Bureaucide: A Method for Organizational Disassembly

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Efforts to hold down spending plainly have high priority in government now. One area often singled out for reductions is the “bureaucracy.” This word, which has developed such negative connotations over the years, has recently been invested with the character of an anti-Christ.

It was in the political hyperbole of the 1980 Presidential campaign that the picture of the grossly inefficient, byzantine agglomeration of self-perpetuating absurdities was painted in all the lurid colors of partisan politics. Former President Carter had begun a concerted, if ill-starred, attempt to “clean up” the bureaucratic apparatus that he blamed for so much suffering and bad policy throughout the country. This rhetoric proved attractive, and much-heralded programs to “trim the fat” from bloated bureaucratic organizations were begun with a will. Few social scientists were surprised when most of these cost-cutting streamlining programs were brought to a screeching halt many miles short of their objectives. In some respects, Ronald Reagan's own program to correct these problems has run into similar obstacles. When attempts to bring down costs succeed, they generally do so at the expense of lower-level staff, or at the expense of the poor or marginally poor citizen who could least afford them (Bould and Valdivieso, 1974).

Why have most efforts to reduce the bureaucracy failed so abjectly? Is there a way to make judicious cuts in bureaucratic organizations that will be valid and long-lasting? It is the intent of my paper to suggest that such a way exists, and that this goal may be accomplished within a small time frame and with minimal expense. The method proposed here makes use of several of the major insights about bureaucracy that social scientists have accumulated since the days of Max Weber. Perhaps because no adequate theory has been developed to make sense from all the facts that have been gathered, there has been a reluctance to apply existing knowledge in a problem-solving context.
This project is a departure from that stance in that the method involved addresses the practical exigencies of reducing the size and cost of bureaucracies.

Since Max Weber initiated the sociological study of the bureaucratic phenomenon there have been thousands of books and articles written on the subject. Some have been openly partisan: They declaim the inhumanity of bureaucratic organizations in moralistic chants and responses. Others have taken a more "objective" stance and relied on description and the accumulation of data with practically no analysis or conclusions whatever. Still others have designed programs for the "humanization" of bureaucratic organizations in which the strategies of the human potential movement are brought to bear on tiresome situations. In the more popular realm, yet another approach provides the individual with "survival manuals" with which to navigate the labyrinth of bureaucratic procedures. But the literature on methods for the actual dismantling of wasteful, cumbersome, and unpleasant bureaucracies is scanty, indeed.

Despite the lack of research in the area of cutting down on bureaucracy, it is rather widely agreed that bureaucracy, at least in the government realm, has in fact grown to a point so far from optimum size that radical surgery is required. The precise nature of the subject's anatomical malfunctions must be ascertained before the "operation" can commence. In this case, the surgery will be aided by the basic structure of the organization itself, which here refers to the rules which come to characterize bureaucratic procedure. It is precisely this feature of bureaucracy which makes it so susceptible to inefficiency, waste, and irrelevance. The bureaucracy, and the bureaucrat, are guided in their day-to-day operations by rules. But the social world is full of surprises, and inevitably the rules have to be revised or, more frequently, added to. A morass of frequently meaningless rules emerges, and renders any given operation impotent. The problem has varying degrees of severity: the Armed Forces, the Post Office, the Immigration "service," the Veteran's Administration, and the various state and local welfare departments are the more notorious among the offenders. Yet the disorder is endemic to most bureaucratic organizations.

Lately it has been the fashion to lampoon bureaucracies. Senator Proxmire has handed out his "Golden Fleece" award to many an embarrassed recipient. The Washington Monthly publishes its Memo of the Month book in which the most absurd, arcane, and redundant communiques between government functionaries are reprinted in all their comic-opera detail. But this nervous laughter about the petty foibles of bureaucracy masks the enormously threatening spectre that looms on the horizon: an administered world which has become so top-heavy and so wasteful that it stifles every positive and creative initiative in a quagmire of counter-productive controls and rules. Robert Merton (1968) summarizes the bureaucratic dilemma thus:
1. Bureaucracy demands the same response to situations and strict devotion to the rules.
2. Bureaucracy leads to an absolute devotion to the rules, thus losing track of the purpose of the rules.
3. Situations arise which are not covered by the rules.
4. The very elements which make for efficiency and rationality in some situations may produce just the opposite results under different conditions.

