its appearance reveals something about the current institutional situation of theory-as-such. *Eloquent Obsessions* was first published as a special number of *South Atlantic Quarterly*, Duke University’s nationally-distributed faculty publication. Thus, the department most closely identified with the rise of theory in the 1980s academy has now produced a volume that presents itself as the alternative to that very development. To be sure, this book must be seen in the context of a number of recent books by Duke faculty that oppose variously renewed relations to the “personal” against theory-as-such. There are, first, the memoirs by contributors to this book, Kaplan’s *French Lessons* (1993), Davidson’s *Thirty-six Views of Mount Fuji* (1993), and Torgovnick’s *Crossing Ocean Parkway* (1994). There is the similarly autobiographical *The Edge of Night* (1993) by Frank Lentricchia, editor of *South Atlantic Quarterly*. Then there are Stanley Fish’s recent calls for a more “public” academic discourse, echoing Gerald Graff’s essay in *Eloquent Obsessions*. The dispositions of *Eloquent Obsessions*, of course, have their institutional grounding just as has the proliferation of theory. Most of the “younger critics” collected here (younger than whom? Samuel Wilson?) wrote earlier theory-laden books before the security of tenure allowed them to shrug off the shackles of academy-speak. In this context, though, the gestures of “recovery” *Eloquent Obsessions* enact must also be seen as gestures of renunciation. As it tries to disengage “cultural criticism” from “critical theory,” the book invests considerable energy in avoiding the consequently potential pit-falls of anti-intellectualism or retrograde postures. Such avoidance requires only thinking rigorously and progressively, as most of the contributors to *Eloquent Obsessions* do. Still, the project is disturbing. Must we really choose between the personal and the theoretical? To achieve a “public” voice, must we too construct “high theory” as the inmost den of narcissistic subjectivity, or as the threatening Symbolic that forever intrudes upon our Imaginary pleasures?

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There is an old tradition in English cricket, one that should have been rendered anachronistic decades ago but was still observed as recently as the 1970’s. It is the annual game between the Players and the Gentlemen, a cricket match in which the best Professionals opposed the finest Amateurs at
Lords, the sport's international headquarters. The amateurs were cricketers who hailed from the English ruling classes and, after collecting their Oxbridge degrees and their cricket colors, played the game purely for enjoyment. Unlike the professionals, working-class men who depended on the game for their livelihood, the amateurs received no renumeration. The gentlemen, however, received their cricketing perks in other ways. They accrued cultural and political authority by being appointed captains of their county teams and the national team was invariably selected by former amateurs. Needless to say, England was skippered by an amateur. (Of course, at the end of a sports career the gentlemen had a respectable profession to take up while the player's options were reduced to staying in the game in another capacity—as coach or groundsman—or reintegrating himself into working class life.) Amateurism, the opportunity to play cricket simply out of a love and passion for the game, is not a purer form of participation but the result of the gentlemen's historical privilege. As a result, the amateur is strategically situated in and a beneficiary of the machinations of cricket's power structures.

A conception of amateurism as an impure status is instructive for a reading of Edward Said's latest book, *The Representation of the Intellectual*, because this work turns so much on an understanding of the intellectual as amateur. *Representations of the Intellectual*, a treatise on the responsibility of the intellectual in our times, marks the publication of Said's 1993 Reith Lectures. Inaugurated with Bertrand Russell's address in 1948, the Reith Lectures are an annual event in which the radio division of the British Broadcasting Corporation invites a noted figure to present a series of talks on intellectual matters. Composed of six essays, *Representations of the Intellectual* maps the role of the contemporary thinker in a complex of ways: through the contours of nationalism, exile, and the professional/amateur split. Said, however, is most concerned with the processes which enable intellectuals to "speak truth to power." The organizing theme of his 1993 lectures, then, was an engagement with the "public role of the intellectual as outsider, 'amateur,' and disturber of the status quo" (x). Said's positing of the intellectual as a marginal figure is motivated by the intention to rethink the role of the contemporary intellectual.

