Book Reviews

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Available at: http://digitalcommons.wayne.edu/criticism/vol43/iss3/5

Start with the cliche that provides the title for this new collection of essays about English professors, “day late, dollar short”—meaning, you got here too late, and you didn’t bring enough resources anyhow. Meaning you’re out of luck because the game is over, even before you begin. (It depends on who you are, of course, because some of us did get here before it was too late, which is also part of the story.) But then there’s the subtitle, “the next generation and the new academy,” which implies that maybe there’s hope yet for the academic Generation X who arrived after the end of all the big deals that were the making of the boomer-generation’s careers: the theory invasion and the culture wars, and the trinitarian grappling of race/class/gender, and above all the burgeoning growth of enrollments that created the post–World-War-II academy. And this is probably where your eyes start to glaze over. You’re thinking it’s just another cliche rehash of the same old same old—the on-going “crisis” that seems the only story academics are able to tell about themselves nowadays.

And that’s true, about this being a crisis story, like so many others—stories abetted by the same academic “stars” who populate the footnotes here, some of whom even take a hand in the discussions: Gerald Graff and Jacques Derrida, Paul de Man and Michael Bérubé, Cary Nelson and Stanley Fish, et cetera, et cetera. But this collection is also—crucially—something more. It’s a generational story about a future betrayed, both pedagogically and institutionally, and the people who got stuck holding the bag. As the editor Peter C. Herman characterizes them, they’re the X Generation of “critics who are now at the beginning of their careers, people who are in graduate school or are assistant professors. If tenured, then tenured only recently” (1). That’s who this book is about, and largely by. And that’s who has shown up—it seems—a day late and dollar short. “To summarize,” Herman writes, “for most of the next generation. . . . it might not be exaggerating to say that . . . getting a position will be the trauma that will haunt the rest of our professional lives for two reasons: the wretchedness of the process and, for the successful few (meaning those who have gotten tenure-track positions), the awareness that so many of our friends have not been so lucky” (16).

As David Galef suggests in his essay, “The message is clear: In a time of cutbacks in English departments, universities are nonetheless expanding and diversifying their writing programs, with an emphasis on teaching students how to produce effective prose. Unfortunately, this message came as belated news to those of us schooled in the literary theory practiced by our professors and handed on to us as professionalism. . . . Our generation, downsized here and unemployed there, has yet to find itself crucial to any enterprise” (164).
Galef, happily, does have a job. (He’s an associate professor of English at the University of Mississippi). But a lot of his generation do not, and never will, at least not a “real job,” “crucial to any enterprise” (as he so poignantly puts it) with only 25 percent of America’s 1.2 million professors being tenured, and only 40 percent being tenure track, which is a drop of 20 percent from only two decades ago (218). And that is the real issue—or set of issues—that this collection explores.

Young scholars today must find their careers in a world undreamed of in the philosophies of their teachers, who have shown a scrupulous (if benignly ignorant) care in not preparing students for eventualities that have overtaken the academic marketplace: the ascendancy of rhetoric/composition and the superannuation of literature and theory, the public demand for technology instruction and with it the corporate incursion into the classroom, and what is most significant of all, the shift from tenured appointments to part-time labor. Those are the realities confronting the young people who comprise the bloated enrollments of America’s graduate programs, and who desperately show up each winter at the MLA convention, hoping that somehow they are going to be the ones to get real jobs, when the evidence is all too plain that most of them will only ever succeed in joining the ranks of the tangentially employed part-timers for whom the sole “benefit” offered is a job near the work they imagined devoting a career to.

That’s what is so valuable about Day Late, Dollar Short. It is authentic, and not just another voyeur’s guide to somebody else’s crisis, written by a gang of usually suspicious academic hot-shots, whose closest brush with the actualities described, and emoted over, is no more consequential than a lost piece of luggage on the way to the next big conference. The contributors here (of the thirteen essays plus introduction) have lived through what they describe (at least most have). There are nine men and five women, of whom the majority are genuinely of the “next generation.” They write with authority, then, if not always grace and style, about what it has meant to get to where they have gotten, and what it has cost them spiritually and emotionally. (Many of the pieces, it should be noted, have previously appeared in journals.) There are essays on theory (several) and its failure to provide an adequate guide to the real world of jobs; there are pieces on the Yale TA strike, on a firing gone bad, on technology and corporate dollars in the academy, on the star system, on the value of travel money in sustaining careers, on the false utopia of cultural studies.

Twelve of the fourteen contributors are English professors, with the two who aren’t being in closely related fields (humanities and classics). And that’s one of the problems with the collection, maybe the problem. English professors—and I am one too—tend to think we understand not only ourselves but everybody else as well. But as it turns out, it’s what we don’t know and won’t
know—thanks to our arrogance—that will likely be our undoing, as it possibly already has been (day late, dollar short): about technology and markets, politicians, and the real-world use (if any) for the kinds of knowledge we presume to think are still important. “O wad some Pow’r the giftie gie us,” as the poet said, “To see ourselvs as others see us!” Burns was right, of course, but that gift he refers to is only rarely bestowed on English PhD’s.

So, what then? My own generational affiliation being what it is, a Baby-Boomer to the end, I’m pleased to note that it’s one of the token gray-beards, Michael Bérubé who, in a brief Epilogue, tries to imagine a way out, which few of the other contributors are probably in a position to do. “The next generation, or the last generation?” he asks, “What, indeed, will it take for the next to avoid becoming the last?” (224). Bérubé then proceeds to sketch a kind of answer, organized around the idea of citizenship, both civic and also institutional:

[W]e need to see ourselves . . . as citizens—citizens of departments, citizens of disciplines, citizens of the professoriat in general, and citizens of our states and nations. . . . [T]he widespread and notorious breakdowns in major departments, so widespread and so notorious as to make the phrase “dysfunctional English department” a redundancy . . . can be attributed in part to the erosion of the sense of departmental or disciplinary citizenship. But we would be mistaken to see our obligations as civitates solely or primarily in terms of department and discipline; we should also think of ourselves, no matter where or when or how we teach, as college teachers. (224)

And that’s the trick, isn’t it? Thinking of all of us who work here, as somehow being embarked on a common mission, as being citizens of the same work, which is teaching.

That’s how everybody else sees us—as teachers first, often teachers who seem not very interested in their jobs, or else not particularly well prepared to do them, the jobs that our fellow citizens think they are hiring us to do when they pay our salaries. If we could give ourselves a gift, that would surely be it, “to see ourselvs as others see us”: professors, stars, grad students, part-timers, all of us. Citizens. Teachers. And once we see ourselves that way, then we ought to act as if we believed what we saw. Because it is true. Because it is the only thing, the right thing to do. And that is why this collection—in many ways incomplete, short-sighted, and unsatisfactory—is nevertheless a valuable book. We all ought to read it. Together. Not because it solves our problems, but because it makes clear—both intentionally and not—why solutions are so much of the time unthinkable.

Jerry Herron
Wayne State University

The book’s cover reproduces a 1789 print of the famous fight between the Anglo-Jewish Daniel Mendoza and the Gentile Humphrey. The picture shows a defeated Humphrey knocked down on one knee in a posture of weakness, while Mendoza is pressing forward, confident and controlled, leaving a distance for his opponent’s surrender. The inscription on the print concludes with an analogy: “the Christian pugilist proving himself as inferior to the Jewish Hero, as Dr. Priestley when oppos’d to the Rabbi, David Levi.” Only 35 years after the repeal of the “Jew Bill” in 1753 and almost 70 years until what is considered “emancipation” in 1857 with the seating of Lord Rothschild in parliament without having to take a Christian oath, this representation of Jewish strength and self-assurance is as striking as the parallel between the Jewish Joe Louis and the indefatigable “one man Jewish antidefamation league” (57), David Levi. Where is the fearful Jew, weak and dependent on Gentile protection? Jews fought back, literally and figuratively, refusing to accept a subordinate position in British society. And they fought back effectively.

