
The “death of the subject” heralded in poststructuralist theory challenges some pivotal assumptions in the philosophy of emotion. Most pointedly, we are led to ask whether the subject, whose presence is no longer assured, is nonetheless necessary to “do” the feeling. Rei Terada responds to this question firmly and in detail: not only is emotion not “subjective,” she argues, but “we would have no emotions if we were subjects” (4). From her perspective, we have clearly crossed the divide: the death of subjectivity is secure. But, its demise has left emotional experience dangling somewhere between intellectual desiccation and nostalgic reversion to the ‘expressive hypothesis.’ Terada’s objective is to replace that hypothesis with a discourse of emotion that is faithful to the pathos of Derrida’s deconstruction of presence and de Man’s deconstruction of prosopopeia.

The path toward that replacement is restlessly traveled, passing through the territory of scholars as diverse as Daniel Dennett, Ronald de Sousa, Edmund Husserl, Gilles Deleuze, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and, of course, Jacques Derrida and Paul de Man. Such breadth has risks: it is not easy to coordinate these diverse forms of scholarship, and the occasional missteps along the way are worrisome. For example, to frame the issue, Terada refers in passing to psychological research by Schacter and Singer, suggesting that Husserl was a “precursor” to their “content approach” to emotion. Not only would these neo-positivistic authors be stunned to learn of their imputed phenomenological heritage, but Terada assimilates their concern with the labelling of feeling sensations (e.g., as “anger”) to her own concern with the intentionality of feeling acts (e.g., what anger is “about”). And yet, there are, to this reviewer’s knowledge, very few such missteps in this volume; in general the author’s arguments are effectively grounded—and documented—in relevant sources.

Terada begins by revisiting the Derridean critique of Husserl’s phenomenological account of the living present. Her reinstatement of that critique may be difficult for a reader not independently versed in the subtitles of Derrida’s Speech and Phenomena (trans. David Allison [Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1973/1967]), and it may seem presumptive to a reader who is not already acquainted with Derrida’s explication of self-distribution (cf. Leonard Lawlor, Derrida and Husserl [Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 2002]). Nonetheless, this reinstatement is critical to Terada’s objectives. Husserl’s description of the immediacy of auto-affective subjectivity is contrasted with Derrida’s account of the contamination of auto-affective interiority by exteriority; Husserl’s description of the expression of ideality within subjectivity is contrasted with Derrida’s account of the self-differential non-immediacy of
re-presentation; and, most importantly, Husserl’s portrayal of the idealized expression of emotion is contrasted with the pathos that seems inevitable within the self-differential non-immediacy of re-presentation. “Emotion demands virtual self-difference—an extra ‘you’” (31), concludes Terada, opening the way to consideration of fictive courage within Kant’s version of the sublime, the virtual “you” within Rousseau’s discussion of theatrical imagination, and the personified tropes within de Man’s portrayal of the nominative force of emotion.

The realm of analogy, metaphor, and irony opened by Derrida’s discussion of pathos becomes the site for Terada’s articulation, primarily through de Man’s Allegories of Reading, of different types of self-differential emotion. Fear, she argues, is the flight from suspended meaning, from figural distrust, toward literal (or faux-figural) reference to a locus of “danger.” Love, similarly, is the flight from vacillation between ipseity and alterity toward the literal (or faux-literal) identification of a “beloved.” In general, Terada argues, emotion is the gradual resolution of nameless uncertainty through nominative acts, a tropological shift—or, more precisely, flight—from fictive to more nearly literal meaning.

The character of this shift locates emotion within the realm of bad faith or, despite its self-centering connotations, self-deception. “Interest” (63) and “deception” (63), phrases that can be (and, in Terada’s text, occasionally are) self-referential (e.g., self-interest, self-deception), suggest the displaced reconstruction of an egoic centre that purposively and deceptively acts. And yet, the figurative “flight” from pathos that Terada posits seems to betray the (plural?) self-relational nuances that would warrant the language of self-deception. This dilemma becomes especially salient when considering that “particularly bizarre corner of de Man’s world in which personified concepts and figures go around deceiving themselves and one another in a kind of masked ball for abstractions” (66). Personifications within this theatre remain figuratively related, but it is unclear whether these figurative relations support the attribution of self-deception, i.e., of one egoic center “deceiving” another (cf. Fingarette, Self-deception [London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1969]). To complete her account of personified emotions, an equally nuanced discussion of self-deception—and of the possibility of its allegorical “undoing”—seems necessary.