Amateurism, in Said's terms, is a quality the contemporary intellectual cannot function without in our society. Characterized by a "desire to be moved not by profit or reward but by love and unquenchable interest in the larger picture, in making connections across lines and barriers, in refusing to be tied down to a specialty, in caring for ideas and values despite the restrictions of a professional" (76), the intellectual as amateur stands in contradistinction to the intellectual as professional. Here is a thinker who is endemically compromised by the condition of working as a professional in "universities that pay salaries, political parties that demand loyalty to a party line, think tanks that while they offer freedom to do research perhaps more subtly compromise judgement and restrain the critical voice" (67). The amateur intellectual, who is not affiliated to any of these institutions, obtains—and maintains—the "critical voice" which the professional intellectual cedes to these powerful social structures. The university, the political party and the think tank do not have a purchase on the amateur.
In our postmodern world, however, where most intellectuals are compelled to be specialists and professionals affiliated with public institutions, be it the university or the multinational corporation (a category which by no means excludes the university), it takes a considerable leap of political and critical faith to envisage a thinker who can stand outside the constraints of financial dependence and ideological commensurability. Yet is is only through this representation, the intellectual committed to the “virtues of outsiderhood” (107), that Said believes thinkers can perform their critical function in our society. Outsiderhood, a location beyond the “mainstream, unaccommodated, unco-opted, resistant,” engenders in intellectuals a critique of “patriotic nationalism, corporate thinking, and a sense of class, racial or gender privilege” (52, xiii). While Said never suggests that attacks on these ideologies and privileges cannot be made from other sites, his argument is premised upon the notion that marginality sharpens and intensifies the intellectual’s critical acumen. It is in this regard that Said’s conception of the amateur has its greatest salience and pertinence.

The trope of marginality is a prominent one in Representations of the Intellectual. Not only is outsiderhood metaphorically and literally presented as the ideal position for the intellectual, but this conception is given historical substance by the figure of the exiled thinker. In one of the pivotal chapters, “Intellectual Exile: Expatriates and Marginals,” Said recalls the travails and successes of thinkers such as Adorno, Cavafy, Jonathan Swift and C.L.R. James in order to represent the signal vantage point that marginality affords. It should be pointed out here that Said’s explanation of James’s intellectual trajectory is incorrect. The Trinidadian did not come to “England as a cricketer.” He came to the metropolis to pursue his ambitions as a creative writer. His journey to England, however, was sponsored by a cricketer—Learie Constantine. While James did play some cricket in England, it was for recreational purposes only. The Trinidadian made his mark on the game as a critic of the sport. Borrowing a phrase on exile from the West Indian novelist George Lamming, Said ponders with a tempered lyricism on the experience. The “pleasures of exile,” Said writes, “those different arrangements of living and eccentric angles of vision that it can sometimes afford, which enliven the intellectual’s vocation, without perhaps alleviating every last anxiety or feeling of bitter solitude” (59). However, despite the unusual though painful benefits that accrue to the marginal(ized) thinker, we cannot forget that without a secure public positioning (which often requires professional accreditation of some sort), both the exiled and the amateur intellectual will find it difficult to speak to a broad public. They will find it hard to champion the cause of the “poor, the disadvantaged, the voiceless, the unrepresented” (113), the primary constituencies to which Said’s intellectuals are committed. Standing as they do on the outside of the socio-political arrangement, we might ask of Said’s thinkers: From what public base will the amateur intellectual make interventions in the public sphere? How stable and influential is that base? How effective will those interventions be? How can the amateur intellectual sustain herself materially? Indeed, is it possible to be an amateur intellectual in our times? Apart from the last enquiry, which is affirmatively answered, the questions relating to the effects of context are only nominally engaged in Representations of the Intellectual.
Any engagement with the dominant order intellectuals make has to take cognisance of its coercive and co-optive capabilities. The amateur has, in a crucial sense, to be a professional of sorts—a professional skilled both in the arts of sly civility and confrontation. These two strategies are vital to the amateur in that they will increase the intellectual's ability to combat and transform the status quo. Moreover, these battles can only be effectively conducted if the amateur recognizes the extent to which he or she is shaped by and implicated in, the dominant order. If Said's amateurism is to have any purchase on our times, it has to be simultaneously amended (in order to speak more efficaciously to the demands of our moment) and unchanging (as envisioned in *Representations of the Intellectual*). It has to engage the specifics of our historical conjuncture and explain why distance from the power structures is definitive for the intellectual. After all, the nearer to the status quo the thinker, the less the room for intellectual mobility, ingenuity and critique; the further removed, the greater the capacity for these possibilities.