The central figure, perhaps hero, of Ruderman’s study is David Levi (1742–1801). Not actually a rabbi but well trained in Hebrew and rabbinics, Levi battled the famous radical and scientist Joseph Priestley who encouraged Jews to convert to Unitarian Christianity. Defending traditional Judaism and attacking forthrightly the Christian interpretation of the Hebrew Bible (the “Old Testament”), Levi has not figured prominently in histories and has received attention mostly in Anglo-Jewish histories (Todd Endelman, David Katz, and Richard Popkin have written on Levi). Typical of Levi’s marginalization is that there is not a word about Levi, a largely self-taught artisan (shoemaker, hatter, printer), in E. P. Thompson’s The Making of the English Working Class. Arguably Jews were marginal because of their small numbers, but Jews, Jewishness, and Judaism played a not insignificant role in the British cultural imagination. They, along with Afro-Britons who also settled largely in London, presented Anglo-Saxon Britain with a challenge for multicultural acceptance. For the “imagined community” of Great Britain the Jews—and Levi—were not marginal.

Levi defended traditional Judaism against not just radicals and Dissenters—Paine, Richard Brothers, and Priestley—who could have been opportune targets and scapegoats to gain majority favor, but also powerful Anglicans (Bishop Robert Lowth, Benjamin Blayney, Archbishop William Newcome, Nathaniel Halhed, M.P., Anselm Bayly, Humphrey Prideaux). The terms of the
theological controversies will be unfamiliar to most non-specialists but Ruderman explains clearly what was at stake in the authority of the Masoretic text of the Hebrew Bible, the legitimacy of the “pointing” of the Hebrew text to provide vowels and grammatical structure, and the challenges to Jewish modes of interpretation by Benjamin Kennicott and the Hutchinsonians. I would guess that many literary scholars know Lowth for his appreciation of Hebrew poetry and the “Romantic” effect that appreciation produced on English poetry, but fewer will be as aware of Lowth’s aggressively anti-Jewish theology that underpins his translation of Isaiah. Christian theologians constructing defenses of Christianity against the threats from deists and other radical critics of religion tried to strengthen the authority of Christian doctrine by reinterpreting the Jewish origins of the religion. Kennicott and the Hutchinsonians, each in their different ways, argued that certain perceived weaknesses in the Christian position were in fact caused by an Old Testament that was flawed by illegitimate and arbitrary Jewish textual criticism. Kennicott challenged the Masoretic text of the Hebrew Bible—the text that is authoritative for Jews—with other versions of holy scripture, while the Hutchinsonians, with their inventive if unscholarly etymologies, concentrated their fire on the pointing of the Masoretic text to make the Old Testament yield meanings more compatible with Protestantism than the Authorized Version, tethered ultimately to the pointed Masoretic text, could produce. Argument for argument Levi matched them, not at all hesitant to insist upon a superior Jewish knowledge of the Hebrew language, a “mother tongue” for Levi, whose “true spirit” he claimed to know better than the Anglicans (80).

How does Ruderman convincingly show that Levi, apologist for traditional Judaism, is part of the “Enlightenment”? The reader is on somewhat familiar ground in chapter three because Abraham Naphtali Tang, who defended the radical John Wilkes, translated the Pirke Avot, and wrote deistic philosophy (in Hebrew), seems to resemble one’s notion of an Enlightenment writer. Also in chapter three we find Mordechai Levison, follower of Locke, Newton, and Linnaeus, associate with Swedenborgians, member of the Masons. Levi is of the Enlightenment because of the aggressive style in which he contested the claims of Christian writers and because he effected a pioneering “Englishing” of Judaism. Levi knew that “Judaism could not survive on English soil unless [Jews] translated its classic texts into the language of their new homeland” (215). Well aware of the “linguistic turn” in recent philosophy and literary studies, Ruderman knows that translation means much more than substituting English for Hebrew words. Translation is also interpretation, a “rewriting” (216). Levi was a zealous translator. His first work was a handbook of Jewish practices addressed to not just Gentiles but Jews who were also religiously illiterate (241–42). In various forms Levi’s translations of the entire
Jewish liturgy—daily prayers, festival and holiday prayers, including the Passover Haggadah—were so influential that they were being used in the early twentieth century. Levi never had enough time to translate the Torah but his critical notes to the Authorized Version were an important intermediate step. Ruderman does not attach the Englishing of Judaism to proto-Reform tendencies that would reflect similar movements in Germany. Rather, he insists that Judaism was reflecting the powerful influence of English Protestantism (240). This is a fascinating idea that will have to be explored further and tested more rigorously, but Ruderman offers here a provocative thesis that is congruent with the postcolonial idea of cultural hybridity. Ruderman does not speculate on the speed by which Anglo-Jewry embraced English, so permit this reviewer the opportunity: perhaps it was because there was no single language that could have become easily the Anglo-Jewish tongue. The wealthier and more influential Sephardim spoke Italian and Ladino, while the Yiddish of the Ashkenazim had to compete with the more prestigious English. Additionally, the small numbers of Jews and their concentrations in urban commerce encouraged acquisition of English out of economic necessity. The Jewish communities in central and eastern Europe where Yiddish thrived were to varying degrees self-governing and self-sufficient, thus diminishing the necessity of acquiring the language of the surrounding Gentiles.

I have a difficult time containing my enthusiasm for this book. It is not as though Anglo-Jewish history has been lacking in good historians. Hardly. Todd Endelman, David Katz, David Feldman, Bill Williams, Tony Kushner—to name the ones that come to mind immediately—have done superb work. Ruderman does so many things so well. We certainly knew about David Levi to some extent before Ruderman, but we never knew he was as important as he is. Moreover, Ruderman points out perceptively how, despite Levi’s conventionality in theology and politics, “David Levi should be considered ultimately the primary Jewish dissenter of his day” (183). Abraham Tang is a real discovery, especially his writings in Hebrew. That Ruderman works in Hebrew has opened up texts and areas of inquiry otherwise closed off. There are a few references to Jacob Hart, or Eliakim ben Avraham, in the historical literature, but Ruderman has read the Hebrew works, which he has usefully summarized. The importance of the Masonic lodges for sustaining a public sphere that Jews could use has probably been asserted elsewhere but Ruderman presents a persuasive case for the centrality of the Masons for Anglo-Jewish intellectuals (Levi, Tang, and Hart were all Masons).

No book is perfect and no review is complete without some critical comments. Although the footnotes are thorough and easy to follow, there is still a need for a bibliography. He makes a full citation only when the text is first presented, so sometimes it is laborious to trace back the first mention of a text.
All the Hebrew words are transliterated, but I wish the actual Hebrew had been reproduced, especially for texts as rare as Tang and Hart’s.

Contrary to the dominant image of eighteenth-century Anglo-Jewry as politically and intellectually timid, Ruderman’s radicals, deists, kabbalists, and apologists are anything but timid. The British Jews were “less defensive and socially repressed than other European Jews” and tended to “identify more openly with the larger societies” (273). The identification had mixed results but Ruderman shows us a body of writing far more culturally insurgent than one had imagined.