After presenting the basic form of her theory, Terada examines several other theories that vary in their “openness to nonsubjective emotion” (91). She works her way through selected aspects of the work of Peter Kivy (the difficulty of identifying the subjective locus of the expressiveness of music), Ronald de Sousa (the challenge of reconciling singular emotions with the iterability of intentionality), Daniel Dennett (the materialist struggle to provide a cognitive model of emotional qualia without a subjective witness), and Deleuze (the effort to spell out a nonsubjective conception of expression). This
phase in Terada’s discussion provides the kind of clarification that emerges through comparison, primarily in the form of contrasts between these authors’ perspectives and her own.

However, these comparisons seem to postpone pursuit of the author’s primary objectives. And later she does return to her own primary enterprise by reviewing Derrida’s *Memoires for Paul de Man*. Here she persuasively demonstrates and documents the self-distributed thinking that generates unspeakable grief. Her discussion of responsibility, of how to say “come” and to answer the “come” of the other, makes present, however tentatively, the fecundity of a conversation that is infinitely open because “interlocking internal divisions turn each thesis toward its antithesis” (146). Her discussion exemplifies but does not yet articulate a response to the complications that her theory presents for subject-centred accounts of sincerity, authenticity, and integrity. Without the forced oppositions and affected polysemy of some deconstructionist writing, these pages compellingly demonstrate the lively pathos that has no determinate locus but that allows the personifications of psyche and prosopopoeia reciprocally to enhance rather than obscure each other.

Don Kuiken  
*University of Alberta*


David Simpson knows that he has assigned himself a difficult task. By writing a book about “situatedness” he courts the danger of writing “a book about everything” (4). For “situatedness” carries with it “nothing less than the entire predicament of being in the world” (9)—the questions of how the various biological and social contexts we occupy do or do not determine who we are, what we think, and what we do. One of Simpson’s aids in organizing this huge subject is the “azza sentence” (41–47), a familiar act of preemptive self-definition such as: “As a post-colonial feminist ethnographer, I . . . .”. The speaker of the azza sentence combines a necessary humility with a residual claim of authority: Because no one can claim a transcendent position, those who use the azza acknowledge that their authority emerges from a particular, limited position that shapes who they are and bounds what they know. But within that realm their authority is credible. While honoring the progressive impulse behind the azza and rejecting nostalgia for objective knowledge,
Simpson relentlessly exposes the appeal to situatedness as a symptom rather than a solution to the epistemological and political crises that dog us.

In this effort, he devotes a chapter each to law, sociology, literature, and philosophy, moving without pomposity or clotted prose from Clarence Darrow’s defense of Leopold and Loeb to John Stuart Mill’s conflicted wish for a probabilistic social science and individual liberty to Sartre’s uneasy intertwining of biography and philosophy in his studies of Flaubert and Stalin. Along with remarkable erudition, wit is another of the book’s many strengths. See, for instance, his pithy summary of Seyla Benhabib’s recourse to dialogue within radically situated communities as a way of avoiding Cartesian individualism while preserving individual agency and rationalism: “‘We are, therefore, I think’” (203).

What links all of these cases is what Simpson calls an “aporia” of situatedness. Situatedness promises knowledge but in practice leaves us in a cloud of unknowing about our place in the world. This is because we have certain knowledge neither about the degree to which various forces may be shaping us nor how individual agency can be squared with these determinations. So although the rise of the azza sentence may register our wish for a life free of the difficulties of knowing in a world without master narratives (204), it is merely a wish. The ubiquity of this desire suggests an instability in the entity who is both the effect and the justification of our political and economic systems—“his majesty the subject” (9). That instability, in turn, may betoken some profound change on the horizon.

Up to this point, it’s a persuasive account, and that is saying a great deal. But Simpson is less satisfying when specifying the nature of this stress and the change it portends. The problem can be traced to how Simpson presents a discourse featured in Simpson’s previous book as well as in this one—literature. In The Academic Postmodern and the Rule of Literature (1995), he interrogated the turn by philosophy, anthropology, and other discourses toward anecdote, autobiography, and other literary modes. Although he tended in that book to present literature primarily as a signifier of cultural capital, he also allowed that “literature has never quite managed to set itself off from the demotic narratives that provide its not-so-binary antagonists” (see The Academic Postmodern and the Rule of Literature: A Report on Half-Knowledge [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995], 18). In Situatedness, however, literature is revealed as merely one of many vehicles for the aporia of situatedness and thus “may have no more or less to teach us than other forms of inquiry” (144). His “bold statement” is that literature’s “purpose, consciously or otherwise, has been the cultivation of aporia,” for it “represents situatedness while sidestepping or denying the urge to solve or factor it out in exact or limiting terms” (142; 121).