Merton’s stress on the rule-making and rule-following aspects of bureaucracy will act as the starting point of the method proposed here. “Bureaucide: A Method for Organizational Disassembly” approaches the problem of an overgrown bureaucracy from the standpoint of reducing its size by “over-enforcing” its rules until the weight of procedural impediments forces a structural breakdown and effects an actual “disassembly” of the unit through the avenue of its own nonfunctional rules. A chief executive taking this tack may well have met with greater success than Mr. Carter, whose attempts to reduce bureaucratic waste required the setting up of yet another office to superintend the overall cost-cutting. As one might predict, very little was accomplished, save the creation of an extra addition to the Washington family of government offices.

Before the method can begin to be applied, several problems must be resolved. Among these are: How does one identify bureaucracies which require disassembly? How can one select for enforcement the rules which will net the greatest result? How can the method be applied with surgical precision to avoid harming valuable personnel and viable institutions? These and other questions must be thoroughly addressed so as to ensure maximum effectiveness in the disassembly process, while guarding against a “meat axe” approach which can only do harm in the long run. This paper will present the core elements of this ongoing project.

**BETWEEN TERRORISM AND TOKENISM**

The past gives certain concrete lessons about attempts to limit the size and growth of bureaucratic organizations. Today bureaucracy is frequently conceptualized as “lifeless,” “faceless,” “impersonal,” and “neutered” (Crozier, 1964). Its mindlessness and lack of direction are, at least in the eye of the beholder and outsider, relatively new perceptions. Bureaucracy in its modern
form was created in the mid-eighteenth century as the servant of the state and modeled on the army. This was a time of "enlightened despots" like Frederick of Prussia and Joseph of Austria who used the state bureaucracy as a weapon against competing interests in their respective countries (Jacoby, 1976: 28-35). In this era the bureaucracy was "mindless" only insofar as it was founded and organized on Teutonic military principles. For the Beamte to question the order that crossed his desk was no less detestable than the second Lieutenant's refusal to charge headlong into the enemy (Presthus, 1962: 49). It was cowardice under fire in both cases. Hence, the state bureaucracies were perceived with accuracy as extensions of royal power and it was on these premises that they were attacked.

At the one extreme of attempts to disassemble bureaucracies is terroristic and revolutionary violence. It was popular well into the twentieth century, especially under the auspices of anarchist inspiration from the pens of Bakunin, Proudhon, and Kropotkin. In these rudimentary and primitive attempts at bureaucide, horrific and often murderous violence was employed to bring down the apparatus of the state. Apart from a bloodthirsty system of ethics, it also proved to be a failure in practical terms. This frightfully amateurish and morally culpable approach to disassembling bureaucracies was born under the dark star of utopian longings. It was a wholly romantic assertion of will, and totally unsuited to the complex and demanding job it undertook.

A more familiar, slightly more sophisticated, and similarly ineffective approach to the problem can be found in the various reform attempts that issue from within the bureaucracies themselves. This is not to say that a given department, office, or division itself organizes and administers a paring down of its own operation. This may happen, but it is rather unusual. More often a watchdog agency or outside consulting outfit is called in to perform the surgery. The techniques of most of these operations are familiar to the casual reader of the Wall Street Journal. The contractor is most often a local "human relations" think tank with a skeleton core staff and scores of occasional part-timers who are swiftly recruited for the job and just as swiftly let go. The specific techniques designed to "enrich jobs," to promote happiness and lessen on-the-job frictions are well-known and differ only in detail from one another. They are in effect softcore extensions of Taylorism, smoothed out and dressed up with pseudo-science jargon by corporate mind technicians like Robert Ford of A T & T and Scott Myers of Texas Instruments. What they have in common above all is the attempt to increase productivity from employees whose dependency and incompetence are considered a priori (Perrow, 1972: 98-143).

