
The work of Mikhail Bakhtin has found its way into many theoretical approaches, including feminism, cultural studies, and even the emerging field of ecological literary criticism. Although it is doubtful that Bakhtin could have anticipated such a wide ranging expropriation of his ideas, they nevertheless seem applicable to an extraordinary variety of situations. This phenomenon has taken place mainly in the West since the mid-1970s when Bakhtin's work was translated, but as Caryl Emerson's enlightening new book clearly shows, Bakhtin has also been many things to many readers in Russia, often in starkly contradictory terms. In examining the reception history of Bakhtin's work, Emerson develops not only the contexts in which Bakhtin himself worked but also the contexts through which Russian readers, from the publication of Bakhtin's writings to the present, have developed their own perspectives on Bakhtin. As Emerson sifts through these layers of context, she makes her readers aware of the remarkable history surrounding Bakhtin's ideas, providing an important and necessary background that most Western readers of Bakhtin lack. Emerson's book will prompt Western readers of Bakhtin to reevaluate and, likely, deepen their understanding of the Russian thinker's work.

As Emerson begins her study, she focuses on the contrast between Russian and Western perspectives on Bakhtin and notes the peculiarities of each. One of the most important factors that keeps Western and Russian criticism in conflict is that Western criticism tends to focus heavily on power relations and political issues, yet since the collapse of the highly politicized Soviet Union, Russian critics have moved away from such issues, seeing them as misguided and fruitless. This contrast is central to Emerson's study and, indeed, to the future of Bakhtin studies in general because Bakhtin's work has little to do with power relations. As Emerson points out, Bakhtin begins his search for agency and personhood not with political consciousness but with the assumption that "genuine knowledge and enablement can begin only when my 'I' consults another 'I' and then returns to its own place, humbled and enhanced" (26). The Western preoccupation with group identity, ironically nourished by Bakhtinian notions of dialogic community, tends to obscure this individualizing aspect of Bakhtin, but while emphasis on individual consciousness is attractive as an alternative to the excesses of cultural politics in Russia, Emerson suggests that what may be needed there is not a Bakhtinian retreat from politics but "a pragmatic working-out of responsible and differentiated power relations" (26). While trends in the West tend to obscure some of Bakhtin's most significant contributions, those very contributions may be more of a distraction than a solution on Russian soil.

Emerson then turns her attention to Russian criticism of Bakhtin during his lifetime, noting that while Bakhtin is currently seen as a liberal pluralist both
in Russia and the West, his earlier critics saw his avoidance of communist ideas as radical conservatism. During the Stalinist era, Bakhtin's work had a cool reception partly owing to contemporary turf wars and Soviet political restraints but also because it eccentrically went against the grain of contemporary scholarship. Early reviews of the Problems of Dostoevsky's Creative Art, published in 1929, saw Bakhtin as “an idealist philosopher, an anti-Marxist infected with pernicious Formalist habits” (88), and although the second edition of the Dostoevsky book, published as Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics in 1963, received similar criticism, it was no longer seen as dangerous. The Creative Art of François Rabelais and Folk Culture of the Middle Ages and the Renaissance (later translated as Rabelais and His World) was published after Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics in 1965 but met with harsher criticism. Although Bakhtin was by this time an approved Soviet author, the idea of “carnival laughter” was seen as “a good deal more dangerous and potentially anarchic than the dialogic word in the novel” (91). The dangerousness of this idea to Russian critics can only be realized when the Western reader considers that the Soviet literary climate of the mid-1960s was a “straitlaced, starchy, infinitely more cautious landscape” (93). Some critics even sought to temper this idea by suggesting that it can only be persuasive within the context of Stalinist oppression and terror. As Emerson puts it, “Under such conditions, a moment of ‘liberation from fear’ is by itself, and by definition, creative” (100). Only with the publication of Problems of Literature and Aesthetics in 1975 (later translated as The Dialogic Imagination) did Russian critics begin to recognize more fully the broader aspects of Bakhtin's thought: “The theoretical essays at last make it clear that Bakhtin was not primarily an explicator of individual literary worlds. He was a genre theorist who made use of individual writers to explicate a larger thought” (115). The publication of this anthology accounted for some of the perceived eccentricity of Bakhtin's method, but these essays would not have been possible during the Stalinist era. Instead, Bakhtin, like many writers of his day, had to mask his ideas in what Emerson refers to as “Aesopian language,” a hermeneutic device that allegorizes one's words in multilayered, hidden subtexts to be decoded by the knowledgeable reader but which also compounds the problem of explication. Bakhtin himself regretted that, as he says, “I was forced to prevaricate, to dodge back and forth continually. I had to hold back all the time. The moment a thought got going, I had to break it off” (qtd. in Emerson 129). Only with the relaxation of the political climate in Russia could Bakhtin's more overtly theoretical work, including his earliest essays, like “Author and Hero in Aesthetic Activity,” as well as his unpublished notes, be used to lift the mask of allegory.

Having taken the reader through the major critical trends during Bakhtin's lifetime, Emerson devotes the second half of her book to recent criticism on three major Bakhtinian themes—“polyphony” and “dialogism,” “carnival,” and “outsideness.” While some of the criticism raises issues similar to those of the earlier criticism, Russian scholars have had a better opportunity to evalu-
ate Bakhtin's work in light of the full spectrum of his publications and without the full weight of political restrictions on them. Since Bakhtin's treatment of polyphony and dialogism is exemplified through Dostoevsky's work, critics question Bakhtin's reading of Dostoevsky, which not only avoids the actions of characters and issues of plot but is also unconcerned with moral and ethical considerations, apparently missing Dostoevsky's point and suggesting that polyphony and dialogism is not born out by Dostoevsky. Emerson notes, however, that critics often develop this objection with a more traditional view of dialogue in mind, focusing on face-to-face exchanges between individuals rather than on the broader view, which Bakhtin developed through his awareness of Einstein's theory of relativity, that takes into account the much more complex play of influences surrounding the exchange of words including the microdialogues that take place within the individual as he or she attempts to negotiate these many influences. While these microdialogues may indeed represent the torments of misguided characters, as in the case of Raskolnikov in Crime and Punishment, they do emphasize the centrality of dialogue to Bakhtin's, if not necessarily Dostoevsky's, theory of language. Bakhtin's notion of carnival, moreover, has irked Russian scholars, who tend to view the idea with suspicion because it has been so widely adopted by Western critics and because it seems incompatible with polyphony and dialogism. Whereas dialogue individuates and functions most completely in the situation of the privately consumed novel, carnival absorbs and effaces the individual in the public square, “a place of monosyllabic obscenities and hawkers' cries, more suited to a Dionysian book burning than to sedate book reading” (167). But the connection between the two concepts has been made by other Russian scholars through Bakhtinian outsideness, an idea that comes from the early writings but functions as an underpinning of his later writings. Outsideness emphasizes the separation and independence of each individual that allows for finalization and evaluation. Carnival, then, can be seen as a “metaphysics of ‘laughing outsideness,’” whereby an individual, in a public and participatory setting, laughs at the absurdity of his or her own position, recognizes its limitations, and invites others to orient him or her to the broader dialogic framework. The concept of outsideness, developed fifty years before it emerged after the publication of Bakhtin's major works, is, according to Emerson, the crux of Bakhtin's argument and the cornerstone of his aesthetic and ethical thinking.

In Emerson's opinion, the future of Bakhtin studies will make significant contributions in the fields of pedagogy and literary theory and in a deepened understanding of Bakhtin's own work as a theorist. Her book, which fills an enormous gap by charting the history of Russian Bakhtin criticism for the Western scholar, is an essential step in this direction. This history is necessarily complex, but Emerson renders it in a most readable and valuable way, by putting into play the dialogue of competing voices responding to Bakhtin's
word. She thus reaffirms a key aspect of Bakhtinian theory: that each individual comes to an already spoken word, responds to it in a spirit of creative understanding, and in anticipating the responses of future others, opens a space for others to participate in dialogue.

John H. Jones
Jacksonville State University


Daniel Boyarin has always brought a personal agenda to his provocative scholarly projects. In Carnal Israel: Reading Sex in Talmudic Culture (Berkeley, 1993), perhaps his most influential work, Boyarin set out not only to correct what he believed to be prevalent misconceptions about the ideology of sexuality, gender, and the body in rabbinic culture, but also to promote a feminist restructuring of sex and gender in traditional Judaism’s present manifestations. In that volume, which occasionally became an apologia for some aspects of the status and treatment of women in traditional Judaism, Boyarin ended with the hope that his cultural critique had shown how contemporary rabbinic Judaism might discover the internal resources with which to make necessary social changes while preserving itself and its vitality. In Unheroic Conduct Boyarin goes considerably further in projecting both personal and political concerns into a supposedly historical study as he searches for corroboration of his thesis that rabbinic Judaism has always found a place for what he identifies as his kind of “feminized” Jew, a male whose achievements are intellectual rather than physical and whose sexual affinities are as much homosocial, if not homoerotic, as heterosexual. In so doing, Boyarin seeks to demonstrate that the cultural and religious tradition to which he is so strongly committed, and which he believes richly enhances the lives and identities of many men and women, has always been accepting of people like him if only it could be persuaded to know it.