Michael Scrivener
Wayne State University


In this wide-ranging and ambitious book Anthony Uhlmann proposes to analyze the relationship between Samuel Beckett’s trilogy of novels (Molloy, Malone Dies and The Unnamable) and two related areas: the historical circumstances within which it was written and the poststructuralist philosophical conceptions to which it bears a special affinity. His introductory chapter raises the question of how such divergent forms of cultural production as philosophy and literature can be related. In responding to this question, Uhlmann invokes the inherent reciprocity of the activities of the writer and the philosopher, with “literature moving from the particular towards the general, philosophy from the general to the particular.” He offers as a specific example of this reciprocity the concept of “haecceity,” which is both a philosophical concept and a form of sensation; thus “the apprehension of immanence described by Beckett might be understood as a sensation of a concept, while on the other hand, the concept of ‘haecceity’ described by Deleuze and Guattari in A Thousand Plateaus . . . might be understood as an attempt to conceptually describe the sensation (or the apprehension) of immanence, and therefore it might be called a concept of a sensation.” Accordingly, a major concern of his book will be the relationship between the “sensations of concepts” produced by Beckett the writer and the “concepts of sensations” produced by such philosophers as Gilles Deleuze, Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida and Emmanuel Levinas.

The relationship of literature and philosophy to the third term of Uhlmann’s investigation, that is, the political situation in France both during and after World War II, is presented in terms that have been made familiar by
poststructuralist thought. Thus, circumstances in France constitute a “problem field” that reveals in an especially striking way the “fundamentally fascistic nature of judgments dependent on the concept of the unified subject.” It follows that the figure of the “decentered subject,” encountered both in the trilogy and in the work of poststructuralist thinkers, may be conceived as a response to the particular character of this historical moment.

The major part of the book is composed of six chapters, two on each novel of the trilogy. In each of these, Uhlmann’s method consists in drawing the reader’s attention to an aspect of the novel in question, which he then relates at some length to comparable features of poststructuralist thought or to the historical situation that nourished both the trilogy and poststructuralism. He compares *Molloy*, for example, to Michel Foucault’s essay *Discipline and Punish* and to Marcel Ophuls’s film *The Sorrow and the Pity*, characterizing Beckett’s novel as based upon an opposition between “surveillance and power” on one hand and freedom on the other, “which is closely tied to questions of discipline, ignorance and failure.” He then finds evidence of a similar opposition in Foucault’s description of Béasse, a thirteen-year-old vagabond, in *Discipline and Punish* and in the behavior during the war of a group of upper-middle-class French youths, called “les zazous,” who openly flaunted their disrespect for the Vichy government.

In the second of the chapters devoted to *Molloy*, Uhlmann begins by distinguishing between Molloy himself, whose narrative “might be read as an attempt to express a kind of existence outside order,” and Moran, whose narrative “might be read as an attempt to express a kind of existence within order, the ruled and regulated society.” He then relates this observation to the opposition between the “molar” and the “molecular” as well as to the concept of “inclusive disjunction” that Deleuze and Guattari propose in *The Anti-Oedipus*. This is followed by a discussion of Beckett’s description of “involuntary memory” in his book on Marcel Proust as well as of related notions in the works of Foucault and Henri Bergson. Molloy’s wandering is seen to echo the vagabondage described by Foucault in *Discipline and Punish* as well as the “line of flight or escape” invoked by Deleuze and Guattari. A lengthy concluding phase of this chapter analyzes the novel from the perspective of the interrelationship between perception and sensation. This prepares the way for Uhlmann’s judgment of Moran as a character who, beginning “as one unable to apprehend because he is too ready to perceive,” undergoes a metamorphosis whereby he “stops perceiving and begins to apprehend.”

Uhlmann begins his discussion of *Malone Dies* by noting that the passage from *Molloy* to the second novel of the trilogy involves a shift of emphasis from “a so-called external to a so-called internal world” that preserves, nonetheless, Beckett’s central preoccupation with the relationship between order and chaos. Seen against the background of Vichy and, later, Gaullist France, this
novel essentially “involves bringing into existence, or creation, through the affirmation of one’s being, rather than through the subjectification and oppression of other beings brought about by judgment.” This insight is followed by an overview of various atrocities that have occurred in France, ranging from the Saint Bartholomew’s massacre of Huguenots on the night of 23 August 1572 through the murder of an estimated two hundred Algerians, ordered by Maurice Papon on 17 October 1961.

Uhlmann then suggests that the rejection of judgments based on the simplistic dichotomies of good/evil and black/white that one finds in Malone Dies could be read as a response to the moral crisis provoked by World War II. This novel implies that “we must exist amongst orders, but that does not mean we must surrender our souls to this or that order; rather, life at times requires us to disobey, to pass beyond judgments towards the reality of our being and that ethical existence which will allow us to live fully, so that, following Malone, ‘My story ended I’ll be living yet.’” Uhlmann continues this line of argument by noting parallels with the work of Deleuze and Guattari. Borrowing from their terminology, he proposes, in particular, that we interpret Macmann as a character who inhabits the plane of “consistency,” thus placing himself at odds with a social order that exists on the plane of “organization.”

In the concluding chapters on The Unnamable, Uhlmann interprets the final novel of the trilogy as involving a tension between two forms of stories: those told by a “leader,” which “attempt to impose a Form or a constant,” and those told by a “translator” (Deleuze and Guattari’s term), which “undermine or provide counter-narratives to these totalizing political myths.” He then notes a comparable dichotomy in Levinas’s distinction between “totality” and “infinity” which leads him, in turn, to a discussion of the political careers of Maréchal Pétain and Général de Gaulle, each of whom aspired to embody a particular “totalizing” narrative of French national identity. After noting the crucial role played by the outsider in destabilizing these narratives, Uhlmann then details the various forms of outsidedness experienced in France by Beckett as an Irishman and Derrida and Levinas as Jews.

The final chapter begins with Vincent Descombes’s assertion as to the central importance of the relationship between the same and the other in contemporary French philosophy, which Uhlmann associates with the question of justice found in Levinas, for whom this term involves recognizing the infinite difference of the same and the other. A discussion of these and related points leads Uhlmann to conclude that in The Unnamable “there seems to be a true between of discourse, a between which allows a double movement between the same and the other, the other involving the same and the same involving the other.”

Uhlmann’s book offers useful discussions of a broad range of subjects.
One may legitimately wonder, however, whether a philosopher, or an historian, or a literary critic will feel that it significantly advances understanding of his own area of expertise. This may be an inevitable consequence of Uhlmann’s method, which requires that he isolate World War II France, poststructuralism, and Beckett’s trilogy from the contexts (whether in European history, the history of western philosophy, or the western literary tradition) that would deepen our appreciation of their complexity as well as of their larger historical significance. This problem may also be exacerbated by the relatively elementary notions (the reciprocal relationship between “concepts” and “sensations,” for example, or the decentered subject as a response to fascism) that Uhlmann uses to characterize the interfaces among his three areas of investigation.

I was frequently reminded while reading this book of the philosopher Clément Rosset’s remark that without its humor Beckett’s work would be merely a needless repetition of the “big truths” that life has always taught us. Uhlmann’s own interest in the relationship between Beckett’s “sensations of concepts” and his poststructuralists’ “concepts of sensations” radically marginalizes the comic devices through which Beckett portrays the otherwise tragic circumstances of his characters. This may explain why the profound and enduring originality of the trilogy seems to have largely eluded the terms of his analysis. Readers who do not share my misgiving will, however, find much to ponder here.