Along a similar line operates the cluster of techniques generally called
Management by Objective, pioneered by Peter Drucker in the 1950s. Here the goal is not so much job enrichment as it is to effect cooperation from two fundamentally antagonistic camps, labor and management, with attendant loss of identity in the all-powerful organization (Perrow, 1972: 61-95). To this could be added Sensitivity Training, Transactional Analysis, Behavior Modification, and a dozen other approaches which are designed to smooth out the wrinkles of personality, status, and economic conflict in the workplace. Whether or not any of these techniques actually deliver what they promise is a moot point, especially since the consultants who normally undertake this kind of work build the need for “follow-ups” into their programs, thus assuring continued patronage from the afflicted bureaucracy. So while the malady may be said to lessen in intensity, the best the patient can hope for is to go into remission (Thompson, 1975: 31). Cures, even if available, would force the clinicians to close up shop.

The results of these treatments in the private sector bureaucracies are hard enough to determine, but not impossible since the growth or shrinkage of profit margins can act as a rough indicator (Reif and Luthans, 1972: 30-37). In government, however, it is virtually impossible to assess the impact of such programs. This is because the various Federal, State, and local bureaucracies neither “produce” tangible goods, nor do they measure their success or failure in terms of “profit” or “loss.” In fact, the criteria for success or failure issue either from the office itself, or from another office within the same overall agency or department. The standards of “production,” “efficiency,” and “goal attainment” are subject neither to the marketplace nor to other real-world forces. The bureaucracy is its own reason for existence, and it fine tunes its performance to conform to internal criteria.

This constellation of attempts to limit, improve, and streamline bureaucracy has a sideshow aspect. It is tokenism in its most manipulative and most benign guise. Its rank manipulation of people and situations is recognized as such by almost everyone involved. There may even be some limited entertainment value present. Also within the classification of tokenism is budgetary cost-cutting. Here the accountants take over, and blue pencil everything that is “frivolous” and “non-essential;” at least that is how it works out in theory. In June of 1980 the results of three years of then-President Carter’s hard-nosed cost-cutting of the Federal bureaucracy were announced. Only a half dozen offices were actually excised from the roster of government agencies, and these dealt with the purest bureau trivia imaginable: The people who administer a miniscule office on the aesthetics of the American flag had their appropriations slashed to the very bone, as did an obscure bureau that was still working out Spanish land grant claims in California.
Now there is more bureaucracy because of all the GS-14s that were hired in the past few years. It was their job to administer the cuts, and their own hires were "hidden" from public scrutiny by making their appointments "temporary" and "provisional" at the outset, although most are by now full-time employees of the government. It would be wrong to blame these employees for wanting a decent job, a secure position, and a reasonable income. In a real sense they are just as victimized by the system as the harried civil servants they were hired to eliminate.

The cleverness of bureaucracies in increasing employee numbers, budgets, and power in general is amply illustrated by the imaginative strategies used in short-circuiting plans to cut back on personnel (Altheide and Johnson, 1980: 77-80). Some examples of this include the practice of hiring two part-timers to replace one full-time position, hiring people to work for 39 hours per week, thus maintaining the "part time" status, misclassifying employees as "temporary," and dropping employees from the payroll records at times when the auditors make checks. It has been estimated that about 165,000 people are employed through one or more of these gambits. The Census Bureau, the Social Security Administration, the Forest Service, HUD, and the Bureau of Indian Affairs seem to be the worst offenders. The resounding success of this mammoth subterfuge was borne out when President Reagan, shortly after his election, announced a hiring freeze on government jobs. An embarrassed chief executive was chagrined to learn that just such a freeze had been in effect for years.

