Document Type

Article

Abstract

Prior research from our group developed a control-integrated active actuator cyberattack detection strategy. This strategy continuously probed for cyberattacks by updating target steady-states at every sampling time and then moving the process state toward these over the subsequent sampling period. Attacks were fagged if a Lyapunov function around the target steady-state did not decrease over a sampling period. This strategy had the benefit of ensuring safety of the process until an attack was detected. However, the continuous probing for attacks could decrease profit from the process compared to not probing for the attacks, which could limit the attractiveness of the method in practice. This work marks our first step toward attempting to develop a framework for modifying this detection strategy to make guarantees that the profit over a sampling period would be no worse than that of a stabilizing controller. This is achieved through utilizing two auxiliary controllers, in addition to the one which facilitates the attack-probing, with constraints on profits in the various controllers to enable the profit proofs over a sampling period (in the absence of disturbances) to be developed. A process reactor example is used to demonstrate the implementation of the detection strategy.

Disciplines

Controls and Control Theory | Information Security | Process Control and Systems

Comments

© 2024 The Authors. Peer Reviewed Conference Proceeding, 12th IFAC Symposium on Advanced Control of Chemical Processes (ADCHEM 2024), Toronto, Canada, July 14-17, 2024. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution NonCommercial NoDerivatives 4.0 License (CC-BY-NC-ND, https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/). Originally published at https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ifacol.2024.08.401

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