Thomas J. Cousineau
Washington College


Building (“Bildung”) a Conscious Self

The Hieroglyph of Tradition is one among many recently published books (see for instance Terry Eagleton’s latest book The Idea of Culture) that struggles with a redefinition of modern identity and its context. But its originality lies in the fact that it does so by deconstructing the word tradition which Angelika Rauch rereads and reinterprets from a selection of great German thinkers. For this, she can supply a fresh perspective for the anglophone reader because of her intimate familiarity with both languages though her sentence structure is often reminiscent of German academic work. Beginning with a psychoanalytical dialectic, the author exposes tradition first as a library of received wisdom, then as a library of activities, and finally as a personal synthesis of history and
memory. At the end, tradition becomes the motive for each individual to construct his or her own personal archive.

It is a difficult task, and this is not an easy book. The author renders the word tradition into a signifier of doubtful intentions, a glyph whose meaning has yet to be ascertained. She proceeds to fill the space. With a decipherment in which tradition is seen as the reference to a reality that stands behind the fictional, she adds to the quality of tradition the kind of truth that fiction best conveys. In doing so, she rescues tradition from being concretely embodied in the mother, invoking unconscious forces. By becoming the signifier that effects change within us, tradition becomes a liberating force. It opens up the future because it frees us from a concrete vision of absolute history. In psychoanalytic terms, it frees us from the melancholy of our absence of connections with the original bliss.

In order to answer the question of what is tradition and how it can be more than just received wisdom, Rauch adopts in the first of her four sections the stance of a Freudian analyst. Here, she is teaching the reader to examine the experienced moment as would a psychoanalyst in therapy. All of us long to return to a lost unity with the universe, and attach ourselves momentarily and unconsciously to objects whose present images evoke pleasurable memories of the past. The links between the apparently disconnected fragmentary images can be traced by the flow of libido attachments, an inference the analyst uses to render the meaning conscious. Here tradition is treated, like the dream, as a “complex of images that have to be brought into a sensible alliance” as it is only by “creating relationships between the various enigmatic parts of the dream that manifestations of an unacknowledged past or experience can come to light” (59). Desire remains unconscious until the analyst draws attention to the underlying connections. Drawing her own meaning from fragments of the writing of several great German-language writers, including Freud, Rauch, in part two of her book, turns to the philosopher Kant.

Rauch shows how Kant fails to eliminate “the nurturent body of the mother” (84) as a source of creativity. The unconscious longing to return to the womb manifests itself as intuition, imagination and feelings that intrude upon the aesthetic experience. Suspended between our desire to experience the beautiful object, and the memories that compete for awareness, we become conscious of ourselves for the first time. It is the special task of the genius historian, the artist, to create the object that evokes this link between past and present, and to order, give meaning to, this emerging self-consciousness. By reinterpreting our relationships to our past, the genius historian induces a sense of freedom in us and creates the possibility of action: from being rigid and unresponsive, we become able to have a purpose. To be purposeful or “to become aware of purposiveness in the beautiful means to realize that meaning
and signification of nature depends upon the subject’s experience and memory” (116). We cannot be purposeful unless we recognise past experiences in the moment. And this can only be achieved through imagination which weaves together past and present, a series of images evoked by pleasurable feelings. It is in fiction that history lives.

In part three of the book, Rauch uses Novalis in a similar manner. In order to establish tradition as the organizer that allows us to construct a historical sense of our conscious self, she builds around Novalis, but also Lacan and Gadamer, showing that it is language as novel that provides for us a contemporary staging of experience. In trying to understand the text, we are by an act of imagination transformed not into the other but into ourselves with the other. In other words, building the self is not an act of assimilation but an act of dialogue. Tradition becomes the relationship between language and imagination (174). Thus tradition is seen not just as transmission but also as the medium for transformation. It is here that we are a bit puzzled by the fact that Rauch, who adopts a prospective stance, does not use, mention or cite Jung. Also a great Germanic writer, Carl Jung seems to be present throughout the book (written symbolically in four parts). Like Jung, Rauch seems to struggle to escape Freud’s entrapment of tradition as a tradition of the unconscious, reducing everything to “nothing but” the past. Struggle, because her whole analysis is somewhat passive, devoid of action towards the future. However, in the last part of her book, she gives a glimpse of the possibilities that lie behind remembering the past. Indeed, with the psychoanalytical incorporated, she turns to Benjamin, a philosophical writer, for a consciously ordered analysis that now treats tradition as a responsibility for transformation that grows in the conscious individual.

And this transformation can only take effect once it creates a context “in which all ‘elements,’ all experiences of the past, can be placed and thus redeemed in the greater unity of an idea as figural intuition” (213). In other words, the fruit of an allegorical reading is like a living idea. Allegory, as described by Benjamin, deconstructs the iconic unexamined word and forces a reflexion upon its meaning in the juxtaposition or “in an arrangement of concrete elements in the concept: as the configuration [“constellation”] of these elements” (212). Allegorical reading allows one to approach the text as the analyst approaches the dream. While the analyst exposes the apparent random flow of images as connected by libido attachments, allegorical reading searches the concrete text for an overlying idea. As a “redeemed linguistic state of experience,” the idea preserves “an experiential truth for human history” (213). The experience of these effects upon the reader reveals tradition as an archive of living ideas because we connect with them. The responsibility and the melancholic task of the reader is to discard his own illusions in a resurrection of
the ideas of the past. "There exists then, finally, a dynamic relationship between the living and the dead; the living proceed to lend the dead their voice for an appearance, or rather an apparition, of a spirit that we can recognize as our psychic archive" (217). In that way, we are redeemed from endlessly re-peating, re-enacting the past. In rendering tradition as a glyph, Rauch decipher-s tradition not as received wisdom but as the archive upon which a living consciousness lives. This is a book that richly repays careful examination. No single reading can expose its full potential. What it seems to offer is a synthesis that exposes the emergence of self-consciousness through the reinterpretation of tradition.

Agnès Conacher
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The Shakespearean canon has been exhausted by generations of critical interpreters—at least, this is the myth that many of us working in the early modern period tell ourselves. The reality is that much critical work remains to be done with Avon’s bard. Shakespeare and the Bible is a perfect example of the kind of refreshing and important work still needed in Shakespearean studies. Its author, Steven Marx, claims that “until now” no critical book has been dedicated to illuminating the connections between Shakespeare’s plays and the Bible (2). While his scholarly predecessors have utilized articles and books for individual comparisons between a Shakespearean play and a biblical book, Marx fills something of a void with Shakespeare and the Bible. He compiles critical works, identifies current arguments within the field, and lends his own interpretations. The final product is a comprehensive and insightful contribution to Shakespearean scholarship.

Of course, a study of such immense subjects could have become unwieldy, but Marx has settled on a reasonable and productive focus. He notes that “only six out of forty-six biblical books and five out of thirty-six Shakespeare plays are fully treated, [but] they make for a representative selection and a coherent sequence” (17). Marx is too modest about his “coherent sequence,” as his organization hints at an artistic flair. To mirror Shakespeare’s pattern of the five-act dramatic structure, Marx divides each chapter into five subsections (17). The primary constants shared by the chapters are the identification of how Shakespeare diverges from the Bible and the context of the
individual play and book within their larger collections, the Folio, and the Geneva Bible. Beyond these similarities, each chapter is uniquely crafted. Marx capitalizes on the assets of the individual works by adapting his approach in each comparison. He alternates between typology, midrash, and multiple critical theories, while identifying any potential for biblical allusions within the plays. A summary of select chapters will further suggest Marx’s flexibility.