Boyarin also describes his project as an act of political and cultural resistance since he believes that European Jewry have been subject to several centuries of “liberal” colonizing impulses which insisted that Jewish practices be “reformed” to conform to liberal bourgeois principles. According to Boyarin’s reading of the past, Jewish “Enlighteners” like Sigmund Freud and Theodore Herzl colluded in thinking that only an eradication of the “talmudic spirit” could fit the Jews for civilization. He believes that through Jewish involvement in modern movements, including psychoanalysis and Zionism, the “richness
of Jewish life and difference has been largely lost. Yet, while Boyarin sees the modern Jewish abandonment of a “sissy heritage” as a noxious force in modern Jewish life, he also admits that the traditional culture itself not only assumes a homophobic stance but also systematically excluded and continues to exclude women from the practices the culture most highly regards, especially the study of Torah. Thus, his task in this volume is also to propose ways to eliminate oppressive Orthodox Jewish practices and attitudes, particularly those regarding women and homosexuals. He envisions the possibility of a militant, feminist, nonhomophobic, traditionalist Orthodox Judaism and insists that traditional Judaism can accommodate change and remain viable if the terms of change can be seen as rooted in the documents, traditions, and texts of the Rabbis. While Boyarin claims that to participate in this endeavor is the calling of the scholar, those who read his book primarily in search of scholarly method and insights may feel compelled to disagree; in attempting to fulfill its utopian goals, Unheroic Conduct, full as it is of flashes of interpretive brilliance, more often reads like a polemical tract rather than a work of history.

In the first half of Unheroic Conduct Boyarin presents a series of texts intended to demonstrate that from the time of the Babylonian Talmud the ideal model of masculinity in normative patterns of Jewish culture featured men who were not aggressive, strong, or physically active. Within Ashkenazic culture, rooted in the reality of Jewish political powerlessness, the soft man, sexually and procreationally functioning but otherwise gendered as if female, was the central and dominant cultural paradigm. While Boyarin does not claim that this male model was valued exclusively or is more authentic than others that are equally “Jewish,” he is quite unabashed in asserting not only that this particular exemplar can be found in the texts, but also that he finds it personally sympathetic and wishes to strengthen its presence and influence in contemporary Jewish life.

This section of the book also attempts to account for why rabbinic culture produced gentle, passive, emotional men at the same time as it formed a social system based on subordinating women and keeping them separate from the privileged spheres of study and communal worship. Boyarin denies the views of scholars like myself who believe that such exclusions have to do with rabbinic convictions that women are essentially different from and lesser than men in their natures or qualities. Nor does he accept that exclusion of women can be explained by male perceptions of women as dangerous sources of both sexual temptation and potential pollution. Rather, Boyarin explains this rigid assignment of gender roles as a simple consequence of male desire for cultural control. Moreover, he argues that because non-Jewish cultures understood studying Torah, the quintessential activity of rabbinic Jewish maleness, as female, internalized ambivalence within Jewish culture itself is also responsi-
ble for the extreme exclusion of women from male domains of worship and study. Since the passive and studious men were already occupying women's internal space, women had to be limited to crucial but culturally diminished roles as family caretakers and economic entrepreneurs. Boyarin's insistence that excluding women from the defining activities of traditional Jewish culture is not an essential component of rabbinic Judaism but simply a sociological development reflective of a particular time and place is an integral component of his projected reformation of contemporary Orthodox Judaism, a system he describes as still empowering men to make virtually all decisions about the lives of women. Boyarin's sociological explanations and protestations, however, are not particularly convincing to this reader who is familiar with rabbinic Judaism's deeply embedded convictions about women's essential alterity and separateness from men.

The second half of Unheroic Conduct describes what Boyarin sees as Jewish assimilationist efforts to undo the tradition of the effeminate Jewish male and redefine gender roles to conform to European bourgeois models, especially in late nineteenth-century Vienna. Here, his focus is on Sigmund Freud and Theodor Herzl, since he sees both psychoanalysis and Zionism as complicit in processes of westernization which set aside traditional feminized Jewish male paradigms for a vision of the "New Jewish Man" and the "Muscle Jew," ideals Boyarin sees as all but identical to contemporaneous glorifications of the "Aryan" and the "Muscular Christian." Thus, Boyarin represents Freud as panicked by late nineteenth-century anti-Semitic discourses which portrayed Jews as feminized, pathetic, and homosexual. He suggests that the Oedipal complex was Freud's attempt to escape into gentile, phallic heterosexuality, writing that "After the 1890s, no longer could a feminized male, father-desiring, pathic, hysterical Jewish queer be at the center of his thinking but an active, phallic, mother-desiring, father-killing 'normal' man."

Similarly, for Boyarin, Herzl's Zionism was another response to new models of the masculine, and he insists that Zionism represents a profound sort of assimilationism in which Jews become like all the other nations and find manliness in having their own state. For Boyarin, who observes that this kind of self-hatred characterized German-speaking Jews at the time when Herzl founded political Zionism, it is clear that Freud's and Herzl's solutions to the "Jewish problem," are based on the repudiation of Jewish male "femininity." A corresponding consequence, as well, was the adoption by prosperous Western and Central European Jewry of bourgeois norms for women which were directed at transforming the active, robust, and entrepreneurial Jewish woman into a passive and dependent "angel of the house." Such formulations have been made before, most recently by Paula E. Hyman in her excellent Gender and Assimilation in Modern Jewish History: The Roles and Representations of Women (1995), and they are unassailable. However, to place the onus for such
complex social phenomena on two men alone, and to represent the purport of their lives' work as little more than a rejection of traditional Jewish constuctions of a kinder, gentler masculinity in favor of acquiescence to European colonization and Jewish assimilationism seems reductionist at best.

Boyarin's need to symbolically kill Freud and Herzl, two of the central framers of contemporary Jewish discourse, and, indeed, of the modern condition in general, finds its ironic Oedipal conclusion in his embrace of Bertha Pappenheim, the heroine of his final chapter, whom he describes as having successfully diagnosed and resisted their projects. For Boyarin, Pappenheim, known to many as Freud's patient, Anna O., survived psychoanalysis and cured herself by leaving the malignant environment of Vienna for Frankfurt where she became a social worker who devoted her considerable energies to improving the condition of women both in and outside the Jewish community. He portrays the admirable Pappenheim as a positive model for Jewish modernity because she remained an Orthodox Jew, rejecting both Jewish religious reform movements and Zionism while rebelling against the stifling effects of bourgeois culture on women's propensities for action in the world. Although Boyarin insists on Pappenheim's identification with Orthodox Jewish practice and describes her as a radical reformer within that culture and its institutions, he gives little evidence of this beyond her rejection of liberalizing Jewish alternatives and his portrayal of her German translations of Yiddish literature identified with female readers as a feminist effort to preserve evidence of women's spirituality alongside the all-male Hebrew tradition. Rather he offers the circular argument that "If Pappenheim observed Jewish tradition, as she clearly did, then she is Orthodox, and Orthodoxy has been redefined by her feminist militance." Similarly, his statement that there is some justification for considering Pappenheim a foremother of lesbian separatist feminism is given little substantiation beyond Boyarin's assumption that Pappenheim's choice to remain unmarried is proof of her same-sex orientation. Pappenheim receives Boyarin's particular approbation because he sees her as identifying with traditional Jewish alternative gender models, both in her own social activism and in her special interest in her seventeenth-century relation, the businesswoman and memoirist Glikl of Hameln; in fact, however, Pappenheim's rejection of the traditional Jewish woman's role of entrepreneurial wife and mother seriously undercuts this notion.

Daniel Boyarin praises Bertha Pappenheim as a Jew who combined militant feminine protest and demand for radical change within Judaism with a continued personal commitment to traditional Jewish practice, but he offers little evidence that this was how Pappenheim indeed defined herself. Once again, in this stimulating but infuriating volume, ideology takes precedence over a convincing reading of the historical record. As Boyarin writes in conclusion, he does not see this volume as a historical reconstruction of any actual past as
much as a recovering of materials for an altogether new and different construction of a Jewish past and everyone's future. I would agree that building imaginary pasts to serve the putative needs of an unforeseeable future is not historical writing. The reader should have been warned before the final page.

Judith R. Baskin
State University of New York, Albany


Richard Cohen's new study of Jewish icons begins appropriately with the biblical injunction, "You shall not make for yourself a graven image, or any likeness of any thing that is in heaven above, or that is in the earth beneath . . . you shall not bow down to them or serve them" (Exodus 20:4). Consciousness of the authority of the Second Commandment infuses the book, though the author points out that Jewish exegesis of less conspicuous biblical passages, usually drawn from outside the Pentateuch, often made that authority far from absolute. Later parts of the Bible were periodically ransacked to provide a release from too literal a response to godly or Mosaic dictum. So, for instance, a passage from the Book of Isaiah—"and your eyes shall see your teachers" (30:20)—became from the sixteenth century a fairly standard justification for allowing Jewish and gentile artists to create and then to replicate images of well-known rabbinical figures.

Naturally, there were orthodox rabbis who took great exception or absolutely refused to have their portraits made in any form. Knowing his strict views, when followers in London of the Hakham Zevi Ashkenazi (1660–1718) wanted his portrait, they surreptitiously arranged for it to be painted while the rabbi remained in another room unaware of what was being plotted. So excellent was the canvas (now in the Jewish Museum, London) that when Rabbi Zevi's son first saw it several years later, he was completely enthralled, marvelling that it seemed to bring his late father back to life (115). Ironically perhaps, the portrait shows the Hakham pointing with his right forefinger to a bookmark extending from a sacred text and containing the Hebrew words for "God is one." It is as if the unknown artist were acknowledging the sacrilegious nature of his act of disobedience by reminding us, through the rabbi's gesture, of the sanctity of the Ten Commandments. More cautiously, Cohen suggests that the gesture emphasizes the Hakham's rejection of "any other Jewish interpretation" and that it was a commonplace in seventeenth-century Christian portraiture to show a religious leader pointing
to a particular text (115–16). At the very least, it becomes evident from Cohen's reexamination of the Hakham's portrait in the context of similar works depicting Christian figures that Jewish iconography in early modern Europe and later is in no small measure indebted to gentile influences.