But the readings that result from this claim seem less than bold. To cite
two instances, the interpretation of Robinson Crusoe seems little more than an
elegant restatement of the hoary “individual-vs-society” structure and the as-
sertion that The Prelude cannot account for the self because it is always de-
ferred by the writing of the self seems little more than a basic post-
structuralism Simpson exceeded in his own earlier works, like Irony and Au-

The more serious problem is that Simpson’s approach flattens the pasts,
prese nts, and potential futures of different discourses. This is perhaps to be
expected in a book emphasizing a phenomenon larger than any particular dis-
course. Still, this treatment of literature works against his stated goal of fig-
uring out how we might think past the knot of situatedness. Doesn’t it matter
that, in comparison to literary theory or sociology, literature has been perme-
ated and even perforated by forms of knowledge and value that may provide
different takes on “situatedness”—say, in the Songs of Blake or “the Sorrow
Songs” in W. E. B. DuBois’s The Souls of Black Folk? Doesn’t it make sense to
highlight the fact that literature underscores aporia while tort law simply de-
nies it and the phenomenology of Husserl seeks to solve it too quickly?

For Simpson the answer is, in the end, “no.” All discourses are equally
complicit in disabling us from solving the riddle of situatedness. His stance is
due in part to an admirable skepticism toward the power accorded to the li-
terary by recent literary theory. But it is also due, I think, to a murkiness concern-
ing: 1) the relationship of any particular discourse to power and 2) the
ontology of what rigs the game of situatedness to make it seem as if “[l]ife re-
quires the withholding of truth.” (130).

What is it that requires this ignorance so that we might live? The answer
appears to be “modernity” itself: “[M]odernity’s vocation has only pretended
to be the solution of the questions arising from situatedness. Its real goal,
which it has achieved very well in the liberal-democratic nation-states, has
been the management of extremes, the setting of limits to the more dangerous
ergies of a risk culture that is fundamentally committed to the positive eval-
uation of those same risks for its own purposes” (144). The key phrase, “risk
culture,” is drawn from Ulrich Beck’s Risk Society. Frequently cited by Simp-
son, it holds that the complexity of modern life vitiates the purchase that indi-
viduals have on what controls their lives. And yet that very system teaches us
to believe individual choices do make a profound difference. The name of that
system is “capitalism, or late capitalism, or liberal democracy, or mod-
ernity—it is something of each of these” (191). On one hand, “modernity” re-
quires “a manageable citizenry” to whom it must deny “access to ideas about
radical self-determination” (193). On the other, it must value various forms of
the motility required by global capital. It must deterritorialize tradition and
celebrate the entrepreneur currently starring in financial pages and stump
speeches, not to mention school curricula.
Here, though, we may see the revenge of the literary in one of its most familiar tropes—personification. For (to indulge in a bit of basic post-structuralism myself) the “modernity” that Simpson conjures seems awfully close to a personification—armed with the will-to-power necessary to animate subjects to think of themselves as persons fully endowed with agency. This Modernity is a potent figure that works its mystifying magic through discourses as disparate as phenomenology and the debate over what caused the Columbine shootings. Modernity makes it impossible to tell the difference between a contradiction that furthers the enthralling goals of Modernity and something that might give us purchase on that very ideology.

To be fair, Simpson ends by offering suggestions to avoid reductiveness of this sort. Turning to J. L. Austin’s notion that our vocabulary is bound to involve “disparate” models, he urges us to acknowledge that claims for group identity and individual agency are not absolute. Nor can they be reconciled. But their fuzziness and irreconcilability do not render them useless as long as we see their limits, and Simpson then sketches how doing so would help clarify current debates over affirmative action, income distribution, and the death penalty (238–47). So a proper skepticism about the knowledge we gain from situatedness could save us from being Modernity’s stooges (198).