It is fairly safe to assume that the Presidential attempts to trim down the size of bureaucracy have long ago come to be regarded as mere campaign rhetoric by the majority of people. Although this highly advertised assault on bureaucracy can be discounted as tokenism, the various tax cutting initiatives that began with California's Proposition 13 in July, 1978, cannot. As of this writing, the so-called "taxpayers' revolt" has lost some of its initial momentum, but the use of this drastic method is, in all probability, not to be discounted. Now it is allied with the proposed Constitutional Amendment to balance the budget, and enjoys tremendous support from corporate interests. And with good reason: The property tax relief was a windfall for the largest property owners. For every dollar saved by the over-taxed elderly couple trying to hold onto their home, several millions were realized by utilities, manufacturers, and agricultural interests.

This attempt to cut bureaucracy results in eliminating services to people who can least afford to lose them. The jobs that are cut will typically affect not bureaucrats holding sinecures, but janitors, clerk-typists, and maintenance people. This approach was echoed by President Carter's attempts to lower
social security payments to people who could supposedly afford to do without them. In 1978 this was translated into an attempt to eliminate such payments to widows with children in college. Although the measure was withdrawn under heavy fire, it illustrates the cruelty that can issue from politically opportunist and insensitive approaches to bureaucide. This, too, is tokenism in that nothing really changes in the bureaucracy, but it is tokenism in a most malignant form insofar as it victimizes the perennial "innocent bystander" while purposely missing the real target.

What I have discussed here are admittedly the extremes: There are indeed other approaches which fall in between them, such as Alvin Toffler's prediction, made ten years ago, that we are witnessing "the breakdown of bureaucracy." Toffler believed that in the new "ad-hocracy" people would escape from "being trapped in some unchanging, personality-smashing niche." The human being would instead find itself "liberated, a stranger in a now free-form world of kinetic landscapes." He saw a return to free-wheeling entrepreneurship, nineteenth-century style, as the new adhocracy assembled an exciting, venturesome, liberated world (Toffler, 1971: 125-126, 148). The patent silliness of this confused prognosis is certainly not the worst of its genre, but a more thorough examination of its competitors is not possible here.

THE SEARCH FOR A METHOD

Although famous for his development of the F scale, Theodor Adorno is better known in Europe as an originator and exponent of the theory of an "administered world." In this framework, which really has more of the qualities of a vision than a formal theory, a nightmare of bureaucratic controls is assembled by the sinister forces of a managed society. Adorno simply carried Max Weber's predictions about the rationalized, bureaucratized, "disenchanted" world a few steps further toward its firmly pessimistic conclusion: i.e., all forms of social life were to be frozen in the deadly embrace of bureaucratic accountability. There was no villain in this scenario, because this is just the way things turned after the events of a thousand years ago set an inexorable process in motion. And there is no escape from the administered world since even the modes of escape are themselves developed and distributed by bureaucratic machinery. What results is a sociology of despair, and all attempts at halting or turning back the growth of bureaucratic control are dismissed as doomed from the outset (Greisman and Ritzer, 1981). This view, which is enjoying increasing acceptance in some circles, overlooks the potential weaknesses in-
herent in the bureaucratic phenomenon, and it is upon these weaknesses that a bureaucide method can be based.

The fundamental weakness of bureaucracy resides in one of its essential properties -- rules -- an enormous codex of faithfully recorded, selectively enforced, frequently ignored rules which constitute the legal system of every petty bureaucratic fiefdom that the administered world has spawned (Crozier, 1964). As part of the legitimating function, that is, in order to make executive caprice or the desire of powerful interests more acceptable to employees and the general public, bureaucracies develop impressive reserves of supposedly inviolate rules (Weber, 1947). The superabundance of rules is dictated largely by the belief, which seems to be endemic to bureaucracies, that each and every possible situation can be handled by a given rule. It is just a question of framing enough rules to cover all these contingencies. Hence, the National Labor Relations Board in Washington distributed an administrative bulletin which set down the rules and procedures to be followed by employees should the nation's capital be the target of a nuclear attack. With deadpan earnestness the memo laid out all the proper steps to be followed so that work could go on despite the inconvenience of an atomic holocaust (Peters and O'Neil, 1973: 33). For every rule that is made to cover extraordinary situations, dozens are typically promulgated to cover day-to-day commonsense circumstances. Many of these rules exist because of an initiative tied to personal ambition. Bureaucrats who want to advance in an organization will try to win points by starting projects, initiating "improvements," or tracking down deviants. These attempts are frequently translated into policy, and eventually become rules. Long after the given bureaucrat has been promoted and retired, the brainchild remains on the books, and assumes a fossilized and thoroughly nonfunctional character.