The process of making an iconic figure out of an important rabbi leads Professor Cohen to offer implicit—and sometimes explicit—comparison with Christian hagiography. He sees it as "similar to the way individuals in medieval or modern pilgrimages are motivated to walk away from a particular shrine with souvenirs or to create images that rekindle the memory and reality of their experience" (122). In the Epilogue to his book, he reminds us that "this phenomenon has not withered but only intensified in recent years" (259), drawing our attention to the proliferation of images of the late Lubavitcher rebbe, Menachem Schneerson (1902–1994). Because so many publications of the Lubavitch sect that appeared during his lifetime were graced with a photograph of the white bearded and benign figure of Rabbi Schneerson, one can only surmise—perhaps wrongly—that he himself saw no objection to such visual self-representation.

In an earlier age, as Richard Cohen shows very convincingly, the iconic portrayal of a leading rabbinical figure would be deemed highly controversial, as in the case of Rabbi Yehuda Aszod (1794–1866), "a commanding presence in Hungarian Orthodoxy" (236) during much of the nineteenth century. The hero worship of Aszod by his congregants led many to ascribe to him supernatural qualities. At his death, devotees persuaded the rabbis who came for his funeral to allow his corpse, dressed in his finest Sabbath clothes, to be propped up in a chair, in order that a photograph of this great spiritual leader could be taken. In acquiescing to this, the rabbis were fully aware of their revered mentor's known abhorrence of visual representation but were prepared to disregard this in favor of preserving his image. The photograph thus taken was quickly copied for sale to his followers, the impressive receipts proving invaluable (it was said by some) to pay for the marriage dowries of his daughters. However, word had it that all those who had instigated the taking of the photograph "died within the year as retribution for their mistreatment of the dead“ (137). Their fate may belong more to folk tradition than to fact but the story illustrates well the continuing uneasiness in Jewish religious thinking that accompanied breaking the Second Commandment in the name of art.

Given its frequently anomalous status, how then should we define Jewish art? The question is in many ways almost impossible to answer and, as a historian, Cohen's approach is at once circumspect and pragmatic. His main position is that the study of Jewish art may be used to exemplify "the increasing integration of Jews into European society" (5). As a consequence, exploring Jewish art may be viewed simultaneously as reflecting "the mutuality of the unfolding relationship between Jew and Christian" (36) in early
modern Europe. Such a position, as I think Cohen himself recognizes, raises as many questions as it resolves. For instance, it must be evident that the study of Jewish ritual or ceremonial art, represented by such objects as torah shields and finials, menorahs, ketubot (marriage contracts) and mezzuzahs (covered scrolls fixed to doorposts), is most valuable and informative for what it tells us about the practice of Judaism itself. If to a greater or lesser extent these objects as objects show the influence of techniques and forms that derive from non-Jewish sources, that merely serves to illustrate the eclectic nature of art. Their intrinsic interest as objects that reflect an ongoing discourse between Jew and Christian is negligible.

Cohen neatly sidesteps this particular issue by introducing two fascinating chapters on the nineteenth- and twentieth-century mania among European Jews of the haute bourgeoisie to build up vast personal collections of Jewish ceremonial art. Many of these collectors appear to have been Jews who viewed themselves as sufficiently assimilated with their gentile neighbors, but who could identify most readily with their Jewish roots by amassing collections of Judaica. If falling short of bowing down or serving graven images, these collectors “released lingering feelings of attachment and nostalgia, which allowed . . . [them] to renew contact with a Jewish world otherwise so distant” (156). But when ritual objects are detached from their original purpose by being translated to the showcase for exhibition, they risk becoming little more than fetishistic casualties. Witness the cultural vandalism associated with the heyday of collecting African art in the late nineteenth century. At least in the case of Jewish ritual art, most—though not all—of the collectors retained more than a vestigial reverence for their ancestry. It is an ultimate and terrible irony that the largest of these collections was that assembled in Prague by officials of the Nazi party for ideological and propagandist purposes as an epitaph to the Jewish race. As Richard Cohen tells us, it was conceived as “a permanent museum of Jewish art, from cradle to grave, that would be a constant reminder to the world of the decadent nature of Jewish civilization” (202).

If translating Jewish ceremonial objects into “art” creates unsuspected difficulties and rattling loose ends, it would seem less problematic to examine the work of artists who claim Jewish descent or whose work is infused with Jewish themes. By judicious selection, Cohen shows how from the middle years of the nineteenth century through to the cataclysm of the Holocaust, “Jewish artists were to become important interpreters of contemporary Jewish life” (255). For some readers, Cohen’s choice of artists may seem idiosyncratic, particularly as several of them are less than well known, but each is well employed to illustrate the multiplicity of ways in which Jews confronted problems of modernity in the pursuit of art. It is pleasing to encounter informed discussions of such figures as Samuel Hirszenberg (1865–1908) and Maurycy Minkowski (1881–1930), both important Polish artists of their day, whose
work has all but disappeared from the public consciousness. Hirszenberg, declares Cohen, “created works whose realism turned the momentary experience into a symbolic statement of the entire course of Jewish history” (223). This observation is backed up by a largely helpful commentary on several of his paintings, though Cohen omits any reference to the social realism of “The Sabbath Rest” (Ben Uri Gallery, London), a canvas depicting an impoverished Jewish family in a squalid urban tenement. The Ben Uri web page description of this important painting gives far more prominence to the view from the window, showing “an unwelcome industrial landscape,” and suggests that it is “presumably threats of violence” that have kept the Jewish family indoors. Cohen remains silent on this. However, his perceptive commentary on Minkowski, whose work is “seldom exhibited or discussed today and hardly accessible” (251), gives belated recognition to this fine artist.

Jewish Icons is an ambitious book that confidently crosses cultural boundaries in its pursuit of its main themes. As with other books out of the University of California, it is extremely well produced, containing excellent reproductions of well over a hundred images. (Occasionally, however, as in the replication of “The Sabbath Rest,” part of a picture has been lopped off without explanation.) If at times the reader is left uncertain as to the direction its author will take, there is rarely a moment when he loses our attention in mapping out his themes. When the celebrated nineteenth-century historian, Heinrich Graetz, claimed that “paganism sees its god, Judaism hears him,” he was reckoning without Richard Cohen’s elegant reminder that, despite—or maybe because of—the Second Commandment, Judaism has never been absent of visual imagery.

Frank Felsenstein
Yeshiva University


In recent years a number of books have addressed the problematic role of the visual and the visible in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Such studies as Barbara Stafford’s Body Criticism (1991) and William H. Galperin’s The Return of the Visible in British Romanticism (1993) have explored the subject beyond the “sister arts” tradition so ably articulated by Jean Hagstrum. At their best, these recent books confront the competing and often contradictory values assigned to empirical perception. “We are led to believe a Lie / When we see not through the Eye,” Blake enigmatically wrote. But what does it mean to see “through” the eye? Sketching would seem to be a way to
approximate the eye's rapid movements on paper and paradoxically to capture the natural perception in a more permanent form. The sketch is lodged at the intersection of two elements of the visible: the immediate and the permanent. The conflict between immediacy and permanence resonates throughout Romanticism, perhaps most famously in the lifelike but lifeless figures on Keats's Grecian Urn. The sketch, however, is far from Keats's polished vase: it may seem more accessible, but it also must prove its aesthetic validity in order to be seen and preserved.

At the end of his absorbing and highly readable study, Richard C. Sha has amassed an impressive list of visual and verbal sketches published in the United Kingdom between 1758 and 1850. This list alone would argue for the importance of the sketch in British Romanticism. Such centrality in itself is hardly surprising: in both literature and painting, Romanticism called into question the neoclassical values of polish, decorum, genre, and even artistic labor, preferring the "spontaneous overflow" of pen or paintbrush. In particular, as Sha puts it, the sketch "convinces audiences that less finish, less labor, and less fastidiousness to form is more aesthetic, more truthful, or, in the case of women artists, more proper" (1). In other words, sketching embodies a conflict between authenticity and rhetoric. On the one hand, the sketch possesses a naturalness, a genuineness, and an immediacy that a polished work of art can never have. Modest and unassuming, it gives the appearance of having no "palpable design" on its reader, as Keats would put it. Yet Sha finds a "powerful rhetoric" in the "denied rhetoricity" of the sketch. The sketch, he argues, persuades its viewer that "less is more." "Less finish, polish, labor, formality, and false learning make the sketch more artful" (17). Paradoxically, therefore, by imposing an aesthetic code of its own, the sketch participates in the very art(ifice) it denies.

Sha's first chapter examines attitudes toward the visual sketch in Britain during the period, focusing on a series of binary categories for the sketch: "either monumental or provisional, finished or unfinished, public or private, expressively true or mimetically so" (28). These competing interpretations of the sketch and sketching lead him to some definitions of class and (later in the book) of gender. Sha begins by noting that the word sketch does not enter the English language until 1687, and further suggests that, unlike the distinction between drawing and painting, the distinction offered by the "sketch" depended on a shift in the notion of the artistic moment: "Only when it becomes possible to envision art as occurring [sic] not so much on or after the moment of completion, but more at original conception—the originating idea—can drawing become valued for its own sake" (29).

Sha uses Constable's work to show how "sketchiness" as an evaluative term could be either negative, suggesting vagueness and vulgarity, or positive, implying genius and originality. He further exemplifies these two schools of
thought through the arguments of Sir Joshua Reynolds and Rev. William Gilpin. Sha suggests that Reynolds, as spokesman for the Royal Academy and thus arbiter of British national taste, denigrated the sketch because the lack of polish in the sketch would put the Academy out of business, not only as a trainer of artists but as a commercial institution. Reynolds insisted on the “labor” necessary to produce a work of art, but he took pains to dissociate this mental, invisible labor from the physical labor of a workman, associating the sketch with the latter, lower form. Finally, Reynolds distrusted the sketch because it depended so much on the (untrained) viewer's imagination and interpretation.