But doesn’t this “ecology of ignorance” (a term borrowed from Niklas Luhmann) risk reproducing the ignorance cultivated by Modernity? In response Simpson can offer “only once again a faith in history” (197). I would have more faith in Simpson’s faith, however, if the history he tells in this book were more perspicuous concerning the relationship of modernity to language and ideology. It is somewhat disappointing that the closest we get to a model of ideology beyond Althusserian interpellation is the fleeting observation that Simpson doesn’t assume that it is he who is being hailed (32–33). Neither does he provide any concrete examples of what it might be to think outside of the aporia of situatedness in a credible way, either from the present or the past. Presumably Modernity has not always existed, and presumably it exerts different gravities in different spaces even within “late first-world anglophone” nations.

One figure he might have made better use of in this regard is Fredric Jameson. Although Simpson frequently cites him and Jameson’s blurb can be found on the back cover, this book could do with a more-Jamesonian sense of the subtle and unpredictable relationships between language, ideology, and history—for instance, a sense of how style provides an insight into the contradictions of modernity and postmodernity. Perhaps we might think of the azaa sentence as a rhetorical figure that carries with it certain assumptions about how language represents the reality that “modernity” puts forth. But this would provide only limited help because Simpson does not sufficiently detail the work done by language and in part because “modernity” remains here too much of a puppet master.
As an alternative, we might then turn to a text that Simpson could not have read before sending off his manuscript, Jameson’s *A Singular Modernity: Essay on the Ontology of the Present* (London: Verso, 2002). There, he warns us against invoking modernity as an explanatory concept and argues instead that it is a “narrative category” that can be represented only through considering “situations” rather than focusing on a “subjectivity” that is, properly speaking, unrepresentable (40–57). If we are still animated by a Utopian wish to dethrone “his majesty the subject,” Jameson directs us to consider the yearning for *de*-personalization he detects in Rilke, Wittgenstein, and Heidegger, among others, a desire that may help us see what lies beyond the aridity of our current situation in modernity (131–38).

In contrast, the history that Simpson conjures looks more like a ground that consumes all figures. It becomes difficult to understand from which position within “situatedness” we might see some modification of it or what aspects of situatedness may or may not be attached to a history beyond Modernity. It thus looks too much like the faith of the historicist in history, a too-unexamined faith that limits a witty, learned, and otherwise very useful book.

Steve Newman
Temple University

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Blair Hoxby’s *Mammon’s Music: Literature and Economics in the Age of Milton* is an ambitious, compellingly argued book which will be essential reading for Miltonists, scholars of the seventeenth century generally and anyone interested in the relationship between literature and economic thought in the early modern period. Focusing on Milton but offering careful readings of Dryden’s and Davenant’s poetry and marshaling atlases, paintings, statuary and public architecture both Dutch and English, Hoxby argues that Milton’s writing and the poetry of his age are deeply engaged with a public discourse of trade. Beginning with *A Maske Presented at Ludlow Castle* and ending with *Samson Agonistes*, Hoxby demonstrates that Milton is, in fact, an economic thinker but also that his ideas changed considerably in relation to the political developments of the Revolution, Interregnum and Restoration. Ultimately however, Hoxby finds a consistency in Milton’s position: “from beginning to end Milton opposed the ‘great Marchants of this world’ whether they took the form of monopolistic churchmen or chartered companies. He consistently attacked fixed forms and visible powers and in doing so, he made various uses of that strain
of economic analysis that sought to describe the power of independent initiatives and invisible processes” (237). Hoxby makes his case persuasively and in detail, paying careful attention to the terms of seventeenth-century debates and to poetic echoes and appropriations of explicitly economic discourse.

*Mammon’s Music* is divided into four sections. The first deals with *A Maske* and *Areopagitica*, the second with Republican and Royalist discourses of trade, the third with the Restoration, Dryden, Davenant, Denham, and Cooper as well as *Paradise Lost*, and the fourth with the discourse of work and building after the Great Fire, and its relation to Samson’s labors in the mill. In the first section Hoxby both establishes Milton’s involvement with economic discourse and demonstrates the first key transition in his economic thinking. Comus’s arguments to the Lady, Hoxby notes, resemble those made by Thomas Mun in the 1620s that both “production and consumption were required to turn the wheels of commerce” (20). They also resemble the arguments of the mercantilist theorists such as Mun insofar as they stress that the forces they invoke are “deterministic rather than normative.” The Lady’s response speaks to the economic vehicle rather than the sexual tenor of Comus’s arguments and invokes an older tradition of economic thought, one that presupposes an inelastic supply of wealth and focuses on distributive justice. Insofar as we can assume that Milton sides with the Lady, then he appears to oppose the new economic reasoning. Thus, as Hoxby notes, “it is remarkable to see how nearly Milton converges on Comus’s arguments for economic and sexual circulation in his tracts of the 1640s” (24). *Areopagitica*, Hoxby argues, is indebted both to antimonopoly case law, and to contemporary arguments in favor of free trade. In it Milton offers a “model of intellectual exchange that, relying on the theories and arguments of free trade advocates, contended that men could best generate truth when they were left free to exercise their industry and employ their skill in producing, venting and purchasing ideas in an open market” (26).