Following the preliminary chapter, Marx demonstrates connections between The Tempest and Genesis. The premises are that both pieces open their respective collections, and that they share the form of the creation myth. After identifying thematic parallels, such as time and space, Marx suggests that Genesis’s God and The Tempest’s Prospero share the roles of creator/author, subject/protagonist, and receding ruler. Structural changes are said to mark the retreats of both controllers. Genesis evolves “from primal myth into longer, more complex, even novelistic units” while The Tempest shows “increasing length and dramatic complexity of scenes as the play proceeds” (23–24). As both works move toward concerns of procreation, their creators use “qualifying tests” to determine “the selected” who will be given conditional rewards (29). Marx then glides into a discussion of Genesis’s shifting concern from paternity to fraternity, and how The Tempest mirrors this change. He proposes that “stories of Joseph and Prospero, the providers, overlap the stories of Joseph and Prospero and their brothers” (30). As the detailed similarities grow in number, readers will be tempted to retrieve copies of Genesis and The Tempest in order to hold the two side-by-side with renewed interest. Should they be able to delay such desires, readers will be rewarded with Marx’s intriguing justification of Shakespeare’s clown scenes.

Another interesting chapter compares Measure for Measure and the gospel. Marx identifies the play’s resemblance to a medieval allegory, based on its pervading biblical references and character names; simultaneously, the plot lines imply a biblical parable, thematic elements suggest a history play, and the play’s conclusion follows the formula of a comedy. Aside from the timeless debate about how to categorize Measure for Measure, Marx acknowledges the disagreement about how to perceive Duke Vincentio. Is he portrayed “as a benign embodiment of divine power, a malicious abuser of it, or a mere mortal who aspires to be God and fails” (81)? Marx believes that such uncertainties are appropriate, given the play’s association with the gospels—which are the subject of their own multiple controversies; but he recommends that this play’s clarity may be improved by tracing the parallels between Measure for Measure’s Vincentio and the New Testament’s God. Both figures are said to use the same strategies of positioning deputies in power, testing these chosen enforcers, adopting human disguises, implementing interrogation during entrapment, and dramatically revealing themselves once humanity appears most humiliated. Just as God uses and directs Christ, the Duke does so with Isabella. Marx
also makes the innovative connection that a “body substitution at the heart of the bed trick constitutes a comic version of the ransom story of atonement at the centre of gospel theology” (89–90). The limited awareness of the audience and stage characters are described as an “elaborate arrangement of sight-lines and obstacles” that work to emphasize the Duke’s omniscience (92). Perhaps Marx shines an unkindly light on the New Testament’s God, but he works miracles to vindicate and elevate the character of Vincentio.

In a later chapter, Marx shows great awareness of and respect for personal ideologies. Rather than rush into the vehement and sensitive debate that surrounds The Merchant of Venice, Marx eases into his comparison between the play and Paul’s Letter to the Romans. The historical contexts of both pieces are provided, as well as the possible sources that Shakespeare might have used: Italian prose fiction, the Bible, the tradition of England’s mystery drama (104). Marx suggests that Shakespeare expanded his original sources in order to theologize the comedy and render theology as entertainment (104). The multiple levels of the play’s biblical allusions are given brief examination before Marx notes that the manner in which “one construes the play’s biblical allusions seems hard to separate from what ones feels about Judaism in general” (107). He also clearly asserts that his personal agenda in this chapter is “to dispute traditional invidious comparisons between the Hebrew and Christian Bibles that have been discredited by modern biblical scholars but which occasionally still are reinforced by literary critics” (107). The work of Barbara Lewalski, among others, serves as the critical backdrop to Marx’s argument that allusions allow the presence of Shakespeare’s Shylock to do “as much to tarnish as to burnish the image of the Christian he was meant to foil” (124). This chapter shows Marx’s sensitivity with delicate subjects and his dexterity with the presentation of research.

The final chapter especially highlights Marx’s talents. By returning to The Tempest, Marx creates something of a framed study. The rationale is that this play holds the paradoxical positions of being the first in the Folio and last complete drama (according to general consensus) in the career of its playwright; The Tempest simultaneously echoes the Bible’s Genesis and The Revelation of St. John the Divine, also called the Apocalypse. Marx makes some general references to his earlier comparison involving this play, wisely avoiding redundancy; but he also advances new insights. For example, he shows that The Tempest and the final book of the Bible share shifts in chronological sequences and settings as well as a four-part structure, and he contrasts the dramatic form of the masque with the origin of apocalypse. Toward the chapter’s end, he shows how the two pieces differ, placing particular emphasis on the Bible’s closure and The Tempest’s open ending. Rather than making closing remarks on his examination, Marx creates his own open ending, thus encouraging readers to re-approach the Shakespearean canon with a new
understanding. Marx hopes to motivate others to make their own similar contributions to Shakespearean studies.

Marx’s *Shakespeare and the Bible* should be recommended reading for any serious Shakespearean. For students, the terms are clearly defined, and the subject is made approachable. It would make a wonderful introduction to the world of interdisciplinary studies, especially at a time when students are far too reliant on the footnotes of editors. Shakespeare specialists will also benefit from this reading. Whether as an aid in teaching, research, or interpretation, Marx’s book is a strong resource. Most importantly, an improved understanding of the plays, and perhaps the Bible, is everyone’s reward.

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First things first: Arthur Little’s brilliantly persuasive reading of *Antony and Cleopatra*, which occupies the entire second half of the book, is a stunning achievement. Insight in Shakespeare studies usually proceeds incrementally in small steps; landmark interpretations so thoroughly innovative that they suddenly and permanently change the way we see a play are rare. Little’s two-chapter study of *Antony and Cleopatra* is such a landmark event. One can only be grateful for the excitement of the questions it prompts: how could we not have seen the play so clearly and fully before now, why has this strikingly new perspective emerged at just this particular historical moment?

Little argues that Shakespeareans cannot adopt “a deracialized or desexualized subject position” because this stance would “leave in place an assumed and affective whiteness and straightness” (6–7) that continually reproduces itself, thereby ruling out in advance investigation of the full range of interpretive possibilities. Focusing on the two elements that this closed circle suppresses, Little’s project opens up issues of race and sexuality by according them the same extensive and rigorous analytical scrutiny given to more established Renaissance topics. Stating that “our books are always personal” (8), Little identifies himself “as an African American and as a gay man” (10), and he brings this self-representation to bear on interpretation with an engaging combination of clarity and subtlety.

As the use of the words “white” and “whiteness” six times in the table of contents indicates, Little’s approach to race participates in the recent emphasis

Whiteness studies and queer studies have both been key developments in Shakespeare criticism through the 1990s. (For an account of race studies and queer studies as separate lines of investigation and of the need for their greater convergence, see my “Epilogue” in *Early Modern Visual Culture*, Peter Erickson and Clark Hulse, eds. [Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2000]). Little’s special contribution, however, is his ability to combine these two elements in sophisticated ways to generate new perspectives.

The description of the book’s overall structure in its first paragraph is a bit misleading: by specifying its agenda in terms of the three plays—*Titus Andronicus*, *Othello*, and *Antony and Cleopatra*—this synopsis omits the crucial role of *The Rape of Lucrece*, to which Little devotes fully one half of the first chapter. In my view, Little’s analysis of the latter is more significant than his discussions of *Titus Andronicus* and *Othello*. In the cogent account of *The Rape of Lucrece*, detailed terminology for the concept of sacrifice is worked out that subsequently provides the foundation for the reading of *Antony and Cleopatra*. It is not too much to say that, without the prior examination of *The Rape of Lucrece*, the sustained intensity and complexity of Little’s approach to *Antony and Cleopatra* would not be possible. The direct link between *The Rape of Lucrece* at the outset and *Antony and Cleopatra* at the conclusion is the book’s strongest organizational line.