William Gilpin “enshrined” the sketch, Sha argues, for many of the same reasons Reynolds objected to it. Gilpin celebrated the sketch's aesthetic merits as both mimetic and expressive, arguing that the sketch was “even more natural than nature herself” insofar as the sketcher might correct some irregularities of landscape (54). Gilpin further argued for the intrinsic truthfulness of the sketch, contrasting it to the “deceptiveness” of the oil painting. This alleged truthfulness derived from the immediacy of the sketch's composition, its “intimate connection to the landscape it renders” (56). Yet he complicated the aesthetic, and blurred the boundary between the visual and the verbal, by describing the sketch as a “translation” of nature, which is meaningless if it is verbatim. Finally, Gilpin, unlike Reynolds, celebrated the lack of labor required for the sketch and seemed not to mind that some of the labor is displaced onto the viewer, who must make a coherent image from the sketch.

Sha notes that for Gilpin and others, the sketch was an easy and harmless way of “converting someone else's property into aesthetic property” (63) at a time when physical acts of appropriation, such as war, colonization, and enclosure, were having real and destructive effects. Hence he closes this first chapter with a discussion of the sketch as appropriation. While conceding that “no one is advocating real taking,” Sha argues that “this displacement attenuates and contains the potential violence of appropriation” (67). Here, as at several other points in the book, Sha slips a potentially compelling argument in through the back door, as it were, touching rapidly on a series of topics (plagiarism, colonialism, the gendered landscape) that merit more careful examination. In general, Sha raises enough issues in this first chapter to make a very different book, but his next three chapters will turn aside from questions of labor and property to concentrate on gender.

In the second chapter, Sha turns to the relation between sketching and gender as the visual sketch became a “female accomplishment.” Many of his points in this chapter are rather predictable: that women's sketches, unlike men's, were not intended for later polish and completion; that sketching was perceived as a moral and salutary occupation for the increasingly idle women of the middle class; that, conversely, it might corrupt women of the lower class
who would be tempted to rise above their station; and that, in general, the
moral encoding of women's sketches involved a conflation of the sketcher
with her subject (e.g., flowers). With this chapter, however, Sha is only setting
up his third and more provocative chapter, which argues that many women
used the verbal sketch as a means to question the code of feminine conduct
while at the same time “citing” that code to give themselves the appearance of
propriety (104). In other words, under the cover of the “sketch,” an unim-
peachable feminine pursuit, such writers as Ann Batten Cristall, Hannah
More, Helen Maria Williams, and Sydney Owenson (Lady Morgan) challenged
conventional assumptions about the gendering of emotions and, in the case of
More and Morgan, advanced political opinions without overtly trespassing on
the masculine sphere. The sketch, in other words, became a coded language
that women could use to their advantage.

The fourth chapter turns back to the female visual sketch, this time as re-
presented in the novels of Austen, Edgeworth, and the Brontës, all of whom
expose the contradictory expectations of the conduct book that women's
sketches should be private and yet that to be “accomplished” required some
display (145). On the one hand, Sha argues, Austen warns against the moral
danger of substituting “accomplishments” for real education. On the other,
she engages in serious debate about the gendering of aesthetics. By separating
moral from aesthetic issues, Austen opens up “an aesthetic space for women
beyond ideology” (151). Sha goes on to show how the novels of Charlotte and
Anne Brontë use the sketch to probe the power relations between the sexes:
women sketch in private so as to avoid the immodesty of public display, yet
their sketching is a currency of their value that must be scrutinized, evaluat-
ed, and supervised by men: men who persistently question their validity and
originality.

Sha's final chapter examines Wordsworth's Descriptive Sketches and Byron's
Childe Harold's Pilgrimage as examples of “how male Romantic writers used
poetic sketches to signal their consciousness of the limits of monuments and
monumentality” (163). Though his account is brief, Sha offers an alternative
to the deconstructive work of such critics as Hartmann and de Man on the
rhetorical power of the monument and its epitaphic inscriptions. Sha does not
quite make clear, however, the relationship between the Romantics' acknowl-
edgment of the materiality of language and their embrace of the sketch as a
fluid medium. His discussion of Wordsworth and Byron touches on such
important issues as political tyranny and self-representation, but many read-
ers will wish he had extended this discussion further. The book ends without
a real conclusion: as Sha notes that “the monument marks the sketch's grave,”
the book itself seems to lose its fluid exploration in the face of the monu-
mental Romantic canon.

With their appetites thus whetted, other readers may wish, as I did, for
fuller discussion of the implications of sketching among the male Romantic

Nineteen ninety-six saw the commemoration of the bicentenary of Robert Burns's death; it also marked a burgeoning renewal of interest in the Scottish poet. Robert Crawford's Robert Burns and Cultural Authority joins Kenneth Simpson's collection of essays, Burns Now (1994), Ian McIntyre's biography, Dirt and Deity: A Life of Robert Burns (1995), and numerous other works seeking not just to reconfirm but to reassess "the Immortal Memory." The essays in Robert Burns and Cultural Authority, derived from a series of lectures which Crawford organized at the University of St. Andrews in 1996, concern themselves both with the many ways in which Burns confronted eighteenth-century cultural authority and with his subsequent establishment as a cultural authority in his own right. Attempting to move beyond the walls of academia and to indicate "the continuing way in which Burns's work provides cultural nourishment" (xi), the collection includes contributions from writers of poetry and fiction as well as literary critics: an ambitious goal, but one which, for the most part, succeeds. (A poet himself, Crawford serves as an admirable example of one who crosses over into several camps.)

Crawford begins the collection with a compelling essay on "Robert Fergusson's Robert Burns," in which he emphasizes the importance of the earlier poet's work to Burns's own cultural project. Fergusson, as Crawford suggests, provided Burns with an example of how to combine "solemnity and daftness" (3) in a verse form that would adequately convey that "odd tonal mix" (4): Standard Habbie. At the same time, in his commemoration of and identification with Fergusson (who "died pining in an Edinburgh madhouse at the age of 24" [7]), Burns exposes "the failure of Edinburgh's great and
proud patrons to nurture native, vernacular talent” (7). Fergusson thus served Burns both as model and as a haunting foreshadowing of his own potential fate. Crawford moves from the fraternal link between the two poets to focus on eighteenth-century Scottish fraternities: the all-male clubs (including, but not limited to, the Freemasons) which, he argues, influenced the work and sensibility of both Fergusson and Burns. According to Crawford, these clubs “functioned as part of the articulation of eighteenth-century Scottish masculinity through their rituals and use of literary texts, drink, male bonding and initiations” (8). Crawford's examination of Burns's work in relation to these clubs provides a valuable reassessment of Burns's vernacular.

A. L. Kennedy's “Love Composition: The Solitary Vice” continues the examination of gender in the work of Burns, but in a much more problemat ic fashion. Kennedy describes her experience in a local English Burns club where, as “a young and delicate lady caught in the company of older, expatriate Scots” (23), she came face to face with the connection between “Burns and sex” (24) in the form of the club's large mural of Tam O'Shanter and a scantily clad Nannie. Rather than pursue the connection between the erotic and the condition of the expatriate (which Crawford might perceive as a form of contemporary homosocial bonding), Kennedy chooses to examine “the harnessing and channeling of sexual energy for literary ends and the relationship between Burns's use of sex in his work and in his life” (24). According to Kennedy, writing provided Burns with, progressively, “socially acceptable expressions of lust” (25), a space to explore the “interior conflict” (26) between love and death, an effective means of “seducing a farmer's daughter” (29), and, in the case of the more socially elevated women to whom he wrote, a way of eliciting help towards better poetic performances. While Kennedy's easy equation of sexual experience and writing begs many questions—couldn't a celibate poet write with just as much energy as one who experienced frequent sexual gratification?—the most disturbing aspect of this essay is the way it reiterates the moral attitude to Burns voiced by commentators soon after his death, an attitude used both to condemn and to coyly elevate him in the present day: in Kennedy's words, “a more chaste Burns would quite possibly have lived longer” (27).

Also on the topic of gender, Kirsteen McCue's “Burns, Women and Song” sets out “to examine briefly the work of a small number of Burns's fellow women writers who were equally fascinated by this literary and musical medium, and to determine the similarities between several of their songs and those of Burns” (41). McCue focuses on the interaction between Burns and three women: Jean Glover, Isobel Pagan and Carolina Oliphant. The case of Glover, a laboring-class woman, illustrates how Burns was influenced by the performances of women singers. The cases of the other two women demonstrate the indeterminacy surrounding claims to first publication of popular songs.
Although Burns declared himself to have been the first to bring “Ca’ the Yowes” to the printed page, later scholarship also attributes the song's publication to Isobel Pagan, another “peasant poet” in the area. Similar controversy surrounds “The Land o’ the Leal,” which was attributed to Burns but is now recognized as the work of Carolina Oliphant, Lady (or Baroness) Nairne. McCue's essay is valuable in addressing Burns's songs, which scholars have been reluctant to discuss, and in bringing to light the existence of female song-makers, who, according to McCue made up 30 percent of the song-publishing population in Scotland at the time. But McCue's essay opens up as many questions as she answers. In particular, given that the essay specifically aims to draw our attention to Burns's “fellow women writers,” the reader may wonder further about the link between gender, song, and the development of national culture. In particular, McCue hints at a significant feminization of the nation, suggesting that “many song collections were produced specifically with young women in mind” (43) and, quoting Charles Rogers, that Lady Nairne was seen as “a noble coadjutor and successor to [Burns] in renovating the national minstrelsy” (46).