In the second section, Hoxby explores how Milton’s appropriation and enlargement of economic ideas in his pamphlets of the 1640s was part of a larger political discourse linking Republicanism with trade, a discourse which then began to shift when Cromwell changed his foreign policy from fighting England’s great trading rivals, the Dutch, to fighting the Spanish just as England went into a trade depression in 1658; this permitted the Royalists to construct a vision of a restored monarch as a restoration of trade, and appropriate the language and imagery of earlier Republican encomiae to trade. At this juncture Milton’s position also starts to shift again. Resisting any form of strong centralized government, monarchical or otherwise, Milton argued instead, in *The Readie and Easie Way*, for a kind of federalism akin to that represented by the New England colonies and their proliferation of Puritan congregations.

In the third section, Hoxby attends to the relationship between force and
trade. Where in the earlier part of the seventeenth century trade had been invoked as an example of relationships based on “covenant or agreement” in contrast to “coercive modes of social and political organization” such as the monarchy, after the Restoration another way of understanding trade as a fundamentally imperial activity gained discursive ground. It was actually the Rump which translated this premise into politics thus forcing the restored king “to live up to that example by re-imagining his empire in terms of trade rather than dominion” (128). In this connection Hoxby examines Dryden’s *Annus Mirabilis* as a celebration of the idea of England as a trading Empire which has appropriated from the Dutch “mastery through violence of the sea paths” (147), and traces a tradition of Royalist topographical poetry from Denham’s *Coopers Hill* to Pope’s *Windsor Forest*. Against this tradition he sets *Paradise Lost*, particularly the depiction of Paradise as the object of a Satanic enterprise which is described in the “Restoration language of trade empire” (157), and Adam’s vision in Book 10 in which Hoxby finds a subtle deconstruction of the panoramic, even cartographic vision, which he argues throughout this section, emerges in this period because of “trade’s natural resistance to modes of representation like narrative.” Where in Book 10 of *The Lusiads* da Gama is vouchsafed a vision of future empire, Adam’s vision is deflated by Michael as a strictly fallen prospect: “the dream that scientific knowledge might promote the prosperity of the nation which might in turn help England encompass the globe in a single empire of trade—all that is disregarded for faith, virtue, patience, temperance and love” (176).

*Mammon’s Music* concludes with a discussion of *Samson Agonistes* as “a meditation on the consolations, obligations and temptations of laboring under a hostile regime . . . undermin[ing] the Restoration’s politically inflected discourse of work, building, and production which, flourishing after the Fire of London, looked to the world of goods for things beneath dispute and therefore suitable as the basis for a society otherwise riven by religious and political differences” (204). Hoxby notes the similarity between the theater of the Philistines and depictions of the first and second Royal exchanges and reads Samson’s decision to labor at the mill and ultimately to destroy the theater as an attempt to construe work as embracing inward spiritual activity rather than simply outward, economically productive activity.

Such a summary cannot do justice to the subtlety with which Hoxby pursues his argument. Perhaps the book’s greatest virtue is the fluidity with which it charts both Milton’s position and those of other players in this discursive field. The polarities which govern his narrative are not Royalist and Republican, millenarian and merchant for, as Hoxby ably demonstrates, all of these parties are at one time or another enthusiastic participants in the process of imagining England as a great trading nation and of imagining human society in market terms. Milton in the 1640s thinks like Comus, Edmund Waller’s
panegyric to the Lord Protector, “‘Ours is the harvest where the Indians mow. We plough the deep, and reap what others sow’” (71), offers a vision that will be fully evident in the pageantry that marked Charles II’s royal entry in 1661. Perhaps most tellingly, Hoxby notes in the conclusion of his discussion of Paradise Lost’s negative representation of trade that, in “the values and habits of thought that underlie its very rejection of the claims of institution and place, its enlarged sense of human liberty and its profoundly abstract and mobile conception of the individual and the community alike [the poem nevertheless] may have done more to promote the expansion of English trade, the growth of the English economy, and the development of abstract economic analysis than did the more overt imperialist ambitions of the Court and its poets” (177). Ultimately this opposition, between an anti-institutional conception of an inward life and a vision of a great state dominating the oceans and bringing wealth home to England is what organizes Hoxby’s argument and situates Milton. But, in a brilliantly telling reading he admits that in the long run of economic and social history even that opposition may not matter. “Milton himself must have suspected how easily the personal powers of a paradise within could be transformed into a different sort of individual initiative and accountability for his language insists that from Adam’s ‘by small/Accomplishing great things’ (10.1457–58/ 12.566–67) to Mammon’s creating ‘great things of small’ (2.258) there is scarcely a slip” (177).