The idea of following the rules to the very letter as a way of making a statement or winning an advantage from a given organization has been implemented in the past, although the goals of such actions have little to do with the bureaucide here proposed. Perhaps the best-known instance of this rigid adherence to all rules as a weapon is the so-called "rule book slowdown" which was until recently the tactic favored by air traffic controllers (Weinstein, 1979: 95-7). Every so often a dispute over wages and benefits came up between the controllers in the tower and the airlines. If negotiations stalled, the controllers staged a rule book slowdown instead of striking. By reporting to work and doing just what the rule book called for and nothing else, the controllers were able to bring air traffic to a virtual standstill, while continuing to receive their paychecks. (These tactics contrast sharply with the disastrous confrontation methods employed during 1981.)
Some bureaucracies are extraordinarily old, permeated by nepotism and antiquated redundancies, and hopelessly inefficient. Yet within these same criteria, some are worth saving. The old Post Office Department was one such organization. Reorganized as a “public corporation” and renamed the U.S. Postal Service, it has been greatly modernized since its inception in 1969. Thousands of cost-ineffective rural post offices have been eliminated, modern machinery has replaced outdated sorting and cancelling methods, and new personnel policies have streamlined the ponderous hiring, promotion, and incentive programs of the old Post Office Department. The result of all this tampering has been much worse service at much greater expense. The idea of centralizing postal districts has not worked, the new machinery, special-ordered at great expense, eats packages and letters with gusto; millions of postal patrons miss the convenience of their local post office; employees, dissatisfied with management gimmicks, have struck on several occasions, operating costs have skyrocketed, the prospect of curtailed deliveries is in the offing, and the very thought of a nine-digit zip code has businessmen worried over the next disaster to befall their mailings. Before the business-school surgeons operated, the old Post Office Department was a model of quaintly absurd nineteenth century procedures which for some reason, still secret, managed to serve two hundred million people with lackluster predictability. Its replacement sought to impose space age technology on a service conceived by antediluvian minds. The results are plain to those who receive a piece of chewed up mail inside a brown envelope which is stamped “damaged mail,” just so there is no doubt about the actual condition of one’s correspondence.

Just because a bureaucracy is antiquated and outdated does not necessarily mean it should be eliminated or even tampered with. By the same token, brand-new bureaucracies can be worse than their century-old counterparts. A prime example of this is the National Railroad Passenger Corporation, another “public corporation” put together by the Nixon Administration. Its mission was to restore some semblance of life to the moribund remnants of the passenger train network which once functioned with efficiency under private ownership. Although it was created only in 1971, Amtrak has become a model for what not to do in countless ways. Many people on its governing board know absolutely nothing about railroads; its procurement methods are devastatingly slow and prone to massive errors; it is the focus of a half-dozen probes on corruption charges, and despite massive federal subsidies, has failed to restore U.S. passenger service to what it was in the 1940s. As relatively new as it is, Amtrak and its sister bureaucracy, the Northeast Corridor Improvement Program, walk away with awards for waste and red tape (Greisman, 1980).

Within the criteria of size and efficiency, one also must consider
organizations that are pitifully understaffed and manage to provide essential services. Naturally, these would hardly qualify for bureaucide, but may merit attention as exact opposites of waste and inefficiency. Hence, the selection of the organization must proceed with care and caution. Only with surgical precision can advocates of bureaucide move to dismantle targeted bureaucracies. Anything less than exquisite care in this area can result in enormous hardships for both employees and those whom the bureaucracy ostensibly services.