Douglas Dunn's “‘A Very Scottish Kind of Dash’: Burns's Native Metric” borrows the term “metric” from T. S. Eliot's Ezra Pound: His Metric and Poetry in order to examine not just versification but “the poet's entire system of resonance, his acoustic and voice” (58). Dunn makes the very valid point that the term “artistry” is rarely applied to Burns because of his continued reputation as the most popular of popular poets. In this essay, Dunn begins by focusing on Burns's “self-controlled myth” of nonartistry, then shifts to an examination of Burns's use of particular stanza forms, almost all of which “have an ancestral root in Scottish poetic tradition” (60). Dunn's attention to the mechanics of Burns's poetry is a welcome addition to the corpus of Burns criticism.

Marilyn Butler's “Burns and Politics” provides an impressive and comprehensive overview of the many different kinds of politics in Burns's work. She examines the overt political works—those which include direct references to “current events and public personalities,” but she also considers the less overtly political works—Jacobite songs, poems about church politics and Burns's use of the vernacular in his poetry (here she displays the same kind of interest as Dunn in the resonances of poetic form). Butler's Burns is foremost a political animal, and an informed and unwavering political animal at that. Butler rejects the view that Burns displays “uncertain loyalties” in his poetry, preferring to read the Burns of 1793 as conscious that he was “an unmistakable partisan of reform” (97). Butler interprets Burns's move to song publication and collection as an attempt to escape censorship, suggesting the importance of particular tunes in conveying political messages while evading the disapproval of government authorities. The most important issue Butler raises in this essay is Burns's relevance to the recent critical project to reassess
the definition of “Romanticism.” According to Butler Burns's song collection marks for him a place in a “decentered, localised British Romanticism” which is “genuinely popular in its verse-forms, social origins and ideal audience” (111). Butler’s comment that Burns is “the first of our cultural nationalists, though his brilliantly-imagined construction of modern Scotland” (111) bears further consideration, however (if only because of the ambiguity of the possessive “our”). It might be fairer to say, given the vastly different interpretations of the poet and his nation that have resulted from reading his work, that Burns constructed multiple Scotlands, indeed, multiple Britains.

Susan Manning’s “Burns and God” looks at Burns’s negotiation with the cultural authority of the Scottish Kirk. Burns adopted the persona of Satan, but, according to Manning, this was not just “a calculated offense to cultural authority in all its forms”; rather it was “a self-conception which seemed to stimulate his language into liberating virtuosity” (115). (In a paradoxical twist, Manning suggests that Burns's revolutionary spirit made him “more Calvinist than the Kirk” which had by Burns's day “ossified into a new theological orthodoxy” [115].) However, while “Burns's greatest religious poetry was fabricated from the theological positions which he most despised,” “he had no imaginative language in which to write directly of his beliefs” (126). A “positive religious vernacular” (127) was not available to him. Manning suggests that it was this impasse that in part motivated Burns's turn to songs, where he found a positive vocabulary that evaded Kirk discourse.

Carol McGuirk’s “Haunted by Authority: Nineteenth-Century American Constructions of Robert Burns and Scotland” concentrates on the transatlantic Burns. McGuirk finds evidence for two different versions of Burns. The official Burns, a “Major Dead Briton,” was constructed by leading American writers such as Emerson, Hawthorne, Longfellow, and Whitman. Their constructions were, however, carefully calculated to promote their own conceptions of America. Interestingly, McGuirk suggests that, while American writers admired Burns's representation of the local, Burns was seen primarily not as a Scottish but as a British poet, and so was associated with the dominant culture from which American writers were attempting to free themselves. Longfellow’s poem, “Robert Burns,” which attempts to combine Standard Habbie form with Standard English vocabulary, stands out as an especially curious example of the ambiguous interpretations of Burns that occurred on the other side of the Atlantic. According to McGuirk, however, in addition to the Burns constructed by American litterati, an unofficial Burns also entered American popular mythology, sometimes anonymously, through the songs.

In “Authenticating Robert Burns,” Nicholas Roe explores the paradox that has characterized Burns criticism since the early reviews of his work: his cultural authority depends on his obscure origins, yet those origins have to be clearly proved in order to legitimately claim him as a “Scottish bard.” Roe
adroitly examines critical opinions that seek to link Burns's native genius with his nativity. Arguing that in nineteenth-century commentary, Burns's obscurity became associated with both Romantic sublimity and self-destructiveness, Roe also maintains that Burns himself provided his readers with a self-representation that ultimately preempted the power of any such pronouncements on his character.

While Roe concentrates primarily on Romantic appropriations of Burns, Andrew Nash offers an analysis of the recruitment of Burns into the later nineteenth-century Kailyard ideology. Such a recruitment was made possible by contemporary perceptions of literature as a mimetic document of Scottish life. According to John Wilson and others, Burns accurately recorded the simple life of the Scottish peasantry. According to Nash, later nineteenth-century Burns clubs, biographical essays in editions of Burns's poetry and textual apparata found in song collections "froze" Scottish literature and Scottish identity "at a time when it was perceived as moving into a stage of irreparable transition" (189). It was only a short step to Burns being perceived as "Scotland personified" (189).

It was in direct repudiation of such representations of Burns as the voice of the rural peasantry and of Scotland that Hugh MacDiarmid (C. M. Grieve) established his own anti-Burnsian campaign, attempting to move Scottish literature beyond the Kailyard into the modernism of the twentieth century. In "MacDiarmid's Burns," Alan Riach takes the reader through the many contradictions in MacDiarmid's struggle with Burns's cultural authority. MacDiarmid produced hundreds of articles for Scottish newspapers and journals denouncing Burns and the Burns cult, while at the same time, as Riach points out, drawing on and alluding to Burns's work in his own work, for example in A Drunk Man Looks at the Thistle (1926). In a similarly paradoxical vein, MacDiarmid claimed that Burns had no lasting literary value in European literature while capitalizing on Burns's popularity, particularly in Eastern European countries, in order to travel and to deliver international lectures on Burns.

Finally, in "Burns's Art Speech," Seamus Heaney draws on his personal impressions to exuberantly discuss both the "speech" and the "art" of Burns's poetry. Such poems as "To a Mouse," Heaney suggests, demonstrate Burns's capacity to offer "asylum to all vernacular comers" (218). At the same time, however, he acknowledges that much of Burns's poetic power comes from his "merging of Ayrshire Scots and literary Scots with an English that is variously Scots or Standard in its colouring" (225). Heaney's own poetic concern—to use poetry to "intimate the possibility of some new intercourse and alignment among the cultural and political heritages" of different languages in Ireland—seems at the forefront of his reading of Burns. Whereas Dunn points out evidence of Burns's Scottishness in the metrics of his poetry, Heaney emphasizes the multiple languages of Burns's work to make his case that Burns is not just
a local but a “world poet” (225). Nevertheless, both Dunn and Heaney share a belief that Burns's poetry indicates that “the ‘margin’ is not ‘marginal’ at all” (Dunn 80), that it can be used “to take cultural authority back to the local ground and to reverse the colonising process by making the underprivileged language of the native the normative standard” (Heaney 221).

Detailing the various contradictory positions that critics have taken on Burns's religious attitudes, Susan Manning remarks in her essay that “the ‘Burns’ so described probably reflects nothing so much as the beliefs of the describer” (118). One could say the same thing of each of the essays in this collection, as different, sometimes conflicting Burnses are brought to light throughout the volume. What is notable, however, is the level of critical engagement. Where much critical ink has been spilt proving Burns's status as a “great poet” according to canonical standards, the essays here examine Burns on his own terms as both a serious writer and as a cultural icon. The issue, then is not how Burns does or doesn't fit in with the standard canon of British literature, but how the study of Burns can alter our conception of canonicity and of what counts as literature. Here is a collective endeavor to look at the whole of Burns's work, including the songs, whose importance has been largely minimized by literary critics. For Crawford, the songs are evidence of the kind of masculinist culture that shaped Burns's sensibility. For Butler, they are further evidence of Burns's political activity. For Manning, they offered Burns a revolutionary spiritual vernacular, while for McGuirk the songs provided a means of smuggling an unofficial Burns across the Atlantic.

What seems to characterize this collection of essays as well is a desire to move away from the easy identification of Burns as “Scotland personified” (189) as Andrew Nash puts it in his essay. Instead we see the complications in that image. Nicholas Roe hints at this aspect of the project when he quotes Keats on Burns: “The Genius of Poetry must work out its own salvation in a man. . . . That which is creative must create itself” (176). Roe concludes, “If this was true of Scotland’s ‘own inspired Bard’, it also remains true for the ‘well-known Land’” (176). As well as providing a welcome addition to the critical understanding of a figure who has been undervalued in literary scholarship, Burns and Cultural Authority also speaks to the condition of a Scotland busy trying to negotiate a new relationship with the political authority of Great Britain.

This is the best collection of essays on Burns to be published to date. A condensed excursion into the cultural politics of marginality, the twelve essays cross between disciplines, centuries, and continents not so much to reveal the “true” identity of the man, whatever that may be, but rather to suggest the multiple contexts in which Burns has been and will continue to be read and re-read.

Leith Davis
Simon Fraser University
Until quite recently, it was a truth universally acknowledged that Blake—as poet, artist, thinker, and publisher—was a historical anomaly, a visionary whose work transcended the beliefs of his time. Although he is classified as a Romantic poet, his work is notoriously difficult to assimilate with his contemporaries'. And though he lived most of his life in the eighteenth century, his radical poetics could not be more alien to that period's dominant concerns or its prevailing style. Beyond traditional disciplines as well as periods, Blake consciously defied the conventions of his culture, nowhere more so than in the production of his books, which he meticulously engineered one at a time.