The book’s other great virtue is its richness of texture, the sheer abundance of material that it brings to bear on its topic, and its revelation of the many borrowings, transformations and responses that give form to the discourse of trade. Hoxby turns his attention not just to the poetry and prose writings relevant to his topic but to atlases, frontispieces, pageantry, paintings, playing cards, and the decoration of Amsterdam’s City Hall, demonstrating the sheer ubiquity of the discourse of trade and its inter-penetration of other topics. He has a fine ear (and eye) for telling repetition: thus he detects in Milton’s focus on Samson’s destruction of the theater echoes of Sir Cheney Culpepper’s prophecy that with the destruction of monopolies, “‘Babylon’” will “‘tumble, tumble, tumble’” which in turn echoes John Owen’s exhortation to the Commonwealth Parliament to consider the example of Samson: “Now what are the Pillars of that fatall building? Are they not the powers of the world as presently stated and framed?” (223). And he supports his argument that Adam’s vision in Book 10 (of the first edition) is cartographic, a parody of the Restoration fantasy of trade empire, by showing that the catalogue of places that meet Adam’s eye, “‘Mombaza, and Quiloa, and Melind,’ And Sofala thought Ophir” (10/11.389–10) are the names that meet the eye in bold print in contemporary sea atlases mapping the coast of Africa, a catalogue that also turns up on a geographical playing card which describes “the Coast of Higher Ethiopia.”
Mammon’s Music deserves to be called “ground-breaking” in its careful situation of Milton’s writing in the context of the seventeenth-century discourses of trade and rational economics. At the same time however, the book is methodologically rather conservative, to some degree an old historicist treatment of subject matter brought into view by cultural materialism. Hoxby rejects the notion “that a society shares a single mentality” (a proposition to which few critics would actually subscribe these days) and notes that the methodological consequence of this is that (contrary to New Historicist practice) he “limit[s] the historical context in which [he] reads texts by asking what contemporary events or strains of discourse these works seem either to invoke as their own context or to suppress with a bad conscience” (10). So far so good; it is precisely Hoxby’s adherence to this limitation that makes his book so persuasive in its general argument that Milton and other poets are deeply and consciously engaged in the discourse of trade. At the same time however, it leaves him in a position where he must take the claims and terms of argument of his protagonists more or less at face value; in other words, he leaves himself without a set of analytical terms different from those of the essentially liberal tradition which he finds Milton in particular articulating. (Marxism is acknowledged and then dismissed without theoretical engagement in a footnote as “doing more to hinder than to help the search for instructive answers”) (257, n.26).

The Milton of Mammon’s Music is engaged in “economic thought,” not the reproduction of ideology. Moreover, when the emphasis on distributive justice in A Masque gives way to an embrace of a “free and open marketplace of ideas” (40) in Areopagitica this demonstrates the development of Milton’s “thought” as do his subsequent shifts when he “sees the constraints that seemingly free and uncoercive contractual relations could impose, once aggregated into market forces, on the moral life of individuals.” In other words, the Milton who emerges in Hoxby’s account is in fact the very subject, reasoning and choosing at every turn in never ceasing search for truth, that Milton so brilliantly conjures up in Areopagitica. My point is not simply that Milton is, in fact, merely reproducing ideology, but rather that the practice of economic thought is one of the more remarkable developments in the seventeenth-century European transformation of subjectivity and to naturalize it, as Hoxby does is to sell short part of his story, to ignore the way in which not just political content and literary form but also the very forms of social experience are at stake in it.