Because there are separate chapters on Antony and on Cleopatra, there are in effect two distinct paths between *The Rape of Lucrece* and *Antony and Cleopatra*. The connection between Lucrece and Cleopatra, while profound, is the more obvious and therefore easier to make. In this regard, the use Little makes of visual images is especially telling. The substantial survey of pictorial
images of Lucrece—including important observations about the role of the black attendant, “the witnessing slave” (44–45), who is sometimes depicted as accompanying Tarquin—is in itself impressive. The recapitulation of this material in the context of the discussion of Cleopatra (145, 170) is breath-taking.

The more challenging transition between Lucrece and Antony represents Little’s most innovative intervention. He links Antony not only to Lucrece (107), but also to the murdered Julius Caesar (110–12). This surprising double move surrounds Antony with a dense network of associations that enables Little to produce a context of great depth and complexity—one feels that for the first time Antony has been given an adequate interpretive field. Particularly valuable is the visual aspect of Little’s approach to Antony. Despite the absence of actual visual analogues for Antony, the detailed analysis of the physical effects of his body vividly conveys a visual dimension through verbal formulations. For example, “At the beginning of his aggressive refashioning of himself he envisions the iconographic figuring of his own body” (112). This visually-oriented language is compelling partly because it is supported by Little’s art-historical work elsewhere in the book.

While I believe that Antony and Cleopatra will never be the same after Little’s convincing reading, I also want to raise further (and ultimately minor) questions about his deployment of key categories when translating representations of physical bodies into representations of genders, sexualities, and races. With regard to gender, Little’s assessment of Antony seems at times too readily to accept traditional definitions of male and female rather than critically to question them, with the result that one is forced to operate within an unduly narrowed binary framework. A related question concerns sexualities. Without in any way wishing to diminish the persuasiveness of Little’s elaboration of Cleopatra’s allusion to her boy-actor status as “push[ing] Antony and Cleopatra’s relationship into a homoerotic space” (174), I wonder if this conclusion is too exclusive and monolithic and whether a dramatic sense of more multiple or overlapping sexualities remains in play. Regarding Little’s use of Spenser’s A View of the State of Ireland to help establish Antony’s “nonwhite” identity (123), I would ask about the potential problem of conflating Ireland and Africa; if all versions of blackness are not to be viewed as interchangeable equivalents of one another, then distinctions among early modern ethnicities must be observed.

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Reclining in a comfy La-Z-Boy, the remote ignition switch for the gas log tucked at our side, we’re obviously far removed from the terrors of the Gothic; yet, we still experience a vicarious thrill, tiptoeing page by page behind a heroine as she negotiates a dark, portrait-lined corridor of a castle with no other protection than that of a faltering candle and her unwavering Victorian morals. With the Gothic, it is the tension between the real and the unreal, the ‘natural order of things’ and the supernatural, that draws us in; perhaps it is because of the genre’s cult-ishness (as in B-movies, rather than the occult) that we feel more strongly the disparity between our own situation and the threats—those temporally and spatially displaced terrors—that haunt the characters of these novels. It is exactly this distancing, the transportation of character and reader to another place and time, which operates at the core of Robert Mighall’s recent study of the Gothic. The ultimate premise of his book, *A Geography of Victorian Gothic Fiction: Mapping History’s Nightmares*, is that we are not so far removed from the source of these horrors as we might think. He posits that the Gothic re-constructed the time in which it was written—and informs us about the time in which it is ‘read’—as much as it preyed upon readers’ anxieties about the past. Much of the existing scholarship on the Gothic focuses on the psychological components of the genre, almost always exploring the meanings of the work with regard to its writers and their contemporary readers. But Mighall takes a different tack, pointing out that the Gothic strove to reassure Victorian readers of their distance, culturally and socially, from past evils and arguing that our theories about the Gothic, especially those that cite it as evidence of Victorian sexual repression, inform us more about who we are today. He argues that the “psychological, ontological and ‘symbolic’ approaches” (xix) overlook the historical and political nature of the times in which the Gothic first appeared and ultimately refuse to acknowledge what our scholarship on the genre reveals about our own insecurities. In essence, what is ‘thrilling’ about the medium, then and now, is the reader’s unconscious understanding that something laid to rest, in this case the past, has come back to haunt the present.

Mighall starts from a claim that the genre is not as anachronistic as it might appear. Instead, he demonstrates that writers of the gothic purposely mixed temporalities in order to pit modernity against the past so that readers had evidence of the progressive nature of their own religious, political and social institutions. Using examples from non-fiction, such as Anna Laetitia Barbauld’s “On Monastic Institutions,” Mighall shows us how writers utilized Gothic conventions to “re-enforce the superiority of [their] own times and [their] gratitude that the ‘Gothic’ ages [were] no more” (2). While nothing in the Gothic is overtly political, Mighall claims that novels such as Montague’s *The Demon of Sicily* and Radcliffe’s *A Sicilian Romance* set conflict within an
“intra-familial sphere which is nonetheless arranged around historical and political oppositions” (10).

Mighall next analyzes travelogue passages evocative of the Gothic tradition alongside Radcliffe’s *The Italian* to demonstrate how the “past . . . survive[d] into and threaten[ed] the present” (25) through the political and historical consciousness of both writers and readers. He posits that this allowed “England and Italy [to] exist in different temporal realms” (17) so that characters could be transported back in time, experiencing the horrors of yesterday, simply by venturing onto foreign soil. This convention, which reassured readers in England that they were doubly safe from past abominations—distanced by both time and space—was soon broken by writers such as Dickens who relocated the Gothic closer to home.

Mighall coins the term ‘Urban Gothic’ to describe the writings of Reynolds and Dickens, but distinguishes between their modes of constructing the city. According to Mighall, Reynolds’s description of the city in *The Mysteries of London* initiated a Gothic that was both contemporary and local but still reliant upon spaces previously tainted by crime: thus, he continues in the tradition of “locating the source of disorder in the past” (51) by relegating horror solely to the houses of the criminal class and to the rookeries. Dickens, on the other hand, frustrated by the “cliché[d] and commodified” Radcliffian version of the genre, called for a “new Gothic, a new way to depict horrors, stripped of disguises and stage properties” (42). But, while Dickens made the Gothic of his novels site-specific, using actual names for streets and throughways, Mighall notes that he still “emphasize[d] distance and defamiliarization [through] the characteristics (moral and architectural) of the respectable and the outcast districts of the same city. Certain parts of London, despite their distance from the castles and monasteries of the Radcliffian landscape, are rendered as strange and remote in their own way as those more traditional Gothic locales” (43). Mighall ends this section with an extended reading of *Bleak House* in which the legal system, or more specifically Chancery, is depicted using all the traditional tropes of the Gothic. Mighall contends that “the legal labyrinth in this Urban Gothic novel not only resembles the topography of the slum districts of the city, it can also produce them and their counterparts. . . . Dickens thus transfers the attributes now firmly associated with the figure of the labyrinth (in Urban Gothic writing), to its cause—the legal labyrinth” (73).