Both works under review set out to challenge this portrait and to situate Blake within the cultural and political context of what Glausser calls “the long eighteenth century” (1660–1830). More importantly, they seek to engage Blake in a series of fruitful conversations with the pressing topics of his day, from slavery to Gnosticism. Even as they differ markedly in style and method of argument, both books attempt to overturn Harold Bloom's theory of poetic influence, his emphasis on the charged agon of the Freudian psychodrama. Rather than defeat his interlocutors, as both critics show, Blake means to persuade and ultimately redeem them. As they appear in his work, figures like Locke, Bacon, Milton, and Newton are less bogies to be resisted and vanquished than specters ready for “rehabilitation.” Glausser's book is more emphatic in this regard, working against the grain not only by setting Blake and Locke in direct dialogue, but also by searching out points of agreement rather than contention. Glausser endeavors “to discover more complicated patterns of comparison” (ix), a task that leads him to experiment with a new hermeneutic model, what he calls “a composite critical biography” (ix). Although he deploys the more orthodox form of the critical essay, Peterfreund similarly works to implicate Blake in the scientific, religious, and cultural debates of his time. His study examines the extent to which Blake's reaction to his predecessors is “based on an informed understanding of Enlightenment premises in general and Newtonian thought in particular” (xii).

Peterfreund begins his book by defining “situated knowledge”—knowledge that is cognizant of its own ontology, its existence as part of an ongoing historical narrative—which he sets in opposition to a universalizing epistemology he calls “scientific” (4) that insists on “dissituation” (9). Among those rationalists who embrace an ahistorical “knowledge in itself” (15) are
Montesquieu, Voltaire, Hume, Gibbon and, of course, Newton. Included in those thinkers who espouse what Clifford Geertz calls “local knowledge” are Leibniz, Vico, Herder, and Blake, whose “locolalia” (16) or obsession with lists of the actual reveals his belief in the primacy of situated knowledge. Peterfreund argues that above all “what situated knowledge foregrounds and celebrates . . . is the deployment of metaphor in the act of invention” (17), a characteristic Blake borrows from the prophetic discourses of Jesus in the Gospels.

The first two chapters examine Blake’s response to Newton’s *Principia*, especially in the later prophetic works, where characters like Urizen, Los, and Enitharmon variously adopt and struggle with Newtonian roles. In skillful close readings of passages from *Jerusalem* and *Milton*, Peterfreund shows how Blake corrects Newton’s model of the universe, replacing the “outward” with the “inward” gaze. The middle chapters analyze Blake’s complicated negotiations with the Freemason and Gnostic movements and explore Blake’s treatment of charters, weights, and measures as forms of social control. In chapter 3, “Blake, Freemasonry, and the Builder’s Task,” we learn that “Blake’s animosity to some practitioners of Freemasonry does not necessarily imply his rejection of Freemasonry itself” (60), a point driven home in Peterfreund’s useful analysis of a number of Blake engravings which borrow visual motifs from Masonic aprons and ornaments. The fourth chapter, “Blake, Priestley, and the ‘Gnostic Moment’” traces the revival of gnosticism in eighteenth-century England and the importance of this dissenting movement in shaping Priestley’s scientific theories as well as Blake’s “immanentist metaphysics” (94). Chapter 5, “Blake on Charters, Weights, and Measures,” is the most New Historicist of the essays, focusing on the increasing authority of measurement and standardization in the 1790s and the effect of this new dispensation on the language of “London.”

The final three chapters outline Blake’s critique of Newtonian metonymic logic, Natural Theology, and the ideology of Nature respectively and chart what happens to Blake’s language in the new urban landscape (“The Din of the City”). These chapters include a persuasive and original reading of the questions in “The Tyger” as metonymic rather than metaphorical (or rhetorical), as attempts “to mobilize the logic of effectus pro causa to reason back from the tiger as created effect to an understanding of his creative first cause” (127); a discussion of Blake’s spiritual ideology, which “ordains a transferential and metaphorical relationship between causal subject and caused object . . . maintaining both in a state of (re)constitutive play” (141); and a thoughtful analysis of cacophony in Blake’s prophetic books.

Peterfreund’s essays offer a wide-ranging and learned discussion of important topics, but they never cohere as a book, as a sustained, capably developed meditation on Blake’s relationship to eighteenth-century science and culture.
The author has added a preface and introduction, but all of the major chapters have been reprinted, two from as long ago as the early 1980s. No effort, as far as I can tell, has been made to refashion the essays into a more cohesive sequence or provide clarifying transitions between chapters. On the contrary, each essay begins anew, with the result that there is overlap and repetition, but no development. It is the patient reader indeed who will leave this work without feeling that the author has neglected “the builder’s task” of supplying a sturdy framework for his ambitious design. A myriad proofreading errors (at least two dozen), the absence of a bibliography, and the fact that key terms like “transferential,” “immanentist,” and “ideology” are not fully defined until the later chapters only increases the reader’s burden.

Of greater concern, perhaps, is the explicit identification with and endorsement of Blake’s perspective, especially in a collection that is so careful to warn against the totalizing claims of scientific rhetoric. Rather than enacting a genuine conversation—as Glausser attempts to do—Peter Freund establishes a binary that privileges the “intuitive rightness” (48) of Blake’s philosophy over the benighted materialist project of Newton. Again and again, the “immanent, immaterial principle” (56) of Blake’s writings triumphs over the deluded materialism of Newton, whose world is a “heavy” mess of matter, motion, and force and whose theories and language are never adequately examined or complicated. The prevalence of references to the Bible—from Genesis, the Gospels, and Paul especially—far outweighs the discussions of science (which, in any case, is figured only in terms of its rhetorical dimension) and indicates the author’s own spiritualist proclivities.

In Locke and Blake, Glausser tries to be more fair-minded, examining his subjects “with equal attention and critical distance” (x). To do so he dispenses with the standard critical essay format and creates an eclectic critical biography organized by specific cultural topics. A series of “correspondences” or “convergences” in the lives of his subjects allows Glausser to bring the two together in unexpected ways. For example, both men had run-ins with bishops and with the law (Blake was brought to trial for sedition; Locke’s name was included on a 1685 list of seditious radicals); both sought alternatives to ordinary marriage; both had complex and ambivalent responses to the slave trade; both quarreled over “stolen” pictures; and both composed epitaphs that lamented the meaninglessness of earthly life. The biographical parallels are sometimes thin, however, and Glausser is on safer ground when he widens the discussion to include overlapping topics, such as medicine, property, and printing.

Chapters 4 and 7, on slavery and printing, are the strongest and most compellingly argued of the book. Chapter 4 examines both men’s ambivalence toward slavery. Locke is clearly the more complex and difficult case, and Glausser sets forth the circumstances surrounding his involvement in the
slave trade with admirable clarity. After summarizing scholarly interpretations of Locke's personal and theoretical associations with slavery, Glausser concludes that "Locke the opponent of slavery cannot entirely suppress Locke the Landgrave" and that because of the "many confusions of theory and practice" (70) Locke cannot avoid writing "himself into the histories of both slavery and abolition" (75).

Blake was more demonstrably abolitionist, but Glausser nonetheless describes "some fault lines" (76) running through his antislavery texts and images. The first appears in his collaboration with John Stedman in engraving designs for Stedman's Narrative of an Expedition against the Revolted Negroes of Surinam. On the surface an antislavery text, Stedman's narrative in fact ends up defending an "enlightened" type of slavery practiced by humane owners (77) and "implies a theory of white skin as primary" (79). Although, as Glausser admits, "it is difficult to distinguish [the engraver's] authorship within a collaborative text" (81), Blake is all but convicted of guilt by association. In his own work, Blake's imagery is seen to participate in his culture's "pejorative figuration of black" (83), most notoriously in a troubling parenthetical reference that appears in "Song of Liberty": "O African! Black African! (go winged thought widen his forehead)". In "The Little Black Boy" as well, Glausser finds that the poem's narrator "is actually enslaved by the universalist transcendence designed to liberate him" (91). If there is a tendency here to regret the fact that Blake was not as modern or liberal-minded "as one might have hoped" (91), in other words not as sensitive to these issues as we are, there is also a welcome attention to the nuances of Blake's specific language and the iconography of his images.

In Chapter 7, "Printing," Glausser explores the substantive ways in which "print consciousness" (141) influenced his subjects' dominant ideas. While Locke immerses himself in print culture—and becomes so affected by it that he uses print as a constitutive metaphor in defining the operations of the mind—Blake revolts against it, both in explicit thematic arguments and in his use of expressive media (illuminated printing). In itself this is not a startlingly new idea, but Glausser goes on to uncover "shadowy subplots" (156) within both authors' thinking about print which work against their surface claims. For the rationalist Locke this involves a suspicion in the Essay Concerning Human Understanding that imprinted images are "idols, somehow deficient in spiritual content" and a nostalgic desire "for inspiration" (153). More interesting still are a number of biblical echoes in the Essay's argument, echoes that show that "Locke's printed ideas occasionally fall into association with shadows, eidola, idols and may call up just the faintest shudder of spiritual death" (156). For the visionary Blake, the counterplot turns on "the danger of excessive spirituality" (157), a claim that is teased out in a tantalizingly brief close reading of "The Crystal Cabinet." Here Glausser uncovers Blake's reservations
about imagination and enthusiasm, his need to limit or restrain the voice of private inspiration.