But it is also the case that what Milton is doing in Areopagitica might be better understood as producing (if not re-producing) ideology. Hoxby notes in conclusion that Milton “chose to apply his mastery of economic logic, as often as not to problems (like intellectual exchange or the preservation of choice in the polity) that were not on the face of it economic. He thus made a contribution not just to the literary representation of trade but, just as crucially, to the rise of economic analysis as a tool for thought, a way of looking...
at things” (238). But it remains a valid question whether applying economic logic to problems not on the face of it (not essentially?) economic is a contribution to economic thought per se or to the naturalization of market models (and whether this is a sustainable distinction). Certainly one of the more interesting features of the emergence of rational economic thought in this period is the use of analogy to understand the elusive forces which determine economic outcomes, a maneuver freighted with ideological implications as Hoxby notes in his fine discussion of Comus’s arguments, but which nevertheless permitted the development of the discipline of economics. But to go the other way, as Milton does, abstracting the market model from actual economic forces such as the costs and conditions of production, finance, transportation etc., ensures that the model contributes little to understanding how markets work, but much to linking them with ideas like freedom. And where Milton stops Hoxby takes over, his occasionally anachronistic language reproducing a liberal world view (“rather than centralized planning, Milton’s system prizes experimentation,”) whether he means to or not (83). The problem with Hoxby’s approach is that it leaves him without a way to account theoretically for his book’s strongest insight: that Dryden’s mercantile Royalism and Milton’s personal paradise both worked for England’s commercial ascendancy. While not exactly a single mentality, there is nevertheless a totality posited here whose character I would like to understand better.

Ultimately, however, it may be unfair to expect theoretical engagement on top of everything else this book delivers. Its clarity and scope may in fact depend on suspending for the nonce questions like the difference between rational thought and ideology. Mammon’s Music is a magisterial delineation of a fascinating subject and compelling reading, a truly remarkable achievement.

Elizabeth Hanson
Queen’s University


After the revisionism of recent decades, in which the long eighteenth-century canon has expanded to accommodate many authors previously banished to its remote fringes, how many scholars of the period can profess to have read widely in the works of Hannah More? One senses strongly that here is a writer more talked about than read. There’s a good reason for this, perhaps, since much of More’s work in the 1790s, and particularly the writings
for the poor that are the principal focus of Scheuermann’s book, was not calculated to impress or interest academic or intellectual tastes. Even if we accept Scheuermann’s contentious claim that these writings were responsible (though surely not so single-handedly as this book occasionally implies) for stalling the French Revolution on its northwards expansion, a problem remains: More’s output in the revolution decade can today seem extremely dull. The most useful aspect of In Praise of Poverty is thus its willingness to deal at length with More’s important but unengaging conduct writings for the poor. The moral fables and contrived dialogues which form Village Politics (1793) and the various Cheap Repository Tracts (1795–97) are thoroughly interrogated, though the sheer level of detail can become a little wearing. (Some of the Tracts are only slightly longer than Scheuermann’s ‘precis’ of them.) The discussion is unleavened, moreover, by reference to Hannah More’s more ‘interesting’ writing: Strictures on the Modern System of Female Education (1799) is treated only briefly at the end, while the early plays, and the works on slavery, merit no more than occasional mention.

Scheuermann does not stint in expressing admiration for More’s gifts as a “brilliant,” “marvellous,” if sometimes “repugnant” rhetorician, and for her “amazingly successful career,” as a writer able to “distill . . . the thought of the powerful of her time” (4). More certainly kept impressive company, and was soon close to the center of the conservative ascendency of the period. Scheuermann provides an impressively thorough analysis of her associations and friendships in the late ’80s and early ’90s, especially in her correspondence with members of the Bluestocking Circle, the Bishop of London, David Garrick, and Horace Walpole. Walpole was among More’s advisors in her handling of Ann Yearsley, the Bristol milkwoman poet with whom she later quarrelled. This compelling, scandalous interlude is now well known, and pleasingly recounted here in an early chapter, but Scheuermann’s account turns up no new facts or interpretations, though it is helpful to see the incident in the light of More’s thought on poverty and lower-class deference and discipline generally, which is ably synthesized here. Yearsley’s name is perhaps too often invoked in the rest of the book as a typical representative of the poor, however: readers of the several recent extended studies of Yearsley will not readily recognise her in this costume.