Said's idealism and his belief in the capacity of the intellectual to be a crucial agent of change is a manifesto out of sync with the cynical tenor of our times. Said's argument is compelling because of his conviction and his determination to occupy nothing less than the moral high ground. "The central fact for me is," he maintains, "that the intellectual is an individual endowed with a faculty for representing, embodying, articulating a message, a view, an attitude, philosophy or opinion to, as well as for, a public. And this role has an edge to it, and cannot be played without a sense of someone whose place it is publicly to raise embarrassing questions, to confront orthodoxy and dogma (rather than produce them) . . ." (11). The esteemed role Said assigns intellectuals is admirable in a moment where fewer and fewer people participate in the democratic process and when they do find themselves confronted with what amounts to Hobson's choice. Since neither of the alternatives is particularly palatable, voters invariably find themselves choosing between "orthodoxies and dogmas." Even in those sites, South Africa, Palestine and Ireland, where leftist intellectuals over the last three decades have courageously asked "embarrassing questions" and advocated "philosophies" of justice, equality, tolerance and respect for humanity, the resolutions to the conflicts—or those in process—foster cynicism rather than replenish our faith in transcendent political principles.

In *Representations of the Intellectual*, however, outsiderhood is an ambivalent location. On the one hand, it indicates a skeptical remove from the institutions of power; on the other hand, it proposes an organic relationship with the embattled communities in that society. Said's model of outsiderhood or marginality, derives from the mapping of an unlikely theoretical hybrid: the merging of Antonio Gramsci with Julien Benda. As progenitors of intellectual schools go, the Italian communist and the French *philosophe* represent diametrically opposed positions. Gramsci's *The Prison Notebooks* is accepted as a handbook for the engaged revolutionary while Benda's *La Trahison des Clercs (The Treason of the Intellectuals)* is regarded as an endorsement of the reactionary status quo. In Gramsci's terms, the intellectual must be aligned organically with the oppressed and exploited; for Benda, the intellectual occupies an elevated position far removed from the clamor of everyday experi-
ence. If Gramsci's intellectual is understood as a committed activist, then Benda's is the learned, cloistered scholar in search of immortal truths and transcendent values.

*Representations of the Intellectual* marks the coupling of these divergent models in an unexpectedly successful hybrid. Said's intellectual—and ideological—cross-fertilization proves efficacious because he is able to combine, in unequal measures, Gramsci's capacity for oppositionality with Benda's appetite for "metaphysical passion and disinterested principles of justice" (6). "Representations of the Intellectual," the lead essay in Said's book, lays the theoretical foundations of the work by setting up the dialectic between *The Prison Notebooks* and *The Treason of the Intellectuals*. However, as much as *Representations of the Intellectual* relies on *The Prison Notebooks* notion of the intellectual as a radical left figure, the text rather glosses Gramsci—he is a relied upon but not an extensively referenced presence. We are, in any case, dealing with a specific reading of "The Formation of Intellectuals," Gramsci's seminal essay on the subject. Said is less concerned with the Italian communist's claim that "all men (sic) are intellectuals" than he is with Gramsci's distinction between the organic and the traditional intellectual. Developments in the "late twentieth century," Said writes, when so many new professions—broadcasters, academic professionals, computer analysts, sports and media lawyers, management consultants, policy experts ... have vindicated Gramsci's vision" (8) of the intellectual as organic to and irreplaceable by several social organs.

*Representations of the Intellectual* thrives on the rendering of Benda's clerics as a constituency which is not only in a "state of almost permanent opposition to the status quo" (7), but is also a grouping so invested in its social role as to regard "no worldly power [as] too big and imposing to be criticized." The brave and boldly confrontational amateur throws into sharp relief the insufficiently critical professional. There is a compelling urgency about Said's argument. Unless intellectuals refashion themselves and take seriously their responsibilities ("There has been no major revolution in modern history without intellectuals; conversely there has been no major counterrevolutionary movement without intellectuals."), a historically invaluable space for political intervention will be, if not lost, then drastically reduced.

The conversation between Gramsci and Benda which Said facilitates provokes a reconsideration of where and how the intellectual locates her/himself. *Representations of the Intellectual* provides a significant set of questions about the contemporary intellectual. As it stands, however, Said's model of the intellectual as amateur, a thinker unfettered and uncompromised by materiality, has to map the contours of our context if it is to be at all usable and not simply an intriguing theoretical possibility—a tendency uncharacteristic of Said. By attending to the attractions, distractions, rewards, lures and specializations of the late twentieth century, the model can be reworked so that Said's charge to intellectuals to radically change our world can be taken up with vigor. This critique, paradoxically, marks a return to Said's founding premise: that the intellectual is a man or woman passionately committed to social transformation, regardless of the costs.