**Step Two: Compiling Rules.** Bureaucracies by definition place a premium on codified rules and procedures. Reliance on written rules has effectively insulated bureaucracies from substantive change for many years, and the frustrating response to an innovative suggestion, “we’ve never done this before,” aptly illustrates the historic resistance of bureaucracies to change. Much of this resistance issues from the private interests and desires of the bureaucrats in managerial positions, but the concrete manifestation of these interests shows itself in rules and their selective enforcement. The relevance of all this to bureaucide is that a reasonable amount of organizational disassembly can be hoped for by the thorough enforcement of certain of these rules which may be either long forgotten, or honored more in the breech than the observance.

It was noted earlier how “work-to-the-rule” actions by unions had achieved limited gains without resorting to strikes. The labor interests were concerned with the continuing function of the organization, since it was to the organization that they owed their livelihood. Predictably, few if any departments or businesses have been actually destroyed by such actions. Bureaucide picks up where these approaches leave off; it pushes the point so far that some kind of massive breakdown occurs. The goal, it should be recalled, is not the interim chaos that results, but the long-term rebuilding on a smaller scale and along more rational and humanized lines.

For those familiar with the extraordinary resiliency of bureaucracies in general, this proposal may seen too utopian. But bureaucracy’s resiliency is matched by its overall structural rigidity, especially when means against it are employed from within. To picture such a situation one can draw on the registration procedures common to most colleges and universities in America. Those faculty who are not obliged to donate their time and energy to these twice-yearly exercises are dimly aware from personal memory and from student grumblings that registration is a nerve-wracking process of considerable complexity and overlong duration. Most people who have gone through it scarcely believe that it is really finished once it ends. It is the academic bureaucracy swaggering about in all its obscene plumage. Now it only remains to consider what an Achilles heel this process is. Anyone wishing to effect
drastic reforms in this process need only consult its rules. One set of rules
governing this process concerns prerequisites. Most college courses above the
introductory level require one or more of them, but it is only a tiny minority of
faculty (the number is smallest at the largest schools with the biggest classes)
who take the time to enforce these. If these prerequisite rules were to be
followed to the letter in a large state university of 20–30,000 students, registra-
tion would go on for weeks, as students, faculty and administration wore out
frazzled nerves in an attempt to get classes started amidst the thundering
bureaucratic fiasco.

The example of a university registration is used only to make the effect of
rule enforcement graphic. The unpleasantness of these procedures is merely
annoying and is hardly to be considered harmful. Nonetheless, this example
demonstrates what can be done on the governmental level as well. To take
another hypothetical case, consider the frequently ignored rules regarding the
allocation of square footage, desks, phones, and other office furniture to
government functionaries on the basis of rank. Nothing could be more
evocative of the Prussianized origins of modern bureaucracy, and the overall
and forceful enforcement of these regulations would surely result in ad-
ministrative havoc as frantic bureaucrats scrambled to move people around in
a desperate attempt to bring everything into compliance with the rules.

The success or failure of this rule-enforcing technique depends in large
degree on the willingness of the supervisory authority (president, governor,
mayor) to permit an outside group of consultants free reign for a limited time.
These specially trained people would be the real practitioners of bureaucide.
Recruited from the private sector, they would have no connection with the
bureaucracy, and their mandate must be total in its ability to strictly and
thoroughly enforce the rules of the bureaucracy itself. This is akin to the grant-
ing of special powers for a brief period of time. Only under these cir-
cumstances can the method proposed here succeed; the attempt to enforce
rules from outside fails, and essays in reform from within are likewise doomed.
It is only the special status of the consultant as “outsiders with inside power”
which grants bureaucide a chance for success.