A note at the end of Locke and Blake informs us that the author has received several awards for teaching and was chosen “Indiana Professor of the Year” in 1990. This no doubt accounts for the book’s lucid exposition, its clear presentation and summary of arguments, and its jargon-free prose. If its claims are not always earth-shatteringly original, they have the virtue of being presented concisely and accessibly. Any reasonably intelligent undergraduate would have little trouble negotiating the pages of this book, some of which are also highly entertaining (see, for example, Locke’s forays into medicine, his interest in Lycanthropy, and his fortuitous operation on Lord Ashley Cooper [43–53]). In my mind this clarity enhances rather than diminishes the value of Glausser’s achievement, though it cannot compensate for the book’s lack of illustrations, a sin in any study of Blake and a serious shortcoming in the slavery chapter, where several designs are searchingly analyzed but remain unavailable for our immediate inspection.

Other weaknesses include a tendency to mix the personal with the published views of the authors (overstressed in Glausser’s speculations about Blake’s credibility in the Scofield affair) and the book’s somewhat outdated bibliography. A reckoning with two important new studies of Locke, Barbara Arneil’s John Locke and America: The Defense of English Colonialism (Oxford, 1996) and Nicholas Wolterstorff’s John Locke and the Ethics of Belief (Cambridge, 1996) might have strengthened the book’s assertions. Chapter 4 especially would have benefited from New Historicist work on the slave trade and recent essays by critics like Alan Richardson and Anthony Harding on “The Little Black Boy.” In the main, though, Glausser’s study offers a useful corrective to the rote polarizing of Locke and Blake to which we have become accustomed, placing the authors in fruitful dialogue, and staking a convincing claim that they belong together in the long eighteenth century. Although at times uneven in presentation, both books will be welcomed by Blake scholars looking to situate the poet more firmly in his own time.

Grant Scott
Muhlenberg College


Nostos is Greek for the homecoming of the heroes from Troy, and in Blake’s Nostos: Fragmentation and Nondualism in ‘The Four Zoas,’ Kathryn S. Freeman adapts the term to mean the “homecoming as a return to wholeness” (159) of
consciousness itself. To explain this homecoming, Freeman addresses the question of how Blake can offer an alternative to the fallen state of dualism without himself falling into the dualism against which he struggles. Freeman's answer is that in Blake's apocalypse the dualism of the fallen world is subsumed by "nondualism," rather than being dialectically opposed to it. "Blake does more," Freeman says, "than invert conventional duality; he calls the notion of duality itself into question" (2). Blake's apocalypse, according to Freeman, "is a state that expands the universe, destroying not people, nature, time, or history, but the illusion of otherness," and she adds that it is this "unhesitating dissolution of boundary lines" that "distinguishes Blake from the poets of the high romantic sublime, who tentatively probe nonduality but ultimately retreat to the familiar ground of their separate existence" (4–5). In Freeman's analysis, Blake attempts to dissolve this sense of separate existence so that the reunified consciousness itself can emerge as the hero of The Four Zoas.

Freeman's discussion hinges on her answer to what she calls the "greatest structural riddle of the poem," the relationship between "the affirmation of Night the Ninth and the chaos that precedes it" (40). The attempt to explain this relationship, Freeman argues, has led to "linear or dialectical descriptions of the poem's movement"; in place of such descriptions she proposes a "proleptic" and "metaleptic" approach, in which "Night the First through Night the Eighth gain meaning through the revelation of Night the Ninth, which in turn is achieved through the experience of the first eight Nights" (40). Using as a model the Jungian notion of the "centricity of the archetypal mandala," Freeman attempts to "[visualize] Night the Ninth as the center rather than the ending of the poem" (45), and this effort informs the book's overall structure. After tracing Vala's prototype in the character of Lyca from Blake's "Little Girl Lost" and "Little Girl Found" poems, and introducing her own focus on the problem of "fragmentation and wholeness" (dualism and nondualism), Freeman proceeds both linearly and proleptically, progressing linearly through (more or less) two Nights per chapter, while discussing Night the Ninth in all of her chapters along the way. In this manner, the nondualist insights of Night the Ninth are made to appear as the eternal now, the background against which the temporal events of Night the First through Night the Eighth are played.

Freeman's method certainly allows her to answer many questions that arise in her movement through the poem, but is it really fair to try to move Night the Ninth from the end to the center of the poem? Freeman understands the apparently unfinished or "palimpsest-like state of the manuscript" to be Blake's way of addressing the fragment-vs-wholeness set of contraries, and she suggests that Blake was "'keeping' the poem, as one keeps a journal" (27). This model is persuasive for understanding the repeated revisions laid atop and
beside other versions or drafts; it suggests the sort of recursive model common in modern writing theory, in which composition is recognized to be ongoing, and the author continues to revise earlier passages as she or he comes to understand more about what comes later. But Freeman’s notion of “proleptic echoes,” for example, in the interpretive process also seems to imply a similar sort of reader, not a reader who reads the poem as one reads a journal, but readers who are willing to “keep” the poem, to read it through to Night the Ninth, and then return to Nights the First through the Eighth, commenting and revising in the margins with Night the Ninth now echoing in their heads. This may or may not be a viable model for Blake’s conception of his contemporary readership, but it probably does describe the methods of the serious modern student of Blake.

Still, Freeman does generate some valuable insights, some of which will unsettle popular notions of Blake. For example, Freeman’s account of non-dualism has implications for one of Blake’s most beloved lines, “Without Contraries is no progression” (Marriage of Heaven and Hell 3, prose; Erdman 34). This line functions in Blake criticism as a sort of base to which we all return to explain the dynamics of innocence and experience. In The Four Zoas, however, Freeman says, “It becomes clear . . . that progress through contraries is not inevitable historical reality but is rather a contraction of consciousness” (123). Freeman is making a very nice pun on “contraction” as both shrinkage and the bindings of a legal contract, but what is important here is her assertion that the progress of contraries simply continues the problem of dualism. Contraries imply “otherness,” the separation necessary for identity; life without this “otherness” is exactly what Enitharmon and the Sons of Los fear in the closing plates of Jerusalem, when Los tells them, “Fear not my Sons this Waking Death, he is become One with me / Behold him here! We shall not Die! we shall be united in Jesus” (93:18–19; Erdman 253). In Freeman’s reading of The Four Zoas, the equivalent to this union with Jesus is the “nostos,” the return of even the contraries to the home that is the unified consciousness.

Ironically, perceiving this unified consciousness behind the poem requires that the reader separate Blake from his characters. In chapter 1 Freeman says that in grappling with the narrative instability of The Four Zoas, “the key” is to understand that “the characters’ anxiety about this [narrative] instability should not be confused with Blake’s willful disorientation of traditional narrative structure” (25). Freeman returns to this crucial distinction between author and character in chapter 3 where she addresses “the problem of how the authorial voice can be gleaned from the conflicting versions by these self-proclaimed authorities [the characters] of what had been, what is, and what will be” (68). One way that she accomplishes this gleaning of the authorial voice is to recognize the “highly polemical” context of the speeches of the various characters of the poem. Of a scene in Night the Seventh, for example,
Freeman says, "Rather than seeing the Spectre as a mouthpiece for the author, one can see his manipulation of Enitharmon's 'memory'" (78). For most writers this would be a point hardly necessary to make, but with Blake there is often a tendency to flatten his characters into "mouthpieces" and then to identify those mouthpieces with their author; consider how often Los's remark in Jerusalem about "creating a system of my own" is uncritically pulled out of context and offered as Blake's philosophy. Freeman insists that we recognize the outline of Blake's manipulating consciousness behind the conflicting accounts of the characters in The Four Zoas, and even behind the "de-authored" narrative voice who cannot bring order to their conflicts.

Freeman returns to the distinction between author and characters near the end of her argument, saying, "When one allows for the interplay of fallen and redeemed moments as a means of deriving the authorial voice, however, one sees that the characters are far from personae for Blake" (150). This recognition is important because it emphasizes the fact that the characters' different accounts of the "historical moment of the fall that supposedly caused the contemporary chaos" are "fictions never authenticated by the authorial voice" (154). Just as an "eternal present" is revealed once the characters "[surrender] the desire for an irretrievable past" (154), so is the presiding consciousness of William Blake revealed once the reader ceases to choose among the conflicting versions of fallen history.

R. Paul Yoder
University of Arkansas, Little Rock


From the opening pages of Sweet Reason: Rhetoric and the Discourses of Modernity, in which she invokes Plato's treatment of love, madness, rhetoric, and truth in the Phaedrus, Susan Wells grapples with problems of rationality and desire in language that have occupied theorists of rhetoric from antiquity to the present. But Sweet Reason is not a book about the history of rhetoric. Rather, Wells is concerned with drawing on the rhetorical tradition in order to construct a new rhetoric appropriate for reading desire and reason in the discourses of modernity, the "texts of the sciences, the professions, of government and the academy." The texts definitive of modernity are, as Wells explains, "texts that we are only now learning to read" (3). Wells supports her claim and so justifies her elaboration of a new rhetoric by pointing out the persistent incommensurability between the material practice of language in use and language as an "articulated system of reason."
Wells bridges the gap between the material and the ideational through a rhetoric of intersubjectivity. In the first chapter of *Sweet Reason*, she lays out her rhetoric of intersubjectivity, building on the link long important in literary theory between language and narration. The originality and significance of Wells's book derives, however, from her introduction of the term “action” into the language/narration pairing. With action, Wells introduces materiality. Specifically, Wells draws on the work of Lacan as demonstrative of the link of action with narration and as characteristic of the desire, pleasure, and power of language in use. For the link of action with language that Wells characterizes as rationality, she turns to Habermas.