Much more problematically, the book’s central thesis—that More’s polemics successfully countered Paineite radicalism—is virtually unsubstantiated and in the absence of reliable evidence, may indeed be unsupportable. I wanted to hear much more about the composition of the audience for Village Politics and the Tracts, and the range of its responses. Where are the testimonies of inflamed, Paine-toting peasants being successfully hosed down by More’s common sense and contentedness? Where are the accounts of riotous mobs halted in their tracks by a gratis copy of “The Lancashire Collier-Girl”
or “The Happy Waterman”? Scheuermann offers ample evidence of the Tracts meeting with the approval of More’s conservative friends, and of their widespread distribution (even to India and the West Indies), but other than a single secondhand report from a York bookseller, who tells Bishop Porteus that the people “were very fond of them” (101), there is no credible evidence of their reception by the poor for whom they were written. Scholars of radical culture in the 1790s have been a good deal more forthcoming about the relationship between polemical texts, implied and real audiences, and political action: Chase (1988), McCalman (1988), Worrall (1992), Mee (1992), Wood (1994), Janowitz (1998) and Keen (1999), to mention only of a few of the principal studies, have been able to demonstrate who in the radical underworld was reading what, and how and with what effect such materials were circulated. Scheuermann’s task is more difficult, of course, since calls to inaction are somewhat less likely to prompt becalmed readers to record their sentiments. In another kind of study—a stylistic analysis of this kind of conduct writing, for example, which would make for an interesting project—this might not matter so much, but the book is eager to announce its contextualising credentials. The materials chosen to illuminate More’s political thinking are refreshing but, in isolation, potentially perverse: an entire chapter, for example, titled “Conservative Contexts,” is devoted to Joseph Townsend’s Dissertation on the Poor Laws while Burke’s Reflections, the more obvious (because more important) loyalist context, gets the scantest attention.

Other recent readers of Hannah More have been more sensitive to her complex thinking and compelling personality by “dispensing,” as Angela Keane puts it, “with the radical/reactionary binary” see “The Anxiety of (Feminine) Influence: Hannah More and the Counter-Revolution,” in Rebellious Hearts: British Women Writers and the French Revolution, eds. Adriana Craciun and Kari E. Lokke [New York: SUNY Press, 2001], 109, in order to accommodate her sometimes very different trains of thought on matters of class and gender. Scheuermann has no truck, however, with the feminists of the 1980s and ’90s (Myers and Kowaleski-Wallace especially) who, while sharing her view that More is deeply reactionary on matters of rank and class mobility, prefer to see More as in some respects a more cautious and productive thinker on gender. For Scheuermann, to “misinterpret” More in this way is to “distort” her project (229, 239); Scheuermann’s More is a conservative on all matters, social, political, and personal. The inflexibility of In Praise of Poverty in this regard is matched by the depiction of More’s polemical work as entirely unchanging. This is probably an injustice to her subject, and there is evidence in Scheuermann’s own summaries of More’s work of her thought undergoing some intriguing shifts, both within and beyond the 1790s. For example, in Village Politics, Tom Hod persuades Jack Anvil to reject the ideas of Paine, but also urges him to resist burning his now-unwanted copy of The Rights of Man
Criticism, Vol. 45, No. 3: Book Reviews

(“let’s have no drinking, no riot, no bonfires”); yet a later tale, “The Death of Doctor Fantom” closes with the victory of the loyalist Mr. Trueman, who “set fire to this combustible heap” of “assorted subversive pamphlets” (cited 121, 174). Despite discussing both of these works at some length, Scheuermann makes no remark at all on this potentially interesting and fruitful discrepancy.

There are further disappointments: the book is at times inexpertly edited, with both typographic and material errors remaining. The author also reaches for the exclamation point with a frequency that is unusual (and unsettling) in an academic study. Another stylistic gripe concerns the book’s inconsistent and sometimes unappealingly jaunty tone. At one point, More’s (thoroughly conventional) admiration of Soame Jenyns is described as a ‘crush’ (74), even though the passage cited as evidence principally alludes not to Jenyns alone but to his relationship with his wife.

For all Scheuermann’s efforts and for all this book’s virtues, I was left with the feeling that Hannah More had won the ideological battle of the revolutionary decade in no more demonstrable or direct a way than Vera Lynn won the Second World War. This is not to say that More is not worth studying: she is a significant and complex thinker but her complexity is invariably reduced when she is painted as a “pure,” unwavering conservative.

Tim Burke

St. Mary’s College, Strawberry Hill