**Step Three:** Supervising Organizational Collapse. What happens to a hide-
bound, ossified bureaucracy which for decades has been virtually immune to
change and innovation? What effect will bureaucide have upon the middle-
management people who have hitherto ruled their fiefdoms with the smug ar-
rogance of feudal princes? What will be the response of the dozens of marginal
and lower-level bureaucrats whose ambitions and designs have for years been
frustrated by the powers-that-were? It should be openly admitted that the ef-
fect of bureaucide could be unsettling for many people. The mildly “burotic”
personality could become "bureapathic" in a trice (Thompson, 1975: 170-177). The dammed-up frustrations and anxieties of the past could burst through the weakened barriers and engulf the target organization in a deluge of collective hysteria. The psychic effects to be produced should not be underestimated, since when the cherished rituals and structures of a given world collapse, the mental structures which drew sustenance from them likewise topple in a staccato burst of spasmodic seizures.

A critical ingredient is the provision of a guarantee at the very outset of the collapse stage, that no one's job will be lost and no one's salary will be cut. It should be recalled that the aim of bureaucide is to create more effective and responsive organizations, not to axe the jobs of people who are marginally useless and create thereby human misery at the savings of a few paltry GS-13 salaries to the public coffers. To do otherwise would amount to "blaming the victim." Alfred McClung Lee has pointed out that the private sector has been unable to provide any reasonable level of job security for its employees, so people's survival instincts have sent them scurrying to the bureaucratized pigeon holes of civil service. The "flight" from the private sector is intensified as jobs are lost to foreign competition and by technological advances which make skills redundant. In this kind of economic climate, the victims try to "hide" in the bureaucracy where luck, connections, or just a "low profile" might land them a sinecure that is immune to the fluctuations of the marketplace (Lee, 1966: 230-244).

Written assurance of job security should short circuit the collective nervous breakdown which can predictably accompany or sabotage any really effective bureaucide operation. Also, a staff of clinical sociologists should be placed on hand to deal with any unpleasant symptoms that might come up as a response to all the stress. This need can be inferred from the increasing amount of suicides and outwardly directed violence that has accompanied recent attempts to "reform" the Federal bureaucracy. The vicious beating given the young woman sent to streamline the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, and the six-story plunge of a downgraded GS-12 from the Agriculture Department serve as reminders of the sensitivity of bureaucrats to any change in their routine. They are more psychologically vulnerable than their counterparts in the corporate bureaucracy, where job security is typically traded-off for higher salaries, and the edging out of faithful long-time employees by young go-getters is an established practice.

Step Four: Operation Retrieval. The anarchist wishes to destroy all government organizations once and for all. The labor organizer seeks to push organizations to the brink of inconvenience to elicit limited gains. Bureaucide aims at the discrete dismantling of specific organizations so that they can be
reconstituted on different premises, or eliminated altogether if the situation warrants. In no case will an employee be fired, edged out, downgraded, or otherwise harmed in terms of making a living and having secure expectations for the future. Despite these assurances, people are bound to be unhappy. But there will be those who welcome, for whatever reasons, the bureaucide procedure, and it is arguable that some of these people can assist in reassembling the organization under a new mandate. The talents of these people should be utilized, as should the contributions of the people whom the bureaucracy is supposed to serve but seldom serves very well.

The fact that most bureaucracies have lost touch with their actual task vis-a-vis the taxpayer is now a truism. Not long ago, at a luncheon with two government attorneys at the much-maligned Department of Energy, this was made rather clear to me. Both men agreed that DOE would continue to rubber-stamp the demands of the oil companies and translate them into public policy. This was "inevitable" since the executive branch had become convinced that it was far easier to control several hundred million private citizens than a dozen enormously powerful corporations. But DOE was hardly ruthless, and performed a very vital function: It provided support for its employees and their families. This appears cynical only to the outsider; for the bureaucrat such sentiments constitute the logic of survival. Hummel (1977: 3) conceptualized these as the public misunderstandings of the bureaucrat, and the private misunderstandings of the bureaucracy itself. For example:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Public Perception</th>
<th>Bureaucratic Reality</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Socially —</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bureaucrats deal with people.</td>
<td>Bureaucrats deal with cases.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linguistically —</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communication with bureaucrats is possible; we all speak the same language.</td>
<td>Bureaucrats find it in their interest to define how and when communication will take place; they create their own secret languages.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politically —</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Public bureaucracies are service institutions.</td>
<td>Public bureaucracies are control institutions.</td>
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Bureaucide hopes to achieve the modest gains of making the bureaucracy
somewhat more responsive to its constituency, as well as making it more efficient and cost-effective overall. Within these general goals there will be a thousand detailed goals for each and every bureaucracy that is targeted for bureaucide, and the specific outlines of the method under discussion here. Step Four is the most challenging and the most promising stage of this method. If bureaucide works, and there is no way of determining that now, then a genuine opportunity for substantial positive change will be presented.