The body becomes the next locus (and locomotion) of the Gothic as Mighall examines its use in Hawthorne’s *The House of the Seven Gables*. He writes that “one of the ways Hawthorne achieves this transportation of the Gothic, from gloomy Europe to sunny America, is his representations of the Pyncheons ‘aristocratic’ pretensions, and the way this is associated with the morbidity which really distinguishes their lineage” (88). Besides the pathological, this portion of Mighall’s study deals with two other means of transmission: the supernatural and the legalistic. The section subtitled ‘Documents and
Memories’ logically leads Mighall to sensation novels, a subset of the genre in which the door to every house—not just foreign castles, tenement slums, or estates endowed with a family curse—was opened to the terrors of the Gothic. Here, Mighall redefines his own argument as well: he claims that in sensation fiction, “the past is remembered, not through nostalgia, but as a means of coming to terms with it, a way of ensuring that the past remains the past and cannot impose a burden on the present” (110). Mighall coins a new term for the relocation of the Gothic to what was a previously untainted site, referring to the works of such writers as Collins and Braddon as ‘Suburban Gothic,’ and states that “Sensation fiction . . . emphasizes a mobility (both social and geographical) that allows identities to be changed and past lives to be discarded” (121). This permutation of the Gothic—a genre which had previously worked to reassure readers by proving that identity, whether it be specifically English and Protestant or simply modern and moral, was immutable even when subjected to the most harrowing of circumstances—instead became a nightmare of “modernity and anonymity, where appearances of respectability can be deceptive, and where, in place of legends, the burden of the past is recorded in legal documents or memories, to be discovered by blackmailers or detectives” (129).

Returning to the body, Mighall shifts his corpus of work to texts not generally classified as ‘Gothic’: the medical texts and scientific discourses of the Victorian era. He compares these, with their constructions of sexual and mental deviance, to Stevenson’s Strange Case of Doctor Jekyll and Mr. Hyde, demonstrating that they share a rhetoric which positions the body as “the locus of Gothic horror” (130). Mighall maintains that “as a man of science Jekyll not only internalizes the morality of his class, he internalizes its models of hierarchy and deviance, the bestial and the primitive” (147). One of the more interesting suppositions Mighall makes in this section is that Jekyll and Hyde, with its reconfiguration of the corporeal nature of Gothic terrors, updates the definition of an Urban Gothic by allowing Jekyll (and thus Hyde) to transport the horror within him. Here, the ‘curse’ becomes a literally dis-figuring virus that can contaminate if not infect others as Jekyll and Hyde move freely through the otherwise class-constricted sections of the city. In this variant of the Gothic, Mighall points out that we see “the disruption of various structures and hierarchies designed to place bodies, topographically, taxonomically, and chronologically” (152). Unfortunately, immediately after this refreshing shift to a class-conscious construction of the Gothic, Mighall presents what is possibly his most disappointing premise. In his reading of Quetelet’s Treatise on Man, with its construction of the “ideal average man,” Mighall posits that “from an epistemological point of view” this work—which he acknowledges to be considered a “cornerstone of bourgeois normalization”—should “be regarded as productive rather than defensive or merely oppressive” and that “Quetelet’s dream of seeing ‘deviations from the average’ disappear should not
be read as eugenicist or Fascistic avant la lettre, as it sees the ‘perfectibility of man’ as a leveling process, and adopts a Godwinian rhetoric of improvement and the exaltation of the ‘mean.’” Mighall goes on to propose that “this is not so much the exclusion or demonization of the deviant ‘Other,’ but the inclusion of the excessive, the anomalous, and the monstrous as contributory to the sum of human knowledge. For this ideal of the average is dependent upon, indeed, made up from, the monstrous limits” (171). While Mighall is referencing a valid mathematical formula here, his attempt to make a moral judgment adhere to the rules of arithmetic does not hold sway, and it is not easily believed that, as he attempts to tell us, “the monster and the criminal . . . are brought within the human family and are understood according to analogous laws of human behavior” (171–72) simply because they would have affected a ‘moral equation’ that established the mean. While he credibly demonstrates that the medical discourse which produced such theories and the Gothic share certain discursive patterns, he is unconvincing in his attempt to persuade the reader that these men of science were attempting to be inclusive—and as this isn’t instrumental to his theory regarding the conventions of the Gothic and the rhetoric surrounding the genre, it only serves to erode what is an otherwise compelling argument.

However, it is worth wading through this section to get to his final, and perhaps most rewarding, premise—that our scholarship on vampirism reveals more about our own anxieties than it provides evidence of Victorial sexual repression. Here, his argument comes full circle. Having begun by demonstrating that early Gothic was all about reassuring Victorian readers of their safety in the present, he ends by forcing us to question whether our scholarship on texts such as Dracula might not serve the same function. To accomplish this, Mighall again digs up interesting alternative texts as proof, looking at sexologists’ comments on the ‘real life’ vampire Sergeant Bertrand. His examples show us “how different ‘Victorian’ attitudes to the relationship between vampirism and sexuality were to the way modern criticism of Stoker’s novel represent this situation” and thus overturn the “critical consensus . . . that Stoker, the text, its characters, or its readers—collectively ‘Victorian culture’—did not fear vampires so much as what these figures masked, disguised, or embodied” (226). Instead, he finds that the “horror derives not from the emergence of some erotic anxiety played out on the symbolic screen of representation; quite the contrary, it is in failure of the erotic and the sexological to contain and explain away the monstrous and the supernatural that makes Dracula effective as horror fiction” (227). In Mighall’s words, “it was because a vampire was sometimes only a vampire and not a sexual menace that Dracula was an immediate and terrifying success” (247).

Thus the Gothic, or at least our understanding of it, becomes as much a commentary on our cultural identity as on that of the Victorians. Having come
to this point, Mighall reiterates his desire to “[describe] the development of the Gothic mode by demonstrating the historical and rhetorical connections between criticism and its object” (248). He establishes that studies of the Gothic became virtually inseparable from psychoanalytic theory because “psychological, symbolic, and essentialist models encourage the suppression of history. This suppression enables the striking rhetorical affinities between the Gothic and psychoanalysis to actually endorse their application” (261). Thus scholars, even those who are proponents of psychoanalytic approaches to the Gothic, will discover a rewarding reading of their own work in Mighall’s text. Ultimately, he accomplishes his goal with this book—exposing what lies behind the ‘veiled portrait’ we’ve painted of the Gothic. Instead of an innocuous wax figure, Mighall reveals to us “the ‘mobility’ of the Gothic, locating it once more in the critical realm, and showing how criticism of the Gothic, especially Victorian fiction, mirrors its object” (267).