Habermas is useful to Wells in providing the insight that the rationality of our language use is defined in action, through an intersubjective experience. Yet Wells finds Habermas wanting in his inability to take full account of emotive investments in language use. Habermas falls victim to placing too much emphasis on the intersubjective experience of language as rationality and so his theory loses the possibility of explicating terms for personal investment in an active use of texts. Rather than dismissing Habermas altogether, Wells balances his theories against the psychoanalytic insights of Lacan. Given Habermas’s constant and consistent disagreements with French poststructuralists, Wells’s choice of synthesizing an intersubjective rhetoric out of elements drawn from both Habermas and Lacan at first seems counterproductive. But Wells has made her choices carefully. The point is not so much one of finding a common ground between the two, or even of attempting a resolution of the debate that divides them, but to acknowledge the productive tensions that join Habermas and Lacan even as those tensions might drive them away from each other. As she explains: “In reflecting on language, action, and narration, I repeatedly encounter the limits of Habermas and Lacan. Such limits emerge as necessary implications of each theorist’s initial, productive choice. A refutation of Habermas or Lacan would be even less interesting than a harmony between them: both theories are singular raids on the impossibly complex discourses of modernity. Habermas’s reduction of language to illocution and perlocution and Lacan’s elision of propositional claims both have their costs, but for a rhetorical analysis, their productive power is more salient” (7). Throughout the remaining six chapters of *Sweet Reason*, Wells demonstrates again and again, and across a wide variety of examples, the salience of her intersubjective rhetorical analysis. What makes her rhetoric so salient is that each of her applications of the theory is carefully argued and well supported. She never suggests readings of any texts that are not adequately supported by her claims for the terms action, language, and narration. Yet, though I appreciate the thoroughness of her arguments, I often found myself longing for more consequential conclusions.

For example, chapters 2 and 3 discuss exemplars of modernity, scientific and technical writing. In these chapters Wells describes the authorlessness of
scientific writing and the teaching of voiceless writing in technical writing pedagogy. These two chapters are best read together as documentations of separate though related facets of the same problem in modern discourse, the privileging of rhetorics that erase themselves in an attempt to represent the truth objectively. In terms of her tripartite rhetoric of action, language, narration, scientific and technical texts, the people who produce them, and the institutions that house them, remain unself-conscious of writing as action, and only slightly more conscious of it as narration. In a subtle and provocative argument, Wells demonstrates that to learn to read the scientific and technical texts of modernity, we must at the very least learn to read them as narratives expressing desires and anticipating actions they never quite realize and about which they are at best ambivalent. In chapter 3, Wells locates the denial of agency and action in scientific writing in both the institutional expectations we have of scientific and technical writing and in the pedagogical practices that train our expectations. In making these claims, Wells demonstrates the heuristic strength of her intersubjective rhetoric for reading the texts of modernity. In summary conclusion to chapter 3, Wells explains that for technical and scientific discourse to become communicative action requires a pedagogy that reflects on “the kinds of subjects that technical texts require and create, on their discontinuity with subjects that science constructs, and on the forms of life that such a discontinuous and multiple subjectivity supports” (108). The conclusion is certainly well grounded in her argument. Wells anticipates, however, the response that such work may pay minimal returns. She explains that reading the texts of modernity is necessarily mundane and not heroic; it is the important work of understanding the intentionless emergence of actions from the production of the variety of everyday texts—directions, descriptions, protocols—that define our society. 

Putting aside the desire for heroic conclusions, Wells provides forceful readings of actions produced through emotional and rational investments in the mundane texts of modernity, a government report and a college classroom. As with the chapters on scientific writing and the teaching of technical writing, the chapters on the report and the classroom are best read together. In chapter 5, Wells uses the terms of her intersubjective rhetoric to read the MOVE Report, the official account of events that led Philadelphia city officials in 1985 to firebomb a home in which members of a militant African American group had barricaded themselves. The MOVE Report attempts to provide a public account of decisions that led to the destruction of the home and the death of all but two of the inhabitants. As such, the report elicits rational investment in the act by narrating a common civic purpose to the events. Through her discussion of the report and the events, Wells hints at the complex reasons why collective experience of the civic is so elusive in texts of modernity. In part, “the report sponsors reflection but does not itself carry out the labor of understanding, the work of constructing language that can open
up the public sphere to disparate discourses, transparent to reason” (192). In chapter 6, Wells describes her own attempts to take on the task of constructing a language that opens the public sphere to disparate discourses by discussing emotional investments in the texts of modernity. She recounts an awkward teaching moment, when a student in one of her courses took over a discussion, silencing the other members of the class and denouncing the indifference of institutional discourse to her own personal suffering. Wells is honest and evenhanded in her analysis of what happened and why. Here, Wells shows how her intersubjective rhetoric can be used to make sense of the discourses of rationality and desire of both students and teachers.

Without offering simplistic solutions, Wells demonstrates through carefully crafted case studies the value of her productive elaboration of action, language, and narration. Wells's book is a contribution to contemporary debates that scholars and students in English studies must read. Its close argumentation and careful conclusions challenge us to do the hard work of reading the texts of modernity.

Richard Marback
Wayne State University


Through a variety of circumstances women have been excluded from the history of rhetoric. Molly Meijer Wortheimer has attempted to examine women’s rhetorical history and the ways that women have affected traditional rhetorical theory from their positions of marginality. It is important to reclaim the voices of these marginalized women because by doing so we enrich our definitions of rhetoric and our understanding of rhetorical theory.

This text consists of eighteen essays that are thematically separated into five sections. The first of these sections focuses on the patriarchal conditions that historically rendered the voices of women silent. This includes Cheryl Glenn’s essay, “Locating Aspasia on the Rhetorical Map,” which focuses on Aspasia of Miletus, a 5th century B.C.E. female Greek subject-ally, who was uncommonly brilliantly educated and by whose works men were educated. Aspasia was one of the rare female intellectuals who was mentioned by her male counterparts. She colonized the patriarchal realm of intellectual activity, but her colony was quickly (re)appropriated by men. Glenn argues that if we take Aspasia’s role in history into account, we acknowledge that history is not neutral territory and we also acknowledge that Aspasia, and women like her,
challenge the history of rhetoric in a way that has ramifications for past studies as well as for future research.

Part 2 is a sampler of rhetorical practices and includes essays that address female rhetorical practices from Pharaonic Egypt to nineteenth-century black women. In her essay, “Black Women on the Speaker's Platform (1832–1899),” Shirley Wilson Logan argues that speaking of the rhetorical activities of African American women in the nineteenth century can be equated to speaking of their advocacy for change. She focuses on the speeches of Sojourner Truth, Frances Ellen Watkins Harper, and Maria Stewart in an attempt to show how women used their rhetorical skills in the public realm to work at righting the wrongs they saw in society. These women did not write books and left no written records but they did help to establish a tradition of political activism among African American women. Logan surmises that these women were the embodiment of their messages for social change.

The third part deals specifically with women's writing that was sanctioned by religious beliefs and includes Julia Dietrich's essay, “The Visionary Rhetoric of Hildegard of Bingen,” which analyzes the rhetorical activities of Hildegard, an eleventh-century mystic and abbess who was a writer of visionary tracts, morality plays, medical handbooks, and Latin hymns. Dietrich points out the discrepancy between Hildegard's words and deeds. While she claimed that women were weak individuals created to bear and nurture children, and therefore unworthy of the priesthood, she fought, using her will and her strong familial connections, to separate her group of nuns from the male monastic foundation with which they had been associated. Through her espousal of the traditional weakness and necessary submissiveness of women, Hildegard created a rhetoric that allowed her to write with the authority of the divine and to use her marginality as a source of credibility. According to Dietrich, Hildegard shows us that innovation within the traditional patriarchal realm was possible, even at the hand (and in the hand) of a woman. Hildegard helped to make northern Europe accustomed to hearing women speak authoritatively, and resuscitated the protest tradition through which the marginalized “Other” used her marginality as a platform from which to speak.

The fourth part of the text examines the strategies that women have used to appropriate intellectual and educational territories previously held exclusively by men. Contained within this section is Nancy Weitz Miller's essay, “Ethos, Authority, and Virtue for Seventeenth-Century Women Writers: The Case of Bathsua Makin's An Essay to Revive the Antient Education of Gentlewomen,” in which Miller considers Makin's authorial decision to write anonymously under the persona of a man interested in his daughter's education. Miller claims that Makin makes moderate demands and justifies them in a manner that would appeal to the self-interest of men. Specifically, Makin sets forth the argument that educated women make better wives, helpmates, and educators to their sons.
The fifth and final thematic section of the text discusses a variety of revisions that women have made to their recently inherited rhetorical traditions. This section includes Jane Donawerth's "Textbooks for New Audiences: Women's Revisions of Rhetorical Theory at the Turn of the Century," which analyzes the theories of female rhetoricians who wrote textbooks at the turn of the century in the United States. Through this analysis Donawerth attempts to ascertain the effect that race, as well as gender, has on theory. She examines the research of previous scholars and adds research of her own to compare and contrast the writings of Gertrude Buck at the turn of the century, and Hallie Quinn Brown and Mary Augusta Jordan in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Donawerth finds, through this investigation, that these women wrote because there was a segment of the population that was not well served by texts written by and for white men, that they experimented with gendered pronouns, and that they relied more heavily on conversation as a model for discourse and teaching than did their male counterparts.

The text is drawn together by Diana Helene Miller's essay, "The Future of Feminist Rhetorical Criticism," which details the accomplishments of feminist critics and their use of feminist rhetorical criticism. Miller claims that as recently as 1989 there was no such thing as feminist rhetorical criticism and states that in relation to the dominant tradition, feminist criticism remains marginalized as it has failed to radically raise any fundamental rhetorical concepts. She also outlines the continuing struggle to bring feminist criticism from the margins to the center.

Wertheimer has edited a clear and concise history of the rhetorical tradition of women of the world. While some of the essays do not satisfy the claims they set forth, they are interesting and informative on both a historical and theoretical level.

Samantha Blackmon
Wayne State University