SUMMARY

Among the more traditional opponents of the state are those associating themselves with some variety of Marxian outlook. Central to many of these positions has been the idea of the "withering away of the state." As desirable as such a happening might be, there is precious little evidence to indicate that anything of the kind will happen in the foreseeable future, unless of course, "withering" is taken in a more literal context and we picture the grotesque spectacle of hollow skeletons slumped over their office desks after a neutron bomb assault. Ruling out this horrific possibility, a trend which indicates just the opposite of any withering away seems to be occurring: The bureaucracy is growing and proliferating on every level. Washington, D.C., the epicenter of this growth, was within recent memory a dull and dowdy city, described sarcastically by the Kennedys as embodying "northern charm and southern efficiency." Washington is now a city of expensive restaurants, flashy discos, exclusive neighborhoods, and scarce housing second only to that of southern California in price.

Government expansion has created some of this, but it is not the clerk-typist who dines at Rive Gauche, nor is it the GS-12 at the Commerce Department who buys a home in Kenwood. Rather, it is corporations, foreign business interests, pressure groups, and just "special interests" in general that have been drawn to Washington because of the growing power of the bureaucracy. They want to have their voices heard, and they come to the city with the specific intention of spending large amounts of money in strategic places. The much-discussed division between the public and private sectors is becoming academic as the lines between corporate interests and public policy blur. The bureaucracy is growing, and just how fast this is happening is difficult to determine, since literally thousands of employees' names are intentionally and systematically hidden from public record through the byzantine accounting procedures of the bureaucracy itself (Washington Post, August 16,
1979: 1). Washington is a boom town, and no one seems worried about the bubble bursting; if there is a severe depression, the government will just hire more people, and for the astute investor, things will just get better and better.

Conservatives attempt to defeat this bureaucratic growth with tax-cutting schemes like Proposition 13 and the amendment to balance the budget. As already noted, tactics like these usually penalize the victim, and as for a balanced budget, massive tax increases can accomplish this rather swiftly. The radical solution, barring a revolution, is to sabotage the bureaucracy from outside. This underestimates the organization's resiliency, and fails. As for the more orthodox Marxist idea of the state withering away after (or before) a takeover by the proletariat, such utopian longings appear pathetic beside the more stoic observations of Max Weber, T.W. Adorno, and Henry Jacoby. We are approaching the day of the totally managed society, the administered world so chillingly depicted by novelists like George Orwell and Aldous Huxley thirty years ago, and which is now coming to fruition in the Soviet Union. When L'Enfant laid out the plans for the new capital of the United States during the Eighteenth Century, he included provision for a port, since in those days a city wholly dependent on government for its existence was unthinkable. Now the bureaucracy sustains itself without any industry whatsoever, and it would appear as though bureaucratic growth and inefficiency are limited only by global resources.

The thesis underlying the bureaucide method is that the bureaucracy will be the very last thing to wither away, and that the way to make it more responsive to human needs is to disassemble it, using its own backlog of rules as a tool. This method can be criticized on the grounds that its departs from due process in its endowing outsiders with inside power. It can be viewed as naively utopian or as a mere cover for anarchist sympathies. Notwithstanding these objections, the author offers it as a "modest proposal" which, while it may not be able to do away with all of the wicked aspects of bureaucracy, may in fact net some provocative results.

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