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By staying attuned to Walt Whitman’s anxieties and insecurities, Vivian Pollak presents a study of the poet that is—perhaps at first paradoxically seeming—always at the quick of his poetic inspiration. Though not altogether new to discern that Whitman experienced grave tensions at the same time that his persona claimed robust physical and psychological health, nonetheless Pollak finds a fresh approach because she provides in a book-length study an examination of the spiritually replete Whitman of the poetry, tracked concomitantly along the faultlines of the actual Whitman’s emotional tensions. To put it succinctly, and to quote Pollak, Whitman “is less generous and more aggressive than he purports to be” (xv). _The Erotic Whitman_, however, is not a biography _per se_, even though it utilizes biographical materials—some of them, such as the letters from Whitman’s mother, groundbreaking material. Instead the project tends simultaneously to the double helixes of biographical anxiety and poetic ecstasy as they illuminate each other. For example, Whitman could experience profound anxiety about emotional intimacies that would become converted in the poetry to his speaker’s espousal of American closeness and union. Pollak locates at the heart of Whitman’s poetic urges the exquisite tension between the fear of intimacy and the desire to unite the nation.
Given the lapse between *The Erotic Whitman* and the appearance of previous works, such as Harold Aspiz’s 1980 *Walt Whitman and the Body Beautiful* and M. Jimmie Killingsworth’s 1989 *Whitman’s Poetry of the Body: Sexuality, Politics, and the Text*, it is time for another book about Whitman and the erotic body, especially if we acknowledge that the body is Whitman’s primary topic. Certainly Pollak brings to her task a multiplicity of perspectives not so readily available in the previous books. *The Erotic Whitman* proceeds in the wake of an enormous recent outpouring of historically based scholarship that allows the author to include in her discourse on the body detailed analyses of class, race, social history, feminism, psychology, and American history. Because of these intercalated disciplines, the work is textured and rich, with many overlays that still manage to generate what seem like insights not produced but found. That is to say, the text offers freshness of insight at every turn. Pollak provides the delightful abundance of detail one finds in a biography with the sharp clarity of the most acute literary criticism. In addition, for all its erudition, the text is a basically accessible study, with an authorial tone that invites the reader to join in with her as she negotiates the problems of intellectual investigation, as for example in the aside after discussing Whitman’s mother’s powerful though potentially sentimentalizing description of the Indian squaw in the poem, “The Sleepers.” Pollak interjects, “Romantic racialism? Yes”—and then proceeds to reenter the complications of interpretation of this passage which includes at the same time a love for domesticity and a love for artistic freedom. There are many such instances of accessibility in the midst of perspicacity, and the tone remains throughout one I find refreshing and direct.

Specifically, Pollak’s study of the figure of the mother provides one of the major contributions to Whitman scholarship afforded by the book. She not only investigates in depth the role played by Louisa Van Velsor Whitman in her son’s life, but also extrapolates to argue for the presence of a “mother-muse” (172) throughout the corpus of Whitman’s poems. In doing so, Pollak provides a needed antidote to the overwhelming majority of previous books concerning Whitman (with perhaps only Sherry Ceniza’s 1998 *Walt Whitman and 19th-Century Reformers* an exception) that understandably have accentuated his phallic imagination. Pollak includes the previously underexamined reliance by the poet on paradigms of the mother, and describes such mother figures to be “oppressive as well as empowering” (172). Especially useful to Pollak’s biographical examination of the mother are her detailings of the letters of Louisa Van Velsor, paraphrased or quoted from the Trent Collection at the William R. Perkins Library at Duke University. The investigation reveals a hard-working, self-squelching mother who provided some of the major patterning for her son’s identity.

In redrawing the Whitman family dynamics, Pollak also constructs fascinating portrayals of Whitman’s older and younger brothers, Jesse and Jeff—
who between them and the other Whitman siblings, more or less abandoned Walt to carry on as the head of the household, along with his mother. Pollak also emphasizes Whitman’s relationship with perhaps his favorite sibling, his sister Hannah. Understanding his relationship with Hannah allows us another gauge by which to weigh Whitman’s involvement with imagining the American woman; moreover, Pollak’s intriguing discussion of the eleventh section of “Song of Myself,” the “twenty-ninth bather” section, rests on an interpretation of Hannah as the model. Born in 1823 on the 28th of March, and married at 28 years of age, her situation may have suggested to her brother the role of the bather subject to “Twenty-eight years of womanly life, and all so lonesome.” As such, Hannah would represent the epitome of unfulfilled erotic womanhood, to the extent that her brother saw her trapped in “the false body of her married life” (114). Pollak’s discussions of family relationships in Whitman’s life and work situate anew conceptions of gender in Whitman scholarship.

I will mention now only two of many other contributions of The Erotic Whitman that reconfigure the ways we understand the Whitmanian body: namely, the ways that Whitman’s early fiction informed his later poetry, and the ways he developed the persona of the gentleman alongside another persona more often noticed by critics—that of the rough. As regards the former, Pollak’s second chapter, “Why Whitman Gave Up Fiction,” examines at length Whitman’s 1842 temperance novel, Franklin Evans, as well as various others of the twenty-three stories Whitman published throughout the 1840s, such as “Wild Frank’s Return,” “Bervance: or, Father and Son,” and “The Child-Ghost; a Story of the Last Loyalist.” These fictions often describe a family with an absent, unmissed father, a widowed mother, and a son upon whom she is dependent. Pollak assumes that financial considerations did not prompt Whitman to relinquish his fiction career; he could hardly have earned much money at such endeavors. Instead, she argues, the family patternings that he discovered in his stories undermined the buoyant intimacy he wanted to portray. Pollak asserts that “the psychological urgency of these slippery fictions was incompatible with the inner serenity he was attempting to cultivate” (38). Furthermore, his ideal family life, which excludes fathers, was also less reliant upon mothers than is at first evident, and depends upon the alliance and affection found between men, a discovery that might have unnerved Whitman at this point in his life, and that he found he couldn’t adequately pursue until he began writing poetry in the 1850s. His desire in the 1840s to uphold the middle-class heterosexual family gave way in the next decade to his portrayal and celebration of the very different kind of home found in comradely associations.

Secondly, Pollak tackles the discrepancy between Whitman’s presentation of himself as gentleman dandy and as blue-collar workingman in the chapter, “Interleaf: From Walter to Walt.” In both the above-discussed discrepancy between conventional-family sites and comradely sites of intimacy and in this,
related, discrepancy between the Walter of the upper-middle class and the Walt of the working class, Pollak covers new territory valuable to Whitmanians. The poet’s gentlemanly, dandyish man-about-town not only informed his presentation of his fiction of the 1840s, but continued to afford a persona he clung to, despite his appropriation of the workingman persona. Pollak iterates that while “most criticism has ignored Whitman’s perfect gentleman, preferring instead to focus on the rough as an exuberant manifestation of the poet’s democratic ideology, the ‘gentleman’ expresses Whitman’s fastidious recoil from social outcasts and from his ‘vile’ imagination of himself as one of them” (57). Significantly, both types remain beyond reproach, the rough because he is presumably beneath it, the gentleman because he is protected by his “class-based access to tradition” (57). Whitman alternately draws to himself and appropriates each type. The ability to shift from one to the other seems to have allowed Whitman to allay his feeling of social alienation caused by the lack of intimacy he experienced; hence, he oscillated from Walter to Walt, one class-based type of personality to another.

In these ways The Erotic Whitman resituates questions about the life and art of the poet. How all the more rewarding to find such discoveries here, then, in the rigorous, nuanced, sometimes even resounding interpretations that Vivian Pollak delivers. I’ve touched upon a few of the highlights in the above discussion, but had to bypass others, like for instance, Pollak’s discussion of the mockingbird in “Out of the Cradle Endlessly Rocking” as encoding a racialized persona in order to depict the plight of the African American at mid-century, a possibility that none of the contemporary reviewers noticed. Overall, Pollak’s approach to Whitman studies offers a fresh line on this multifaceted poet; she reads many of the poet’s passages previously seen as ecstatic instances of perfect physical and psychological health instead as covers for the anxious tensions of a psyche struggling to find closeness and his own sense of family dynamics. As Pollak states, “Whitman engaged in powerful repressions of his personal past and mythologized an untroubled self that never was” (xxiii–xxiv). She revectors the troubled as well as the mythologized selves and in so doing provides a more rounded view of Whitman as lover, citizen, writer, and speaker, than that to which we’ve heretofore been privy.

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